REDD and Indigenous Peoples: The Programme Socio Bosque by the

Ecuadorian Ministry of Environment in the Context of the Debates

around Development and Climate Change.

Master Thesis

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements

for the degree of Master of Science at the
Faculty of Natural Sciences of the University of Salzburg

by Markus Seiwald

Examiner: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Christian Zeller

Department of Geography and Geology

Salzburg, February, 2011

Abstract
This masters thesis puts the programme Socio Bosque by Ecuadors Ministry of Environment (MAE) into
the context of debates around development and efforts to mitigate global warming. The programme is
analysed on its compatibility with the indigenous rooted concept of sumak kawsay (good life) on the
international, the national and the regional scale. On the international scale the connection of Socio
Bosque to the REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation in Developing Countries)
mechanism is examined. The financing of REDD, its scope, its scale and the attitude of indigenous
peoples organisations (IPOs) on it are of special interest for the analysis. The design of Socio Bosque, the
information and participation policies of the MAE and the role of the program in the protection of
primary forests are studied on the national scale. On the regional scale, the research covers projects
that have joined the program and implemented activities to facilitate the development of the
indigenous population. The analysis leads to the assessment that Socio Bosque probably wont be able
to achieve its self-imposed goals, to protect around 4 million hectares of primary forest and to improve
the quality of life of the rural indigenous population. Additionally, it is suggested to see the programme
as a manifestation of neoliberalisation of conservation in Ecuador, and that serious contradictions inhibit
Socio Bosques compatibility with the concept of sumak kawsay.

Acknowledgment
Id like to thank all my interview partners that made this thesis possible, the people in Ecuador that I
lived with in Quito and that always had an open ear for me and my worries, the people in the office in
Cumbay that supported me in all issues, the people of the Amazona del Ecuador that welcomed me
very cordially, my professor at the University of Salzburg and all the other people that read this thesis
for their advice and comments, my family and my loved ones.

II

Declaration for the Masters Thesis

I warrant that the thesis is my original work and that I have not received outside assistance. Only the
sources cited have been used in this draft. Parts that are direct quotes or paraphrases are identified as
such.

Salzburg, 20.06.2011

III

Table of Contents

List of Figures ......................................................................................................................................... VI

List of Tables .......................................................................................................................................... VI
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................ VII
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1
1 Ecuador Economy, Politics, Society .................................................................................................... 4
1.1 Economic history of Ecuador since the beginning of big scale oil exploitation................................. 4
1.2 The presidency of Rafael Correa and the constitute assembly ........................................................ 7
1.3 Ecuadors indigenous peoples and their struggle for self-determination ........................................ 8
2 Theoretical concepts .......................................................................................................................... 11
2.1 Neo-Desarrollismo ....................................................................................................................... 11
2.2 Sumak kawsay ............................................................................................................................. 14
2.3 Neoliberalisation of conservation................................................................................................. 19
3 Research questions, hypothesis and methodology .............................................................................. 24
3.1 Research questions and hypothesis.............................................................................................. 25
3.2 Applied methodology................................................................................................................... 27
3.3 Limitations ................................................................................................................................... 29
4 The international scale ....................................................................................................................... 31
4.1 The financing of REDD Markets or funds?.................................................................................. 31
4.2 The scope of REDD ....................................................................................................................... 38
4.3 The scale of REDD ........................................................................................................................ 41
4.4 REDD and indigenous peoples and organisations ......................................................................... 44
4.5 Ecuadors national REDD strategy ................................................................................................ 49
5 The national scale ............................................................................................................................... 51
5.1 The design of Socio Bosque .......................................................................................................... 51
5.1.1 Mode of choosing areas for the programme.......................................................................... 52
5.1.2 Design of the conservation agreements ................................................................................ 59
5.1.3 Structure of incentives .......................................................................................................... 62
5.1.4 Monitoring project areas....................................................................................................... 67
5.1.5 The investment plans ............................................................................................................ 69

IV

5.2 Participation and socialisation...................................................................................................... 71

5.3 Socio Bosque and the extraction based economy......................................................................... 75
6 The regional scale ............................................................................................................................... 77
6.1 The Gran Reserva Chachi ............................................................................................................. 78
6.2 The Pueblo Shuar Arutam ............................................................................................................ 81
6.3 Comparison of the two projects ................................................................................................... 83
7 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................ 86
8 Discussion .......................................................................................................................................... 91
9 References ......................................................................................................................................... 94

List of Figures
Figure 1: Geographical distribution and type of contracts (MAE 2010d) ................................................. 25
Figure 2: The different scales of REDD (Angelsen (ed.) 2008:12) ............................................................ 27
Figure 3: Effects of forest definition on deforestation rates (Sasaki & Putz 2009:3) ................................ 39
Figure 4: Three options for the scale of REDD (Angelsen et.al. 2008:32) ................................................ 41
Figure 5: Functioning scheme of Socio Bosque (MAE 2010d) .................................................................. 51
Figure 6: Carbon content (MAE 2010c) .................................................................................................. 57
Figure 7: Scenario of geographical prioritisation (MAE 2010c) ............................................................... 59
Figure 8: Decreasing incentive/ha with growing size of the area under contract .................................... 63
Figure 9: Use of the incentives from community contracts (MAE 2010e) ............................................... 70

List of Tables
Table 1: Forests and deforestation in Ecuador (Hbenthal et.al. 2010:3) ................................................. 4
Table 2: Quantification of the indigenous population (Chisaguano 2006:19) ............................................ 8
Table 3: Comparison between old and new developmentalism (Bresser-Pereira 2009:21) ..................... 12
Table 4: Growth strategies of conventional orthodoxy and new developmentalism (modified after
Bresser-Pereira 2009:31) ....................................................................................................................... 13
Table 5: Sanctions against landowners in case of early withdrawal from the programme (MAE 2009a:18)
.............................................................................................................................................................. 62
Table 6: Structure of incentives paid under SB (MAE 2009a:10) ............................................................. 62
Table 7: Accumulated results of SB up to December 2009 per type of contract (MAE 2010b)................. 64
Table 8: Comparison between the projects of GRCH and CGPSHA (GTZ 2010, Fundacin Natura 2010).. 84

VI

Abbreviations
ALBA Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra Amrica
BINGO Big (Environmental) Non-Governmental Organisation
CC Cordillera del Condor
CGPSHA Consejo del Gobierno del Pueblo Shuar Arutam
CI Conservation International
CODENPE Consejo de Desarrollo de Las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador
CONAIE Confederacin de Nacionalidades Indgenas del Ecuador
CONFENIAE Confederacin de Nacionalidades Indgenas de la Amazona del Ecuador
CTI Circunscripcin Territorial Indgena
DED German Development Service (Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst)
ECORAE Instituto para el Ecodesarrollo de la Amazona del Ecuador
FECCHE Federacin de Centros Chachis del Ecuador
FICSH Federacin Interprovincial de Centros Shuar
FLACSO Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GESOREN Gestin Sostenible de los Recursos Naturales
GHG Greenhouse Gas
GRCH Gran Reserva Chachi
GTZ German Agency for Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft fr technische Zusammenarbeit)
IIPFCC International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPO Indigenous Peoples Organisation
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature
MAE Ministerio del Ambiente del Ecuador

VII

MRV Monitor, report and verify

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA Official Development Assistance
PES Payments for Environmental Services
PWCCC - World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth
REDD Reducing Emissions form Deforestation and Degradation
SB Socio Bosque
TNC Trans National Corporation
UNASUR Unin de Naciones Suramericanas
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNDRIP United Nations Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
VCM Voluntary Carbon Market

VIII

Introduction
The discussion about climate change and its socio-economic impacts is one of the most urgent
issues on the agenda of humanity. Theres widespread agreement on that the worlds remaining native
forests play a crucial role in mitigation of climate change and have to be integrated somehow into
strategies to limit global warming to a value of 2 K by the end of the 21st century. One approach that
deals with the conservation of forests and the minimisation of their destruction and degradation is the
programme Socio Bosque (SB) of the Ministerio del Ambiente del Ecuador (MAE). The programme also
pretends to serve as a solution for the ongoing disputes between the indigenous population and the
government around the development of the Ecuadorian Amazon region. This work puts SB into the
context of debates around development and international efforts to mitigate global warming and
analyses its functionality on the national and regional level. Finally suggestions are given, how SB could
be modified to guarantee a maximum of socio-economic benefits for the indigenous population of the
Ecuadorian Amazon basin in accordance with the concept of sumak kawsay (good living).
To understand the different aspects of this research, it is necessary to give some basic
background information about Ecuador. This will be done in chapter one. The first section of the chapter
provides some general facts about the country. The economic history of Ecuador since the beginning of
big scale oil exploitation and its dependency on resource exportation is outlined. These issues need to
be understood in order to draw conclusions about current economic policies. The rise of current
president Rafael Correa, his relation to leftist and indigenous peoples organisations (IPOs) and the role
of Ecuadors indigenous peoples in the context of the research question is explained. Struggles and
conflicts that characterise the relation between the indigenous population and the current government
are identified.
The second chapter focuses on exposing the basic concepts of new developmentalism, the
current dominating economic paradigm in a number of Latin American countries, sumak kawsay, an
alternative approach that has its origin in indigenous world vision and was introduced as a central
concept in Ecuadors new constitution from 2008 and the National Development Plan 2009 2013, and
neoliberalisation of conservation, a process that affects heavily the current discussions around climate
change and the forestry sector. The conflicts and contradictions between the concepts are explained,
especially in regard to the term of development. Katz (2006), Bresser-Pereira (2009) and Gudynas (2010)
have characterised the economic policy of new developmentalism and have shown its underlying

paradigms. The concept of sumak kawsay has provoked wide interest in intellectual circles in Latin
America and its anchoring in Ecuadors constitution can be seen as a success of indigenous emancipation
movements. Viteri (2002), Davalos (2008), Acosta (2010c), Gudynas (2009a) and Walsh (2010) among
others have tried to clarify the term and have provided valuable contributions to intellectually
understand and characterise the indigenous concept. The notion of neoliberalisation of conservation or
neoliberal conservation appears in Igoe & Brockington (2007) and Castree (2008). One central aspect is
the commodification of nature that manifests in commodity fetishism (Kosoy & Corbera 2010) and is
linked to processes of primitive accumulation or accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2003, Glassman
2006). While new developmentalism and sumak kawsay stand in a struggle concerning ecological issues,
neoliberal conservation pretends to be an alternative to resource extraction that is in harmony with
sumak kawsay and the capitalistic mode of production, as it promises to protect the environment and to
yield profits for investments in conservation at the same time.
The third chapter explains shortly the evolution and the goals of SB and its diffusion up to
December 2009. The research questions and the hypothesis are exposed. It is suggested to see SB as a
manifestation of neoliberal conservation that clearly cannot be in accordance with sumak kawsay. The
analysis is conducted on three different scales: the international, national and sub-national (or regional)
level. On the international level it will be analysed, whether the mechanism of REDD (Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) and its integration within the global carbon market can
be in accordance with the rather philosophical concept of sumak kawsay; on the national scale it is
important to evaluate, whether the national laws and their application are compatible with the notion
of sumak kawsay as it can be found in the Ecuadorian constitution from 2008; and on the regional level
it shall be clarified, whether the manifestations of the international and national policies on the ground
support the self-determined development of the indigenous population. The applied methodology to
answer the research questions and validate the hypothesis is explained and research limitations are
disclosed.
Chapter four deals with the international level. It is argued that the developments around the
mechanism REDD and the international carbon market can be seen as an extension of capitalism to
peripheral regions and as a commodification of nature and that they contain serious risks for Ecuadors
indigenous peoples. The evolution of REDD and options for its implementation are revealed and
Ecuadors position on it is explained. The analysis pays attention to the topics of financing REDD, its
scope and scale and the attitude of IPOs on the mechanism. Crucial flaws of a market based approach on

the financing of REDD and problems that arise from the UNFCCCs (United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change) current definition of forest are outlined. The topics are illustrated by
comments by employees of project developing institutions that have been interviewed during the
research phase with regard to REDD in the Ecuadorian context.
Chapter five analyses the functionality of SB on the national scale. The analysis covers the issues
of the mode of choosing areas for the programme, the form of the contracts that are signed with the
landowners, the height of the incentives for the conservation and how their sustainable use is
guaranteed. The participation and information policies of the MAE are illuminated and the distinction to
payments for ecosystem services (PES) schemes is questioned. Furthermore, the question is answered if
Socio Bosque can really be a protection against extractive activities within primary forests. Interviews
with functionaries of the MAE, with employees of SB supporting institutions and with IPO
representatives complete the argumentation.
Chapter six provides a short overview of two projects that were implemented with the support
of international and national NGOs and development agencies and have in the meanwhile joined the
programme SB. The Gran Reserva Chachi and the experience of the Pueblo Shuar Arutam can be seen as
two pilot initiatives in Ecuador to promote rural development, financed through payments for
conservation agreements. Differences and similarities of the projects in regard to the underlying
approaches on development, implemented activities, duration and technical support are outlined.
In chapter seven conclusions are drawn from the analysis of the three scales. Chapter eight tries
to state points on how to harmonise Socio Bosque with the concept of sumak kawsay and gives an idea
of further research that has to be done.

1 Ecuador Economy, Politics, Society

Ecuador is a republic situated at the West coast of South America with an estimated population
of 14,7 million for July 2010 (CIA 2010). It occupies a territory of 283.561 km2, including the Galapagos
Islands. The mainland part of the country can be divided into three major regions: the Coast (Costa), the
Andean mountain range (Sierra) and the Amazon lowlands (Oriente).
Most of the forest areas are found in the Amazon region. According to the Food and Agriculture
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO 2006) forest cover in 2005 was 10,8 million hectares and
annual deforestation rate from 2000 to 2005 was 1,67%, one of the highest in Latin America. Current
estimations by Ecuadors Ministry of Environment (MAE:2010d) speak of 10 million ha of remaining
forest cover in the country and a loss of about 200.000 ha per year. Primary forest cover in 2005 was 4,7
million ha (FAO 2006). Table 1 gives an overview of deforestation in Ecuador:

Table 1: Forests and deforestation in Ecuador (Hbenthal et.al. 2010:3)

The economy of Ecuador is substantially dependent on the revenues from the export of
petroleum resources. More than half of Ecuadors export earnings originate in it. Other export goods are
agricultural products (bananas, cacao, coffee), shrimp, cut flowers and wood. Major import products are
industrial materials and nondurable consumer goods. The estimated trade balance for 2009 is slightly
positive, with US$ 14,34 billion exports and US$ 14,27 billion imports (CIA 2010).

1.1 Economic history of Ecuador since the beginning of big scale oil exploitation
Despite ongoing massive oil extraction from the Amazon region since the 1970s (estimated
485.700 barrel per day in 2009 according to the CIA World Factbook), the percentage of the population
living below poverty line is still about 35%. The high revenues gained from the oil exportation in the

1970s didnt direct the country onto a path of sustainable development, despite an annual economic
growth rate of about 8% in the time from 1972 to 1981 (Acosta 2004:201). How can this be understood?
In the ecstasy of the newly available external financial resources, the government abandoned necessary
reforms of the economic policy. Although the government initiated programmes to strengthen industrial
production and protect the domestic market in an effort to substitute importation, imports of consumer
goods rose dramatically. Production couldnt hold pace with the growing consumption of the upper and
middle class. Transformation of society didnt occur, and the same patterns of inequality as in the
preceding decades were reproduced. Summarising it can be said that there was no change in quality of
economic growth, just in quantity. Furthermore, taxes were low and expenses were mainly financed by
foreign credits in the belief that oil prices would rise steadily. This led to growing foreign debts, from
US$ 260,8 million in 1971 to US$ 5.869,8 million in 1981. In 1971 15% of the revenues from exportation
were spent on debt service, in 1981 it were 71% (ibid:201). Ecuador got caught in the international debt
crisis in 1982 when oil prices started to fall.
From this time on, Ecuador started to implement structural reforms guided by the IMF and
switched step by step from the economic model of national developmentalism, which focused on import
substitution with the state as the key player of collective action, to a model inspired by neoclassical
economics (Bresser-Pereira 2009:6ff). In 1982 the government devalued the Sucre for the first time in
eleven years. Taxes on consumption, elimination of wheat and gas subsidies, an increase in
transportation fares, a doubling of the gas price, and limits on public salary completed the first wave of
reforms (Hey & Klak 1999:71). During the 1980s and 1990s several adjustments conducted by IMF and
World Bank followed. Acosta & Falcon (2005:19) summarise the applied measures:

Austerity and fiscal discipline

Restructuring of public expenses

Tax reforms

Privatisation of public enterprises

Stabilisation of a competitive exchange course

Trade liberation

Deregulation of the financial market and opening of the capital account

Opening to foreign direct investment without regulation

Flexibilisation of economic and labour relationships

Guarantees for private property rights

By these means the international economy was restructured, and the developing countries
found their place in the international division of labour called globalisation as providers of cheap
resources and spaces for new lucrative investment (emerging markets). Through the structural reforms,
the state lost his position as distributor of wealth to the lower classes of society. In Ecuador workers and
employees in the public sector were struck mostly by the austerity measures of the government. From
1980 to 1990 the share of the production factor labour in national income fell from 32% to 12,7%
(Acosta 2004:209). To gain revenues for the debt service, Ecuador intensified the exploitation of crude
oil, mainly operated by foreign private enterprises. It was argued that the state didnt dispose of the
financial resources to and the technical know how to conduct petroleum extraction. But despite rising
exportation rates no economic growth could be generated until 1997, as surpluses were skimmed by
private enterprises and often transferred to their home countries. The private sector couldnt act as a
redistributor of wealth, like the state did at least to a certain level during the precedent decades. The
corporations acted isolated and werent willing to fill this gap. The reinforcement of raw material
economy led to de-industrialisation and an increase in environmental destruction, especially in the
Amazonas region (ibid:210f).
In the second half of the 1990s an unprecedented crisis struck Ecuador. It was the result of
environmental, economical and political factors that played together: heavy floods, the El Nio
phenomenon, the debt service, the fall of oil prices, the structural reforms imposed by the IMF and five
different governments in five years. In July 1999 the flow of international capital ran dry, the GDP
declined by 7% in that year and poverty rate rose up to 71% (Acosta & Falcon 2005:27, Acosta
2004:213). In January 2000 the national currency Sucre was abandoned to prevent a supposed
hyperinflation and the US Dollar was introduced as new official currency of Ecuador. Anyway the
inflation stayed high: from December 1999 to December 2000 it rose from 61% to 91% before a rigid
adjustment could bring it down to 9,4% in 2002 and 8% in 2003, which was still high compared to US
inflation with about 2% (Acosta 2004:214). The expensive dollarisation is basically financed by ongoing
oil exploitation and the transfer of money from more than one million emigrated Ecuadorians to their
home country, which accounted for US$ 1,6 billion in 2003 (Inter-American Development Bank 2004).
Over 20 years of structural reforms under the IMF and World Bank and the focus on exportation
of petroleum have increased inequality within the Ecuadorian society and made the nation strongly
dependent on international markets. The second half of the first decade of the 21st century is

characterised by political change and the search for alternatives to the neoclassical economics. These
developments are subject of the next section.

1.2 The presidency of Rafael Correa and the constitute assembly

As Birk (2009:30f) points out, in April 2005 the frustration of the Ecuadorian population about
neoliberal adjustment, corrupt politics and high poverty peaked in massive street protests. Lucio
Guitirrez had to resign as president and an interim government was constructed with Rafael Correa, a
left wing economist, as minister of economy. He only stayed three months in office before he was
dismissed because of his positions against a free trade agreement with the USA and for a prioritisation
of public spending before debt service. After leaving the government, Correa founded the movement
PAS together with other leftist and social actors. PAS soon joined with other movements to form
Alianza Pas and run for elections in November 2006 with Correa as candidate for presidency. The
unconventional candidate won the hearts of the population with his promise to start the Citizens
Revolution (Revolucin Ciudadana). After winning the elections Correa announced to initiate a
constituent assembly to rework the widely disapproved constitution from 1998 in a participatory
process. The assembly was held in Montecristi from November 2007 to July 2008 under the presidency
of the economist Alberto Acosta. A total of 3.164 citizens proposals were processed during that time
(ibid:62) and numerous social movements took part in the assembly. The result is one of the most
progressive constitutions worldwide with wide impacts on political and socio-economic life in Ecuador.
The new constitution was finally resolved in congress on September 28th, 2008 with an approval of 64%.
Some of its aspects will play a major role in the forthcoming chapters of this thesis.
Correa was voted for president for the second time in April 2009 as the constitution demanded
new elections. The high support by the population has allowed Correa to govern in a very solitary style
since his first inauguration as president in January 2007. Several ministers resigned after having disputes
with Correa, among them the economists Alberto Acosta as former minister of energy and Fander
Falcon as former minister of external affairs. In an article on the occasion of three years of Citizens
Revolution Acosta (2010a) accuses Correa of governing in a style, that didnt allow the consolidation of a
real participatory democracy like it is established in the constitution of Montecristi. Correas relationship
to several social movements is also tense. In 2008 he stated officially that the major threats for the
countrys development originated from left and ecological infantilism as well as from indigenous
infantilism (Burbach 2010). Leftist organisations blame Correa for promoting an economic policy based
on the extraction of raw materials and capitalistic logics (they use the term neo-desarrollismo, which

will be explained in section 1.2) and not the socialism of the 21st century, like he promised at the
beginning of his presidential career (Arciniegas 2009, Rodas 2010, Marambio 2010, Ponce 2008).
Correas stressed relationship to Ecuadors indigenous people will be one of the subjects in the following
section.

1.3 Ecuadors indigenous peoples and their struggle for self-determination

According to the CIA World Factbook indigenous peoples (indgenas) represent 25% of Ecuadors
population. But figures vary: According to Ortiz (2008:150) indigenous population is around one million,
which would represent less than 10% of the population. Table 2 gives an impression about the varying
figures.
Quantification of the indigenous population
Source
Year
Variables
National Institute for Statistics and Census
1950
Language
(INEC)
INEC
1990
Language
Committee for Census of the Indigenous
Geographical area of
1995
Peoples of Ecuador
community organisation
INEC
1998
Language
Survey of Employment, Under-Employment
Language,
2001
and Unemployment, ENEMDUR
Autoidentification
Language,
INEC
2001
Autoidentification
Indicator system of Ecuadors nationalities
2003
Estimated
(SIDENPE)
United Nations
2004
Estimated

Population

Pop. %

347.745

10,9

362.500

3,8

3.055.678

26,7

616.844

5,5

1.682.875

15,0

830.418

6,8

1.058.363

8,7

4.100.000

43

Table 2: Quantification of the indigenous population (Chisaguano 2006:19)

Although no clear number of how many people they are exists, the indigenous population can be
separated into thirteen or fourteen nationalities, depending on whether the Kichwa of the Andes and
the Amazon region are distinguished or not. The indgenas are organised in several organisations of
different grades. The organisation of the first grade normally represents the local community
(comunidad). The second grade usually represents communities from the same nationality that share
one common territory, like the PKR Pueblo Kichwa de Rukullacta or the CGPSHA Consejo de Gobierno
del Pueblo Shuar Arutam. On higher levels we find bigger confederations and unions, like the
CONFENIAE Confederacin de Nacionalidades Indgenas de la Amazona del Ecuador. The most

important umbrella organisation of the indigenous people in Ecuador is the CONAIE Confederacin de
Nacionalidades Indgenas del Ecuador, although other nationwide structures exist; like the FENOCIN
(Confederacin Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indgenas y Negras) or the FEINE (Consejos de
Pueblos y Organizaciones Indgenas Evanglicas del Ecuador).
Ecuadors indigenous peoples organisations (IPOs) have played an important role in social
struggles during the last decades and have achieved some major successes, like the legalisation of their
land titles in 1990 and the notion of Ecuador as a plurinational and multi-ethical state in the constitution
of 1998. The concept of sumak kawsay (Kichwa for good life, harmonic life), which is one of the core
pieces of the constitution of 2008 and will be discussed later, is based on indigenous world view.
Although IPOs participated in the constituent assembly of Montecristi and the CONAIE supported the
approval of the constitution in the end, they were not completely satisfied with the final draft and
conflicts with president Correa started to rise during the assembly. In May 2008 the CONAIE published a
declaration in which they break with Correa and Alianza Pas because of his insistence on maintaining
and forcing extractive activities in the country (Peripecias 2008).
One central point of conflict in this context was and still is the new mining law which was
introduced in January 2008 and according to the NGO Accin Ecolgica is, favoring foreign investment
over social and environmental concerns, putting the extraction of minerals over the rights of
communities, as well as allowing for open pit mining and the destruction of biodiversity, including the
unlimited tapping of water resources in the process of mining operations (Burbach 2010). Furthermore,
CONAIE strongly rejects the draft for a new water law, which allows water privatisation, sets limits on
community participation in water management and prioritises access for industrial users (ibid). In the
course of protests against the new water law in September 2009, the situation escalated and a teacher
from the Shuar nationality was killed. The protests from side of the indigenous people were held with a
lot of passion. It has to be understood, that water is the home of the superior god Arutam in Shuar
mythology and cannot be subject to privatisation, but is a collective good, accessible to everyone
(Misoczky 2010:6f). Beside the struggles around mining and water laws, the CONAIE contends for
indigenous territories to be recognised as an official level of government in form of CTIs
(Circunsripciones Territoriales Indgenas an in the constitution of Montecristi newly introduced
administration unit that grants some autonomy to indigenous communities, peoples or nationalities)
and for a de facto recognition of the international agreements the government has already signed
officially, like the United Nations Declaration on Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP) (Webber 2010).

