North American Philosophical Publications

The Limits of Kantian Duty, and Beyond

Author(s): Richard McCarty
Reviewed work(s):
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Jan., 1989), pp. 43-52
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical Publications
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American

Volume

Philosophical

26, Number

Quarterly

1, January 1989

THE LIMITS OF KANTIAN DUTY, AND BEYOND

Richard McCarty

the moral
for
OUPEREROGATION,
category
to
do but not morally obligatory,
^actions
good
raises fundamental
for Kantian
ethical
problems
the
theory. Any ethical theory which,
following
Kantian
from obli?
turn, derives moral goodness

I. Supererogation
never appears
The term, "supererogation"
in
Kant's writings,
though occasionally he uses phrases
which suggest he has the concept inmind: He speaks
in one place of "super-meritorious"
deeds, and else?
where of doing ''more in the way of duty than the
law can compel [one] to do."2 The term itself rises
out of Catholic moral theology, where
its unique
role is not easily transferable to philosophical ethics.
A prima facie case may be made, then, for rejecting
the notion as spurious and inimical to sound moral
its dubious origin, however,
philosophy.
Despite
the term has found a use in ethical theory, as well as
an anchor in common ethical intuitions.
as a philosophical mor?
supererogation
Rejecting

gation, instead of the other way around,1 precludes

in its very foundation
the possibility
of morally
actions. Supererogation,
then,
good, non-obligatory
looms as a threat to the plausibility
of the Kantian
program in ethics. In the face of such a threat Kant
ians may simply deny the legitimacy of the category
of supererogation,
regardless of how strongly en?
trenched itmay appear in common moral thinking.
moral
intuitions,
respecting
pretheoretical
some?
to
include
they may attempt
supererogation
how among the basic moral categories of Kantian
ethics.
The object of the present study is to offer reasons
why neither of these responses to the problem is ac?

Or,

al category

has decisive
for ethical
implications
for
Kantian
ethics.
That
theory, especially
rejection
might entail a moral theory which requires or en?
courages our efforts and sacrifices for good causes
up to certain limits, beyond which we may continue
into a "zone of indifference,"3
if we desire, though
without moral incentive or recognition. While
this

this will require, among other

ceptable for Kantians;
a
examination
of a few recent
summary
things,
of Kantian ethics and supererogation.
discussions
If neither rejecting the moral significance
of super?
nor
cate?
it
the
basic
among
erogation,
including

view

in the direction of moral

pushes admirably
it nevertheless
makes
saints and heroes
equality,
from a moral standpoint. On a less
unremarkable,
grand scale, it cannot distinguish between one who
contributes only what he ought, and one who cheer?
fully "goes the second mile."

then
gories of Kant's moral theory is acceptable,
Kantian ethics must be rejected, unless a satisfactory
account of supererogation
non-moral
is plausible
and consistent with Kantian ethics. To address the
I
of Kantian
therefore,
supererogation,
a
account
below
develop
plausible,
"quasi-moral"
of the value of supererogation
from Kant's wide
I
how the close
aesthetic
show
ranging
theory.

problem

possible view entailed by rejecting super?

erogation simply denies any limits tomoral impera?
tives, except those imposed by our physical capa?
cities. On this view, we ought to do all the good we
can; there is no "zone of indifference." Every action,
therefore, should aim at satisfying one or another
moral imperative: Morality
regulates all our steps,
our
to
limits of our capacities.
all
efforts
the
pushing
Another

between Kant's ethics and aesthetics,

par?
his theory of the sublime, may confer a
status upon some actions which are
"quasi-moral"
a
in
relevant sense, though not morally obli?
good
account of the
gatory. Provided this "quasi-moral"
relation

ticularly

While

some may

view entailed
Kantians
should
rejecting
by
supererogation,
embrace it with great reluctance. Consider Kant's
of the moral
condemnation
fanaticism
he called

is generally acceptable, and

value of supererogation
I think it should be, Kantian ethics can meet the
challenge posed by the problematic moral concept

"fantastic

of supererogation.
43

virtue":

endorse

this rigorous

44
But

that man

can

be

called

admits nothing morally

strews
traps;

all

his

. . . Fantastic

virtuous

fantastically

duties,
is a micrology

virtue

as

sovereignty

virtue

and

with

man?

which,

were

it admitted into the doctrine of virtue, would

of

who

indifferent (adiaphora)
with

steps

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

into

turn the

tyranny.4

of Kant's wide imperfect duties.9 His identification

is not exact, however,
since unlike supererogatory
some actions in fulfillment
of imperfect
actions,
are
duties
morally required. Itmay be recalled from
the third and fourth examples
in the Groundwork
or
that adopting maxims
policies of forsaking one's

tyranny of such a doctrine of virtue, with

is surely too high a
its unsatisfiable
conscience,
to
to
evade
the
pay
price
problem of supererogation.
virtuous person rises daily with
The fantastically
eats with moral discrimina?
moral determination,

ignoring the needs of others is a

transgression of the categorical
imperative.10 These
on occa?
wide imperfect duties may be overlooked
a
them entirely constitutes
sion, but neglecting

toward moral destina?

tion, organizes all activities
in
Kantian
retires
moral
deliberation.
and
tions,
virtue is for imperfect humans who must neverthe?
in order to avoid compla?
less strive for perfection
to
It
is
of
Kantian
virtue, however,
part
cency.5

Consequently,
supererogatory
by a principle of wider
formed by an agent who

The

to know when duty

develop a sound understanding,
to
calls and when it is silent,
gauge the limits of
one's obligations with good judgment.6 Unless we
reasonable
limits to moral obligation,
recognize
such
is "fantastic."7
virtue
Admitting
of surpas?
entails the possibility
limits, however,
sing the limits, of acting beyond the call of duty.

