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To cite this article: Jorge N. Ferrer (1998) Beyond absolutism and relativism in
transpersonal evolutionary theory, World Futures: The Journal of New Paradigm
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and value; and (2) the critique of any privileged picture, metanarrative or "Big Story" about human beings and their place in history
and the cosmos.1 As Lyotard (1974) put it in his often quoted
dictum, postmodernity can be characterized by an "incredulity
toward metanarratives." According to many contemporary thinkers,
metanarratives have historically not only claimed universal status,
but also functioned as legitimization devices of ethical and epistemic
judgments and practices. The absolutist character of metanarratives
has been fiercely criticized for being totalizing, imperialistic, and
logocentric. Postmodernism emerged as a reaction against these
totalizing meta-frameworks, and due to the failure of the fundamental Enlightenment project to find untouchable or absolute
foundations for human knowledge and morality. This lack of ultimate foundations has been often portrayed as potentially leading to
a situation of utter perplexity, enervating anxiety, meaningless relativism, and even banalized nihilism (e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Crook,
1991; Carr, 1992).2 If there are no transhistorical and transcultural
foundations for our knowledge and morality, the enemies of postmodernism argue, then the only route open to us is one leading to
both a self-refuting epistemological relativism and a pernicious moral
anarchy. This is, paraphrasing Habermas (1987, p. 300), the dilemma of the postmodern era: How to navigate between the Scylla of
a totalitarian and unattainable absolutism and the Charybdis of a
self-contradictory and morally repugnant relativism.
Interestingly enough, this postmodern predicament finds striking parallels in the history of evolutionary philosophical thinking.
Ever since the rise of Darwinism, many of the debates on biological
and human evolution have orbited around the conflict between
defenders of an uni-linear, universal, and frequently pre-given evolutionary process (Hegel, Teilhard de Chardin, etc.) and proponents
of multiple, undeterministic, and often purposeless evolutionary
pathways (Spencer, Morgan, Bergson, Monod, etc.) (Bowler, 1989).
In the same vein, the perpetual quarrels between scientists and
religious partisans of various sorts (creationists, finalists, etc.) about
the nature and purpose of evolution usually derived from similar
points of divergence (e.g., Barlow, 1995). However, it was in the
discipline of cultural anthropology where the dichotomy between
absolutist and relativism in the context of evolutionary thinking
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in the universe. In this section, I want to show how this map is laid
out from the absolutist position known as the perennial philosophy.
Before proceeding further, however, it may be necessary to
say some words here about my use of the term "absolutism," instead
of the more in vogue "objectivism," to refer to Wilber's position
throughout this paper. As is well known, absolutism has been a
term in disuse in Western philosophy for the last decades. Recently,
for example, Bernstein (1983) encouraged the substitution of
objectivism for absolutism in the classic dichotomy "absolutismrelativism." Bernstein (1983) argued that, since all human knowledge is today accepted to be fallible, conjectural, and approximate,
absolutism is "no longer a live option" (p. 12). Therefore, he proposed to use objectivism to refer to all forms of foundationalist
philosophy standing in opposition to relativist, contextualist or
skeptical views of reason, knowledge, and value. However, although
both absolutism and objectivism have been applied in contrast to
relativist doctrines, these two terms should not be used as interchangeable. In short, while objectivism claims that our knowledge
of the world, even if imperfect and approximate, is warranted by the
existence of a pre-given reality that exists "out there" independently
of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity, absolutism maintains the
existence of ultimate, transcendental or eternal truths and values
embedded in human nature, the universe, or both.