One recent example for the relationship between the government and IPOs are the incidents around the
summit of the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra Amrica (ALBA) which took place on June
24th and 25th in the town of Otavalo. As no IPOs were invited to the summit, CONAIE called for protests,
in whose course a pair of police handcuffs disappeared and Marlon Santi, president of the CONAIE,
reportedly broke through a police line together with other activists. Subsequently the government
initiated investigations against Santi for alleged sabotage and terrorism.
Although relations are tense, the government depends on indigenous collaboration for the
implementation of policies for forest protection, as the vast majority of forest area is situated within
indigenous territories, especially in the Amazon region. According to the International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN), around 80% of the remaining biodiversity in Latin America is found
within indigenous territories (Pacari 2009:36). The CONFENIAE (2008) claims that a similar percentage of
forest areas is situated within indigenous territories in the Ecuadorian Amazon region.
At the base of the conflict between IPOs and the government underlies the question of which
path of development Ecuador should take after the Citizens Revolution: Should it follow a model of new
developmentalism (neo-desarrollismo), like Rafael Correa seems to aspire, or should it seek for a new
paradigm of development founded on the principle of sumak kawsay and, therefore, on the constitution
of Montecristi, like the IPOs call for? To understand the conflict between the two concepts, it is
necessary to take a look at their theoretical background, which will be done in chapter 2.

10

2 Theoretical concepts

2.1 Neo-Desarrollismo
Several leftist South American state chiefs (Correa, Chavez, Morales) announced during the last
decade to initiate a development into direction of a 21st centurys socialism and argue that to achieve
this goal, first a capitalistic phase of adjustments to the neoliberal model would be necessary. For Katz
(2007) this so called neo-desarrollismo is a model that only pretends to pave the way to the new
socialism and prevents real changes to happen. Gudynas (2010:62ff) calls the economic model of several
Latin American governments neoextractivismo. He names the governments of Nstor Kirchner and
Crisitina Fernandez Kirchner in Argentinia, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Inacio Lula da Silva in Brasil, Rafael
Correa in Ecuador, Fernando Lugo in Paraguay, Tabar Vazquez and Jos Mujica in Uruguay and Michelle
Bachelet in Chile as representatives of this model. All these governments broke supposedly with the
neoliberal model; the state recovers his position as a central protagonist of development, privatisations
are halted and in some cases key industries are (re)nationalised. Extractive activities are expanded to
boost economy and environmental destruction and degradation are tolerated with the argument that
they are unavoidable to achieve progress and development. In Ecuador president Correa repeatedly
used the image of a beggar sitting on a bag of gold to justify extractive activities. One statement which
illustrates Correas attitude on nature and environmental issues is (ibid:79): If nature opposes the
Citizenss Revolution with this drought, we will fight together and defeat it, be sure of that.1 BresserPereira (2009:16) calls neo-desarrollismo a third course for middle-income countries, in between old
developmentalism and conventional orthodoxy. To understand the concept of neo-desarrollismo we will
delimitate it from these two mentioned models.
Desarrollismo (developmentalism) was a model of development for Latin American countries
widely applied in the time after World War II until the debt crisis of the 1980s. As mentioned in section
1.1.1, developmentalism focused on promoting industrialisation through import substitution and high
tariffs on imported goods. The state played a central role in old developmentalism, investing in
infrastructure and basic industries. The central criterion for development was economic growth, the
level on which development takes place the national state. To achieve economic growth, the nation,

Original text: Si la naturaleza con esta sequa se opone a la revolucin ciudadana, lucharemos y juntos la
venceremos, tengan la seguridad.

11

consisting in workers, the middle-class, the bureaucracy and businessmen, had to unify to survive in the
imperialist world economy (ibid:6f).
The new developmentalism or neo-desarrollismo picks up on the central role of economic
growth and the state in development. It is still based on Keynesian macroeconomics like its predecessor,
but these are not misunderstood anymore as an excuse to raise public debt disproportionally, like it was
the case with old developmentalism which led the Latin American countries into the debt crises
(Bresser-Pereira & Oreiro 2010). New developmentalism is more orientated on macroeconomic
equilibrium than old developmentalism. This is true for debt and inflation policies. Furthermore, focus is
now put on strengthening industries to make them competitive on the international scale and not to
substitute imports. The East Asian Tigers that relied on an export orientated model of development and
integration into the international economy have become the role model for Latin American countries.
Table 3 shows the main differences between old and new developmentalism:

Table 3: Comparison between old and new developmentalism (Bresser-Pereira 2009:21)

As Bresser-Pereira (2009:24ff) shows, the most obvious difference between conventional

orthodoxy and new developmentalism is found in the role of the state. Conventional orthodoxy is
market fundamentalist and believes in the self-regulation of the market, whereas new
developmentalism sees the market as a powerful institution that needs to be guided by the state as the
essence of collective action. The institutions in new developmentalism should regulate the market to
guarantee economic growth and a more equal distribution of income, whereas for the institutions in

12

conventional orthodoxy it is primary important to guarantee private property rights and unlimited
competition. New developmentalism sees commercial globalisation as a chance for middle-income
countries and supports it like conventional orthodoxy, but rejects financial globalisation, because
middle-income countries run the risk to lose their self-determination considering the power of
international finance capital.
In regard to macroeconomic strategies, new developmentalism and conventional orthodoxy
aspire similar goals: fiscal balance, moderate interest rates, and competitive exchange courses. But
while the mandate of the central bank in conventional orthodoxy is reduced to steer interest rates and
thereby tackle inflation, the central bank has at least three tasks in new developmentalism: control
interest rates and inflation, keep the exchange course actively competitive (which is essentially for
export orientated economies) and achieve full employment. Table 4 compares growth strategies of
conventional orthodoxy and new developmentalism.
Conventional orthodoxy

1. No economic role for the nation or for

national development strategies.
2. Reforms reducing the size of state and
deregulating markets.
3. The fundamental institutions to promote
growth are property rights and contracts.
4. Minimal role of the state in investing and
in industrial policy.
5. Commercial and financial globalisation
6. Central Bank has a single mandated target:
Inflation

New developmentalism

1. The nation is the agent defining the

national development strategy.
2. Reforms strengthening the state and
regulating Markets.
3. The key institution to promote growth is a
national development strategy.
4. Moderate role in investing and in
industrial policy; large role in
redistribution.
5. Rejects financial globalisation
6. Central Bank has three targets: Inflation,
exchange course, employment

Table 4: Growth strategies of conventional orthodoxy and new developmentalism

(modified after Bresser-Pereira 2009:31)

In this section we have highlighted some differences between old developmentalism, new
developmentalism and conventional orthodoxy. All three approaches got one thing in common: They
are capitalistic approaches and take economic growth as a central parameter for development. The next
section will deal with a completely different approach: the indigenous concept of sumak kawsay.

13

2.2 Sumak kawsay

As mentioned before, the term of sumak kawsay has its origin in the indigenous world view
(cosmovisin). It can be translated from Kichwa as good life or harmonic life and is a rather wide
concept. Carlos Viteri (2002), anthropologist and Kichwa from the province Pastaza in the Amazon
region, gives a first hint to the understanding of the term: In the indigenous cosmovisin exists no idea
comparable to development in the occidental world. The imagination of a linear process in life, which
leads from a state of underdevelopment to a developed one, is not part of the indigenous world view.
Neither exist the notions of wealth and chronic poverty. Instead theres the holistic concept of sumak
kawsay, which constitutes a central category in indigenous philosophy and involves the relationship
between humanity and nature, spirituality, human values, traditional cultural life and responsibility for
future generations among others. One central feature of the concept is that it is in a state of constant
construction and adaptation, like the environment and social and economic structures are in constant
construction and change. Viteri concludes that it is inappropriate and even dangerous to apply a
paradigm, which defines development as economic growth, on indigenous societies.
Davalos (2008) points out some of the basic discrepancies between the concepts of sumak
kawsay and development as economic growth. Economic growth requires the accumulation of capital,
which usually means an amplification of the frontiers of exploitation and leads to more environmental
degradation (ibid:2). These characteristics of accumulation contradict the idea of sumak kawsay in the
following manners:
1. According to Davalos (ibid:3), the relation between human being and nature is destroyed in
occidental ideology and this constitutes the first caesura between sumak kawsay and capital
accumulation. The whole occidental philosophy from the Greeks and Christianity on has been based
on a separation of human mankind from nature. Since Descartes and the Enlightenment the last
spiritual and religious limitations to the power of humanity in occidental ideology have fallen. Man
now is the sovereign of nature, owns it and has the right to its exploitation. Ongoing privatisation
and commercialisation of nature facilitated the overuse of natural resources to maximise economic
surplus and expand the discrepancies further. In indigenous cosmovisin however, man is part of
nature and is obliged to conserve it. As already mentioned before, an ownership of water for
instance is unimaginable for the indgenas. The manifestation of this principle can also be seen in
the indigenous territorial administration that doesnt know any private property rights on land. All

14

land within the territory belongs to the community as a whole. The delimitation of chacras (family
fields) within communities only grants the right to use the land for agriculture.
2. Another discrepancy between the concepts is found in ethics. In an idealistic, competitive market
that consists of economical rational acting individuals (homo oeconomicus) is no place for ethics. As
Davalos (ibid:4) puts it, to think rationally in an economic sense means to think for someones own
advantage and can never be ethical.
3. A third caesura as stated by Davalos, can be found within the history and culture of peoples.
Through the introduction of capitalism new needs and desires grow, which affect traditional way of
life. People get dependent on the capitalistic mode of production to satisfy the new needs.
Capitalism demands for radical rationalisation and modernisation wherever possible and is not
compatible with traditional forms of reproduction. Maybe this is the biggest contradiction of
development as economic growth and sumak kawsay as it appears for the indigenous population of
the Amazon basin. However, according to Davalos an epistemic colonisation which eradicates the
capacities to think about alternatives to capitalism is linked to modernisation in general (ibid:5).
4. Davalos finds a fourth problem of development as economic growth and its compatibility with
sumak kawsay within its definition of poverty. Usually poverty is measured by economic means (1$
per day) and it is assumed that poverty can be overcome by growing income. For Davalos poverty is
a political problem and is characterised by a relation of exploitation in the sense of Marx. He
emphasises, that not one of the developed countries in the world has eradicated poverty and
especially not exploitation. As mentioned before, no notion for chronic poverty exists in indigenous
cosmovisin. The term mtsui constitutes a temporary scarcity of agricultural products for
alimentation and is never chronical. Mtsui can occur as a reason of a natural disaster but it is also
linked to bad land use that is not conform with traditional knowledge and an absence of foresight
(Viteri 2002).
We have outlined some basic conflicts between sumak kawsay and development as economic
growth. But still we dont know how a development in harmony with sumak kawsay could look like.
Acosta (2010c) states some points that could lead to such a development. The task is to fulfill a change
in quality of development and not in plain quantity.
One of the most important tasks will doubtlessly be to fix the disrupted relation of humanity
with nature. Gudynas (2009a:41ff) states some key factors that should be thought of in context of
development and environment.

15

1. First he argues for a change from the notion of natural capital to natural inheritance. The notion of
natural capital suggests seeing nature as a stock of different commodities, some of them of
economic use for humanity, waiting for exploitation, and some of them useless. The notion of
natural inheritance however, is much wider and linked to a sense of responsibility for future
generations.
2. A second key factor is to respect the rights of nature (derechos de la naturaleza) which are
grounded in the constitution of Montecristi. According to Gudynas (ibid), it is necessary to accept
that all living beings have their rights, independent from their economic value for humanity.
Although it still stays unclear and has to be defined in what these rights consist and how to protect
them, Acosta (2010c:12) emphasises that the achievements of human rights in the 20th century
would be incomplete without their extension by the rights of nature in the 21st century.
3. Another critical point is the question of property rights, the access to and the commercialisation of
natural resources. These aspects underlie the logics of capitalist dynamics and even state-run
enterprises are bound to work within the system and stay competitive. To regulate and finally
overcome the tendency of globalised capitalism to exploit the given natural resources and
commercialise them under competitive pressure on the international markets it seems necessary to
promote regional integration also in terms of transnational environmental policy and not only in
terms of trade agreements.
Sumak kawsay should facilitate a good life for the whole humanity and not dolce vita for the
elites (ibid:6). This demand targets the second contradiction that was mentioned above. Acosta (2010c),
Wray (2009) and Quintero (2009) outline necessary preconditions for the transformation to a new
development paradigm: Ethics would have to be integrated somehow into economics. The rules of
capitalistic concurrence and maximisation of profit would have to be disarmed. How these goals can be
achieved lies still in the dark and will hopefully be subject to discussions in the future (not only in
Ecuador, but globally). The discussions about and movements towards alternatives to capitalism have to
be linked to a new understanding of participatory democracy and plurinationality, which are already
established in the constitution of Montecristi. A new development paradigm and its application in
national laws and programmes have to be evolved through the participation of social movements and
the public in general.
The aspect of plurinationality also plays a central role in the third contradiction mentioned by
Davalos (2008) concerning the history and culture of the peoples. To prevent the colonisation of the

16

remaining indigenous peoples by capitalism, it is necessary to allow the indgenas to follow a path of
self-determined development (autodesarrollo indgena, etnodesarrollo, desarrollo con identidad).
Therefore, it is necessary to fulfil following steps (Martnez Novo 2010):

recognition of the indigenous ethnicities by the state

recognition of indigenous territories and self-determined control

of the use of natural resources situated within these territories

definition of the obligations of the state in the context of development

Acosta (2010c:8) emphasises furthermore, that theres a need for new indicators of
development and the need for discussion of the methodology of their calculation. These claims aim at
the fourth contradiction that we outlined. Experts from various disciplines economists, sociologists,
anthropologists, geographers, philosophers, etc. are called to think about a new paradigm of postdevelopment and its indicators that fit the needs of the 21st century.
Once more it is very important to remind the contradictions between development and sumak
kawsay. Escobar (2009:28) summarises the basic changes to traditional concepts of development in the
constitution of Montecristi:
1. Sumak kawsay questions the notion of development based on growth and progress,
2. replaces development as a goal for development as a process of qualitative change,
3. allows to think about a new model of economy, that is not based on the extraction and
exportation of raw materials.

However, Escobar criticises, that within the Ecuadorian project of founding the new constitution
on an alternative concept of development (or post-development), economic growth has been
questioned as a goal but not as a mean of development (ibid:27f). The development question has
moved from the centre of the discussion and opened space for culture, nature and other non-economic
aspects, but the proposed model still is focused on modernisation and conducted by experts. For
Escobar it is from fundamental importance to distinct between the sumak kawsay of the indigenous
cosmovisin and the modified version of the concept, that is anchored in the constitution of Montecristi,

17

has grown as a political project and is characterised by tensions between neo-desarrollismo and postdevelopment (ibid:30). Some serious contradictions can be found within the constitution of Montecristi,
which will be addressed in chapter 5. The notion of sumak kawsay, which is meant to propose an
alternative model of life to the Eurocentric paradigms and help the peoples of Ecuador to decolonise, is
already perceived and re-interpreted to fit into western models of development.
As Walsh (2010:19) outlines, the basic tool to transform the idea of sumak kawsay from the
constitution into concrete measures for development is the National Plan for buen vivir 2009-2013. In
the plan development is used as a synonym for buen vivir. Walsh concludes that the document is
significantly inspired by visions of development emerging in the Western world, especially by the
Eurocentric model of integral and sustainable human development. This perspective distances itself
from the notion of development as mere economic growth and focuses on the individual and quality of
life. It is mostly associated with the work of Manfred Max-Neef and Amartya Sen (ibid:16).
In contrast to previous linear models, the focus here is systemic, subject rather than
object based. It is concerned with recuperating the molecular dimension of the social and
deepening democracy and citizenship from below. Equity, democracy, participation,
protection of bio-diversity and natural resources, and respect for ethnic-cultural diversity
serve as key elements of the framework. (ibid:16)

Walsh argues that on a first sight these principles match the challenges of a development
according to sumak kawsay. A closer look however, reveals that the modernistic model of sustainable
and integral human development supports individual stamina and initiative, whereas the indigenous
concept is focused on solidarity, fraternity and collective community-based relations. Walsh concludes,
that the principle of sumak kawsay is not without problems and contradictions, as it requires the
general populace to think and act with ancestral principles (ibid:19). Furthermore, she calls for vigilance
so that the European push to humanise capitalism (ibid:20) doesnt entrap the indigenous principle in
colonial entanglements. Similar concerns are expressed by Acosta (2010c:6) when he warns not to fall
into the traps of sustainable development or green capitalism that supposedly offer win-win solutions
for all participating actors but leave the principles of accumulation untouched.

18

2.3 Neoliberalisation of conservation

Another key-concept that has to be understood in the context of this work is neoliberalisation,
which is not to be reduced to an economic policy that is characterised by neo-classical economics but a
spatiotemporally variable process (Castree 2008:137). Neoliberalism in the sense of Castree is one
possible configuration of capitalism, that sees the market as the best mechanism for allocating goods
and services to meet the diverse needs of actors across the globe (ibid:143) and sometimes is labeled
as market triumphalism. In the real world its not one homogenous neoliberalism, but many different
variations of neoliberalisation processes that consist of one or more of the following components
(ibid:142):

Privatisation the assignment of clear private property rights

Marketisation or Commodification the assignment of prices to phenomena that were

previously unpriced

Deregulation the rollback of state interference to make state regulation light touch
and make more actors self-governing within centrally prescribed frameworks

Reregulation the deployment of state policies to facilitate privatisation and

commodification

Construction of market proxies in the residual public sector running remaining public
sectors as efficient and competitive businesses

Construction of flanking mechanisms in civil society encouragement of civil society

groups that provide the services that before were provided by the interventionist states
and tackle problems that emerge from the previous measures listed

Based on these criteria for neoliberalisation Castree (ibid:146ff) identifies four types of
biophysical or environmental fixes to tackle the problem of finite accumulation possibilities. By these
fixes the capital finds a way to expand its control to previously economically unmanaged areas and
spheres of the biophysical world to base new accumulation activities on it. The four types of fixes are
closely related to each other, and in real life examples usually can be found interconnected to varying
degrees within different cases of neoliberalisation of nature.
Environmental fix 1: This fix is powered by the idea that the contradictions between infinite
economic growth and finite ecological capacities can be overcome by internalising the environment

19

within economy. According to this view, resources and ecosystems can be protected in the best way if
they are privatised and commodified. For instance nature is subdivided into a bundle of ecological goods
and services that the owner can sell. The capitalist logics tell us that the owner will protect these goods
and services as long as opportunity costs for extraction and exploitation are not significantly higher. This
fix is obviously linked to conservation efforts in a neoliberal environment and is widely applied under the
banner of green capitalism.
Environmental fix 2: Privatisation and commodification also play a central role here, but
ecological issues dont stand in the heart of the discussion like it is the case with the first environmental
fix. Previously protected or state-controlled aspects of the environment are opened to the full influence
of the capital. An example here is the privatisation of water supply.
Environmental fix 3: These are measures to extend capitals subsumption of nature without any
ecological motivated background, for instance the exploitation of new crude oil or mineral resources.
The third environmental fix has been practiced for decades all over the world under more or less
restricted approaches on economic subsumption of nature. In Ecuador especially the oil and mining
sectors are examples for this kind of environmental fix.
Environmental fix 4: The contradictions between infinite accumulation and finite resources have
to be managed somehow by the state. This can lead to contradictions within the regulation approach, as
it is wished at one hand to facilitate accumulation and economic growth while at the other hand society
has to deal somehow with unintended outcomes of accumulation like pollution. To overcome those,
basically two possibilities exist: The first is to adopt a minimal state attitude from the beginning, the
second is to outsource responsibilities to the private sector and/or civil society groups.
Recently there has been a push to address new emerging models of conservation as neoliberal
conservation, which is characterised by the reregulation of nature through forms of commodification,
territorialisation in form of the partitioning of resources and landscapes, and the emergence of new
networks that cut across traditional divides of state, NGO, and for-profit enterprise (Igoe & Brockington
2007). Conservation usually is perceived as a protection of nature against the destructive forces of
capital accumulation. Neoliberal conservation promises to protect nature while making profit and to
lead to win-win situations for all participants, which corresponds to Castrees first environmental fix.
1. The central component of neoliberal conservation usually is commodification of ecosystem services
(ES). Ecosystem services are defined by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) as benefits
20

people obtain from ecosystems. They are classified as provisioning services such as food, water,
timber, and fiber; regulating services that affect climate, floods, disease, wastes, and water quality;
cultural services that provide recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; and supporting services
such as soil formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling (MA 2005:V). This classification and
the establishment of payments for environmental services (PES) can be addressed as commodity
fetishism in the sense of Marx, as it contributes to conceal the social relations underlying the mode
of ecosystem service production and commercialisation (Kosoy & Corbera 2010). The masking of
realities manifests in three ways: Closer analyses of PES schemes reveal invisible complexity,
invisible values and invisible institutional asymmetries (ibid:1231ff). PES schemes suggest simplicity
by itemising ecosystem services for monetary valuation, pricing and exchange. But these
distinctions and boundaries are very difficult if not impossible to draw, as ES are interconnected to
each other because several biotic and non-biotic components interact to produce such services.
The itemisation and quantification of ES requires a very high level of abstraction, as ecosystems
usually are highly complex and show features of non-linear, chaotic dynamics and unpredictable
behavior. The masking of the complexity of ecosystem functions affects human perception of what
an ecosystem is and how it works. Some approaches try to bundle ES to optimise their significance.
But those approaches are also problematic and lead to new conceptual and technical challenges
(ibid:1232). A second concealment is linked to the process of valuing ES. Determining a single
monetary value for a specific ecosystem service ignores the diverse valuation that different
stakeholders assign to an ecosystem as a whole. For instance can the assignation of a price to a ton
of carbon never capture the spiritual value that is linked to the forest for the indigenous peoples.
The third dimension of PES as commodity fetishism is about hidden asymmetries in power in regard
to price formation and property rights allocation. Market based approaches on PES schemes mask
the relations that lead to the establishment of prices. Kosoy & Corbera (2010:1233) state the price
for carbon sequestration services as an example, which is highly influenced by international
agreements on climate politics and does not necessarily follow changes in supply and demand of
the service. Markets of whatever kind are social products in which participants have different
access to knowledge and power to enforce their interests.
2. Another component of neoliberal conservation according to Igoe & Brockington (2007) is
territorialisation, which means the reregulation of property rights on land. Igoe & Brockington state
the sub-division of collectively held land, making state-controlled territories available to investors
through rents and concessions, and even presenting collective legal titles to rural communities that

21

allow them to enter business ventures with outside investors as examples for neoliberal
territorialisation (ibid:437). Neoliberal territorialisation can be seen as a new type of state-making,
which produces state forms that are more decentralised than previous ones and are increased
dependent on external funding, technology and expertise. This leads to a higher level of direct
involvement of businesses and NGOs.
3. The third aspect of neoliberal conservation is the emergence of new networks of NGOs,
government institutions and enterprises. Especially a few big transnational environmental NGOs
(BINGOs) control billions of Dollars of funding nowadays. The most important BINGOs are: the
Nature Conservancy, Conservation International, the World Wide Fund for Nature, Flora and Fauna
International, the Fund for Wild Nature, the Wildlife Conservation Society and the African Wildlife
Foundation, among others (ibid:447). These BINGOs are increasingly interlinked with other
institutions like states, corporations, financial institutions and so on. The resulting networks are
hardly comprehensible and concentrate significant power to establish their interests. By
territorialisation and commodification they create new transnationalised spaces of high
biodiversity value, which have been reregulated to give them new types of economic value and to
make that value available to transnational interests and national elites, often at the expense of
local rural communities (ibid:441). These local communities are often seen as one of the main
threats for conservation, because they use natural resources for their subsistence. The answer of
neoliberal conservation to this problem is to bring them out of nature and into the market, to make
them eco-rational subjects. Igoe & Brockington (2007:442) name four steps to reach this goal:
1.

issue of legally guaranteed property rights which gives local people the authority to
protect natural resources as environmental stakeholders and gives them the capital to
enter into conservation-oriented business ventures

2.

teach the local people the ability to think economically and realise the present and
projected market value of the nature in which they live

3.

support them in acquiring skills, technology and ethics of accountability to execute

conservation according to the neoliberal model

4.

train them to be able to work in the tourism sector

Some of the sophisticated, technocratic approaches of neoliberal conservation have been

explained in this chapter. Once again it has to be mentioned here, that neoliberalisation is to be

22

understood as a variety of processes and not a certain paradigm of economic policy. The processes that
constitute neoliberal conservation and a subsumption of nature within capitalism are not dependent on
the dominance of neoclassical economics, although conventional orthodoxy supports these processes by
its confidence in markets. But neoliberalisation of nature as environmental fix in the sense of Castree is
closely related to Marx notion of primitive accumulation and Harveys (2003) concept of accumulation
by dispossession, which constitute a characteristic trait of capitalism in general, independently from the
dominant paradigm that defines economic policy within capitalist society.
Although Castree explicitly draws on Marx and certain neo-Marxists in his concept of
neoliberalisation of nature, he only links his second environmental fix to Harveys concept (Castree
2008:147). However, I maintain that the first environmental fix also constitutes efforts for primitive
accumulation or accumulation by dispossession, as primitive accumulation in the sense of Marx is the
historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production, transforming the social
means of subsistence and of production into capital and the immediate producers into wage laborers
(Glassman 2006:610), and as such is closely linked to the processes of commodification and
territorialisation that are conducted under the banner of neoliberal conservation.