Kantian

and

II. Supererogation

"Imperfect

Duty"

If it is unwise for Kantians to reject the possibility

actions, then it may be best to try
supererogatory
to include supererogation
somewhere
among the
of
Some
be encour?
Kantian
ethics.
may
categories
passage from
aged in this project by a promising
Kant's

Doctrine

of Virtue,

... are
only duties of virtue. To
Imperfect duties
fulfill them ismerit (meritum = +a); but to transgress
them

is not

so much

guilt,

(demeritum

?a)

as mere

lack of moral worth (=0), unless the agent makes

his principle not to submit to these duties.8

it

talents

and of

serious dereliction

of duty.
an action
on Hill's
is
view,
only if it is "of a sort commended

imperfect duty" and per?

has "adopted the relevant
principle of wider imperfect duty and has often and
continually acted on that principle." To these neces?
while
sary conditions Hill adds another which,
as a
for
Kantian
looms
indeed
ethics,
necessary
to
to
block
include
any attempt
superero?
stumbling
gation within the categories of Kantian duty: The
action must be "motivated by a sense of duty (or,
perhaps, respect for moral reasons)."11 This neces?
is simply
inconsistent
however,
sary condition,
with the concept of supererogation.
motivation
since
The moral
is necessary,
a
are
and
actions
supererogatory
good,
morally
is necessary for moral goodness,
moral motive
Kantian moral worth. Yet the moral motive,
Kantian
action,
Kantian

for
in

to act from duty. The

ethics, is the motive
not
in any
could
be
then,
supererogatory
sense unless the agent recognizes
it as a

necessary,12
duty, sees it as objectively practically
and performs
it on that account. But if the action
is morally necessary,
if it is the agent's duty, then
the action cannot be supererogatory.
to the ends enjoined
Not all actions contributing
are
Kant's
wide
by
imperfect duty
objectively prac?

Here,
imperfect duties, most of which are "wide
in Kant's
duties,"
terminology,
enjoin actions
which are good to do and not wrong to omit. Thus
the category of imperfect duty bears a resemblance
some recent dis?
to supererogation.
Accordingly,

to be sure. It is seldom wrong

tically necessary,
or bad to omit such actions; still, if performing
them on some occasion
is to have Kantian moral
must
the
worth,
agent
regard the action as necessary
on
that
occasion
and act out of respect
(obligatory)

of Kantian
and supererogation
ethics
a
to
in
find
these
duties of virtue;
solution
propose
and to one of these discussions we may now turn.
Thomas E. Hill, Jr. comes close to identifying

for that necessity

(duty). Hill's account, therefore,
flawed.
appears seriously
this problem,
itmay not be wise to reject
Despite
too
Hill's
since the common
proposal
quickly,
notion of supererogation may after all be consistent

cussions

supererogatory

actions

with

actions

in fulfillment

THE LIMITS OF KANTIAN DUTY 45

acting from duty or from "respect
reasons." Let us recall that the project

with

for moral
here is to

the relatively
intuitive notion of
imprecise,
into Kantian ethical theory. If this
supererogation
notion does not clearly specify what kind of duty
fit

actions "beyond the call of duty" surpass, then its

vagueness may allow us to count most actions in
of Kant's
wide
fulfillment
imperfect duties as
actions surpass, in
Most
these
of
supererogatory.
some sense, the "hard-and-fast"
of
requirements
forbid
"narrow,"
duties, which
perfect
as universal
not consistently
law
willable
etc.).13
(lying, promise-breaking,
In Kantian ethics, then, actions are morally good

Kant's

actions

if performed from duty; yet from a point of

external to Kantian ethics, dutiful actions in
fulfillment of wide imperfect duty may satisfy the
intuitive notion
vague requirements of the common,
of supererogation.
Since the initial challenge to the
from the
of Kantian
ethics
arises
plausibility
only
view

account may easily

external point of view, Hill's
answer that initial challenge.
Still, the problem, once raised, is not so easily
dismissed. From a point of view internal toKantian
the problem
resurfaces when we turn to
ethics,
how to classify actions which surpass the
limits of even wide
reasonable
imperfect obliga?
of virtue. To see how this problem
of
duties
tion,
these limits
arises more clearly we must examine
consider

of obligation.
III. The

Limits

of Kantian

Duty

In various places Kant speaks as if there are no

limits to duties of virtue except those imposed by
other obligations.14 To surpass these limits, then,
would be to neglect or transgress other important
duties. The duty to love one's neighbor, for exam?
ple, may be limited by a duty to one's parents;
likewise, it iswrong to sacrifice personal happiness
another's
and "true needs" in dutifully promoting
happiness.
the only limits to duties of virtue those
Were
there
stringent duties,
imposed by other, more
actions in
could be no genuinely
supererogatory
sense; but these cannot be the only
any Kantian
limits. If the only limits to Kantian duties of virtue
are other duties, then we can represent the whole

of practical
life by a map on which every district
is colored by some kind of duty. In that case, how?
virtue
ever, duty dogs all our steps and Kantian
becomes
"fantastic virtue."
In some places where Kant appears to deny any
limits to duties of virtue,
have determinate
limits,
virtue have indeterminate

he denies

only that they

that duties of
implying
limits.15 On this (highly

view of the limits of imperfect obliga?

