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2013 REMINDERS ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP and SUFFRAGE

Carlo L. Cruz
The POLICE POWER
The police power may use both the power of taxation and the power of eminent
domain as implements for the attainment of a legitimate police objective.
Subsequent law prohibiting gambling upheld as a valid exercise of the police power.
[Stone v. Mississippi, 101 US 814] In the context of municipal law, a law takes
precedence as against a treaty obligation, for a treaty may never curtail or restrict
the scope of the police power. [Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 155] note - As has
been observed by US constitutional scholars, a treaty has greater dignity than an
executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty
having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people; a ratified
treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory
enactment. [Bayan Muna v. Romulo - G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011]
Exercise of the Police Power primarily exercised by the legislature; may be
delegated to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking
bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangays vested in local government
units under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.
NOTE - The integration of the Philippine Bar under the Constitution does not make a
lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. Such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. [In
re Edillon, 84 SCRA 554]
THE LEGISLATURE MAY NOT BE COMPELLED [by mandamus] to exercise the
police power.
Tests for a Valid Exercise of the Police Power - [1] Lawful Subject - the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the exercise of the police power, and [2] Lawful Means - the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon the individual.
Matters which have been recognized by the Supreme Court as lawful
subjects Billboards [Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580] prices of prime
commodities [Yakus v. White, 321 US 414] six-year-old cabs [Taxicab Operators of
Metro Manila v. Board of Transportation, 119 SCRA 597] barber shops and massages
services [Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA 568] heavy vehicles and public streets
[Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329] video piracy [Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board,
151 SCRA 208] bouncing checks [Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323] private roads
inside subdivisions [Sangalang v. IAC, 176 SCRA 719] - National Medical Admission
Test 3-test limitation rule [Dept. of Education v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533] free air
time for COMELEC [Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v.
COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337] Generics Act [Del Rosario v. Bengzon, 180 SCRA 521]
books of account [Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 US 500] EO 420 requiring
government agencies and GOCCs to streamline their identification card systems
[KMU v. Director General-NEDA, April 19, 2006] BUT NOTE Ople v. Torres [293 SCRA
141], where the Supreme Court rejected a National ID System on the basis of the
peoples right to privacy the regulation of rates imposed by a public utility such as
SURNECO [Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Energy Regulatory
Commission, G.R. No. 183626, October 4, 2010]; ban against the importation of used
motor vehicles to protect the domestic industry [G.R. No. 164172 (Executive
Secretary v. Subic Integrated Macro Ventures Corp.) and G.R. No. 168741 (Executive
Secretary v. Motor Vehicle Importers Association of Subic Bay Freeport, Inc.), cited in
Executive Secretary v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc. - G.R. No. 199324, January 7,
2013]; a law removing the remedy or right of redemption in cases of foreclosures of
real estate mortgages already in place upon the effectivity of said new law
[Goldenway Merchandising Corporation v. Equitable PCI Bank G.R. No. 195540,
March 13, 2013]
Regulations which have been acknowledged by the Supreme Court as
lawful means for attaining police power objectives - Leprosariums for lepers
[Lorenzo v. Director of Health, 50 Phil. 595] reasonable working hours and

minimum wages [Ramos v. Poblete, 73


stores [Roschen v. Ward, 277 US 337]
marriage license [Gould v. Gould, 61
common carriers, or theaters [People
imbeciles [Buck v. Bell, 274 US 195]

Phil. 241] - full-time pharmacist in drug


blood tests before issuance of a
Atl. 604] limiting the capacity of
v. Chan, 65 Phil. 611] sterilization of

Instances when the means for the attainment of an apparently legitimate


police objective rejected for being unlawful EO prohibiting the inter-provincial
transport of carabaos to prevent their indiscriminate slaughter [Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA
659 - Note: SC commented on the absurdity of the method] prohibition against the
use of a material known as shoddy for the making of mattresses annulled, there
being no basis for fear that it was inimical to the health of the user [Weaver v. Palmer
Bros. Co., 270 US 402] prohibition against distribution of handbills in public places
(annulled on the ground of freedom of expression) [Jamison v. Texas, 318 US 413]
prohibition against wash room rates and renting out rooms more than twice a day, to
minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike. you cannot legislate morality! [White Light
Corporation v. City of Manila - G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009] regulation of
parking fees in malls - The power to regulate does not include the power to
confiscate [OSG v. Ayala Land, Inc. - G.R. No. 177056, September 18, 2009]
ordinance regulating the construction of fences and walls [requiring setbacks and see
through fences] [Fernando v. St. Scholasticas College - G.R. No. 161107, March 12,
2013]
Standards for Judicial Review [for the validity of ordinances] - strict scrutiny
for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the
rational basis standard of review for economic legislation; heightened or
immediate scrutiny, for evaluating classifications based on gender and legitimacy.
The overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even
constitutionally guaranteed rights. [White Light Corporation v. City of Manila - G.R.
No. 122846, January 20, 2009]
The POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
The power of eminent domain may be exercised by the Legislature, the
President, various local legislative bodies, certain public corporations like the
Land Authority and even quasi-public corporations, like the PLDT and the PNR.
(Water districts may be given the power to expropriate. [Metropolitan Cebu Water
District v. J. King and Sons Company, Inc., G.R. No. 175983, April 16, 2009]
Necessity of Exercise- The power of eminent domain should be construed liberally
in favor of the property owner; courts can look into whether the expropriation by the
delegate is necessary or wise, unless there is a specific, as opposed to a general,
grant of authority to expropriate. [City of Manila v. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349;
Republic of the Philippines v. La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, 1 SCRA 646]
Private Property anything that can come under the dominion of man MUST BE
WHOLESOME - real, personal, tangible and intangible properties,
franchises,
churches and other religious properties, cemeteries EXCEPT money and choses in
action because just compensation is usually paid also in money.
SERVICES are considered embraced in the concept of property subject to taking. The
subject of this case was the interconnection between the Government Telephone
System and the PLDT, so that the former can use the lines and facilities of the PLDT.
[RP v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620] In PLDT v. NTC [190 SCRA 717], PLDT was required to
interconnect with a private communications company
Taking imports a physical dispossession of the owner, deprivation of all beneficial
use and enjoyment of his property. Requisites of Taking in Eminent Domain - [1]
expropriator must enter a private property [2] entry must be for more than a
momentary period [3] entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority [4]
property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected [5] utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way
as to oust the owner and deprive the owner of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
[Republic v. Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336]

Instances of Taking, as recognized by the Courts Permanent inundation of a


farmland because of the construction of a dam nearby [US v. Lynch, 18 US 445]
government planes constantly flying over private property at very low altitudes [US v.
Causby, 328 US 256] easement over a three-meter strip of private property [Ayala
de Roxas v. City of Manila, 9 Phil. 215] ordinance prohibiting the construction of any
building which would obstruct the view of a plaza from a highway [People v. Fajardo,
104 Phil. 443] COMELEC Resolution requiring newspapers to provide it with free
space of not less than page for the common use of political parties and candidates
[Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272] - right-of-way [aerial]
easements, resulting in the restriction on property rights over land traversed by
transmission lines [NPC v. Aguirre-Paderanga, 464 SCRA 481; National Power
Corporation v. Purefoods Corporation, G.R. No. 160725, September 12, 2008;
National Power Corporation v. Co, G.R. No. 166973, February 10, 2009; National
Power Corporation v. Ileto - G.R. No. 169957, July 11, 2012, Second Division, Brion] exhaust fan in a tunnel directly blowing smoke into a house [Richards v. Washington
Terminal, 233 US 546] agrarian reform [Association of Small Landowners v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343] construction of a tunnel under the
land [National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Sangkay - G.R. No. 165828, August 24,
2011] - ordinance requiring private cemeteries to reserve 6% of their total areas to
paupers [City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759] effort to prohibit
malls from collecting parking fees - The power to regulate, however, does not include
the power to prohibit. The power to regulate does not include the power to
confiscate. [OSG v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. No. 177056, September 18, 2009]
agrarian reform stock distribution [Section 31 of RA6657 (CARL)] or collective
ownership, provided control of the corporation or cooperative is vested in farmersbeneficiaries [Hacienda Luisita Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council G.R. No. 171101, April 24, 2012] ordinance requiring setback requirement for walls
[to make available more parking space for free for the general public] [Fernando v.
St. Scholasticas College - G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013, En Banc, Mendoza]
AN ORDINANCE requiring private cemeteries to reserve 6% of their total areas to
paupers is not a valid exercise of the police power but an exercise of the power of
eminent domain, which requires the payment of just compensation. [City
Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759] A COMELEC RESOLUTION
requiring newspapers to provide it with free space of not less than page for the
common use of political parties and candidates constitutes taking of private
property without payment of just compensation. [Philippine Press Institute v.
COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272]
Mere intention to expropriate does not bind the owner, who may still sell the
property before actual expropriation. [People v. Fajardo, 104 Phil. 443]
Public Use any use directly available to the general public as a matter of right and
not merely forbearance or accommodation. Examples parks which are res
communes; agrarian reform [Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343]; property devoted to public services
administered by privately-owned public utilities,
like telephone or light
companies (demandable as a matter of right by anyone prepared to pay for said
services) [Denieter Land Co. v. Florida Public Service Co., 128 S0. 402] - pilot
development center [Province of Camarines Sur v. CA , 222 SCRA 173];
expropriation for slum clearance and urban development is for a public
purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners,
commercial firms, entertainment and service companies and other private
concerns [Reyes v. NHA, 395 SCRA 494]; urban land reform and housing, or
socialized housing program involving only a one-half hectare area [Manapat
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110478, October 15, 2007]; socialized housing,
whereby housing units are distributed and/or sold to qualified beneficiaries on much
easier terms, has already been included in the expanded definition of public use or
purpose in the context of the States exercise of the power of eminent domain.
[Sumulong v. Guerrero, No. L-48685, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 461, citing the
earlier case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, Nos. L-60549, 60553-60555,
October 26, 1983, 125 SCRA 220, cited in [City of Manila v. Te G.R. No. 169263,
September 21, 2011, Third Division, Peralta] - Property already devoted to public
use can still be expropriated. [City of Manila v. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349]
There is collective ownership as long as there is a concerted group work by the
farmers on the land, regardless of whether the landowner is a cooperative,

association or corporation composed of farmers. However, this definition of collective


ownership should be read in light of the clear policy of the law on agrarian reform,
which is to emancipate the tiller from the bondage of the soil and empower the
common people. Worth noting too is its noble goal of rectifying the acute imbalance
in the distribution of this precious resource among our people. [Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742,
July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 352] Accordingly, HLIs insistent view that control need
not be in the hands of the farmers translates to allowing it to run roughshod against
the very reason for the enactment of agrarian reform laws and leave the farmers in
their shackles with sheer lip service to look forward to. [Hacienda Luisita
Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council - G.R. No. 171101, April 24,
2012]
In expropriation proceedings, the value of the land and its character at the
time it was taken by the government are the criteria for determining just
compensation. [Philipine National Oil Company v. Maglasang, G.R. No. 155407,
November 11, 2008] Property taken should be assessed as of the time of the
taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of expropriation
proceedings. [Republic v. Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336]
Just Compensation full and fair equivalent of he property taken; must be fair to
both parties. THE DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION is a judicial function
[Land Bank of the Philippines v. Escandor, G.R. No. 171685, October 11, 2010]
Payment of just compensation in bonds is allowed. [Association of Small Landowners
v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343]
THE PRESENCE OF
TRANSMISSION LINES undoubtedly restricts respondents use of his property.
Petitioner is thus liable to pay respondent the full market value. [National Power
Corporation v. Co, G.R. No. 166973, February 10, 2009]
Payment of just compensation shall be made to the owner, which refers to all
those who have lawful interest in the property, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a
vendee. [Knecht v. CA, 207 SCRA 754] BUT see Land Bank of the Philippines v.
AMS Farming Corporation [G.R. No. 174971, October 15, 2008] - Since AMS was
not a landowner, but a mere lessee of the agricultural land owned by TOTCO, it had
no right under the CARL to demand from LBP just compensation for its standing crops
and improvements. As a lessee, the rights of AMS over its standing crops and
improvements on the leased property are defined, conferred, as well as limited by the
provisions of the MOA it executed with TOTCO.
Just compensation was determined in 1973 as of the time of the taking of the
property in 1924. However, the Supreme Court did not apply Article 1250 of the Civil
Code calling for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or
deflation because, in eminent domain cases. The obligation to pay arises from law,
independent of contract. [Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos, 96 SCRA
831]
Administrative agencies have no jurisdiction over just compensation cases. Thus, as a
rule, the DARABs decision setting the amount of just compensation is merely
preliminary and not executory if challenged before the SAC. xxx. The determination
of the amount of just compensation is a judicial function that cannot be usurped by
administrative agencies. [Land Bank v. Heirs of Listana, G.R. No. 182758, May 30,
2011]
The owner is entitled to payment of interest from the time of taking until actual
payment of just compensation; interest must be claimed or is deemed waived.
[Urtula v. Republic, 22 SCRA 477] Interest of 12% per annum on the just
compensation is due the landowner in case of delay in payment, which will, in effect,
make the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance. [Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Chico, G.R. No. 168453, March 13, 2009]
Taxes paid by the owner from the time of the taking until actual transfer of title are
reimbursable by the expropriator. [City of Manila v. Roxas, 60 Phil. 215] Title to the
property shall not be transferred until after actual payment of just compensation.
[Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus, 40 Phil. 550]
The failure for a long time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation
proceedings covering a property that the government had taken constitutes a waiver

of his right to gain back possession. The Mendozas remedy is an action for the
payment of just compensation, not ejectment. [Republic v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 185091,
August 8, 2010, 2nd Division, Abad]
LGUs may expropriate but ordinances, and not mere resolutions, would be needed for
them to do so. [Yusay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156684, April 6, 2011]
The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating
agency differs from the action for damages. The former, also known as inverse
condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the
governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent
domain has been attempted by the taking agency. [According to 29A CJS, Eminent
Domain, 381: Inverse condemnation is a cause of action against a
governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been
taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal
exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking
agency. While the typical taking occurs when the government acts to condemn
property in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, the entire doctrine of
inverse condemnation is predicated on the proposition that a taking may occur
without such formal proceedings. The phrase inverse condemnation, as a common
understanding of that phrase would suggest, simply describes an action that is the
inverse or reverse of a condemnation proceeding.] [National Power Corporation
v. Heirs of Sangkay - G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011, First Division, Bersamin]
The POWER OF TAXATION
Distinguish from licenses [for regulatory purposes; exercise of the police power].
Taxes are for purposes of raising revenues. - Includes all properties, whether
tangible or intangible, found in the territory of the taxing jurisdiction - even shares of
stock issued by a foreign corporation, but in action in the local state may be taxed
by it [Wells Fargo v. CIR, 40 OG 159]; also insurance proceeds from a policy issued
abroad [Manila Electric Co. v. Yatco, 69 Phil. 89]
Tax on knowledge not allowed - a tax based on circulation was annulled for being
violative of due process and freedom of expression. [Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 US 233]
Double taxation when additional taxes are laid on the same subject by the same
taxing jurisdiction during the same taxing period and for the same purpose. There is
no specific prohibition in the Constitution against double taxation. No Supreme Court
decision also. Double taxation is no more prohibited than doubled taxation. The
power to tax twice is as ample as to tax once. An additional P25 tax on
professionals who were already paying the P50 occupation tax under the Revised
Internal Revenue Code would be valid - different taxing jurisdictions local and
national. [Punzalan v. Municipal Board of Manila, 95 Phil. 46] Possible remedy if the
second tax constitutes a violation of the equal protection clause. In the Punzalan
case, the SC said there was no violation of the equal protection clause because there
was a substantial distinction between practitioners in Manila as opposed to
practitioners elsewhere, who earned less.
Public Purpose a tax must be for a public purpose the mere fact that a tax will
be directly enjoyed only by a private individual will not make it invalid so long as
some link to the public welfare is established. Examples cash incentives for
athletes; pensions paid to veterans; unemployment relief; support for the
handicapped, etc.
A tax levy [LOI No. 1695] on sale of fertilizers for purposes of benefiting a private
corporation, Philippine Planters, Inc. is invalid. Not even a valid exercise of the police
power. [Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006, March 14,
2008] The imposition of a vehicle registration fee is not an exercise by the State
of its police power, but of its taxation power - mainly to raise funds for the
construction and maintenance of highways and to a much lesser degree, pay for the
operating expenses of the administering agency. x x x Fees may be properly regarded
as taxes even though they also serve as an instrument of regulation. [Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. Edu, G.R. No. L-41383, August 15, 1988, 164 SCRA 320]

