The Athenian Embassies to Sardis and Cleomenes' Invasion of Attica

Author(s): Richard M. Berthold

Source: Historia: Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte, Vol. 51, No. 3, (3rd Qtr., 2002), pp. 259-267
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436657
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THE ATHENIAN EMBASSIESTO SARDIS AND CLEOMENES'

INVASIONOF ATTICA
Sometimeduringthe archonyear 508/7 king Cleomenes of Spartawas
summonedbackto Athensby a beleagueredIsagoras,whose politicalposition
was crumblingbeforethe reformtacticsof Cleisthenes.Failingin theirattempt
to establisha narrowoligarchy,the two men and theirsupporterswere driven
out of the city, and Cleomenesbegan organizinga three-prongedinvasionof
Attica, invitingarmiesfrom Chalcisand Boeotia in from the north,while he
gatheredthe Peloponnesianlevy in the south.In apparentresponseto this threat
the Atheniansdispatchedan embassyto Sardis,perhapsin the springof 507, to
seek an alliance from the PersiansatrapArtaphernes,who demandedof the
Atheniansthe usualtokensof submissionto the empire,earthand water."On
theirown responsibility"the envoys providedthe tokensand returnedto Athens, wherethey "themselveswereblamedgreatly"for this act.,
While the intentionof this mission is perfectlyclear - an alliance with
Persia- virtuallyeverythingelse aboutit has been the subjectof debate.It can
hardlybe doubtedthatCleisthenes,just recalledto Athensaftertheexpulsionof
IsagorasandCleomenes,was responsiblefor sendingthe embassy,2andits goal
is clearlystatedby Herodotus:to concludean alliancewithPersia.WhyPersia?
Because no potentialally of any significancewas available.The Peisistratid

Herod. 5.70.1-74.2:

ic'taqpwv ai)tiCovIak6gevot;

wrUT6v aidia; "ydXa; eiXov (73.3);

as C. Hignett,A Historyof the AthenianConstitutionto the Endof the Fifth CenturyB.C.

(Oxford1952) 178 notes, Herodotusdoes not actuallysay the submissionwas disavowed.
The events leading to the embassycan be no laterthanthe end of the archonyear in late
Juneor early July and were probablyearlierin the spring;see pp. 262-265.
Actually, it has been doubtedby M.F. McGregor,"ThePro-PersianPartyat Athens,"in
AthenianStudiesPresentedto W.S.Ferguson(Cambridge1940) 77-78, followed by R.J.
Buck, "The Reforms of 487 B.C. in the Selection of Archons," CP 60 (1965) 99.
McGregor'ssuggestion that the Atheniansrecalled Cleisthenesand sent the embassy at
the same time perhaps"does no violence to the tenses of Herodotus,"but the Greek
certainlyimplies a sequence:Avhva^iot8i jeta fai'a KXAtoaOvea
... gieaxeai6WEvot
1ic4uouat

d6yygXoo

?;

dp8t; (5.73.1). McGregor's objection that Persian alliance

meantthe restorationof Hippiasis nonsense;thereis no evidence of Sardisadoptingthat

policy before Cleomenes' second failure to install Isagoras, and the fact is that ArtaphernesacceptedAtheniansubmissionwith no mentionof Hippias.His second objection,
that it would have been political suicide to propose submissionto Persia, is an entirely
subjectiveconclusion drawnfrom the reactionof the Athenianswhen the embassy did
return.
Historia,Band LI/3 (2002)
i) FranzSteinerVerlag WiesbadenGmbH,Sitz Stuttgart

