GOLDEN FARMS V.

SECRETARY OF LABOR 234 SCRA 517 (1994)

FACTS: Petitioner Golden Farms Inc is a corporation engaged in the production and
marketing of bananas for export. In 1992, private respondent Progressive Federation of
Labor (PFL) filed a petition for certification election among the monthly paid office and
technical rank-and-file employees of petitioner
1. Golden Farms moved to dismiss the petition the on the following grounds:
a. Respondent PFL failed to show it was organized as a chapter within the
petitioners establishment
b. There was already an existing CBA between the rank-and-file employees
represented by the National Federation of Labor (NFL) and the petitioner
c. The employees represented by PFL had allegedly been disqualified from
bargaining with management in an earlier case (Golden Farms Inc v. FerrerCalleja)
2. Respondent PFL countered that the monthly paid office and technical employees
should be allowed to form a separate bargaining unit because they were
expressly excluded from coverage in the CBA between petitioner and NFL.
3. In its reply, petitioner argued that the monthly paid office and technical
employees should have joined the existing collective bargaining unit of the rankand-file employees if they are not managerial employees
4. Med-Arbiter granted the petition. Upon appeal, Secretary of Labor affirmed the
same.
ISSUE: WON petitioners monthly paid rank-and-file employees can constitute a
bargaining unit separate from the existing bargaining unit of its daily paid rank-and-file
employees (definition of bargaining unit)
HELD: Yes.
A "bargaining unit" has been defined as a group of employees of a given
employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which
the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the
employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties
of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law. The
community or mutuality of interest is therefore the essential criterion in the
grouping. "And this is so because 'the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best
assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.'
In the case at bar, the evidence established that the monthly paid rank-and-file
employees of petitioner primarily perform administrative or clerical work. In
contradistinction, the petitioner's daily paid rank-and-file employees mainly work in the
cultivation of bananas in the fields. It is crystal clear the monthly paid rank-and-file
employees of petitioner have very little in common with its daily paid rank-and-file
employees in terms of duties and obligations, working conditions, salary rates,
and skills. To be sure, the said monthly paid rank-and-file employees have even

been excluded from the bargaining unit of the daily paid rank-and-file employees.
This dissimilarity of interests warrants the formation of a separate and distinct
bargaining unit for the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. To
rule otherwise would deny this distinct class of employees the right to self-organization
for purposes of collective bargaining. Without the shield of an organization, it will also
expose them to the exploitations of management.

INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILL WORKERS UNION V. CALICA 205 SCRA 697 (1992)
FACTS: Petitioner Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union-PTGWO is a legitimate labor
organization duly registered with DOLE and is the exclusive bargaining agent of all
rank-and-file employees of Indophil Textile Mills Inc. Calica is impleaded in his official
capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator of NCMB, while private respondent Indophil Textile Mills
Inc is a corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale and export of yarns of various
counts and kinds
1. Petitioner union and private respondent Indophil executed a CBA covering April
1987 to March 1990
2. Subsequently, Indophil Acrylic Manufacturing Corp was formed. When Acrylic
became operational, it hired its own workers. Sometime in 1989, the workers of
Acrylic unionized and a CBA was executed between both parties
3. Petitioner union claimed that the plant facilities built and set up by Acrylic should
be considered as an extension or expansion of the facilities of private respondent
company pursuant to Art 1 of its CBA. Petitioner now contends that Acrylic is part
of Indophil bargaining unit
4. Respondent Voluntary Arbitrator held against petitioner union and held that
Acrylic is separate and distinct from Indophil Textile Mills
5. Petitioner argued that the articles of incorporation of the two corporations
establish that the two entities are engaged in the same of kind of business
6. On the other hand, public respondent through OSG, contended that Acrylic is not
an alter ego or an adjunct or business conduit of private respondent because it
has a separate legitimate business purposes.
ISSUE: WON the Indophil Acrylic Corp is an extension or expansion of private
respondent company; WON the rank-and-file employees working at Acrylic should be
recognized as part of, and/or within the scope of the bargaining unit
HELD: No. In the case at bar, petitioner seeks to pierce the veil of corporate entity of
Acrylic, alleging that the creation of the corporation is a devise to evade the application
of the CBA between petitioner Union and private respondent Company. The fact that
the businesses of private respondent and Acrylic are related, that some of the
employees of the private respondent are the same persons manning and
providing for auxiliary services to the units of Acrylic, and that the physical
plants, offices and facilities are situated in the same compound, are not sufficient
to justify the piercing of the corporate veil of Acrylic.
In the case of Diatagon Labor Federation Local 110 of the ULGWP v. Ople, the SC held
that that it is grave abuse of discretion to treat two companies as a single
bargaining unit when these companies are indubitably distinct entities with
separate juridical personalities.
Hence, the Acrylic not being an extension or expansion of private respondent, the rankand-file employees working at Acrylic should not be recognized as part of, and/or within
the scope of the petitioner, as the bargaining representative of private respondent.