The term "tax" frequently applies to all kinds of exactions of monies which become
public funds. It is often loosely used to include levies for revenue as well as levies for
regulatory purposes such that license fees are frequently called taxes although
license fee is a legal concept distinguishable from tax: the former is imposed in the
exercise of police power primarily for purposes of regulation, while the latter is
imposed under the taxing power primarily for purposes of raising revenues.
[Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. City of Manila, 118 Phil. 383; 8 SCRA
370 (1963); Pacific Commercial Co. v. Romualdez, 49 Phil, 917 (1927)] Thus, if the
generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the
imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally
revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax. [Manila Electric
Company v. El Auditor General y La Comision de Servicios Publicos, 73 Phil. 133
(1941); Republic v. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, 32 SCRA 215 (1970)] xxx. As a
general rule, there must be a statutory grant for a local government unit to impose
lawfully a gross receipts tax, that unit not having the inherent power of taxation. The
rule, however, finds no application in the instant case where what is involved is an
exercise of, principally, the regulatory power of the respondent City and where that
regulatory power is expressly accompanied by the taxing power. [Progressive
Development Corporation v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 36081, April 24, 1989, 172 SCRA
629, 636, citing Saldaa v. City of Iloilo, 104 Phil. 28, 33 (1958)] [SEE Angeles
University Foundation v. City of Angeles, G.R. No. 189999, June 27, 2012, First
Division, Villarama where the issue pertained to the validity of building permit fees.]
The coconut levy was imposed in the exercise of the States inherent power of
taxation. [See Republic v. COCOFED, G.R. No. 147062-64, December 14, 2001, 372
SCRA 462, 482-84]
Tax Exemptions may be constitutional [Article VI, Section 28[3] churches, etc.
[Lladoc v. CIR, 14 SCRA 292] or statutory [Article VI, Section 28[4] - concurrence of a
majority of all the members of congress required for laws granting tax exemptions]. Where the tax exemption is granted gratuitously, it may be validly revoked at will,
with or without cause BUT if the exemption is granted for a valuable consideration, it
partakes of the nature of a contract and the obligation is protected against
impairment [Casanova v. Hord, 8 Phil. 125]
The BILL OF RIGHTS
Due Process and Equal Protection
Person all persons, natural as well as artificial, are covered; including aliens
[Villegas v. Hiu Chong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270] Artificial persons are covered but
only insofar as their property is concerned. [Smith Bell & Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil.
136]
Deprivation to take away forcibly; to prevent from possessing, enjoying or using
something. Deprivation per se is not necessarily unconstitutional; what is prohibited
is deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
Life connotes in the first place the integrity of the physical person. It can be validly
claimed by law, as in the imposition of the death penalty [for a heinous offense, not
for a petty offense] or when a person is required to render personal military service.
The compulsory sterilization of incurable hereditary imbeciles was considered all right
since the operation only involved a minimum of pain, or none at all. [Buck v. Bell,
274 US 200] - The SC considered as confiscatory a municipal ordinance prohibiting
the construction on residential land of any building that might obstruct the view of
the public plaza from the highway. [People v. Fajardo, 104 SCRA 443]
Substantive Due Process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering
with the rights of the person with respect to his life, liberty and property.
Requirements [1] the law must have a valid governmental objective, i.e., the
interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class
require the intervention of the State; and [2] the objective must be pursued in a
lawful manner; the means employed must be reasonably related to the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive.

A law prohibiting the sale of milk for less than the specified minimum or floor price, to
prevent the lowering of the quality of milk sold in the market, upheld as valid.
[Nebbia v. State of New York, 291 US 502] A law was annulled as violative of
substantive due process where it was shown that the rates prescribed by it for
railroad companies, while allowing them some profit, did not permit them a
reasonable return of their investments. [Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v.
Minnesotta, 134 US 118] A municipal ordinance required all laundry establishments
to issue their receipts in English or Spanish. Valid, as the measure seeks to protect
the public from deceptions and misunderstandings. [Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 41
Phil. 103] A law prohibited merchants from maintaining its books of accounts in any
language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect. Invalid because it
prevented merchants from using other languages, including their own. [Yu Cong Eng
v. Trinidad, 271 US 500] - A criminal investigation undertaken by an agency which,
under the law, is likewise responsible for the conduct of a preliminary investigation
leading to a criminal prosecution would not be violative of due process. [Concio v.
DOJ, G.R. No. 175057, January 29, 2008] - No violation of due process when an
investigating prosecutor files an information or dismisses a complaint cognizable by
the MTCC without first requiring the submission of counter-affidavits. [Borlongan v.
Pena, G.R. No. 143591, November 23, 2007] - A reevaluation does not necessitate
the introduction of new materials for review nor does it require a full hearing for new
arguments. In this light, the respondent has been given the opportunity to be heard
by the DOLE Secretary. [NASECO Guards Association v. National Service Corporation,
G.R. No. 165442, August 25, 2010]
A law which imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion
of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local
workers with fixed-term employment, is violative of substantive due process. (Also
violative of the equal protection clause suspect classification.) [Serrano v. Gallant
Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009]
The concept of vested right is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due
process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new
obligations created after the right has become vested. Rights are considered vested
when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable. [Heirs of Arcadio Castro Sr. v. Lozada - G.R. No.
163026, August 29, 2012, First Division, Villarama] While one may not be deprived of
his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation
is founded in law and jurisprudence. [Quiao v. Quiao - G.R. No 176556, July 4, 2012,
Second Division, Reyes]
Procedural Due Process - The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute
the essential elements of due process and neither of these elements can be
eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional guaranty. - Judicial Due
Process [1] impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the case; [2] jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person and
the property subject of the proceeding proper service of summons; [3] defendant
must be given an opportunity to be heard; [4] judgment must be rendered upon
lawful hearing.
THE AWARD OF 5% MONTHLY INTEREST RATE is not supported both by the allegations
in the pleadings and the evidence on record. xxx It violated the due process
requirement because respondents were not informed of the possibility that the RTC
may award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived of reasonable opportunity to
refute and present controverting evidence as they were made to believe that the
complainant petitioner was seeking for what she merely stated in her Complaint.
[Diona v. Balangue - G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013, Second Division, del Castillo]
Right to appeal lost through neglect; no denial of due process. [Lobete v. Sundiam,
123 SCRA 95] Right to Appeal is not essential to a right to a hearing; may be
deprived except for Art. VIII,[5],[2], on the minimum appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. - The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due
process. Clearly, the right to cross-examine a witness, although a fundamental right
of a party, may be waived. [Equitable PCIBanking Corporation v. RCBC Capital
Corporation, G.R. No. 182248, December 18, 2008]

Counsel asked for reinvestigation and asked to defer proceedings until


reinvestigation was concluded; judge said trial should proceed; counsel did not
participate; on appeal, trial was set aside; serious irregularity violative of due
process [People v. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361]
Instances when notice of hearing may be validly omitted without violating due
process cancellation of a passport of a fugitive from justice; preventive suspension
of a civil servant; distraint of property for tax delinquency; padlocking of unsanitary
restaurant or movie theaters showing obscene movies; nuisances per se. - Nuisance
per se objectionable under any circumstance because it presents an immediate
danger to the welfare of the community mad dog may be abated without
necessity of judicial authorization. - Nuisance per accidens objectionable only
under some but not all circumstances. A nuisance per accidens may be summarily
abated if authorized by law, provided the nuisance per accidens is of trifling value
only. [Lawton v. Steele, 152 US 133] Only nuisances per se may be summarily
abated. [Civil Code, Article 704] An industrial waste processing plant is not a
nuisance per se. Accordingly, its operations may be ordered stopped only after
judicial proceedings. [Parayno v. Jovellanos, 495 SCRA 85]
A market stall not affected by a recent fire is not a public nuisance and may not be
abated without judicial proceedings [Asilo v. People, GR No. 159017-18, March 9
2011]
Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city
council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion,
to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. This fact alone should have
warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure. Neither does the
MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law
have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. [AC Enterprises v.
Frabelle Properties Corp., [G.R. No. 166744, 2 November 2006, 506 SCRA 625, 660661] [Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City - G.R. No. 177807, October 11,
2011, En Banc, Sereno]
Respondents fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the
health or comfort of the community. It was built primarily to secure the property of
respondents and prevent intruders from entering it. And as correctly pointed out by
respondents, the sidewalk still exists. If petitioner believes that respondents fence
indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for
that purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per accidens, its
summary abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted. [Lucena Grand
Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., G.R. No. 148339, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA
174, 191, cited in Perez v. Spouses Madrona and Pante - G.R. No. 184478, March 21,
2012, First Division, Villarama]
Violation of due process is a personal defense that can only be asserted by the
persons whose rights have been allegedly violated. [Napere v. Barbarona, G.R. No.
160426, January 31, 2008; Carandang v. Heirs of Quirino A. De Guzman, G.R. No.
160347, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 469, 480]
Equal Protection A flight attendant is dismissed for being fat. Private actions
cannot violate the equal protection guarantee. The equal protection clause does not
apply to private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.
[Yrasuegui v.
Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008]
Requirements for a Valid Classification - [1] substantial distinctions [2] germane
to the purpose of the law [3] must not be limited to existing conditions only [4] must
apply equally to all members of the class.
[1] Substantial Distinctions - cannot be based on color of attire or of vehicles,
emotions, shape or color of eyes/can be based on height, weight, health [lepers],
age, allegiance or citizenship. - 65 year olds not allowed to run for same office from
which they have retired.
Valid. [Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392] - The
classification of cities as highly urbanized cities if they had an annual revenue of
P40 Million and all others as component cities is valid. use. [Ceniza v. COMELEC, 96
SCRA 763] RA 6770, which authorizes the Ombudsman to impose a six-month
preventive suspension, instead of the civil service provisions of the Administrative
Code, which limits the disciplining authoritys prerogative to only imposing a

prevention suspension for a period not exceeding 90 days, does not violate the equal
protection guarantee. Substantial distinctions exist. [Gobenciong v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 159883, March 31, 2008] There is a substantial distinction between
appointive and elective officials. [Quinto v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, December 1,
2009, [MR] February 22, 2010, Puno] Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down
as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. [Biraogo v. The
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, December 10, 2010] A
substantial distinction exists between municipalities with pending Cityhood bills prior
to the subsequent passage of a law increasing the revenue requirement of cities [to
P100T] and those which seek Cityhood on the basis of the new law. [League of Cities
of the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, April 12, 2011]
The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in
the same place in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of the equal protection of
laws is not violated if there is a reasonable classification. For a classification to be
reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same class. [Philippine Rural Electric
Cooperatives Association, Inc. v. DILG, 451 Phil. 683 (2003)] Unfortunately, CMO 272003 does not meet these requirements. We do not see how the quality of wheat is
affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have
imported food grade wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat,
a classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers
listed under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only be
made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation,
therefore, does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the
state. [Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation - G.R. No. 179579,
February 1, 2012, Second Division, Sereno]
The subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the
monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a
3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in
their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term
employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens
it with a peculiar disadvantage. [Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No.
167614, March 24, 2009]
Republic Act No. 9262 has been upheld by the Supreme Court as against a challenge
as to its constitutionality on the ground of its purported violation of the equal
protection clause, as it applies only to women, and not to men. The Court cited the
unequal power relationship between women and men and the fact that women are
more likely than men to be victims of violence, not to mention the widespread
gender bias and prejudice against women as basic distinctions between women and
men which justify the classification under the law. [Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No.
179267, June 25, 2013]
[2] Germane to the Purpose of the Law - Examples there are substantial
distinctions between men v. women with respect to the performance of hard labor
as against passing grades in examinations, or between foreign v. local cars with
respect to taxes, but not in the context of traffic violations.
[3] Must not be limited to existing conditions only - The classification must be
enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected
exists. - A law prohibited members of non-Christian tribes form drinking liquor, on the
ground that their low degree of culture and their unfamiliarity with this kind of drink
rendered them more susceptible to its effects as compared to more civilized
countrymen who were not affected by it. Law SUSTAINED. [People v. Cayat, 68 Phil.
12] - A tax was limited only to Ormoc Sugar Company [specifically named in the
ordinance], which was then the only sugar company in the area. Classification not
limited to existing conditions, as the tax measure would not be applicable to similar
companies which may be established in the same taxing jurisdiction in the future.
[Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, 22 SCRA 603]

[4] Must apply equally to all members of the class. - The classification will be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed.
The law can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective officials
because the Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these
elective officials with respect to length of term and term limitation. [COMELEC v.
Cruz, G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009]
SEARCHES and SEIZURES
A search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action or the commencement
of a prosecution. The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the
discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar
remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. It
resembles in some respect with what is commonly known as John Doe
proceedings. While an application for a search warrant is entitled like a criminal
action, it does not make it such an action. A search warrant is a legal process which
has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State to procure relevant
evidence of crime. It is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases of
public prosecutions. A search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police
power. A search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of
the Philippines. A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process
for adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere private rights. It concerns the public
at large as distinguished from the ordinary civil action involving the rights of private
persons. It may only be applied for in the furtherance of public prosecution. [United
Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip (500 Phil. 342 (2005)), at 357-358]
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the
obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action
in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the
power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action,
jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It
ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a
search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal
action. For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely
constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and
directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and
bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin
to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and
made necessary because of a public necessity. [Malaloan v. Court of Appeals - G.R.
No. 104879, May 6, 1994, 232 SCRA 249, cited in PLDT v. HPS Software and
Communication Corporation - G.R. No. 170694, December 10, 2012, First Division,
Leonardo-de Castro]
Since a search warrant proceeding is not a criminal action, it necessarily follows that
the requirement set forth in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
which states that "all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public
prosecutor" does not apply. [PLDT v. HPS Software and Communication Corporation G.R. No. 170694, December 10, 2012, First Division, Leonardo-de Castro]
A private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a
government agency charged with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the
BFAD, may appear, participate and file pleadings in the search warrant proceedings
to maintain, inter alia, the validity of the search warrant issued by the court and the
admissibility of the properties seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be filed;
such private party may do so in collaboration with the NBI or such government
agency. The party may file an opposition to a motion to quash the search warrant
issued by the court, or a motion for the reconsideration of the court order granting
such motion to quash. [United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip G.R. No. 169156, February 15,
2007, 516 SCRA 62, at 68-69, cited in PLDT v. HPS Software and Communication
Corporation - G.R. No. 170694, December 10, 2012, First Division, Leonardo-de
Castro]