260

RICHARDM. BERTHOLD

alliance with Thessaly had likely rested on a personal relationship, and in any
case it is improbable that the Thessalian cavalry could have provided decisive
support against armies of hoplites.3 The Thessalians may well have been
thirsting for revenge against the Spartans, but, burned once already, they were
not about to rush to the aid of a city whose prospects must have seemed very
dim. Athens' failure to approachArgos, the naturalally of any enemy of Sparta,
is best explained by the existence of a peace treaty between Argos and Sparta
and the Argives' remarkableconsistency in adhering to such agreements.4
As has long been recognized, the appeal to Persia was born of desperation.
The threat from Sparta was real and imminent, and with nowhere else to turn
Cleisthenes followed the lines of his family's old connections to Sardis and
sought help from the superpower across the Aegean.5 It is simply inconceivable
that Cleisthenes did not know that any relationship with the Persian empire
began with an unqualified recognition of Persian superioritythroughthe surrender of the tokens of earth and water. In addition to Alcmaeonid connections in
Asia Minor there is the fact that the Asian Greeks, including trading partnersof
Athens, had been under Persian rule for a half century. Is it credible that when
Cleisthenes and his people discussed whether to turn to Persia, no one asked
what the natureof the alliance would be or no one could be found who had any
knowledge on the subject? What is known of Cleisthenes does not suggest a
man who would take a complete leap into the darkon such an importantissue or
fail to give the envoys instructions regarding submission. It is much easier to
believe that Herodotus' statement that the envoys were responsible for the
decision is a distortion intended to spare the Alcmaeonids a furthercharge of
medism, particularlyin view of his later enthusiastic defense of the family after
Marathon.6
3

4
5
6

The victoryin 511 was clearlyagainsta small andpossiblydisorganizedforce (it came by

sea, was not commandedby a king and seems to have fought immediatelyafterlanding);
in contrast,the Thessalianswere easily drivenoff by Cleomenes' army;Herod.5.63.264.2; Arist.Ath. Pol. 19.5.
See J. Holladay,"Medismin Athens508-480 B.C.,"G&R25 (1978) 178-79, who points
out thatsuch a treatywould also explain Cleomenes' involvementin Argos in 495/4.
Herod.6.125.2-5.
So G. Busolt, GriechischeGeschichte2(Gotha 1894-1903) 11,441, n. 9; W.W. How & J.
Wells, A Commentaryon Herodotus(Oxford 1912) II, 40; E.M. Walker,"Athens.The
Reformof Cleisthenes,"CAHIV (Cambridge1926) 157-58; A.R. Burn,Persia and the
Greeks. The Defense of the West, c. 546-478 B.C.2 (London 1984) 187-88. G.M.E.
Williams, "AthenianPolitics 5087-480 B.C.: A Reappraisal,"Athenaeum60 (1982)
526-27 wondersif the Philaids,enemies of Persiaand the Alcmaeonids,had anythingto
do with Cleisthenessendingthe embassyto Sardis,butthis seems extremelyunlikely;the
externalthreatto Athens was clearly a more compellingmotivationthansome potential
domestic problem.On submissionto Persia see L.L. Orlin, "Athensand Persiaca. 507
B.C.: A NeglectedPerspective,"in L.L. Orlin,ed., MichiganOrientalStudiesin Honorof
G.C. Cameron(Ann Arbor 1976) 255-66, who stresses the eternaland cosmic signifi-

The AthenianEmbassiesto Sardisand Cleomenes' Invasionof Attica

261

A more perplexing question is exactly what Cleisthenes expected from the

Persian gambit. That the mission was connected to the threat from the Peloponnesus is obvious and accepted by all, but it is not clear how a sudden alliance
with Persia, whatever the terms, could thwart that threat. Could Cleisthenes
seriously expect that Cleomenes would be scared off by the mere news of an
alliance with Persia, a power with no presence west of the Aegean?7 And if he
was counting on actual Persian military aid, how could he possibly expect to see
it in time, when Cleomenes was already collecting his forces when the embassy
was sent? Even assuming Artaphemes could implement a major development in
Achaemenid foreign policy without reference to Darius, deploying an effective
force to Athens would require a significant amount of time for the collection of
ships, troops and supplies and the organization of a fairly complex amphibious
operation. News of these preparations was more likely to spur Cleomenes to
more aggressive action than to deter him, and he need only employ established
mechanisms to summon the Peloponnesian allies.8 If the Persians do decide to
send a force, then Cleomenes has every strategic reason to move even more
quickly and seize Athens before they can arrive. It seems that Cleisthenes was
grasping at Persian straws, and real help from the east, whether in the form of
deterrence or actual military force, was at best a long shot. Simply establishing
a basis for possible future Persian intervention was the only realistic hope.
Herodotussuggests thatupon their returnthe envoys were censured ("blamed
greatly") for submitting the tokens to Artaphernes, but he fails to explain
exactly why. The passage strongly implies that the people were caught by
surprise and displeased, but was it the mission itself or simply the terms it
accepted that offended them? A secret embassy, sent only on Cleisthenes'
orders, is certainly possible, since Athens was only now departing an age when
foreign policy was essentially the preserve of aristocrats,9but Herodotus says it