plausible)
tions, we cannot say precisely how much one ought
to contribute to ends enjoined by duties of virtue.
This does not, however,
prevent us from recog?
which
efforts
nizing
clearly surpass the limits of
those duties. Consequently,
the exact
determining
point at which one's sacrifices on others' behalf
is impossible,
surpass the limits of obligation
just
as it is impossible
to determine
the point at which
a balding man becomes
some heroic
bald. Yet
actions on others' behalf are clearly well beyond
the reasonable
limits of imperfect obligation,
just
as some men are clearly bald.
In Kantian
ethics,
then, either wide
imperfect
at
have
least indeterminate
limits,
obligations
to act
it is sometimes
beyond which
possible
without
other
or,
duties,
transgressing
imperfect
are limited only by other duties, and
obligations
virtue is fantastic virtue. Rejecting
the lat?
conclude, with some textual support, that
Kant's wide
imperfect duties have indeterminate
limits. Surpassing
and surpassable
the limits of
no Kantian
can
have
however,
imperfect duty,
for in the remote districts beyond
moral worth;
to did from
wide
imperfect duty, it is impossible
duty. One simply cannot have the required moral
motivation
when his action is not in fulfillment of
a duty. Thus, within Kantian
ethics the vexing
Kantian
ter, we

of supererogation
remains unresolved.
problem
some
sacrifices
for others' bene?
should
only
Why
fits be morally worthy while other extraordinary,
sacrifices along those lines lack
clearly permissible
moral

worth!

IV. Supererogation

and

Kantian

Virtue

of the Kantian problem

Other recent discussions
of supererogation
suggest a solution may be found
the
Hill
addressed
in a new approach. While
a
account
of
Kantian
problem by trying to offer

46

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

the apparent moral value of supererogatory

acts,
more
can
be
made
progress
by focusing
perhaps
on the moral value of the virtuous characters
from
acts spring.16 Marcia Baron,
which supererogatory
in this con?
whose view I shall consider principally

she raises against

tastic, the same type of objections
the traditional view can now be leveled at hers. It
think
is easy to see how people might mistakenly
that virtue, as she understands
it, is fantastic. This
to their neglecting
will
lead, we may presume,

a special moral cat?

objects to recognizing
for
egory
supererogation principally because doing
so may invite some undesirable attitudes or tenden?
cies in moral judgment. She argues that reserving
acts
a special moral category for supererogatory
are
some
acts
to
beneficent
that
may suggest
strictly

For these reasons,

virtue altogether.
therefore,
Baron's rejection of any special distinction between
acts falters.
dutiful and supererogatory
to the problem of
Baron's positive contribution

nection,

optional, so that "moral scrutiny of one's omissions

it "in?
of such acts would be inappropriate." Also,
vites the assumption that [extraordinary,] admirable
and apparently unselfish acts ... are certain to be
though clearly not all
morally unobjectionable,"17
generally "heroic" actions are blameless: Consider
the (in)famous American
hero, Oliver North.
the traditional view of
criticizes
Though Baron
at
she
great length, the problems
supererogation
a
to
finds in assigning
superero?
special moral status
gatory acts are reducible to just those mentioned
are nothing but
above. These problems,
however,
mere

undesirable attitudes and tendencies inmoral

and they arise only if people misun?
judgment;
derstand the "special" character of supererogatory
are hardly
acts. These
sufficient
"problems"
reasons to reject a traditional moral category. Baron
admits at one point that "an argument
herself
against an abuse of a notion is not a good argument
in favor of giving up the notion entirely."18
If we side with Baron and reject a special moral
status for supererogatory
acts, though, we face
in Section I. Either there
those problems mentioned
in
is no moral incentive and no moral recognition
or
limits
there
the
of
acting beyond
imperfect duty,
are no limits to imperfect duty. Baron would cer?
tainly reject the first option, since she rejects limits
for imperfect duty for reasons which can be extrapo?
lated from the problems
she worries about above.
She is therefore forced to embrace "fantastic vir?
tue." My argument against Baron at this point,
she raises "problems" for
then, is just that while
the traditional view (undesirable attitudes and ten?
dencies inmoral judgment),
still the problem which
arises from rejecting
the traditional view (virtue
becomes
"fantastic virtue") is much worse.
Even if Baron's view does not make virtue fan

in Kantian ethics is her suggestion

supererogation
that Kantian ethics can account for the moral status
and other lesser friends of
of saints and heroes,
their "re?
their virtues,
humanity,
by recognizing
to good causes."19 Thus,
commitment
markable
Baron

concludes
that Kant's category of imperfect
of what ethicists have wanted
much
duty "supplies
from the category
of the supererogatory.
The
rest ...
is much better captured by evaluation of
a special category of
character than by recognizing
actions that go 'beyond' duty."20

between
Because Baron rejects any distinction
dutiful and supererogatory acts, she also rejects any
moral distinction between the virtuous character of
one who does his duty at great sacrifice, and that of
one who acts in excess of his duty at great sacrifice.21
Since her rejection of supererogatory acts falters, as
I argued above, this traditional distinction in virtuous
characters raises a serious problem for her view.
In short, Baron's
shift from actions to characters
merely relocates the problem of Kantian superero?
gation, it does not solve it.
In Kantian
if virtue is to have a moral
ethics,
must
to duty; for moral goodness
it
tied
be
status,
in
Kant's
is,
view, always derived from the moral
law. Hence Kant's definition of virtue: "the moral
strength of a man's will in fulfilling his duty, amoral
necessitation

by

his

own

legislative

the character

reason

. . ,"22

of the person who

can be assigned a

Therefore,
only
to fulfill obligations
sacrifices
status in Kantian
moral
virtue. This is because,
a necessary condition of
the
moral
is
motive
again,
and
moral
the
motive
is amotive respecting
virtue,
rare
hero
The
who
surpasses the limits
obligations.
of imperfect duty displays a remarkable, (morally?)
character
the meta
>vhich, given
praise-worthy
of Kantian morality,
cannot
ethical commitments
be a part of virtue.
Since neither wide imperfect duties nor Kantian

THE LIMITS OF KANTIAN DUTY 47

virtue provide a satisfactory account of admirable
the limits of Kant's
heroism
imperfect
beyond
duties, therefore, we must recognize a shortcoming
in Kantian ethics. Even so, must we reject it for
that reason? Only if we assume that ethical theory
for every admir?
alone must provide an explanation
able deed or character. Beginning with that assump?
leads us to ignore the intuitively
tion, however,
evident harmony and mutual
support of different
realms of value. It leads us to view ethics in isola?
in a way
tion from other vital human concerns
it is clear, Kant himself did not view it.
which,
We need not suggest here that morality may be
to other realms of value, we need not
subordinate
to seek a satisfactory
threaten its "overridingness"
extra-moral
V.

account

of supererogation.
and

Supererogation

Sublimity

or saintly characters are

truly inspiring, except perhaps to villains and per?
sons devoid of feeling; this much
is uncontrover
those
between
sial. Here we need not distinguish
saints and heroes who fulfill obligations where most
Genuinely

would

heroic

deeds

fit into the supererogatory

their obligations.
surpassing

fail and those who

category by clearly
The inspired response to these deeds and characters,
a moral pleasure
dutiful or not, is a moral feeling,
of varying degree. If moral feelings or moral sen?
sound criteria for moral
sibilities
offered
judg?
in
would
be little difficulty
there
then
ments,
for the moral status of supererogatory
accounting
them from
deeds or characters and distinguishing
or
characters
virtuous
deeds
dutiful
extraordinary
which are hardly less noteworthy.
Because Kantian ethics opposes the moral-sense
school, though, it seems that our moral feelings are
not relevant for the problem of Kantian
superero?
to pursue this avenue.
gation, so it seems useless
Yet Kantians do not reject moral sense entirely, but
ground of moral obligation.
only as a determining
Moral feeling plays a very important role inKantian
If practical reason is the "mea?
moral psychology.
rod"
determining what is obligatory, moral
suring
"the moral incentive to
is
the
"mainspring,"
feeling
action" which "lies in the heart."23
commit?
Still, it seems that given the metaethical
ments

of Kantian

ethics,

a feeling

cannot properly

be called "moral" unless it is a response to the moral

law, an object of respect (Actung). Even in moral
then, it seems we can find no room for as?
feeling,
a
Yet if we
moral status to supererogation.
signing
consider the moral incentive more closely, we can
see how Kant's account of moral feeling expands
beyond duty; we can see how moral feelings can be
indirectly by non-moral objects.
My objective in this section, then, will be to show
how supererogatory actions or characters, which are
non-moral
in Kantian
ethics,
technically
objects
can excite moral feeling. This will require a discus?
aroused

and
sion of both Kant's theory of moral motivation
of
the
his aesthetic
the
theory, especially
theory
I shall display a funda?
sublime. In this discussion
mental
the
the moral
incentive,
identity between
aes?
the
the
moral
and
of
for
law,
respect
feeling
I shall
natural objects.
how
then, by showing
or
are
sublime
characters
supererogatory
natural objects which can excite moral feeling.
Human beings, partly noumenal and partly phen?
can act in the sensible world not only
omenal,
thetic response
conclude
the

to sublime

section,
actions

to the intelligible moral law, but also from

according
motives
respecting reason's law. Since Kant holds
that the human will is moved
only by incentives,
either incentives of pure practical reason or incen?
show how
he must
tives of sense (inclinations),
noumenal reason can incite phenomenal
action, ac?
tion respecting duty. He cannot, he acknowledges,
explain a noumenal causality. He can, however, on
the assumption of such causality, explain its effects
on our phenomenal
nature.24 He calls this human
to
of reason moral feeling.25
the
law
sensitivity
Now as is frequently the case inKant, we can dis?
tinguish between a faculty and a particular activity
or determination
ofthat faculty.26 Here, then, moral
name
and
can
both an internal sensibility
feeling
or feelings. We can
sensations
internal
particular
the will stimulates
say that reason's determining
or we can say that it
the faculty of moral feeling,
arouses particular moral feelings:
respect
namely,
the two, therefore,
or reverence.27 To distinguish
I shall hereafter refer to the faculty of moral feeling
of
in the singular and to particular determinations
the faculty in the plural.
Moral feelings appear to be of two general kinds:
when
the tran
we feel unpleasant
"humiliation"

48

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

law of reason checks our natural self-love;

but when we recognize
the autonomy of the moral
law is "our" law, we feel
law, that the absolute
self-esteem.28 These negative and positive feelings
in Kant's notion of respect (Actung) for the
merge

quality of the feelings themselves or in the fact that

in the former the feelings arise from reason's impera?
tives and in the latter the feelings arise from reason's
capacities is perhaps a moot question in our present
context. While Kant may not identify moral feelings

law.29 It is proper to call this faculty moral

feeling because such feelings serve as "an incentive
to make
law] itself a maxim."30 Kant
[the moral
that in addition to being excited
holds, however,
by rational imperatives, moral feeling can also be
stimulated by the thought of reason itself, especially

with

scendent

moral

the thought of its transcendence of the phenomenal

world. This is an essential element of his theory
of the sublime.
ac?
of the sublime,
The aesthetic
experience
or
can
to
"mathematical"
be
either
Kant,
cording
In the former, the object of experience
"dynamical."
in the latter, it
is one of sense-defying
dimensions;
a frightening degree of power. In each of
manifests
even somewhat
these cases the object is humbling,
painful to behold. Yet in each case there is a move?
ment of themind from finite sensible representations
to transcendent reason. Though sensibility (imagin?
infinite
ation) is exhausted in the face of seemingly
reason
infinite
in
the
its
grasps
totality.31
objects,
Thus, the pleasure in the sublime is just the discovery
of reason's superiority to the magnitude
and might
of nature. And insofar as reason is "our" reason,
a defiant
this discovery
is a thrilling self-discovery,

the feelings of the sublime, he thinks reason's

in moral motivation,
imperatives
just as much as
reason's capacities in the experience of the sublime,
stimulate moral
feeling.35 The relation between
moral feelings and the feelings of the sublime, then,
may not be an analogy at all, but an identity.36 In
any case, the same feeling
(faculty) is stimulated by
the starry heavens above and the moral
law
are the
whether or not the particular feelings
really distinct in character.
Having shown, then, how moral feeling is excited

both

within,

by considering natural, so-called "sublime" objects

no less than by the thought of the moral law, we are
in a position to see how supererogatory
actions, or
or
can
heroic
moral
stimulate
characters,
saintly
to
remains
be
It
shown, therefore, how
feeling.
only
these supererogatory
"objects" can be sublime.
even affec?
characters, motivations,
Empirical
are
so they
of
"internal
and
tions,
nature,"
objects
can also be sublime when they exhibit sufficient
or power. At one point Kant notes that
magnitude
"enthusiasm" may be sublime because of the power
of the enthusiast's
attraction to the idea of the good;
a power far exceeding
the attraction to sensible

The "analogy" between

the moral feelings and
the component
of
the
sublime is striking.
feelings
In the one case we are humiliated
by the law of

love, or sympathy, as natural

objects.37 Friendship,
in
therefore
also be manifested
affections,
might
sublime degrees by saints and heroes.38 These are
to be sure, and thus they
forces,
"pathological"
must not eclipse
the supreme position of duty or
of the "good will."
these natural motive
Still,
are
if
to motivate
sacrifices
sufficient
forces,
they
arouse
of
the
call
moral
beyond
duty, may
feeling
in disinterested
observers.39 As remarkable exam?

reason when our selfish inclinations

are checked,
in the other case by the sense-defying
mag?
in
nitude and might of nature. Yet immediately,

ples they may also serve to cultivate our sensitivity

to the moral law and to reinforce our commitment
to obey the law against more mundane
adversities

both cases, we are confronted with our transcen?

dence of the natural world
through reason; in a
our
The
difference
word,
appears to be
freedom.
this:
that
for
the
moral
law
is combined
respect
only
with an interest in action, the feelings of the sublime

or natural

to the formerly humiliating

satisfaction in opposition
natural object.32 Technically,
then, natural objects
are not sublime, they merely occasion the inspiring
feeling of the transcendence of reason. Thus, a per?
occurs by which we
fectly natural "subreption"
of
the
external
object as sublime."33
speak

and

are

merely

Whether

contemplative.34

we

should

locate

this difference

in the

inclinations.
to pathological
incentives, however,
Appealing
is risky business. These incentives cannot be trusted
to coincide with the moral
law. Consequently,
it
that
forces
be
exhibited
appears
may
pathological
to sublime degrees even in actions contrary to the
moral
law. If so, then such immorality will be

THE LIMITS OF KANTIAN DUTY 49

to
admirable. Yet there is an important qualification
forces
here. The strength of the pathological
or immoral
involved in either morally permissible
acts will give rise to the experience of the sublime
in an observer only if she is able to consider the acts

make

For disinterestedness
is a necessary
disinterestedly.
for the experience
of the sublime,
condition
to Kant.40
according
to contemplate
the
it may be possible
While
it seems ex?
devil's vile character disinterestedly,
sensi?
for the morally
especially
tremely difficult,
tive person. On the other hand, the saint's boundless
is relatively easy to con?
love for the disadvantaged
Perhaps the saint's bene?
template disinterestedly.
the
factors may have some difficulty contemplating
as
his
of
his
in
it
is
manifested
benefi?
love
sublimity
cence particularly
to them, though this difficulty
is
as
turn
to
the
contemplate
they
easily surmounted
actions
saint's beneficence
toward others. Whether
or characters can be admired in the special sense
considered here will depend not only on the actions
or characters themselves,
but also and especially on
the sensitivities
and attitudes of the admirers. Thus,
some remarkable acts involving
relatively minor
moral transgressions may constitute admirable im?
but this should not open up any serious
morality,
as admirable
to regarding supererogation
objections
action beyond the call of duty.
VI. Concluding

Remarks

I have argued that it is impossible to fit superero?

gation into the moral categories of Kantian ethics.
In neither imperfect duties nor in Kantian virtue
can we make room for actions beyond duty or for
the characters of those who act beyond duty. I take
Kantian moral worth quite literally: It is the moral
of duty for duty's
value of actions in fulfillment
excludes
worth
moral
logically
Kantian
I
that
have
also
argued
supererogation.
limits of
at least indeterminate
ethics recognizes
sake.

Thus,

action is
beyond which supererogatory
obligation,
The
virtue."
Kant
"fantastic
prob?
rejected
possible;
lem, then, is to capture our intuitions that rare
actions clearly beyond the limits of
supererogatory
some moral
deserve
recognition
by
obligation
a
status.
them
moral
assigning

The moral status I assign to such actions is based

on their effect on our moral sensibilities;
they are
even
often
bolster
morally pleasing,
inspiring. They
our determination
to obey the moral
law. I take
this to be a generally accepted empirical truth and
a generally
some
basis for assigning
satisfactory
kind of moral status to supererogatory
actions or
The
characters,
among nonKantians.41
especially
real problem with this suggestion,
it seems to me,
is showing how, in this Kantian
context, we can
a
or
status
to
moral
actions
characters
assign
solely
on the basis of their effect on feeling or their inspi?
rational character. I offer a solution to this problem
I think should be acceptable
to Kantians and
nonKantians
Kantians
should insist
alike, though
account
that this "affective"
of the value of
it perhaps only a
supererogation
justifies assigning

which

status.42

"quasi-moral"

I suggest that the "moral" status supererogation

enjoys is not Kantian moral worth but, from a Kan?
tian viewpoint,
status of Kan?
it is the "quasi-moral"
tian sublimity, an aesthetic category closely related
tomorality
through its stimulation of moral feeling.
Kantians may address the supererogationists'
de?
mand for amoral status for supererogation,
then, by
clarifying what a moral status is: by distinguishing
the moral status of duty from that of moral feeling,
and by suggesting
that the latter should satisfy the
demands.
supererogationists'
The source of positive moral feeling, whether
that aroused by moral imperatives or by the experi?
ence of the sublime
in nature,
is the "transcen?
It
dence" of reason, which excites moral feeling.
of my account of the moral
is a happy consequence
status of Kantian
that the role of
supererogation
in the Kantian
sublime may also
transcendence
elucidate the frequent tendency to assign superero?
gation a religious status, to consider supererogation
saintly.43 In contrast, the "moral saint" sometimes
as one who has a moral reason for
characterized
as a fanatic,
virtually every step, can be dismissed
as "fantastically
in Kant's phrase. Thus
virtuous,"
is that my account of
another happy consequence
allows
the moral status of Kantian
supererogation
a
to
charac?
deeds
and
moral
value
saintly
assigning
ters without making moral
tue,"

a reasonable

Kantians

will

moral

sainthood,

"fantastic vir?

ideal.44

insist that the affective moral

value

50

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

is no substitute for duty, that

of supererogation
moral feeling must not replace moral worth in prac?
tical life. But this does not require rejecting super?
insisting that it be
erogation entirely, but merely
what
for
it
is;
recognized
insisting that duty must be

wishes

himself

these

along

of

unattainable

romance,

pro?
perfection
while
priding
transcendent
greatness,
who,

or
feeling
the common
from observing
as petty
and
insignificant.45
responsibility
their

themselves

everyday

and

I take this and many

similar46 complaints from Kant

"noble (super-meritorious)"
romanticizing
con?
as a kind of "back-handed"
however,

against
actions,
firmation of my account of supererogation's
moral" status. Were
it not so compellingly

lines:

But Iwish [moral educators] would spare [their pupils]

of so-called noble
(super-meritorious)
examples
so fill our sentimental writings, and
which
actions,
would refer everything to duty only and the worth
which a man can and must give himself in his own
eyes through the consciousness of not having trans?
gressed his duty, since whatever runs up into empty
East Carolina

for

longings
heroes
on

themselves
release

the focus of our moral thinking and moral education

and that care must be taken not to confuse moral
feeling with moral worth. Compare a complaint of
Kant

and
mere

duces

"quasi
evident

that these actions or characters excite and

inspire us, he would not have felt it neces?
morally
to
and
tried so frequently and emphatically,
sary,
to
turn attention away from these moral feelings
moral imperatives.47
to Kant

University

Received March 31, 1988

NOTES
1. See
2.

Immanuel

Immanuel

Kant,

Kant,

of Practical

Critique

Doctrine

of Virtue,

tr. by Lewis

Reason,

tr. by Mary

J. Gregor

White

(New York,

Beck

(Indianapolis,

1964),

p. 27/Ak

1956),

227.

See

pp.
also,

57ff.

59ff./Ak
Ibid.,

158-59/Ak

155,

below.

quoted

3. I borrow

this phrase

4. Doctrine

of Virtue,

5. Moral
according

from

James

p. 71/Ak

The Limits

Fishkin,

of Obligation

(New Haven,

1982).

409.

since we have an imperfect

is part of Kantian
ourselves
virtue,
duty to perfect
perfection
our moral
to Kant,
"talents"
and moral
"sensibilities."
It may be thought,
then,
developing
so that Kant's
of fantastic
virtue
is inconsistent
with a duty he would
fantastic
virtue,
rejection

enjoins
This apparent

morally.

This

that this duty

not be willing

includes,
ultimately
to reject.

can be easily
in moral
is both progress
in
that progress
however,
resolved,
inconsistency
by noting
perfection
to
not
and
in
one's
meet
those
what
demands
demands.
If
does
demand
progress
understanding
morality
willingness
morality
to submit to the tyranny of such a
if he thought
fantastic
be morally
he was
it did, however
virtue, one would
imperfect
willing
doctrine
of virtue. See Doctrine
433n.
pp. 97-98n./Ak
of Virtue,
6. Ibid.,

61/Ak401.

with
of "fantastic
virtue" appears
inconsistent
the "rigorism"
he defends
in Religion
the Limits of
Within
repudiation
is the view that no action or character can be "morally
Alone.
There the rigorism
he espouses
But this appears
indifferent."
to be what he criticizes
about fantastic
to his characterization
virtue. Careful
attention
of fantastic
that
virtue reveals,
however,
Kant
it as a conjunction
of rigorism
and "strewing
all one's
steps with duties." Kant's
regards
rigorism does not entail strewing
7. Kant's

Reason

all one's

steps with

commanded,

morally
M. Greene

Theodore
everything
Kant's
sense,

rigorism

for when

commanded

is consistent

49/Ak

"moral

permissible.

indifference"
(See

(New York,
1960),
or morally
prohibited.

he means

Immanuel
p.

Kant,

18n.) The

with

acts

supererogatory

9. See Thomas

he denies

or morally
H. Hudson

prohibited
and Hoyt

either morally

then,

8. Ibid.,

duties,

since supererogatory
supererogation
are not morally
indifferent,
though this

only

the Limits

virtuous

be a subset

sufficient

or character

action

Within

fantastically

acts will
is not

that every

Religion

of

to give

man,

is either morally
tr. by
of Reason Alone,
on the other hand,
sees

the morally
them moral

permissible.
worth.

62

pp.

390.
E. Hill,

Jr.,

"Kant On

Imperfect

Duty

and Supererogation,"

Kant-Studien,

vol.

(1971),

55-76.

In this

THE LIMITS OF KANTIAN DUTY 51

10.

Immanuel

12. I draw
13. Onora

Nell

15. Ibid.,

18. Ibid.,

supererogation

p. 71.

On Principle

(New York,

1975),

pp.

94-96.

Reconsidered."
seems

Baron

The Journal
and Supererogation,"
of Philosophy,
see his Supererogation,
in part of Kantian
virtue,

vol.

84 (1987),

Its Status

pp. 237-62.

in Ethical

David

Heyd

(New York,

Theory

the traditional
"Kantian

moral
and

Ethics

that philosophical
like a philosopher
worried
ideas or categories
be misunderstood
might
a
she seems to think that because
moral
for
category
recognizing
special
supererogation
for common moral
their theories accordingly.
thinking, moral philosophers
ought to construct

to write

Thus,

by non-philosophers.

have undesirable

Ibid.,

Ethics

not permit a detailed

to Baron's
rich discussion
of these problems
with
response
I have discussed
Baron's
in an as yet unpublished
arguments
paper,
thoroughly
Interested
readers may write
for a copy.

does

Space

supererogation.

248.

19. Baron,

consequences

259.
262.

21. Urmson

this distinction

draws

in "Saints

clearly

see A.

and Heroes,"

I. Melden,

inMoral

Essays

(Seattle,

Philosophy

1958),

200-01.

22. Doctrine
23.

"Kantian

from

261.
of

and abused

pp.

421 -24.

pp. 39-42/Ak

see Hill,

222-23.

see Acting

in this way,

1959),

(Indianapolis,

three are drawn,

49-72.

pp.

Supererogation

20.

Baron,

room

17. Baron,

will

(five

Beck
these

from which

390.

p. 49/Ak

of Virtue,

in all)

p. 21/Ak

of Virtue,

view

tr. by Lewis White

of Morals,

conditions

53/Ak393.

sees

category

Hill's

defends

16. See Marcia

1982),

of theMetaphysics

set of necessary
from Doctrine

this phrase

14. Doctrine

also

Foundations

Kant,

lists a complete

11. Hill

Kant,

404.

p. 66/Ak

of Virtue,

Immanuel

tr. by Louis

On Ethics,

Lectures

Infield

(New York,

p. 36.

1963),

there
Reason,
p. 17n/Ak 401 n. Here
of Morals,
of the Metaphysics
seems
as
reason
some
to
in
moral
Kant
in
if
the
role
of
moral
action.
about
respect,
feelings,
speak
places
question
to speak as if
In other places
to act directly,
is a mere
he seems
of this process.
side-effect
while
the will
determines
respect
I say about moral
with reason and ending with phenomenal
action. What
is a link in the causal chain beginning
respect
feeling
24. Critique
is a difficult

of Practical

is neutral

however,

here,

of our consciousness

of

25. Doctrine

of Virtue,

26. Critique

of Practical

itself)

is really moral

27.

Ibid.

28.

Ibid.

29.

Ibid.,

84/Ak81.

Ibid.,

79/Ak

30.

the disposal
31.

Kant,

32.

Ibid.,

33.

Ibid.,

105-06/Ak

34.

Ibid.,

123/Ak271.

35.

Ibid.,

116-20/Ak

Critique
vol.
Kant-Studien,

37. Critique
38. Kant
Foundations

59-61/Ak

83/Ak

p.

of

Moral

feeling

will

interpretations

allow.

of

such

do all I require

of

it so long as it is a concomitant

399-400.

80:

"the capacity

in the text Kant

this point
This suggests
that moral

asks
feeling

taking

an interest

(or of having

"moral feeling"
whether
rhetorically
a sensitivity
to reason,
is essentially

tr. by James Meredith

of Judgment,

Critique

respect

for the moral

law

(Oxford,

1952),

pp.

is a good name the this feeling

"at
or to the moral
not tomorality
law.

107-09/Ak

258-59.

257.

266-68.
between

occasionally

(1956),
vol.

Kant-Studien,

the Metaphysics

47

124/Ak
of

such

feelings

1960),
(Chicago,
On
similarities,

296.

p.

vol.

p.

these moral

Reason

of Practical
64 (1973),

of Judgment,
speaks

both

(my emphasis).

feeling"

Kant-Studien,
Feeling,"

also Foundations

interpretations.
which

reason,
387,

Reason,

differences

apparent

On Kant's

Philosophy,"

to these

respect

46/Ak

pp.

76. At

114/Ak264.

Religious

with

transcendent

See

only of reason."

Immanuel

36. On

72.

p. 74/Ak

71

pp.

see Lewis White

the feelings
of the sublime
Beck, A Commentary
see also A. Murray MacBeath,
"Kant On Moral
Feeling,"
in Kant's
'Moral Law'
and The
C. Nahm,
"'Sublimity'

see also Allan

502-24;

pp.
(1980),

and

pp. 220-21;
see Milton

Lazaroff,

"The Kantian

Sublime:

Aesthetic

Judgment

and

of duty.

See

202-20.

271-72.
natural

of Morals,

pp.

inclinations,

but

14-16/Ak

398-99.

usually
See

to distinguish
them from the motive
only
402.
also Doctrine
pp. 62-63/Ak
of Virtue,

52
Imust

39. Here
gation's
40.

See Critique

nobleness,
John
42.

Stuart Mill,

43.

See Critique

44.

See

See

"Moral

of Practical

especially

Ibid.,

II.
of

p.

pp.

83-89/Ak

a noble
be doubted
whether
possibly
other people
and that the world
happier,

the value

Kant would

113/Ak

Saints,"

Reason,
pp.

if it may

Ch.

of Judgment,

Susan Wolff,

45. Critique

"and

that it makes

them are "pathological,"

of superero?

247.

account

Utilitarianism,

this an "affective"

I call

p. 93/Ak

of Judgment,

for example:
Mill,
there can be no doubt

have described

46.

with Baron
that characters
and not acts, per se, are the primary bearers
my agreement
acknowledge
status. This
is especially
evident when
sacrifices
fail to achieve
their intended end.
supererogatory

moral

41. Compare

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

263.

See

The Journal
158-59/Ak

of

say, but moral

also Lazaroff,
of Philosophy,

feeling
op.
vol.

is always
the happier
a gainer
is immensely

a "pathological"
account.
Supererogatory
is not, since it is the "non-pathological"
moral

not

supererogation,

character
in general

for
by

motives

its
it."

as I

incentive.

cit.
79

(1982),

419-39.

155.

85-92.

to acknowledge
The National
Endowment
For The Humanities
and James F. Childress
for support during a Summer
I began
an earlier version
research
in 1986. I presented
for this project
of this paper to the Central Division
of
the APA
in 1986, and to the Southern
and Psychology,
to whom
I am very grateful
for the honor of the
Society for Philosophy
Richard M. Griffith Memorial
Award.
47.

I wish

Seminar

where