ALGIRE V. DE MESA 237 SCRA 647 (1994)

FACTS: Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union (URTMSEU),
through private respondent de Mesa, filed a petition for the holding of an election of
union officers. Acting on the petition, the Med-Arbiter issued an order directing that such
an election be held.
1. In the pre-election conference, it was agreed that the election by secret ballot be
conducted between petitioners Algire and private respondents de Mesa under
the supervision of DOLE
2. The secret ballot contained instructions to mark check or cross inside the box
specified for the candidates. It also indicated not to make any additional markings
3. In the election Algire and de Mesa both had 133 votes while there were 6 ballots
declared as spoiled
4. Algire, then, filed a petition to include one spoiled ballot in his favor. Said ballot
contained two checks inside the box opposite the name of Algire. Algire argued
that the two checks made it even clearer that the voter intended to vote for Algire
5. The Med-Arbiter declared the questioned ballot valid and counted the same in
Algires favor. Accordingly, Algires group was elected as the unions officers
6. Upon appeal, the Secretary of Labor reversed the Med-Arbiters order and issued
a new one calling for a re-election of union officers of URTMSEU
7. Algire filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner argued that a representation officer can validly rule only on on-the-spot
questions arising from the conduct of the elections, but the determination of the
validity of the questioned ballot is not within his competence. As such, any ruling
made by the representation officer concerning the validity of the ballot is an
absolute nullity for being done with lack of jurisdiction
ISSUE: WON DOLE representative acted in excess of his jurisdiction in not counting the
disputed ballot in favor of Algire
HELD: No. To resolve the issue at hand, it must be identified first if the election was a
consent election or a certification election.
It is unmistakable that the election held on November 15, 1990 was a consent
election and not a certification election. It was an agreed one, the purpose being
merely to determine the issue of majority representation of all the workers in the
appropriate collective bargaining unit. It is a separate and distinct process and has
nothing to do with the import and effort of a certification election.
The ruling of DOLE's representative in that election that the questioned ballot is spoiled
is not based on any legal provision or rule justifying or requiring such action by such
officer but simply in pursuance of the intent of the parties, expressed in the written
instructions contained in the ballot, which is to prohibit unauthorized markings
thereon other than a check or a cross, obviously intended to identify the votes in
order to preserve the sanctity of the ballot, which is in fact the objective of the
contending parties.

If indeed petitioner's group had any opposition to the representation officer's ruling that
the questioned ballot was spoiled, it should have done so seasonably during the
canvass of votes. Its failure or inaction to assail such ballot's validity shall be deemed a
waiver of any defect or irregularity arising from said election.

NUWHRAIN-MANILA PAVILION HOTEL CHAPTER V. SECRETARY OF LABOR

G.R. NO 181531 (2009)
FACTS: In a certification election held among the rank-and-file employees of Holiday
Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel, petitioner NUWHRAIN-MPHC garnered 151 votes while
private respondent HIMPLU had 169 votes.
1. Because of the number of segregated votes (22 votes), NUWHRAIN-MPHC and
HIMPLU referred the case to the Med-Arbiter to decide which among those vote
should be opened in tallied. 11 votes were initially segregated because they were
cast by dismissed employees (although their dismissal was pending before CA),
6 other votes were cast by employees who were already occupying supervisory
positions at the time of the election, and 5 were cast by probationary employees
(which, pursuant to the existing CBA cannot vote). It must be noted, though, that
one vote by a probationary employee (Gatbonton) was counted
2. Med-Arbiter ruled for the opening of 17 out of 22 segregated votes, particularly
those of the 11 dismissed employees and those cast by the 6 supposedly
supervisory employees of the hotel
3. As such, NUWHRAIN-MPHC appealed to the Secretary of Labor, arguing that
the votes of the probationary employees should be opened since Gatbontons
vote was tallied. And should the 5 votes be included, the majority would be
169+1 (151+169+1+17)
4. The Secretary of Labor affirmed the Med-Arbiters order on the basis that
according to Sec 5 Rule IX of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code,
probationary employees cannot vote.
5. CA affirmed the ruling of the Secretary of Labor and held that the ruling in Airtime
Specialist v. Ferrer-Calleja applies only to situations where the probationary
employees were already employed as of the date of filing of the petition for
election. But in this case, the 6 probationary employees were not yet employed
by the hotel at the time the order of the certification election was issued. As such,
they were not entitled to vote. CA also ruled that since the inclusion of
Gatbontons vote was nor properly challenged, its inclusion could no longer be
questioned, nor could it be made the basis the include the votes of the 6
probationary employees
ISSUE: WON employees on probationary status at the time of the certification elections
should be allowed to vote; WON HIMPLU was able to obtain the required majority for it
to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent
HELD: Yes. The inclusion of Gatbontons vote was proper not because it was not
questioned but because probationary employees have the right to vote in a certification
election. The votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been
counted. As held in Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja:
In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit

whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly

stated in Art 255 of the Labor Code which states that the "labor organization designated
or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be
the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for purposes of collective
bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the
resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining
unit. Hence, all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial
interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction
as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for
certification election.
The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from voting cannot
override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization, as well as
the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on certification elections
and jurisprudence thereon.
A certification election is the process of determining the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes
of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, refers to the negotiated contract
between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages,
hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining
unit.
While the Court rules that the votes of all the probationary employees should be
included, under the particular circumstances of this case and the period of time which it
took for the appeal to be decided, the votes of the six supervisory employees must be
excluded because at the time the certification elections was conducted, they had
ceased to be part of the rank and file, their promotion having taken effect two months
before the election.
HIMPLU cannot be considered as the exclusive bargaining agent of the hotel. It is wellsettled that under the so-called "double majority rule," for there to be a valid certification
election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union must
have garnered majority of the valid votes cast. Under Art 256 Labor Code, the union
obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be certified as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the appropriate bargaining
unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170.
HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU was not
able to obtain a majority vote.

PORT WORKERS UNION V. UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR 207 SCRA 329 (1992)

FACTS: When the CBA between the company ITCSI and private respondent APCWU
was about to expire, other labor unions sought to represent the laborers in the
negotiation of the next CBA. In line with this, SAMADA, another labor union, filed a
petition for certification election. The consent signatures of at least 25% of the
employees in the bargaining unit were submitted 11 days after the petition
1. Another petition for certification election was filed by PEALU. Subsequently, the
petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were consolidated.
2. APCWU filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that SAMADA and PEALU did
not comply with the requirement provided in Sec 6 Rule V, Book V of the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code which provides that the petition should be
accompanied by 25% consent signatures at the time of filing. The Med-Arbiter
dismissed the consolidated petitions
3. PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor, arguing that Art 256 Labor Code did
not require the written consent to be submitted simultaneously with the petition
for certification election. However, the principal petitioners, SAMADA and
PEALU, did not appeal. Undersecretary of Labor Laguesma affirmed the order of
the Med-Arbiter
4. Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new CBA
5. Petitioner PWUP argued that under Art 256 Labor Code, the Med-Arbiter should
automatically order election by secret ballot when the petition was supported by
at least 25% of all employees in the bargaining unit. SAMADA and PEALU
complied with this requirement when they submitted the required consent
signatures several days after the filing of the petition. In dismissing the petitions
for certification election, Laguesma was, in a way, indirectly certifying APCWU as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of ICTSI employees
6. Private respondent ICTSI contended that the decision in TUPAS v. Inciong is
applicable in this case where the SC held that since 499 out of the total working
force of 641 have not only ratified the CBA concluded between UMI and
LUSTEVECO, but affirmed their membership in UMI, there is no more need for
holding a certification election.
ISSUE: WON contract-bar rule applies in this case
HELD: Yes. The administrative rule requiring the simultaneous submission of the 25%
consent signatures upon the filing of petition for certification election should not be
strictly applied to frustrate the determination of the legitimate representative of the
workers. Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found in Art 256 Labor Code,
the law it seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the regulation should at
best be given only a directory effect. Accordingly, the mere filing of a petition for
certification election within the freedom period is sufficient basis for the issuance
of an order for the holding of a certification election, subject to the submission of
the consent signatures within a reasonable period from such filing. It is not
denied that the petition to intervene filed by PWUP did not carry the 25% consent
signatures, but that the requirement is in fact not applicable to a petition in intervention.