23

3 Research questions, hypothesis and methodology

As shown in the first chapter, several conflicts and struggles exist between the government of
Rafael Correa and the indigenous peoples, especially in regard to the predominant paradigm of
economic development based on resource extraction. But in 2008 the government launched a new
programme called Socio Bosque (forest partners, SB), that promises to facilitate a development that is
in harmony with the concept of sumak kawsay. According to the Ministry of Environment (MAE), Socio
Bosque is besides others one of the central components of the new strategy to reduce deforestation in
Ecuador and the contribution of the Government of the Citizens Revolution to the combat against
climate change, the conservation of biodiversity and the improvement of quality of life of the population
in accordance with the principle of buen vivir or sumak kawsay (MAE 2010a:23). Socio Bosque in its
effort for conservation suggests being an alternative to the extraction based economy that devastated
and poisoned vast areas in the Northern Amazon region and that seems to be promoted once more
under the new label of neo-desarrollismo by the very same government of Rafael Correa. The MAE
names three objectives for the programme (ibid:6):

protect four million hectares of native forest (about 66% of the remaining
forests outside the system of protected areas) and their ecological, economic
and cultural values

reduce the deforestation rates and the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs)

contribute to the improvement of quality of life of the poor population (about

one million beneficiaries)

To achieve these goals the ministry concludes contracts with the owners of forest areas that
qualify for the programme (the mode of eligibility will be explained in chapter 5) and pays them an
annual incentive for the conservation of the contracted areas. Up to December 2009 the MAE has
achieved to contract 413 covenants and protect 416.509 hectares of forest. A population of 40.273
inhabitants has benefited from the payment of US$ 2.073.033. From the 416.509 ha under contract, the
vast majority (369.449 ha or 89%) is situated within indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian territories, whose
population owns collective land titles (ibid:25f). These figures show that the most affected people by
Socio Bosque are the indgenas, especially in the coastal province of Esmeraldas and the Amazon
lowlands. Figure 1 shows the distribution of areas that already joined the programme:

24

Figure 1: Geographical distribution and type of contracts (MAE 2010d)

Blue: Contracts concerning community land, Red: Contracts concerning private land

3.1 Research questions and hypothesis

Given these facts, the question arises, whether the programme Socio Bosque is really able to
initiate a process of development which will be in accordance with the indigenous cosmovisin and the
concept of sumak kawsay, or if it constitutes a push for neoliberal conservation with commodity
fetishism at its heart that only pretends to be in harmony with the anti-capitalistic vision of the
indigenous concept.
As the government intends to participate in the international mechanism of REDD (Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) from 2012 on (MAE 2010a:23), it seems to be very
important to clarify, whether REDD in its prospected design is compatible with sumak kawsay and which
measures could promote such a compatibility. Furthermore, the question should be answered, whether
the design of the programme Socio Bosque on a national scale respects the rights of nature,

25

plurinationality, the principles of decentralisation and participation and the right to free, prior and
informed consent that are anchored within the constitution of Montecristi and form an important part
of sumak kawsay. Finally it will be important to answer the question, if the manifestation of SB on the
regional scale in the form of different projects to facilitate development is in accordance with sumak
kawsay, which basically means that it should allow self-determined development within indigenous
territories in harmony with the points stated in chapter 2.2.
Given the harsh critics from side of the IPOs and some leftist NGOs, it is assumed, that Socio
Bosque does not match the requirements of a development in harmony with sumak kawsay. The
following hypothesis and assumptions underlie this research:

The developments around REDD constitute an extension of capitalism to

peripheral regions. They are a commodification of nature characterised by
commodity fetishism and neoliberalisation of conservation.

The design of Socio Bosque was developed without any participation of the
(indigenous) population and is highly unfair against the forest owners in regard
to the obligations that are fixed within the contracts.

The distribution of the incentives according to the established scheme

constitutes a disadvantage and discrimination of the indigenous population.

The information policy of the MAE about the functioning of the programme
doesnt meet the requirements of free, prior and informed consent.

Human resources within the MAE for SB are too little to guarantee a
sustainable functioning of the programme.

SB doesnt constitute a protection against extractive activities (oil extraction,

mineral mining).

SB is designed to address indigenous communities directly and evade their

grown institutions and organisations.

It has to be mentioned that the programme Socio Bosque consists of different components: one
component for forests and one for pramos (a typical ecosystem that can be found in the Andes in
altitudes between approximately 3.000 and 5.000 meters). The following analysis only covers the
aspects of the forest component, as forest areas are from higher significance in a quantitative way and

26

will be eligible for a possible future REDD mechanism, while the treeless pramos dont store enough
carbon to be included into the scheme. Consequently other rules exist for the application of landowners
for Socio Pramo than for the application for Socio Bosque. Anyway the two programmes are sometimes
seen as one, as Socio Pramo is usually not mentioned separately because of its relative pettiness
compared to the actual Socio Bosque.

3.2 Applied methodology

To answer the research questions and verify the hypothesis, the impacts of SB were analysed on
three different scales: the international, the national and the regional scale. The international scale
deals with the intended inclusion of SB within the mechanism of REDD and its conceptual implications.
The national scale takes a look at the design of the different aspects of the programme, like the scheme
for incentives and the contracts between the partners. The regional or sub-national scale focuses on
areas, where the programme has already been implemented, and the experiences that have been made
up to now. Figure 2 is a schematic illustration of the different geographical and institutional levels with
the main stakeholders and shows the potential functioning of a future REDD mechanism.

Figure 2: The different scales of REDD (Angelsen (ed.) 2008:12)

27

SB corresponds to the lower bracket (National REDD-PES scheme) in the illustration and
directly covers the sub-national and national scale. However, the international level shall provide the
wider institutional arrangements in which the national REDD-PES scheme will be embedded and the
financing that will be necessary to guarantee the functioning of the national programme for decades.
Different possibilities for financing are displayed in blue on the international scale. The red bubbles
show possible manifestations of national institutional arrangements that may vary from state to state.
The different types of landowners on the sub-national scale that should benefit the most from the
payments for conservation are pictured in green.
In a first step it was necessary to identify the involved parties of the programme. After detecting
the main stakeholders, interview-partners from the three scales were chosen by selective sampling and
open-ended interviews were realised with them. Attention was paid to conduct interviews with
supporters and critics of the programme to similar parts. Interviews were held with the following
persons and institutions (most of the names are not mentioned to guarantee anonymity):

functionaries of the MAE, in regard to the programme design, its

intended inclusion within REDD and experiences made up to now;

the NGO Conservation International (CI), in regard to its position

concerning REDD and its involvement within SB;

the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), in regard to its

involvement within SB and experiences made up to now;

the German Development Service (DED), in regard to its involvement

within SB and experiences made up to now;

a functionary of the CONAIE, in regard to CONAIEs position on REDD

and SB;

staff of Accin Ecolgica, an established Ecuadorian NGO, on their

position on REDD and SB;

Carlos Viteri, indigenous anthropologist and general secretary of the

Institute for Regional Ecodevelopment of Ecuadors Amazon Region
(ECORAE), in regard to the concept of sumak kawsay and the state of
IPOs in Ecuador;

Ral Petsain, elected leader of the Pueblo Shuar Arutam (CGPSHA), in

regard to the experiences made with SB;

28

the ECORAE in the province of Morona Santiago on its involvement in

the implementation of SB with the CGPSHA;

staff of a private enterprise which is implementing projects in the

context of REDD on a sub-national scale, in regard to its position on
REDD, SB and the implementation of projects on a regional scale.

In a third step the recorded interviews were transliterated and analysed. Special attention was put on
statements on the program goals and ambiguities as most of the available information on SB is
published by the MAE and, therefore, generally uncritical. Citations appearing in this research usually
emphasise persisting uncertainties in the program design that havent been discussed elsewhere (an
exception is the unpublished work by Hazlewood (2010b)).

3.3 Limitations
One central limitation for the outcome of this research is the ambiguity of the concept of sumak
kawsay. There exist at least three different nuances of the term: the concept as it is rooted in
indigenous cosmovisin (which varies depending on the indigenous nationality), as it is anchored in the
constitution of Montecristi and as it is interpreted by a circle of mainly leftist intellectuals. For the
analysis on the international scale it seems appropriate to refer to the third of the mentioned
interpretations, as it is linked to other scientifically discussed concepts that are in relation to the
debates around climate change and development, like the mentioned neoliberalisation of nature or the
discussion around a new development paradigm. On the national scale, special attention is put on the
notion of sumak kawsay as it appears in the constitution of Montecristi. However, there is still missing a
variety of concrete laws and policies to further define the term in reality. The analysis here is limited on
showing the discrepancies that might arise between SB and the constitutional sumak kawsay in the
future. For the regional scale it seems adequate to see sumak kawsay as the right and ability of the
indigenous nationalities to lead a self-determined life. In reality the different nuances of sumak kawsay
overlap and complement one another, as do the different geographical scales. This leads to complicated
relations and interactions that are varying constantly and must be simplified to perform a conceptual
analysis.

29

Another constraint concerning the research methodology was obviously the existing language
barrier. During open-ended interviews it might be helpful and enlightening to change the direction of
the conversation and interpose questions to clarify topics and force the interview partner to reveal
critical information, which he or she originally didnt want to disclose. This is especially true for
interviews with functionaries, who are usually careful not to reveal delicate details that could cause
problems with their superiors. As most of the interviews were held in Spanish, it was not always easy to
change subjects if the interview ran in a vague direction, or to inquire stronger if an important issue was
only treated superficially by the interview partner.
Besides the language barrier cultural barriers exist to a different degree. Whereas it was easy to
fix an appointment with most of the interview partners that got their offices in Quito, according on
appointments with indigenous representatives and even government functionaries in the Amazon
region was much more difficult, due to the remoteness of the locations on one hand and the partly
cultural conditioned different perception of time on the other hand. In some cases it took up to three
attempts until an interview could be realised and two intended interviews couldnt be conducted at all.
Furthermore, in some cases the relation to the interview partners was characterised by certain
mistrust. This was especially the case for conversations with indigenous people in remote areas of the
Amazon lowlands, as the relations to the government and transnational concerns (TNCs) are tense and
the indgenas sometimes falsely identify all white people as delegates of these institutions. In many
cases it took some time to build up confidence with the interview partners. For instance the first
question addressed to me in the indigenous community Pukayaku was, if I was working for the Ministry
of Environment, followed by the affirmation that the community decided that there wont be any oil
extraction within the Andoa territory. However, there was also a certain reserve from side of the
program developing institutions, as there is a lot of political discussion around the topics of REDD and
development in Ecuador.
The short running time of SB makes it difficult to evaluate outcomes of its implementation. This
work only analyses the design of the programme and is not to be misunderstood as an evaluation.
Unfortunately the intention to do research in Shuar communities that take part in the programme in the
province of Morona Santiago couldnt be realised, as permission for the visit by the monthly held
assembly of Shuar representatives couldnt be obtained.

30

4 The international scale

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD) is a
central strategy for Greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation. Deforestation of tropical forests will account for
around 20% (Corbera et.al. 2010, Herold et.al. 2008:39) of global GHG emissions in the next 100 years.
From the UNFCCCs eleventh Conference of Parties (COP-11) in 2005 on, the importance of REDD for
climate change mitigation was acknowledged by the conference members. COP-13 agreed on starting a
work programme on methodological issues (ibid) and COP-15 in Copenhagen issued guidelines on the
implementation of REDD activities (UNFCCC 2010:11f). The proposals for an international REDD scheme
cover different issues that affect indigenous peoples inhabiting forest regions all over the world. Section
4.1 gives an overview of the most critical topics.

4.1 The financing of REDD Markets or funds?

Maybe the most passionate discussion is held around the question of how to finance REDD.
Basically there are two approaches that even could be combined in different ways: markets and funds.
During the 1990s only the USA promoted market based approaches as a solution for climate change,
while the European Commission of the EU favored taxation of GHGs (Spash 2009:3). The situation has
changed in the meantime: The EU runs the biggest emission trading system (ETS) worldwide and most of
the BINGOs (for instance the WWF, CI, CARE, TNC, and even Greenpeace), that originally opposed
carbon trading, support it nowadays at least in some way (for instance Greenpeace proposes to
introduce a special accounting unit for forest carbon only). Bachram (2004:11f) sees one reason for the
changing role of BINGOs in the funding which often comes from big corporations. Another reason could
be that even well-intentioned activists sometimes are persuaded to agree to the win-win scenarios,
which are painted by the proponents of neoliberal conservation and emission trading. Furthermore, the
very technocratic approaches applied would confuse most people participating in negotiations around
solutions for climate change. They would not understand the full implications of the compromises made
(ibid:12). This corresponds with the view of interview partners that work in the sector and admit that
the discussions around REDD are very complicated (Employee of an international NGO, pers. com. 23
June 2010). There is also the tendency to blame IPOs and more radical and independent NGOs for not
understanding the concept and being uninformed about REDD and carbon markets:

31

Because they [CONAIE and CONFENIAE, ed.] really dont know, what they are talking
about. I think its a matter of time. Its a long process. Only a few people understand the
concept of REDD. Indigenous organisations are only starting to understand. Indigenous
organisations most of the times are badly advised by quite radical groups. (Employee of a
project developing enterprise, pers. com. 15 June 2010)

While the big Northern mainstream NGOs meanwhile support emission trading, a variety of
IPOs, small NGOs and social movements from the South oppose it. However, these institutions are often
chronically underfinanced and have no say in international negotiations. Bachram (2004:12) concludes
that now that NGOs have been effectively diverted, corporate interests have been placed at the heart
of political negotiations and industry has been defined as a legitimate stakeholder.
The basic assumptions that underlie the approach of carbon trading are well explained (for
instance see Altvater 2008, Spash 2009). Economic theory assumes universal reversibility of processes
that release GHGs, while in nature there is a fundamental difference between the emission of fossil
carbon and the temporal binding of carbon in vegetation. Here we see a first oversimplification of reality
that constitutes one central aspect of PES as commodity fetishism. Another simplification is the
reduction to carbon markets, while CO2 is only responsible for half of human induced climate change
(Spash 2009:8f). Carbon offsets manifest as the most abstract and maybe most problematic form of
emission trading. Offsets are generated by projects that are disassociated from the source of emissions,
but reduce carbon emissions elsewhere (for instance avoided deforestation) or increase the capacity of
a sink to absorb GHG (for instance reforestation or afforestation). Under the Kyoto Protocol, offsets are
currently traded within the CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) and JI (Joint Implementation) as CERs
(Certified Emission Reductions). They are also widely traded in the Voluntary Carbon Market (VCM).
CERs represent a perfectly itemised and monetary valued commodity and, therefore, represent one
central aspect of REDD as commodity fetishism.
Another central point of critique is that offsets dont require a polluting source to reduce
emissions, but instead allow them to increase emissions and then aim to offset it elsewhere. (ibid:23)
Elsewhere in this case usually stands for the Global South, where project implementation is cheaper and
institutional regulation is weak. Thomas (2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d) identifies three major flaws
concerning offsets generated in the REDD context:

32

1. Flaws arising especially from the forest carbon segment of the market
2. Flaws intrinsic to market practices and organisation
3. Extrinsic flaws arising from the penetration of the market by fraudsters and organised
crime

The first set of flaws emanates from the apparently cheap availability of forest carbon credits
(for instance see Stern 2006:216f). This animates the Global North (corporations and consumers) to
offset their emissions, green-wash their image and eventually make a profit during the process. For
instance BP has established an internal, self-monitored trading scheme that allowed them to reduce
their emissions to 5% below the levels of 1990 and earn some US$ 650 million in extra profits up to 2002
(Bachram 2004:5f). One of the supported projects is the Noel Kempff Project in Bolivia, which recently
was heavily criticised by Greenpeace. Central findings of the Greenpeace report are that the project fails
to produce scientifically quantifiable CERs, to deal accurately with the issues of leakage, additionality
and permanence and to provide sustainable benefits for the local communities (Densham et.al. 2009:ii).
It seems appropriate to explain in short the terms of leakage, additionality and permanence in
context of forest carbon projects. Leakage means the shift of deforestation activities to other areas as
the protected. Saved emissions are therefore released elsewhere and there is less net reduction.
Additionality means that CERs can only be issued for activities that are additional to business as usual.
For instance it is questionable how to deal with forest areas that are already situated within protected
areas and are (officially) not subject to deforestation. In order to approve additionality it is necessary to
define a reference scenario, which usually is called emission baseline. In the forestry sector baselines are
most commonly calculated by extrapolation of the historical deforestation rate, if available. However,
deforestation is a very complex issue that is dependent on various parameters and difficult to predict.
The calculation of baselines therefore is loaded with problems (for an analysis of challenges see
Karsenty 2008). Permanence refers to the problem that forests can be destroyed, even without
intention. Forest fires are a big issue for the permanence of projects as are changing policies on forest
management. The topics of leakage, additionality and permanence are of special importance for the
quantification of emission reductions and, therefore, market based approaches rely heavily on finding a
solution on how to deal with them.

33

Carbon offsets for private persons also play a role in the voluntary carbon market (VCM). For
consumers it is possible to follow a CarbonNeutralTM lifestyle (Bachram 2004:7), which means to offset
their flights for instance. Spash (2009) and Altvater (2008) compare this offsetting with medieval sale of
indulgences. This raises fundamental ethical questions, which cannot be discussed in detail here.
However, ethical issues play a crucial role in the concept of sumak kawsay as outlined in chapter 2.2.
Therefore, it has to be assumed that continuing to pollute and paying the poor South for emission
reductions is not compatible with the indigenous concept.
The second set of flaws is intrinsic to every kind of widely unregulated markets in a globalised
economy. As Thomas (2010b) emphasises, money in markets is made by designing innovative financial
instruments that game the regulatory framework. Financial institutions are already bundling carbon
offsets originating from projects with different implementation status, different legal frameworks,
different risk levels etc. These baskets are split again and packed into different tranches of risk, like
collaterised debt obligations that played a central part in the making of the 2007 financial crisis. This
leads to not even remotely comprehensible complexity of these financial instruments, a rise in subprime carbon certificates and opens the doors for fraudsters and organised crime. Thomas cites the CEO
of the Dutch concern DSM:
They are now already in development derivatives of carbon dioxide prices that are so
complicated that I do not understand it any more if you get a reservoir of derivatives,
which becomes so big it becomes an industry in itself that is very dangerous because you
can get the tail wagging the dog. (ibid)

The third flaw of carbon markets emanates around fraud and organised criminal activities. The
examples of carbon scam are already numerous. One would be the already mentioned Noel Kempff
Project in Bolivia that had to scale down to about one tenth of its size after remote sensing and more
accurate baseline models proved overestimated emission reductions (Eilperin 2009). Several Australian
newspapers reported on a carbon scandal in Papua New Guinea, where fake REDD certificates were
issued and A$ 1.2 million were spent on taxi drives and mysterious scientific research (see IEN 2009 and
Lang 2009). The Guardian published an article that states examples for doubtful projects in countries
participating in the World Banks REDD programme and cites an Interpol environment crimes specialist:
Alarm bells are ringing. REDD is simply too big to monitor. The potential for criminality is vast and has

34

not been taken into account." (Vidal 2010) Other newspapers and web-platforms quote an Europol
report on criminal organisations and carbon trading (Simoner 2010) and the head of the UN
Environment Programme environmental law division issuing concerns (Lang 2010).
The three described flaws of REDD projects address the issue of invisible power relations and
vested interests that underlie PES schemes as commodity fetishism. To live a fairly unaffected and selfdetermined life will be a difficult task for communities that join the global REDD mechanism and make
themselves dependent on international capital and the interests that steer it. Bursting of speculation
bubbles on an international scale could potentially affect those communities that rely on a steady
income from the sale of carbon credits.
A second option for financing REDD would be through funds or the traditional official
development assistance (ODA). However, these options seem to be out of fashion recently, even though
critique on carbon trading is growing. Nevertheless all major NGOs support carbon trading, although
sometimes under different preconditions, like in the case of Greenpeace who supports an individual
separated scheme for forest carbon offsets (Angelsen et.al. 2008:50). Several proposals for the grade of
fungibility and regulation of a future REDD market exist (for instance see Angelsen et.al. 2008,
Livengood & Dixon 2009), they all have in common that they exclusively focus on market based
approaches. Although these proposals exist, they are only discussed marginally. Even as the issue plays a
crucial role for a central aspect of offsetting, which also is one argument for fund based financing: The
blocking, or in the case of regulated markets limiting of the offset possibility for the industrialised Annex
1 countries of the Kyoto Protocol, which forces them to really exert for emission reductions and carry
their historical justified part of the burden.
I agree with the argument that its not a matter of buying offsets here and keep on
polluting in the Netherlands or Germany or Austria. Neither its an issue of paying
indigenous communities for not developing themselves. [...] What in the end happens in
the market is out of your control. To be honest I am not aware of how thats regulated
[...] (Employee of a project developing enterprise, 15 June 2010)

As Bachram (2004:12f) outlines, it is very likely that a future market will be subject to the
general push on the liberalisation of trade conducted by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). One
major donor for implementing programmes on a national scale is the World Bank with its Forest Carbon

35

Partnership. Carbon funds and facilities under World Bank management grew from $145m to $2.3b in
the time from 2000 to 2009 (World Bank Carbon Finance Unit 2010). It is very likely that the WB and
other big donor groups will lobby heavily for a full liberalisation of carbon markets, even if these would
be introduced fairly regulated (which is not to be expected anyway). Therefore, the director of
Rainforest Foundation emphasises that REDD needs to be taken out of the hands of the World Bank,
and a new global institution [must be] established to rigorously oversee payments to tropical countries
[...] (Vidal 2010)
As Karsenty (2008:452) outlines, one advantage of funds in addition to blocking the offset
possibility is to raise financial means that are independent from the amount of saved carbon. This would
avoid the need for baseline calculations to quantify the amount of carbon saved exactly. These
calculations are difficult to conduct in a scientifically rigorous way, given missing data for historical
deforestation and forest cover in developing countries, uncertainty in the methodology to be applied
and the expensive monitoring process. By the means of a fund also the need for commodification of
carbon would be avoided as a whole. There would be no need to assign a single monetary value to an
oversimplified ecosystem service commodity.
Karsenty also emphasises that only a fund could provide sufficient early money to finance the
expensive implementation of worldwide REDD programmes (ibid:453). This argument is supported by
most project developing organisations as is confirmed for instance by an employee of an international
NGO (pers. com. 23 June 2010). It is to be expected that up-front financing will also come from private
initiatives, even if they see it as an investment as it is the case for one enterprise in Ecuador (pers. com.
15 June 2010). Of course those private enterprises will expect a return from future market based
activities. The discussion around the financing of REDD in Ecuador can be summarised as followed:
For Ecuador its supposed to be a three phase approach. That is proposed by many
different organisations. The first phase would be readiness and maybe some early action.
The second phase would be a mixture between readiness and already implementing some
projects. And the third phase would be really market based activities. In the first phase
probably the most likely financing options are international operations. This is the phase
we are now in. So the easiest way now to get funding is through the multilateral, bilateral
mechanisms for international cooperation. And of course what everybody hopes is, that
eventually well get to the third phase where there will be really market based activities.