10

AVAILABE to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not [Moncado
v. Peoples Court, 80 Phil. 1], and even corporations [Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA
383], although they may be required to open their books of accounts for examination
by the State in the exercise of the police power or the power of taxation. The
guaranty may be invoked by a person inside a phone booth (eavesdropping on an
accused in a public phone booth unless with a warrant is illegal) [Katz v. US, 389
US 347], or even by known criminals or fugitives one cannot just force his way into
any mans house on the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his rank. [Alih v.
Castro, 151 SCRA 279]
REQUISITES for a valid Search Warrant or Warrant of Arrest [1] It must be
based on probable cause. [2] Probable cause must be determined personally by the
judge. [3] The determination must be made after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. [4] The warrant
must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a
search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. [Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October
7, 2008] A bank inquiry order, under Section 11 of the AMLA, is not a search
warrant or warrant of arrest as it contemplates a direct object but not the seizure of
persons or property. [Republic of the Philippines v. Eugenio, G.R. No. 174629,
February 14, 2008]
[1] Probable cause - There is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry, which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and the
preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should
be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of
issuing a warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper
whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of
the offense charged is the function of the investigating prosecutor. [People v.
Gabo, G.R. No. 161083, August 3, 2010]
Rules of Court, Rule 126, Section 3 each warrant should refer only to one
specific offense.
Examples of invalid warrants - A warrant which alleges violations of CB circulars,
Tariff and Customs laws, the Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code
[Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383], or for four separate and distinct offenses [Asian
Surety & Insurance v. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312], or for illegal traffic in narcotics and
contraband [Castro v. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 477], or a scatter-shot warrant, for
robbery, theft, qualified theft or Estafa [People v. CA, 216 SCRA 101] - hoarding of
used bottles is not a crime or offense. [Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. v. Gomez, G.R.
No. 154491, November 14, 2008] - It is quite obvious then that their cause of action
arose out of the intrusion into their established goodwill involving the two
motorcycle models and not patent infringement. No offense specified. Search
warrant INVALID. [Hon Ne Chan v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 172775, December
19, 2007]
[2] Probable cause must be determined personally by the judge. - Warrants of
arrest may be issued by administrative authorities only for the purpose of
carrying out a final finding of a violation of law, like an order of deportation or an
order of contempt, and not for the sole purpose of investigation or prosecution.
[Board of Commissioners v. de la Rosa, 197 SCRA 853]
[3] The determination must be made after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. (Regional Trial Court] judges need not personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses for purposes of determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest [Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393] Evaluation of the documents relevant to
probable cause must be done personally by the [RTC] judge. [Enrile v. Salazar, 186
SCRA 217]
Affidavit based on reliable information correct to the best of his knowledge and
belief cannot be used as basis for a search warrant [Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil. 33] Mere affidavits not enough to issue a search warrant; judge must take depositions

11

in writing and attach them to the record as these are necessary to determine the
existence of probable cause. [Mata v. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388]
[4] The warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. - John Doe warrants are generally not valid
[Commonwealth v. Crotty, 10 Allen (Mass.) 403] but a warrant against a John Doe
described in the same as the person occupying and in control of a building at a
specified address was considered valid. [People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169] - A
description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. [People v. Veloso,
48 Phil. 169] - A search warrant need not identify with particularity the person
against whom it is directed; it suffices that the place to be searched and things to be
seized are described. [People v. Lagman, G.R. No. 168695, December 8, 2008]
The CA held that the proceedings before the Makati RTC and the Muntinlupa RTC
are separate and distinct. The object of the motion to quash search warrant, here
filed by respondents Pastrana and Abad with the Makati RTC, the issuing court, was to
test the validity of its issuance, given that the warrant was made to cover several
offenses rather than just one as the rules provide. On the other hand, the object of
the Muntinlupa injunction case is to prevent the three agencies from using the seized
articles in any criminal proceeding against Mendoza, et al. considering the SEC and
the NBIs failure to immediately turn over the seized articles to the court that issued
the warrant as the rules require. But Section 14 of Rule 126 is clear. Questions
concerning both 1) the issuance of the search warrant and 2) the
suppression of evidence seized under it are matters that can be raised only
with the issuing court if, as in the present case, no criminal action has in
the meantime been filed in court. [Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Mendoza - G.R. No. 170425, April 23, 2012, Third Division, Abad]
General warrants not allowed records pertaining to all business transactions.
[Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383] - equipment used as means for committing
offenses - not allowed general warrant. [Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800] books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection
with his activities as money-lender, charging a usurious interest, in violation of law
valid description. [Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil.33]
- documents, papers and other
records of the CPP/NPA/NDF, such as minutes of the party meetings, plans of these
groups, programs, list of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions,
manuals not otherwise available to the public and support money from foreign or
local sources. NOT VALID vaguely described and not particularized. Does not
specify, among others, what subversive books and instructions, etc. [Nolasco v. Pano,
139 SCRA 152]
Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located about 20
meters away from his house is no longer within the permissible area that may be
searched by the police officers due to the distance and that the search warrant did
not include the same nipa hut as one of the places to be searched. The OSG, on the
other hand, argues that the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches
and seizure is applicable only against government authorities and not to private
individuals such as the barangay tanod who found the folded paper containing packs
of shabu inside the nipa hut. xxx. Having been established that the assistance of the
barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who effected the searched
warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods
were acting as agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the search.
Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated items are
inadmissible in evidence. [Del Castillo v. People - G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012,
Third Division, Peralta]
Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court allows the absence of the lawful occupant
provided that two witnesses are present.
Section 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence
of two witnesses. No search of a house, room, or any other
premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter,
two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality.

12

The presence of the two barangay officials was not disputed by petitioner. xxx.
Resultantly, the seized items cannot, therefore, be considered as "fruits of the
poisonous tree." [Valleno v. People - G.R. No. 192050, January 9, 2013]
Warrantless Arrests, Searches and Seizures - Rules of Court, Rule 113, Section
5 a peace officer or even a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person [1] when such person has in fact just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense in his presence; [2] when an offense has in fact just
been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; or [3] when the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. [(1) arrest in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners]
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the
meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the
offense, although at a distance [in this case, two meters or 50 meters], or
hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof.
(U.S. v. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472 [1909]; and U.S. v. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 [1910]) In
essence, Section 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in
flagrante delicto or caught in the act of committing a crime. [People v. Sucro, G.R.
No. 93239, March 18, 1991]
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not
require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the
offense with their own eyes. [Abelita III v. Doria, G.R. No. 170672, 14 August
2009, 596 SCRA 220, 226-227] It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were
monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long enough for them to be informed
that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal
knowledge based on probable cause. [People v. Uyboco, G.R. No. 178039, January
19, 2011]
Tipped information is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search
only in cases involving either a buy-bust operation or drugs in transit. [People v.
Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010]
In a buy-bust operation, the violator in flagrante delicto and the police officers
conducting the operation are not only authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the
violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the
commission of the crime. [People v. Macatingag, January 19, 2009, January 19, 2009]
The absence of evidence of a prior surveillance does not affect the regularity of a
buy-bust operation, especially when the buy-bust team members were accompanied
to the scene by their informant. [People v. de la Rosa, G.R. No. 185166, January 26,
2011]
A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.
[People v. Abedin - G.R. No. 179936, April 11, 2012; People v. Fundales - G.R. No.
184606, September 5, 2012]
A POLICE OFFICERS ACT OF SOLICITING DRUGS from appellant during the buy-bust
operation, or what is known as the "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by law and
does not invalidate the buy-bust operation. [People v. Espiritu - G.R. No. 180919,
January 9, 2013]
The military arrested, without warrants, among others, [1] a suspected rebel,
bedridden because of a bullet wound for subversion, which was considered by the
military as a continuing offense [2] a sleeping man, who was hog-tied and bodily
dumped into a police jeep for allegedly subversive remarks made by him the day
before [another continuing offense] [3] a suspected murderer for a murder
supposedly committed y him 14 days earlier. Arrests held valid by the SC. [Umil v.
Ramos, 18 SCRA 311]
There must first be a lawful arrest before a warrantless search can be made
- the process cannot be reversed. [People v, Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432]
Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede

13

the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the
search. [People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010]
Section 80 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer to arrest, even
without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing in his presence
any of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools
and equipment used in committing the offense or the forest products gathered or
taken by the offender. [Revaldo v. People - G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009]
There was constructive possession of prohibited drugs even when the accused
was not home when the prohibited drugs were found in the masters bedroom of his
house. [People v. Torres, G.R. No. 170837, September 12, 2006] The wife cannot
feign ignorance of the drugs existence as she had full access to the room, including
the space under the bed. [People v. Tira, G.R. No. 139615, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA
134]
The accused was in constructive possession of prohibited drugs which had been
found in the drawer located in her bedroom. [Abuan v. People, G.R. No. 168773,
October 27, 2006]
There are xxx instances when a warrantless search and seizure is valid, to
wit: (1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches
of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws;
(4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or
constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in plain view;
(7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and
building regulations; and (8) stop and frisk operations (Terry search).
[People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008; see also Epie, Jr. v. UlatMarredo, G.R. No. 148117, March 22, 2007, 518 SCRA 641, 646.] ALSO customs
searches and exigent and emergency circumstances. [People v. Gonzales, 417
Phil. 342, 357 (2001)] [People v. Dequina, G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011; see
also People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010 and Malacat v. CA, 283 SCRA
159] Warrantless searches and seizures at military checkpoints valid
justified on the basis of the right of the State to protect itself. Dissent: the bland
declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security
ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of
the State even if asserted on the ground of national security. [Valmonte v. de Villa,
170 SCRA 256] Tipped information in buy-bust operations or cases involving
drugs in transit. [People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010]
Moving Vehicles - such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as
the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior
to the search that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (A tip from an informant constitutes
probable cause.) [People v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 175783, September 3, 2007] - Tip was
given one week before the warrantless search of a vehicle. The Supreme Court said
the warrantless search was valid. Teehankee dissented saying there was enough
time to obtain a warrant. [People v. CFI of Rizal Jesse Hope, 101 SCRA 86] BICYCLE - Jurisprudence defines transport as to carry or convey from one place to
another. In the instant case, appellant was riding his bicycle when he was caught by
the police. He admitted that he was about to convey the package, which contained
marijuana, to a certain Jimmy Gonzales. Warrantless arrest justified. [People v.
Penaflorida, G.R. No. 175604, April 10, 2008] - The search in this case is valid. The
vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2
Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to
require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the
circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching officer had no
time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle
before the same left for its destination. [People v. Mariacos, G.R. No. 188611, June 6,
2010]
In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending
officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the
suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter's reach. Otherwise
stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on
the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The
phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. [Valeroso v. Court of

14

Appeals, G.R. No. 164815, 3 September 2009, 598 SCRA 41, 55-56 citing People v.
Cueno, 359 Phil. 151, 163 (1998); People v. Cubcubin, Jr., id. at 271; People v. Estella,
443 Phil. 669, 683 (2003)]Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so for the
police to search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested. [People v. Uyboco,
G.R. No. 178039, January 19, 2011]
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason,
arrested. xxx Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search
that resulted from it was likewise illegal. xxx It must be noted that the
evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in plain
view. It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket.
Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent. [See People v. Macalaba, 443
Phil. 565 (2003)] Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.
[Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263 (2002)] xxx Neither does the search
qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule normally applies when a police
officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a
criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of
outer clothing for weapons. [People v. Sy Chua, 444 Phil. 757 (2003)] xxx The
foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to
object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. [People v. Lapitaje, 445 Phil.
729 (2003)] The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.
[People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010] The drugs are the very
corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their
inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused. [Id.]
[Luz v. People - G. R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012, Second Division, Sereno]
Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto violating Section 31 of Republic Act No. 4139
(The Land Transportation and Traffic Code spurious government plate). In flagrante
delicto means in the very act of committing the crime. To be caught in flagrante
delicto necessarily implies the positive identification of the culprit by an eyewitness
or eyewitnesses. Such identification is a direct evidence of culpability, because it
"proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption." [Go v.
Leyte II Electric Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No. 176909, February 18, 2008, 546 SCRA
187, 195] Chief Insp. Divina signaled for Belocura to stop for verification but the
latter ignored the signal and sped off towards Balut, Tondo. The team pursued
Belocuras jeep until they blocked its path with their Tamaraw FX vehicle, forcing
Belocura to stop. At this point, Chief Insp. Divina and the rest of the team
approached the jeep and introduced themselves to Belocura as policemen. Chief
Insp. Divina queried Belocura on the government plate. SPO1 Rojas confiscated
Belocuras Berreta 9 mm. pistol (Serial Number M13086Z) that was tucked in his
waist and its fully loaded magazine when he could not produce the appropriate
documents for the pistol and the government plate. They arrested him. Even by his
own admission, he was actually committing a crime in the presence or within the
view of the arresting policemen. Such manner by which Belocura was apprehended
fell under the first category in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest
was valid, therefore, and the arresting policemen thereby became cloaked with the
authority to validly search his person and effects for weapons or any other article he
might use in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or might be
used as evidence in the trial of the case, and to seize from him and the area within
his reach or under his control, like the jeep, such weapon or other article. The evident
purpose of the incidental search was to protect the arresting policemen from being
harmed by him with the use of a concealed weapon. Accordingly, the warrantless
character of the arrest could not by itself be the basis of his acquittal. [Valdez v.
People, G.R. No. 170180, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 611] [NOTE accused was
ACQUITTED because of inadequate testimonial evidence the arresting officer who
seized the marijuana bricks was not presented to testify.][People v. Belocura - G.R.
No. 173474, August 29, 2012, First Division, Bersamin]
Vessels and Aircraft - Searches and seizures without warrant of vessels and
aircraft for violation of customs laws are valid. [Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336]
The essential element of the charge is the movement of the dangerous drug from one
place to another. In this case, appellant was apprehended inside the airport, as he

15

was intending to board his flight bound for Davao City with a substantial amount or
196.63 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu in his possession,
concealed in separate plastic bags inside his oversized Spice rubber shoes. While it
may be argued that appellant was yet to board the aircraft or travel some distance
with the illegal drugs in his possession, it cannot be denied that his presence at the
airport at that particular instance was for the purpose of transporting or moving the
dangerous drugs from one place to another. [People v. Laba G.R. No. 199938,
January 28, 2013]
Plain View - The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites
concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must
lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must
be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. [Revaldo v. People - G.R. No.
170589, April 16, 2009] - However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by
its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an
observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if
the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance
that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must
be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. [People v. Doria, GR.
15299, January 22, 1999] The drum alleged to have contained the methamphetamine
was placed in the open back of the van, hence, open to the eye and hand of the
NBI agents. The liquid-filled drum was thus within the plain view of the NBI agents,
hence, a product of a legal search. [People v. Lagman, G.R. No. 168695, December 8,
2008]
Terry Search/Incident to a Lawful Arrest - Warrantless search even before
arrest is valid when an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose
suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is presently dangerous to the
officer or to others. [Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1] In a legitimate warrantless arrest,
the arresting police officers are authorized to search and seize from the offender (1)
any dangerous weapons and (2) the things which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense. (People v. Ayangao, G.R. No. 142356, April 14, 2004, 427
SCRA 428, 433.) [People v. Bohol , G.R. No. 171729, July 28, 2008]
Search [for concealed weapons and all unlawful articles] in the course of a valid
arrest is valid. [Adams v. Williams, 47 US 143; see also People v. Figueroa, 248 SCRA
679 and People v. Salazar, 266 SCRA 607]
In this case, the prosecution has satisfactorily established that airport security
officers found in the person of petitioner the marijuana fruiting tops contained in
rolled paper sticks during the final security check at the airports pre-departure area.
Petitioner at first refused to show the contents of his short pants pocket to Soriano
who became suspicious when his hand felt the "slightly bulging" item while frisking
petitioner.
In [People v. Johnson 401 Phil. 734 (2000)], which also involved seizure of a
dangerous drug from a passenger during a routine frisk at the airport, this Court ruled
that such evidence obtained in a warrantless search was acquired legitimately
pursuant to airport security procedures xxx We find no irregularity in the search
conducted on petitioner who was asked to empty the contents of his pockets upon
the friskers reasonable belief that what he felt in his hand while frisking petitioners
short pants was a prohibited or illegal substance. Such search was made pursuant to
routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235.
[Sales v. People - G.R. No. 191023, February 06, 2013]
According to the Rules of Court, personal property may be seized in connection
with a criminal offense either by authority of a search warrant or as the product of a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. If the search is by virtue of a search warrant, the
personal property that may be seized may be that which is the subject of the offense;
or that which has been stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the