Regarding the invocation of Inciong by the private respondents, the Court has modified
that decision in Associated Labor Unions vs. Calleja: The petitioner was obviously
referring to the contract-bar rule where the law prohibits the holding of certification
elections during the lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement. Said
agreement was hastily and prematurely entered into apparently in an attempt to
avoid the holding of a certification election.
Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only where the need for industrial
stability is clearly shown to be imperative. Subject to this singular exception,
contracts where the identity of the authorized representative of the workers is in
doubt must be rejected in favor of a more certain indication of the will of the
workers. As stated in Philippine Association of Free Labor Union vs. Estrella, any
stability that does not establish the type of industrial peace contemplated by the
law must be subordinated to the employees' freedom to choose their real
representative.
The private respondents contend that the overwhelming ratification of the CBA is an
affirmation of their membership in the bargaining agent, rendering the representation
issue moot and academic and conclusively barring the holding of a certification election
thereon. That conclusion does not follow. Even Tupas did not say that the mere
ratification of the CBA by the majority of the workers signified their affirmation of
membership in the negotiating union. That case required, first, ratification of the CBA,
the second, affirmation of membership in the negotiating union. The second
requirement has not been established in the case at bar as the record does not show
that the majority of the workers, besides ratifying the new CBA, have also formally
affiliated with APCWU.

CALTEX REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. BRILLANTES 279 SCRA 218

(1997)
FACTS: When the CBA between petitioner Caltex Refinery Employees Association
(CREA) and private Caltex Phils Inc was about to expire in July 1995, both parties
negotiated the terms and conditions of the new CBA. However, some items in the new
CBA were unresolved
1. As such, a series of meetings between the parties were conducted but the same
remained unresolved
2. During a strike vote, the members of CREA opted for a walkout. Caltex Inc then
filed with DOLE a petition for assumption of jurisdiction in accordance with Art
263(g) Labor Code
3. In August 1995, Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the entire labor
dispute and issued an order enjoining both parties from staging a lockout or
strike
4. However, petitioner CREA began a strike and set up a picket in the premises of
Caltex Inc. thereafter, several company notices directing the striking employees
to return to work were issued but CREA continued their mass action
5. DOLE Undersecretary Laguesma interceded and convinced the members of the
union to return to work and enter into a MOA with Caltex Inc.
6. Because of the strike, Caltex Inc terminated some of the officers of the CREA.
The legality of these dismissals brought additional contentious issues. Failing to
resolve their differences, both parties agreed to refer the problem to the
Secretary of Labor
7. The Secretary issued an ordering directing both parties to execute a new CBA
ISSUE: WON the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving
the instant labor dispute
HELD: Other than his failure to rule on the issue of union security, the Secretary of
Labor did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in resolving the instant labor
dispute.
As held in Saballa v. NLRC: the findings of [NLRC] are entitled to great respect and
even finality when supported by substantial evidence, otherwise, they shall be struck
down for being whimsical and capricious and arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. It
is a requirement of due process and fair play that the parties to a litigation be informed
of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to
the conclusions of the court. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the
facts and the law of which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was
reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the
possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
In the present case, the foregoing requirement has been sufficiently met.
Petitioner's claim of grave abuse of discretion is anchored on the simple fact that
public respondent adopted largely the proposals of private respondent. It should

be understood that bargaining is not equivalent to an adversarial litigation where

rights and obligations are delineated and remedies applied. It is simply a process
of finding a reasonable solution to a conflict and harmonizing opposite positions
into a fair and reasonable compromise. When parties agree to submit unresolved
issues to the secretary of labor for his resolution, they should not expect their
positions to be adopted in toto. It is understood that they defer to his wisdom and
objectivity in insuring industrial peace. And unless they can clearly demonstrate
bias, arbitrariness, capriciousness or personal hostility on the part of such public
officer, the SC will not interfere or substitute the said officer's judgment with its
own. In this case, it is possible that this SC, or some its members at least, may even
agree with the wisdom of petitioner's claims. But unless grave abuse of discretion is
cogently shown, the SC will refrain from using its extraordinary power of certiorari to
strike down decisions and orders of quasi-judicial officers specially tasked by law to
settle administrative questions and disputes. This is particularly true in the resolution
of controversies in collective bargaining agreements where the question is rarely
one of legal right or wrong but one of wisdom, cogency and compromise as to
what is possible, fair and reasonable under the circumstances.