36

But the question is, if these markets are really going to develop and I think no one knows.
(Employee of an international NGO, pers. com. 23 June 2010)

This statement corresponds with the official positions that were published by TFD (The Forests
Dialogue), who organised a Field Dialogue on REDD Readiness in Ecuador in June 2010. The following
statement concerns Ecuadors position in REDD negotiations at UNFCCC and in other multilateral and
bilateral processes, like UN-REDD (under management of the FAO, UNEP, UNDP) and the World Bank led
FCPF (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility) and FIP (Forest Investment Programme):
Ecuador supports the financing mechanism that combines funds and the market. Ecuador
supports the idea that, for the REDD+ preparation phase, financing should come from
funds or international cooperation. Subsequently, additional resources for the second
phase, defining and implementing policies and demonstration activities and the third
phase, complete implementation may be supplied by funds or through the carbon
market by trading CO2 emissions reduction credits. (Hbenthal et.al. 2010:18)

Currently Socio Bosque is still in the REDD preparation phase and most of the financing is
provided by the state. However, the German KfW Entwicklungsbank is supporting the project with 10
million (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2010) and therefore is probably the biggest donor. Minor amounts of
financial support are provided by Conservation International (pers. com. 23 June 2010) and probably
also by other organisations. Private enterprises however are still cautious and not investing in Socio
Bosque on a grand scale.
The approach of different project implementation phases dominates in efforts to create a global
REDD mechanism. Funds usually are reduced to the role to provide up-front financing and pay the cost
for the bringing up of a global carbon market. It seems that official development assistance (ODA) and
other funding sources are meant to set up the surrounding for investors to make big profits. By this
means investors reduce their project implementation costs and their risk of losing their investment,
which is very high as the creation of a REDD market depends on the advancement of international
negotiations on emission reductions.
[...] So I think its dangerous to plan everything on the basis of a possible future carbon
market, because maybe its not going to be there. So you cannot expect that everything

37

you are going to do is finally generating a lot of money through the market, because we
dont know. (Employee of an international NGO, pers. com. 23 June 2010)

4.2 The scope of REDD

One discussion evolving around REDD is the question, what kind of activities should be included
within an international scheme. The proposals reach from RED to REDD++. Ha et.al. (2009) distinguish
the different approaches:

RED Reducing Emissions from Deforestation; only changes from forest to non-forest
land cover types are included

REDD RED and forest degradation; shifts to lower carbon stocks within the forest
areas are included

REDD+ REDD and restocking within and towards forests

REDD++ REDD+ and all transitions in land cover that affect carbon storage, whether
peat land or mineral soil, trees outside forests, agro-forests, plantations or natural
forests (at the moment not officially discussed)

The definition of forest is a crucial issue with regard to the activities that will be accountable for
REDD. Currently forest is defined under the CDM agreement of the Marrakesh Accord (COP-7 in 2001) as
[...] a minimum area of land of 0.05-1.0 hectares with tree crown cover (or equivalent
stocking level) of more than 10-30 per cent with trees with the potential to reach a
minimum height of 2-5 meters at maturity in situ. A forest may consist either of closed
forest formations where trees of various storeys and undergrowth cover a high proportion
of the ground or open forest. Young natural stands and all plantations which have yet to
reach a crown density of 10-30 per cent or tree height of 2-5 meters are included under
forest, as are areas normally forming part of the forest area which are temporarily
unstocked as a result of human intervention such as harvesting or natural causes but
which are expected to revert to forest. (UNFCCC 2002:58)

38

The definition of the UNFCCC left it open for participating countries to decide, whether they use
a crown density of 10% or 30% for their definition of forest. The same thing is true for the height of
trees. It has to be mentioned here that the FAO defines areas with a canopy cover of over 40% as
closed forest and areas with a canopy cover with 10% to 40% as open forest (Sasaki & Putz 2009:2),
the minimum height for trees within the FAO scheme is 5 meters (FAO 2006:169).
Probably the definition of forest from the CDM will be adopted without any changes for REDD.
Under the current definition however, it would be possible to extract large quantities of timber without
affecting deforestation rate. Therefore, it is argued that it will be necessary to include degradation
within a REDD approach. Figure 3 shows the scope of emissions by degradation and deforestation under
the current definition of forest. Degradation reaches from point A to B, C or C, depending on which
definition is used for forest.

Figure 3: Effects of forest definition on deforestation rates (Sasaki & Putz 2009:3)

Under the current scheme plantations are also included within the definition of forest. The
approach of REDD+ would allow these plantations to be accounted. This could lead to serious
consequences for biodiversity and socio-economic sustainability. Ecuadors indigenous peoples so far

39

have made bad experiences with monoculture plantations (for instance see Hazlewood 2010a, Lohman
2006). As Bachram (2004:8) puts it: While plantations have their own ecologically destructive qualities
such as biodiversity loss, water table disruption and pollution from herbicides and pesticides, their social
impact is equally devastating to a local community. Lands previously used by local peoples are enclosed
and in some cases they have been forcibly evicted. As afforestation and reforestation are currently
included within the CDM, it would have to be clarified, for which mechanism those projects can apply, to
have a clear distinction between the CDM and REDD+.
The approach of REDD++ would evade the need for a stringent definition of forest and
internalise all land use topics within the scheme. However, this induces an even higher grade of
abstraction and commercialisation of nature and hardly comprehensible and solvable technical issues.
While data availability for deforestation is yet very difficult to guarantee in developing countries,
extensive data on all types of land use change seems to be impossible to gather.
Another critical issue seems to be the definition of degradation. The Indigenous Environmental
Network (IEN 2009) fears a criminalisation of traditional land use practices, as some activities that are
crucial for the indigenous peoples (such as shifting cultivation, hunting, foraging, collecting kindling,
medicinal plants, materials for housing and art, performing ceremonies and accessing sacred sites) [...]
may be disrupted by REDD systems without adequate compensation. (PEP 2008:3) Indeed it seems that
there is a certain lobbying to blame indigenous peoples for the degradation of forests. In September
2010 the German newspaper TAZ cited a report authored by German diplomats who visited an oilfield
that is operated by the Spanish concern Repsol in the Yasun National Park in Ecuadors eastern Amazon
region. The diplomats praise the cautious approach of the oil-multi and predict that the local Huaroni
people will overuse the forest in the future. They conclude that the best way to protect the forest in the
Yasun National Park is to allow Repsol to exploit the crude oil in the area and secure and protect the
zone against illegal activities from outside (Dilger 2010a). Section 4.4 will show the opposing perception
and deals with the attitude of indigenous peoples and organisations on REDD in general.
Ecuadors official position on the scope of REDD is of special interest for this research: Ecuador
supports the idea of REDD+ [...] As for increasing forest carbon stocks, Ecuadors position is that the
reforestation activities that this country will recognise for REDD are those achieving reforestation /
forestation with native species. (Hbenthal et.al. 2010:18)

40

4.3 The scale of REDD

Another widely debated issue is, on which level REDD should be realised. In a publication of
CIFOR (Center for International Forestry Research) three options for the scale in which REDD could be
organised are pointed out (Angelsen et.al. 2008:31ff):

National approach

Subnational approach

Nested approach

Figure 4 visualises how the three approaches basically work. The arrows indicate the exchange
of money from the international buyers for information about the applied projects from the
(sub)national entities.

Figure 4: Three options for the scale of REDD (Angelsen et.al. 2008:32)

The CIFOR report (ibid:31ff) discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the different
approaches. It concludes, that a nested approach might be the answer for the accurate scale of REDD
programmes. While the national approach fails mainly in terms of equity and fair distribution of

41

generated financial means, the subnational approach might suffer from leakage as it cannot control
deforestation and degradation outside the boundaries of project areas. The main challenges in
supporting a nested approach however, would lie in the coordination and harmonisation of the two
scales.
The discussions around the issues are intense. For instance Greenpeace (Densham et.al.
2009:16f) strongly opposes subnational projects that wouldnt deliver reliable results. On the other hand
Corbera et.al. (2010) argue that national implementation could have negative equity implications. Those
are a result of general lack of capacity in most developing countries, especially smaller ones. A wider
approach could facilitate the participation of smaller countries (ibid). Skutsch & McCall (2009) then again
conclude that only a nationwide approach could guarantee a significant reduction of GHG emissions, but
at the same time they call for supporting the legality of community forests combined with an equitable
distribution of carbon payments, which could be better achieved by subnational projects. As both
approaches show their pros and cons, it seems very likely that some sort of hybrid nested approach will
be developed for Ecuador. The official position of Ecuador on the scale of REDD as published by TFD is:
Ecuador supports implementing REDD+ activities on a national scale, that is, sub-national
activities may also be developed. However, the emissions accounting, reporting and
monitoring system shall be standardised on a national level. This includes defining
standardised methods for collecting data on REDD (such as estimating forest carbon stocks
or defining the referential scenario for emissions from deforestation). (Hbenthal et.al.
2010:18)

Project developing and SB supporting NGOs and private enterprises seem to aim into a similar
direction:
The way in which the government participates is still to be seen. I think we need more
discussion on that. What I do think is really necessary, is that the government regulates
that, because what you want to avoid, is some sort of project that is not well registered
within the carbon accounting scheme of the country. And youll also want to make sure,
that there is no abuse of communities or other landowners that participate in carbon
markets. So I think the main role of the government is to regulate the carbon market, not
to make it prohibitive or attractive but to make sure that it is fair and well done, right? So I
think well surely need to regulate the carbon market and I think there is a good

42

justification to say they [the government, ed.] might also participate in that. Lets say to
receive some share of that. (Employee of an international NGO, pers. com. 23 June 2010)

We are collaborating with the government. We have regular talks with the subsecretario
del cambio climatico. The projects are registered in the Ministry. And they see the projects
as part of the national REDD strategy. (Employee of a project developing enterprise, pers.
com. 15 June 2010)

The efforts to create a national REDD strategy in Ecuador in form of a nested approach will be
discussed in more detail in section 4.5. A nested approach would allow to start REDD implementation in
Ecuador with several subnational projects and SB as the national programme and later on harmonise the
two scales. However, this task is not to be underestimated, especially not in poor governed developing
countries. Reminding the assumed international push for liberalisation of carbon markets, it seems very
unlikely that governments will be able to cope with the task of regulating those. Ironically the very same
organisations that seek cooperation with the MAE have doubts concerning the competence of the
ministry:
I appreciate a lot the people in the ministry, but there are only a few. The Ministry of
Environment in Ecuador is extremely weak, bureaucratic, incapable of a lot of things.
There are a lot of new fresh young people. There are some people who already have a
long career within the Ministry, which are very very valuable people. There are also a lot
of people, which are already 20 years in the Ministry and didnt help a lot. So, yeah...
having too much expectation about the capacity of the government to handle all those
things... Then a better strategy is to find collaboration with private initiatives, like NGOs
and companies. Then if its an NGO or a company for me it doesnt matter. At the end its
more or less the same. (Employee of a project developing enterprise, pers. com. 15 June
2010)

During the research phase for this thesis, other conversations with similar issues occurred. It
seems that the cited employee isnt the only one who criticises the ministry. This explains why some
organisations plan sub-national REDD projects on their own and dont rely solely on the efforts of the

43

government. However, it is clearly recognisable that the government wants to play a central role in the
regulation of a future market and wont allow uncontrolled implementation of projects. This
corresponds to the general orientation on access to natural resources of the current left-wing
government.

4.4 REDD and indigenous peoples and organisations

Indigenous peoples and IPOs are extremely cautious about REDD. One employee of a project
developing enterprise summarises the dilemma in which communities got stuck and gives a compelling
solution:
[...] at the end of the day REDD is a kind of market mechanism. There is a lot of political
position against all the capitalist market. At the other hand there are only very few
indigenous organisations or communities which are able to keep themselves out of the
market. So if the communities have to connect themselves to a market with a relative
compatibility with their way of living, I see more compatibility with a REDD market than
with mining or timber or oil. [...] I even think sometimes that the best you can do is taking
advantage as fast as possible, because I shouldnt be surprised if this is something of 5 to
10 years and then its over and well have another solution. (pers. com. 15 June 2010)

This statement also expresses at least partly the opinion of several indigenous communities, for
instance the people of the communities Cofn Dureno and Santa Elena who stated: Conserving nature
is cultural for our community, as Cofn people we know that the territory belongs to all, we are all
landowners, we have conserved the forest for years before the oil companies arrived. (CCBA 2009) 2
We have kept the forest for our culture; we always have taken care for the sector of our community
[...] The government grabbed our traditions to make a national programme [Socio Bosque, ed.]. (ibid) 3
Following these statements it really seems that conservation is better compatible with
indigenous cosmovisin than raw material extraction. However, it must not be forgotten that

Original text: Conservar es algo cultural para nuestra comunidad, como Cofanes nosotros conocemos que el
territorio es de todos, todos somos dueos, desde muchos aos antes de llegar los petroleros hemos conservado.
3
Original text: Nosotros por cultura hemos mantenido nuestro bosque, siempre hemos cuidado el sector de la
comunidad [...] El gobierno acogi nuestras costumbres para hacer un programa nacional.

44

the global carbon market is one of the fastest growing commodity markets in the world
(projections speak of a volume of 1,7 trillion (Bloomberg New Energy Finance 2011) to
2 trillion (Point Carbon 2008) by 2020) and highly dynamic, which tempts for
speculation, criminal activities etc. (see chapter 4.1),

conservation as seen by many NGOs of the global North differs from conservation in the
sense of indigenous peoples, who are dependent on the use of forest resources,

a defective solution for climate change mitigation (that might just exist for a few years)
cannot be in accordance with the principle of sumak kawsay.

The Indigenous Environmental Network (IEN 2009) published a little brochure which describes
very well the most common worries and doubts of IPOs about REDD:

REDD and offsetting

REDD allows the historical polluters to keep on polluting via the global offset market (see
chapter 4.1)

REDD and CO2lionalism even with assured property rights

This concern arises around the fact that carbon offset markets dont really trade with carbon,
but with activities that store the carbon. In the case of REDD those are trees. Indigenous
people fear that they will get expelled from the forest on which they depend for food,
medicine, construction materials etc. by the holders of CERs, who want to keep the forest
untouched. One example is the UNEP-founded Mau forest project in Kenya. The inhabitants of
the forest, including the indigenous Ogiek people, were forcefully and often violently evicted
from their lands (Lovera 2008:3). This corresponds to the more violent form of
territorialisation and re-arrangement of property rights. In many cases territorialisation is
conducted more subtle: The indigenous population gets employed as guardians of the
protected area and receives a wage for it. They are divided from their means of production and
made dependent on financial resources. This form of cultural CO2lionalism can even be
accomplished when people own legal titles on their ancestral territories as was mentioned in
chapter 2.3. The landowners are integrated within the market economy and educated to
become eco-rational subjects, which leads to changed ideals (which is principally neither

45

negative nor positive) and eventually a loss of cultural identity, which corresponds to the next
worry:

REDD and loss of culture

is closely connected to CO2lionalism, when people are forced to leave their subsistence
activities. In a personal communication, a member of the Amazon Kichwa nationality
complained about getting served Coca Cola and no Chicha (a traditional beverage that is made
from Yuca / Manioc) when he arrived at a community in the province of Orellana. IPOs fear
that the abandoning of subsistence activities and the availability of money intensifies the
integration of indigenous peoples within the market economy and leads to an accelerated loss
of culture.

REDD and plantations corruption of the sacred

IPOs fear that REDD will cause a spread of monoculture plantations that cannot be addressed
as forests in an indigenous sense. The reduction of forests to carbon storages violates the
indigenous cosmovisin, especially if plantations are cultivated with genetically modified trees.

REDD and oil companies, the organised crime and the World Bank
IPOs mistrust the World Bank as a major funder of deforestation and degradation of land
through contracts with mining and oil companies (Castro Diaz 2008:6). They also mistrust the
TNCs that push REDD and are aware of the possibilities for fraud and criminal activities that
REDD provides.
For these and further reasons most IPOs reject the REDD mechanism totally. The CONFENIAE

published a statement on 3 August 2009: We reject the negotiations on our forests, such as REDD
projects, because they try to take away our freedom to manage our resources and also because they are
not a real solution to climate change, on the contrary, they only make it worse. (CONFENIAE 2009)4
Similar statements are issued by the ECUARUNARI, the IPO of the Ecuadorian Andes region, and the
CONAIE (see CONAIE 2010). The COICA (Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indgenas de la Cuenca
Amaznica) published a slightly more open declaration in February 2009 after taking part at the World
Social Forum in Belm do Par in Brazil: They refer to the bad experiences that IPOs made with CDM and
demand full recognition of all indigenous rights on their territories and on free, prior and informed
consent (COICA 2009). The Peoples World Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother
4

Originial text: Rechazamos las negociaciones sobre nuestros bosques, como los son los proyectos REDD, ya que
pretenden quitarnos el libre manejo sobre nuestros recursos y porque adems no son una solucin definitiva al
problema del cambio climtico, al contrario, solo lo empeora.

46

Earth (PWCCC) held in April 2010 in Cochabamba, Bolivia, with participation of 241 NGOs, IPOs and
other social movements condemns neoliberal market mechanisms such as the REDD mechanism and its
+ and ++ versions, as those ones related with markets, that are violating our Peoples sovereignty and
right to free informed prior consent; as well as the sovereignty of national States. (PWCCC 2010) The
International Forum of Indigenous Peoples on Climate Change (IIPFCC) presented its last statement
during the COP-16 in Cancn, Mexico. Like in their previous declarations they reject a market based
solution for REDD (IIPFCC 2010). Considering the wide consent and homogeneity of IPO statements, the
argument that IPOs are badly advised by radical groups that was stated by one interview partner (see
chapter 4.1) loses its consistency. Rather, these statements are backed by the over 360 million
indigenous and aboriginal people that are represented by the IIPFCC (ibid) and a variety of NGOs, social
movements and other parts of the civil society worldwide. However, these voices are hardly heard in the
international negotiations on a post-2012 climate agreement. Despite ongoing declarations, statements
and claims on indigenous rights, the UNFCCC keeps on pretending deaf. Theres still no recognition of
the UNDRIP within the UNFCCC that would bind projects to respect the fundamental rights of the
indigenous peoples.
Instead, the most common approach for guaranteeing indigenous rights has been and is the
draft of voluntary safeguards. The so called CCBA (Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance)
standards are promoted for implementation by several BINGOs, namely Conservation International,
CARE, the Nature Conservancy, Rainforest Alliance and Wildlife Conservation Society. They cover social
and environmental standards. Although Ecuador took part in the drafting of the standards, it appears
that they are not fulfilled by Socio Bosque as will show this research. Exemplarily selected criteria (CCBA
2010:5f) that are not fulfilled by SB:
The REDD+ programme recognises and respects both statutory and customary rights to lands, territories
and resources which Indigenous Peoples or local communities have traditionally owned, occupied or
otherwise used or acquired. (CCBA 2010, Criterion 1.2)
However, land tenure conflicts in Ecuador persist. According to Palacios (2005, as cited in
Hbenthal et.al. 2010:4) 65% of natural forests and over 7 million hectares of forest land are in the
hands of indigenous peoples. State forests divide in Sistema de Areas Protegidas (SNAP) with 4,7 million
hectares, Bosques Protectores Publicos (BPP) with 2,3 million hectares and Patrimonio Forestal del
Estado (PFE) with 2 million hectares (FAO 2005:12). State areas are overlapping, so that overall state

47

owned forest area is less than the sum of the three divisions. Conflicts arise mainly from intersection of
indigenous lands and state areas. Hbenthal et.al. (2010:4f) identify issues for conflicts:

the existence of land with legal title deeds obtained before a protected area was established

ancestral holdings that cannot be legalised (within SNAP)

prior landholdings that have not been legalised (within SNAP)

re-delimitation of protected areas

the presence of settlers and the lack of boundaries between settlers and ancestral landowners

the PFEs conversion to ancestral communal properties, without this meaning that the awarded
land is removed from the PFE

As already outlined in chapter 1.3, the recognition of indigenous territories by the state is one
central aspect of the struggle of the IPOs with the central government that is still far from being
resolved.
The REDD+ programme requires the free, prior and informed consent of Indigenous Peoples and local
communities for any activities affecting their rights to lands, territories and resources. (CCBA 2010,
Criterion 1.3)
The participation process of SB and the right on prior, free and informed consent will be subject
in chapter 5.2.
Where the REDD+ programme enables private ownership of carbon rights, these rights are based on the
statutory and customary rights to the lands, territories and resources that generated the greenhouse
gas emissions reductions and removals. (CCBA 2010, Criterion 1.5)
This criterion is connected to issues about the commercialisation of ecosystem services, which is
regulated by Article 74 of the constitution of Montecristi. This article will be a subject in chapter 5.1.1.
Furthermore, the question of property rights is closely related to the issue of CO2lionalism as mentioned
before.
In an interview an employee of an international NGO that facilitates SB with technical and
financial support on different scales and also promotes the implementation of CCBA standards stated
that their support is not conditional on the implementation of the standards (pers. com. 23 June 2010).

48

It seems very unlikely that any international investor will make his decision of buying carbon credits
dependent on the application of voluntary standards, if not even the conducting BINGOs make their
support for projects dependent on it.

4.5 Ecuadors national REDD strategy

With the national REDD strategy the MAE starts an effort to regulate and harmonise different
REDD projects in Ecuador. There are currently about ten projects identified nationwide that want to
access carbon markets through the REDD mechanism (Hbenthal et.al. 2010:25). The MAE sees its
responsibility in facilitating sustainable forest management and climate change mitigation via the
Subsecretary of Natural Heritage and the Subsecretary of Climate Change.
The strategy consists of six components: Forest Information, Forest Control, Sustainable Forest
Management, Reforestation/Afforestation, Legalising of Land Ownership and the Incentive Programme,
namely SB (ibid:14f). Most of the components are in a very early stage of development. Resources are
mainly mobilised to conduct forest inventory, build a monitoring system and the implementation of SB.
The MAE has headed two initiatives since 2009 to establish a national baseline scenario (ibid:20ff). The
National Forest Assessment collects data on the carbon stocks stored in nine distinguished forest classes
and a historical deforestation map is elaborated. These are necessary steps to establish a reference
scenario for emissions from deforestation. The MAE is responsible for legalisation of land tenure on
forest areas through the Direccin Nacional Forestal. However, no information on processes to legalise
ownership of forest areas could be found. The MAE refers in this context to the expected environmental
services bill that will further elaborate Art. 74 of the constitution of Montecristi (see chapter 5.1.1) and
regulate the access to environmental services like the ability to capture carbon. Re- and Afforestation in
Ecuador is conducted by the programme PROFORESTAL. One interview partner of an international
development agency seriously doubts the sustainability of this programme:
For reforestation theres another programme, where I have serious doubts about its
sustainability. Thats PROFORESTAL, a programme of the Ministerio de Agricultura y Pesca,
which is about the reforestation of 1 million hectares per year. But that are really
commercial plantations, its about producing timber. And this leads to the perversity that
natural forests are cut clear and Eucalyptus is planted for instance. PROFORESTAL has
done different projects in the Amazon region, with Balsa, Cedar and Teak forests. But this

49

is all production orientated. Conservation of natural resources is not an issue for

PROFORESTAL. (pers. com. 9 June 2010)

NGOs and other project developing organisations support the approach of the MAE to create a
national REDD strategy, as they need the institutional framework to access a possible future REDD
market. The government carries the costs for expensive measures that will be a basic requirement for
accountability of REDD certificates, for instance creating a forest information system, the monitoring
system and baseline scenarios. For these activities the MAE receives technical assistance by the
potential future project implementing organisations. One feature of neoliberal conservation in the sense
of Igoe and Brockington (2010) can be observed here: The emergence of a new public private
partnership to set up the framework for the commodification of carbon. As already mentioned,
investors thereby minimise their risk and the government assures itself the legitimacy to participate in
carbon markets.
[...] And they [the government, ed.] could do two things: They could say, ok we are there
investing so lets bring that carbon to the market or they could leave it up to others, right?
Its not necessarily the government that should commercialise carbon from the areas.
They could also say ok, whos interested to bring this carbon to the market, but we want
to have some sort of participation. I think this participation is justified, because they invest
already a lot of money in SB and the government also invests a lot of money in those
things that are part of the national strategy to reduce deforestation, which is more than
SB. I mean, the national forest inventory, which will be a requirement to show emissions
from deforestation... Of course updating deforestation data is very expensive. So there are
many problems additional to SB, which cost a lot of money. So I think it makes sense that
the government participates in some way in a possible future market, because we dont
know yet if they [the markets, ed.] will become reality, thats what we hope. (Employee
of an international NGO, pers. com. 23 June 2010)

Original text: Fr Wiederaufforstung gibt es ein anderes Programm, mit dem ich meine groen Zweifel hab, dass
das nachhaltig ist. Das ist PROFORESTAL, ein Programm des Ministerio de Agricultura y Pesca, bei dem es um die
Wiederaufforstung von 1 Mio. ha pro Jahr geht. Aber das ist wirklich Nutzwald, es geht darum Holz zu produzieren.
Und das geht bis zur Perversitt, das Naturwald abgeholzt wird und dann zum Beispiel Eukalyptus gepflanzt wird.
PROFORESTAL hat verschiedene Projekte im Amazonas gemacht, mit Balsa-, Zedern- und Teak-Wldern. Aber das
ist alles eher produktionsorientiert. Schutz der natrlichen Ressourcen spielt bei PROFORESTAL berhaupt keine
Rolle.