The reason I am emphasizing this distinction here is because
I believe that, in the context of transpersonal theory, to use the
term objectivism is profoundly confusing and misleading for at
least the following two reasons: First, to accuse an absolutist
transpersonal theoristsuch as Wilberof being objectivist is
inaccurate because he or she may be defending the identity
between human deepest subjectivity and the ultimate nature of
objective reality. After all, this is the central claim of the perennial
philosophy, according to which: "At the highest levels, world
and self, outer reality and inner reality, coincide as the 'ground' of
all that is" (Rothberg, 1986, p. 3). Or, in Wilber's (1993b) own
words: "The core insight of the psychologia perennis is that our
'innermost' consciousness is identical to the absolute and ultimate
reality of the universe" (p. 22). Second, we should also remember that
one of the most basic tenets of transpersonal theory is precisely
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matter has evolved from It. (2) Hierarchical ontology and axiology, or
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(...) there is still That One, or the timeless and absolute Spirit of
which the entire universe is but a manifestation, but that world of
manifestation is not now devolving away from Spirit, it is evolving
toward Spirit. God does not lie in our collective past, God lies in our
collective future; the Garden of Eden is tomorrow, not yesterday; the
Golden Age lies down the road, not up it. (p. 63)
What Wilber is claiming is that the involutionary cosmology of the
traditional perennial philosophy should be complemented with a
special type of teleological evolutionism. Teleological evolutionism is
the view that cosmological, phylogenetic, and ontogenetic processes
are ultimately directed towards a predetermined goal. In the classic
evolutionary perennialist view, this pre-given goal is generally
equated with Spirit itself. For traditional evolutionary perennialists
like Teilhard de Chardin or Aurobindo, that is, Spirit is not only the
beginning, but also the end-point of evolution. Spirit is both the
Alpha and the Omega of all cosmological and evolutionary processes. It is important to note here that, in contrast to these philosophers, Wilber (1995a, 1997) does not believe that this Omega
point (Spirit) towards which the evolutionary process is directed will
ever be reached in the world of time and space and form. Since
Spirit is timeless and formless, Wilber (1997) convincingly argues,
It will never be reached at any point in time, but can only be
realized "by stepping off the cycle of time and evolution altogether"
(p. 280). Still, it should be noted here that Wilber (1995a) regards
Spirit as the final cause, pull, and telos of the entire cosmic and
human evolutionary process.
It is certainly one of Wilber's great accomplishments to have given
the perennial vision higher contemporary finesse and explanatory
power than any other traditional or modern account. In my opinion,
this is due not only to the incorporation of the notion of evolution, but also to the adoption of two conceptual frameworks: One
modern, structuralism, and the other postmodern, constructivism.
Against an evolutionary background, these two frameworks allow
Wilber to accommodate, somewhat artificially I believe, both the
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Once the false dichotomy between absolutism and vulgar relativism is artificially constructed, the second move logically follows: A
sustained attack of the "wrong" pole under the charges of selfrefutation and "aperspectival madness." In this section, I will consider the legitimacy of the charge of self-refutation with which
Wilber (1995a, 1996) attempts to dismiss all non-absolutist approaches, such as cultural relativism, constructivism, pluralism,
and other contextualist accounts of truth and morality. The next
section will deal with the second charge, that of "aperspectival
madness."
The core of Wilber's attack against non-absolutist approaches
rests in the argument for self-reflexivity or self-refutation. When
considering cultural relativism, for example, Wilber (1995a) claims
that its adherents "maintain that all diverse cultural values are
equally valid, and that no universal value judgments are possible.
But that judgment is itself a universal judgment. It claims to be
universally true that no judgments are universally true" (p. 29, his
emphasis). Therefore, he continues, "this type of obscurantism (...)
is profoundly self-contradictory" (p. 29; see also pp. 526-528,
note. 26). Wilber (1995a) applies the same line of argumentation
ad nauseum to critique non-hierarchical approaches (p. 25), pluralism (p. 28; p. 574, note. 26), perspectivism and post-structuralism
(p. 188), multiculturalism (pp. 199-204), constructivism (pp. 599-601,
note. 16), and deconstructivism (p. 721, note. 4).
