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Foreword
T h e two-hundredth anniversary of Immanuel Kant's birth must not go
uncelebrated even in our phenomenological yearb0ok.l For in the
fundamental development which phenomenology has undergone in
my life's work, in its course of development from a method, novel in
form, for the analysis of origins (as in its first breakthrough in the
Logical Investigations) to a new and, in the strictest sense, independent
science (the pure or transcendentzl phenonlenology of my Ideas),
there has emerged an obvious essentia1 relationship between this
phenomenology and the transcendental philosophy of Kant. In fact,
my adoption of the Kantian word "transcendcntal," despite all remoteness from the basic presuppositions, guiding problems, and methods of
Kant, was based from the beginning on the well-founded conviction
that all senseful problems which Kant and his successors had treated
theoretically under the heading of transcendental problems could, at
* Trunslators' Note: "Kant und die Idee der Transcex~dentalphilosophie"( 1924)
was first published as a "Supplementary Text" to Erste Philosophk (1923/24),
Volume I (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), pp. 230-87. Ours is the first
English translation. W e have attempted to leave unaltered as far as possible the
peculiar characteristics of the German text and yet to achieve a readable English
text.
Our gratitude is offered here to James Street Fulton, Professor Emeritus of Rice
University, for his encouragement and valuable assistance with this project. We are
also grateful to Dr. H. J. H. Hartgetink of Martinus Nijhoff for granting us permission on behalf of the publisher and the Husserl Archives to publish this
translation.
Copyright @ 1956 by Martinus Nijhoff.
Copyright @ 1974 by Ted E. Klein, Jr. and William E.Pohl, translators.
1. Husserl's intention (as can be seen from this sentence) of publishing this
treatise in the Jahtbuch fur Philosophie und Phiinomenologie was never realized.
The text appears here for the first time in print. (Note by editor of Husserlian VII.)
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"merely subjective7'): this became immediately a great theme of phenomenological descriptions. The world took on an infinite wideness
as soon as the actual life-world, the world in the "how" of the givenness
of mental process, was observed. It took on the whole range of the
manifold subjective appearances, modes of consciousness, modes of
possible position-taking; for it was, for the subject, never given otherwise than in this subjective milieu, and in purely intuitive description
of the subjectively given there was no in-itself that is not given in subjective modes of the for-me or for-us, and the in-itself itself appears as a
characteristic in this context and has to undergo therein its clarification
of sense.
The principle, guiding from the start, of granting its due and its
primary right of conceptual form to all that is given and to be given to
the Ego in immediate intuition also led, however, already in the Logical
Investigations, to the recognition of the primary legitimacy of givenness
of truly existing ideal objectivities of every kind, and in particular, of
the eidetic objects, of the conceptual essentialities and of the eidetic
laws. With all these, obviously, there was connected the knowledge of the universal possibility of sciences of essences for objectivities of each and every objective category and the requirement of
the systematic development of ontologies, formal and material. For the
description of the infinity of immediate data in their subjective "how,"
however, there came, once again in immediate sequence, the knowledge
of the possibility and necessity of a description of essence to be carried
out everywhere; of an eidefic description which did not remain dependent on the particular empirical data but rather searched after their
eidetic types and the contexts of essence (as necessities, possibilities,
regularities of essence) belonging thereto. The freedom with which the
look may turn from straight to reflective data and the knowledge of the
correlations of essence that emerge hereby led to intentional analysis of
essence and to the basic elements of the intentional clarifying of the
essence of reason, and first of all of the logically judging, predicating
reason and its preliminary stages.
Even though in the beginning of the spreading phenomenological
movement the analysis and description of essence (in the case of psy~hologicall~
interested phenomenologists usually without any stressing
of its basic character as being of the "essence," of the genuine a piori,
which must be intuitively grasped) was carried out in various fields,
phenomenology seemed to most either a fundamental method of an
immanently pure and at best eidetic-psychological analysis or-to those
whose interest was chiefly scientific-theoretical-a philosophical method
by which to accomplish for the various already existing sciences a clari-
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had in mind under the heading relation of idea, but which he had sensationalistically and nominalistically reinterpreted and depreciated).
A transcendental subjectivism, carried out in the purity and necessity
of essence, in which precisely the indefeasible essence of subjectivity is
predelineated as the primal locus and primal source of all sense-bestowal
and truth achievements, and therewith, of all true objectivities and true
worlds (and no less, all fictitious ones); [such a transcendental subjectivism] leaves no room for "metaphysical" substructurings of a being
behind the being intentionally constituting itself in actual and possible
achievements of consciousness, whether it be a matter of an in-itself of
nature or an in-itself of souls, in-itself of history, an in-itself of eidetic
objectivities, and of ideal ones of whatever type.
The execution of a genuine and pure transcendentalism is, of course,
not the task of one man and one "system," but rather the most exuberant of all scientific tasks for all mankind. I t is the idea of a final
system of all sciences and, therefore, one carried out on the final, transcendental-subjective ground of science, carried out, that is to say, by
means of a descriptive phenomenology as the primary science of all
scientific method. The sphere of all possible sense and of all truth is,
nevertheless, at the outset conceptually predelineated in it and by the
method of phenomenological reduction as the correct and intuitively
shown sense of "consciousness in general," including inseparably all its
possible correlates. Metaphysics in the common sense of the word, referring to transcendences in principle trans-subjective, is an infinite
realm, but a realm contrary to sense, as must be made evident. Therefore, only if we disregard such constituent elements, which for Kant's
philosophy, of course, are not indifferent, will we transcendental phenomenologists be able to confirm Kant's genuine intuitions. Thoroughgoing studies, indeed, have taught me that, if one abstracts from such
Kantian "metaphysics" (and that yields really a full context), Kant's
thinking and research moves de facto in the framework of the phenomenological attitude and that the force of these genuinely transcendental theories do in fact rest on pure intuitions which in their
essential lines are drawn from original sources. Of course, it makes a
differenceand, with regard to the level of scientific adequacy, an essential difference: whether one theorizes na'ively in the phenomenological
attitude or whether, in radical self-reflection one obtains fundamental
clarity about the essence of this attitude and the essence of the infinity
of possible consciousness as such standing directly before one's qres
and whether one therefore produces a description that runs its course
in originally conceived concepts of essence and explains the sense and
necessity of an attitude and mode of knowledge that leads beyond all
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the modes of knowledge of a natural attitude, that is to say, a completely new one, the "transcendental."