16

offense; or that which has been used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense. [Section 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court] If the search is an
incident of a lawful arrest, seizure may be made of dangerous weapons or anything
that may have been used or may constitute proof in the commission of an offense.
[Section 13, Rule 126, Rules of Court] [Phillipine Drug Enforcement Agency v. Brodett
- G.R. No. 196390, September 28, 2011, First Division, Bersamin]
The search of the contents of petitioners short pants pockets being a valid search
pursuant to routine airport security procedure, the illegal substance (marijuana)
seized from him was therefore admissible in evidence. Petitioners reluctance to show
the contents of his short pants pocket after the friskers hand felt the rolled papers
containing marijuana, and his nervous demeanor aroused the suspicion of the
arresting officers that he was indeed carrying an item or material subject to
confiscation by the said authorities. [Sales v. People - G.R. No. 191023, February 06,
2013, First Division, Villarama]
Waiver - An arrest may be made without a warrant where the right thereto is
waived by the person arrested, provided he knew of such right and knowingly
decided not to invoke it. [People v. Tabar, 222 SCRA 144] - An accused cannot
question her arrest for the first time on appeal.
[People v. Marcelino, G.R. No.
189278, July 26, 2010]
The accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise
such issue before arraignment. However, this waiver is limited only to the arrest. The
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. [People v.
Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010]
Rules of Court, Rule 114, Section 26 posting of bail will not result in waiver of
right to question lawfulness of the arrest.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure
is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances
involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. [People v. Nuevas, G.R.
No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463, 476, cited in Sy. V. People - G.R. No.
182178, August 15, 2011, Third Division, Peralta]
Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed
to take a photograph of the seized drugs as required under Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165, such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized
inadmissible in evidence. [People v. Octavio - G.R. No. 199219, April 3, 2013, Second
Division, Perez]
The Right to Privacy
Zones of Privacy - Constitution Bill of Rights Section 1 -due process, equal
protection, Section 2 -searches and seizures, Section 6 - liberty of abode; Section 8 freedom of association and Section 17 - right against self-incrimination - Civil Code
Art. 26 every person shall respect the dignity, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and
prying into the privacy of another. - Art. 32 holds a public officer or employee or
any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of
another person - Art. 723 recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications. - Revised Penal Code Art. 229 makes a crime the violation of
secrets by an officer - Art. 280 trespass to dwelling - Art. 290-292 the revelation
of trade and industrial secrets - Special Laws RA 4200 Anti-Wiretapping Law - RA
1405 Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act - RA 8293 Intellectual Property Code - Rules
of Court Rule 130, Sec. 24 privileged communication
This statutory right to privacy will not prevent the courts from authorizing an inquiry
upon the fulfillment of the requirements set forth under Section 11 of the AMLA [in
instances where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related
to kidnapping for ransom, certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs

17

Act of 2002, hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and
murder] [Republic of the Philippines v. Eugenio, G.R. No. 174629, February 14, 2008]
The provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. Employees have a reduced
expectation of privacy. With respect to persons charged before the public
prosecutors office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1)
day imprisonment, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless.
To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably
forced to incriminate themselves. [Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board
G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008] Section 36 of R.A. No. 9165 provides that
drug tests shall be performed only by authorized drug testing centers. [Nacague v.
Sulpicio Lines, G.R. No. 172589, August 8, 2010]
Petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily
fail. His other argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence
under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering
the recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of
employees in the government workplace under the aforecited authorities. xxx. As
already mentioned, the search of petitioners computer was justified there being
reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield
incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as
government employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This
situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in
administrative searches defined in
OConnor.
[Pollo v. Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David - G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011, En Banc, Villarama]
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed
ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily
includes their right to decide how best to protect their property. It also appears that
requiring the exposure of their property via a see-thru fence is violative of their right
to privacy, considering that the residence of the Benedictine nuns is also located
within the property. The right to privacy has long been considered a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution that must be protected from intrusion or
constraint. The right to privacy is essentially the right to be let alone [Gamboa v.
Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012, 677 SCRA 385, 396, citing Morfe v. Mutuc, 130
Phil. 415 (1968)], as governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions
into the personal life of its citizens. [White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, G.R.
No. 122846, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 416, at 441, citing City of Manila v. Laguio,
495 Phil. 289 (2005)] It is inherent in the concept of liberty, enshrined in the Bill of
Rights (Article III) in Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8, and 17, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. [Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012, 677 SCRA 385, at
397-398, citing Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948 (1998)] [Fernando v. St. Scholasticas
College - G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013, En Banc, Mendoza]
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective,
the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a
fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or
overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling. [Gamboa v. Chan - G.R.
No. 193636, July 24, 2012]
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated
[with the collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis--vis the interest of
the state to dismantle private armies], suffice it to state that privacy is not an
absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution,
guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation,
not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate
congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to
access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to
privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to
privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest.
Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is

18

no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure


information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government
agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public
who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a
reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.
[Gamboa v. Chan - G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012]
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed
ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily
includes their right to decide how best to protect their property. It also appears that
requiring the exposure of their property via a see-thru fence is violative of their right
to privacy, considering that the residence of the Benedictine nuns is also located
within the property. The right to privacy has long been considered a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution that must be protected from intrusion or
constraint. The right to privacy is essentially the right to be let alone [Gamboa v.
Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012, 677 SCRA 385, 396, citing Morfe v. Mutuc, 130
Phil. 415 (1968)], as governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions
into the personal life of its citizens. [White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, G.R.
No. 122846, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 416, at 441, citing City of Manila v. Laguio,
495 Phil. 289 (2005)] It is inherent in the concept of liberty, enshrined in the Bill of
Rights (Article III) in Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8, and 17, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. [Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012, 677 SCRA 385, at
397-398, citing Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948 (1998)] [Fernando v. St. Scholasticas
College - G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013, En Banc, Mendoza]
Article III, Section 3 (2) - Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The so-called Exclusionary Rule teaches that evidence illegally obtained shall be
inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.
Freedom of Expression
Freedom from Censorship - A radio station was denied a permit to operate
pursuant to a new ordinance converting its location into a commercial area. It was,
however, shown that said ordinance was passed to suppress said stations criticisms
against the local government. Jurisprudence distinguishes between a contentneutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one
that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined
standards; and a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is
based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. Content-based laws are
generally treated as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial
concern with discrimination in the regulation of expression. Content-neutral
regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to lesser
but still heightened scrutiny. Ordinance held as content-based restraint.
INVALID. [New Sounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Dy, G.R. Nos. 170270 &
179411, April 2, 2009]
Minnesota shut down a paper for being a public nuisance. US SC: Even miscreant
purveyors of scandal, such as Jay M. Nears blatantly anti-Semitic Saturday Press,
are protected from prior restraint. Thus, a law which provides for the suppression of
any periodical found, after hearing, on the basis of its past issues, to be obscene, is
INVALID. [Near v. Minnesota, 283 US 697 (1931)] US SC upheld a law which
authorized the suppression of any issue of any periodical if and as such issue was
found to be objectionable after judicial hearing, but without affecting the right of
the periodical to continue publication. The statute was aimed against issues already
published, not against future issues. [Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 US 436] - No
political campaigns allowed except during the election period.
[Gonzales v.
COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835]
Freedom from Punishment - Freedom of expression does not cover ideas offensive
to public order or decency or the reputation of persons, which are all entitled to
protection by the State. Thus, the lewd word, the obscene word, the seditious word,
the slanderous word, cannot be considered a step to the truth and therefore will not
enjoy immunity from prohibition and punishment. [Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 US 88]
The Clear and Present Danger Rule - Justice Fernando the term clear seems to
point to a causal connection with the danger of the substantive evil arising from the

19

utterance questioned. Present refers to the time element. It used to be identified


with imminent and immediate danger. The danger must not only be probable but
very likely inevitable. [Gonzales v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835] The clear and present
danger rule is founded on the same principles as Content-based Restraint.
[Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008]
A 13-year old girl showed up in class with a black arm band to protest US policy in
Vietnam and was suspended. Suspension set aside by the US SC - It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights at the
schoolhouse gate. [Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District (1969),
adopted in Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 - Students barred from reenrollment because they had participated in demonstrations. Malabanan affirmed,
although some students were not accepted for re-enrollment, not for participating in
a rally but because of academic deficiencies. [Villar v. Technological Institute of the
Philippines, 135 SCRA 706; see also Non v. Dames, 185 SCRA 523]]
A private individual may be the subject of public comment even if he is not a
public official or at least a public figure, as long as he is involved in a public issue.
the publics primary interest is in the event. [Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 US 29]
Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the
courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal
contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. This rule is otherwise after
the case is ended. [People v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265]
Accused delivered inside an auditorium before less than a thousand persons a speech
attacking various political and racial groups while an angry crowd of about one
thousand gathered outside to protest the meeting and a number of disturbances
occurred, created by the people outside not by the defendant. Convicted under an
ordinance punishing any improper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or
diversion tending to the breach of the peace. Conviction annulled. a function of
free speech is to provide dispute. [Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 US 1] BUT in
Feiner v. New York, [340 US 315], the US Supreme Court upheld a statute
forbidding speaking on public streets with intent to provoke a breach of peace. It
found the accused to be guilty of a genuine attempt to arouse the Negro people
against the whites. Chief Justice Charles Evans writes for a unanimous Court to
overturn the conviction of a Communist, who had been arrested at a meeting to
protest the police shooting of striking longshoremen. Peaceable assembly for lawful
discussion cannot be made a crime. [US v. Dirk De Jonge (1937)] [Note - A
heckler's veto occurs when an acting party's right to freedom of speech is curtailed
or restricted by the government in order to prevent a reacting party's behavior. The
common example is that of demonstrators (reacting party) causing a speech (given
by the acting party) to be terminated in order to preserve the peace. The best known
case involving the heckler's veto is probably Feiner v. New York [340 U.S. 315],
handed down by the Supreme Court in 1951. Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, writing for
the majority, held that police officers acted within their power in arresting a speaker
if the arrest was "motivated solely by a proper concern for the preservation of order
and protection of the general welfare." In Gregory v. Chicago [394 US 111], Justice
Hugo Black, in a concurring opinion, argued that arresting demonstrators as a
consequence of unruly behavior of by-standers would amount to a heckler's veto. It
was rejected in Hill v. Colorado [530 US 703], where the Supreme Court rejected the
"Heckler's Veto," finding "governmental grants of power to private actors" to be
"constitutionally problematic" in cases where "the regulations allowed a single,
private actor to unilaterally silence a speaker"]
Tests of obscenity [1] whether the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; [2] whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable law; [3] whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. [Miller v.
California, 37 L. ed. 419] - Obscene magazines cannot be summarily confiscated; a
warrant must be issued. [Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362] - Where a language is categorized
as indecent, as in petitioners utterances on a general-patronage rated TV program, it
may be readily proscribed as unprotected speech. [Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No.
164785, April 29, 2009]

20

Unprotected speech or low-value expression, refers to libelous statements,


obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or fighting
words, i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security. The Court
finds that petitioners statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to
the average child. Even if we concede that petitioners remarks are not obscene but
merely indecent speech, still the Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of
the constitutional protection of free speech. Said statements were made in a medium
easily accessible to children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances are to
be treated as unprotected speech. [Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29,
2009]
Freedom of Assembly - The use of public places for public meetings or rallies can
only be reasonably regulated, and not absolutely prohibited. Clear and
present danger rule applied. [Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71; Reyes v. Bagatsing,
125 SCRA 553]
BP Blg. 880 - The Public Assembly Act of 1985 - A written permit shall be
required for a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be
required if the public assembly shall be done in a freedom park duly established
by law or ordinance [centrally located within the poblacion Section 15] or in
private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to
its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and
operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and
regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held
during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered
by this Act. [Section 4] The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the
application within two (2) working days from the date the application was
filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted.
B.P. No. 880 is a content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of
holding public assemblies. Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of
the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear
and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. There
is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the
regulation. The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in
our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom.
The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally permits is valid because it
is subject to the constitutionally-sound clear and present danger standard. [Bayan
v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 226]
TESTS - Purpose Test - The test of a lawful assembly should be the purposes for
which it is held, regardless of the auspices under which it is organized. Peaceable
assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. In this case, the conviction
of a Communist, who had been arrested at a meeting to protest the police shooting of
striking longshoremen, was reversed by the US Supreme Court. [De Jonge v. Oregon,
229 US 353 (1937)] Auspices Test applied a rally of the Communist Party of the
Philippines was prohibited, because a fiscal had determined the CPP to be an illegal
association. [Evangelista v. Earnshaw, 57 Phil. 255] not yet formally abrogated in
this jurisdiction.
Respondent was holding the position of Social Insurance Specialist of the Claims
Department of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) when she was
administratively charged with Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service for the following acts: 1. Wearing red shirt and marching
to or appearing at the office of the Investigation Unit in protest and to support Atty.
Mario Molina (Atty. Molina) and Atty. Albert Velasco (Atty. Velasco); 2. Conspiring with
other employees and temporarily leaving her workplace, and abandoning her post
and duties; 3. Badmouthing the security guards and the GSIS management and
defiantly raising clenched fists; and 4. Causing alarm, frightening some employees,
and disrupting the work at the Investigation Unit during office hours.
In this case, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office
wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity
or mass action proscribed above. CSC even added that their actuations can be
deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA
found no cogent reason to deviate therefrom.

