Habermas and the nonhumans: Towards a critical theory

for the new collective

Edgar A. Whitley
Information Systems Department
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom
Email: E.A.WHITLEY@LSE.AC.UK
Home page: http://is.lse.ac.uk/edgar
Telephone: 44 (0)20 7 955 7410
Fax: 044 (0)20 7 955 7385
Information technology and critical theory
Abstract
This paper proposes a new way in which the principles of critical theory can be applied to the
study of information systems by drawing on the work of Bruno Latour. It does this by reflecting
on Habermasfocus on human agency and, by reconsidering the fact value division, it proposes
a new collective consisting of selective humans and nonhumans. The paper ends by considering
how this new collective could apply in the context of information systems implementation and
proposes areas for future research.

Habermas and the nonhumans: Towards a critical theory

for the new collective
Abstract
This paper proposes a new way in which the principles of critical theory can be applied to the
study of information systems by drawing on the work of Bruno Latour. It does this by reflecting
on Habermasfocus on human agency and, by reconsidering the fact value division, it proposes
a new collective consisting of selective humans and nonhumans. The paper ends by considering
how this new collective could apply in the context of information systems implementation and
proposes areas for future research.

Political representation of nonhumans seems not only plausible now, but necessary,
when the notion would have seemed ludicrous or indecent not so long ago (Latour, 1998a
p. 119)

1 Introduction
Is there hope for critical theory in the study of information systems for the new millenium? I
believe there is and will try to demonstrate the basis for this belief in this paper. In order to do
so, however, we need to be clear about what we mean by critical theory and what we consider
to be the phenomena known as information systems and reevaluate some of the assumptions of
critical theory in the light of our understanding of our technologically mediated world.
Critical theory, especially the work of German social theorist Jrgen Habermas, can be viewed
at two levels. At the highest level there is the ideal of fairness. Critical theory aims to explore
various features of human life with the express intention of providing a critique of their fairness
or unfairness. Thus it raises questions of whether situations are being distorted by power
imbalances or bias; whether the views of all participants given equal opportunity for expression,
etc. The second level of Habermas work can be seen in his attempts to provide particular
guidelines that would characterize ideal situations where such distortions would be avoided and
to describe mechanisms for due process to be seen to take place. These guidelines are intended
to be applicable to all areas where the distortions outlined above are found.
Information systems can be regarded as a phenomena with vast uncertainties. Technological
change is, as ever, rapid and organisations are struggling to keep uptodate with the last
advances, whilst evaluating the current ones and trying to anticipate and prepare for the next
changes proposed in the management literature. These problems are coupled with difficulties that
arise from the poor quality of the product that they are working with; rarely has a technology
achieved such widespread acceptance with such a poor quality record. Every software package,
from the smallest shareware item to the latest releases from the largest professional vendors, has
faults (bugs) and organisations spend vast sums purchasing fixes and updates. Furthermore,
very little is understood about the long term effects of changes in organisational structure, work
practices and society (Scott & Walsham, 1998) as a result of new technology or even the cost
effectiveness of such technology investments.

be criticised as being too limited to be of practical benefit. Alternatively, approaches such as