50

5 The national scale

5.1 The design of Socio Bosque

To understand the functioning of SB, we will take a look at some crucial aspects of the
programme. Figure 5 shows the functioning scheme of SB. The MAE launched the programme in 2008
and started to announce it all over the country (see chapter 5.2). Interested landowners need to present
their land titles and a map with the area that applies for the programme. In a next step the MAE verifies
whether all necessary requirements are fulfilled to access SB. Part of this verification is a countrywide
geographic prioritisation of areas that will be analysed in the next section. Holders of common land titles
have to present an investment plan for the future payments (see chapter 5.1.5). If all demands are
fulfilled the conservation agreements are signed (see chapter 5.1.2) and the incentives flow (chapter
5.1.3). The conservation on the ground is controlled by a monitoring system that isnt pictured in figure
5 but will be discussed in chapter 5.1.4.

Figure 5: Functioning scheme of Socio Bosque (MAE 2010d)

51

5.1.1 Mode of choosing areas for the programme

The mode of choosing areas for a REDD project has serious implications for the topics of
additionality, leakage and monitoring. The MAE has elected identifying project areas by means of an
operationalised GIS application that they call geographical prioritisation (priorizacin geografica). The
analysis is conducted by a geographer that works within the programme group (Functionary of the MAE,
pers. com. 8 June 2010). There are 22 points given away for the three main variables (MAE 2009a) level
of threat, environmental services, and level of poverty.

1.

Level of threat (nivel de amenaza)

The variable consists of two sub-variables, of which only one is classified for the overallprioritisation.
-

Distance to access routes (distancia a vas de acceso)

low distance, high level of threat

9 points

medium distance, medium level of threat

6 points

high distance, low level of threat

3 points

if the downhill gradient is bigger than a certain percentage and the distance to
access routes is at least medium, the area doesnt receive points
-

Historical Data of Deforestation (patrones histricos de deforestacin)

only if available, no points

The level of threat reflects mainly the accessibility of the area. This corresponds basically to
areas with high deforestation pressure, as a high percentage of logging activities in Ecuador is conducted
illegally. This situation affects one of the basic issues of sustainability of the programme: The question
whether the indigenous communities will be able to protect the contracted areas all by themselves, if
areas are made accessible by infrastructure construction. Although control of illegal logging is a topic of
Ecuadors REDD strategy, concrete activities are still rare and have to be developed. These facts also
cause doubts about the sustainability of the programme with representatives of development
organisations as one employee states:

52

Yes, the [deforestation] pressure is higher if more infrastructure exists. Where a road is
built the forest disappears, no matter if Socio Bosque or not. One thing, that hasnt been
thought about yet is, that it is questionable if the nationalities will be able to protect the
area if a road is built there. They have to protect it against people from outside. The
lumberjacks dont ask if it is Socio Bosque or not. They come with chainsaws, cut all down
and it is gone. Everything that concerns forest control is in development at the moment. In
Morona Santiago they finally managed to install a forest control post at a strategic
crossing where every lumber truck has to pass. This will surely affect illegal logging, but
this is still in development. (Employee of a development agency, pers. com. 9 June 2010)6

This example illustrates one of the conflicts that arise between development and conservation.
The idea of development as economic growth demands for the construction of infrastructure which
leads to the exploitation and destruction of nature. As long as extractive industries like mining and oil
drilling are promoted, there will be the need for infrastructure and illegal deforestation can only be
prevented by strong forestry laws and regular control. The related issue of monitoring SB project areas
will be discussed in section 5.1.4. Employees of development organisations and indigenous people in the
affected areas are well aware of the problem of illegal logging. Projects to prevent invasions and
promote sustainable forest management are common on the regional level and also found within SB
areas. They will be an issue in chapter 6.

Original text: Ja der Druck ist eigentlich hher, wenn mehr Infrastruktur da ist. Also dort wo eine Strae gebaut
wird, verschwindet auch der Wald; egal ob Socio Bosque oder nicht Socio Bosque. Eine Sache, die da noch nicht
wirklich mitgedacht wurde ist, wenn da Infrastruktur hingebaut wird, ist es fraglich ob die Nacionalidades in der
Lage sind, das Gebiet wirklich zu schten. Die mssen das gegen Leute von auen schtzen. Wenn da eine Strae
hingebaut wird, fragen die Holzfller nicht lange nach ob das Socio Bosque ist oder nicht. Die kommen mit der
Motorsge an, legen um und weg ist das. Alles was Control Forestal angeht, ist im Moment alles erst im Aufbau. In
Morona Santiago hat man es endlich mal geschafft, an einer strategischen Strassenkreuzung, die mitten in der
Provinz liegt und an der eigentlich jeder Holzlaster, wenn er nicht durch den Acker fahren will, vorbei muss, so ein
Control Forestal hinzustellen und die Laster zu kontrollieren. Das wird mit Sicherheit den illegalen Holzeinschlag ein
bisschen verndern, aber das ist alles gerade erst im Aufbau.

53

2.

Environmental Services (servicios ambientales)

Three sub-variables can be found within this category:

-

Refuge of biodiversity (refugio de biodiversidad)

Classifies the actual percentage of ecosystems found in the project area that are
under-represented in the National System of Protected Areas (SNAP).

very high represented

4 points

high represented

3 points

medium represented

2 points

low represented

1 point

Hydrological regulation (regulacin hidrolgica)

high importance

3 points

medium importance

2 points

low importance

1 point

Carbon storage (almacenamiento de carbono)

high carbon content

3 points

medium carbon content

2 points

low carbon content

1 point

In a second step the available environmental services are rated. This variable splits into three
sub-variables. Although the MAE is valuing the disposable environmental services to determine eligibility
for SB, the government emphasises strongly that SB isnt a programme for payments for environmental
services (PES), but pays an incentive for the conservation of areas that generate environmental services.
The MAE argues that there are two main criteria for PES-schemes: calculation of opportunity cost and
level of threat (MAE 2010a:21). As shown above, there have been efforts to determine the level of
threat for forest areas in Ecuador. Although there is no difference in the height of incentives paid to the
landowners for areas with higher deforestation pressure, there is kind of a ranking, as not all forest
areas are yet allowed within SB (see priority map further down). The explanations why the programme
is not calculating opportunity costs seem to be a bit hypocritical (ibid:21):

54

SB doesnt need to determine the opportunity cost of every project area

because it is not sought to compensate these costs.

Calculating opportunity costs for the whole country would be an

expensive, tedious and finally useless effort, because markets are
dynamic and prices might change very quickly.

Regarding these lax distinction to PES-schemes it seems that Hazlewood (2010b) is right when
she states that the communities do the dirty conservation work on the ground while the government
acts as the broker for environmental services on an international scale. This procedure seems to be
covered by Article 74 of the constitution of Montecristi, where we find a basic contradiction with the
principle of sumak kawsay within the very same constitution, remembering that its already a reduction
of nature in the sense of indigenous cosmovisin to address it as environmental services that can be
produced and commercialised. Dividing nature into little pieces and putting a price on the different
manifestations of the Pachamama (mother earth) equals a sacrilege from the idealised indigenous point
of view. In this context the Article 74, on which the MAE refers to in terms of Socio Bosque, appears a bit
problematic:
The people, communities, peoples and nationalities will have the right to benefit from
the environment and the natural riches that will allow them Buen Vivir. The environmental
services will not be susceptible to appropriation; their production, lending or borrowing,
use, and development will be regulated by the state. (Asamblea Constituyente del
Ecuador 2008)

So if this handling is justified by the (in this case ambiguous) constitution anyway, theres the
question why the MAE is so keen on underlining a far-fetched distinction to PES-schemes. Maybe
because they try to hide how low the incentive is compared to other projects with REDD background.
The government pays less for environmental services than most private initiatives for the
implementation of projects (the details about the incentive system will be discussed in section 5.1.3). An

Original text: Las personas, comunidades, pueblos y nacionalidades tendrn derecho a beneficiarse del ambiente
y de las riquezas naturales que les permitan el Buen Vivir. Los servicios ambientales no sern susceptibles de
apropiacin; su produccin, prestacin, uso y aprovechamiento sern regulados por el Estado.

55

employee of an international NGO in Quito sees two reasons for the distinction to PES-schemes by the
government:
The first thing is, that if you talk about ecosystem services then you should do it in a very,
lets say systematically, theoretically correct way. Then you should give a value to the
services that are being generated by a certain area of forest for example and you should
pay for that, right? So if the protection of a forest also protects a source of water and
there are so and so many cubic meters of water coming out of the forest which has a
price, then you can say ok, we should pay for the value of the water coming from that
forest or we should pay for the value of the carbon that is stored in that forest. And that is
not the principle of SB, right? [...] I think the second reason is that in this region, South
America, sometimes there is a very ideological debate around paying for ecosystem
services, because there are organisations that say that is privatising of nature; that is sort
of selling our nature. So there are some of these ideological arguments of people that are
just against any market based mechanism. [...] Its a bit sensitive issue. So in order to avoid
this discussion they just call it an incentive. (Employee of an international NGO, pers.
com. 23 June 2010)

Figure 6 shows the distribution of the carbon content. Red areas of the category ALTA contain
up to 210 tons of carbon per hectare. Similar maps are elaborated for the other environmental services
biodiversity and hydrological regulation. Carbon is the environmental service that can be
commercialised pretty easy yet via international carbon markets. The voluntary carbon market is
accessible for all kind of projects and it might be an option for the MAE to sell certificates there if the
negotiations around REDD and a worldwide, compulsory mechanism should fail.
To commercialise other ecosystem services is far more difficult, as no markets yet exist for
them. However, Ramos (2011) states that the MAE also seeks to commercialise the other sub-variables
biodiversity and water in the future. It can be seen in Figure 6 that the vast majority of potential billable
carbon is stored in the Amazon region and the province of Esmeraldas, exactly where the first big pilot
regions of SB are situated. The two pilot areas will be a subject in chapter 6.

56

Figure 6: Carbon content (MAE 2010c)

3.

Level of poverty (nivel de pobreza)

Percentage of population, whose basic needs are not satisfied
equal or more than 65%

3 points

less than 65%

0 points

The level of poverty is the socioeconomic criterion that is considered in geographical

prioritisation. Although the variable is weighted only lightly and doesnt have a big impact on the mode
of choosing areas for the programme, as vast areas of the country surpass the threshold value for

57

poverty anyway, the MAE seems to make efforts to sell the idea of SB as a social programme, as the
interview with an employee of an international development agency shows:
Actually Socio Bosque is not a programme for conservation. Its not about conservation,
but about paying compensation to the people that havent used the forest sustainably up
to now to assure that they dont continue like this. Actually Socio Bosque is more a social
programme than a programme for conservation, and it is seen like this by the majority of
the international donor organisations. [...] Its not all about the area, but the poverty
indicator of the landowners plays a central role. The access to energy and communication,
health, education, the alimentary situation... Theres a whole list of indicators that are
measured. (Employee of a development agency, pers. com. 9 June 2010)

There seems to be some confusion about the weighting of the objectives of SB. While
conservation NGOs see conservation as the central objective of the programme, development agencies
and NGOs seem to see the focus of the programme on poverty reduction and empowerment. The mode
of choosing areas for the programme however, puts the emphasis clearly on the level of threat and the
valuation of the available ecosystem services, the two central criteria for PES-schemes.
The variables of the geographical prioritisation are finally aggregated into one map (Figure 9)
and the values are classified into three categories. At the moment it is only possible for areas with
priority 1 and 2 (red and green coloured in figure 7) to enter the programme. However, it might be
necessary for the MAE to also include areas with a priority of 3 (yellow in figure 7) in the programme, to
reach the goal of 4 million hectares under contract up to 2015 (Functionary of the MAE, pers. com. 08
June 2010).

Original text: Eigentlich ist Socio Bosque kein Schutzprogramm. Es geht nicht um Schutz, sondern es geht darum,
Leuten, die den Wald bisher nicht nachhaltig genutzt haben eine Entschdigung zu bezahlen, damit sie den Wald
nicht weiterhin nicht nachhaltig nutzen. Eigentlich ist Socio Bosque, und so wird es auch vom groen Teil der
internationalen Gebergemeinschaft gesehen, eher ein Sozialprogramm, als ein Schutzprogramm. [...] Es geht ja
nicht nur um die Flche, sondern eine ganz starke Rolle spielt der Armutsindikator der Bevlkerung die Besitzrechte
ber dieses Land hat. Da spielt dann also Zugang zu Energie und Kommunikation, Gesundheit, Schulwesen,
Ernhrungssituation... Es gibt da eine ganze Liste von Indikatoren, die da gemessen werden.

58

Figure 7: Scenario of geographical prioritisation (MAE 2010c)

5.1.2 Design of the conservation agreements

To guarantee the sustainability of the programme in terms of mitigation of GHG emissions,
contracts have to bind both parts for a significant period. In the case of SB the contracts have a running
time of 20 years and are prolonged automatically after this period, if there is no objection from side of
the contract parties (Ramos 2011). The duration of the agreements is a serious issue for landowners. All
the people I talked to in the Amazon region are deterred by this and the low level of incentives, which
will be the topic of the next section. To determine an area for conservation for such a long time is no
option for most landowners as long as earnings are low. For instance a 19 year old youth in Macas (pers.
com. 14 July 2010), who owns about 100 hectares of land of which 50 ha would be eligible to enter the
programme, assured that he would never sign a contract over 20 years to receive 1.500 US$ per year, as
he is thinking about expanding the cultivation area of his finca (farm) and calculating with higher
revenues from that activity.

59

Besides the long running time of the contracts, concrete obligations of participants are a central
issue for landowners. Basically the MAE as one party of the agreement only has to fulfil three obligations
(MAE 2009b:2):
a) realise the transfer of the incentives
b) realise the monitoring with the goal to verify the fulfilment of the
obligations by the landowners
c) provide assistance to landowners in relation to issues concerning the contracts

The list of obligations for landowners is unequally longer (ibid):

a) no logging in the area under conservation
b) no change of land use in the area under conservation
c) no fires in the area under conservation
d) no intensive pasturing in the area under conservation
e) no realising of activities that alter the natural behaviour or that threat the
capacity to give shelter to biodiversity, alter the natural hydrological
conditions or reduce the storage of carbon through logging
f)

no hunting for commercial or sporting purposes

g) inform the MAE within five days about transfer or limitation of the
dominion
h) prevent fires in the area under conservation and inform the MAE and other
competent authorities about their occurrence
i)

allow the access of personal of the MAE to the areas under conservation
and facilitate their work

j)

delimitate adequately the area under conservation with signs at intervals in

accordance with the MAE

k) hand in required information about the state of the area under

conservation to the MAE
l)

fulfil the requirements of the investment plans (see chapter 5.1.5)

60

m) inform the MAE about events of nature beyond control that affect the area
under conservation or that could affect the normal implementation of the
project (like invasions, changes in the investment plans, etc.)
n) hand in legitimate information about the area under conservation
o) hand in a yearly declaration, that the area under conservation is in the
same conditions as at the beginning of the contracts and that the financial
means are used in a good way

Although the contracts respect and allow some forms of traditional use within the conservation
areas, like hunting for subsistence or collecting medicinal plants (Functionary of the MAE, pers. com. 8
June 2010), there can be found some critical aspects within the obligations of the landowners; for
instance the obligations to install signs to delimitate the conservation area and to inform the MAE about
fires, invasions etc. Basically the contract partners are left alone by the MAE with the responsibility for
the conservation, like already mentioned in the preceding section of this chapter. In case they dont
report an invasion or a forest fire to the MAE this constitutes a violation of the contract and can result in
the obligation to pay back part of the incentive they already received in accordance with table 5: It has
to be mentioned here that a violation against the obligations f) to k) and o) are seen as minor offences
by the MAE and just lead to the suspension of the payments for one period. After the suspension of the
incentive in more than three occasions however, the case is treated as termination of the contract and
table 5 applies. Violations against obligations a) to e) and l) to n) always lead to termination of the
contract and application of the sanctions. Additionally to refunding the incentives the MAE reserves the
right to initiate administrative, civil and penal actions in accordance with the law. On the other hand the
MAE can terminate the contracts unilateral at any moment without any consequences or sanctions.
This, together with the unequal list of obligations, is what makes the design of the contracts highly
unfair for landowners.

Category
1
2
3
4

Amount of time in the programme

1 to 5 years
6 to 10 years
11 to 15 years
16 to 20 years

Sanctions Percentage of paid incentive

that has to be returned to the MAE
Restitution of 100%
Restitution of 75%
Restitution of 50%
Restitution of 25%

61

Table 5: Sanctions against landowners in case of early withdrawal from the programme (MAE 2009a:18)

5.1.3 Structure of incentives

The structure of the incentives and how they are distributed play a crucial role in the design of
the programme. Since late 2009 the incentive for conservation is determined by application of the
following table:

Table 6: Structure of incentives paid under SB (MAE 2009a:10)

For areas under protection up to 50 ha the MAE pays 30 US$/ha/year to contract partners.
Contract partners with bigger areas under protection receive 30 US$/ha/year for the first 50 ha, 20
US$/ha/year for the following 50 ha, 10 US$/ha/year for hectares No. 101 to 500, and so on. This means
that the incentive per hectare decreases with growing size of the area subscribed to the programme, as
is shown in Figure 8.

62

Incentive/ha
35,00
30,00

US$/year

25,00
20,00
15,00
10,00
5,00
300.000

150.000

100.000

75.000

40.000

20.000

5.000

500

50

0,00

Area under conservation (ha)

Figure 8: Decreasing incentive/ha with growing size of the area under contract

The MAE calls this mode of calculating the incentives solidary, as the incentive would be also
attractive for people, who own just a small piece of land (MAE 2010a:19). But it can also be seen as a
serious discrimination of indigenous people, who dont own private, but community land titles. They
dont have the possibility to split their community land and enter the programme with many small,
private areas, which would guarantee them higher incentives. According to Max Lascano, coordinator of
the programme in the MAE, there has been a lot of thinking about the scheme of incentives to make it
fair. In an interview with the international NGO TRAFFIC he states the example of the Consejo del
Gobierno del Pueblo Shuar Arutam (CGPSHA), who entered the programme with 89.500 ha (according to
Fundacin Natura (2010:6) there are 92.000 hectares subscribed to the programme) and receive about
400.000 US$ for that area. Lascano compares the case of the CGPSHA with the nationality Spara, who
joined SB with 83.000 ha and only receive about 80.000 US$ per year. He argues that there are far more
beneficiaries in the CGPSHA (about 10.000 compared with about 800 beneficiaries in the case of the
Spara nationality) and that it would be fair, that they receive a higher overall incentive (TRAFFIC
Amrica del Sur 2010). To argue with the paid incentive per head seems to be an acceptable method to
analyse the fairness of incentive distribution. The MAE published the following figures in 2010:

63

Type of contract

No. of

Families

contracts
Contracts on

Benefited

Hectares under

Incentive amount

population

conservation

(US$)

43

8.966

38.687

369.449,42

1.325.703,90

388

348

1.586

47.059,10

748.228,95

431

9.314

40.273

416.508,52

2.073.932,85

community land
Contracts on
private land
TOTAL

Table 7: Accumulated results of SB up to December 2009 per type of contract (MAE 2010b)

Table 7 shows that the mean incentive per hectare, which is paid in the context of community
contracts, is with 3,59 US$ per year around 4 times lower than the incentive per hectare paid for
individual contracts with 15,90 US$ per year. The difference is even bigger, if the mean incentives are
calculated per head of the benefiting population: 34,26 US$ per year were paid for contracts concerning
community land, but 471,77 US$ per year for contracts concerning private land. These figures reveal the
inequity that lies within the incentive scheme of SB. To top it all off, the gap between incentives paid to
communities and incentives paid to private landowners will probably get even bigger in the future;
because the 400.000 450.000 US$ (the figures vary, some interview partners spoke of about 500.000
US$/year) that are paid to the CGPSHA are in fact a result of negotiations and not of simple calculations,
as Max Lascano pretends in the interview conducted by TRAFFIC Amrica del Sur.
Well, we decided to start negotiations; this also depends on the capacity for negotiation of
the social actors. [...] Because according to the table [of the MAE, ed.], to put 100.000
hectares resulted us with about 130.000 US$ per year. And we said that it doesnt satisfy
us, because the estimation for our Plan de Vida was around one million Dollars per year.
[...] We decided if it wont support us to realise the Plan de Vida, it doesnt serve us, its
not interesting. So we started to negotiate on various occasions and we achieved to get
450.000 US$ per year, which are more or less 5 Dollars per hectare per year. (Ral Petsain,
pers. com. 30 July 2010)

Original text: Bueno, nosotros decimos comenzar la negociacin, eso tambin depende de la capacidad de
negociacin de los actores sociales. [...] Porque segn la tabla [del MAE], poniendo 100.000 hectreas nos
resultaba como 130.000 US$ por ao. Y nosotros decimos que no nos conviene, porque el presupuesto aproximado
de nuestro Plan de Vida est alrededor de un milln de Dlares por ao. [...] Nosotros decimos si no va a apoyarnos
a realizar el Plan de Vida, no nos sirve, no nos interesa. Entonces empezamos a negociar en varias ocasiones y
logramos los 450.000 US$ por ao. Ms o menos son 5 Dlares por hectrea por ao.

64

As the Shuar people usually are known to be pretty reluctant and rebellious, the MAE probably
paid special attention on including the CGPSHA into the programme of SB. As the CGPSHA is already well
organised, which will be shown in chapter 6, and owns vast areas of forest lands that are reserved for
conservation, they had a special position for negotiations with the MAE. Other IPOs are not that well
consolidated in their structures and thus receive a lower price per hectare. This leads to disagreement
from sides of the other IPOs, because they dont understand why the CGPSHA receives a higher price
than they do (Ral Petsain, pers. com. 30 July 2010). This circumstance shows another critical issue of
SB: Although the direct payment to the communities can be seen as an improvement, as no
intermediary organisations that claim part of the money are involved, the government thus ignores the
grown structure of the indigenous movement. While organisations like Conservation International
support this approach (pers. com. 23 June 2010), Martnez Novo (2010) emphasises that this practice
leads to a division of the indigenous movement. An assumption that is confirmed by the statements of a
functionary of the CONAIE: [...] Rather everything has been decided in a work at a desk, just with the
people of the government and without us. This led to some malaise within the peoples and nationalities.
[...] This led to a division between communities and nationalities, they are quarrelling10 Similar
experiences have been reported to Accin Ecolgica (pers. com. 30 June 2010) and are expressed by a
Cofn community member: [...] The very same CONFENIAE and CONAIE say that the government will
rob the territories with Socio Bosque, the state is buying us with Socio Bosque, this is not true and
therefore we dont participate in their meetings. (CCBA 2009)11 The issue is linked to questions about
the socialisation of the programme and the attitude of IPOs towards REDD in general, which are
attended in section 5.2 and 4.4.
Another critical topic is the absolute height of the incentive. One employee of an international
development agency explains: Just think about that a forestry activity; one hectare can bring you 1.500
US$. [...] One Chanul tree can bring you up to 300 US$. [...] Theres a serious problem, here I dont see
many opportunities for a solution. [...] One tree brings you 300 US$, you stay with 150 US$, versus 6,50
US$ per hectare. This is a structural problem of the concept, of the whole strategy. (pers. com. 25 June

10

Original text: [...] Ms bien todo ha sido decidido en un trabajo en la mesa, en un escritorio, solamente con la
gente del gobierno y sin nosotros. Ahora todo eso est generando un poco de malestar en los pueblos y
nacionalidades. [...]Eso ha generado que las comunidades se dividan a las nacionalidades, se pelean.
11
Original text: [...] la misma CONFENIAE y CONAIE dice que el gobierno nos va a quitar las tierras con Socio
Bosque, el estado est comprndonos con Socio Bosque, eso no es verdad y por esto no participamos de las
reuniones.

65

2010)12 This statement reflects the attitude of the young landowner cited at the beginning of chapter
5.1.2; as long as opportunity costs are so much higher, it will be difficult to convince people to subscribe
their areas to SB. And its not only the opportunity costs but also other REDD based projects that
promise higher benefits for landowners as an employee of a project developing enterprise states: If
theres a reasonable rate of deforestation, then a REDD project will be much more attractive than Socio
Bosque. We are talking about hundreds of dollars a family a year. (pers. com. 15 June 2010) These
claims seem to be also made by other agents of NGOs or private enterprises. A functionary of the
CONAIE talked about people from Costa Rica and Colombia who visited the Cofn people in the northern
Amazon region and promised them 400 US$/ha if they agree to implement projects for carbon trading in
their territory (pers. com. 1 October 2010). Garzn (2009) elaborated a list of projects, which are
orientated on PES-schemes. He identifies three projects for the protection of hydrological
environmental systems. They consist basically in the protection of the forest in the drainage basin. The
project in El Chaco pays 36 to 60 US$/ha/year for forest conservation and the Celica projects pays 52
US$/ha/year. Only the project in Pimampiro pays prices comparable to SB with 6 to 12 US$/ha/year. So
it seems that SB pays much less than most PES-projects. Corbera shows that payments for forest carbon
projects in Mexico oscillate between 250 and 800 US$/ha for a 25 year period. Even if the programme is
criticised for the low benefits for the participating population (Kosoy & Corbera 2010:1233), prices are
still higher than in the case of SB.
For the single landowner it doesnt make much difference, if the money he gets is called
payments for environmental services or an incentive for conservation. He will decide on basis of the
height of his revenues which programme to join. Although people in the MAE are talking about possibly
adjusting the incentive scheme in the future and the revision of the incentive scheme is anchored in the
programme manual (MAE 2009a:10), there is no guarantee for that and an employee of an international
NGO in Quito states:
In a way I think exists that openness towards the possibility to modify the programme.
But of course you have to go slowly and cannot change it every week, or it will become a
chaos. For every change they need to make a new legal document and then it needs to be

12

Original text: Solo ponte a pensar que una actividad forestal; una hectrea puede darte 1.500 US$. [...] Un rbol
de Chanul puede darte hasta 300 US$. [...] All hay un problema serio, aqu no veo muchas posibilidades de
solucin. [...] Un rbol te da 300 US$, queden te 150 US$; versus 6,50 US$ por hectrea. Eso es un problema
estructural del concepto, de toda la estrategia.