21

Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the
land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their
rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of
expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the
members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be
reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.
In the recent case of GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS [GSIS, G.R. No.
170132, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 622], the Court upheld the position of
petitioner GSIS because its employees, numbering between 300 and 800 each day,
staged a walkout and participated in a mass protest or demonstration outside the
GSIS for four straight days. We cannot say the same for the 20 or so employees in
this case. To equate their wearing of red shirts and going to the GSIS-IU office for just
over an hour with that four-day mass action in Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa
GSIS case and to punish them in the same manner would most certainly be unfair
and unjust.
Recent analogous decisions in the United States, while recognizing the government's
right as an employer to lay down certain standards of conduct, tend to lean towards a
broad definition of "public concern speech" which is protected by their First
Amendment. One such case is that of Scott v. Meters. [191 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1999)] In
said case, the New York Transit Authority (NYTA), responsible for operation of New
York City's mass transit service, issued a rule prohibiting employees from wearing
badges or buttons on their uniforms. A number of union members wore union buttons
promoting their opposition to a collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, the
NYTA tried to enforce its rule and threatened to subject these union members to
discipline. The court, though recognizing the government's right to impose
reasonable restrictions, held that the NYTA's rule was "unconstitutionally overboard."
Thus, respondents' freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSC's
Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action
has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that definition,
respondents' actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass
action. The CSC and the CA were both correct in arriving at said conclusion. [GSIS v.
Villaviza - G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010]
In said November 15, 2010 Decision, this Court ruled that complainants concerted
mass action was actually a strike and not a legitimate exercise of their right to
freedom of expression; that complainants violated the January 18, 2000 Order of
Secretary Laguesma; that the union officers dismissal was valid; and that petitioners
therein failed to present proof that the union members participated in the
commission of an illegal act during the said strike; hence, their dismissal was
unjustified. [Solid Bank Union v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company - G.R. No.
153799, September 17, 2012, Second Division, del Castillo]
Freedom of Religion
Related Provisions in the Constitution - Preamble/Article II, Sec. 6/establishment
clause [Article III, Section 5] Article VI, Section 29(2) - state cannot set up a church
[Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1]; no part of the business of government to
compose official prayers [Engel v. Vitale, 370 US 421]; state may not require reading
of bible verses [District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 US 203]; may not
provide for the distribution of bibles through public teachers using government time
[Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 NJ 31]; BUT may allow religious instruction on
released-time arrangement (with obligation to make up for lost time) [Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 US 306] Article XIV, Section 3 (3), on optional religious instruction; or
lend textbooks to both public and parochial schools (ownership of the books remains
with the state) [Board of Education v. Allen, 392 US 236]; and even provide
transportation to students of both public and parochial schools [Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 US 1; Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness - benevolent
neutrality approach - gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause - benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling
state interests - the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of
the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as

22

little as possible on religious liberties. Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be


penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her
fundamental right to freedom of religion. [Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651,
June 22, 2006; see also Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003]. SEE
ALSO Article XV, Section 3[1] The State shall defend the right of spouses to found a
family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood. - For a Christian nation like ours, such bestial act should never be
tolerated. [People v. Bosi - G.R. No. 193665, June 25, 2012, Second Division, Reyes]
The establishment clause does not inhibit the use of public property for religious
purposes when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary
use which is available indiscriminately to the public in general, as in religious
processions along public streets. [People v. Fernandez, CA G. R. No. L-1128 (1945)]
Nothing objectionable with respect to the use of private contributions for the
purchase of a religious image. [Garces v. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510]
Religious Profession and Worship - Religious profession and worship has a
twofold aspect freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones beliefs. The
first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of
thought. The second is subject to religion where the belief is translated
into external acts that affect the public welfare. [Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
US 296] No license needed to sell Bibles because to subject said activity to a license
fee would be to impair the free exercise of religious profession and worship, which
includes the right to disseminate religious beliefs [American Bible Society v. City of
Manila, 101 Phil. 386] BUT a P1,000 VAT registration fee would not constitute an
impairment of religious freedom, because said registration fee is a mere
administrative fee, not one imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right. [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630]
Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu [219 SCRA 256 (1993)]
upheld the religious freedom of Jehovahs Witnesses and ruled that they could, if they
so wished, refuse to salute the Philippine flag because of their religious belief that it
is an image.
Religious Tests - A conscientious objector who refused, on religious grounds, to
take an oath which contained a provision requiring service in the militia in times of
war was considered morally unfit to practice law. [In re Summers, 325 US 561] A
conscientious objector may not refuse, by reason of his religious beliefs, to render
personal military or civil service, as required under Article II, Section 4 of the
Constitution. [People v. Zosa, 38 OG 1676]
Liberty of Abode
A housemaid may transfer residence even if she had not yet paid the amount
advanced by an employment agency. [Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil.851] To require nonChristian tribes to reside in a reservation, for their better education, advancement
and protection, would be a valid exercise of the police power. [Rubi v. Provincial
Board of Mindoro, 50 Phil. 595] A mayor deports women of ill-repute to Davao.
There is no showing that he was authorized to do so under any law. Ours is a
government of laws, and not of men. [Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39SCRA 778] The
Supreme Court has sustained an administrative regulation, enacted pursuant to
legislative authority, temporarily suspending the deployment of Filipina domestics
abroad on the ground of public safety. [Phil. Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon,
163 SCRA 386] National security invoked for limiting a persons right to return to the
country. [Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 669]
While the right to travel is a constitutional right that may be impaired only in the
interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by
law, there are recognized exceptions other than those created by law. Foremost is
the restriction on the right to travel of persons charged of crimes before the courts.
Another is the restriction on persons subpoenaed or ordered arrested by the Senate
or House of Representatives pursuant to their power of legislative inquiry. There are
also restrictions on the right to travel imposed on government officials and
employees. For example, Office of the Court Administrator Circular No. 49-2003(B)
requires judges and court personnel to secure a travel authority from the Office of
the Court Administrator before they can travel abroad even during their approved
leave of absence or free time. This restriction to travel abroad is imposed even in the

23

absence of a law. In the present case, petitioners are already undergoing preliminary
investigation in several criminal cases, and charges may be filed before the courts
while petitioners are abroad. In fairness to the Government which is tasked with the
prosecution of crimes, this Court must hear first the Government in oral argument
before deciding on the temporary restraining order which if issued could frustrate the
Governments right to prosecute. The Government must be heard on how the
charges against petitioners could proceed while petitioners are abroad. [Arroyo v. De
Lima - G.R. No. 199034, November 15, 2011, En Banc, Carpio, Dissenting Opinion]
It has been argued that OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (B) on vacation leave to be
spent abroad unduly restricts a citizens right to travel guaranteed by Section 6,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Let there be no doubt that the Court recognizes a
citizens constitutional right to travel. It is, however, not the issue in this case. The
only issue in this case is the non-compliance with the Courts rules and regulations. It
should be noted that respondent, in her Comment, did not raise any constitutional
concerns. In fact, she was apologetic and openly admitted that she went abroad
without the required travel authority. Hence, this is not the proper vehicle to thresh
out issues on ones constitutional right to travel. Nonetheless, granting that it is an
issue, the exercise of ones right to travel or the freedom to move from one place to
another, [Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 158793,
June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 318, 353] as assured by the Constitution, is not absolute.
There are constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right to
travel. Section 6 itself provides that neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be
provided by law. Some of these statutory limitations are the following:
1] The Human Security Act of 2010 or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9372.
The law restricts the right to travel of an individual charged with the
crime of terrorism even though such person is out on bail.
2] The Philippine Passport Act of 1996 or R.A. No. 8239. Pursuant to
said law, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or his authorized consular
officer may refuse the issuance of, restrict the use of, or withdraw, a
passport of a Filipino citizen.
3]
The Anti- Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 or R.A. No. 9208.
Pursuant to the provisions thereof, the Bureau of Immigration, in order
to manage migration and curb trafficking in persons, issued
Memorandum Order Radjr No. 2011-011, allowing its Travel Control
and Enforcement Unit to offload passengers with fraudulent travel
documents, doubtful purpose of travel, including possible victims of
human trafficking from our ports.
4] The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or R. A. No.
8042, as amended by R.A. No. 10022. In enforcement of said law, the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) may refuse to
issue deployment permit to a specific country that effectively prevents
our migrant workers to enter such country.
5] The Act on Violence against Women and Children or R.A. No. 9262.
The law restricts movement of an individual against whom the
protection order is intended.
6] Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 or R.A. No. 8043. Pursuant
thereto, the Inter-Country Adoption Board may issue rules restrictive of
an adoptees right to travel to protect the Filipino child from abuse,
exploitation, trafficking and/or sale or any other practice in connection
with adoption which is harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to the
child.
Inherent limitations on the right to travel are those that naturally emanate from the
source. These are very basic and are built-in with the power. An example of such
inherent limitation is the power of the trial courts to prohibit persons charged with a
crime to leave the country. [Silverio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991,
195 SCRA 760, 765] In such a case, permission of the court is necessary. Another is
the inherent power of the legislative department to conduct a congressional inquiry
in aid of legislation. In the exercise of legislative inquiry, Congress has the power to
issue a subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to a witness in any part of the country,
signed by the chairperson or acting chairperson and the Speaker or acting Speaker of
the House; [House Rules and Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation,
adopted on August 28, 2001, Section 7] or in the case of the Senate, signed by its
Chairman or in his absence by the Acting Chairman, and approved by the Senate

24

President. [Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation,


adopted on August 21, 1995, Section 17] xxx. As earlier stated, with respect to
members and employees of the Judiciary, the Court issued OCA Circular No. 49-2003
to regulate their foreign travel in an unofficial capacity. Such regulation is necessary
for the orderly administration of justice. If judges and court personnel can go on
leave and travel abroad at will and without restrictions or regulations, there could be
a disruption in the administration of justice. A situation where the employees go on
mass leave and travel together, despite the fact that their invaluable services are
urgently needed, could possibly arise. For said reason, members and employees of
the Judiciary cannot just invoke and demand their right to travel. [Leave Division v.
Heusdens - A.M. No. P-11-2927, December 13, 2011, En Banc, Mendoza]
The Right to Information
There are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents
pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a
subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information
grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These
powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen. [Senate v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006] The right of Congress or any of its Committees to
obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the peoples right to
public information. The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an
exercise of the peoples right to information. [Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008] The COMELEC
may be compelled to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the various
party-list groups named in the petitions. [Bantay Republic Act v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
177271, May 4, 2007]
Splendid Symmetry- The right of access to public documents, has been recognized
as a self-executory constitutional right. The policy of full public disclosure enunciated
in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on
matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. [The
Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines
Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008]
While national board examinations, such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of
public concern, there may be valid reasons to limit access to the Examination Papers
in order to properly administer the exam.
[Antolin v. Domondon, GR No. 165036,
July 5, 2010]
Jurisprudence [Chavez v. PCGG, 360 Phil. 133, 160-162 (1998)] has provided the
following limitations to that right: (1) national security matters and intelligence
information; (2) trade secrets and banking transactions; (3) criminal matters; and (4)
other confidential information such as confidential or classified information officially
known to public officers and employees by reason of their office and not made
available to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet
meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, and the internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court. This could only mean that while no prohibition
could stand against access to official records, such as the SALN, the same is
undoubtedly subject to regulation. [RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF
ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR
CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY - A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012, En Banc,
Mendoza]
Here, petitioners second letter dated May 14, 2010 specifically requested for [sic]
detailed information regarding the winning bidder, such as company profile, contact
person or responsible officer, office address and Philippine registration. But before
PSALM could respond to the said letter, petitioners filed the present suit on May 19,
2010. PSALMs letter-reply dated May 21, 2010 advised petitioners that their letter-re
quest was referred to the counsel of K-Water. We find such action insufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement and inconsistent with the policy
under EPIRA to implement the privatization of NPC assets in an "open and
transparent" manner. PSALMs evasive response to the request for information was

25

unjustified because all bidders were required to deliver documents such as company
profile, names of authorized officers/representatives, financial and technical
experience. Consequently, this relief must be granted to petitioners by directing
PSALM to allow petitioners access to the papers and documents relating to the
company profile and legal capacity of the winning bidder. [Initiatives for Dialogue and
Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. v. Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Management Corporation - G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012, En Banc,
Villarama]
The Right of Association
RELATE TO ART. XIII, Sec. 15 - The State shall respect the role of independent
people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the
democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations
through peaceful and lawful means. People's organizations are bona fide associations
of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with
identifiable leadership, membership, and structure.
Members of the civil service may not declare a strike to enforce their economic
demands. [Alliance of Government Workers v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, 124
SCRA 1] The Anti-Subversion Act, which outlawed the Communist Party of the
Philippines, was held not violative of the right of association on the ground that the
government has a right to protect itself against subversion. [People v. Ferrer, 48
SCRA 382] A law providing that closed-shop agreements in CBAs should not include
members of religious sects which prohibit them from joining labor unions is valid.
Right to associate includes the right not to associate on the basis of religious beliefs.
[Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54]
Article III, Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.
Contract civil law concept any lawful agreement on property or property rights,
whether real or personal, tangible or intangible. Includes franchises or charters
granted to persons or entities, like an authorization to build a public utility
[Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518]; does not cover licenses [Pedro v.
Provincial Board of Rizal, 53 Phil. 123; Tan v. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302 a
license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful and is
not a contract with the government] NOTE Article XII, Section 11 franchises to
operate public utilities shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the
Congress when the common good so requires - does not cover marriage contract,
marriage being a social institution subject at all times to regulation by the legislature
and to change of the original conditions [Maryland v. Hill, 125 US 129] does not
cover public office or salaries, except those already earned. [Mississippi v. Miller,
276 US 174]
LICENSE AGREEMENTS are not contracts within the purview of the due process and
the non-impairment of contracts clauses enshrined in the Constitution. [Republic of
the Philippines v. Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc., G.R. No. 159308, September 16,
2008]
Laws statutes, executive orders and administrative regulations, municipal
ordinances [Lim v. Register of Deeds, 46 OG 3665] BUT does not include judicial
decisions [but see Ganzon v. Inserto, 123 SCRA 713 where it was held that the
clause would be violated by the substitution of a mortgage with a surety bond as
security for the payment of a loan as this would change the terms and conditions of
the original mortgage contract over the mortgagees objection. This change was
effected by a decision of a court, not by a law.]
To impair, the law must retroact so as to affect existing contracts concluded before
its enactment; no impairment if the law is to be applied prospectively. Impairment is
anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract as when the principal of the loan
is reduced or the period for payment is either lengthened or shortened
Remedies there will be impairment only if all remedies are withdrawn, even if the
only remedy left is the most difficult [Manila Trading Co. v. Reyes, 62 Phil. 461]
The impairment clause may be limited by the States fundamental powers.

26

Gold Clause Cases contracts stipulated payment should be made in gold despite a
change in currency. Subsequent law converting currency to silver was considered
valid. [Norman v. Baltimore, 294 US 240]
AN EXECUTIVE ORDER and a law declared a moratorium on the payment of pre-war
debts until after eight years from the settlement of the war damage claims of the
debtors. The law was considered invalid no more emergency by reason of the war
period was oppressively long. [Rutter v. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68] A law converted all
pre-existing share tenancy contracts to leasehold tenancy arrangements. Valid
police power. [Illusorio v. Court of Agrarian Reform, 17 SCRA 25] Lots sold for
residential purposes used for construction of commercial buildings based on new
zoning ordinance. Valid police power. [Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank, 94 SCRA 533] BP
22 valid exercise of the police power. [Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323] A
government directive which discontinued assignment of salaries of teachers to
creditors is not offensive to the impairment clause because the latter could still
collect loans after salaries had been withdrawn by the employees themselves. [Tiro v.
Hontanosas, 125 SCRA 697] Substitution of mortgage with security bond as security
for payment of loans violative of impairment clause (Note: it was a court which made
this change.) [Ganzon v. Inserto, 123 SCRA 713] A private company had a contract
with a town to supply water. When the town became a city, the latter expropriated
the properties and franchises of the water company. Valid. [Long Island Water Supply
Co., Inc. v. Brooklyn, 166 US 685]
Section 47 [of R.A. No. 8791] did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem
their foreclosed properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by
reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption
period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of
the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is
likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47
exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and
whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135. [Goldenway
Merchandising Corporation v. Equitable PCI Bank G.R. No. 195540, March 13, 2013,
First Division, Villarama]
Custodial Investigation any questioning by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way. [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436] The right to counsel attaches
upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused.
[Gamboa v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-56291, 27 June 1988, 162 SCRA 642, 653] RA 7438 also
provides that custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an
invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting
officer for any violation of law. - The accused was, upon his arrest in Quezon where
he had fled, subjected by the police to informal inculpatory investigation that
continued during their trip to Manila, where his formal investigation was conducted at
the police station. He was not assisted by counsel, who arrived the following day. His
confession during the trip from Quezon was held inadmissible. [People v. Compil, 244
SCRA 135] It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned
his and Cols plan to kill Pasion. Bokingcos confession was admittedly taken without
the assistance of counsel in violation of Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. In People v. Sunga, [447 Phil. 776 (2003)]we held that the right to
counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed critical stages in
the criminal process. The preliminary investigation can be no different from the incustody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary
investigation will be subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes
intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal
prosecution. [People v. Bokingo G.R. No. 187536, August 10, 2011]
The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called
Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. [People v. Lara -G.R. No.
199877, August 13, 2012]