prototyping that attempt to address issues of domination etc. are rarely applied with any
consideration of due process and can often be seen as cynical, instrumental actions.
Two further related issues complicate the application of critical theory to information systems.
The first is the fact that information systems, by their very nature, have to be live systems; that
is to test the system it has to be operational. The second relates to the size of the system it has
to be scale 1. You cant evaluate a working system by having it only perform part of its
operations for a few staff. You can test individual functions, you can have a staggered roll out
of the system, but in each case the part being evaluated is liveand full size.
How then can we see a future for critical theory in information systems? In order to make
progress in this, this paper will be applying ideas developed by French sociologist Bruno Latour
and presented at the London School of Economics and Political Science in Spring 1988 (Latour,
1998b). Latours ideas draw heavily on his earlier work in science studies and his examination
of the status of nonhumans and he applies them to the area of ecology. Ecology shares the same
complications as information systems we dont know what we are doing, what the problems are.
Also, any test of a solution has to be done live and full size. If we propose to address holes in the
ozone layer by changing taxation levels of leaded fuel, we can only do this live and at full scale.
The next section summarises how critical theory has typically been applied to the study of
information systems. The paper then moves to explore the focus on human agency that is
prevalent in Habermaswork and its application to computers. The implications of choosing to
ignore nonhumans is then addressed. The next section of the paper describes Latours approach
to dealing with nonhumans by reconsidering the fact/value distinction. This allows us to propose
a new collective; a collective of selected humans and nonhumans. The paper then shows how
the ideals of critical theory can be applied to this new collective. Finally the paper summarises
the work here and describes areas for future research.

2 Critical theory and information systems

Critical theory has been discussed in the information systems literature for the last fifteen years
(Goldkuhl & Lyytinen, 1982) (Ngwenyama, 1991) (Lyytinen, Klein, & Hirschheim, 1991). It has
been advocated as an important theory for information systems researchers because, according
to Ngwenyama and Lee (1997), critical theory argues (1) that there is a difference between
observing nature and observing people and (2) inquiry into social activity should focus on
understanding their meanings from within the social context and lifeworld of actors (p. 151).
Lyytinen (1992) reports that critical theory has been used in two main areas in the information
systems field. The first area where the theory has been used has been based on Habermasearly
work on knowledgeconstitutive interests. The second area where critical theory has been
applied is through the use of Habermaswork on communicative rationality.
Recent examples of work in the first area include Myers (1997) critical ethnography in
information systems which is applied to a case of the development of a system for mental health
in New Zealand. Romm and Pliskin (1997) present a longitudinal analysis of the political use of
electronic mail in a university context whilst Silva and Backhouse (Silva & Backhouse, 1997)
explore the power relations associated with the institutionalisation of a computer based
information system for ambulance management.

Other work in information systems has utilised Habermasideas about communicative rationality
and his notion of communicative action (1984). Ngwenyama and Lee (1997) describe
communicative action as being concerned with achieving and maintaining mutual understanding
(one persons coming to understand what another person means) among all those who are
involved in a coordinated organizational situation (p. 154). This process of finding coherent
meaning is done by testing the validity claims of the speech acts made.
Speech Act theory (Austin, 1962) states that when somebody issues an utterance they are actually
performing an act, i.e. it is not just idle language describing something, it will actually cause
something to happen. By promising, we are not just making a hollow statement but are actually
performing the act of promising. Habermas (1987) states that the use of language is oriented
towards reaching a shared understanding and that, in the public space, such language requires the
exchange of criticisable validity claims (Brand, 1990). Habermas proposes four validity claims
that refer to three worlds (the objective, the social and the subjective) and states that the speaker
assumes all the claims when performing the speech act:

comprehensibility the request is understandable by both speaker and hearer.

truth the request concerns a true situation (the sharing of knowledge of the objective
world).
sincerity the request made is an honest one (the establishment of trust in the subjective
world).
normative the request is socially acceptable (the social lifeworld).

This aspect of critical theory has been used in information systems research to try and understand
what happens when communication becomes mediated (Introna & Whitley, 1996) (Whitley &
Scothern, 1997); to evaluate the application of information richness theory to electronic mail
(Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997) and to achieve shared understanding between doctors and nurses
when they use health information systems (Schoop & Wastell, 1998).