cance of the act; A. Kuhrt,"Earthand Water,"in A. Kuhn & H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg,

eds., AchaemenidHistoryIII: Methodand Theory(Leiden 1988) 87-99. If the tokenshad
literally to be from the submitting state, then the Athenians would have had to know

7
8

beforehandwhat the terms would be, but an understandingof the mythopoeticnatureof

the tokens suggests thatany earthand waterwould do; see Orlin (as in p. 260 n. 6) 26566. My thanksto Jack Balcer for informationon this.
The alliance as a deterrenceis implied by many scholars and stated explicitly by F.
Schachermeyr,"Athenals Stadtdes GroBk6nigs,"Graz. Beitr. 1 (1973) 217.
If Herod.5.31.4-32.1 is to be believed, Artaphernesneededroyal approvalfor the assault
on Naxos. Persian preparationsfor the Marathonexpedition began the previous year
(Herod.6.95.1), whereasSparta,Athens and Plataeawere able to prepareforces and get
them to Marathonin a matterof days ratherthanmonths;note also the rapidPeloponnesian mobilizationbeforePlataea(Herod.9.9.1-11.3). On the absolutechronologysee pp.
262-265.
F.J. Frost,"Politicsin EarlyAthens,"in G.S. Shrimpton& D.J. McCargar,eds., Classical
Contributions. Studies in Honor of M.F. McGregor (Locust Valley, NY 1981) 35.

262

RICHARD
M. BERTHOLD

was "the Athenians" who sent the mission. Further, if it had been secret, why
was it now revealed, only to be condemned? Could Cleisthenes, whose political
success had been based on an understandingof the demos, now so thoroughly
misjudge them? The dispatch of the embassy, if not the terms it could expect,
must have been public knowledge.
The condemnation of the embassy clearly resulted from the terms it accepted, which in turn means those terms - submission to Persia - were refused by
the Athenians.10 Now, it is possible that upon the envoys' return Cleisthenes
was confronted by an unexpected anti-Persian sentiment among the people and
simply abandoned the embassy, but such a sudden and politically decisive
outburst of anti-Persian feeling seems a bit surprisingfor a state surroundedby
serious foes and desperately seeking allies. The rejection of the Persian alliance
makes much more sense among a people facing no immediate threatsand with a
couple of impressive military victories under their corselets, which would be
the case had Cleomenes' invasion already failed when the envoys retumed.'1
With Cleomenes at least temporarily neutralized and morale boosted by the
energetic defeat of the Boeotians and Chalcidians the Athenians in their enthusiasm would probably have rejected any deal that even hinted at an inferior
status.
Unfortunately, Herodotus does not provide a precise chronology for either
the embassy or the invasion, but the evidence strongly suggests the summer of
507 for Cleomenes' failed attack.12Both Aristotle and Herodotus place Isagoras' political problems and thus his appeal to Spartain the archon year 508/7,13
which means Cleomenes' failed intervention must have taken place in the same
10 H. Berve,Miltiades.StudienzurGeschichtedes Mannesundseiner Zeit (Berlin 1937)71,
n. 1; Schachermeyr(as in n. 7) 213-14; andR. Sealey, "ThePit andthe Well: the Persian
Heraldsof 491 B.C.,"CJ 72 (1976/7) 17-18 all believe the alliance was accepted;Berve
points to Herodotus'silence and the notionthatwere it rejected,Artapherneswouldhave
no legal basis for his later demand to restore Hippias. But Herodotussurely implies
rejection (censuringthe envoys, but accepting their deed, is difficult to believe), and
Artaphernes,if indeedhe neededany legal basis, wouldconsiderthe submissionunilaterally valid regardlessof the acts of the Athenianassembly;see note 29.
11 So Walker (as in n. 6) 158-59; Burn (as in n. 6) 188; R. Thomsen, The Origins of
Ostracism(Copenhagen1972) 125; M. Ostwald,"TheReformof the AthenianState by
Cleisthenes,"CAH2IV (Cambridge1988) 308, 338.
12 With two exceptions every author places the invasion in 506, but no one offers the
slightest reasonor evidence for doing so. The exceptions are Burn (as in n. 6) 188 and
J.M.Cook, ThePersian Empire(London1983) 92, who date it to 507; fourauthorshedge
with the date 507/6: D.W. Knight, Some Studies in Athenian Politics in the Fifth Century