To give such a description for the new attitude in which the Kantian
thinking and research indeed moves is eo ips0 to go beyond him. It is to
develop in ultimate philosophical self-consciousness the method of
phenomenological reduction, through which the concrete thematic
horizon of transcendental philosophy-transcendental subjectivity in its
true sense-is founded, and simultaneously with it the mode of work
appropriate only to it, the ordering of the problematics arising from
the intuitive origins is discovered. A philosophy, and above all the
"first" of all philosophies, which is supposed to enable us to do the
"critique" of any achievements of reason whatever, must do its utmost
in methodological self-examinations; it must not do anything where it
has not itself grasped what is methodological in this activity and made
it clear according to its necessities of essence. Kant was able to go beyond the realm of pure consciousness only because he neglected to
wrench from the source-point of all modern philosophy-the Cartesian
ego cogito-its ultimate sense, that of the absolute, concretely intuiting
subjectivity. Also, through this lack of ultimate sense-investigations, he
does not get so far as to bring the manner and method of an analysis of
consciousness-as an unraveling of intentional implications and essencecorrelations-to an actual development, although in his profound doctrine of the synthesis he already discovered, basically, the peculiarity of
intentional contexts and already practiced, in his own naiveti., genuine
intentional analyses. Had Kant realized the necessity of such ultimate
sense-investigations and essence-descriptions, realized their unconditional necessity for making possible a rigorously scientific philosophy,
then his whale critique of reason and his philosophy would also have
become something different. It would then of necessity have had to go
the ways that we phenomenologists go on the basis of arduous individual work on the consciousness itself and the essence-typology of its
phenomena.
The following expositions of the phenomenological sense of the
Kantian revolution in the natural way of thinking-with the appropriate simplification, which consideration of the audience demanded,
of course-formed the essential thoughtcontent of a talk on Kant that
I delivered at the Kant Celebration at the University of Freiburg on
May 1 of this year. For the present readership I have not only added
significant depth to the presentation but have added some additional
pieces after it which can clear up the misunderstandings of phenomenological transcendentalism that are circulating. These latter pieces, by
the way, derive in large part from the fact that as a consequence of the
war that broke out shortly after the appearance of Volume I of the
Ideas, the publication of Part II, which had been planned a t the same
time as the latter, was ~ o s t ~ o n eand
d has not yet come about. W h a t
was lacking in the published part was all too naively called an oversight,
and where it could not be seen how the continuation was possible,
absurd consequences were imputed to me, as might be expected of the
still all too primitive thinking and the phenomenological infantilism of
the critics where they tried to refute me with a show of what they
thought was phenomenology.
Phenomenologv is not "literature" by means of which one goes riding
for pleasure, as it were, while reading. As in any serious science, one
must of course work in order to acquire a methodically schooled eye
and only thereby the capability of making one's own judgment.
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course as rigorous science, can all other sciences attain the highest and
final level of theoretical rationality, which they must, after all, necessarily demand of themselves.
Anyone who has been brought up in the beliefs still prevailing in our
time will hear such claims with indignation. According to these convictions, the positive sciences are autonomous vis ci vis philosophy. To
devise methods and theories, to interpret some, even the ultimate, sense
of the truths they have gained are merely a matter for specialized scientific work. Does not the demand for an inversion of the entire manner
of thinking practiced in them-even if with the intention not of compromising their method but rather of furnishing them with a novel
perfection of cognition out of hitherto undisclosed sources beyond the
specialized sciences-does not that demand sound like one of those
philosophical "extravagances" that have so seriously damaged the reputation of philosophy in recent times?
How unsuitable such a verdict would be-this I hope is something of
which the following considerations will be able to convince us.
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determined in "objective" truth, which makes our cognition independent of the relativity of "merely subjective" modes of appearance.
Likewise all practical questions of the outwardly working life have to
do with how the given world is to be formed according to purposes in
practical reason2
If the thought is here suggested that this "presupposition," which is
included in the essential form of natural life and, especially, in that of
the scientific cognition of nature, could and must be "put in question,"
then no damage of any kind is to be supposed done by that to the proper
legitimacy of this life. Nothing lies further from our intention than to
play skeptical paradoxes off aga~nstthe natural rational activity of lifeor against natural experience and its self-confirmation in its harmonious
continuation, or against natural thinking (and also valuing, active striving) in its natural methods of reasoning (and, therefore, also against
natural science), and it is not intended that any of these be deprecated.
The genuine transcendental philosophy-let it be emphatically stressed
at the outset-is not like the Humean and neither openly nor covertly
a skeptical decomposition of the world-cognition and the world itself
into fictions, that is to say, in modern terms, a "philosophy of As-If."
Least of all is it a "dissolution" of the world into "mere subjective appearances," which in some still senseful sense would have something
to do with illusion. I t does not occur to transcendental philosophy to
dispute the world of experience in the least, to take from it the least bit
of the sense which it really has in the actuality of the experience and
which in its harmonious course certifies itself in its indubitable legitimacy. And again, it does not occur to it to deprive the objective truth
of positive science of the least bit of the meaning that it really creates
in the actual employment of its naturally evident methods and bears
within itself as legitimately valid.
But, of course, transcendental philosophy is of the opinion that this
sense of legitimacy, as it matures in such actuality, is in no way understood thereby. T h e "unquestionableness" of what goes without ques2. Presupposition does not mean premise. "Presupposition" (not without reason
do we put the word in quotes) is of course an improper expression; for what we SO
designate is the general conception of that which lies in concrete particularity in
every act of natural living itself. In every act of experience there lies: "This or that
real thing is there"; and in every connecting of new experiences to the same, there
lies: "The same thing is there," which was experienced before, only now grasped in
a later phase of its being; and in the interim, while I was meanwhile experiencing
something else entirely, it was unexperienced; and similarly, for acts founded on
experience. Therefore, we described under the heading "presupposition7'the general
sense of natural living, which, as such, it continually carries in itself-as a form of
all its convictions without its ever being brought out.
tion in the natural cognition, of what is valid in its nalve evidence, is,
says transcendental philosophy, not the understandableness of the insight developed through the most radical lines of inquiry and clarification, is not that highest and ultimately necessary indubitability which
leaves remaining no unasked and therefore unsettled questions of that
fundamental sort which belong inseparably, because esssentially, to
every theme of cognition whatsoever.