3 The focus on human agency

As a consequence of Habermasfocus on examining communicative action and power relations
almost all applications of Habermasideas to the issues of information systems have focussed on
questions of human agency. Researchers have addressed the role that technology plays in creating
or distorting ideal speech situations and considering how power relations affect social structures
in organisational settings. Very little critical theory, however, has been applied to questions of
the computer technology itself. In so doing, information systems researchers are simply following
the ideas implicit in Habermaswork.
If we are to try and apply critical theory to the issues surrounding new information and
communication technologies, we need to understand how Habermas came to have this focus on
human agency. We need to make explicit his assumptions about science and technology so that
we can alter those assumptions which are no longer appropriate for understanding information
systems. In order to do this it is useful to review his analysis of the role and impact of new
technologies such as computer systems and more generally, of science and technology, topics
which Habermas has written about since the 1960s.
To Habermas, science and technology are seen as something separate from the social world of
humans. In an early work he argues (O)ur problem can then be stated as one of the relation of

technology and democracy: how can the power of technical control be brought within the range
of the consensus of acting and transacting citizens (Habermas, 1970 p. 57). Technology is seen,
therefore, as something distinct from human activity and is something that can be brought under
human control. Again (T)his challenge of technology cannot be met with technology alone. It
is rather a question of setting into motion a politically effective discussion that rationally brings
the social potential constituted by technical knowledge and ability into a defined and controlled
relation to our practical knowledge and will (Habermas, 1970 p. 61).
This separation between the facts of science and technology and the values of humans is
addressed by a proposal that reciprocal communication seems possible and necessary, through
which scientific experts advise the decisionmakers and politicians consult scientists in accordance
with practical needs (Habermas, 1970 pp. 6667).
This distinction is described even more explicitly by suggestions that communicative action, or
symbolic interaction, is governed by binding consensual norms, which define reciprocal
expectations about behaviour and which must be understood and recognized by at least two acting
subjects. Social norms are enforced through sanctions (Habermas, 1970 p. 92). In contrast,
incompetent behaviour which violates valid technical rules or strategies, is condemned per se to
failure through lack of success; the punishment is built, so to speak, into its rebuff by reality
(Habermas, 1970 p. 92).
Habermas cannot say anything about science, since (I)nformation provided by the strictly
empirical sciences can be incorporated in the social lifeworld only through its technical
utilization, as technological knowledge, serving the expansion of our power of technical control
(Habermas, 1970 p. 52). As a consequence such information is not on the same level as the
actionorienting selfunderstanding of social groups (Habermas, 1970 p. 52).
From these quotations it is apparent that Habermas accepts the notion of science and technology
as being something out there whose status cannot be questioned, even if concerns are raised
about the implications of them. In this he shares many similarities with Ulrich Beck, another
German social theorist, whose risk society thesis (1992) states that science and technology have
introduced a new class of risk, the risks of modernization. These new risks are no longer tied
to their place of origin the industrial plant. By their nature they endanger all forms of life on
this planet (Beck, 1992 p. 22). Science and technology introduce these risks yet they require
the sensory organs of science theories, experiments, measuring instruments in order to
become visible and interpretable as threats at all (Beck, 1992 p. 162 emphasis in original).
According to Bruno Latour, we can only make sense of this apparent contradiction between
science on the one hand being the cause of our new, different risks and science on the other hand
being the only trusted source for informing us about these risks if we take a bold step and
reconsider the modernist constitutionthat has been accepted by Habermas and Beck.
For Beck and Habermas, there is a clear separation between technology and humans, between
science and society and critical theory takes this separation as a given (the previous quotation
from Ngwenyama and Lee (1997 p. 151) demonstrates this particularly clearly). Researchers who
study the history and sociology of science and technology, however, challenge this perceived
wisdom. The apparent separation of the two, they argue, is only achieved by the hidden
proliferation of hybrids (Latour, 1993 p. 47).