27

Line-ups After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an


uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. [People v. Macam, 238
SCRA 306] BUT, citing Gamboa v. Cruz [162 SCRA 642 (1988)], the Supreme Court,
in People v. Lamsing [248 SCRA 471] and People v. Salvatierra [276 SCRA 55],
declared that the right to counsel is NOT available during a police line-up as this is
not considered part of the custodial investigation. [De la Torre v. Court of Appeals,
294 SCRA 196; recently affirmed in People v. Lara -G.R. No. 199877, August 13, 2012]
RE-ENACTMENT of the crime in the absence of counsel is inadmissible evidence
against the accused. [People v. Suarez, 267 SCRA 119]
The right to counsel is not essential in administrative proceedings. [Ampong v
CSC, G.R. No. 167916, August 26, 2008]
No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
- SWEARING OFFICERS should have confessants physically examined by
independent doctors before administering the path. [People v. Barros, 122 SCRA 34]
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. - Uncounselled
confession made during custodial investigation [made before the accused was
advised of his custodial rights], as well as evidence obtained from house of the
accused, inadmissible. Uncounselled confession made to a mayor, whom the
accused treated as a confidante, and who did not even question the accused,
admissible. Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a
televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. [People
v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997, 269 SCRA 95, 109-110.] Uncounselled
extrajudicial statement given to barangay tanods, including the Barangay
Chairman, inside a barangay hall INADMISSIBLE. But uncounselled admission [of
crime of arson] made to a neighbor ADMISSIBLE. [People v. Mayo, G.R. No. 170470,
September 26, 2006] Uncounselled but voluntary written admissions made to
kagawads ADMISSIBLE. Not under custodial investigation at the time. [People v. Gil,
G.R. No. 172468, October 15, 2008]
In People v. Wong Chuen Ming [326 Phil. 192 (1996)], the trial court, in convicting
the accused, relied heavily on the signatures which they affixed on the boxes of
Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags. The Court construed the accuseds act of
affixing their signatures thereon as a tacit admission of the crime charged. And, since
the accused were not informed of their Miranda rights when they affixed their
signatures, the admission was declared inadmissible evidence for having been
obtained in violation of their constitutional rights. [Ho Wai Pang v. People - G.R. No.
176229, October 19, 2011, First Division, Del Castillo]
The Right to Bail - one who is not detained may not post bail. - Any person in
custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the
province, city or municipality where he is held. Despite the absence of any written
application, respondent judge verbally granted bail to Melgazo. This is a clear
deviation from the procedure laid down in Sec. 17 of Rule 114. As regards the
insistence of Judge Canoy that such may be considered as constructive bail, there
is no such species of bail under the Rules. [Pantilo v. Canoy, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2262,
February 9, 2011] - Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural
necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail,
especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion. [Dericto v. Bautista, A.M. No. MTJ99-1205, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 223, 227] - Bail may be granted even if
evidence of guilt is strong where the accused is ill and requires hospitalization. [De
la Rama v. Peoples Court, 77 Phil. 461]
Reliance on a previous order granting bail does not justify the absence of a
hearing in a subsequent petition for bail. [Basco v. Rapatalo, supra note 26; citing
Baylon v. Sison, 313 Phil. 99 (1995); Tucay v. Domangas, 312 Phil. 135 (1995)] Even if
the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an
accused, the court may still require the prosecution to answer questions in order to
ascertain, not only the strength of the State's evidence, but also the adequacy of the
amount of bail. [Villanueva v. Buaya, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2131, November 22, 2010] Even
where there is no petition for bail in a case like Criminal Case No. 1138-03, a hearing

28

should still be held. This hearing is separate and distinct from the initial hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause, in which the trial judge ascertains
whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the crime. The
Prosecution must be given a chance to show the strength of its evidence; otherwise,
a violation of due process occurs. [Directo v. Bautista, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1205,
November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 223] The fact that the public prosecutor
recommended bail for Ancheta did not warrant dispensing with the hearing. xxx
[Marzan-Gelacio v. Flores, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1488, June 20, 2000, 334 SCRA 1, 9] in
whom alone the discretion to determine whether to grant bail or not was vested.
Whatever the public prosecutor recommended, including the amount of bail, was
non-binding. Nor did such recommendation constitute a showing that the evidence of
guilt was not strong. If it was otherwise, the trial judge could become unavoidably
controlled by the Prosecution. [Gacal v. Infante - A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1845, October 5,
2011, First Division, Bersamin] SEPARATE HEARING for bail not indispensable
hearing on petition for bail may be summary in nature or held in the course of the
trial. [Gerardo v. CFI, 86 Phil. 504]
The earlier ruling of this Court that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of the right to
question the validity of the arrest has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the principle that the
accused is precluded from questioning the legality of his arrest after arraignment is
true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without
previously invoking his objections thereto. [Borlongan v. Pena, G.R. No. 143591,
November 23, 2007]
Criminal Due Process - Denial of right to preliminary investigation is a denial of due
process, even if the right to a preliminary investigation is just a statutory right.
[Patanao v. Enage, 121 SCRA 228] - Upon the filing of the complaint and affidavit
with respect to cases cognizable by the MTCC, the prosecutor shall take the
appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting documents
submitted by the complainant. It means that the prosecutor may either dismiss the
complaint if he does not see sufficient reason to proceed with the case, or file the
information if he finds probable cause. The prosecutor is not mandated to
require the submission of counter-affidavits. Petitioners could not validly
claim the right to preliminary investigation.
They were not denied due
process. [Borlongan v. Pena, G.R. No. 143591, November 23, 2007] - A judge, who is
also the mayor, should not have a share in the fines he imposes against the accused
who appear before him. [Tumey v. Ohio, 273 US 510] - Police authorities forced an
emetic solution through a tube into the stomach of a suspect to eject two narcotic
pills he had swallowed to prevent their use as evidence against him. Violative of due
process [Rochin v. California, 342 US 165] Small amount of blood extracted from an
unconscious person suspected of being drunk was not considered violative of due
process. [Breithanpat v. Abram, 352 US 432] - the determination of probable cause,
for purposes of preliminary investigation, is an executive function. [Lim Po v.
Department of Justice - G.R. No. 195198, February 11, 2013, First Division, Reyes]
Penal provisions of an EO which became effective on June 29, 1982 were sought to be
enforced against the accused for acts they committed on April 2, 1982. Violative of
due process.
[Pesigan v. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174]
Said EO was declared
unconstitutional in Ynot v. IAC [148 SCRA 659]. Date of publication of penal laws is
the date of the release for circulation of the OG. [People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 524]
Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by
the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, as here. [See Rule 114, Section 5, Rules of Court] The Court held:
Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on bail pending appeal" policy, the presence of bailnegating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such
that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court
for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where
bail is prohibited. [Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, 615
SCRA 619, 648, cited in Qui v. People - G.R. No. 196161, September 26, 2012, Third
Division, Velasco]

29

The Rights of the Accused


ACCUSATION is not synonymous with guilt. [People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59] The
constitutional presumption of innocence may be overcome by contrary
presumptions based on the experience of human conduct, such as the wicked flee
when no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion. [People v. Labara,
April 20, 1954] Escape from detention during the pendency of the case before the
trial court is in itself an indication of his guilt. [People v. Isang, G.R. No. 183087,
December 4, 2008] Possession of stolen property may give rise to the reasonable
presumption that it was he himself who had stolen it. [US v. Espia, 16 Phil. 506]
Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the Stateprovided that the
filing of the charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military
tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact."
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of the constitutional presumption of
innocence. [Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392]
No inference of guilt may be drawn against an accused for his failure to make a
statement of any sort. [People v. Arciaga, 99 SCRA 1] While the accused has a right
to be silent, they run the risk of an inference from the non-production of evidence.
[People v. Solis, 128 SCRA 217]
Failure or refusal of the accused to testify may
prejudice him if the prosecution has already established a prima facie case against
him. [People v. Resano, 132 SCRA 71]
The constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence prevails until a promulgation
of final conviction is made. [Trillanes v. Pimentel , G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008]
Denial of right to preliminary investigation is a denial of due process, even if the right
to a preliminary investigation is just a statutory right. [Patanao v. Enage, 121 SCRA
228] Denial of this right, in the absence of a waiver, will violate due process. [Bunye
v. Sandiganbayan, 205 SCRA 92] Preliminary investigation is a component part of
due process in criminal justice. [Sales v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 293]
The Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a
complaint. Indeed, we have said in Knecht v. Desierto [353 Phil. 494 (1998)] and later
in Mamburao, Inc. v. Office of the Ombudsman [398 Phil. 762 (2000)] and Karaan v.
Office of the Ombudsman [476 Phil. 536 (2004)] that should investigating officers
find a complaint utterly devoid of merit, they may recommend its outright dismissal.
Moreover, it is also within their discretion to determine whether or not
preliminary investigation should be conducted. The Court has undoubtedly
acknowledged the powers of the Ombudsman to dismiss a complaint outright
without a preliminary investigation in The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto. [437 Phil. 702 (2002)] We reiterate that the
Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed,
including whether a preliminary investigation is warranted. The Court therefore gives
due deference to the Ombudsmans decision to no longer conduct a preliminary
investigation in this case on the criminal charges levelled against respondent
Velasco. [Judge Angeles v. Gutierrez - G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173, March 21, 2012]
The right to be assisted by counsel is indispensable only in judicial criminal
proceedings. - The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken into
custody and placed under investigation for the commission of a crime. [People v.
Lino, 196 SCRA 809] The right to counsel does not cease after trial; continues on
appeal. [People v. Rio, 201 SCRA 702]
Deaf-mute could not defend himself at the trial because of lack of sign language
expert. Conviction reversed. [People v. Parazo, 310 SCRA 146]
The description and not the designation of the offense is controlling. Even if there is
an erroneous designation [e.g., Section 3b of the Anti-Graft Law], an accused may
still be convicted of bribery if the information properly describes the offense.
[Soriano v. Sandiganbayan, 131 SCRA 184] A person charged with rape, of which he
was absolved, cannot be convicted of qualified seduction, which was not included in
the information. [People v. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144] Conviction of the accused of rape
by intimidation under an information charging him with raping his daughter while she
was asleep and unconscious would violate his constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. [People v. Abino, 372 SCRA 50]

30

A person charged with homicide by drowning cannot be convicted of homicide by


stabbing. [People v. Ortega, 276 SCRA 166]
The use of the words aggravating/qualifying circumstances will not add any
essential element to the crime. Neither will the use of such words further apprise the
accused of the nature of the charge. The specific allegation of the attendant
circumstance in the Information, coupled with the designation of the offense and a
statement of the acts constituting the offense as required in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule
110, is sufficient to warn the accused. [People v. de la Cruz, G.R. No. 174371,
December 11, 2008] Petitioners cannot be validly convicted on the basis of the
original information as the prosecution failed to allege in the informations that the
crimes were committed in relation to their office. Petitioners were thus not placed
in danger of being convicted when they entered their plea of not guilty to the
insufficient information. [Herrera v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 119660-61, February
13, 2009, 2009; Guy v. People, G.R. Nos. 166794-96, March 20, 2009]
The amendment entails the deletion of the phrase gross neglect of duty from the
Information. Although this may be considered a substantial amendment, the same is
allowable even after arraignment and plea being beneficial to the accused. As a
replacement, gross inexcusable negligence would be included in the Information as
a modality in the commission of the offense. This Court believes that the same
constitutes an amendment only in form. [Albert v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164015,
February 26, 2009]
Petitioner claims that the information filed against him charged him with violation
of Art. 171 of the RPC in his capacity as Board Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, but the Sandiganbayan convicted him of violation of Art. 172 as a
private individual. Thus, he avers, he had not been given a chance to defend himself
from a criminal charge of which he had been convicted, claiming a violation of his
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and his
right to due process of law. The last paragraph of Art. 172 does not specify that the
offending person is a public or private individual as does its par. 1. The crime in Art.
171 is absorbed by the last paragraph of Art. 172. The headings in italics of the two
articles are not controlling. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, or the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly
violated, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein
recited. [Pactolin v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 161455, May 20, 2008, Velasco]
Admittedly, the prosecution could have alleged in the information the mode of
committing a violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 with technical precision by
using the disjunctive term "or" instead of the conjunctive term "and." Nonetheless, in
the early case of Gallego, et al. v. Sandiganbayan [201 Phil. 379 (1982)], the Court
already clarified that the phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "gross
inexcusable negligence" are merely descriptive of the different modes by which the
offense penalized in Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 may be committed, and that the use
of all these phrases in the same information does not mean that the indictment
charges three distinct offenses. [Jaca v. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013]
The CA further ratiocinated that the variance in the two crimes is not fatal to
Pielagos conviction. Indeed, in order to obtain a conviction for rape by sexual
assault, it is essential for the prosecution to establish the elements that constitute
such crime. Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code explicitly provides that the
gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault which is the insertion of the penis
into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another
persons genital or anal orifice. In the instant case, this element is clearly present
when AAA straightforwardly testified in court that Pielago inserted his forefinger in
her vagina and anus. Jurisprudence has it that testimonies of child-victims are given
full weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed. Thus, AAAs unrelenting narration of what transpired, accompanied by
her categorical identification of Pielago as the malefactor, established the case for
the prosecution. [Pielago v. People - G.R. No. 202020, March 13, 2013]
The CA correctly declared that the illegal possession of marijuana was a crime that
is necessarily included in the crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused
have been charged with. The right of Manansala to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him enunciated in Section 14(2), Article III of the

31

1987 Constitution was not violated simply because the information had precisely
charged him with selling, delivering, giving away and distributing more or less 750
grams of dried marijuana leaves. Thereby, he was being sufficiently given notice that
he was also to be held to account for possessing more or less 750 grams of dried
marijuana leaves. As Lacerna and similar rulings have explained, the crime of illegal
sale of marijuana defined and punished under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, implied the prior possession of the marijuana. As such, the crime of illegal
sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal possession. The rule is that when there
is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that
proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged. [Section 4, Rule 120, Rules of Court (1988)]
According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court (1985), the rule then applicable, an
offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. [People v. Manansala - G.R. No. 175939, April 3,
2013, First Division, Bersamin]
Exception to the right to meet witnesses face to face dying declarations.
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. Clearly,
the right to cross-examine a witness, although a fundamental right of a party, may be
waived. [Equitable PCIBanking Corporation v. RCBC Capital Corporation, G.R. No.
182248, December 18, 2008] If a witness dies before his cross-examination, his direct
testimony can be stricken off the record; may be retained if the material points of his
direct testimony had been covered on cross. [People v. Seneres, 99 SCRA 92; People
v. Gorospe, 129 SCRA 233]
Failure to invoke right to compulsory process constitutes a waiver that cannot be
rectified or undone on appeal. [US v. Garcia, 10 Phil. 384] It is the courts duty to
compel the attendance of persons subject of subpoenas. [People v. Bardaje, 99 SCRA
388] - The rights of an accused in a criminal prosecution to cross examine the
witness against him and to have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance
of witnesses and the production of other evidence in his behalf does not lie. CTA
Case No. 7160 is not a criminal prosecution, and even granting that it is related to I.S.
No. 2005-203, the respondents in the latter proceeding are the officers and
accountant of petitioner-corporation, not petitioner. [Fitness Design, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 177982, October 17, 2008]
There can be no valid conviction before a valid arraignment. [Borja v. Mendoza, 77
SCRA 422] The right to be present at trial is a personal right that may be waived,
BUT his presence may be required if it is necessary for purposes of identification
[People v. Presiding Judge, 125 SCRA 269 and People v. Macaraeg, 141 SCRA 37] and
also for arraignment. [Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546] A trial in
absentia does not abrogate the provisions of the Rules of Court regarding forfeiture of
the bail bond if the accused fails to appear. [Rule 114, Section 21] [People v. Prieto,
84 SCRA 198]
The Writ of Habeas Corpus - The liberty of a person may be restored by habeas
corpus where he is subjected to physical restraint, such as arbitrary detention, or
even by moral restraint, as when a housemaid is prevented from leaving her employ
because of the influence of the person detaining her. [Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851]
A prisoner convicted by a court without jurisdiction or where his sentence has
become invalid, as in the case of a person convicted of a crime of a political
complexion during the Japanese Occupation after restoration of the legitimate
government, may avail himself of the writ. [Alcantara v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil.
749] Habeas corpus is also available to a person sentence to a longer penalty than
that subsequently meted out to another person convicted of the same offense
[Gumabon v. Director of Prisions, 37 SCRA 420] or in cases of unlawful denial of bail
[Zafra v. City Warden, 97 SCRA 771]
A restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police
officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or
restraint of liberty. [Manalo v. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920, October 15, 2007]
A 94-year-old widow had been living with her nephew, who acted as her guardian.
Her other relatives took her, and said nephew filed a petition for habeas corpus. The