T h e whole aim of transcendental philosophy goes back ultimately to
those fundamental matters that are unquestioned (and all others essentially akin to them), of which we spoke earlier. In them it sees the most
profound and most difficult problems of the world and world-cognition
(or, in its necessary expansion: problems of all objectivities in generalalso of the nonreal-in relationship to their cognition as existing "in
themselves," as substrata for "truths in themselves"). It says:
Certainly, the being-in-itself of the world is an indubitable fact; but
"indubitable fact" is nothing other than our naturally well-founded
statement, or, more precisely put: content of our statement, based on
that which is experienced in our actual and possible experience, that
which is thought and seen in our experiential-logical thinking; so it is
here, it is wherever we maintain something, establish it as legitimate, as
theme of "truths in themselves." Does not that which is expressed, established, seen-in short, cognized-and does not the essentially cognizable draw its sense from the cognition, from its own essence, which
cognition is, after all, in all its levels in consciousness, subjective mental
living? Whatever it may "relate" itself to as "content" and whatever
signification this word "content" may thereby assume-is not this relating accomplished in consciousness itself, and does not the content
therefore lie enclosed in consciousness itself? But how is the "being-initself of the world" to be understood now, if it is for us nothing other,
and can be nothing other, than a sense taking shape subjectively or
intersubjectively in our own cognitive achievement-naturally including the character "true being," which is conceivable only of senses?
And finally: if the substratum of these questions is understood, can
there still be any kind of philosophical consideration of the world that
proceeds as though talk of a "world existing in itself" could have a
legitimate sense that would still be completely different from the senseformations in cognition, from the sense concretely taking shape by
synthesis in the multiplicity of acts of insightfully cognitive consciousness-as though it could mean "metaphysical transcendence," which
through the "transcendent" regulation by a "metaphysical" causality
could be connected with the "merely subjective" cognition formation
as if with a "picture of cognition" effected inside subjectivity? Would
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that not be a sense which, having been torn from the primal place of all
sense in the sense-bestowal of consciousness, is precisely nonsense?
But questions must not preconceive answers. One thing is clear from
the outset: there can be only one method of really answering all such
questions and of obtaining a real understanding of the relationships between cognized being and cognizing consciousness. One must study
the cognizing life itself in its own achievements of essence (and that,
naturally, in the wider framework of the concretely full life of consciousness in general) and observe how consciousness in itself and
according to its essentiai type constitutes and bears in itself objective
sense and how it constitutes in itself "true" sense, in order then to find
in itself the thus constituted sense as existing "in itself," as true being
and truth "in itself."
111. Discovery of the Realm of Transcendental Experience
( a ) Pure subjective and intersubjective consciousiness.
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cisely because in its last part that of which one is conscious was meant.
The distinction between "objective sense" and "object pure and simple"
does away with the equivocation; likewise the simpler manner of expressing it in print: "object" (in quotes) and object (without quotes).
-According to the prevailing trend of judgment, by the way, object
means something real, object of the world, which our distinction itself
would make equivocal if we were not careful to keep pure the indispensable, most general, concept of object, that is, to speak expressly of
something real where we mean it.
In order to learn to see ihat of which one is conscious as that of which
one is conscious, to learn to see objective sense in its "how" according
to important new dimensions of this "how," let us turn our attention to
some basic types of processes of consciousness, of concrete particulars
in the-only now properly concrete in the full sense-stream of the life
of consciousness. They shall be considered purely according to what we
find in or on them, in or according to their proper essence, which is,
therefore, inseparable from them.
Let us consider perception. If we take the word in a completely
general sense but, of course, not the usual one, then perception is the
kind of consciousness that makes us conscious of an existent as existent,
completely originally, as it itself. The "object" stands in the mode
"peculiar own being and being-thus," "it itself in the original" in the
gaze of consciousness; where the perceiving has the mode of attention
(attentive awareness, grasping), the "object" is grasped in this character
of the so-called "being there in person'? and has the character obviously
from the perceiving itself.-If we take perception in the more restricted
and more obvious sense, in the ordinary sense of the perception of
reality, then it is what originally makes us conscious of the realities existing for us and "the" world as actually existing. T o cancel out all such
perception, actual and possible, means, for our total life of consciousness, to cancel out the world as objective sense and as reality accepted bv
us; it means to remove from all thought about the world (in every signification of this word) the original basis of sense and legitimacy. An
individual perception, considered itself, is consciousness of some physicalities and, taken quite concretely, is perception of the world by
virtue of the horizon of perception belonging to it. Let us attend strictly
to the fact that the particular perception in itself makes us conscious of
the world with these or those intuitive traits and, in fact, as being there
in personal presence. T o make thus conscious is, so to speak, the achievement of consciousness essentially peculiar to perception as perception.Were we more closely to consider perception and what it has perceived,
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all this, the experiencing consciousness goes on throughout in continuous harmony, then the "that's right," "it is actual," is again a formation of sense making itself conscious, and, to be sure, in this mode of
concordant consciousness, and likewise if the harmony is broken, in the
new synthetic type of consciousness of the inner strife, the "it does not
accord," "it is doubtful," or "null."
[It is] not otherwise in conceptual thinking and in the ever so highly
developed syntheses of "theoretical" action. In that action itself the
concepts and concept forms, judgments and judgment forms take shape.
If the theoretical train of thought progresses with perfect insight as
genuine grounding and terminates in evident truth, then there lies in
the unity of this synthetic activity of consciousness itself, as a formation
produced by the mind that has developed in the immanence of this
activity, the grounding theory, and its thesis bears the characteristic
of consciousness that in turn has developed purely immanently:
"grounded truth." But true being, for example, physical being to which
this truth "refers," naturally lies in the nexus of consciousness which at
first had already constituted it in itself by objectifying it in pretheoretical objectivations as something existing in certainty, then set it
as a target of cognition in theoretical thinking, and, proceeding methodically in the unified flow of insightfully predicating cognition, determines it in theoretical truth.