Despite Habermas insistence on a distinction between humans and nonhumans, he is unable

to explain why artifacts enter the stream of our relations, why we so incessantly recruit and
socialize nonhumans (Latour, 1998a p. 116). According to Latour, most of the things we
attribute to social order scale, asymmetry, power, hierarchy, the distribution of roles are not
possible if we do not recruit socialized nonhumans. As a very simple example, the use we make
of rooms is highly dependent on the nonhuman actors we know as doors, to enable us to have
meeting spaces which we can enter and leave and yet keep warm and private (Latour, 1992).
Similarly, hotel managers enlist the help of large weights which they attach to their room keys to
help persuade their human guests to deposit their keys when they leave the hotel (Latour, 1991).
Computer based systems are examples of nonhumans which act in a similar way.
It is important to clarify at this point that Latours work in science studies does not claim, a
priori, that there is some connection between society and science and technology, between
humans and nonhumans, but rather it has found that time and again such links do exist and as
a consequence his work provides a mechanism for tracing the connection between the two when
it exists (Latour, 1998a p. 48). While Habermas separates out pure science and pure politics and
then spends considerable effort ensuring that they stay separated, Latour is prepared to accept that
they are or can be interlinked and prefers to use his energies to explore the implications of the
resulting imbroglios rather than enforcing an artificial distinction.
What, then, are the implications for critical theory if we follow Latour rather than Habermas on
this point? If we take the simple but important step of accepting hybrids rather than trying to
prevent them, can we come up with a critical theory for the new millenium? In the next section,
we explore some of the consequences of mixing humans and nonhumans.

4 Dealing with nonhumans

Rather than dealing solely with human agency, let us take critical theory to a new collective, a
collective where discrimination between humans and nonhumans does not exist. But simply
(T)o refuse any a priori division between the list of human or political actors and that of ideas
and procedures is no more than a first step, and an entirely negative one at that (Latour, 1998a
p. 48). Like Habermaswork for human agency, our critical theory for the new collective needs
to look forward, issuing positive guidelines for the operation of the collective, ideals which can
be used as the basis for future work in much the same way that Habermas description of ideal
speech situations allows us to analyse communicative situations.
In order to make progress in this direction, Latour suggests that we reconsider one way in which
the separation between science and society is maintained; he proposes that we reconsider the
fact/value distinction.

4.1 Scientific facts

Facts are normally associated with science. Let the facts speak for themselves is a typical cry.
For some, such as Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, science is an intellectual endeavour aimed at
a rational understanding of the world; a collection of accepted theoretical and experimental ideas
(Sokal & Bricmont, 1998 p. 190) and scientific attitude is understood, very broadly, as a respect
for the clarity and logical coherence of theories, and for the confrontation of theories with
empirical evidence (Sokal & Bricmont, 1998 p. 182).

Such definitions ignore a large and important part of what science is all about. Science is not just
a collection of theoretical and experimental ideas that arise from the confrontation of theories with
empirical evidence. These are the results of science, results that are institutionalised and
accepted.
Science is also about research, about deciding what is to be considered as a fact. The history of
science is full of ideas that wanted to claim an existence as facts phlogiston, cold fusion, etc.
Even now, scientists are considering questions about things which do not yet have the status of
facts What are the facts associated with mad cow disease? What are the facts about global
warming? What are the facts about the effectiveness of outsourcing as an means of managing the
information technology infrastructure of an organisation? These are elements of doing scientific
research and are necessary for reaching facts, but they concern candidates for facticity, not facts
themselves.
Thus we have seen that the work of science in creating facts actually consists of at least two steps.
The first is concerned with questions of perplexity, about determining what phenomena actually
exist. Only once these questions have been answered to the satisfaction of the research
community, the second step can begin, namely the institution of the facts.

4.2 Human values

A similar distinction can be found in questions of values. Values are typically expressed in terms
of a hierarchy. I value the pleasant working environment in my university over the financial
rewards I could obtain in the commercial sector; we value the jobs that a new factory would
create over the playing field it is to be built on, etc. As with scientific facts, however, the creation
of the hierarchy is only part of the process.
The creation of a values also involves a consultation process. We dont just make up our
hierarchies, we learn them from others, we discuss them with others, we reflect upon in the light
of comments made by others. It is only after this process of consultation that we can create a
legitimate hierarchy of values.
Thus we have seen that the work of society in creating values actually consists of at least two
steps. The first is concerned with consultation, about obtaining a broad appreciation of the issues
associated with our decision. Only once this has been done, can the second step can begin,
namely the creation of the hierarchy of values.

