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@ 2
@ ln L
= n
@
2
E[ @ ln@f2(x;)
2
is
+
=
1
2
n
2
P
ln(1 + xi ) MLE, is = [ ln(1 + xi )]/n],
2 P
E[ln(1 + xi )] = n2 . Therefore 2 in this case
3
/n.
p 1 ne
2
p 1 ne
x2 =s
2
i i
p 1 ne
2
p 1 ne
2
s
i
2
i xi =
P
2
i i
2
x2
i i
2
s,
i
2
x2 =s
i i
p1 e
2
x2
i
2
fS (s)
dxi
fS (s)
P
p 1 ne
2
=
i
x2
i i
2
p 1 ne
2
p 1 ne
x2 =s
2
i i
i
2
p 1 ne
2
x2
i i
2
fS (s)
i
2
dxi
dxi
x2 =s
i i
1 if
x>
8
>
>
>
<
if
s<0
Therefore, P [S < s] == > n if 0 < s <
>
>
: 1 if
s>
nsn 1
Therefore the pdf fS (s) = n 1[0<s<] .
Now we need to find the distribution of T = S/. Since dt = ds/, the
0
sn
5. Consider an individual risk and let X = (X1 , X2 , . . . , Xn ) be the observation vector, where Xj is, for example, the aggregate claim amount
in the j-th year. Assume that conditionally, given = , the Xj s
(j = 1, 2, . . . , n) are independent and normally distributed, with mean
, and variance 2 . Further, the apriori distribution of is N (, 2 ).
2
2X
+ (1 )E[], where = n 2 .
Show thatP Bayes = +
= X
2 +n 2
n+
[32]
:= E[|X], the a posteriori density of |X
Ans. For P Bayes =
0
1
u(|X) /
p1 e
2
1
2
Qn
j=1
@p 1
1
2
A.
This implies |X N (0 ,
the identity
2 +n 2 X
2 +n 2
n
n+
2
2
),
20
X+
1
1
, 0 =
[ 12 + n2 ]!
n
n+
1
2
20
1
n
2
2 2
2 +
2
h
i
+ nX2 . From
2
P Bayes .
(d) Show that the quadratic loss of P Bayes is E[(P Bayes
)2 ] =
)2 ]. [12]
(1 )E[(P coll )2 ]= E[(X
2 = E[V ar[|X]]=
Ans. For the quadratic loss of P Bayes we get E
( 0 )2 =(1 ) 2 . Further (1 ) 2 =
2
)2 |]} = n .
n+
2
2
2
)2 ] =E{E[(X
= n E[(X
6. Consider two firms which are competing with each other for a share of
the market for a particular product which both of them manufacture
and distribute. Modeling this as a game with two players, denoted
M and W, assume that one play of the game consists of each player
5
nX
2
(3,3)
(0,5)
M D (5,0) (1,1)
where (x, y) denotes the payos as x for M and y for W.
(a) Show that there exists a Nash equilibria in pure strategies for this
game.[10]
Ans (a) Consider pure strategies. Applying the characterization of
Nash Equilibrium, to the pure strategy C applied by M, W actually
gains in moving from C to D. Therefore (C,C) cannot be a NE. If M
applies D, W gains in moving from C to D. So (D,C) is not NE. If W
applies D, M gains from moving to C to D. Therefore (C,D) is not a
NE. However, if M and W both play D, there is no incentive for any
player to move from D. Therefore, (D,D) is a pure strategy NE.
(b) What is the MaxiMin decision for choice of strategy for M? [4]
Ans. For the Maximin decision,
W
W Min of each row
C
M D 5 1
M D 5 1
1
Max of the minimum values, is 0 and corresponds to D.
(c) What is the MiniMax Regret decision for choice of strategy for M?
[6]
Ans. For the MiniMax decision,
W
C
M D 5 1
M
D
0
0
0
Min of the maximum values, is 0 and corresponds to D.
(d) If the game is repeated with complete knowledge once (the game
being played twice in a sequence) with the final payo being the sum
of payos in the one-stage games, what is the Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium?[12]
Ans. Since the Payos simply get added up, the Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium is to play D at the start of every subgame.