In the synthetic connection of "repeated" arguments-whether one's
own or another's arguments-truth and true being are constituted as the
same in the manner peculiar to consciousness: the practical freedom of
"being able" in the wider context of one consciousness to repeat the
argument and to restore originaliter the same truth in insight, the
ontological character of truth as something existing in itself in the
realm of cognition. Likewise, in the conscious insight into the possibility of being able to think of the argument as carried out by anybody
at any time who can intuitively be conceived as in community with us,
there emerges the character of truth as something supertemporal and
exalted above any cognizing subject-and therefore always as truth
"in itself."
If we remain consistent in this sort of meditation, with a radical consistency that quite exclusively goes after subjective and intersubjective
consciousness in all its actual and possible forms, particular and synthetic forms, and quite exclusively directs its gaze upon what belongs
to consciousness in and for itself-then we are already in the transcendental attitude. The conversion of the natural manner of thinking then
is complete. What is basically essential to it is the radicalism and the
universality of a pure meditation on consciousness, a meditation that is
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fully conscious of this peculiarity, and is willed and carried out with
unbroken consistency. For only thereby does pure consciousness as the
absolutely self-contained realm of purely subjective being become
known and, with its purely immanent interconnections, abilities, sensestructures, form the realm of a unique science in contrast to all "positive" sciences, independent in principle of all their statements: namely,
transcendental philosophy.
The "radicalism" of the transcendental attitude demands, therefore,
the firm resolve to bring consciousness, consciousness in its pure ownessentialness, exclusively to intuitive self-comprehension and to theoretical cognition, and thereby consciousness in its full concretion, in
which it is subjectivity existing purely for itself and contained purely in
itself, according to each and every thing that is included in it in really
immanent and intentional moments, syntheses, centering, that is exhibitable in and of it as intuitively and theoretically inseparable from its
own essence; this radicalism obviously demands, then, the resolve to see
to it that we radically exclude every accompanying meaning of what is
not consciousness and of what is assigned to consciousness so as to be
interwoven with it by natural or even scientific-psychological or
philosophical, legitimate or perverse-convictions.
O f course that is more easily said and desired than actually doneand done in the understanding of its whole range, indeed, of its true
sense.
At the outset, the idea of a subjectivity purely closed off in itself and
taking charge of itself intuitively in its own pure life of consciousness
through the self-reflection of the ego cogito is nothing especially
astounding, but on the contrary-since Descartes' time-is something
quite familiar; and accordingly also, the idea of an analysis and description of cognition geared to theory, first of all in immediate PSYchological self-experience and then (by way of empathy) in the
experience of someone else. Perhaps it is the case that the struggle
against transcendental-philosophical psychologism and against the substitution of psychology for the science of transcendental consciousness
has the fundamental root of its legitimacy in the fact that consciousness in the sense of psychological apperception is not pure in the sense
in question here. W e foresee, therefore, that the transcendental attitude, even if it is in itself a successful attitude toward consciousness in
its own essentials and leads to theoretical results that are in our plain
sense transcendental-purely according to the theory of consciousnesscannot yet be accepted as transcendental-scientific and transcendentalflhilosophical, so long, that is, as a special methodological sense-inve~tigation has not clarified more deeply the sense and the legitimacy of the
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demand of the purity in question and a method that scientifically justifies itself has not secured in general the effecting of a transcendental
experience, of an evident grasping of self by the "pure" consciousness,
and therewith opened the way for the original grounding of a transcendental philosophy as a rigorous science.
The demand that is hereby being made has already been satisfied by
the new phenomenoIogy under the title "phenomenological reduction."
Since the development of this method makes indispensable a few considerations that are not easy and are understandable only with some
elaboration, we shall deaI with them in a section of their own.
( b ) Transcendental essence-research and transcendental science of
mutters of fact.
At the outset-assuming the full success of the following clarifications and therewith of the distinction between psychological and transcendentally pure consciousness-the definite sense of a science of the
transcendental in its universal range is firmly established in form, so
to speak. W e at once call it transcendental philosophy-anticipating, as
cannot until later be established, that it embraces all "philosophical"
tasks of the entire tradition. In any case, it is not supposed to be anything other than that science which in the transcendental attitude, and
methodologically secured attitude, theoretically investigates pure subjectivity in general and, concerning all formations possible in it, continuously asks only about that which belongs to it according to its
proper essential sort and its own laws of essence and about that which
subjectivity brings about in the way of possible achievements of sense
and reason-achievements under manifold titles of the true, the genuine, the correct. This obviously amounts to saying that all possible
experiences and sciences as well as all formations of consciousness that
are at all possible must belong to the area of research of this science.
They are for it themes of investigation, in no way, however, logically
basic cognitions the determinations of which could serve in it as premises. Transcendental philosophy, therefore, also refers correlatively
to the world and to all possible worlds-and, again, not as given already
and plainly and simply existing in reality or possibility, but rather as
forms of harmony and truth that display themselves immanently in the
life and work of rational philosophy.
Along with this, the universe of pure possibilities and the fact are
naturally separated in view of the transcendental investigations to be
carried out. The factual life of consciousness, the universal life of con-
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therefore, eidetic transcendental philosophy (transcendental phenomenology, as we also say) is the instrument or method for the transcendental science of matters of fact.
If we look back from here at natural living and knowing, to which the
radicalism of transcendental consideration remains foreign, then it has,
on the ground of natural experience, the world, and related to it, the
"positive" sciences of matters of fact; on the ground of the natural
attitude toward pure possibilities, it has eidetic sciences (such as the
mathematical sciences), functioning as instruments of the positive
method of the sciences or' matters of fact. Whatever the extent to
which it penetrates the infinities of natural horizons, it never happens
upon-even if in principle it can in its attitude happen upon the
transcendental data and theories-the actual and possible transcendental consciousness, the "world," "possible worlds," as its intentional
construction, nor upon the above designated transcendental sciences.
How, then, the one might stand in relation to the other, in what
sense one can speak at all of another, in what sense the universal science
of the transcendental-and, above all, the transcendental eidetic phenomenology with its immediate essential descriptions of the possibilities of pure achievements of consciousness of transcendental subjectsis called upon to interpret the ultimately true sense of the naturally
given and cognized .world, is similarly called upon to exercise criticism
of all positive sciences and of all in the same sense positive ("dogmatic")
philosophies, indeed, with regard to these, even called upon to produce
in its own framework all science in ultimately scientific form and to
realize in itself every possible sense of philosophy in ultimate formthese are the questions that are now pressing upon us or opening up.