5 The new collective

This restatement of what we mean by facts and values enables us to make progress in the
development of a critical theory for the new collective. If we take our four areas associated with
facts and values and plot them below, we can see the traditional way in which the fact value
distinction is made.
Facts

Values

Perplexity

Consultation

Institution

Hierarchy

A redivision of these concepts, however, allows us to make progress. Instead of choosing

between facts and values, two different questions can be asked.

Perplexity

Consultation

How many are we? Which of the

candidate entities will we include in the
new collective?

Institution

Hierarchy

Can we live together? How will

relations be managed in the new
collective?

5.1 Membership of the new collective

The new collective is not simply a freeforall, consisting of all the humans and nonhumans we
can find, put together. Rather, we must have rules for deciding which entities are to be included
in the collective How many are we?.
The collective is a particular historical entity with particular issues and concerns. Thus, for
example, we may have a collective for mad cow disease. In this collective we would include
human agents such as politicians and scientists, we would have nonhumans in the form of cows
and we would have candidate entities who wish to be considered part of the collective. At the
current time, the most eager candidates are prions, the cells that are thought to be the cause of
the disease. They are not members of the collective because there is still perplexity about their
existence and role. In order to determine whether they can join the collective at this time,
consultation is taking place within the scientific community and related interest groups. They are
deciding whether or not these candidate entities should be included or not.
Other entities, for example, the cars that annually kill far more people than eating beef currently
does, are explicitly excluded from the collective at this time. For these entities, there is little
perplexity (although see Collins and Pinch (1998) for arguments that even in supposedly clear cut
cases like people dying in car accidents, things are not so straight forward) however the
consultation process has resulted in their exclusion.
If the rules of the new collective are to be effective and satisfy the broader aims of critical theory
then these excluded entities must have a mechanism for appealing their decision and being
considered at a later stage. This can be done by the reintroduction of perplexity which will require
the consultation process to be repeated.

5.2 Managing the new collective

Once the collective has been fixed for a period of time, the status of the different elements needs
to be determined Can we live together?. It is at this stage that decisions about hierarchy can
be made. Having decided to include, for example, prions and butchers in our collective, but not
motor cars, we can then decide which we consider to be more important than the other. Should
we focus on the employment concerns of our butchers or on the potential health risks posed by
prions?

Once such decisions have been taken, the final stage is started, namely institutionalizing the
chosen hierarchy. Thus, mechanisms will be introduced to, perhaps, make beef available to the
public, but also to have a publicity campaign warning about the potential risks of eating meat.

5.3 The information systems collective

The issues of membership and status in the new collective are typical questions faced by
information systems developers in their regular activities in analysing, designing and managing
new information systems.
When a new information systems project is proposed, there is typically a period of perplexity.
What functionality should the new system provide? How should the tasks be divided between
human workers? Which form of encryption should be used for our secure transmissions? Is the
latest release of the software stable enough to use? All of these are candidate entities for
membership of the collective associated with the new project. There then follows a period of
consultation during which the opinions of the relevant stakeholders (Pouloudi & Whitley, 1997)
are sought. The result is a list of entities (programs, interface devices, functions) which are to be
included in the project and a list of entities which are to be excluded.
The next stage in the information systems project is determining the status of the various entities.
A hierarchy of needs is determined it is more important to have the database functioning
correctly than changing the font on the weekly printed reports and finally efforts are taken to
ensure that the proposed change becomes institutionalised (MacKenzie, 1997).