As is well known, the charge of self-refutation is the classic
argument against relativism used by virtually all absolutist philosophers even since Plato's quarrels with the Sophists.13 In its general
form, the argument runs as follows: Relativism (or constructivism,
contextualism, etc.) is self-refuting because it cannot be stated consistently without becoming some form of absolutism (or objectivism, universalism, etc.). That is, to say that all views are relative
(or constructed, contextual, etc.) renders the relativist thesis either
relative itself or claiming to be an exception to its own logic. If the
relativist thesis does not have absolute and universal value, the
absolutist philosopher argues, then there is no reason to consider it
more valid than any other view. Conversely, if the relativist thesis is
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legitimacy of an argumentative universe of discourse, is precisely what is denied or put into question by these approaches.
Furthermore, the contradictory problems seemingly implicit in
self-referential propositions do not necessarily emerge in either a
dialogical universe of discourse or in a model of "concourse." But
then, the argument for self-refutation against relativism is wellfounded only if relativism, the view that it is trying to discredit is
mistaken (that is, if there really exist absolute standards of reason,
knowledge, and value). Once it is revealed that the hidden premises
of the self-refutation charge against non-absolutist approaches presuppose its conclusion, this reasoning becomes what logicians call a
syllogistic fallacy. This is why a non-absolutist philosopher such as
Fuchs (1992) can tranquilly point out that "The methodological
horror of relativism and its paradoxes scares and occupies only
those who still search for safe epistemic foundations" (p. 30).
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reality (pp. 693-694, note. 1); with the Suchness of all Forms (p. 693,
note. 1); with pure Presence (p. 696, note. 1); and even suggests that,
once the Madhyamaka via negativa is relaxed, Nagarjuna's emptiness
can be metaphorically matched with the Hindu Brahman (p. 698,
note. 1). Furthermore, Wilber (1995a) adds, the Buddhist no-self
doctrine cannot be literally applied to the Absolute, because both self
and non-self "are equally manifestations of the Primordial State, selfcognizing Emptiness and spontaneous luminosity" (p. 706, note. 1).
Several objections can be raised about Wilber's account of emptiness (sunyata): First, Wilber omits to mention that Murti's work
(1955), together with Stcherbatsky's writings (1962, 1968) are
unanimously regarded by modern Buddhist scholars and historians
as the "absolutist" interpretation of Nagarjuna. This absolutist
interpretation, strongly influenced by nineteenth-century German
idealism (Schelling, Hegel, Kant, etc.), emerged as a reaction to the
nihilistic readings of emptiness fruit of the first Western intellectual
encounter with Buddhism (e.g., Max Mller) (Tuck, 1990). Modern
commentators concur in that in order to establish convincing parallels between these traditions (Madhyamaka and German idealism),
Murti had to transform Nagarjuna's thinking into a version of
Advaita Vedanta philosophy that does not stand any serious analysis
of the textual and historical evidence (Tuck, 1990; Hayes, 1994).
As Huntington (1989) pointed out, for example, Murti's "Vedantic/
Kantian spectacles distort the Madhyamika's message in a much
more subtle and persuasive fashion than any nihilistic interpretation ever could, and for that reason have unfortunately done a great
deal to prevent us from deepening our understanding of these
texts" (p. 27). Actually, no modern scholar of Madhyamaka philosophy would quote Murti's work except to point out the inadequacy
of his interpretations, or as an historical example of the projection
of Western philosophical notions on Eastern thinking (see e.g.,
Streng, 1967, p. 76, p. 148, note. 15; Huntinchon, 1989, pp. 26-30;
Tuck, 1990, pp. 47-53; Hayes, 1994, pp. 333-338).
Second, modern interpreters of Nagarjuna find any form of
absolutist account of emptiness (sunyata) completely unacceptable,
and in no way grounded on textual evidence. According to Richards
(1978), for example, "It is a mistake to subsume the Madhyamika
philosophy of Nagarjuna in Advaita Vedanta and thereby to change
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Notes
1. For a popular introduction to the main themes of postmodernity, see the
interesting collection of essays compiled by Anderson (1995) in his The Truth
About the Truth.
2. Although I cannot subscribe all its conclusions, the work of Carr (1992) is uniquely
valuable in offering both a taxonomy of the different varieties of nihilism
(epistemological, alethiological, ontological, ethical, and existential), and lucid
distinctions between nihilism on the one hand, and relativism, skepticism and
atheism on the other.