But, before we take a further step in this direction, it will be necessary to assure ourselves still further of the previous separation of the
two kinds of thinking, that is to say, above all, to illuminate more
deeply that remarkable radicalism of an exclusive letting-be-accepted
and seeking of the "purely" subjective, in the concretely self-contained
whole of a "pure subjectivity." We have already said that it shall belong
to the essential sense of this pure subjectivity not to presuppose or
tolerate in principle any co-positing of naturally objective being (decided in the universe of positive fact).
(c) Natural and transcendental refectionand the underlying basis of
intentionality.
Let us go back again to something already considered. In the course
of our natural living we human subjects at every moment have the
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of the verified, the true, etc. So even the simple title "perception"
of some thing or other, and experience of this thing in general, is-as my
and our total experience, related and to be related to this same thinga title for exceedingly multiform lived experiences and modes of givenness as lived experiences, without which the latter cannot be consciousness of the thing, and any things in general, as this one and same existent. But while perception gives us the thing as existing "in person," we
know nothing of the exceedingly manifold modes of consciousness,
sense-contents, modes of positing, etc., which make up the experiencing
as that of this thing. The grasping view rests exclusively on the constituted synthetic unity and its elements of unity, the physical properties.
In the natural attitude, and to be sure, in the basic attitude of straightforwardly, unreflectively living along, we see the thing and not the
subjective manifold in which it is constituted as unity. If something
pre-given becomes the theme of an action of consciousnesss founded at
a higher level, e-g., of a theorizing and perhaps of an evident theorizing,
then nothing other than this is the case: in the process of this theorizing
we have exclusively in the thematic view the consequences of the
theorems given as existing; of the modes of consciousness constructed in
an entangled and very much changing manner, with their sensecontents, modes of positing, syntheses, etc., as whose structure of unity
each component of the theory and, in the successive building up, the
whole of the theory comes into view-of these we know nothing in the
performance; they remain extra-thematic. In general, actually given objects are themes; themes are unities of act manifolds remaining
unthernatic.
W h a t has been said about the objectivities given in the mode of the
actual present, with the subjective features belonging to them, is transferabIe to the objectivities in some way "presentiated" with the correspondingly presentiated subjectivity (remembering, depictive representation, and the like); likewise, it is transferable from the objectivities
of which there is consciousness and which are accepted as actual with
the acts actually positing them in acceptance to the objects represented
in the mode of "mere phantasying" and to the correlative acts of an acceptance which one merely thinks or phantasies instead of "actually,"
4<
seriously," performing them. For example: as one is conscious of an
actually experienced existing house in many subjective modes, in changing orientation and perspective, in changing differences of clarity and
distinctness, of the mode of attentiveness, etc., so also a phantasiedexistent house has its modes, and it has in an exact parallel "the same'?
typical set of subjective modes, and yet all of them in the radically
deviant character of the not actually subjective but rather of an "as if I
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house, as that for which it was there, and was there in these or those
modes of consciousness.
Remembering is, according to its essence, not only the having in force
of something past, but rather of this something past as something that
has been perceived by me and as something of which there has been
consciousness in some other way: and precisely this past Ego and consciousness that is anonymous in straightforward recollection gets uncovered in a reflection (reflection not on the present recollecting but
rather "in" i t ) . W e see immediately that in the same manner a reflection "in7' every phantasy is also possible. If I phantasy a thing (or some
other object), there lies in it the fact that it appears to me as phantasy,
that I have the consciousness "as if I were perceiving it," and I who am
phantasied along with it as subject of the perceiving have uncovered this
perceiving "as if" through reflection not on but "in" the phantasy, and
uncovered it precisely as something subjective that is co-phantasied.
In a similar manner, there arise now, in general, various intentional
variants of the most original self-reflection, self-perception, which is in
this sense the original form of all reflection. All reflections different
from it are (according to their own intentionality) "variants" of the
same, although perhaps very indirect. It is to be noted in this connection that, just as perception is in the first instance an iterable operation,
so to speak, the same also holds for self-recollection, as the primary
(positional) variant of self-perception. It is not only that it can follow
any self-perception of any higher level than that of its variant; as any
remembering, so also can any self-remembering be recollected, and
therefore this latter one, and so on. Precisely the same thing holds for
phantasies, and especially the self-~hantasiesin their iterable higher
levels, and so on in general.
Of special importance are the reflections through which I attain
knowledge of "others," of alien subjectivity, its lived experiences, its
ways of appearing, its intentional objects as such, etc. Intentional derivation ultimateljl from self-perceptions, as must be repeatedly strcssed,
holds good even for these reflections. W e call them reflections and say
thereby that in the essence of every original experience of others
("ernpathy") and-in the further sequence of variants-of every consciousness through which the ego is conscious of the alien subjective
(therefore not only according to ~erceptionas present but also according to memory and according to phantasy, in pre-expectations, through
depictions, through thinking, etc.), there is something reflective, even
if in the form of perhaps very complicated implications. Along with
this, one must take note of the fact that here, as everywhere, the intentional implications can be drawn out unintuitively, symbolically,
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emptily, and so, too, all otherwise possible inflected reflections and, no
less, every kind of prior relation to something existent, can be included
in such acts of an undeveloped sort, which uncover their reflective sense
only in the "clarifying," the making intuited. In the most original and
relatively simplest form (the primitive form for all more complicated
alien experiences and their variants in phantasy), I gain "immediate"
experience of the other by way of implicit reflection which has its
starting ground in the perceptual "existence" of my [animate] organism and my subjectivity originarily functioning in it. From here, a
motivation radiates in which alien [animate] organism as such becomes understandable and therefore understandable as functional
organ of the other. This understanding, in this foundation of my
originary self-experience, arises as a peculiar form of variation of my
self-perception, as a sort of presentiation analogous to memory but obviously different from it. In it, I can attain an Ego and a consciousness,
not, however, as the one announcing itself in my rememberings (and
anticipations), that is, in my originary self-experience, the one reproductively given as presentiated present, but rather as a life running in
the same course with mine, and, to be sure, one such that it indicates
itself in the originary data of my life in an original manner as co-existing.
And similarly, variously inflected reflections, and -always including
reflections such as those through which there comes about for us consciousness of the alien-subjective, alien ego and Ego-life, modes of apprehension belonging to the alien subject, subjective phenomena of
every sort, in the manner of factual existence that is valid for us.