6 Summary
This paper has reviewed the literature of critical theory and information systems and found that
it has a tendency to focus on human agency and in so doing ignore the role of nonhumans in
society. This tendency was explored in relation to Habermas early work and the basis for this
choice of focus were highlighted. By addressing this basis, the paper then proposed a new way
of dealing with both humans and nonhumans. The ideas of the new collective were then applied
to the phenomena of information systems.

6.1 Future research

The ideas of critical theory become important when we step away from the details of a particular
project and focus on the principles that are to govern these in ideal situations, free from the
distortions of power and domination. Our critical theory for the new millenium requires us to
manage these processes as openly and as fairly as possible. Future research can therefore be
designed to test various mechanisms for implementing these goals. Furthermore, because
information systems projects are begun and completed on a regular basis, they provide ample
opportunities for the ideas described in this paper to be evaluated and refined in a way which is
not possible in other possible areas, such as political ecology, where the periods of perplexity and
consultation are typically far longer.
We need to determine the most effective way of handling perplexity. How do candidate entities
make themselves known to the new collective? Should the impetus lie with the collective or with
the entities themselves? In the context of information systems, prototyping is often used to try
and elicit requirements for the new system an active effort is taken to solicit new members of
the collective. It does not, however, have a mechanism for excluding them.

We also need to reevaluate how we address the resolution of perplexity and the necessary
consultation to achieve this end. Numerous studies (Wynne, 1989) (Collins & Pinch, 1998 chapter
7) have shown that we cannot simply rely on traditional sources for assistance in such matters.
Moreover, if we take an emancipatory ethos from more traditional critical theory, then we may
want to explicitly include those who are typically excluded from this consultation process. Again,
there are examples of such wider consultation in participative design and sociotechnical
approaches (Mumford & Weir, 1979) etc., but these approaches have not been explicitly related
to questions of perplexity.
Questions of hierarchy are rarely addressed in information systems research. At best, mechanisms
are set in place for dealing with bug fixes and upgrade requests in an organisational setting so that
they are prioritised although this is normally done in a restricted, financial sense. What is required
is a far more effective mechanism for building and maintaining hierarchies of entities within the
collective.
Finally, information systems researchers are not normally very good at institutionalising their new
systems. Despite widespread analysis of the many spectacular failures of computing projects
(Poulymenakou & Holmes, 1996) (Sauer, 1993) (Mitev, 1996) there is little articulated about
mechanisms for managing the institutionalising phase. One interesting avenue is Ciborras (1996
chapter 1) notions of appropriation and care. New computer based information systems provide
an ideal (and necessary) opportunity to address these issues in detail.

7 References
Austin, J. L. (1962). How to do things with words: the William James lectures delivered at
Harvard University in 1955. Clarendon Press: Clarendon Press.
Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: Towards a new modernity. London: Sage.
Brand, A. (1990). The force of reason: An introduction to Habermas' theory of communicative
action. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
Ciborra, C. U. (Ed.). (1996). Groupware & teamwork: Invisible aid or technical hindrance.
Chichester: Wiley.
Collins, H., & Pinch, T. (1998). The golem at large: What you should know about technology.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goldkuhl, G., & Lyytinen, K. (1982). A language action view of information systems. Paper
presented at the Third international conference on information systems, Ann Arbor.
Habermas, J. (1970). Toward a rational society: Student protest, science and politics (Jeremy J
Shapiro, Trans.). Boston: Beacon press.
Habermas, J. (1984). The theory of communicative action. (Vol. 1: Reason and the rationalization
of society). London: Heinemann Education.
Habermas, J. (1987). The theory of communicative action. (Vol. 2: Lifeworld and system: a
critique of functionalist reason). Cambridge: Polity.
Introna, L. D., & Whitley, E. A. (1996). Thinking about obligations in electronically mediated
communication. Paper presented at the SISnet research workshop, Lisbon, Portugal.
Latour, B. (1991). Technology is society made durable. In J. Law (Ed.), A sociology of monsters:
Essays on power, technology and domination (pp. 103-131). London: Routledge.
Latour, B. (1992). Where are the missing masses? The sociology of a few mundane artifacts. In
W. E. Bijker & J. Law (Eds.), Shaping technology / Building society: Studies in
sociotechnical change (pp. 225-258). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Latour, B. (1993). We have never been modern (Catherine Porter, Trans.). New York: Harvester.