B.C. (Wiesbaden 1970) 24; R.D. Cromey,"Kleisthenes'Fate,"Hist. 28 (1979) 133; J.

Hart,Herodotusand GreekHistory(London 1982) 38, 71; L.H. Jeffery,"Greecebefore
the PersianInvasion,"CAH2IV (Cambridge1988) 360.
13 Herod.5.70.1-2; Arist.Ath. Pol. 20.1-2. Ostwald(as in n. II) 306-8 places the reforms
and Isagoras'appealin 507/6, which flies rightin the face of Aristotle.

The AthenianEmbassiesto Sardisand Cleomenes' Invasionof Attica

263

period. The king brought with him only a small "band"of soldiers,14 who were
easily overwhelmed, and collecting such a tiny force and marching to Athens
could hardly have taken more than a week or two. It is unknown precisely when
in the archon year Isagoras' appeal and expulsion took place, but even if they
are dated to the very end of the year - and there is no particularreason to believe
this so15 - Cleomenes would be back in the Peloponnesus collecting his army
by early August at the absolute latest.16It is far more likely, since Aristotle has
Cleisthenes undertaking his reforms "during the archonship of Isagoras," that
these events were earlier, perhaps in the spring of 507 or even in late 508.17
How long it took to mobilize the forces of the Peloponnesian alliance
cannot be determined with any precision and undoubtedly this varied with the
scale of the expedition, but numerous examples indicate that it cannot have
taken so many months that the expedition would be delayed until the following
year. The Spartanarmy could be mobilized virtually overnight, as demonstrated
by the lead-up to Plataea in 479, when the Peloponnesian levy appears to have
gathered at the Isthmus within weeks of the Spartan decision to march.18
During the great war with Athens the Peloponnesian army regularly invaded
Attica in the spring, and while it is true these expeditions were expected and
involved no political wrangling, they demonstrate that it was certainly physically possible for the levy to be collected and rushed north in less than a month.
And in 507 there appearsto have been little or no diplomatic dithering, since the
allies were in the dark about Cleomenes' true aims, suggesting they had simply
automatically heeded the call to mobilize. For Thucydides the campaigning
season runs from March or April until at least the beginning of November,19
which means that even if Isagoras' ouster is set at the latest possible moment,
early July, Cleomenes still had at least four months to collect his troops and
march to Eleusis. If this was insufficient time, then it is difficult to understand

14 Herod.5.72.1: ou avv jsey6kqiXEtpi; Arist.Ath. Pol. 20.3: jsei okiywv.

15 A. Andrewes, "Kleisthenes' Reform Bill," CQ 71 (1977) 246-47 suggests that since
Isagorasgave his nameto the archonyear he must have served most of his term.Even if
this suppositionis true, which is not at all clear, Isagorascould still have been out of
office in the early spring.
16 In theory the first monthof the Athenianyear, Hecatombaeon,began with the first new
moon afterthe summersolstice, so an archon'stermcould begin anywherefromlate June
to very earlyAugust.It cannotbe calculatedexactly whenthe year507/6 began,but it was
very probablyin mid or late July; see W.B. Dinsmoor,The AthenianArchonList in the
Light of Recent Discoveries (NY 1939) 205-10.