3. Throughout this essay, I will also be referring to Wilber's popular version of SES,
A Brief History of Everything (1996), and to its sequel The Eye of Spirit (1997).
4. In contrast to a metanarrativee.g., Darwinism, Freudianism or Marxismwhich
generally tells the story of human existence in its own termse.g., biological
evolutionism, psychic determinism, or social-economic historicismwithout extensive reference to other branches of knowledge, a meta-metanarrative explicitly
attempts, la Hegel, to accommodate or correct all already existent metanarratives within an all-encompassing scheme about "how things really are." Notice
that meta-metanarratives also function as legitimizing both knowledge claims and
moral judgments. For example, the Basic Moral Intuition derived from Wilber's
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5.
6.
7.
8.
JORGE N. FERRER
meta-metanarrative is "to protect and promote the greatest depth for the
greatest span" (1996, p. 334, his emphasis), and an example of moral judgment
that follows from that intuition is that if we have to choose between killing a
dozen apes or killing Al Capone, we should kill Al (1996, p. 336). After all, Wilber
(1996) adds, "There's nothing sacrosanct about being a human holon" (p. 336).
In a rather personal article, Wilber (1995b) stated that the ultimate purpose, the
"single and unmistakable goal of the twelve books" (p. 21) he has authored "is
not to get people involved in intellectual head trips" (p. 22). On the contrary,
he added, "That is exactly what my books are attempting to stop, as those who
have read them will readily acknowledge. The problem is that many people,
academic or otherwise, are already playing head games (....) So I have
attempted to engage these people in their own game, and to play it very fast and
hard, simply to get to this conclusion: at some point, you and I must stop this
intellectual head-tripping, and begin actual spiritual practice." (p. 20). In
passages like this, Wilber seems to be joining Nagarjuna in his crusade to stop
conceptual proliferation as a means to attain spiritual liberation. As we will see
in this paper, however, SES is not the Mulamadhyamakarikas, but in many
respects its antithesis. And the authoritative, provoking, and sometimes sarcastic
and ridiculing tone of Wilber's critiques of many contemporary thinkers is
certainly not conducive to stopping mind games, but seems to be rather calling
for heated debate and retort.
I do not want the following critical reading of certain trends in Wilber's thinking
to overshadow the profound appreciation I feel for his work. I want to emphasize
here that not only do I believe that the vision he presents is feasible, but also that
I find myself in agreement with an uncountable number of the issues and ideas
he brilliantly discusses in SES. I firmly believe that Ken Wilbertogether with
Donald Rothberg, Michael Washburn, and a few othersis one of the few authors
truly developing the edges and giving maturity to modern transpersonal studies.
Nor do I want this paper to be taken as a postmodern critique of transpersonal
studies. On the contrary, I should make clear from the very beginning that
I consider myself a transpersonal thinker, and I am convinced that many aspects
of postmodernity can and should be critiqued from a transpersonal perspective.
However, as we will see, most sophisticated postmodern thinkers are neither
self-contradictory nor nihilistic, and to ground the transpersonal critique of
postmodernity on these charges is therefore futile and misleading. It is my belief
that the next decade will bear witness to the beginning of a very needed conversation between the transpersonal perspective and wider mainstream academia.
Entering such a dialogue by building "straw men" and begging the real issues at
stake is not the most auspicious presentation of transpersonal studies.
Although, as I will show below, Wilber's thinking is both absolutist and universalist, these two doctrines should not be confused. While absolutism is always
universalist, universalism does not necessarily imply absolutism. Universalism
merely makes reference to the occurrence and incidence of a phenomenon and
does not make any judgment about its absolute rightness, goodness or truth. Likewise, the doctrine antithetical to universalism is not relativism but particularism.
As Gellner (1982) demonstrated, the discovery of universals is perfectly compatible with a relativistic position.