Through the meditations just carried out we have gained some insight into the reflections through which subjective things of every sort,
we ourselves, and the manifold subjective contents of our living, but
also others and their living, come into givenness. And at the same time,
we have become attentive to the underlying basis of intentionaliv
which all reflections ultimately presuppose. Reflectionless acts of consciousness, the most general types of consciousness, such as actual acts
and quastacts in the manner of phantasy, including especially perceptions, recollections, expectations, symbolic indications, pictorially representing acts, empty consciousness, consciousness of generality, etc.,
designate forms in which unreflective living runs its course, as does all
conscious life. But the unreflective living designates a substratum in
which "mere things" exist for us, the realm of the "Ego-alien" objectivities, which are, according to their sense, free of all subjectivity, to the
extent that this subject, so long as it does not perform any acts of reflection, is not conscious even of its very subjectivity (of the originally
first one which can become thematic for i t ) , that is to say, is also not
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capable of including it within any objective sense, as this latter is constituted by a mere consciousness of things. So it is with the things
designated by the title "mere nature," originally given in pure experience, i.e., experience completely forgetful of self, which attends exclusively to the thing as it appears in this mode and is so constituted; but
also likewise for things of the ideal realms, such as pure numbers,
mathematical multiplicities, and the like. So long as the subject remains unreflected and directly dismembers the materially given, it can
not find and utilize for thematic sense-formation anything subjective.
So, then, the universe of my data given beforehand, outside the unreflectively given world of mere things, encompasses myself and an
open multiplicity of alien subjects. All this is intertwined through accepted relationships, clothed with relational characters in which it
constitutes my surrounding world intuitively known and articulated
with categorial definiteness and, at the same time, the surrounding
world common to all of us bound through possible mutual understanding, the one which, as inclusive of ourselves, is therefore "the"
world, pure and simple.
I t belongs essentially to all natural reflection that it does and always
can find consciousness at hand, but only "real," "mundane" consciousness that is intertwined with nature. On the other hand, pure
reflection-practiced, in a certain purifying method, on the data of
natural reflection-seeks and finds pure or transcendental consciousness. In contrast to the natural self-experience,the natural experience of
someone else, and the experience of community, there comes the transcendental experience; likewise for all variants of the experience and all
higher consciousness that builds itself upon it, especially the theoretically cognizing, the factual-scientific, and the eidetic consciousness.
( d ) Natural reflection and the inadequacy of psychological reduction.
Let us first of all bring into greater clarity for ourselves the peculiar
essence of natural reflection.
The Ego that lives in natural living has continually, as we said, a
universe of data given beforehand. What it had earlier gained in new
experiences, from new judging activities, valuings, etc. (from "primally
instituting7, acts, as we say)-all that remained and remains for it in
continuing acceptance, unless it be that this acceptance loses its force,
is Compromised, or the like, for special reasons, e.g., through acts of
rnodalization. Thus, natural living has a universal base upon which
from the outset it finds itself and moves about, as it were-that base,
precisely, of a pre-given, even if changeable, horizon of real and ob-
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can make clear to oneself at once wit11 "positional" acts (therefore for
the time being ignoring all of the merely phantasying oneself in the performance of acts, "as if" one believed, valued, etc.). If I proceed in this
way, the relevant cogito which I have in mv experiential grasp, is consciousness of a cogitatum, of an existent in some mode or other. But this
cogitatum, be it accepted by me on ever so good a ground, be it, as is so
often the case in natural living, cven something subjective ("psj.chic")
-this cogitatum is not only not the consciousness of it, but docs not in
any case even belong to it as a really immanent part. Jlrhat is accepted
by me at any given time in consciousness purely and simply as objcctof that there can, of course, be consciousness; it can be given as the
same existent in ideally innumerable new acts of consciousness-2nd
that is the case with all naturally pre-given ideal objectivities as realities
which are repeatedly perceptible as the same by me and others, and no
less the case with pre-given ideal objectivities that can be grasped repeatedly as the same by me and others in separate acts of original insight. Therefore, in order to preserve in its purity the purely subjective,
the individual lived experience of consciouss~ess,we must put out of
operation all of the objectivities posited therein, i.e., while we posit
consciousness as existing purelv as it itself, we must deny to ourselves
the co-positing of that in it of ihicll there is consciousness and which is
posited.
However, this method, continually practiced in the individual consciousness, if practiced with universally extended methodological intent
on all our lived experiences that we could reflectively catch sight of in
our living, would by no means get at the-in the transcendental sensepure, the radically pure, life of consciousness. In fact, psychology, to
the extent that it takes account of the basic essence of the subjective
life as intentional, requires this sort of purification in order to attain the
purely psychic in the psychological sense. Its theme, human and animal
psychic life," to be sure, comprehends consciousness with all real and
ideal contents belonging inseparably to it, but consciousness as a real
event in the nexus of the pre-given world, continuously pre-given thanks
to our continually univocal experience. Psychic self-perception, selfexperience is, as regards its sense-achievement, just as much "objective"
experience as the experience of spatial things that is related to merely
material being. Such self-perception is essentially founded in this experience, and in such a manner that its own sense-bestowal and positing
of existence inseparably perform a co-positing of physical being and
finally of a whole space-time world-inseparably, so long as this sort of
sense-bestowal and sense remains preserved: consciousness in the
naturally real sense; psychic life in the real, space-time nexus.
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of a science of this world? How are these great tasks initially to he fulfilled under the methodologicalIy primary limitation to the sensebestowals of the individual-ego which functions as subject of the transcendental inquiry, and then fulfilled again at a higher level in the widest
framework of the universal community of subjects standing in possible con~municationwith it and with onc another, that is to say, in
relation to "everybody whatsoever7' and transcendental intersubjectivity?
In such transcendental inquiry, there is given, therefore, under the
title "the world" only what always in the manifoldly changing and
synthetically conncctcd intentionalitr of the consciousness cognizing
the world, only what constitutes itself as a cognitive unity, that is to
say, can constitute itself in practical freedom in freely inferable horizons of consciousncss-as one and the same in the flux of manifold
modes of consciousness and of individual objects always "coming forth"
anew therein. All this, however, must be taken exclusively us it is found
at hand in the consistent and purely reflective manner of observation,
which we call the transcendental, in actual or-in the case of the eidetic
attitude-in essentially possible consciousness.