17 Arist.Ath.Pol. 21.1: en!i 'Iaay6pou dpxovto;. The relativeorderof Cleisthenes'reform

proposalsandIsagoras'appealis unimportanthere,but see Knight(as in n. 12) 13-24 for
a reasonablechronology;puttingthe reformsinto practice,which must take some time,
shouldbe distinguishedfrom simply voting for them.
18 Herod.9.9.1-11.3; some troopswere alreadythereworkingon the wall.
19

See A.W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides III (Oxford 1956) 699-715.

264

RICHARD M. BERTHOLD

how much of fifth and fourth century military history could have happened as it
did.
Of course, just because something could be done in a certain period of time
does not mean it was, especially in the typically plodding world of politics and
diplomacy. But there are good reasons to believe Cleomenes acted as expeditiously as possible. First, there is the king himself, by any account a headstrong
and supremely energetic individual, not given to caution and hesitation.20 A
man willing to bribe Delphi and play fast and loose with Sparta's constitutional
practices to obtain his ends was not likely to dawdle, especially when the issue
was not just political, but very personal. Besieged on the acropolis and forced to
retire, Cleomenes had been personally humiliated by the Athenians, and what is
known of his career strongly suggests an individual particularly eager to take
action when so injured.2'
Second, even a more cautious man would have compelling reasons to move
promptly. The longer the delay, especially into the next year, the more the
military and political situation would from his point of view deteriorate.
Cleomenes, having already been involved with Athens and now presumably
accompanied by Isagoras, must have been aware of the sorry state of Athenian
hoplite forces in the wake of the tyranny,22and he could hardly have failed to
conclude that the less time Athens had to preparethe easier his job would be. The
longer he delayed, the longer his client's enemies, the Alcmaeonids, would also
have to solidify their domestic political position, renderinghis political task that
much harder.Further,that he was apparentlytaken by surpriseby the last minute
defection of Damaratus and the Corinthians suggests - but only that - an
operationthrown together with some haste. Finally, whether Cleomenes knew of
the Athenian embassy to Sardis is unknown, but if he did, this might be another,
if minor, spurto action, since though he might suspect it would take some time to
get the ponderous Persian military machine moving, he could not be sure.
All the evidence, circumstantial though it may be, thus points to the summer of 507 for Cleomenes' invasion of Attica. The failed attack could conse20 So much so that many in antiquityand in the presenthave thoughthim insane; see A.
Griffiths, "Was Cleomenes Mad?," in A. Powell, ed., Classical Sparta. Techniques
BehindHer Success (Norman,Okl. 1988) 51-78.
21 Herod.5.72.1-4; Arist.Ath.Pol. 20.3. Herod.5.74.1 in fact speaksof Cleomenes'actions
in terms of insult and personal revenge: KkeogvIq be icrcxatdevo;ireptuppia0cat
xicetat Kai epyOWati6 A0A"vaiov ... reiacaa0ai Te s0eowv T6v 8i,ov t6v'AOivaxiv.
Cleomenes' subsequent proposal to restore Hippias (Herod. 5.90.1-91.3; Plut. Mor.
860f.) certainlysuggests a man willing to go to any lengthsto gain revenge.
22 Athensapparentlyhad not employeda citizen armyfor almostforty years,and Peisistratus may well have disarmedthe populace,seemingly relyingexclusively on mercenaries;
Arist.Ath. Pol. 15.3-4 (Thuc. 6.58.1-2 hardlyseems evidence for Hippiasdisarmingall
the hoplites,thoughthatmay have followed); see most recentlyF.J.Frost,"TheAthenian
MilitaryBefore Cleisthenes,"Hist. 33 (1984) 283-94.