Latour, B. (1998a). Pandora's hope: Essays on the reality of science studies. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Latour, B. (1998b). Politics of Nature : Lecture course delivered at the London School of
Economics and Political Science.
Lyytinen, K. (1992). Information systems and critical theory. In M. Alvesson & H. Wilmott
(Eds.), Critical management studies (pp. 159-180). London: Sage.
Lyytinen, K., Klein, H., & Hirschheim, R. (1991). The effectiveness of office automation systems:
A social action perspective. Journal of information systems(1), 41-60.
MacKenzie, D. (1997). Abolishing the bomb: Actor-network and other theoretical perspectives.
Paper presented at the ANT and after, Keele University.
Mitev, N. N. (1996). More than a failure? The computerized reservation systems at French
Railways. IT and People, 9(4), 8-19.
Mumford, E., & Weir, M. (1979). Computer systems in work design, the ETHICS method:
Effective Technical and Human Implementation of Computer Systems : a work design
exercise book for individuals and groups. London: Associated Business Press.
Myers, M. D. (1997). Critical ethnography in information systems. In A. S. Lee, J. Liebenau, &
J. I. DeGross (Eds.), Information systems and qualitative research (pp. 276-300).
London: Chapman and Hall.
Ngwenyama, O. (1991). The critical social theory approach to information systems: Problems and
challenges. In H. Nissen, H. Klein, & R. Hirschheim (Eds.), Information systems
research: Contemporary approaches and emergent traditions (pp. 267-280). Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Ngwenyama, O. K., & Lee, A. S. (1997). Communication richness and electronic mail: Critical
social theory and the contextuality of meaning. MIS Quarterly, 21(2), 145-167.
Pouloudi, A., & Whitley, E. A. (1997). Stakeholder identification in inter-organizational systems:
Gaining insights for drug use management systems. European journal of information
systems, 6(1), 1-14.
Poulymenakou, A., & Holmes, A. (1996). A contingency framework for the investigation of
information systems failure. European Journal of Information Systems, 5(1), 34-46.
Romm, C., & Pliskin, N. (1997). Playing politics with e-mail: A longitudinal conflict-based
analysis. In A. S. Lee, J. Liebenau, & J. I. DeGross (Eds.), Information systems and
qualitative research (pp. 362-388). London: Chapman and Hall.
Sauer, C. (1993). Why information systems fail: A case study approach. Henley-on-Thames:
Alfred-Waller.
Schoop, M., & Wastell, D. G. (1998). A language action approach to cooperative
documentation systems. Paper presented at the 6th European conference on information
systems, Aix-en-Provence, France.
Scott, S., & Walsham, G. (1998). Shifting Boundaries And New Technologies: A Case Study In
The UK Banking Sector. Paper presented at the International Conference on Information
Systems, Helsinki, Finland.
Silva, L., & Backhouse, J. (1997). Becoming part of the furniture: The institutionalization of
information systems. In A. S. Lee, J. Liebenau, & J. I. DeGross (Eds.), Information
systems and qualitative research (pp. 389-414). London: Chapman and Hall.
Sokal, A., & Bricmont, J. (1998). Intellectual impostures: Postmodern philosophers' abuse of
science. London: Profile.
Whitley, E. A., & Scothern, R. (1997). Creating and maintaining obligations: An empirical
study of mediated and facetoface communication. Paper presented at the Fifth
European conference on information systems, Cork.

Wynne, B. (1989). Sheepfarming after Chernobyl: A case study in communicating scientific

information. Environment, 31, 10-15, 33-9.