Let us now in this regard take the following into consideration:
cognition in the active sense is striving, and as action is a striving to
pass from merely aiming at meaning to the goal of seeing for oneseIf
and now having for oneself of that which is meant. In the aiming mode
of consciousness that of which there is consciousness is sense in the
mode of "mere meaning" ("intentive sensen4); in the mode of the
achieving consciousness that of which there is consciousness is sense in
the mode "actuality in person," actuality "itself" ("fulfilling sensev5).
But never, in the total realm of reality, is the fulfillment a complete one.
In each instance, the fulfilling sense is burdened at the same time with
horizons of unfulfilled meaning. That of which there is already consciousness in the mode of the object "itself" apprehended "in person"
(as what is perceived in the external perception) has, of course, always
co-intented, but not themselves grasped, "sides." And thus it remains,
however far fulfilling experience may follow them out. There always
remains something new to be experienced, since new horizons of anticipatory intention always open up. T h e new, however, concerns not
merely the "objects" which, as steady targets of experience, are preserved throughout a uniformly connected effort of experience. Rather,
new objects, too, enter into their open horizons of experience, affect
interest, and perhaps become new targets of experience, appropriating
4. Thus in the manner of speaking of the Log. Unters. II.
5. Ibid.
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to themselves in new sequences of experience the fulfilling sense belonging to thcm. In addition, the old and new un~tiesorganize themselves
into combinations, which are objectivities of a higher level.
Naturally, something similar holds for conceptual judgment and, at
the highest level, for scientifically evident cognition. No knowledge is
the ultimate one, every successful insight is at once end and beginning;
with each one new horizons of problems open up, which, in their turn,
again require fulfilling insight. The realm of knowledge is infinite, as is
correlatively the province of knowledge that is knowledge detcrnlined
according to its true being. The complete province of objective-real
factual knowledge, however, is the world, the univcrse of possible univocal experience, the province of all real provinces, whose science therefore encompasses synthetically all objective factual science^.^
Accordingly we can say: in purely transcendental consideration the
world is, as it is in itself and in logical truth, ultimatelv only an idea
lying at infinity, which draws its target-sense from the actuality of conscious life.
Let us make this important proposition completely evident.
Each and every sense arises in the characteristic sense-bestowal by
purc subjectivity and its conscious life and remains therein, henceforth,
even if in the mutation into a knowing that is habitual but alwajs
capable of being reawakened. Likewise also, that universal objective
truth-sense "world," which has its origin in the actuality of the transcendental cognitional life of objective experience and theoretical insight that organizes itself subjectively and intersubjectively into a
universal coherence of harmony. This sense of unity is, to be sure, continually involved in change, but only in the way that, in keeping with
its sense, one and the same thing offers itself in various determinate
formations. T h e same objective universe appears continually, but in
ever new modes of givenness, with ever new objects, properties, relations
corning thereby into "authentic" experience and cognition, Thls sense
of unity continually has at one and the same time the form of an intended and that of a fulfillingsense. The continual process of cognition
is, as for the individual objects so also for the universe, a total process of
fulfillment, running its course in multiple particular processes, a total
process which, with increasing perfection, brings to self-presentation
6. Correlative, of course, is the complete province of eidetic knowledge for the
real in general, or the universe of possible realities and worlds in general; the universal science of the essence of the real in general enconlpasses all o priori sciences
that have been developed or still could be developed for special regions or formal
structures of possible reality (e.g., "pure" natural science, pure gecmetry, pure
doctrine of time, pure mechanics).
and eventually to self-grasping cognizance that horizon of the unexperienced, of undetermined and determinable co-meaning, which of
essential necessity accompanies all real experience. The total fulfilln~ent
is a fulfillment which, in an inclusive harmony and with the total force
of progressive, experiential verification, resolves all the occasional disappointments into a higher harmony. Exposed iIlusion signifies at the
same time and always restoration of a true being which finds itself a
place in the general harmony in place of the illusion.
Experience and processes of experience, however, are essentially
characterized as processes within the framework of the practical "I can"
(and, in further sequence, "everyone can"), i.e., as processes that some
"I" does or can direct. The empty horizons belonging to the general
mode of real givenness are practical horizons, to be fulfilled systemztically in the co-constituted and therefore continually familiar system of
the possibilities of practical intervention. The possibility of fulfillment7
in the sense of the practical possibility of converting the perception in
question as experientially taking cognizance into the form of fulfillment, of more exact determination of that which is still unknown about
the already perceived reality-which, however, essentially is never anything absolutely unknown, but rather, is something predelineated in its
formal type, e.g., as a thing in space-this fulfillability constantly carries with itself empirical-practical evidence: I can, however I may practically engage in the system of my possible ways of performance (e.g.,
in the perceptual "I approach, I see, I feel"), continue my perceiving as
perceiving the same thing, in taking cognizance, which harmoniously
proceeds and at the same time confirms it. Again and again this thing
will come to light as existent and as it itself is; and likewise in the
possible freely active transition to the other things that lie in the SO-tospeak indefinite-definite open horizon, that is to say, within the region
of the world constantly co-posited and known in the all-inclusive
horizon-consciousness.
Inseparable from it, as can easily be seen, is the evidence belonging
to every past phase of my life into which I am able freely to put myself
back: acting freely, I could have modified my past experience in free
realization of my practical possibilities at that time, could have become
acquainted on all sides with the past world as it was, the world which,
in the empirical evidentness of the process of harmony that continually
runs up to the present experience, was the same one that still is, except
that it has been altered in the objective-temporal change of its real
states.
In the continually successful total process of fulfilling realization of
the ever still intended world-sense-and not only in the subjectively but
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also in the intersubjectively communalized process-the future and infinitely continuable realization of the process is always confirming itself, and, to be sure, in the form of cognitive processes of increasing
perfection. But precisely thereby the actual being of the world itself is
confirrncd as a telos-lying at infinity-of this process of ever more
perfect realization, which can at all times be freely continued (in the
consciousness of the "I could," "anyone could," or "could have"). In
the purely transcendental meditation, then, "the world itself" offers
itself onl; as a peculiar truth-sense of a higher level coming to light in
actual subjectivity or intersubjectivity, namely, as an idea constituting
itself in the immanent form of grounded acceptance. Its equivalent is
the idea of the conceived totality of truths cognizable ad infiniturn,
truths related to all objects of actual and possible experience. It predelineates for all cognizing subjects a universal law for these with regard
to the totality of the experiences and experiential theoretizings possible
in them.