In the example calculations, the figures in brackets represent the backward induction best response values which replace the payos at the
start node of each subgame. The figure is assuming the first two stages
7
as representing the first game and the last two stages the second game.
7. Let X be a single unclassified sample observation equally likely to have
originated from one of two populations characterized by the probability
mass functions BER(p1 ) and BER(p2 ) with p2 > p1 .
(a) Derive the misclassification probability for the Fisher Discriminant
Rule when p2 and p1 are known. [20]
Ans (a) The p.m.f is f (x) = px (1 p)1 x .
f (x) = px (1 p)1 x = ex ln p+(1 x) ln(1 p)
= ex[ln p ln(1 p)]+ln(1 p)
= (1 p)ex[ln p ln(1 p)]
pX (1 p )1
p1
The Fisher rule is given by 12 p1X (1 p12 )1 X >1. Or, ln(1 /2 )+X ln 1 p2p1
2
1 p2
0. Since X is equally likely to have come from one of the two populations, 1 = 2 , and ln(1 /2 ) = 0. Consider the function y = 1 x x ,
x.( 1)
dy
= (1 x).1
= (1 1x)2 > 0 for all 0 < x < 1. This implies
dx
(1 x)2
that ln
p1
1 p1
p2
1 p2
longing to BER(p1 ) if X = 0. The total misclassification probability is 12 .P [X = 0|X BER(p2 )] + 12 .P [X = 1|X BER(p1 )] =
1
.(1 p2 ) + 12 .p1 = 1 p22 +p1 .
2
(b) Let X be known to have come from BER(p1 ), but p1 and p2 are now
unknown although p1 < p2 still holds. Show that Maximum Likelihood
estimates of unknown parameters in the Bayes posterior based Fisher
Discriminant Rule is inconsistent with the assumption of p1 < p2 , if
X=1 and consistent with the assumption if X=0. [12]
ekX
(Ans) L(k) = 1+e
kX if X BER(p1 ). If X=1, L(k) is maximized as
p1
1 p1
p2
1 p2
pdf/pmf f (x)
Exponential
X EXP ()
0<
Two parameter
Exponential
X EXP (, )
0<
Beta
X BET A(, )
0 < ,
x/
Mean
Variance
MGF Mx (t)
(1
t)
0<x
(x )/
(1
t) 1 et
<x
(+ ) 1
x (1
() ( )
x)
0<x<1
2
(+ +1)(+
)i
1
2
1+
Notation
pdf/pmf f (x)
Binomial
X BIN (n, p)
0<p<1
q=1 p
Bernoulli
X BIN (1, p)
0<p<1
q=1 p
Geometric
X GEO(p)
0<p<1
q=1 p
Poisson
X P OI()
0<
Chi-square
X 2 ()
n A x n x
@
p q
x
x = 0, 1, . . . , n
px q 1 x
x = 0, 1
pq x
Mean
Variance
MGF Mx (t)
np
npq
(pet + q)n
pq
pet + q
1/p
q/p2
pet
1 qet
x = 1, 2, . . .
x
x!
e(e
1)
x = 0, 1, . . .
x/2 1 e x/2
2/2 (/2)
= 1, 2, . . .
(1
2t)
/2
0<x
Uniform
X U N IF (a, b)
a<b
1
b a
(a + b)/2
(b
ebt eat
(b a)t
a)2 /12
a<x<b
Normal
X N (,
[(x )/ ]2
et+
2 t2 /2
0<
Gamma
X GAM (, )
0 < , 0 <
x/ x
()
0<x
10
(1
t)
Notation
pdf/pmf f (x)
Exponential
X EXP ()
0<
Two parameter
Exponential
X EXP (, )
0<
Beta
X BET A(, )
0 < ,
x/
Mean
Variance
MGF Mx (t)
(1
t)
0<x
(x )/
(1
t) 1 et
<x
(+ ) 1
x (1
() ( )
x)
0<x<1
11
2
(+ +1)(+
)i
1
2
1+