32

writ of habeas corpus is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully
being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person. Thus, it
contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a persons liberty either through
illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any
person from someone entitled to such custody. If the respondents are not detaining
or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the
petition should be dismissed. Petition dismissed because of finding that the widow
was not being detained and restrained of her liberty. [In the Matter of the petition of
Habeas Corpus of Eufemia E. Rodriguez, filed by Edgardo E. Veluz, G.R. No. 169482,
January 29, 2008]
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ
shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
[Section 1] Mere substantial evidence is required. [Section 17] a writ of amparo
should not be issued when the petition merely states that he is under threat of
deprivation of liberty with the police stating that he is not arrested but merely in
custody. [Salcedo v. Bollozos, A.M. NO. RTJ-10-2236, July 5, 2010]; or to protect
concerns that are purely property or commercial, as in this forcible entry case, where
enforcement of the judgment had resulted in violence. [Tapuz v. del Rosario, G.R. No.
182484, June 17, 2008]; excludes the protection of property rights. [Roxas v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010], such as the threatened
demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court. [Canlas v. Napico
Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008]
A petition for a Writ of Amparo may be filed by any concerned citizen,
organization, association or institution only if there is no known member of the
immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party. [Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo - A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, October 24, 2007] BUT a petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus may be filed by any person on behalf of the aggrieved party. [Boac v.
Cadapan, GR No. 184461, May 31, 2011]
The Writ of Habeas Data requires concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful
violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. [Section
6 [a] and should not issue for purposes of fishing expeditions. [Tapuz v. del
Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008] The Writ of Habeas Data may not be
granted on the basis of labor-related issues. [Manila Electric Company v. Lim, G.R. No.
184769, October 5, 2010]
The Right against Self-Incrimination - AVAILABLE not only in criminal
prosecutions but also in all other government proceedings, including civil actions and
administrative or legislative investigations. May be claimed not only by an accused,
but also by any witness to whom an incriminating question is addressed.
When available an accused may altogether refuse to testify as to an ordinary
witness, including witnesses in legislative inquiries, the right may be invoked only as
and when the incriminating question is asked. [Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777,
April 20, 2006; Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006; Standard
Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies ,
G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007]
A person charged with rape may be examined for gonorrhea, which would be the
same as fingerprinting or examining other parts or features of the body for
identification purposes. [US v. Tan Teng , 23 Phil. 145] A woman accused of adultery
may be examined to determine if she is pregnant. [Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62]
The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be
material. [Holt v. US, 218 US 245; Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279] BUT NOTE Social
Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board [G.R. No. 157870, November 3,
2008], where the Supreme Court invalidated mandatory drug testing for persons
accused of crimes for being a violation of their right to privacy. The prohibition
applies to compulsion for the production of documents, papers and chattels that may
be used as evidence against the witness, except where the state has a right to
inspect the same, such as the books of accounts of corporations, under the police
power. [4 Wigmore, Sec. 264] The privilege also protects the accused against any

33

attempt to compel him to furnish a specimen of his handwriting in connection with


his prosecution for falsification. [Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil. 570]
Article III, Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of
his political beliefs and aspirations. (2) No involuntary servitude in any
form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted.
COVERS slavery and peonage. [Revised Penal Code penalties are imposed upon
any person who, in order to require or enforce the payment of a debt, shall compel
the debtor to work for him, against his will, as household servant or farm-laborer.
(Article 247)]
EXCEPTIONS [1] punishment for a crime [2] military service [Art. II, Sec. 4;
People v. Zosa, 38 OG 1676] [3] naval enlistment [Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 US
245][4] posse comitatus [US v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245] [5] return to work orders
[Kaisahan ng Manggagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills, 45 OG Supp. No. 9, p. 147]
[6] patria potestas unemancipated minors must obey their parents [Civil Code,
Article 311]
A housemaid who was being detained and required to render services was released
on habeas corpus. [Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851] The US Supreme Court declared
as unconstitutional a penal statute declaring persons who receive advance payment
for work but subsequently refuse to work as having induced said advance payment
with intent to defraud. [Pollock v. Williams, 322 US 4]
Punishment
PENALTY must ordinarily be proportionate to the offense BUT, where the offense has
become so rampant as to require the adoption of a more effective deterrent, a more
severe penalty may be justified, like the theft of coconuts or jeeps, punished as
qualified theft under the Revised Penal Code. - MECHANICAL failure in electric chair
considered an unforeseeable event not cruel and unusual punishment. [Louisiana
v. Resweber, 329 US 459]
Article III, Section 19 (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall
be dealt with by law.
Article III, Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax.
DEBT refers to any civil obligation arising from contract, expressed or implied a
purely private matter which gives rise only to civil actions. includes even debts
obtained through fraud [Ganaway v. Quillen, 42 Phil. 805] BUT see Lozano v.
Martinez [146 SCRA 323], where it was ruled that a person can be validly punished
in a criminal action if he contracted his debt through fraud. He is to be punished for
his deceit, not his debt.
A law required employers to pay salaries at least once every two weeks, and
punished them for not doing so. VALID punishment is for refusal to make payment
even if capable of making payment. [People v. Merillo, G.R. No. L-3401, June 28,
1951]
A defendant in a civil action was ordered arrested for contempt because of his failure,
owing to his insolvency, to pay the plaintiff past and future support. INVALID. [Sura v.
Martin, 26 SCRA 286] BUT NOTE new law which makes failure to give support a
criminal offense, which may be justified as a valid exercise of the police power.
An accused [estafa] asked to return the money he embezzled may be subjected to
subsidiary imprisonment for his failure to make restitution BUT the law has been
amended and subsidiary imprisonment can be imposed only for non-payment of
fines. [US v. Cara, 41 Phil. 826]
A civil servant who fails to pay a debt may be validly suspended. [Flores v. Tatad, 96
SCRA 676]

34

Double Jeopardy - The principle of double jeopardy applies only


proceedings. [Res judicata in prison grey.]

to criminal

CONVICTED in MTC for grave oral defamation; RTC dismisses appeal on the ground
of prescription after finding that the offense committed was only slight oral
defamation double jeopardy has set in. [Castro v. People, G.R. No. 180832, July 23,
2008]
The principle of double jeopardy finds no application in administrative cases.
[Cayao-Lasam v. Ramolet, G.R. No. 159132, December 18, 2008]
REQUISITES
[1] Valid complaint or information - If, without the express consent of the
accused, the information is dismissed on the ground that it is defective when it is not
so in fact, another prosecution based on the same allegation will constitute double
jeopardy. [US v. Yam Tung Way, 21 PHhil. 67]
PETITIONERS and the other accused pleaded not guilty to the original informations.
Thereafter, at the instance of the petitioners, through a joint petition for bail, they
raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the prosecution failed to
allege in the informations that the crimes were committed in relation to their
office. On the same day, respondent court ordered the amendment of the
informations accordingly. Thus, the first requirement for double jeopardy to attach,
that is, that the informations against the petitioners were valid, has not been
complied with. [Herrera v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 119660-61, February 13, 2009,
2009]
The change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal
amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution. Homicide is
necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge merely
ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original
Information. To repeat, it was the same original information that was amended by
merely crossing out the word Homicide and writing the word Murder, instead,
which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case. [Pacoy v. Cajigal,
G.R. NO. 157472, September 28, 2007]
Petitioners cannot be validly convicted on the basis of the original information as the
prosecution failed to allege in the informations that the crimes were committed in
relation to their office. Petitioners were thus not placed in danger of being
convicted when they entered their plea of not guilty to the insufficient information.
[Herrera v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 119660-61, February 13, 2009, 2009; Guy v.
People, G.R. Nos. 166794-96, March 20, 2009]
[2] Filed before a competent court
A person charged before an incompetent court is not placed in first jeopardy
because, obviously, a court without jurisdiction cannot render a valid judgment. [De
Guzman v. Escalona, 98 SCRA 619] Where an information is motu proprio dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction by a court which is actually competent to hear, said dismissal
will benefit the accused who shall be entitled to plead double jeopardy. [US v. Regala,
28 Phil. 57]
The Supreme Court ruled that military tribunals had no jurisdiction to try cases of
civilians. Judgments invalidated. [Olaguer v. Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144] So,
in Cruz v. Enrile [160 SCRA 702, it said cases may be re-tried, as there were no
valid previous proceedings. BUT in Tan v. Barrios [190 SCRA 686], the Supreme
Court said that its ruling in Olaguer should be applied prospectively only to future
cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, in
the interest of justice and consistency, there should be no retroactive nullification of
final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts
against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final
sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the
convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of the
Constitutional rights of the accused should the nullity of the sentence be declared
and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the

35

accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of the
violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.
If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment
will be accorded the finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which
attend the judgments of a civil court in a case of which it may legally take
cognizance; x x x and restricting our decision to the above question of double
jeopardy, we judge that, consistently with the above act of 1902, and for the reasons
stated, the plaintiff in error, a soldier in the Army, having been acquitted of the crime
of homicide, alleged to have been committed by him in the Philippines, by a military
court of competent jurisdiction, proceeding under the authority of the United States,
could not be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court exercising
authority in that territory. (Marcos v. Chief of Staff, AFP, 89 Phil, 246 (1951), at 248251, cited in Garcia v. Executive Secretary - G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012, Third
Division, Peralta]
AN INFORMATION FOR PARRICIDE dismissed by a regional trial court based on a
mere manifestation of the public prosecutor, and without the judge making an
independent assessment of the merits of the case and the evidence on record, which
dismissal resulted in the recall of the warrant of arrest], is INEFFECTUAL, and the
judge is to be considered as having gravely abused his discretion, such that the
subsequent filing of a case for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide filed with
the MeTC would not vest in it jurisdiction over the new case, the RTC having retained
jurisdiction over the offense to the exclusion of all other courts. The requisite that
the judgment be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is therefore absent.
[Honrales v. Honrales, G.R. No. 182651, August 25, 2010]
[3] To which the defendant had pleaded
No double jeopardy if the complaint is dismissed before arraignment of the accused.
[US v. Solis, 6 Phil. 676] The accused, after pleading guilty, testified to prove
mitigating circumstances. Plea of guilty deemed vacated because of the testimony.
No double jeopardy as there was no valid plea upon promulgation of judgment of
acquittal. [People v. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 1119]
[4] Of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or which was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
Dismissal with the express consent of the accused will not bar another prosecution
but consent, to be effective, must be express. Mere silence or failure of the accused
to object to the dismissal cannot be considered as consent. [People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil.
851] The prosecution moved for the dismissal of the case in the morning. Defense
counsel offered no objection. In the afternoon of the same day, defense counsel and
the accused submitted a formal manifestation objecting to the dismissal. SC Express consent. No double jeopardy. [People v. Pilpa, 76 SCRA 81]
Dismissal, even if with the express consent of the accused, will give rise to double
jeopardy if the same is based on the insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution
acquittal. In this case, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari questioning the
erroneous dismissal by the judge. SC said however erroneous the order of dismissal
is, and although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said order, double jeopardy
sets in. [People v. City Court of Silay, 74 SCRA 248]
Rule 117, Section 9 the grant of a motion to quash, filed by the defendant before
he makes his plea, can be appealed as the defendant has not been placed in
jeopardy UNLESS the basis for the dismissal is the extinction of criminal
liability and double jeopardy. [Los Banos v. Pedro, G.R. No. 173588, April 22,
2009]
A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. [People v. Terrado, G.R.
No. 148226, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 84, 93] As we have previously held in People v.
Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 159261, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 383], "a verdict of
acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal,
even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense."
[Id., at 397] True, the finality of acquittal rule is not one without exception as when
the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In such a case, the judgment of acquittal may be questioned through the

36

extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In the instant
case, however, we cannot treat the appeal as a Rule 65 petition as it raises no
jurisdictional error that can invalidate the judgment of acquittal. Suffice it to state
that the trial court is in the best position to determine the sufficiency of evidence
against both appellant and Ginumtad. It is a well-settled rule that this Court accords
great respect and full weight to the trial courts findings, unless the trial court
overlooked substantial facts which could have affected the outcome of the case.
[People v. Montinola, G.R. No. 178061, January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 412, 427] It is
not at all irregular for a court to convict one of the accused and acquit the other. The
acquittal of Ginumtad in this case is final and it shall not be disturbed. [People v.
Banig - G.R. No. 177137, August 23, 2012, First Division, del Castillo]
In the present case, the withdrawal of the criminal cases did not include a categorical
dismissal thereof by the RTC. Double jeopardy had not set in because Soriano was not
acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the fifty one (51)
cases against her. It stands to reason therefore that the fifth requisite which requires
conviction or acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the
approval of the accused, was not met. xxx. Since we have held that the March 17,
2004 Order granting the motion to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of
discretion, then respondents were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal
dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fifth requisite which requires the
conviction and acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the
approval of the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in. [See
Cerezo v. People, G.R. No. 185230, 1 June 2011, 650 SCRA 222, 229, cited in
Philippine National Bank v. Soriano - G.R. No. 164051, October 3, 2012, Second
Division, Perez]
Appeal of the Prosecution - An acquittal [Castro v. People, July 23, 2008] or a
dismissal due to insufficiency of evidence [People v. City Court of Silay, 74 SCRA
248], except one made with grave abuse of discretion [Galman v. Sandiganbayan,
114 SCRA 43], or a dismissal based on a denial of right to a speedy trial [People v.
Anano, 97 Phil. 28], gives rise to double jeopardy. The grant of a demurrer to
evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, unless the
court acted with grave abuse of discretion, as when the prosecution was denied the
opportunity to present its case [when the court pre-emptively dismissed the case or
aborted its right to complete its presentation of evidence] or where the trial was a
sham. [People v. Tan, G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010], even if done at the instance of
the accused, give rise to double jeopardy, unless it can be shown that the courts
actions are tainted by grave abuse of discretion. [People v. Pablo, 98 SCRA 289]
Given that Justice Narios verbal order dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939
[on the ground of the accuseds right to a speedy trial] is null and void, and does not
exist at all in contemplation of law, it follows that petitioners cannot invoke the
constitutional right against double jeopardy. In the instant Petition, legal jeopardy
has not yet attached since there is so far no valid dismissal or termination of the
criminal cases against petitioners. [Jacob v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162206,
November 17, 2010]
Crimes Covered - The original offense charged OR for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof OR for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the original complaint of information.
[Examples murder and homicide]
Doctrine of Supervening Event - An accused may be prosecuted for another
offense if a subsequent development changes the character of the first indictment
under which he may have already been charged OR CONVICTED. [Melo v. People, 85
Phil. 766] A person convicted of physical injuries may still be prosecuted for
homicide if the victim dies later. [Diaz v. US, 223 US 442] After pleading not guilty to
a complaint for slight physical injuries, the charge was changed to serious physical
injuries after it was determined that the injuries became permanent scars. No double
jeopardy. [People v Adil, 76 SCRA 462]
Inseparable Offenses - Where one offense is inseparable from another and
proceeds from the same act, they cannot be the subject of separate prosecutions,
such as smoking and possession of opium. [US v. Poh Chi, 20 Phil. 140] One who
steals several things from the same person on the same occasion can be held
accountable only for one crime of theft. [People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320] One already