66

approved and put into the official registry, its quite a complicated process. But actually
they already made one reform last year with a couple of changes. But they cannot do that
very often. (pers. com. 23 June 2010)

5.1.4 Monitoring project areas

Monitoring of project areas and verification of avoided deforestation is one central component
of every REDD-project. Quantification of carbon storage is especially important under a market based
approach, like already mentioned in chapter 4.1. Basically the MAE tries to guarantee carbon monitoring
by three means: the use of satellite images, random field inspections and an annual juridical binding
report by the landowners. An employee of an international development agency seems to have his
doubts about this approach:
And the other critical point is how you can do monitoring at all. Lets take the example of
the Pueblo Shuar Arutam. How many people would be needed to do effective monitoring
for the 95.000 hectares? [...] The idea was, I dont know if they changed it in the
meantime, to do the ongoing analysis with satellite images and to do a critical inventory
every five years. But I think thats all very vague. (pers. com. 9 June 2010)

13

One crucial aspect, that should be considered is that the IPOs, which have to submit a juridical
binding report about the state of their forests and also have to comply with all the obligations of the
contracts that were mentioned in section 5.1.2, at least should be able to prove a minimum of
organisational capability and understanding of the modern and technocratic approaches that underlie
the programme of SB and the mechanism of REDD. Otherwise there will be misunderstandings, which
can be seen on the example of the Gran Reserva Chachi (GRCH), a project that was implemented by the
GTZ and Conservation International as main actors in the province of Esmeraldas with Chachi people and
that was kind of the role model for SB. There was an invasion by an Afro-Ecuadorian group within the
13

Original text: Und der andere kritische Punkt ist, wie kann man berhaupt Monitoring betreiben. Also nehmen

wir als Beispiel das Pueblo Shuar Arutam. Wie viele Leute bruchte man um fr die 95.000 Hektar wirklich effektiv
Monitoring zu betreiben? [...] Also die Idee war, ich wei nicht ob sie das in der Zwischenzeit gendert haben, ber
fnf Jahre lang die Analyse ber Satellitenaufnahmen abzuwickeln und alle fnf Jahre eine kritische
Bestandsaufnahme zu machen. Aber ich halte das alles fr sehr vage.

67

territory of the community Corriente Grande (GTZ 2010:92f). They occupied about 200 ha, cut down
trees and cultivated Pltanos. There was basically no reaction from side of the community; no
communication to the GTZ and it was considered to leave the 200 ha to the invaders to avoid further
problems. Additionally it came to light that some inhabitants of Corriente Grande were involved in the
sale of timber. This case of invasion was a serious problem for the whole project and the international
organisations decided to stop payments to the community. The population of Corriente Grande wasnt
aware of the sanctions; in 2008 a survey showed, that only 7,5% of the adults of the community knew
that sanctions in case of non-compliance with the conservation agreement existed (ibid:121). In this
case only payments were stopped. According to the contracts of SB however, the community would
have had to pay back the incentive they received (100% in this case, as the project only existed for two
or three years when the invasion occurred) and even expect administrative, civil and penal actions. The
example shows, that it is not reasonable to conclude a contract with organisations that are not in the
position to guarantee a minimum of organisational capability.
Besides monitoring on the scale of SB, there will also be some kind of monitoring on a bigger,
national level, as one employee of an international NGO (pers. com. 23 June 2010) explains: The national
forest inventory and the establishment of the national deforestation rate, that already were mentioned
in chapter 4.5 as parts of the national REDD strategy, are central components for the verification of
avoided carbon emissions. The employee of the NGO emphasises that this is not a full MRV-system
(monitor-report-verify) yet; there are rough components, but its not yet complete. Furthermore, he
explains that the monitoring system of SB consists of two parts:
If we look at only Socio Bosque, they have two different monitoring systems. One is the
monitoring of forest cover. Of course the people get their payments or incentives on the
basis of performance. They have to comply with the rules of the game and the rules say
they cannot cut down the forest. And there are smaller details but the main thing that
they have to comply with is to maintain the forest area and not intervene. So one
monitoring component is to monitor forest cover of all the forests and pramos that are
within Socio Bosque, and the other one is social monitoring. So they look at the social
investment plans. So they have to fill in, in what they are investing the incentive. So thats
also some kind of monitoring. (ibid)

68

5.1.5 The investment plans

As the last citation shows, the investment plans play a crucial role for monitoring the
achievements of the programme. They serve as key elements to guarantee the second purpose of SB
besides conservation: sustainable development. According to the Manual for the participative
Formulation of Investment Plans by the MAE (2009c), the investment plans should focus on the four
themes or components; conservation, social development, economic-productive development and
institutional strengthening. The communities are meant to realise meetings (asambleas) and form
groups that elaborate concrete goals and specific activities that lead to their achievement. The
investment plans for SB can and should be based on previous documents like a plan de vida, diagnosis
and management plans of the communities, forestry plans, development strategies etc., but they are no
necessary prerequisite for entering the programme.
Here we find the first critical point: Although communities are encouraged to base their
investment plans on available mid- and long-term strategic planning and are committed to sketch a map
of how they imagine their territory in ten years, there is no obligation to base the SB investment plan on
a really solid long-term planning. Basically we come back to the same question as in the previous
section: How to guarantee a sustainable use of the incentives (if this is wished by the project), if IPOs
havent yet worked out their plan de vida or simply lack the capability for long term planning? The SB
investment plans are only designed for a running time of one year and probably wont be a contribution
to sustainable development if they are not embedded in a wider horizon. Furthermore, only one person
at the MAE in Quito is responsible for the approval and evaluation of all the investment plans of the
country (Functionary of the MAE, pers. com. 8 June 2010). It seems very unlikely that the investment
plans will be sustainable under this precondition, as the realities in different communities vary heavily
and sustainable planning demands profound knowledge about specific local conditions. This points at a
big problem: Projects that are taken as a model for SB, like the Gran Reserva Chachi, had a constant
support by technicians over years. In the mentioned case two technicians were constantly working with
the people (Employee of a development organisation, pers. com. 25 June 2010) for a protected area of
7.200 hectares and a total area of 28.063 hectares within indigenous territories (GTZ 2010:52). In the
case of SB however, there is basically only one responsible for investment plans that concern around
500.000 hectares of protected area.
A second point criticised from several sides is the obligation to use the incentives for public
services like health and education that should actually be provided by the state (Employee of a project

69

developing enterprise, pers. com. 15 June 2010). Hazlewood (2010b) conducted several interviews on
that subject and summarises the words of a representative of the Aw people: The government argues
to promote resource extraction to finance health and education. However, they dont fulfill their
obligation to provide these public services. So the people find themselves forced to cut down trees and
sell the timber to satisfy their needs. Now the government comes up with the idea to protect the forest
and pay the people so that they can finance the services that the state is obliged to pay for anyway.
Furthermore, the landowners are obliged to use part of the incentive for the conservation, as already
mentioned in chapter 5.1.2.
In practice conservation efforts represent the biggest part of incentive investment, as shown by
figure 9. They consist basically of investments for signposting and delimitation of the protected areas
and their control by park rangers. The expenses for production basically serve to improve cultivation
areas of cacao, coffee, corn and rice and to diversify agricultural production. Organisational
strengthening means expenses for training, assemblies, journeys of community representatives etc.
Furthermore, resources are spent for construction of latrines and water supply (vivienda e
infraestructura), scholarships for students, salaries of professors and health promoters, emergency
health funds, medicines etc. (educacin y salud).

Figure 9: Use of the incentives from community contracts (MAE 2010e)

70

To verify the results of the plans, all communities that joined the programme have to present a
report about their investments for every period (year). Results of these reports vary strongly, as the
organisational level and computing abilities of the communities are pretty diverse (Functionary of the
MAE, pers. com. 8 June 2010). The MAE tries to change this situation and is doing workshops every now
and then on how to design investment plans and reports. There were workshops in August and
December 2009, one in May 2010, and there will be more in the future (ibid). Besides the elaboration of
plans and reports, accounting is a central topic of the workshops, as many communities are not used to
do this and havent declared their taxes in years (ibid). All in all it seems that those workshops from side
of the MAE aim more at supporting the communities in doing their paperwork for presentation
purposes and only very indirectly at promoting self-determined sustainable development.

5.2 Participation and socialisation

The issues of participation and socialisation are closely linked to the right on free, prior and
informed consent of the UNDRIP and the principle of participation anchored within the constitution of
Montecristi. Article 32 of the UNDRIP states:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed
consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilisation or exploitation of
mineral, water or other resources. (United Nations 2007)

Another very important passage can be found within article 278 of the constitution of
Montecristi, where Ecuadors citizens not only receive the right, but the duty to participate in all spaces
of legislative and administration:
For the realisation of good life, the people and communities, and their diverse
organisation forms, are called to: Participate in all phases and spaces of public
management and planning of national and local development, and in the execution and

71

control of compliance with the plans of development on all scales. [...] (Asamblea
Constituyente del Ecuador 2008)

14

The MAE strongly emphasises that SB is a voluntary programme and that no community is
forced to join it. Furthermore, they are realising workshops with indigenous communities and peoples to
socialise the programme (MAE 2010a:17). Finally it is necessary for communities to present an assembly
act that confirms the willingness of all community members to join the programme (ibid:8). Although it
seems the MAE informs the people well, it becomes clear that most potential contract partners in the
Amazon region dont know much about the programme, when you talk to them. A young man of the
Shuar nationality explained that no good information about the programme was available. The only
information that they would receive, was advertisements and propaganda from side of the MAE (pers.
com. 20 May 2010). A private landowner in the canton of Loreto complained that he had been
conserving his forest for the last 20 years and that he doesnt understand why the MAE didnt pay him
for that (pers. com. 29 August 2010). A young man in Macas reported about a new programme of the
government, which now wants to buy the fresh air of the Amazon region, because they run out of it in
the big cities like Quito (pers. com. 14 July 2010). Although these are individual statements, it seems
that the majority of the people in the Amazon region are not well informed about SB. According to a
functionary of the MAE, the active socialisation of SB is done by media (television, radio, newspapers),
mobile units and punctual socialisation. A certain domino effect within indigenous communities and the
socialisation by partner organisations also would play a crucial role (pers. com. 8 June 2010). Some
twenty articles about the programme are available at the homepage of the MAE. However, this
information is not accessible for most inhabitants of Ecuadors remote forest regions. For them, the
mentioned mobile units are the main source for information about SB. Twelve field promoters for the
programme visit rural centers with their trucks and information material and stay there for a few days to
inform the local population and give them the possibility to sign contracts right away (ibid).
It seems that the criteria for subscribing to the programme are not always fulfilled. In a
workshop on equity criteria held in Lago Agrio in October 2009 a representative of an indigenous
community answered on the question if all community members agreed on joining the programme:
14

Original text: Para la consecucin del buen vivir, a las personas y a las colectividades, y sus diversas formas
organizativas, les corresponde: Participar en todas las fases y espacios de la gestin pblica y de la planificacin del
desarrollo nacional y local, y en la ejecucin y control del cumplimiento de los planes de desarrollo en todos sus
niveles. [...]

72

No, but after signing a general assembly was held to show the components that have to be fulfilled and
the community members said: Lets hope that nothing happens. (CCBA 2009)15 In the very same
workshop another representative answered on the question, what he would change about the
programme: Before signing the contract there should be a good socialisation where the functioning of
the programme is explained. In our community information and socialisation was missing, if it is not
socialised well it will turn into a worry for the community. (ibid)16 Similar conditions were described by
an employee of a NGO in Quito on the question if they knew about problems with the programme:
There were problems; first, because in some cases the contracts were signed by the
representatives without making an assembly. We are talking about territories and
committing them for twenty years. This is absolutely against collective rights. In many
cases the representatives are not informed. They receive a message: Come to Esmeraldas
now! These persons had to spend their money to take the canoe, then the bus to get
there, and then they are told: Good, sign! Sign the contract of Socio Bosque now! [...] And
this representative had to sign, because if not..., he also had to return, buy his ticket etc.,
all in all he needed 160 Dollars. And because of that he signed. This was without any
consult. (pers.com. 30 June 2010)

17

Regarding these cases, it seems that requirements of the principle of free, prior and informed
consent are not fulfilled by the MAE. Although they pretend to do workshops to inform the population
better, critique comes from side of project partners. Different indigenous representatives stated on one
of these workshops, called the SB fair:

15

Original text: No pero luego de firmar se hizo una asamblea general para mostrar los componentes que hay que
cumplir y los comuneros decan esperemos que no pase nade.
16
Original text: Antes de firmar el convenio se haga una buena socializacin donde se explique cmo se va a
manejar el programa, en nuestra comunidad faltaba informacin y socializacin del convenio porque si no se
socializa a fondo se vuelve una preocupacin para la comunidad.
17
Original text: Haba problemas; primero, porque en algunos casos los convenios fueron firmados por los
dirigentes sin hacer una asamblea. Estamos hablando de territorios y de comprometer estos territorios por veinte
aos. Es absolutamente en contrario de los derechos colectivos. Muchas veces los dirigentes no estn informados.
Ms o menos estn llamados: Vente a Esmeraldas ahora! Estas personas tenan que gastar su dinero para tomar
una canoa, despus el bus para llegar, y all les dicen: Bueno, firma! Firma el convenio de Socio Bosque ahorita!
[...] Y este representante tena que firmar, porque si no... , igual tena que volver, comprar su boleto etc., en todo
necesitaba 160 Dlares. Y por eso firm. Eso no ha sido con una consulta.

73

At the Socio Bosque fair, that was not really achieved, we were asked for a presentation
during the meeting, the working schedule was completely changed and was unorganised.
A lot of people complained about the food, the transport, etc. There have to be
workshops organised, where the important issues for the provinces are tackled. A real
meeting where an agreement is found between different communities (on a common
position on working together). This was a meeting to bring the paperwork: plan and
juridical declaration. This meeting served for nothing. (CCBA 2009)

18

A second critique originates in the missing participation in project design. The IPOs had no say in
the development of concrete conservation measures or the negotiation of the price per hectare. These
are criteria that point at institutional asymmetries, one aspect of PES as commodity fetishism (Kosoy
and Corbera 2010). A functionary of the CONAIE describes the participation process implemented by
the MAE as following (pers. com. 1 October 2010):
Its always typical; they already do the proposal, with the ministers, with the responsible
people from the government and at last they say; well, we have to socialise this with the
nationalities. So we had a meeting. There was the president of the CONAIE, and me, and
the people from the Amazon region, just the representatives. They got a very nice, very
good proposal, but just to accept. So we say no, we want to work on the proposal
together with you. This is no participation. [...] Its always like this. They work out the
proposal and we come to sign.

19

18

Original text: En la feria socio bosque, en realidad no se logr eso, durante el encuentro nos pidieron una
presentacin, la agenda de trabajo estuvo completamente cambiado, estaba completamente desorganizado,
mucha gente se quej de la comida, el transporte, etc. se debe organizar talleres donde se topen los temas
importantes por provincias. Un verdadero encuentro donde se pongan de acuerdo entre varias comunidades (tener
una posicin comn de cmo trabajar juntos). Fue un encuentro para entregar los trmites: plano, declaracin
juramentada. No sirvi de nada el encuentro.
19
Original text: Siempre es tpico, que ellos ya hacen la propuesta, con los ministros con las personas encargadas
del gobierno y al ultimo dicen bueno; tenemos que socializar eso con las nacionalidades. Entonces nos hemos
reunido. Estuvo el presidente de la CONAIE, estuve yo, estaban la gente de la Amazona, solo los dirigentes. Tienen
una propuesta muy chvere, muy bonita, pero solo para aceptar. Entonces nosotros decimos no, queremos trabajar
la propuesta conjuntamente con ustedes. Eso no es participacin. [...] Siempre es como as. Trabajan la propuesta y
nosotros solo venimos para firmar.

74

So basically the only issue, in which the indigenous communities are allowed to participate, is
how to spend the incentives. But even for that they have to elaborate an investment plan that has to fit
into the scheme issued by the MAE and has to be approved.

5.3 Socio Bosque and the extraction based economy

One of the main reasons for indigenous communities and peoples to join the programme is the
belief that SB is a protection against the extraction of crude oil and minerals. An employee of an
international development agency explains:
This also has a strategic background. Parts of their territory [of the pueblo Shuar Arutam,
ed.] are affected by mining concessions. And Socio Bosque obligates them not to touch
the forest for twenty years. They subscribed exactly those areas to Socio Bosque, where
the mining concessions are, to say: Lets see how this works, if the state has to break his
own rules. (pers. com. 9 June 2010)

20

A similar point of view can be observed with a Cofn community that joined the programme:
To be part of the programme generates positive actions against the mining activities of
the government, because it cannot contradict itself. If the same government supports
Socio Bosque and then wants to enter to extract crude oil or minerals, we can say that
they cannot enter because it is Socio Bosque. (CCBA 2009)

21

These arguments seem to be reasonable, but as described in section 5.1.2, the government can
quit the conservation agreement anytime and without any sanctions. In an interview conducted by
Accin Ecolgica on the occasion of a conference on protection of biodiversity at the Facultad

20

Original text: Das hat auch so einen strategischen Hintergrund. Teile ihres Gebietes sind betroffen von
Minenkonzessionen. Und Socio Bosque verpflichtet sie fr 20 Jahre den Wald nicht anzurhren. Socio Bosque hat
man just dort darbergelegt, wo die Minenkonzessionen sind, um zu sagen: Jetzt schaun wir mal, wie das
funktioniert, wenn der Staat gegen seine eigenen Regeln verstoen muss.
21
Original text: Estar dentro de este programa, genera una accin positiva contra las actividades mineras que el
gobierno quiera hacer el estado, porque no se puede contradecir, si el mismo gobierno apoya Socio Bosque y luego
quiere entrar a sacar petrleo o minerales, podemos decir que no puede entrar porque es Socio Bosque.

75

Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) on May 10th 2010, the director of the programme, Max
Lascano, explained, that mining activities and oil extraction are state priority and, therefore, can also be
executed within SB areas (Bonilla 2010). Hazlewood (2010b) even found out, that the Ministry of Mining
and Oil is conducting seismic testing in areas subscribed to SB. These facts seem to destroy the hope of
indigenous people that SB could be a protection against extractive activities within their territories.

76

6 The regional scale

On the regional scale SB manifests as projects to improve the socioeconomic circumstances of
the indigenous population. These projects might be conducted with or without the support of national
and/or international organisations, governmental as well as non-governmental. Due to the relative
newness of the programme profound case studies up to now hardly exist. Documentation mainly exists
in form of comments on experiences with the project up to now. For instance, a functionary of the
CONAIE told me about SB and the Spara people:
I told you before that there was a division of the communities. For instance the example
of the Spara. The Spara are divided because of Socio Bosque. One or two
representatives of this organisation took money of Socio Bosque and spent it, because
they dont have a plan, they spent more or less six thousand Dollars, which means they
disappeared. So the community asked where the money was. Why can this happen?
Because we dont have a development plan of the community or a plan of what we want
to do with that money. (pers. com. 1 October 2010)

22

Some publicised experiences have been collected during a consultation meeting on the
mentioned CCBA standards for climate, community and biodiversity impacts for REDD+ projects in which
representatives of three indigenous communities participated, two of them Cofn and one Kichwa. The
communities agree in the report (CCBA 2009), that the information policy has to be improved and the
Rio Cofanes community wants to raise the price substantially, as they only receive 1,50 US$ per hectare
per year. Unfortunately little data is available on the investments that were done with the paid
incentives and their outcomes. Nevertheless documentations exist about two projects, which are in the
meanwhile part of SB and serve as kind of pilot regions for the rest of the country. In the following two
sections I will outline and compare the basic characteristics of the two projects.

22

Original text: Yo te dije anteriormente que haba la divisin de las comunidades. Por ejemplo el tema de los
Sparas. Los Sparas estn divididos por este tema de Socio Bosque. Porque un dirigente, o dos dirigentes de esta
organizacin, agarraron dinero de Socio Bosque, pero gastaron. Porque no tienen un plan, gastaron mas o menos 6
mil Dlares, significa que desapareci. Entonces la comunidad pregunt; donde est este dinero? Porque pasa eso?
Porque no tenemos un plan de desarrollo de la comunidad o un plan de lo que queremos con este dinero.

77

6.1 The Gran Reserva Chachi

The already mentioned Gran Reserva Chachi (GRCH) was initiated by Conservation International
(CI) and the GTZ to protect an area of 7.200 hectares in the buffer zone of the Reserva Ecolgica
Cotacachi-Cayapas (RECC) in the province of Esmeraldas. The area is situated within Chachi community
land. The communities of Corriente Grande, El Encanto and Capul came up with the idea to protect
parts of their territories individually. CI and GTZ initiated a process to coordinate conservation efforts
and create one protected area. The planning process started in 2002, in 2004 negotiations begun and in
2005 the conservation agreement with the first community was signed. The contract partners agreed
upon a price of 5 US$ per conserved hectare per year that was paid for investments to the communities.
As the director of the programme GESOREN (Gestin Sostenible de los Recursos Naturales) by the GTZ,
Alonso Moreno Daz, explains, the project was executed under the paradigm of sustainable
development to improve the competitiveness and connection to the market, support sustainability
through conservation and improve participation and knowledge about indigenous rights (GTZ 2010:8). It
has to be remembered here that Walsh (2010:20) and Acosta (2010:6) warn not to equal the European
approach of sustainable development with the concept of sumak kawsay (see chapter 2.2).
Initially a lot of doubts came from side of the indgenas, as they traditionally depended on the
forest for their subsistence and couldnt imagine quitting hunting and collecting of fruits, medicinal
plants and fiber for their handcrafts. So the technicians tried for over two years to convince the people
to create the GRCH until they got the support of the chief representative of Corriente Grande for the
project (GTZ 2010:53). Basically the proposal to the indigenous people was to quit being hunters,
fishermen and collectors and become safeguards of part of their territory and dedicate another part of
their territory and time to agricultural activities (ibid:54). During the years the project was maintained
by a team of one project coordinator in Quito that coordinates between the FECCHE (Federacin de
Centros Chachis del Ecuador) and GTZ, a field advisor that assists all activities within the centers, a
motorcyclist that helps functionaries and technicians to get around and a bookkeeper to assist the
communities with accountancy. The FECCHE is the local organisation of the second grade (a
confederation of different Chachi communities see chapter 1.3). It is described as a weak organisation
that doesnt own many financial resources or means of communication (no telephone, no internet),
which makes it difficult for them to stay in contact with the world outside the jungle. Furthermore, the
organisation suffers from corruption and bad use of financial resources if they are available, as
accountancy abilities are rare (ibid:95ff). There have been efforts by the DED (German Development

78

Agency) to strengthen the organisational structure of the FECCHE, but no documentation of the
outcomes of those efforts was accessible for this research.
Although the communities agreed in assemblies to create the GRCH, knowledge about the
agreements was low, as already mentioned in chapter 5.1.4. Just 26,8% of the adult population could
mention one of the two organisations involved in the contracts, less than 2% could mention at least
three out of seven obligations of these organisations. The same thing is true for the obligations of the
communities. In 2008 at least 81% of the questioned population knew what activities were prohibited
within the GRCH, although only 30% knew about the extension of the reserve (ibid:121). As the GTZ
admits, one big problem from the implementation of the project in 2005 on was to make clear that the
project was not by the international organisations but by the communities. The task of the technicians
was not the execution of the project, but to serve as a bridge between the international organisms and
the indigenous population (ibid:56). However, it seems that this goal wasnt achieved completely. For
instance all activities in the community of Capul ceased during the absence of the technicians for six
months (Latorre Toms 2008:119) and in an interview a technician explained that the indgenas had
never seen the reserve as their protected but as rented area (ibid:96f). During her research in Capul,
Latorre Toms had to discard the hypothesis that the population of the community saw the GRCH as an
alternative to deforestation and a way to keep their traditional way of life. Actually she concluded that
big parts of the population want to sell timber and leave the community in search for a better life
(ibid:95ff). This situation may also manifest in the following example: Although the community of Capul
had the chance to quit a disadvantageous contract with a private enterprise on the exploitation of
timber, they didnt want to do it. This leads to confusion within the community and the GTZ about the
status of the area and the future intentions for it, because currently the community members neither
use the forest, nor do they quit the unfair contract (GTZ 2010:66).
The main areas of the projects investments were agroforestry, especially the cultivation of
cacao, the improvement of the commercialisation of timber through certification and re-negotiation of
timber sale contracts and the construction and maintenance of infrastructure, like water pipes.
Furthermore, there were efforts to strengthen organisational structures, construct community shops
and funds for health and education (ibid:55ff). The success of the investments is assessed as modest by
both; the GTZ and Latorre Toms. An employee of the GTZ states:
The festivity is a very important investment. They create funds that are called rotary or
health funds... But the health fund is; you get sick and they give you 100 Dollars. The idea

79

is to return the money, because its a fund. [...] Nobody returns the money, nobody makes
an effort to do so. These are investments that end, they are not very sustainable. (pers.
com. 25 June 2010)

23

Similar tendencies could be observed in the centre of Capul with funds for the grant of
scholarships (Latorre Toms 2008:102). Latorre Toms emphasises furthermore, that the investments
into the cultivation and commercialisation of cacao clearly didnt have a big impact (ibid:120) and the
GTZ admits that the success of the productive projects is still very precarious (2010:57). The costs for
commercialisation in remote areas are high and indigenous autoconsumption of cacao is virtually not
existing (ibid:61f).
Although there are several uncertainties about the results of the programme and serious doubts
about the willingness of the indigenous community to really participate in the conservation effort, the
MAE was impressed by the programme and contacted Conservation International, as an employee of
the NGO explained:
Yes, we support Socio Bosque a lot and we are actually also involved in the design of

Socio Bosque, because we had a project in Esmeraldas which was called the Gran Reserva
Chachi. That was a project together with other organisations like GTZ. And we worked
together with indigenous communities, with Chachi communities, to certify part of their
forest. These communities said well ok, we are in charge of the conservation of our forest
but who is going to compensate us for that? And so we set up a project around a
conservation agreement. So the agreement was the Chachi are going to protect 7.000
hectares of their territory forest and we are generating payments for that and evaluate for
each hectare. So the Ministry [of Environment, ed.] was interested in that. They asked;
how does that work and what about the communities and what are the benefits? And
then they asked, if we can do something at the national level. So we started to work with
the Ministry and came up with a couple of scenarios for a national level scheme, which
eventually led to Socio Bosque. So we were involved in the design. But the implementation
is done by the Ministry of course [...]. (pers. com. 23 June 2010)

23

Original text: La fiesta es una inversin muy importante. Crean fondos que se llaman fondos rotativos o fondos
de salud Pero el fondo de salud es; t te enfermas y te dan 100 US$. La idea es que lo vuelvas, porque es un fondo.
[] Nadie devuelve el dinero, nadie hace un intento de tratar de regresarse. Eso son inversiones que se terminan,
no tienen mucha sostenibilidad.