NESTLE PHILS V. NLRC 193 SCRA 504 (1991)

FACTS: In June 1987, the CBAs covering the petitioners employees in:
a. Alabang/Cabuyao factories
b. Makati Administration office (represented by UFE)
c. Cagayan de Oro factory (represented by WATU)
d. Cebu/Davao sales offices (represented by TUPAS)
1. Thereafter, Union of Filipro Employees (UFE) was certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent for all regular rank-and-file employees of petitioners factory in
Cagayan de Oro as well as its Cebu/Davao sales office
2. During the negotiation for a new CBA, the employees at Cabuyao resorted to a
slowdown and walkouts. Collective bargaining negotiations between the parties
ensued
3. Because of unresolved disputes, UFE declared a bargaining deadlock. As such
the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and issued a return to work order.
4. Nonetheless, the union, without notice, staged a strike at the Alabang/Cabuyao
factory. As a result, the company dismissed the union officers and members of
the negotiating panel who participated in the illegal strike. NLRC affirmed the
dismissals
5. UFE filed a notice of to strike due to the CBA deadlock and unfair labor practices.
NLRC issued a resolution ordering a modification of the Nestles retirement plans
for its employees
6. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, alleging that since its retirement plan is
non-contributory, it has the sole and exclusive prerogative to define the terms of
the plan because the workers have no vested and demandable rights, being that
the grant of the retirement plant was merely gratuitous and not a contractual
obligation.
ISSUES: WON the retirement plant is a collective bargaining issue
HELD: Yes, the retirement plant was a collective bargaining issue.
The company's contention that its retirement plan is non-negotiable, is not well-taken.
The NLRC correctly observed that the inclusion of the retirement plan in the
collective bargaining agreement as part of the package of economic benefits
extended by the company to its employees to provide them a measure of financial
security after they shall have ceased to be employed in the company, reward their
loyalty, boost their morale and efficiency and promote industrial peace, gives "a
consensual character" to the plan so that it may not be terminated or modified at
will by either party. The fact that the retirement plan is non-contributory, i.e., that
the employees contribute nothing to the operation of the plan, does not make it a
non-issue in the CBA negotiations. As a matter of fact, almost all of the benefits
that the petitioner has granted to its employees under the CBA are noncontributory benefits. Since the retirement plan has been an integral part of the
CBA since 1972, the Union's demand to increase the benefits due the employees
under said plan, is a valid CBA issue. The deadlock between the company and the

union on this issue was resolvable by the Secretary of Labor, or the NLRC, after the
Secretary had assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
The petitioner's contention, that employees have no vested or demandable right to a
non-contributory retirement plan, has no merit for employees do have a vested and
demandable right over existing benefits voluntarily granted to them by their employer.
Under Art 100 Labor Code, the employer may not unilaterally withdraw, eliminate or
diminish such benefits.

PALACOL V. CALLEJA G.R. NO 85333 (1990)

FACTS: CCBPI Sales Force Union, as the collective bargaining agent of all regular
salesmen, regular helpers and relief helpers of the Manila plant and sales offices of
Coco-Cola Bottlers Phils Inc (CCBPI), entered into a new CBA with the latter. Among
the compensation benefits granted was a general salary increase to be given in lump
sum.
1. The president of the union submitted to CCBPI the ratification by the union
members of the new CBA and authorization for the company to deduct union
dues equivalent to P20 every month plus 10% by way of special assessment
from the CBA lump-sum pay granted to the union members
2. According to the board resolution of the union, the purpose of the special
assessment sought to be levied is
a. to put up a cooperative and credit union
b. purchase vehicles and other items needed for the benefit of the union officers
and general membership
c. payment for services rendered by union officers, consultants etc
3. Of the 800 union members, 672 originally authorized the 10% special
assessment while 173 opposed the same. Subsequently, 355 of the members
who authorized the 10% special assessment withdrew their authorization, which
resulted to a total of 528 objectors and a remainder of 272 supporters
4. Petitioners alleged that the special assessment was a violation of Art 241(o) in
relation to Art 222(b) Labor Code. Petitioners also cite Galvadores v. Trajano,
where it was ruled that no check-offs from any amount due employees may be
effected without the individual written authorizations signed by the employees
which specifically states the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction
5. The Union countered that the deductions not only have the popular endorsement
and approval of the general membership, it also complied with the legal
requirements of Art 241(n) and (o) Labor Code
ISSUE: WON the special assessment was valid
HELD: No, the deduction of 10% as special assessment by the union was not made in
accordance with the requirements provided by law. Art 241(n) Labor Code provides the
requisites of a special assessment upon members of a labor organization:
1. Written resolution of a majority of all the members at a general membership
meeting duly called for the purpose
2. Recording of the minutes of such meeting by the organization secretary
which must contain:
a. The list of all members present
b. Votes cast
c. The purpose of the special assessment
3. That such minutes be attested to by the president of the labor organization
In the present case, the union submitted only minutes of the local membership meetings
when what is required is a written resolution adopted at the general meeting. Worse still,