The AthenianEmbassiesto Sardisand Cleomenes' Invasionof Attica

265

quentlyeasily precedethe returnof the envoys, especiallyif as representatives

of a low statusstatethey were keptcooling theirheels in Sardisby the satrap.
And since Cleomenes'failureand the Athenianvictoriesin the northprovide
the only compelling explanationfor the sudden repudiationof the Persian
alliance,it must be concludedthatthe embassydid in fact returnafterAthens
was saved.
Cleisthenesdisappearsfromhistoryaboutthis time, andsome have linked
thatdisappearanceto the embassy,suggestingthathe fell frompower,ruined
by his connectionwith the unpopularmission.23This is difficult to support,
especially if one acceptsthatthe embassyretumedafterthe crisis had passed.
Granted,the demoswouldlaterbe veryfickle in the treatmentof its leaders,but
it is veryhardto believethatin the flushof militaryvictorythe popularityof the
manrecognizedas the architectof the governmentresponsiblefor the triumph
wouldbe unableto weatheran associationwiththe discreditedembassy.In any
case, his biastowardsthe Alcmaeonidsnotwithstanding,
even Herodotuswould
have troubleglossing over what would have been a very dramaticfall from
power.Theembassywouldlaterreturnto hauntthe Alcmaeonids,butit certainly does not providea reliablebasisfor removingCleisthenesor his familyfrom
the centerstage in Athenianpolitics.The most likely explanation,particularly
in view of the factthatHerodotustypicallydoes not recorduneventfuldeaths,is
thatas a relativelyold man,he simplydied or retiredin the yearsfollowingthe
reforms.24

The firstembassyto Sardishas beenseen as an act of medismon the partof

the "pro-Persian"
Alcmaeonids,25but this conclusionis based in parton the
mistakenassumptionthatthereexistedin Athensdefinablepartieswithconsistent policies. Instead,politics remainedat the turnof the centurya timocratic
gameof individualaristocratsoperatingwithina networkof familyconnections
and competingfor temporaryadvantagein power and prestige,all of which
conspiredagainstthe emergenceof partiesandlong-termpoliticalprograms.26
It is thus impossibleto draw any conclusionsabout the official Alcmaeonid
positionregardingPersiaor whether,for thatmatter,they even had one. That

23 How & Wells (as in n. 6) 11,40; Walker(as in n. 6) 167-68; C.W. Fornara& L.J. Samons
HI,Athensfrom Cleisthenesto Pericles (Berkeley/LosAngeles 1991) 10, n. 38.
24 McGregor(as in n. 2) 79, n. 3; J.K. Davies, AthenianPropertiedFamilies 600-300 B.C.
(Oxford 1971) 375; amongothers.The objectionsof Cromey(as in n. 12) 133-47 make
absolutely no sense, and his argumentthat Cleisthenes went into voluntary exile is
ingeniousbut unconvincing.Cleisthenesis the second child of parentsmarriedsometime
before 570; see Davies (as in n. 24) 372.
25 Walker (as in n. 6) 158, 168; Hignett (as in n. 1) 180; C.A. Robinson,Jr., "Athenian
Politics 510-486 B.C.,"AJP 66 (1945) 247-48 seems to imply this.
26 See esp. F.J.Frost,"TribalPolitics andthe Civic State,"AJAH1 (1976) 66-75 (as in n. 9)
Class. Contr. 33-39.