The foregoing discussion will, in its rough outlines of arguments to
be carried out, suffice to give clarity to the opening proposition and, at
the same time, [suffice] to give evidence of a powerfully motivated anticipation. In any case, what has been said can serve to give bolder relief
to the motivation, which was awakened already in the first, highly unrefined, and unclear attempts at transcendental world interpretation.
It will also make it understandable why great philosophers whose
genius announced itself in the very fact that their anticipatory evidence
reached so much further than they could make clear to themselves in
explicative particular intuitions or could make precise to themselves in
originally created concepts, even as first theoretical approximationswhy they saw themselves forced to a transcendental-subjective consideration of the world, where, of course, they encountered ready objections from the natural manner of thought, which they passed over
without really being able to dispose of them.
But here a more detailed discussion is needed.
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pl~enome~~ology."
That is precisely what forces one to widcn Kant's
peculiar concept "transcendental," on which our prescntation has been
based from the outset.
But whatever stance one might take on Kant's own delimitation of
transcendental philosophy, he was, as I already said, the first to bring it
into the form of theory actuallv being worked out. In particular, he was
the first who, in gigantic sketches, embarked on the attempt, which
must be made again and again until there is full success, of making
nature, first of all the nature of intuition and that of mathematical
natural science, theoretically understandable, as a formation constituting itsclf in the internality of transcendental subjectivity. T h e same
must be carried out for all realms of the naturally-naively experienced
world and therefore also for all sciences. Here-in our time a keenly felt
desideratum-the manifold human socialities and the cultural formations arising in their communal life, therefore also the cultural sciences
related to them, must be brought into the transcendental consideration
as "objects of possible experience," and Kant's "prejudice for natural
science" inust be overcome.
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more difficult: to penetrate to presuppositionless and self-evident beginnings; to develop the appropriate method; to outline the actually
radical problematics, and finally to build up a theory systematically
that could be justified with finality.
And so we now may be able to understand why in trarlscendental
philosophy we have until now missed a continual ascent of the sort
that modern mathematics bas shown from the beginning; indeed, why
long and not yet concluded struggles were required for it to make good
its peculiar right and privilege as opposed to the positive sciences-but
also first and foremost to work out in these struggles the ultimately
justifiable pure sense of a transcendental philosophy and transccndental
method. It is not only that the most deeply ingrained habits of the
natural manner of cognition had to be hrokdn; here tliere was lacking
also the never-failing propaganda power of the other side's technical
successes. Transcendental pl~ilosophl;,a very useless art, does not aid
the lords and masters of this world, the politicians, engineers, industrialists. But perhaps it is no reproach that on the theoretical level it
delivers us from absolutizing this world and opens to us the only possible scientific gate leading to the-in the higher sense-only true world,
the world of absolute mind. And perhaps it is also the theoretical function of a praxis, and of precisely that one in which the supreme and
ultimate interests of humanity must of necessity become effective.
VIII. The Sense of a Succession to Kant
In this manner, therefore, we understand the imperishable significance of Kant's scientific life's work, and therewith is revealed to us the
magnitude of the task in its entirety to which we and all future generations are called. Above all, and at first without raising any questions
about Kant's special theses and theories which so impressively determine the character of his specific philosophical apprehension of the
world, we must recognize the idea of a transcendental
(which came into its first but only preliminary existence as theory in
his philosophy) as the eternal sense which was, as it were, innate in the
historical development of
and which remains forever inseparable from its further development. In any case, it had its first
actual existence, as idea in germinal form, in Descartes' Meditations
and thus it forthwith became the moving developmental sense of Specifically modern philosophy, its intention, spiritedly driving it 2nd
working itself out in it. Once the ego cogito was seen as the pure, selfcontained cognizing subjectivity, seen, that is, as the universal ground of
cognition for everything that can ever be cognized, and once it was
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has prescribed for its coming-into-being the form of a rational development, one vigorously directed toward its genuine teleological sense.
According to all this, Kant's revolutionizing in philosophv is for us
not a merely historical fact, but historically the first (and still imperfect)
actualization of a turn predelineated in the essential sense of philosophy
itself in its development from the natural to the transcendental method
of cognition, from the positive or dogmatic to the transcendental cognition and science of the world; the turn, we can also say, from the naive
positive stage of world-cognition to a world-cognition through ultimate
self-consciousnessof cognition-but not in emptying generalities-concerning its active accomplishments, under the titles of reason, truth,
science.
At the same time, there arises for us, out of the insights attained, the
right sense in which we must understand and challenge Kant's following: to take over his system as it is or to improve its details, this is not
what is necessary above all else, but rather to understand the ultimate
sense of his revolution-and to understand him better than he himself,
the trailblazer, but not the perfecter, was capable of doing. This understanding, however, must be expressed in a scientifically basic way; a
philosophy that is scientific in the most rigorous sense, that according
to its essence is beginning without presuppositions, needs first of all to
derive its ABC's, so to speak, from original consciousness, and by means
of this, it must attain its ultimately valid theoretical form of development that lifts it out above the play of philosophical systems. The
legacy of Kant, therefore, will be not abandoned but rather perpetuated,
by clarifying and making full use of its absolute contents. Whether his
systematic world-view would thereby be retained, even in its general
style, is, on the other hand, a completely secondary question.
There has been no lack of serious efforts in such a spirit, especially
in the last decades. These efforts have in any case seen to it that the
danger of having the transcendental idea completely submerged-as a
result of the sense-perverting misunderstandings of the innermost
motives of Kant, as well as those of his predecessors in transcendental
philosophy--can be considered as overcome, even though the philosophical world-literature of our time, seen as a mass phenomenon, still
yields a different total picture.
For decades our Freiburg in particular has been a place where the
Kantian intentions seek their philosophical effects, even if in quite
varied forms. However
the phenomenological direction that is at
Present represented here goes its own way in the range of its Fobiematics and its formulation, and even in the principles of its method,
and however little it was directly determined by Kant and Kantian
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William E. Pohl
Instructor in German
Texas Christian University