37

convicted of less serious physical injuries cannot be later prosecuted for assault on a
person in authority committed on the same occasion and against the same victim.
[Tacas v. Cariaso, 72 SCRA 528]
PETITIONER was charged before the MeTC with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case
No. 82366). Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and
was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner
moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
Reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of
its various resulting acts [People v. Diaz. [94 Phil. 715 (1954)] Prosecutions under
Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity
of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there
shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be
filed in the same first level court. [Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716,
November 17, 2010]
It is possible for one act to give rise to several crimes violation of motor
vehicles law and damage to property. [People v. Guanco, 47 OG 4179] Other
examples - falsification and violation of conditional pardon [Culanag v. Director of
Prisons, 20 SCRA 1123]; illegal possession of firearms and carrying unlicensed
firearms during the election period [Tapales v. CA, 120 SCRA 471]; Illegal recruitment
and Estafa [People v. Saley, 291 SCRA 715]; Murder and illegal possession of firearms
[People v. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601] A person acquitted of consented abduction was
subsequently charged with qualified seduction arising from the same act on which an
earlier prosecution was based. No double jeopardy. [Perez v. CA, 168 SCRA 236]
Whether there can be a separate offense of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition if there is another crime committed was already addressed in Agote v.
Lorenzo. Agote, like petitioner herein, was convicted of separate charges of (1) illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition and (2) violation of the election gun ban by
the RTC and the CA. However, applying Section 1 of RA 8294, we set aside Agotes
conviction for illegal possession of firearm since another crime was committed at the
same time (violation of the election gun ban). [Madrigal v. People, G.R. No. 182694,
August 13, 2008] A person who stole several items from a single victim on a single
occasion may be prosecuted can be charged with only one crime of theft. [People v.
Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320]
Laws and Ordinances - A person convicted of jueteng under an ordinance may not
again be charged with the same act under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under
either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. [Yap v.
Leuterio, L-1266, April 30, 1959] The accused was charged for having installed a
jumper under an ordinance. Complaint dismissed on the ground of prescription.
Later, he was charged with theft of electricity under the RPC. Court dismissed the
second case, upon motion of the accused. The Supreme Court sustained the
dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy. [People v. Relova, 148 SCRA 292]
Article III, Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be
enacted.
EX POST FACTO LAWS [1] refer to criminal matters [2] are retroactive in their
application [3] work to the prejudice of the accused - EVEN if the law is criminal in
nature and is made to operate retroactively, it will not be ex post facto if it favors the
accused.
NOT EX POST FACTO - War profits tax law retroactively imposing taxes in income
acquired during the Japanese occupation. [Republic v. Fernandez, 99 Phil. 934]
Preventive suspension provided for in RA 3019, not punitive, merely preventive.
[Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 383] Suspensions of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus are not laws. [Montenegro v. Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882]

38

The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant development only
because it clearly manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or
anonymous accounts were permitted banking transactions, whether they be allowed
by law or by a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an indictment against Estrada
using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without violating the
constitutional prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws. [People v.
Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368-69, April 2, 2009]
Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61
cannot be characterized as ex-post facto laws. [The Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans (FFCBL) v. Desierto, G.R. No. 145184, March 14, 2008]
RA 1379 providing for forfeiture as a penalty cannot be applied to acquisitions made
prior to its passage without running afoul of the Constitution condemning ex post
facto laws. [Katigbak v. Solicitor General, 180 SCRA 540]
A new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. However, penal laws that favor
a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.
These are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of
laws. Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the
same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is
lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period from reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866. [Valeroso v. People, G.R.
No. 164815, February 22, 2008]
An Administrative Order limiting the authority of the Office of the President to review
determinations of the Secretary of Justice to capital offenses is not ex post facto, for
being a mere procedural rule. [See Angeles v. Gaite, G.R. No. 165276, November 25,
2009] Remedial laws may be given retroactive effect. [Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v.
Padilla, G.R. No. 156962, October 6, 2008]
On 20 May 2006, Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the "Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006," took effect. Section 68 thereof specifically provides for its
retroactive application [People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, 10 September 2009,
599 SCRA 20] xxx. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9344 is applicable in this case even
though the crime was committed four (4) years prior to its enactment and effectivity.
Parenthetically, with more reason should Republic Act No. 9344 apply to this case as
the 2005 conviction by the lower courts was still under review when the law took
effect in 2006. [People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, 10 September 2009, 599 SCRA 20,
at 48-49] Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of
a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of
majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced. [People v. Jacinto,
G.R. No. 182239, 16 March 2011, 645 SCRA 590, 621] [People v. Monticalvo - G.R. No.
193507, January 30, 2013, Second Division, Perez]
BILL OF ATTAINDER a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial, its
essence being the substitution of legislative fiat for a judicial determination of guilt.
It is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial
trial that it becomes a bill of attainder. Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder
because it pronounced the guilt of the CPP without any of the forms or safeguards of
judicial trial. [People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382]
The US Supreme Court considered as a bill of attainder a law prohibiting payment
from public funds of compensation to individually named respondents, except for jury
or military service, unless they were reappointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. punishment without judicial trial. [US v. Lovett, 323 US
303]
An ordinance required employees to execute affidavits stating whether or not they
were ever members of the Communist Party and prohibiting the employment of
persons who had advocated the overthrow of the government VALID not a bill
of attainder no punishment is imposed by a general regulation which merely
provides standards of qualification and eligibility for employment. [Garner v. Board of
Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 US 717]

39

R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which
inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial
trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group
of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of
judicial trial. [Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 648, 659]
xxx. R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not
seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the
grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the
consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the
constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply protected. [Bureau of
Customs Employees Association v. Teves - G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011, En
Banc, Villarama]
CITIZENSHIP
CITIZENSHIP is membership in a political community with all its concomitant rights
and responsibilities.
A child born of a Filipino mother on January 17, 1973 is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
A child born on January 17, 1973 of a natural-born Filipino mother who, at the time of
his birth, had embraced the citizenship of her husband is a citizen of the country of
his father. Children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973 could have
elected Philippine citizenship until the year 1994. A child born of a Filipino mother
before January 17, 1973 who elects Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
NATURALIZATION is a process by which a foreigner acquires, voluntarily or by
operation of law, the citizenship of another state. DIRECT naturalization is effected
by [1] individual proceedings, usually judicial, under general naturalization laws
[2] by special act of the legislature, often in favor of distinguished foreigners who
have rendered some notable service to the local state [3] by collective change of
nationality [naturalization en masse] as a result of cession or subjugation and [5] in
some cases, by adoption of orphan minors as nationals of the State where they are
born. DERIVATIVE naturalization is conferred on [1] the wife of the naturalized
husband [2] on the minor children of the naturalized parent and [3] on the alien
woman upon marriage to a national. NOTE does not always follow as a matter of
course, for it is usually made subject to stringent restrictions and conditions. Our
own laws provide that an alien woman married to a Filipino shall acquire his
citizenship only if she herself might be lawfully naturalized.
Minor children born and residing in the Philippines shall, upon the naturalization of
their fathers, be considered naturalized Filipinos. Minor children born outside the
Philippines but residing in the Philippines upon the naturalization of their fathers,
shall be considered naturalized Filipinos. Children of naturalized Filipinos born outside
the Philippines shall be considered naturalized citizens but only upon their election of
Philippine citizenship upon the attainment of the age of majority and their taking of
an oath of allegiance. A naturalized Filipino may be denaturalized if he becomes a
nominal director of a corporation, pursuant to a shareholders agreement, to
accommodate his compadre, a foreigner, who wants to gain control of the
corporations board of directors. The denaturalization of a naturalized Filipino shall
have the effect of denaturalizing his wife and children only if the ground for revoking
his naturalization were based on the intrinsic validity of his naturalization. The State
may revoke the naturalization of a Filipino on petition of the Solicitor General. It is
the State, through the Solicitor General, that may question the illegally or invalidly
procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings.
It is not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving
the naturalized citizens descendant. [Limkaichong v. COMELEC , G.R. Nos. 17883132, April 1, 2009]
RA 9225 - Sec. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the
Philippines.
CA 63 Philippine citizenship may be lost by [1] naturalization in a foreign
country [2] express renunciation of citizenship [3] subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining

40

eighteen years of age or more, provided, however, that a Filipino may not divest
himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Republic of the Philippines is
at war with any country [4] rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country, unless with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, if it has a defensive pact with said foreign country, if said foreign country
maintains armed forces in the Philippines with its consent, etc. [5] cancellation of
the certificate of naturalization [6] having been declared a deserter in times of war,
unless a plenary ardon or amnesty has been granted [7] in case of a woman, upon
her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husbands
country, sh acquires his nationality.
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP may be RE-ACQUIRED by [1] naturalization, provided that
the applicant possesses none of the disqualifications prescribed for naturalization.
[NOTE Bengzon v. House of Representatives] [2] repatriation of deserters,
provided a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien may
be repatriated in accordance with te provisions of section 2 of CA 63 after the
termination of the marital status [3] direct act of Congress
A soldier who renounced his Filipino citizenship and joined the US Army during the
Second World War shall not be considered as having lost his or her Philippine
citizenship despite his or her express or implied renunciation of the same.
RA 9225 - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of this Act. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking
the an oath of allegiance to the Republic. Natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. The unmarried child,
whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of
those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be
deemed citizens of the Philippines. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to
all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and
the following conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage
must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic
Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and
other existing laws; (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall
meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath; (3) Those appointed to any public
office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office:
Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they
took that oath; (4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines
shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice; and (5)
That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public
office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who: (a) are
candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or (b) are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized
citizens.
Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act, applies only to natural-born Filipino citizens. Dual
citizens under RA 9225 are natural-born citizens.
A dual citizen who reacquires his citizenship under RA 9225 must comply with the
twin requirements of oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
renunciation of his foreign citizenship to qualify to run for elective office. [Lopez v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008] To qualify as a candidate in Philippine
elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.
[Jacot v. Dal, G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008] Reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 has no automatic impact or effect on his
residence/domicile, for purposes of registering as a voter or running for public office.
[Japzon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009] The so-called twin

41

requirements do not apply to Americans under the jus soli rule and Filipinos under the
jus sanguinis principle. They are qualified to run for public office independently of
the provisions of RA 9225. [Cordora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947, February 19,
2009]
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that
country; (3)Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former
are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship. NOTE: RA 9225
Under Philippine laws, a Filipina who marries a foreigner, whose laws make her
automatically a citizen of his country, retains her Filipino citizenship unless by her act
or omission she can be deemed to have renounced the same. Under Philippine laws,
an alien woman who marries a natural-born Filipino automatically becomes a Filipino
citizen, provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines. Under
Philippine laws, an alien woman who marries a naturalized Filipino automatically
becomes a Filipino citizen, provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines. Both male and female Filipino citizens shall remain Filipinos despite their
alien spouses except only when they may be deemed by their act or omission to have
renounced their Philippine citizenship. - Under Section 15 of CA 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same
law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized
here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath
as Filipino citizen, provided she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under
said Section 4. [Moya Lim Yao v. CIR, 41 SCRA 292]
Dual citizenship does not always result in dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is
different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of
jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person,
ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individuals volition. - Petitioner was a dual citizen who consistently voted in
successive elections. He was considered to have effectively elected Philippine
citizenship. [Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630]
Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father who is
Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship.
It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and
that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow
her nationality. [Go, Sr. v. Ramos, G.R. Nos. 167569-70 and 171946, September 4,
2009, 598 SCRA 266, 294-295] An illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform any
act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the
Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. [Id. at 295] But in the case
of respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. [Republic of the
Philippines v. Sagun - G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012, First Division, Villarama]

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Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are:
(1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election
and of the oath with the nearest civil registry. [Ma v. Fernandez, Jr., G.R. No. 183133,
July 26, 2010, 625 SCRA 566, 577] Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship
shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the
right of election has complied with the requirements of the Alien Registration Act of
1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as an alien. [Ronaldo P.
Ledesma, AN OUTLINE OF PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP LAWS, Vol. I,
2006 ed., pp. 526] Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is required
to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of
Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration based on his
aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based
on the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election. [Id. at 527, citing
Memorandum Order dated August 18, 1956 of the CID] Afterwards, the same is
elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and
review. [Id., citing DOJ Opinion No. 182 dated August 19, 1982] It should be stressed
that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing
of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The
special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on
Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any
interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil
registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed
for by the respondent. [Republic of the Philippines v. Sagun - G.R. No. 187567,
February 15, 2012, First Division, Villarama]
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the
procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship.
Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since
the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by
election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot
take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be
allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship
when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
As we held in
Ching, [Id. at 12] the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is
certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is
to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the
same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing
requirements, respondents petition before the trial court must be denied. [Republic
of the Philippines v. Sagun - G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012, First Division,
Villarama]
FAILURE TO RENOUNCE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP in accordance with the exact
tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible
to run for and thus hold any elective public office. xxx. The foreign citizenship must
be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to
administer oath. We have stressed in Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for
School Teachers and Allied Workers (AASJS) Member v. Datumanong [G.R. No.
160869, May 11, 2007, 523 SCRA 108] that the framers of R.A. No. 9225 did not
intend the law to concern itself with the actual status of the other citizenship.
[Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections - G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012,
En Banc, Reyes]
The use of a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of ones representation as to ones nationality; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the oath of renunciation
required to qualify one to run for elective office [under RA 9225]. [Maquiling v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013; see also Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
207264, June 25, 2013]
SUFFRAGE
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and
who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the

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place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately
preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
The following shall be disqualified from voting: [a] Any person who has been
sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one year, such
disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or granted amnesty: Provided,
however, That any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall
automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five years after service of
sentence. [b] Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent
court or tribunal of having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly
constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion
and firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless restored to his full
civil and political rights in accordance with law: Provided, That he shall regain his
right to vote automatically upon expiration of five years after service of sentence. [c]
Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority. [Omnibus
Election Code Section 118]
Dual citizens, under RA 9225, may exercise the right of suffrage under the provisions
of RA 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. [Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006] Even their children, who acquire derivative
citizenship when they were minors, may vote, under the same conditions. By law,
however, the right of dual citizens who vote as absentee voters pertains only to the
election of national officials, specifically: the president, the vice-president, the
senators, and party-list representatives. [Velasco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180051,
December 24, 2008]
Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the
illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they
shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the
Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the
ballot.
Section 2 is to be considered as an exception to the six months residence
requirement in Section 1. xxx.
[2] Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent
resident who is recognized as such in the host country because immigration or
permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's residence in his
country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent
resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to
show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional
intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that all citizens of the Philippines
not otherwise disqualified by law must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage
and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if
actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the
framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee
voting. [Note: undertaking to return after 3 years] [Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R.
157013, July 10, 2003]

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