266

RICHARDM. BERTHOLD

the mission was clearly undertaken in response to an external crisis also

undermines any conclusions about domestic politics; are Roosevelt and the
American Congress to be considered "pro-Communist"because they made an
alliance with the Soviet Union during the Second World War? Moreover, an
unqualified accusation of medism is at this date completely inaccurate, since it
is only after the Ionian Revolt and Marathon and especially after Xerxes'
invasion that dealings with Persia take on the aura of treason and betrayal
generally associated with the term.27
Sometime close to the end of the century the Athenians sent a second
embassy to Sardis, this time to deal with the problem of Hippias.28 When
Cleomenes' bizarre scheme to restore him to power fell through, Hippias had
headed for the satrapalcourt, which almost certainlytook up his cause because of
Athens' repudiationof the alliance of 507. From the Persian point of view that
submission to Ahura-Mazdaand the GreatKing was permanent,and Artaphemes
was inclined to support whatever Athenian government - in this case the exiled
tyrant- endorsed this arrangement.29While Herodotus states that the purpose of
the embassy was to dissuade Artaphernesfrom supportingHippias, it cannothave
had even the least expectation of success, since the satrap was hardly likely to
preferthe defiant republicto the compliant tyrant.The mission must be viewed as
a diplomatic statement, an assertion to the Persians and anyone else (including
opponents in Athens itself) of the legitimacy of the new government.30Flush with
confidence in the wake of their military victories, the Athenians shrugged off
Artaphernes'threatsand accepted Persian hostility as the price of independence.

27 See esp. Holladay(as in n. 4) 174-91; also A.W. Gomme,"AthenianNotes. 1. Athenian

Politics 510-483 B.C.," AJP 65 (1944) 321-22 (= More Essays in Greek History and
Hlist.22 (1973) 3-5.
Literature[Oxford1962] 19-20); J. Wolski, "MT8tcsa6q,"
28 Herod.5.96.2. For no apparentreason(it appearsto go back to R.W. Macan,Herodotus.
TheFourth,FifthandSixthBooks[London18951I, 245) c. 504 is thedatemostoftengiven
for theembassy(e.g., Walker[as in n. 6]) 163, n. 2; Thomsen[as in n. 11] 126;Ostwald[as
,
i1T' catpCo6 MtAoto; 'Aptaray6p...)
in n. 111338), but Herod. 5.97.1 (ev co-i6u
suggests a date closer to 498; could it be that the new threatcontributedto the military
reformof 501/0?
29 Herod. 5.96.1. On the permanenceof submission see Orlin (as in n. 6) 257-65; by
supportingHippiasArtapherneswas not attemptingto createa new alliancewith Athens,
but was simply interferingin the affairs of a state alreadyconsidereda vassal. On the
Persianrelationshipwith tyrannysee esp. D.F. Graf, "GreekTyrantsand Achaemenid
Politics," in J.W. Eadie & J. Ober,eds., The Craftof the Historian.Essays in Honor of
C.G. Starr(Lanham,MD 1985) 79-123.
30 Thomsen(as in n. I 1) 126 andOstwald(as in n. I 1) 338 see the purposeof the embassyas
counteringHippias,but only Walker(as in n. 6) 168 recognizesthe hopelessnessof this,
wrongly concluding, however, that there is a problem with Herodotus'account. The
Alcmaeonidswould certainlysupportthe embassy as a way to counteractany negative
publicityfrom the previousmission.

The AthenianEmbassiesto Sardisand Cleomenes' Invasionof Attica

267

The second embassy and Artaphernes' acceptance of the tyrant's claim

mark something of a turning point in the domestic affairs of Athens. Henceforth, any suggestion of rapprochementwith Persia meant supporting a restoration of the tyranny, a development that could only make medizing politically
unacceptable to all but a handful who might benefit from Hippias' return.31
Conversely, tyranny, whose popular support was undoubtedly already rapidly
evaporating with the successes of the new government, was now furthertainted
by its clear association with submission to a foreign power. Whatever the
details of Athenian domestic politics in this period, Persian support of Hippias
makes it extremely difficult to accept the presence in the city of any sizable or
influential group of either medizers or tyrannists. Stepping on to the shore at
Marathon a decade later, Hippias might believe there was such a faction, but
Miltiades would know otherwise.
University of New Mexico, Albuquerque

31

Richard M. Berthold

Walker (as in n. 6) 168 recognizes this, but incorrectly believes in the continued existence
of a "party of Hippias" in Athens.