80

So the GRCH basically was the role model for Socio Bosque. The MAE took the idea and made a
national programme out of it. They are still working in the Chachi territory. They extended the expanse
of the protected area; now 14 Chachi communities are part of the programme with a total area of
21.000 hectares. In September 2008 the GTZ and CI signed a contract with the FECCHE that assigned the
IPO with the administration of all funds (GTZ 2010:137ff). There is no information available on how the
fund administration is regulated within SB (directly by each community or collectively by the FECCHE). It
has to be assumed that the FECCHE is overcharged with the complex tasks of planning and executing
future actions for conservation and development, if their organisation is so labile as described by the
GTZ (ibid:95ff).

6.2 The Pueblo Shuar Arutam

The Shuar nationality occupies the southern Amazon region of Ecuador. The Cordillera del
Cndor (CC) is home for 45 Shuar communities, which represent about 1.000 families or 8.000
inhabitants. Their territorys extension is about 200.000 hectares, of which only 16.000 ha are altered
through land use (pasture, agriculture, habitations etc.) (Fundacin Natura 2010:14). In the year 2000,
the Shuar of the CC together with Fundacin Natura, an Ecuadorian NGO, came up with the idea to
create a protected area (Ral Petsain, pers. com. 30 July 2010). As it soon became obvious, that the
organisational structure of the Shuar in the CC was labile, it was decided to initiate a process to
strengthen the management of their territory. The FICSH (Federacin Interprovincial de Centros Shuar)
was identified as not capable to deal with the rapid growth of the Shuar population during the last
decades of the 20th century (Fundacin Natura 2010:16ff); from 100 to 600 communities within 35
years. Due to the high population growth, the reduction of the forest and natural resources, the
fragmentation of the possession of land titles and similar processes, arose conflicts between families,
especially between the ones who inhabit the more accessible areas of the territory and experienced a
very rapid process of modernisation and those who live in remote locations and still rely on selfsubsistence.
It was decided to create a new institution that should bring together the traditional way of
territorial management by indigenous families with a modern approach that resembles the concept of a
regional government. The modern democratic approach cannot subject or subsume the traditional way
of life that is characterised by autonomous decisions of the families and the important position of the

81

Uwishin (shaman) for instance, but has to respect these aspects of Shuar identity and find a way to
harmonise it with the idea of the Shuar population as a group of citizens that are taking common
decisions on the future management of their territory. The communities of the CC decided to found the
CGPSHA (Consejo del Gobierno del Pueblo Shuar Arutam) on the basis of a dialogue on the term of
territory, which has to be understood in a wider sense than just in its geographical extension, but as the
central space of life, use of resources and indigenous culture. The territory is perceived as a governed
space that is inhabited by a indigenous group that depends fundamentally on the forest for its
reproduction and, therefore, requires a system which guarantees its conservation and the sustainable
use of its resources (ibid:19ff). The legal basis of the CGPSHA as institution is the idea of CTIs
(Circunsripcin Territorial Indgena) that first appeared in the constitution of 1998. Although the basic
concept for the CTIs is anchored in the constitutions of 1998 and 2008 as parts of the regular
administration of the state, any concrete law that defines the structure and functioning of these
institutions still doesnt exist. Since September 2006 the Pueblo Shuar Arutam is recognised as an
indigenous social organisation by CODENPE (Consejo de Desarrollo de Las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del
Ecuador), but not as a territorial government (ibid:34). At the moment the CGPSHA is still working
together with other organisations like ECORAE and AmazonGISnet to be recognised as CTI by the state
and become the role model for other Ecuadorian indigenous territories.
The basis for all activities of the CGPSHA is the strategic planning that was done in form of their
Plan de Vida24. The leadership of the CGPSHA consists of the territorial representatives of the different
associations (Nunkui, Sinip, Mayaik, Santiago, Arutam) together with thematic directors for the topics of
the Plan de Vida (health, education, land and territory, forest, good use of forest and conservation,
communication and energy). National and international NGOs like Fundacin Natura and the GTZ that
supported the process with funds were also incorporated within the project in a horizontal structure
(ibid:27f). Fundacin Natura as the main executing NGO supported the project with constant advice and
activities of three technicians over the years (Employee of the ECORAE in Macas, pers. com. 14 July
2010).
The management of funds is one central point for conflicts within the Shuar people. There is
constant mistrust that the leaders and technicians use the money for personal enrichment. Although the
involved NGOs tried to implement a stable system of accountancy, the doubts from side of the families
24

Available: http://cgsha.wordpress.com/2009/04/12/plan-de-vida-del-pueblo-shuar-arutam/#more-11
(2010-12-01)

82

couldnt be overcome (ibid:31). The mistrust against organisations and technicians from outside the
territory is pretty high; money usually is seen to come from outside with unknown intentions (ibid:36).
This mistrust manifests in one way when external listeners are excluded from negotiations on the plan
for hunting and fishing within the territory, to guarantee that there is no influence from outside
(ibid:127).
Concrete activities to implement the Plan de Vida of the CGPSHA focus on the issues of
establishing a zonification of the territory that assigns areas for strict conservation, low use and
sustainable use, modifying the existing system of education to support the recuperation of traditional
indigenous knowledge, supporting the diffusion of traditional Shuar gardens to strengthen food
sovereignty, designing plans for hunting and fishing to guarantee a good use of natural resources and
constructing a system that allows a better commercialisation of timber. For all these activities further
detailed research is needed to assess their sustainability, their acceptance within the population of the
Pueblo Shuar Arutam and their compatibility with the concept of sumak kawsay.
Summarising the process of creating a new organisational structure for the Shuar people in the
CC it has to be emphasised, that the clash between traditional organisational structures and modern
democratic approaches, the clash between families that still rely on self-subsistence and already
market-integrated ones, and the clash between external structures and the indigenous people in general
leads to conflicts and cultural changes that are very complex and difficult to tackle. The re-construction
of the territory concept, the creation of the organisational structure of the CGPSHA and the design of
concrete actions that are in harmony with the Plan de Vida lasted over 8 years, from 2001 to 2009.
The CGPSHA had been searching for years for ways to sustainably finance the implementation of
their Plan de Vida when they heard about Socio Bosque. Like already described in chapter 5.1.3, they
entered negotiations with the MAE and finally agreed on entering the programme with about 90.000
hectares of forest land. They receive US$ 5 per hectare per year for the conservation of these areas
(Ral Petsain, pers. com. 30 July 2010).

6.3 Comparison of the two projects

Although the outcomes of the projects have still to be examined closer to really evaluate their
success or failing and assess their compatibility with sumak kawsay, we can try to compare the paradigm

83

that underlies the two approaches, the institutional arrangements that constitute the basis of the
projects, and the concrete activities that are meant to serve to improve the living conditions of the
indigenous peoples. However, it must not be forgotten that the GRCH in its original extension only
covered an area of 7.200 hectares while the protected area within the territory of the CGPSHA is about
90.000 hectares. Table 8 gives an overview of the topics for the comparison:

Paradigm / Basic concept

GRCH

CGPSHA

Sustainable Development

Plan de Vida of the CGPSHA

Construction of a new

Project first conducted by GTZ,

indigenous organisation,
Institutional arrangements

management later assigned to

horizontal integration of
FECCHE
Fundacin Natura
Timber certification,
Timber certification,
Agroforestry (Cacao for
Agriculture for self-subsistence
commercialisation),

Main areas for concrete

(Shuar gardens),
Community shops, Gasoline sale,

actions

Reformation of education
Infrastructure,
(traditional knowledge),
Education, Health,
Plan for hunting and fishing
Institutional strengthening

No. technicians for support

Duration of the project

2002 2008

2000 2009

Table 8: Comparison between the projects of GRCH and CGPSHA (GTZ 2010, Fundacin Natura 2010)

The basis for the projects is on one hand the occidental concept of sustainable development
(GRCH) and on the other hand the indigenous rooted Plan de Vida (CGPSHA). While in the case of the
GRCH the GTZ largely designed and implemented the project and assigned the management to the
FECCHE from 2008 on, the project of the CGPSHA was designed and implemented by the very same IPO
from the beginning with support from Fundacin Natura. So for the first two points of comparison it
seems that the project of CGPSHA originates stronger in indigenous cosmovisin. It looks like the
initiative in both cases came from the indigenous peoples, but in the case of the CGPSHA the particular
culture of the Shuar people was explicitly considered and the design of the project was done bottom-

84

up. The focus for the CGPSHA project was put on strengthening the organisational structures of the
Shuar people while in the case of the GRCH the FECCHE was heavily criticised for their incapability to
represent their people adequately, but nearly no measures were set to change this situation. In regard
to the first two aspects of the comparison it seems that the project of the CGPSHA is better compatible
with the concept of sumak kawsay.
The GRCH focuses with its concrete actions mainly on productive activities for access to the
market (timber and cacao production), while the CGPSHA basically puts market focus only on the timber
production and supports the traditional Shuar gardens for self-subsistence. While the spending for
education in the GRCH represent mainly costs of paying teachers, construction of school buildings and
scholarships for students, the CGPSHA starts an effort to reform their whole educational system to
harmonise it better with indigenous cosmovisin. It seems that the GRCH all in all is more orientated
towards integration into the globalised economy and less towards autonomy and self-subsistence than
the project of the CGPSHA. This might be a result of the different approaches on development:
Sustainable development on the one hand and indigenous self-development (autodesarrollo indgena)
on the other hand. It can be seen on this example that the availability of financial means and the
willingness to improve the living conditions of the rural population doesnt lead to self-determined
development per se. Constant attention has to be especially paid to the socialisation of projects within
the communities and the integration of the population into the decision making process.
Both projects had a running time of several years with constant technical assistance. This wont
be true for most areas that join SB. The two mentioned projects can be seen as the pilot areas for the
programme and as its flagships. And even as the project of the CGPSHA is revolutionary for Ecuador
and so far the most ambitious attempt to facilitate indigenous autonomy, it is far from being perfect.
Ral Petsain outlined that the CGPSHA had to downscale their projects and dismiss staff as the complete
implementation of the Plan de Vida would have needed US$ 1 million per year and only about US$
450.000 could be raised via Socio Bosque (pers. com. 30 July 2010). So also the CGPSHA has to struggle
with some aspects of the programme, even as they are fairly well organised and had a strong position to
negotiate the price for their conservation efforts. Other indigenous communities, peoples and
nationalities in Ecuador will have even bigger problems enforcing their concerns. As a functionary of the
CONAIE emphasises, the CGPSHA has a good plan, so the money they receive helps them to realise it,
but the Cofn people for instance dont have that plan and SB leads to big confusion within their
communities (pers. com. 1 October 2010).

85

7 Conclusions
Probably the discussion about the financing of REDD is the most problematic issue on the
international level. Funds are basically only discussed as an instrument for up-front financing and the
ultimate goal seems to be the construction of a global market for forest carbon offsets. The commodity
fetishism (Kosoy & Corbera 2010) that dominates the discussions around REDD clearly contradicts the
principle of sumak kawsay. The reduction of the complexity of ecosystems in the form of itemisation
means a reduction of nature, which is incompatible with the rights of nature that are anchored in the
constitution of Montecristi. The attribution of a single monetary value is the second step that makes the
scheme even less compatible with sumak kawsay as it ignores spiritual values for instance that still play
a central role in indigenous cosmovisin. Furthermore, it is clearly shown, that there has been and still is
major concealing involved in the subject of REDD and SB. The complexity of the sophisticated market
instruments that would control the trade of REDD certificates at the international level creates invisible
power relations, that are subject to the generally high dynamics of the global financial markets and to
manipulation by vested interests. The indigenous peoples have no say in the price of the ecosystem
services that are free for the state to trade and they werent included in any way in the design of the
conservation agreement. Additionally they are badly informed about both, REDD and its manifestation
as SB on a national and regional level and, therefore, are in a bad position for negotiations. So in the
case of REDD, all three aspects of commodity fetishism in relation to PES schemes (invisible values,
invisible complexity, and invisible institutional asymmetries) are given on the international scale. On the
national and regional level it seems that commodity fetishism doesnt play such an immediate role as at
the international level, because the state plays the role of the broker of environmental services
(Hazlewood 2010b) and shields the landowners from the direct market induced effects of
commodification. Nevertheless we can observe processes of primitive accumulation conducted by the
state, as the producers (the indigenous people) are divorced from the means of production by the
agreement for strict conservation, the social means of subsistence and production are transformed into
capital and de facto dispossessed by the state, and the former landowners become wage laborers, in
this case stewards for conservation and monitoring activities. The discussion around the scope of REDD
is also relevant for the research question. To address plantations as forests is not compatible with
forests in the indigenous sense. Monoculture plantations, like encouraged by PROFORESTAL for
instance, with their bad impacts on biodiversity, water levels and in various cases on the socioeconomic
situation of the local people are not compatible with sumak kawsay. The definition of forests as
proposed by UNFCCC is reducing the complexity of the ecosystem forest to a mere accumulation of

86

trees. Another critical issue is the definition of degradation. It has to be assured on an international level
that the local people that inhabit the forest are not criminalised for using it. Conservation in a wider
sense has been compatible with the traditional use by the indigenous peoples for centuries. Concerning
the scale of REDD theres pretty wide consensus that the national state has to fulfill central tasks like
regulation and monitoring. Ecuador in this case takes action. Theres a clear signal from side of the
government that Ecuador wants to participate in a global mechanism to reduce deforestation. However,
it is questionable to promote the programme SB with the very same win-win propaganda that is also
diffused for neoliberal conservation on international level by TNCs and BINGOs and that simply ignores
central uncertainties and flaws in the model.
On the national level the discrimination of holders of common land titles by the incentive
system of the programme is another fact that is obviously not in accordance with sumak kawsay. The
same is true for the bad information policy and the exclusion of the IPOs from the design of SB, which
offend against the principles of participation (Art. 278 of the constitution of Montecristi) and free, prior
and informed consent. The design of the contracts reveals the highly disproportional balance of power
between uninformed indigenous communities and organisations and the central government that can
quit contracts anytime. This leads to the maybe severest of all contradictions with sumak kawsay: SB is
no guarantee for the conservation and protection of the forests, as raw material extraction is state
priority and the programme is designed to only protect the forest from the uncontrolled access of the
local population to its resources. Anyway the programme is marketed by the MAE without any hint on
this issue. The facts are completely twisted by pretending to protect the forest. Furthermore, the
association of SB with REDD on the international scale is only mentioned if really necessary. The MAE is
very cautious with regard to the linkage of SB to REDD and PES schemes, as most IPOs oppose these
mechanisms. Summarising major concealing of facts can be clearly observed around SB that makes it
highly dangerous for indigenous communities to subscribe their areas to the programme. The facts that
indigenous communities and organisations are addressed directly by the programme without respecting
the grown structures of the indigenous movement, left largely alone with the work of conservation and
receive only minor support in planning and implementation of projects (basically just to fill out the form
for the investment plans), constitute an environmental fix of the fourth kind in the sense of Castree
(2008). Responsibilities for the outcomes of neoliberal conservation are assigned as far as possible to
indigenous communities and additionally the communities have to manage their own education and
health systems and even plan future infrastructure measures like the construction of pipes for water
supply. The state is basically only involved in the monitoring of the project areas and the evaluation of
87

the outcomes of the investment plans. With these tasks he justifies his claim on (the large) part of the
expected future international payments and his outsourcing-activities concerning the tasks that he is
obligated to provide by law. This situation mirrors in the programme contracts, with only three
obligations to fulfil for the government but fifteen to comply with for the landowners, and the design of
the investment plans that dictate the communities how to use their money. SB here follows a path,
which is clearly not compatible with the solidary concept of sumak kawsay.
As the comparison between the two projects on the regional level has shown, theres a wide
variety of projects that can potentially qualify for SB (with or without help from NGOs, conducted mainly
by NGOs or conducted by the indgenas themselves, etc.). From side of the MAE there are no criteria
that guarantee a development in accordance with sumak kawsay. The only obligation is to present an
investment plan to the MAE, but there are basically no criteria for the assessment of the very same. It
has to be emphasised here again, that the two projects are the prototypes for all other regions, have
been planned for years and were constantly supported by technicians, but still show certain problems in
their execution. As both project documentations, a functionary of the CONAIE (pers. com. 1 October
2010), and even a functionary of the MAE (pers. com. 8 June 2010) outline, the majority of the
indigenous population doesnt have much experience with the management of financial resources and
the mere availability of money within the communities often leads to conflicts, mistrust and accusations.
It has to be assumed that the paying of incentives to indigenous communities that have a weak
organisational structure and only receive minor support by national or international institutions will lead
to investments that dont show any sustainable positive effect on a future self-determined
development. Furthermore, it has to be reminded once again that only one functionary of the MAE in
Quito is in charge for all investment plans in the countrywide SB-areas.
Whether the government can achieve the goals for SB that were described in chapter 3 is
doubtful. To protect 4 million hectares of forest with the program would mean to integrate virtually all
remaining areas with primary forest cover. This seems unlikely, considering the strong rejection of SB by
wide parts of the indigenous movement. A significant reduction of GHG emissions can only be achieved
by the implementation of a nationwide monitoring system. However, the development of forest control
strategies is just beginning and will probably take several years to reach a level of implementation
sufficient for evaluation. Finally it has to be doubted, whether it will be possible to improve the quality
of life of the rural indigenous population by annually paying them an average amount of US$ 34,26 per

88

head and in return making them responsible to care on their own for basic services like health and
education.
Summarising it seems that the Governments of the Citizens Revolution understanding of, and
policy on development leads to the following priorities that affect mainly the indigenous population in
the Amazon region:
1.

Extraction of the available crude oil and mineral resources justified by the arguments for a
phase of new developmentalism mentioned in chapter 2.1. These measures constitute an
environmental fix of the third kind in the sense of Castree (2008). Although exploitation is
state led and only conducted by TNCs, which seems to break with the neoliberal ideology at
the first look, it clearly leads to a well-known subsumption of nature within the capitalistic
mode of production, to environmental degradation and to heavy socio-economic impacts and
is not compatible with the concept of sumak kawsay.

2.

Integration of the remaining forest areas into the international efforts for an ecological fix of
capitalism, that is characterised in Ecuador by a greater role for the state in the execution of
policies, the remaining in place of social programmes (Gudynas 2009b:40) and several forms of
neoliberalisation of nature in the sense of Castree (2008) on different levels of scale.

Socio Bosque plays a crucial role in the Ecuadorian strategies to implement this ecological fix.
The left wing government of Ecuador tolerates the neoliberal push on commodification of nature as long
as they can play an active part in it and because this kind of approach is functional to the trade in
natural resources, and so does not contradict the present version of the ideology of progress. (Gudynas
2009b:39) As Hazlewood (2010b) argues, the functioning model of Socio Bosque represents a
prolongation of the extraction based economy that ruled Ecuador for the last decades and doesnt
promote the socioeconomic change that is needed and whose basis is founded in the constitution of
Montecristi. Even worse, the Ecuadorian state and peoples get entangled within new imperialistic
relations by performing this ecological fix, as it prolongs the dependency on international financial
transactions. By territorialisation vast forest areas will be dedicated to the production of emission
offsets for Annex 1 countries of the Kyoto protocol and wont be available for the self-determined
development of the indigenous population. Emission offsetting in this way appears as CO2lionalism,
currently supported by the central government in Quito and a network of international NGOs and

89

development agencies. Thereby long-standing exploitative relationships and processes are reinvigorated
on the local level (Bachram 2004:8).
Besides the direct contradictions with sumak kawsay, SB and the efforts around REDD in general
entail a critical side effect: In 2007 Ecuador went public with a revolutionary proposal; to abandon oil
exploitation within the Yasun National Park, if funding can be found that compensates the state for the
lost revenues. Since then the Yasun initiative has met wide responses throughout media (e.g. Neuber
2008, 2009, Gabbert & Reineke 2007, Hlcke 2010) and found supporters all over the world, for instance
the government of Germany. Although there have been drawbacks by president Correa and several
people of the committee that negotiated the conditions for the initiative resigned, there is still the hope
of many ecologists and social movements that Ecuador could abandon oil exploitation in the Yasun. In
August 2010 the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) and Ecuador finally agreed on the
establishment of a 2,7 billion Euro fund for the initiative (Scheer 2010). But in September 2010 the
German Minister for Development Dirk Niebel announced that Germany wont support the proposal
anymore. One argument for the turnaround of Niebel was doubt if the Yasun initiative would bring
comparative advantages to the REDD mechanism and Socio Bosque (Lang 2010, Ortiz 2010), although
there is one substantial difference between the concepts visible at first sight: SB promotes the
questionable equivalency between above-ground and under-ground carbon, while the Yasun initiative
protects the forest AND keeps the fossil carbon underground. In a response to the letter of Niebel,
Acosta (2010b) criticises SB and calls the civil society to be cautious about alleged solutions for climate
change and the NGO Oilwatch sent a letter to the German Bundestag where they emphasise the
importance of a solution to climate change alternative to emission trading (Dilger 2010).
.

90

8 Discussion
The analysis has shown that serious contradictions exist between the concept of sumak kawsay
or buen vivir and the nationwide programme Socio Bosque with its implications on the regional scale
and its linkage to the mechanism of REDD on the international scale. Due to the short running time of
SB, its still very early to assess outcomes of the programme on the regional scale. More research and
particular case studies have to be conducted to be able to evaluate regional impacts. It will be very
interesting to observe the development of the Pueblo Shuar Arutam and document their experiences
during the years to come.
As the efforts to integrate REDD into an international post-2012 agreement on climate change
mitigation strategies wont seize, it seems very important for the indigenous peoples and organisations
to deal somehow with the growing interest in conserving their territories. And it must not be forgotten
that the basic idea to pay for conservation efforts is probably better compatible with indigenous culture
and way of life than industrial extraction of raw materials. Regarding the ever growing pressure for oil,
mineral and timber extraction, it seems very unlikely that the indigenous peoples can preserve their
traditional position outside the capitalist system anyway. The pragmatic hope lies on finding a
compromise between full integration within the market economy and a subsistence way of live, that still
allows a self-determined development in harmony with indigenous cosmovisin. It will be necessary to
strengthen IPO structures to assure that they are capable to deal with the growing interest in their
territories from outside. One effort in this direction is the official registration of indigenous territories as
CTIs to guarantee the nationalities sovereign and common rights on all resources within their
boundaries. Without this clarification of sovereignty it seems highly reprehensible to conclude contracts
with landowners. The task of the plurinational state of Ecuador is to respect and guarantee these rights.
The declaration of CTIs could even bring a solution for the controversial article 74 of the constitution of
Montecristi; if the CTIs are recognised as part of the regular division of the administration of the state,
the indigenous peoples have the full rights and power to decide about the commercialisation of
environmental services.
The creation of institutional arrangements that support a development in accordance with the
principles of sumak kawsay, plurinationality and rights of nature is a very complex task that can never be
fulfilled by one programme like Socio Bosque, as Carlos Viteri, indigenous anthropologist and director of
the ECORAE explains (pers. com. 8 July 2010). He emphasises that the struggles of indigenous peoples
start to enter the discussion on an international level and that the states of Ecuador and Bolivia changed

91

the legal framework to replace a paradigm of development that was installed by blood and fire by the
historical colonisers (ibid). The dialogue for a new paradigm is just beginning; a well-designed
mechanism for payments for environmental services could potentially facilitate the needed change and
even yield financial benefits for the state budget, which will be indispensable to compensate the lost
revenues from raw material exportation in the case of Ecuador. However, ecosystem services must not
be understood as a set of valued commodities, but as a service that is provided by the indigenous
peoples that have acted as the guardians of their territories for centuries. Clearly, strong efforts will be
needed on all geographical scales to work out a model that can be in harmony with the principle of
sumak kawsay.
The first step would be for the government to search the real participation of IPOs for the design
of a programme. Contracts have to be negotiated by both parties and the project must only be
implemented in areas where the sovereignty and functioning of indigenous administration is
guaranteed. The access to the programme could be bound to the existence of a registered CTI for
instance. Part of the CTI should be a Plan de Vida, in which the communities autonomously specify their
strategic vision of development for the next twenty years (at least the same period as the running time
of conservation agreements), so that there is a solid basis to work out concrete investment plans and
not a loose set of individual actions that are approved by the centralised structures of the MAE in Quito.
For the planning of the concrete actions the landowners should have the possibility to consult external
advice for free if they want or to plan it on their own, as they already have shown that they do have the
ability to do so by completing the complicated bureaucratic steps to become a CTI.
Of course these steps also demand of the IPOs to rethink their position on the mechanism of
REDD. An absolute rejection of the mechanism will exclude them automatically from negotiations on all
levels. It would be better to rethink Ecuadors official position on REDD together with the IPOs and
develop an approach that fits better to the demands of sumak kawsay. Such a proposal would have to
be socialised and coordinated with other governments, for instance within the ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana
para los Pueblos de Nuestra Amrica) or the UNASUR (Unin de Naciones Suramericanas), to strengthen
its position on an international level. A proposal for REDD in accordance with sumak kawsay would
exclude commercial plantations from the approach, as they cannot be addressed as forests in the sense
of indigenous cosmovisin, and clearly reject a market based approach that promotes the
commodification of nature. The challenge is to protect the remaining primary forests of the world and
the peoples that inhabit these areas by strengthening their organisations and improve their ability to

92

defend themselves against undesired development imposed from outside. To make this possible it is
also necessary to secure the access to health and education in remote rural areas. The financing of
concrete measures has to be orientated on the need for social investments and not on the availability of
abstract environmental services that are itemised and valued economically. If the population of the
Ecuadorian Amazon region can be provided with free health care, education and basic infrastructure, so
that they can lead a life in dignity and relative autonomy, they will pay attention to their environment as
it is part of their culture to conserve the forest, their spiritual home. Potential sources for the financing
of such an alternative, not market-orientated mechanism are well known; for instance a global carbon
tax or a tax on financial transactions.
However, it seems that a solution worked out with the participation of IPOs wont become true,
especially not on the international level and not in the near future. As long as they are excluded from
negotiations on all levels by vested interests, indigenous communities, peoples and nationalities should
act very cautiously with regard to contracts on conservation of their territories.

93

9 References
Acosta, A. (2004): Erdl in Ecuador. In: Prokla, 135, 34, 2, 199-222.

Acosta, A. (2010a): A los tres aos de gobierno de la revolucin ciudadana.

<http://www.diariocolatino.com/es/20100113/perspectivas/75633/> (2010-09-23)

Acosta, A. (2010b): Alberto Acosta rechaza posible incumplimiento de Alemania.

<http://www.amazoniaporlavida.org/es/Noticias/alberto-acosta-rechaza-posible-incumplimiento-dealemania.html> (2010-12-14)

Acosta, A. (2010c): El buen vivir, una utopa por (re)construir. In: Boletn ECOS 11.
<http://www.fuhem.es/cip-ecosocial/boletin-ecos/numero.aspx?n=11> (2010-12-17)

Acosta, A. & F. Falcon (2005): Otra poltica econmica, deseable y posible. In: Acosta, A. & F. Falcon
(eds.): Asedios a lo imposible. Propuestas econmicas en construccin. Quito: FLACSO. 17-38.

Altvater, E. (2008): Kohlenstoffzyklus und Kapitalkreislauf eine Tragdie der Atmosphre. In:
Altvater, E. & A. Brunnengrber (eds.): Ablasshandel gegen Klimawandel? Marktbasierte Instrumente in
der globalen Klimapolitik und ihre Alternativen. Hamburg: VSA.

Angelsen, A. (ed.) (2008): Moving ahead with REDD: Issues, options and implications. Bogor: CIFOR.

Angelsen, A., C. Streck, L. Peskett, J. Brown & C. Luttrell (2008): What is the right scale for REDD? In:
Angelsen, A. (ed.): Moving ahead with REDD: Issues, options and implications. Bogor: CIFOR.

Arciniegas, P. (2009): Neodesarrollismo extractivista. In: Voces del Sur.

<http://resistenciadelsur.blogspot.com/2009/01/neodesarrollismo-extractivista.html> (2010-09-29)

Bachram, H. (2004): Climate Fraud and Carbon Colonialism: The New Trade in Greenhouse Gases. In:
Capitalism Nature Socialism, 15, 4, 1-16.

94

Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2011): Value of the global carbon market increases by 5% in 2010 but
volumes decline. Press Release. <http://bnef.com/Download/pressreleases/133/pdffile/> (2011-04-19)
Bonilla, B. (2010): Max Lascano Socio Bosque REDD. Accin Ecolgica.
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dxf6je5G8wE&feature=channel_video_title> (2011-04-19)

Bresser-Pereira, L. (2009): From old to new Developmentalism in Latin America. Textos para Discusso,
193. So Paulo: Escola de Economia de So Paulo.
Bresser-Pereira, L. & J. Oreiro (2010): Keynesianismo vulgar y el neo-desarrollismo. In: La Onda digital.
<http://www.bresserpereira.org.br/articles/2010/10.01.LaOnda-Keynesianismo_vulgar.pdf>
(2010-09-28)

Birk, N. (2009): The Participatory Process of Ecuadors Constituent Assembly 2007/2008. Masters
Thesis, Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam.
Burbach, R. (2010): Ecuador's President Correa Faces Off With Indigenous and Social Movements. In:
NACLA North American Congress on Latin America. <https://nacla.org/node/6378> (2010-09-27)

Castree, N. (2008): Neoliberalising nature: the logics of deregulation and reregulation. In: Environment
and Planning A, 40, 131-152.

Castro Diaz, E. (2008): REDD, Forests and Indigenous Peoples Rights. In: Forest Cover, 27, 5-6.

Chisaguano, S. (2006): La poblacin indgena del Ecuador. Anlisis de estadsticas socio-demogrficas.

Quito: INEC.

CCBA (2009): Estndares Sociales y Ambientales para REDD+. Informe de Reuniones de Consulta,
Octubre 22-26 2009, Ecuador. <http://www.climatestandards.org/REDD+/docs/new/REDD+_Informe_de_Consulta_Ecuador_11-30-09.pdf> (2010-12-17)

CIA (2010): The World Factbook. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>

(2010-09-23)

95

COICA (2009): Declaracin de la Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indgenas de la Cuenca Amaznica.

<http://earthpeoples.org/blog/?tag=coica-amazon-redd-landrights-undrip> (2010-12-17)

CONAIE (2010): ECUARUNARI: frente a REDD y las falsas soluciones al cambio climtico.
<http://www.conaie.org/component/content/article/4-noits4/310-ecuarunari-frente-a-redd-y-lasfalsas-soluciones-al-cambio-climatico> (2010-12-17)

CONFENIAE (2008): Plan de Vida de CONFENIAE. <http://shuarpiankas.blogspot.com/2010/04/plan-devida-de-confeniae.html> (2010-06-03)

CONFENIAE (2009): Pronunciamiento. Unin Base, Puyo 03 agosto 2009. <http://www.reddmonitor.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/CONFENIAE-REDDD_FI.pdf> (2010-06-03)

Corbera, E., M. Estrada & K. Brown (2010): Reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and
forest degradation in developing countries: revisiting the assumptions. In: Climatic Change, 100, 3-4,
355-388.

Davalos, P. (2008): El Sumak Kawsay (Buen vivir) y las cesuras del desarrollo.
<http://oclacc.org/redes/teologia/files/2009/10/pablo-davalos-2008-sumak-kawsay-y-las-cesuras-deldesarrollo.pdf> (2010-09-29)

Densham, A., R. Czebiniak, D. Kessler & R. Skar (2009): Carbon Scam: Noel Kempff Climate Action Project
and the Push for Sub-national Forest Offsets. Sub-prime carbon brought to you by AEP, BP, and
Pacificorp. Amsterdam: Greenpeace International.

Dilger, G. (2010a): l statt Dschungel. In: TAZ, 22 September 2010.

Dilger, G. (2010b): Yasun-ITT, Herr Niebel und der Emissionshandel.

<http://blogs.taz.de/latinorama/2010/09/23/yasun-itt_herr_niebel_und_der_emissionshandel_/>
(2010-12-14)

Eilperin, J. (2009): Use of Forests as Carbon Offsets Fails to Impress In First Big Trial. Project in Bolivia
Keeps Trees Standing But Has Little Clear Effect on Emissions. In: Washington Post, 15 October 2009.

96

Escobar, A. (2009): Una minga para el postdesarrollo. In: America Latina en Movimiento, 445, 26-30.

FAO (2005): Evaluacin de los recursos forestales mundiales 2005. Informe nacional. Ecuador.
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/ai854S/ai854S00.pdf> (2010-12-16)

FAO (2006): Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005. Progress towards sustainable forest
management. FAO Forestry Paper 147. Rome: FAO.
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/A0400E/A0400E00.pdf> (2010-09-26)

Gabbert, K. & S. Reineke (2007): Erdl: Fordern statt frdern. In: : Die Wochenzeitung WOZ, 24.05.2007.
<http://www.uni-kassel.de/fb5/frieden/regionen/Ecuador/oel.html> (2010-02-19)

Glassman, J. (2006): Primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossesion, accumulation by extraeconomic means. In: Progress in Human Geography, 30, 5, 608-625.

Gudynas, E. (2009a): Seis puntos claves en ambiente y desarrollo. In: Acosta, A. & E. Martnez: El Buen
Vivir. Una va para el desarrollo. Quito: Ediciones Abya-Yala. 39-50.

Gudynas, E. (2009b): Climate change and capitalisms ecological fix in Latin America. In: Critical Currents,
6, 36-41.

Gudynas, E. (2010): Si eres tan progresista Por qu destruyes la naturaleza? Neoextractivismo,

izquierda y alternativas. In: Ecuador Debate, 79, 61-81.

Ha, H.M., N. N. Lung, D. Diem, D. T. Hoan, P. T. Thuy, D. Thomas & N. T. Hien (2009): Reducing emissions
from all land uses - REALU: What will Vietnam's path be? Initial findings of the scoping study. Hanoi:
World Agroforestry Centre Vietnam.

Harvey, D. (2003): Die Geographie des neuen Imperialismus: Akkumulation durch Enteignung. In:
Zeller, C.: Die globale Enteignungskonmie. Mnster: Westflisches Dampfboot. 183-216.

Hazlewood, J. (2010a): Ms all de la crisis econmica: CO2lonialismo y geografas de esperanza. In:

Iconos, 36, 81-95.

97

Hazlewood, J. (2010b): From an extraction based economy to an ecological services based economy in
Ecuador: Taking steps towards a revolutionary post-extraction development paradigm? Unpublished.

Herold, A., G. Cunha Zeri, J. Dietz, A. Freibauer, M. Httner, M. Jung, D. Mollicone, & M. Scheffler (2008):
Bercksichtigung von Treibhausgasemissionen und -festlegungen durch Landnutzungsmanahmen
(LULUCF) im Post-Kioto-Regime. Quantitative Analyse zur Einbeziehung von reduzierter Entwaldung in
ein knftiges Klimaregime. Berlin: ko-Institut.

Hey, J. & T. Klak (1999): From Protectionism Towards Neoliberalism: Ecuador Across Four
Administrations (1981 1996). In: Studies in Comparative International Development, 34, 3, 66-97.

Hlcke, O. (2010): Yassuni-Projekt in Gefahr. In: Junge Welt, 16.01.2010. <http://www.unikassel.de/fb5/frieden/regionen/Ecuador/yasuni.html> (2010-02-19)

Hbenthal, A., F. Starnfeld & D. Carrin (2010): The Forests Dialogue. Field Dialogue on REDD Readiness
in Ecuador 15 18 June 2010 / Papallacta, Ecuador. Background Paper.
http://environment.yale.edu/tfd/uploads/TFD_REDD_Ecuador_BackgroundPaper_ENG.pdf (2010-12-17)

IEN (2009): Reaping profits from Evictions, land grabs, Deforestation and Destruction of biodiversity
(REDD). <http://www.ienearth.org/REDD/index.html> (2010-12-17)

Igoe, J. & D. Brockington (2007): Neoliberal Conservation: A Brief Introduction. In: Conservation and
Society, 5, 4, 432-449.

Inter-American Development Bank (2004): Sending Money Home: Remittance to Latin America and the
Caribbean. < http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=547263> (2010-09-23)

IIPFCC (2010): Press Release. Indigenous Peoples Declare Minimum Requirements for Climate Accord.
<http://s3.amazonaws.com/files.posterous.com/justicenecology/0qbFiWyL2q9jP3kD5zy8DpBpIlc4vJBm
RG5QzPesYL0ejDRz5mRcmgdr90Ox/IIPFCC_Press_Release_1.12.10_E.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=1C9REJR1E
MRZ83Q7QRG2&Expires=1292498118&Signature=mlI8uds935Tp7XeaTpHGmm0qYqE%3D>
(2010-12-16)

98

Karsenty, A. (2008): The architecture of proposed REDD schemes after Bali: facing critical choices. In:
International Forestry Review, 10, 3, 443-457.

Katz, C. (2007): Sozialismus oder Neuauflage kapitalistischer Entwicklungsmodelle. In: INPREKORR,

430/431. <http://inprekorr.de/ipk430.htm> (2010-12-17)

KfW Entwicklungsbank (2010): Programm Waldschutz. Waldschutz und REDD in Ecuador.

<http://www.kfwentwicklungsbank.de/DE_Home/Laender_Programme_und_Projekte/Lateinamerika/Ecuador/Programm
_-_Waldschutz/index.jsp> (2011-04-20)

Kosoy, N. & E. Corbera (2010): Payments for ecosystem services as commodity fetishism. In: Ecological
Economics, 69, 1228-1236.

Lang, C. (2009): More questions than answers on carbon trading in PNG. In: REDD-Monitor.
<http://www.redd-monitor.org/2009/09/11/more-questions-than-answers-on-carbon-trading-in-png/>
(2010-12-17)

Lang, C. (2010): Joining the little REDD dots: Stories from the world of carbon trading.
<http://www.redd-monitor.org/2010/10/01/joining-the-little-redd-dots-stories-from-the-world-ofcarbon-trading/> (2010-12-17)

Latorre Toms, S. (2008): El pago de servicios ambientales por conservacin de la biodiversidad como
instrument para el desarrollo con identidad. Caso La Gran Reserva Chachi, cantn Eloy Alfaro, provincial
de Esmeraldas. Masters Thesis. Quito: FLACSO.

Livengood, E. & A. Dixon (2009): REDD and the effort to limit global warming to 2C: Implications for
including REDD credits in the international carbon market. Wellington: KEA 3 Limited.

Lohman, L. (2006): Carbon Trading. A critical conservation on climate change, privatisation and power.
Development Dialogue 48. Uppsala: The Dag Hammarskjld Centre.

Lovera, S. (2008): REDD Without Rules: Another Disaster In The Making. In: Forest Cover 27, 3-5.

99

Marambio, J. (2010): Entrevista a Leonardo Ogaz sobre la Revolucin ciudadana.

<http://www.kaosenlared.net/noticia/entrevista-leonardo-ogaz-sobre-revolucion-ciudadana-realizadajorge-ma> (2010-09-29)

Martnez Novo, C. (2010): Etnodesarrollo y derechos indgenas en la Revolucin Ciudadana: avances,

ambigedades y retrocesos. Discourse at the Congreso Internacional sobre Etnicidad, Desarrollo y
Pueblos Indgenas (2010-07-08). Quito: FLACSO.

Millenium Ecosystem Assessment (2005): Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Synthesis. Washington:
Island Press.

MAE (ed.) (2009a): Acuerdo Ministerial No. 115. Manual Operativo Socio Bosque.
<http://www.ambiente.gov.ec/contenido.php?cd=278> (2010-06-03)

MAE (ed.) (2009b): Convenio de Ejecucin del Proyecto Socio Bosque entre el Ministerio del Ambiente y
Norma Nombres y Apellidos. <http://www.ambiente.gov.ec/contenido.php?cd=278> (2010-11-04)

MAE (2009c): Manual para elaborar un plan de inversin en forma participativa (Version Agosto 2009).
Unpublished document.

MAE (2010a): Socio Bosque: Primer ao de implementacin 2008 2009. Quito.

MAE (2010b): El mundo se salva si cada uno hace su parte. Suplemento institucional, 5 de Junio del
2010.

MAE (2010c): Mapa de Priorizacin Programmea Socio Bosque ene2010. Unpublished document.

MAE (2010d): Que es el proyecto Socio Bosque?

<http://www.ambiente.gob.ec/userfiles/5117/file/Presentaci%C3%B3n%20Socio%20Bosque.pdf>
(2010-10-29)

100

MAE (2010e): Evaluacin de los Planes de Inversin Individuales y Colectivos del Programmea Socio
Bosque. Unpublished document.

Misoczky, M. (2010): Socio-environmental conflicts and opposing perspectives of development in South

America.
<http://www.egosnet.org/jart/prj3/egosnet/data/uploads/LAEMOS%202010/ST_1_Misoczky_LAEMOS2010.doc> (2010-09-29)

Neuber, H. (2008): Ecuadors Vorschlag an die Industriestaaten. In: Neues Deuschland, 09.12.2008.
<http://www.uni-kassel.de/fb5/frieden/regionen/Ecuador/oel3.html> (2010-02-19)

Neuber, H. (2009): Die Menschen in den Frderregionen drfen nicht bergangen werden. In: Neues
Deutschland, 30.06.2009. <http://www.uni-kassel.de/fb5/frieden/regionen/Ecuador/oel4.html>
(2010-02-19)

Ortiz, G. (2010): Spanien zahlt fr Yasun. <http://www.klimaretter.info/umwelt/hintergrund/7305spanien-zahlt-fuer-yasuni> (2010-12-14)

Ortiz, P. (2008): Ecuador. In: Wessendorf, K. (ed.): El Mundo Indgena 2008. Copenhague: Grupo
Internacional de Trabajo sobre Asuntos Indgenas (IWGIA), 150-159.
Pacari, N. (2009): Naturaleza y territorio desde la mirada de los pueblos indgenas. In: Acosta, A. & E.
Martnez: Derechos de la Naturaleza. El futuro es ahora. Quito: Ediciones Abya-Yala. 30-38.

PEP (2008): Making REDD work for the poor. A Poverty Environment Partnership (PEP) Policy Brief.
<http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/redd_paper___web.pdf> (2010-12-17)

Peripecias (2008): CONAIE rompe relaciones con Correa. Resoluciones de la Asamblea Extraordinaria de
las Nacionalidades y Pueblos Indgenas del Ecuador. In: Peripecias 98.
<http://www.peripecias.com/ciudadania/535EcuadorConaieDeclaracion.html> (2010-09-27)

Point Carbon (2008): Global Carbon Market Worth 2 trillion by 2020. Press Release.
<http://www.pointcarbon.com/aboutus/pressroom/pressreleases/1.918641> (2011-04-19)

101

Ponce, A. (2008): Anlisis post-referndum Ecuador: potencialidades y encrucijadas de "la Revolucin

Ciudadana". TINKU Informacin Alternativa. <http://www.tinku.org/content/view/3404/82/> (2010-0929)

PWCCC (2010): Final Conclusions working group 14: Forests.

<http://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/04/29/final-conclusions-working-group-14-forests/> (2010-12-17)

Quintero, R. (2009): Las innovaciones conceptuales de la Constitucin de 2008 y el Sumak Kawsay. In:
Acosta, A. & E. Martnez: El Buen Vivir. Una va para el desarrollo. Quito: Ediciones Abya-Yala. 75-92.

Ramos, Y. (2011): Socio Bosque: Another face of green capitalism. In: Cabello, J. & T. Gilbertson (Eds.):
NO REDD! A Reader. Carbon Trade Watch. <http://www.wrm.org.uy/publications/REDDreaderEN.pdf>
(2011-04-19)

Rodas, G. (2010): El gobierno de Rafael Correa no es un rgimen socialista sino neodesarrollista. In: El
Universo. <http://www.eluniverso.com/2010/05/15/1/1355/el-gobierno-rafael-correa-un-regimensocialista-sino-neodesarrollista.html> (2010-09-29)

Sasaki, N. & F. Putz (2009): Critical need for new denitions of forest and forest degradation in
global climate change agreement. In: Conservation Letters xx, 1-7.

Simoner, M. (2010): Uno warnt vor Weltherrschaft der Mafia. In: Der Standard, 22 June 2010.

Skutsch, M. & M. McCall (2010): Reassessing REDD: governance, markets and the hype cycle. An editoral
comment. In: Climatic Change 100, 3-4, 395-402.

Spash, C. (2009): The Brave New World of Carbon Trading. MPRA Paper 19114. <http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/19114/> (2010-06-03)

Stern, N. (2006): Stern Review on the economics of climate change. The National Archives.
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/stern_review_report.c
fm> (2010-12-17)

102

Thomas, C. (2010a): Forest carbon offsets: Low-hanging fruit in the garden of evil environmentalism.
Starbroeknews. <http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/features/06/13/forest-carbon-offsets-lowhanging-fruit-in-the-garden-of-evil-environmentalism/> (2010-12-17)

Thomas, C. (2010b): Gaming the carbon market with toxic forest-carbon offset projects.
Starbroeknews.
<http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/features/06/20/%E2%80%98gaming%E2%80%99-the-carbonmarket-with-toxic-forest-carbon-offset-projects/> (2010-12-17)

Thomas, C. (2010c): Buyers beware: Brigands and organized criminals threaten the global carbon
market. Starbroeknews. <http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/features/06/27/buyers-bewarebrigands-and-organized-criminals-threaten-the-global-carbon-market/> (2010-12-17)

Thomas, C. (2010d): REDD and poor rainforest countries: The unfolding of a global scam. Starbroeknews.
<http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/features/07/04/redd-and-poor-rainforest-countries-theunfolding-of-a-global-scam/> (2010-12-17)

UNFCCC (2002): Report of the Conference of the Parties on its fifteenth session, held at Marrakesh from
29 October to 10 November 2001. Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of Parties.
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf> (2010-12-17)

UNFCCC (2010): Report of the Conference of the Parties on its fifteenth session, held in Copenhagen
from 7 to 19 December 2009. Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its fifteenth
session. Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties.
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf#page=3> (2010-12-17)

Vidal, J. (2010): United Nations warned that corruption is undermining grants to stop logging. In: The
Observer, 4 July 2010.

Viteri, C. (2002): Visin indgena del desarrollo en la Amazona. In: Polis 3.

<http://www.revistapolis.cl/polis%20final/3/doc/viteri3.doc> (2010-12-17)

Walsh, C. (2010): Development as Buen Vivir: Institutional arrangements and (de)colonial

entanglements. In: Development 53, 15-21.

103

Webber, J.R. (2010): Indigenous Struggle, Ecology, and Capitalist Resource Extraction in Ecuador. An
Interview with Marlon Santi. In: The Bullet, Socialist Project, E-Bulletin 391.
<http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/391.php> (2010-09-27)

World Bank Carbon Finance Unit (2010): Carbon Funds & Facilities at the World Bank.
<http://go.worldbank.org/51X7CH8VN0> (2010-12-17)

Wray, N. (2009): Los retos del rgimen de desarrollo. El Buen Vivir en la Constitucin. In: Acosta, A. & E.
Martnez: El Buen Vivir. Una va para el desarrollo. Quito: Ediciones Abya-Yala. 51-62.

104