An alternative way to depict Wilber's position is as holding both metaphysical
monismthere exists a "unique Truth" about the worldand critical monismthis
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Truth is open to only "one right interpretation" that can be ascertained by the
human mind and translated into a "Theory of Everything." In contrast, more
pluralistic views, even admitting an independent unique reality, may maintain
that there can be rational disagreements about its nature, a plurality of "right"
interpretations, and that no single theory can map reality in all its complexity and
proclaim to be paradigmatic for the rest (see, e.g., Hoy and McCarthy, 1994).
9. It is probable that many of the universalist claims of the perennial philosophy
stem from an a priori commitment to an absolutist view of reality. As Perovich
(1985), a perennialist philosopher, put it: "The point [of the perennial philosophers] in insisting on the identity of mystical experiences was, after all, to
bolster the claim that the most varied mystics have established contact with 'the
one ultimate truth'" (p. 75).
10. In several passages (e.g., 1995a, pp. 264-276), Wilber suggests the possibility of
validating perennialist claims on the basis of the experiential content of mystical
experiences. Although I consider this proposal highly controversial, I will not
discuss here its validity insofar as Wilber promises to deal in detail with this topic
in the third volume of the Trilogy (see p. 599, note. 15). Meanwhile, the reader
interested in pursuing this issue further can consult the works by Wilber (1990)
and Shear (1994) for different argumentations suggesting that the principles of
the perennial philosophy can find epistemic support in mystical experiences. For
the contrary view, that is, that mystical experiences offer no evidential value for
mystical metaphysics, see Smith (1987), Angel (1994), and Fenton (1994).
11. Elsewhere (Ferrer, 1997) I have critically discussed the relationship between
transpersonal theory and the perennial philosophy. Here, I would like to merely
point out that the roots of this association can be traced to the very birthplace
of the transpersonal orientation, i.e., Maslow's seminal works. Maslow's most
clear perennialist manifesto can be found in Chapter 3 of his Religions, Values,
and Peak-Experiences (1970), adequately entitled "The 'Core-Religious,' or 'Transcendent,' Experience." In this essay, he wrote: "This private religious experience [the peak-experience] is shared by all great religions including the atheistic
ones like Buddhism, Taoism, Humanism, or Confucianism" (p. 28). Transpersonal theory, that is, was born in a perennialist world. Arguably, the second
major factor for the perennialist flavor of most contemporary transpersonal
scholarship is the strong influence of Wilber's thinking in transpersonal circles
(see Davis and Wright, 1987; Walsh and Vaughan, 1994). In any event, the fact
that many perennialist claims have been usually taken for granted by most
transpersonal thinkers suggests that an exhaustive examination of the precise
relationship between transpersonal psychology and the perennial philosophy is
imperative (cf. Walsh and Vaughan, 1993b).
12. Any serious investigation of the issues raised by the different varieties of relativism
should include, at least, the anthologies by Wilson (1980), Hollis and Lukes (1982),
Krausz and Meiland (1982), Bernstein (1983), Margolis (1986), Siegel (1987),
Krausz (1989), and Harre and Krausz (1996).
13. In the Thaetheus, 170a-172c. See Burnyeat (1990) for a detailed examination of
Protagoras' self-refutation.
14. However, listen to Gadamer (1990): "That the thesis of skepticism or relativism
refutes itself to the extent that it claims to be true is an irrefutable argument.
But what does it achieve? The reflective argument that proves successful here
rebounds against the arguer, for it renders the truth value of reflection suspect.
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15.
16.
17.
18.
JORGE N. FERRER
275
psycho-sexual development. No, Freud was not genderly unbiased, and, as I will
show, Nagarjuna did not defend an absolutist view of ultimate reality. For a lucid
work clarifying some of these hermeneutical issues, see Gracia (1995).
Acknowledgments
This research was carried out in part thanks to the support of a
"La Caixa" Fellowship ("La Caixa" Fellowship Program, 201 North
Indiana Avenue, Bloomington, Indiana 47405-3601; 812-855-7072,
fax: 812-855-6271). The author would like also to thank Steve Dinan
for helpful comments on an early draft of this paper, and Alfonso
Montuori, Ph.D. for his encouragement and editorial assistance.
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