the minutes of three of those local meetings held were recorded by a union director and
not by the union secretary. The minutes submitted to the Company contained no list of
the members present and no record of the votes cast.
The failure of the Union to comply strictly with the requirements set out by the law
invalidates the questioned special assessment. Substantial compliance is not enough in
view of the fact that the special assessment will diminish the compensation of the union
members. Their express consent is required, and this consent must be obtained in
accordance with the steps outlined by law, which must be followed to the letter. No
shortcuts are allowed.

PICOP RESOURCES INC (PRI) V. TANECA ET AL G.R. NO 160828 (2010)

FACTS: Respondents were regular rank-and-file employees of PRI and bona fide
members of NAMAPRI-SPFL which is the collective bargaining agent for the rank-andfile employees of petitioner PRI
1. PRI has a CBA with NAMAPRI-SPFL for a period of 5 years from May 1995 to
May 2000. The CBA contained the following union security provisions:
a. The company, upon the written request of the union and after compliance with
the requirements of the Labor Code, shall give notice of termination of
services of any employee who shall fail to fulfill the condition provided in
Section 6.1 and 6.2 of this Article
2. Atty. Fuentes sent a letter to the management demanding the termination of
employees who allegedly campaigned for, supported and signed the petition for
certification election of FFW during the effectivity of the CBA. NAMAPRI-SPFL
considered said act as an act of disloyalty and a valid basis for termination for a
cause in accordance with the unions constitution and by-laws, as well as the
terms and conditions of the CBA. Subsequently, the unions counsel issued
notice to explain to concerned employees
3. Finding the employees explanations to be unsatisfactory, Fuentes informed PRI
of the unions demand to terminate the respondents. As such, respondents filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice
4. Respondents alleged that they did not withdraw their membership from the union
and insisted that mere affixation of signature on such authorization to file a
petition for certification election as not per se an act of disloyalty. Respondents
argued that their action as merely prompted by a desire to have certification
election among the rank-and-file employees of PRI with hopes of a CBA
negotiation in due time and not to cause the downfall of the union
5. LA declared the respondents dismissal to be illegal and ordered PRI to reinstate
respondents to their equivalent positions
6. Upon appeal, NLRC reversed LA decision and declared the dismissal legal
ISSUE: WON there was just cause to terminate the employment of respondents
HELD: No. "Union security" is a generic term, which is applied to and
comprehends "closed shop," "union shop," "maintenance of membership," or
any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to
acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment. There
is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union
within a certain period as a condition for their continued employment. There is
maintenance of membership shop when employees, who are union members as of the
effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain
union membership as a condition for continued employment until they are promoted or
transferred out of the bargaining unit, or the agreement is terminated. A closed shop,
on the other hand, may be defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement
between the employer and his employees or their representatives, no person may
be employed in any or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or

she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in
good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in
interest are a part.
In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security
clause, the employer needs to determine and prove that:
(1) The union security clause is applicable
(2) The union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision
in the CB and
(3) There is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel
the employee from the union.
These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the union
security provision of the CBA.
As to the first requisite, there is no question that the CBA between PRI and respondents
included a union security clause, specifically, maintenance of membership as stipulated
in Art II Sec 6, Union Security and Check-Off. Following the same provision, PRI, upon
written request from the Union, can indeed terminate the employment of the employee
who failed to maintain its good standing as a union member. Secondly, it is likewise
undisputed that NAMAPRI-SPFL, in two (2) occasions demanded from PRI, in their
letters dated May 16 and 23, 2000, to terminate the employment of respondents due to
their acts of disloyalty to the Union. However, as to the third requisite, there is no
sufficient evidence to support the decision of PRI to terminate the employment of the
respondents.
Mere signing of the authorization in support of the Petition for Certification Election of
FFW on March 19, 20 and 21, or before the "freedom period," is not sufficient ground to
terminate the employment of respondents inasmuch as the petition itself was actually
filed during the freedom period. Nothing in the records would show that respondents
failed to maintain their membership in good standing in the Union. Respondents did not
resign or withdraw their membership from the Union to which they belong. Respondents
continued to pay their union dues and never joined the FFW.

GENERAL MILLING CORP INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (GMC-ILU) V. GENERAL

MILLING CORP G.R. NO 183122/183889 (2011)
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD: