I

HERACLITUS
SEMINAR
1966/67

MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND EUCEN FINK

Tr-,mslaled by
Charles H. Scibcrt

TilE UNIVERSln' OF ALABAMA I)RESS

University, Aidbama

ACKNO WLEDG MENTS

CON TEN TS

The tranSlal or gr.uefu lly acknow ledges permiMion to quote from

copyrightl..-d works as follows: (I) from G. S. Kirk, HemdiLus: TIu: Cosmic
Frogmnlls. edited ~'ith an Introdu ction and Comme ntary (Cambr idge:
Cambridge Unh'ers ity Press, 1970): (2) from G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven,
The
PmOlTo tk PltiJosQphm: A Critiol HUla,., UJiIh 11 Sel/um oJTtxts
(Cambr idge:
Cambri dge Uni"ersity PreM, 1957): (3) from Friedrich HOldniin;
Pomu &
Fragmmts, tr'.tnslated by Michael Hambu rger (Ann Arbor: Univers
ity of
Michigan Press. 1966): and (4) from A/o.ic Poems by Friedric h H6lderl
in.
tr'dnslatcd by Elizabeth Hender son. copyrig ht 1962 b)' Elizabe
th
Hcndcr son. publisht.'Cl by Oswakl Wolff (Publishers) Ltd., London
.

Transl ator's Forew ord

vu

Preface to the Germa n Edition

1
2

xiii

Mode of Proced ure.-B eginni ng with Fragm ent 54 (Corre lated

Fragm ents: 41, 1,50,4 7)

Herme neutka l Cirde. -Relat edness of fv and navw (Corre lated

Fragm ents: 1, 7,80,1 0,29, gO, 41, 5g, 90,100 ,102,1 08,114 )
15
:n:6.vta-6).a, :n:6:vta Ov'ta- Differ ent Exposition of Fragm ent 7
(Corre lated Fragm ent 67).-:n:civ tQ3tt6v (Fragm ent
II).-M aturat ion Charac ter of the Seasons (Fragm ent 100)

27

Library of Congft: slI Cataiog ing in Publica tion Data

Heideg ger. Manin, 1889-19 76.

Hcracli lus Semina r, 1966167.
Transla tioll of Herakli t. whK.h is a summa ry of the
papers from the Heradi tus Semina r hekl al I~ Univcrsity
of ..rcibur g i. 81'.. during the wimcr semeste r 1966-1967.

I. Heracli tus. of Ephesu s-Addr esses. essays, Iturcs .

I. "ink. [ugen. joint author.

8223.H 4313
182'.4
ISBN 0-8173-6628-8

11. Title.
78-2726 1

800 2

Trdnsla tcd ilHo English from Htralt.lil,

cop)'rig ht 1970 hy Viuorio Klostcr mann Verlag.
English tr:mslaliOIl and addend a
Copy.iglu 1979 hy
The Ullin:rs ity of Alabam a Press
All righl5 rcsen'cd
he Ulliled State!> of AmericOi
O~S'yjfaclUrcd

ZZ

'1-fAlOl;, Daylig ht-Nig ht,

~QO.-ytQI.W"[a(Corre lated Fragm ents:

94.12 0.99.3 .6.57, lOO, 123)

37

The Proble m of a Speculative Explka tion.-1 tUQ Ctdt;,oxrv and

time? (Fragm ent gO)

49

1ti'.tQ and :n:avtn (Corre lated Fragm ents: 30. 124,66 ,76,31
)

61

Difference of Interpr etation : Trulh of Being (Fragm ent 16) or

Cosmological Perspective (Frdgm ent 54).-H eraclit us and the
Matter of Think ing.-T he Not-Ye t-Meta physka l and the
No-Lo nger-M etaphy sical.- Hegel' s Relatio nship to the
Greeks.-:n:uQO;; YQOl'ta and Dawn, (Corre lated Fragm ents: 31.
76)

71

Intel"twining of Life and Death (Corre lated Fragm ents: 76, 36,
i7).-Re latKHl of Human s and Gods (Corre lated Frdgm ents: 62.

67.~

TRANSLATOR'S FOREWORD

10
11

12
13

Immortal: Mortal (Fragmcnt 62).-tv"to oocp6v (Correlatcd

Fragments: 32, 90)

97

Thc Standing Open of Gods and Humans (Fragment 62). The

"Speculative" in Hegel.-Hegel's Relation.~hip to
Heraclitus.-Life . Death (Correlatcd Fragments: 88, 62)
108

The "Logical" in Hegel.-"Consciousness" and

"Dascin."-Locality of Human Beings betwecn Light and Night.
122
(Correlated Fragments: 26, 10)

Sleep and Drellm-Ambiguity of Wtua6al (Correlated

Fragments: 26, 99, 55)

137

Reference to Death, Awaiting - Hoping (Correlated Fragments:

27. 28).-The "Colllraries" and their "Transition" (Correlated
Fragments: Ill, 126.8,48.51 ).-ClosingQuestion; The Greeks
as a Challengc
150
Notes

163

Glossary

166

Page Guide

171

The fragments of Heraditus have, from the beginning, attracted and

influcnced philosophical thinking. It is hoped that this translation will
allow access by English-speaking readers to the continuing auempt at
interpretation.
The two principal contributors to these conversations arc Martin
Heidegger and Eugen Fink. Of the two, Heidegger is certainly the beuer
known to English-speaking readers. His readcrs will find a familiar voice
here. His interpretation of Heraditus continues to take its orientation
from the fragments that deal with Myo~ and with 1u.:(18Ela.' These
themes have recurred in Bring ana Ti1TU!, Section 44, An IntrOOmtion to
Metaphysics, What is Calkd Thinking1. the "Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)"
and "AletheM (HerakJiJ, Fragmml 16)" essays in Vortriige una Aufsiitu. and
Nutzsche, 1I, Section IX. In addition to continuing Heidegger's interpretation of Heraclitus, the present work is the occasion for interpretation
of other thinkers and poets, notably Hegel and Holderlin, as well as
self-interpretation by Heidegger.
Eugen Fink, the other principal contributor, is less familiar in the
English-speaking philosophical world. This book is the first translation
of Fink's work into English. His role in these conversations is to provide a
preliminary interpretation of the f'dgments that will give the discussion
a "basis and a starting place for a critical surpassing or even destruction,
and [will enable] us to establish a certain common ground appropriate to
inquiring discourse." Throughout the book, the conversations take their
sustenance from Fink's lead.
The pervading theme of interpretation is the relatedness of fv [the
one] and 'to. :rtavta [the many]. This relatedness is exemplified in many
different instances in the conversations of this book. Moreover, the conversations as a whole might well be understoo<1 as one ffiOl'e instance of
this fundamental theme in Heraclitus' thinking. For, while there is a
tension between Ihc multiple interpretations of Heidegger. Fink, and
lhe semimlr participants, the interpretation is nonetheless unified at
important poilHs of agreemelll. While it is not a translator's place to
rehearse the details of a text, it may be helpful to alcrt the reader tu
passages in which the conversants speak for themselves about their
agreements and differences.
Regarding the multiplicity of interpretations. it may be worth noting
that the preSCIH book records conversations, and is nol.lhe finished work
of a single author. Not only does the conversational origin of the book
set it apart from other recent intcrpretive allempts, it also accounts, at
least in part, for the imaginativc and expcrimcntal charactcr of lhe interpretations. In conversations. wc call rarel)' anticipate lhe responses of

viii
those with whom we talk. And if an interlocutor disagrees with us, we are
often forced to take an imaginative, experimental step into areas about
which we ha\'e not prevK)Usly thought. What resulLS in the present case is
a mixture of premeditated consideradon of the text and imaginative,
extemporaneous response. Of cou~, not all the experimenLS work, as
Fink himself predicLS in the opening remarks and affinns at times
throughout the tcxt.
Regarding more specifIC points of disagreement, it may not be acci
de mal that Heidegger cites Fragment I, with its concern for the J.6yoIi,
soon anel' Fink begins his interpretation with a reference to Fragment
64, which deals with XEQCluv6; [lightning] and to.navto.. But perhaps the
clearest summary of the differences of interpretation of Heidegger and
Fink is elicited by Heidegger from onc of the participants in the begin.
ning of the seventh seminar session. In contrast to Fink's "surprising"
and "unusual" beginning, Heidegger makes clear his different beginning from the ~ and from o.).;fI6Ela. While tlte participanLS record
diversity of opinion at many points, perhaps the most general expression
of difference is the remark that, 'More is said in the interpretation of the
FragmenLS than stands in them.'1 Regarding this diITerence of opinion,
more is said below.
The unity that binds the multiplicity of the Heraclitus interpretations
is indicated by Heidegger toward the end of the sixth seminar session.
He says, "Both of us are. i~greement that if we speak with a thinke!.o~'e
must heed what is unsaid in what is said. The qucstion is only which ~ay
leads to this, and o( what kind is the foundation of the intel:pr:ctiYe
step."" This observation marks not only a unifying theme in thcse conversations, but also a unifying theme in Heidegger's own method of thinking about the tradition. As early as Ka1l1 alld the Probltrn of MetaphJoo
(1929), Heidegger says:

tion. This is perhaps most explicitly shown in the opening considerations

of seminar session five. The~ Fink indicates that the method of interpretatKm consisLS in the attempt to pass from the concrete state of
affairs presented in the fragmenLS o\'er to an un sensuous, though not
transcendent, domain. s Again, Fink speaks of the attempt to comprehend macrocosmic relations fmlll the microcosmic relations which
are directly presented in the fragments.- And finally:

Ncvcnhekss, an inlcrp~tation limited to a recapilUlation of what Kanl

explicitl)' said can lIe\'er be a real explic-dtion, if the business of the latter is
to bring to liglu wh;1t Kanl. o"er and aoo"e his exp~ss formulation, uncovered in the cour~ of his 1;I)'illg of the foundation. To be sure. Kanl
himself is no longer able to say an)'thing concerning lhis, bUI what is
esscntial in all I>hilosophical discourse is not found in the SIK."Cific P"ol)(}sit ions of which it is COIlII)(}S(.'{1 but in that which, although unstated as
such. is made cvidcnl through these prol)(}sitiolls.~
The same position is maintained in Heidegger's closing remarks in
seminar session thineen in the presenl book. Thcr'e, as in Section 44 of
Bei"g Qlld Timt (1927), it is ltAtl0no that lies unsaid at the base of ""hat is
s.aid by the Crceks.
In similar f..shiol1, though not in the same words, Fink's "s)X.'Cul'lIi\'c"
interpretation is consonant ""ith Heidcggcr's method of imcrprcta-

When I speak of thoughtful transposition into another dimension. th;1I is

only a first attempt to circumscribe the manner of ou r procedure, because
,,'c still do flot know what it means 10 go over into ,mother dimension. If we
wish to speak of all anlllogy in this connection, then we must think it in a
specifIC w<l)'. In this analogy, only one side is given to us, namely the
phenomenal one, As we hold selccti"ely to specifIC phenomenal stroctures,
we tr.lI1slatc them imo large scak in an ad\'enturous attempt.7
Readers who are familiar with recent English-language scholarship
and interpretation of Heraclitus may find the speculative method of
these com'crsations injudicious or lacking in caution. Some may object
with one of the participants thai, 'More is said in the interpretation of
the fragments than stands in them." Or the reader may, \\,jth Heidcggel', regard thc speculative treatment as "venturesome" or even
"hazardous:" The more fragmentary the evidence, it might be argued,
the more cautious we should be, and the more we must eschew speculative nights of imagination,
But before dismissing this interpretation just because it is speculative,
we ourselves must be a bit more cautious. Professor Fink goes to some
lengths to explain how and why he depal1S speculatively from the speCirK content of a given fragment. And it may also be argued that, given
the vel')' nature of these fragments, no interpretation, cautious or uncautious, can remain only with what is immediately given in the fragments.
It is precisely the fragmentary character of the fragments that not only
allows but even demands a speculative approach in interpretation. This
fragmentary chardcter demands that we seek what is unsaid in w at is
said. since it is clear that Heraclitus was conccrned with much more than
the fragments of experience to which we are, for lhe most part, limited
and th.lt are often recorded in the existing fragmcltls. If Hcr'lc1itus
meant no more than is said in the fragments, many would be trivial and
useful only as exercises for learning the ancient Creck language, Evell
though a pal'ticular fragmelltlllay. fol' example, explicitly mellliOIl only
the continually nowing waters of a riVer (Fragments 91, 12), Heracliws
himself in other fragmenLS sets these concrete images into the context of
the dynamic relatedness of all things to the one, and of the one to all
things. The fragmentary character of the fragments is an invitatton to
see beyond them.

x
Within the context of recent interpretive and critical scholarship on
Hcraclitus, onc of Fink's panicular interpretive strategies is noteworthy.
This strategy may be most easily indicated by reference to some remarks
ill the preface to G. S. Kirk's Heraditus: The Cosmologkal Fragmtttls. On
page xii of the preface, Kirk writes:
In the prcselll study only about half the total number of ("),aam fragments
rCl:civc detailed consideration. "The cosmic fragments" arc those whose
sul~(."<:t-mattcr is the world as a whole, as opposed to men; they include
thost: which deal wjth the Logos and the opposites, and those which describe the large-scale physical changes in which fire plays a pl'imar), part.
They do riot include those which deal wilh religion, with god in relation to
men, with the nature or the soul, wilh epistemology, ethics or politics; nor
do they include Heracliws' allack upon partK:ular individuals or llpon men
in g~neral, although the ground of these attacks is very oftell an impercipience or the Logos or its e(lui,'alents. These rragmellls, whK:h might be
termed "the anthropocentric rragmcnts," could be made the subjt."Ct or a
later study.

Defending this procedure, Kirk wlites further:

... the rragmellls fall not unnaturally into the two classes which I have
indicated, .... hich can be separately treated-provided rull cross-rererence
is carried out-without distortion either or individual rragmcnts or or the
subject as a whole. This justification only applics, or coursc, to a .....ork
..... hich. like this one, consists essentially or a series or commentaries on
individual rragmems. It remains true that Heraclitus took a synoptic ...ie.....
or the problems he was racing, and that his ans.....cr to any onc or them
cannot be entirely dissociated rrom his ans....'ers to all tile others; in panicula 1', his views on the conslitution or the soul and its means or contact with
the outside .....orld bear upon the nature or the Logos, and vice "ersa. The
:lIlIhor has Iwd lhe amhropocellfric rragmellfs in mind when considering
the cosmic ones; and since most or his readers arc likely to be ramillar with
all the eXUlIlt rr;lgments. th~ dangers or misunderstanding arc slight.

Againsl the background of these remarks, two passages in Fink's interpretation stand out. In seminar session 7, while anempting to understand the words j("QO~ "t"QOlto( [transformations of fire], Fink says:
Wc do 110t understand thc llIrning o\cr of fire intO whilt is not lirc in the
SCIIS(: of;l ch~mical changc or ill the St'nse or an original subStance which
Ch~111s.:CS (llllowxw;) 01" in the sense or'1I1 original clement ..... hich m'lsks
itself through its cmanations. Rathcr wc will "icw the emirc range which
binds fit'c, SCOl, e'lrth, and breath offirc in cOllneclion with lif(;";lnd dcath,
I\pparcmly, wc rt:vcrt t() anthropological fragments in op!x'sition to cosmologicill Iragmenls, [n truth. hUI\'(,'cr. it is 1101 a questiun of a rcst riaiol1
to hUlIlall phenomena: ralhcr, what perlains to being hU.!~.IIl. such as lire

and death, becom s i a dis(juCll3cc.senst:_llll: due f0r:.J:I.!M!erslanding or the

the opposing re!atedness or
and

enlir~or

no

JtaVto,'

Again at the end of seminar session eight, Fink summarizes the interprelive struggle with lQ01tt') [turning] in the following words.
Wc came to no resull, and perhaps we will come to no final result at all. But
the '111100 rami liar cxplication or"ttlOml has wandered into the roreignness
and darkness or the rormula, "to live the death or something." We could'
l>erhaps think the relalionship or fire to earth, to air, and to w,ller ra111C' in
reference to life and dealh, so that, .....ith rerercnce 10 the diffiCUlt relationship or tension or lire and death, we could come to a certain anthropological key rOI" Ihe non-anthropological foundational relatedness or
and
;r6:vtu.'f

no

rink has used precisely the human phenomena of life and death, as well
as the relationship between mortals and immortals, in his interpretive
anempt to understand the relatcdness of h and la :rtCtvta, The present
work is a complement to Kirk's book, and partially fulfills, in its main
oUlline, the task left undone by Kirk,
The strategy of using the anthropological fragments as a clue for
interpreting the cosmological fragments is important in anothc,respect,
namely with regard to the previously expressed doubt that, "More is said
ill the interpretation of the fragments than stands in them," I allude here
to Kirk's observation concerning the "synoptic" character of HcraclilllS'
thillking. Fink's method of employing onc set of fragments 10 interpret
another would seem to strengthen the interpretation, Despite many implicil and explicit references to other, later thinkers, Fink's interpretive
strategy may allow some assurdnce that in the long run Heraclitus'
thought is interpreted as an integral whole, and is nOl interpreted by
mcans of reference to a foreign scheme of thoughl.
This translation is not the product of one person working alone, My
aim has been to hear the book wilh two sets of ears, one English and onc
German, hoping thereby lO lose or distort as liule as possible of tile
original. The help of Professor Manfred S. rrings, editor of the German
edition of the Collected WOl"ks of Ma.v: Scheler, has been crucial in pursing
this aim. Because his native tongue is German, hc has frequently been
the needed supplcmcnt lhat allowed rctrieval of nuances that would
otll('rwise havc heen lost. I rcmain indebted to him, and lhankful for his
SCntcncc-hy-scllleI1Ce reading of the text.
Uther people have been consult.-d regarding vat'iolls Ixu'lions of the
lll'lIH1scIipt. John Cody of the Classics departmelH of Northwestern
University has read the manuscripl with a concel"ll for correcting my
glnss of Creek words and translation of Greek phrases. The book has
surdy bcnefitled from his checking of my Greek "homework:' F, Joscph

PREFACE TO THE

xu

Smith was consulted on points of particular difficulty. and he has read

some of the chapters in their entirety. The advice and encouragement of
these men are greatly appreciated. Uhimately, however, I am alone responsible [OT this translation and for any defects it may contain.
All footnotes of the original book are retained in the present translation. FooUlotes of !.he translator are followed by '(fr.)." To facilit<uc
access to the text, the first occurrence of each Greek work is accompanied by an English gloss within square b.dckets. provided nonc is
given by the authors. A glossary of Greek terms is at the back of the
book. A page guide correlating the page numbers Oflhis translation and
those of the German edition is also provided.

GERMAN EDITION
In the Winter Semester of 1966167. a Hcraclitus seminar was held 3llhe
University of Freiburg i. Br., organized mUlUally by Manin Heidegger
and Eugcn Fink. The summary text of the seminar is herewith submitted. It was planned to continue the illlcrpretation over a series of semes
ters, but this plan cannot be realized. The present publication is a torso. a
fragment concerning fragments.
Freiburg im Buisgau

Winnetka, Illinois

CHARLS H.$EIBERT

Apn'/1970

EUGEN FINK

HERACLITUS

1
Mode of Procedure.-Beginning with Fragment
64
(Correlated Fragments: 41, I, 50, 47).

FINK: 1 open the seminar with hearty thanks to ProCessor Heidegger fot
his readiness to assume spiritual leadership in our common attempt to
advance into the area of the great and historically important thinker

Heraclitus. HeracJitus' voice, like that of Python, reaches us OVCT a

thousand years. Although this thinkcr lived at the origin of the West,
and to that extent is longest past, we have not overtaken him even now.
From Martin Heidegger's dialogue with the Greeks. in many of his writings. we can learn h~he funhe.st..becomesnear ancUhe.,Plosl.familiar
becomes slrange;-and how we remain restless and are unable to rely on a

sure interpretation of the Greeks. For us, the Greeks signify an enormous challenge.
Our seminar should be an exercise in thinking, that is, in reflection on
the thoughts anticipated by Heraditus. Confronted with his tex.ts.left to
us only as fragments, we are not so much concerned with the philological
problematic, as important as it might be, I as with advancing into the
matter itself, that is, toward the matter that must have stood before
Heraditus' spiritual view. This matter is not simply on hand like a result
or like some spoken tradition; rather, it can be opened up or blocked
from view precisely through the spoken tradition. It is not correct to
view the matter of philosophy, particularly the matter of thinking as
Martin Heidegger has fonnulated it, as a product lying before us. The
matter of thinking does not lie somewhere before us like a land of truth
into whkh one can advance; it is not a thing that we can disco"cr and
uncover. The reality of, and the appropriate manner of access to, the
matter of thjnking is still dark for us. We are still seeking the matter of
thinking of the thinker Heraditus, and we are therefore a little like the
poor man who has forgotten where the road Icads. Qur seminar is not
concerned with a spectacular business. It is concerned, however, with
serious-minded "'ork. Qur common attempt at renection will not be free
from certain disappointments and defeats. Nevertheless, reading thc
text of the ancicnt thinker, wc make the attempt to come into the
spiritual movemcnt that releases us to the matte I that mcrits being
named the mallcr of thinking.
Professor Hcidegger is in agreement that I should first advance a
preliminary interpretation of the sayings of Heraclitus. This interpretation will give our discussion a basis and a starling place for it critical

surpassing or even destruction. and it will enable us to establi.sh a cenain

common ground appropriate to inquiring discourse. Perhaps a preview
of the particular language of HeraclilllS' sayings is premature before we
have read and interpreted them individually. The language of HeradiIUS has an inner ambiguity and multidimensionality, so that we cannot
give it any unambiguous reference. It moves from gnomk. senlcntial.
and ambiguous-sounding expression to an extreme flight of thought.
As assigned text in our seminar, we will work wilh Fr0IJ'MnJe d,.,. Vor
wltratikLr by Hermann Diels.! For our part, we choose another arrangement. This should cast light on an inner coherence of the fragm~ms'
meaning, but without pretending to reconstruct !.he ol'iginal form of
HemdilUs' lost writing, nQl qnJOEWS; (0" Naturt]. We shall attempt to
trace a thread throughout the multiplicity of his sayings in the hope that
a cenain track can thereby show itself. Whether our arrangement of me
fragments is better than that adopted by Diels is a queSlton that should
remain unsettled.
Without further preliminary considerations, we shall proceed directly
to the midst of tile maneI', beginning our interpretation with Fr. 64: 'to.
be navtU oluxn;.El xEQCluv6;. This sentence is dearly intelligible to
everyone in what it appears to mean. Whether it is also intelligible in
what this meaning concerns, however, is another question. But first, we
ask what this sentence means. As soon as \\'e reflecl on it somewhat more,
we immediately depart from the easy intelligibility and apparent familiarity of the sentence. Die1s' translation reads: "Lightning steers the universe." But is "universe" the fining translation of 'to. nClvtU? After due
deliberation, one can indeed come to equate 'to. nclvtQ and 'universe."
But firsl of all, "to.ntlV'ta names "everything" and signifies: all things, all
of whal is. Heraditus speaks of 'to. rtQVlQ vis-a-vis KQ<ll7V6~ [lightning].
In so doing, he enunciates a connection between many things and the
one oflighlning. In the lightning oolt lhe many, in lhe sense of "everything," flash up, whereby "everything" is a plural. If we lirst ask naively
about "to. navtu, we are dealing with a quintessential relatedness. If we
translate "to. nuv'tQ as "all things," we must first ask, what k.inds of things
there are. At the outset, we choose the way of a certain tactical naivete.
On the one hand, we take the concepl ofthing in a wider sense, and then
we mean alllhat is. On lhe other hand, we also use it in a narrower sense.
I f we mean things in lhe narrower sense, Ihen we can distinguish belwcen such things as are from nature (qnJOEL 6V'ta) and such as are lhe
producl of human lechnics ('tXVTl OV'ta). With all the things of
nature-wilh the in.mimate, like stone, and with the living, like plant,
beast, and human {in so rar as we may speak of a human as a Ihing)--we
mean only such Ihings as are individuated and ha\'e detenninate outlines. W(' have in vicw the dete,minatc. individual thing thai, to be sure,
also has a particular, common char:.lcler in itself, as being of a certain

kind. We make the tacit assumption that "[cl ntlvtQ, in the sense of the
many in entirelY, forms the entirety of finile bounded things. The stone,
fol' example, is part of a mountain. We can also speak of the mountain as
of a thing. Or is it only a linguistic convention 10 call what has a determinale oudine a thing? The stone is found as rubble on the mountain; the
mountain belongs in the mountain range; the latter on the earth's crust;
and the earth itself as a greal thing that belongs, as a gravitational ccnter,
in our solar syslem.
Ht:IDt:GCER: To begin, wouldn't it perhaps be appl"Opriate to ask
whether Heraelitus also speaks of'tQ nCtV'to. in olher fragments, in order
to have a specific clue from him about whal he understands by "tQ 1tQvta?
In this way we gel closer to Heraelilus. That is one questton. The second
questton I would like to put under discuS5ton is what lightning has to do
\\'ith"[Q nclvta. We must ask concretely whal it can mean when Heraelitus
says that lightning steers
~a. Can lightning steer the universe at
all?
PARTICtPANT: If we begin by taking lightning only as a phenomenon, then we must wonder Ihat it should steer the universe, since lightning as a phenomenal entity, as a sensuously perceptib'e, luminous appearance, still belongs together with all other entities in the universe.
HIDGGER: We must bring lightning into connection with lh
phenomenon of nature, if we wish to undersland il "in Creek."
(
FINK: Lightning, regarded as a phenomenon of nature, means the
outbreak of the shining lightning-flash in the dark of night. Just as
lighlning in the nighl momentalil)' flashes up and, in lhe brightness of
the gleam, shows things in their articulaled outline, so lightning in a
deeper sense brings to light the multiple things in their articulated
gathering.
HEIDGGR: I remember an afternoon during my journey in
Aegina. Suddenly I saw a single bolt of lightning, after which no more
followed. My thought was: Zeus.
Our task no..... consists in looking with Heraelitus for what "[a nuvta
Ill.cans: 11 is an open queSlton how far a distinctton was already possible
with him between "e\'crythil1g" in the S(:nse of the sum of individuals and
"c\'~ry~hing" in the meaning of Ihe embracing allness. The other task,
\\'lllCh IS first posed for' us by Fr. 64, is lhe connection between 'ta nclvta
al.l{1 li.ghtlling. We must also bring Heraelitus' lightning into conne<:lion
wIlh lire (nuQ). Il is alsoesscntial toobscl've who has handed Fr. 64 down
I? us. It is Ihe Church Father Hippolytus who died roughtl)' A.D. 236137.
From Heraelitus' time approximately eight hundred years pass before
Our fragment is citcd by Hippol),tus. In the context, nUQ and x6<JJws
(cosmos) are also l1lelllioned. BUI we do not wish to enter here into the
philological problematic that emerges in view of Ihe connl.."Ction of the
fragmclll and the context of liippol)'llIS. In a conversation lhat I held

ta

6
,",,'jth Carl Reinha rdt in 1941, when he stayed here in Freibu rg, I
spoke to
him about the middle ground ~lwee n pure philology, which intend
s to
find the real Heracl itus with its philological tools, and the kind
of
philoso phizing that consisLS in thinkin g withou t discipl ine and
thereby
assumi ng loo much. Betwee n these two extrem es there is a
middle
ground concer ned with the role the transm ission of unders tandin
g. of
sense as well as interpr etation .
\Vilh Hippol yluS ""C find not only JriiQ but also txmJQ<OOt.; [con
nagration] , whkh for him has the meanin g of the end of the world.
If we
now ask wbat to. .mvta. lightni ng. and also steerin g mean in Fr.
64, we
must allhe same Lime attemp t to transfc r ourselv es into the Greek
world
with the c1ariftcation ofthes e words. So that we can unders tand
Fr. 64 in
a genuin e manne r, I would propos e that F.. 41 be added to it: [vat
yQQ
fv 'to ooqOv, btCata a6al y"WJ,l1'JV, 6'tb) txujJtQVTIO' 1ttXvta 6ui 1tclV'[(OV
.
Diels transla tes: "The wise is one thing only, to unders tand the though
ts
that steer everyt hing throug h everyth ing." Literally transla ted,
ltclvta
bui mivtro v means: everyth ing throug hout everyth ing. The import
ance
of lhis saying lies, on the one hand, in lv 't6 ooqxW [the wise is one
thing
only] and, on the other, in 1tclvta 6U~11tclvtrov. Here above all
we must
take into view the connec tion of the beginn ing and the end of
the sen
tence.
FINK: There is a similar connec tion, on the one hand betwee n
the
onenes s of the lightni ng-flas h, in the brightn ess of which the many
show
themse lves in their OUtlhlC and their articula tions, and 'ta ltclvta,
and, on
the other, betwee n the onenes s of oocp6v [the wise) and ltclvta
bla
nclvtwv. As KQ<WV6s relates to 'ta 1tclVt:O, lv 'to 0Qq)6v relates
analogously to ltclvta bui 1tclvtW'V.
HEIl>EGCER: I certain ly gram that lightni ng and lv to ao<p6v stand
in a rdation to onc anothe r. But there is still more to notice in Fr.
4 I. In
Fr. 64 Heracl itus speaks of'ta lt6:v'ta., in Fr. 41 of lt6:v'ta bui 1tclvtro
v. In
Parme nides 1/32 \\'e also find a similar phrase : bui lt6:vtos
ltclvta
ItQWyta. In the phrase navta bla nclvt1JV, the meanin g of bu'x
is above
all IQ be questio ned. To begin, it means "throu ghollt. " But how
should
we unders tand "throu ghout: "lOpog raphic ally, spatiall y, causall y.
or how
else?
FINt.:: In Fr. 64 'ta ltclvta does not mean a calm, static multipl icity,
but rathcr a dynam ic multipl icity of entities . In 'ta 1tavta a
kind of
movem ent is though t precise ly in the referen ce back IQ lightni ng.
In the
brightn ess. specifically the clearin g which the lightni ng bolt tears
open,
to. nclvta flash up and step into appear ance. The being moved
of 'to.
nclvta is also though t in the lightin g up of entities in Ihe clearin
g of
lightni ng.
HElIn:CGEK: At fiT'Sl, let us leavc aside words like "cleari ng"
and
"bright ncss."

or

FINK: If I have spoken of movem ent, we must disting uish, on

the
onc hand betwee n the movem ent that lies in the lightin g of lightni
ng, in
the outbre ak of brightn ess, and on the other hand, the movem ent
in 'ta
1tclvta., in things. The movem ent of brightn ess of lightni ng corres
ponds
10 the movem ent that goes out from fv'to oolp6v and contin ues on
in the
many things in entiret y. Things are nOI blocks at rest; mther,
they are
divcrsi fied in movem ent.
HEIDEGGER: 'to. lt6:v'ta are thus not a whole. presen t in front of
us,
but entities in movem ent. On the other hand, movem ent does not
occur
as x("'lo~ [motio n] in Heracl itus.
FINK: If movem ent does not also belong among the fundam ental
\\'ords in Heracl ilus, it still always slands in the horizo n of proble
ms of
his thinkin g.
HEIOt:CCER: To FTS. 64 and 41, we now add Fr. 1: 'tou bt k6you
'tOub' tovtO; ad 6.!;uVtOI y(vOvta~ 6:vEIQW1tol xat 1tQ6a6tv ~ axoiia
al xal
6.xo6oovtc; 'to 1tQUnov. YlVO~W'V yQQ ntivtrov Xala tOY )..6yov
'tOYb
WtQonv tobt(l(R" It~~ xaL bl:trov xallgy wv 'tOLOlttrov,
6xoWV
tyw 6ITtYriJ....CU Xala <p6o~v blO.lQtrov Exo.O"tov xaL tJlQ6,t;.rov 6xtoe; ExU.
'tou,;
bt 6:llouc; av8QWltou,; WvElavl 6x60a tyQ8tv'tc; 1tOl.OuO'w, 6xcoolt
Q
6x6aa dioovtc; btv.ov86.VOVtCU.' AI first, only YlVOIJ.Evrov yQ.Q
ltclvtrov
xata tOY AiJyov 't6v6 interes ts us. We transla te, "For althou gh
every
thing happen s accord ing to this A.6yoc; [reason , speech , word]. "
If Herac1itus speaks here of y~voJ.&tvwv [comin g into being], he is, nevenh
elcss,
lalking of movem ent.
FINK: In ywotJ.tvwv yQQ 1tclvtrov [comin g into being of everyth ing],
we are dealing with things being moved within the cosmos , and
not with
the mO\'ernent that issues from ).6yo,;.
Ht:lDECCt:R: ytVOlJ.tvrov belong s 10 ytvroL'; [genesis]. When Ihe Bible
speaks of ytvOlc;, il means by this the Creatio n, in which things
are
brough t into existen ce. But what does yvCR.c; signify in Greek?
PARTICIPANT: yvEO't.e; is also no concep t in Hemcl itus.
H[mt:CCEK: Since whcn do we have concep ts at all?
PARTICIPANT: Only since Plato and Arislotle. We evcn have the lirst
philoso phical diction ary wilh Aristot le.
HEmEGCEK: While Plato manag es 10 deal with concep ts only with
difficu lty. \\'e see that Aristot le deals with Ihem more easily. The
word
YLV0l-ltvoov stands in a fundam cntal placc in Fr. I.
FINK: Perhap s we can add a comme nt lO our discuss ion. We find
YEvEOIC; in an e;lsily unders tood sense wilh living beings, phenom
enally
seen. Plants spring up from seeds. beasts from the pairing of
parents .
and human s from sexual union belwee n man and woman . ytvO'~
is also
nativc lo thc phcnom enal region of Ihe vcgctat ive-ani mal. Comin
g iOlo
existen ce (y(yvro 6at) in this region is ;Il the same time couple
d with
passing away (C{I8(Qca6cu). If we now l'efer ytvO'Lc; also to the region
of

8
lifeless things, we operat e with an expand ed. more genera l, sense
of this
word. For if wc refer yf:vEOl; to 'to. l'ttlvta, wc expand the sense
of
yEVEOU; beyond the phenom enal region
in which the genesisphenom enon is otherwise at home.
HIOEGCER: What you unders tand by the phenom enal sense of the
word ytvEO~ we can also label as ontic.
fINK: We also meet the wideni ng of the origina
l, phenom enal
meanin g OfytvEO'V; in commo n langua ge, for examp le. when we speak
of
the world's coming into existence. We use specific images and domain
s
of ideas in our represe ntation s. With Y1VO~WV, in Fr. I, we arc
conccmed with the more genera l sense of ytvEOl;. For 'to. xclvta does
not
come into existence like that entity which comes into existence in accordance with ytvEOlC; in the narrow er sense. and also not like living
beings.
It is anothe r maller when, in the coming illlo-e xistenc e of things,
manu\ facture and produc tion (ttxvTl and no(fIOt.;:) are also meant. The
no(TJOlS
of phenom ena is. howev er, someth ing other than the ytvOlli. The
jug
does not come into existen ce by means of the polleT'S hand like the
man
is begotte n by parents .
HEIOECCR: Let us once again clarify for oursev les what our task
is.
We ask: what doesti: t Jtclvta mean in FT. 64; and Jtclvta SuI JtCrvlWV
in "-r.
4); and YLVO~ WV yD.Q JtclvtWV in Fr. I? xmo. 'tOv Myov [accord
ing to the
Logos] in Fr. I corrcsp onds with 00 'to ooq>6v in Fr. 41 and XQ<lU
V~ in
Fr. 64.
FINK: In YLVO(.ltvWV the sense ofytvEot.;: is used in widene d manne
r.
HIDECCER: But can one actuall)' speak ofa wideni ng here? I mean
that wc should try to unders tand "steering," "every thing throug
hout
everyt hing:' and now the movem ent that is though t in ytvo(.ltvwv.
in a
gcnuin c Greek sense. J agree that we ma), not take the meanin
g of
yEvEOLli in YLVO~WV narrow I)'; rather, it is here a maUer of a
genera l
expres sion, Fr. I is consid ered to be the beginn ing of Heracl itus'
writing .
Somet hing fundam ental is said in it. But may we now refu YlVO(.ltv
WV,
though t in ytvEOtli ill a wide sense, to coming .forth [Hervorkomwu
n)? In
anticip ation, we can say that we must keep in view the fundam ental
trait
of what the Greeks called being. Althou gh I do not like to use this
word
any more, wc now take it UI) neverth eless. When HeracJ itus
thinks
ytvEOU; in ytvo(.ltvwv, he does not mean "bccoming~ in the moder
n
scnse; that is. he does not IlIc;m a process. But though t in Greek,
ytvEOlli
means "to come into being: ' to come forth in presen cc. We now
have
three differe nt concer ns, drawn out of Frs. 64, 41, and I, to which
.....e
must hold ourselv es, if we wish to come into the clear concer ning
'to.
nclVTa. Let LIS also draw 011 Fr. 50: oux (.lOu, iUJJ.l 'tou h.6)'Ou o.xouOQ
VTali
6(.lokoYEiv oo<p6v tanv 00 nCtvtQ Elvm. Dids' tmnsla tion runs, "Listen
ing
nOI to me but to the Logos (M1OIi). it is wise to say that everyt
hing is
one:' Before all else. this saying celller s on 00, 1tOVTQ. and 6~A.oy
dv.

9
FINK: If we now start out from coming -forth. coming -forthtoappear ance [Zum-Vor.scheill-Kommen), wherei n you sce the Greek
meaning of ytvo(.ltvwv as though t in ytvEOlli. then we also have a referen
ce to
the brightn ess and gleam of lightni ng in which the individ ual
thing
swnds ~nd flas,hes ~p, Then we w.ould have the following analog
ical
corrcla uon: as Ilghlm ng on a dark mght IcLS us see e\'eryt hing individ
ual
in its specifIC outline all at once, so this would be in a shoM time span
the
same as that which happen s perpetu ally in rrUQ o.d~wov [ever.l iving
fire)
in Fr. 30. The entr), of entities in their determ inatene ss is though
t in the
momen t of brightn ess. Out of Fr. 64 comes 'to. Jttivta; out of
Fr. 41
comes JtclVtQ Sw JtclvtWV; and out of Fr. I, ytvo~ Jt{tvt<ov 'H.(l'to.
'tQv
).6)'Ov. Earlier we tried to discern the movem ent ofligh ting in the
lightn.
ing bolt. Now we can sa)' that it is the movem ent of bringin g-forth
-toappear ance. But bringin g-forth .to-app earanc e, which lightni ng
accomplishes in entiti~s, is also a Sleeri,ng interve ntion in the moving of
things
themselves. 11nng s are moved III the manne r of advanc ing and
receding, waxing and waning , of local movem ent and alterati on. The
movement of lightni ng corres ponds to the moving of @V 'to oocp6v. The
steering movem ent is not though t with respec t to the lightni ng,
or with
respect to lv 'to ao<p6v, but with respect to the efficac y of the lightni
ng and
of EV 'to ao<p6v, which effects bringin g-forth -to.app earanc c and
continues to effect things. The movem ent of steerin g interve ntion
in the
moving of things happen s in accord with the ~. The movem
ent of
things that sland in the brightn ess of lightni ng has a wisdom like
nature
that must. howev er, be disting uished from the movem ent that
issues
itself from oocp6v. Fr. 41 does not concer n itself onl)' with the related
ness
of the one ~nd the man)' that appear in the one, but also with the
efflCaC)'
of,the one III referen ce to 'tclntiv ta, which comes to expres sion inCttiv
ta
bta nclvtWv, It could be that).6 yoli in Fr. I is anothe r word for ooqXw
in
Fr. 41. for KEQ<luv61i in Fr. 64, as well as for rrU{) [fire) and 1t64:~li
[war).
1t6A~OS is the 1ttivtwv Baoll.uli [king of everyth ing). the war
that de.
tcronn es the antithe tical movem ent of things that stand in the sphere
of
appear ance,

HF.lDt:CCEK: Do )'ou wish to say that what is meant b)' ytvEotli

in
YWO(.ltvwv Yaf! JtclvtWV sen'es to determ ine more closel)' the bw
of Fr.
41? Do )'OU then unders tand Sw. causally?
.
FINI\: In no way. I would onl)' like to say that lightni ng, which tears
o~n the dark of night and, ill ilS gleam. lights lip and
lets all individ ual
thlll gs be .sn, at the same time is also Ihe mobile power ofytvEOlli
in the
Ill~nner of Sw; and that this mO\'ement passes into the
mO\'cments of
Ihmgs. Like the lightni ng, the ).6yo; of Fr. I also relates to 'to. Jtclvta.
Thc
IllOvClllent of h.61O;, which brings- forth and establis hes. stecl'S and
de.
te~mines e\'eryth ing, corres ponds to the lightni ng
mo\'cm ent that
hnngs. fonh.

10

11

PARTICIPANT: The relationship of the lightning movement and the

movement of entities is no relationship of effect. When it was said that

FINK: One can also subsume steering under movement. But with
Heraditus, the steering of lightning is that which stands face to face with
all movement in entities like the lightning stands face to face with that
""'hich shows itself in ilS light. Thus, steering does not have the character
of being moved like entities, but rather the character of bringing move
ment forth in entities. Add to this that steering, which concerns YU
navtO, is no steering of individual things, but of the quintessential whole
of entities. The phenomenon of steering a ship is only a jumping off
place for the thought which thinks the bringing-forth of the whole of
entities in the articulate jointed-whole. As the captain, in the movement
of the sea and winds to which the ship is exposed, brings a course to the
movement of the ship, so the steering bringing-fonh-to-appearance of
lightning gives to all entities not only their outline but also their thrust.
The steering bringing-forth-to-appearance is the more original movement that brings to light the whole of entities in their manifold being
moved and at the same time withdraws into it.
HEIDEGGER: Can one bring the steering of Fr. 64 (oloodtl) and of
Fr. 41 (txuf}l(M}o) into association with 6th? If so, what then results as
the meaning of 6~o.?
FINK: In 6~u a transitive moment is thought.
HElDECGER: What meaning does "everything throughout everything" now ha\'c?
FINK: I would like to bring nQvya btu nvtrov into association with
1tU~ Y{)Gnat The transformations of fire then imply that everything
bTOCS over into everything; so that nothing retains the definiteness of its
character but, following an indiscernable wisdom, moves itself throughout by oppositcs.
HEIOEGGER: But why does Heradit.us then speak of steering?
FIN": The t.ransformatK)Jls of fire are in some measure a circular
movement that gets steered by lightning, specifically by ooqJ6v. The
movement, in which everything movcs throughout cverything through
oppositcs, gets guided. I
HEIDEGGER: But may we here speak of opposites or of dialectic at
all? Her-Aditus knows neither somcthing of opposites nor of dialectic.
FINK: Truc, opposites are not thematic with Heraditus. But on the
Glher hand. it cannot be contested that from the phenomenon he points
10 opposites. The movcment in which c\'erything is transfomled
throughout evcl)'lhing is a steercd movClllent. For Plato, the helm is the
anOllogy for exhibiting the power of rationality in the world.
H.;IDEGGER: You wish to illuSlratc what steering means by naming
that ""'hich steers, the MYO!i. But whal is steering as a phenomenon?
FIN"': Steering .15 a phenomenon is the movement of a human who.
fo!" cxample, brings a ship into a desired course. It is the dil"{:cling of
Itlovelllent which a rational human pursues.

the lightning movement that brings.rorth-to.appearance passes into the

movement of things. no causal relationship is intended between the
movement mat brings-forth and the movement of what is brought-rorth.
Rather, that which stands here in !.he problem-horizon is the difference
between movement in being and movement in entities. specifically between movement in unconcealing and movement in what is uncon-l
cealcd.
FINK: We distinguish the lighwing outbreak of light, as movement
of bringing.forth, and the coming.forth in it of every specinc entity in its
movement. The instantaneousness of lightning is an iodation of an
impermanence. We must understand lightning as the briefest time, precisely as the instantaneousness that is a symbol for,-he movement of
bringing-forth, not itself in time but allowing time.
HEIDEGGER: Isn't lightning eternal, and not merely momentary?
FINK: The problem of the mO\'ement that brings-foM, in its relationship to the movement of what is brought-forth, we must think in the
nexus of lightning, sun, fire, and also the seasons, in which time is
thought. The fiery with Heraclitus must be thought in more aspects, for
example, the fire in the sun and the transformations of fire (n\JQO!i
YQOna(). Fire, which underlies everything, is the bringing-forth that
withdraws itself in ilS transfonnations as that which is brought-forth. 1
would like to bring nQvtQ bLO. n6;vtrov in Fr. 41 into connection with
1tU~ YQOnaC Lightning is the sudden burst of light in the dark of night.
If now the lightning is perpetual, it is a symbol for the movement of
bringing-forth.
HEIDEGGER: Are you opposed to an identifICation of lightning, fire,
and also war?
FINK: No, but the identification here isone of identity and nonidentity.
HUDEGGER: Wc must then understand identilY as belongingtogether.
riNK: Lightning, lire, sun, war, A6YO!i. and ooqxSv are different lines
of thinking on one and the same ground. In rruQbs YQO:rtai the ground of
everything is thought, which, changing itself over, shifts into water and
earth.
HEJI)EGGEII:: Thus, you mean the tr-.lIlsfonnatiOlls of things with
respect to onc ground.
FINK: The ground meant hele is not some substance or the absolute, bUI lighl and time.
. HEJI)EGGER: If we now Slay with our source material and especially
with Ihe question concerning 6ui in Fr. 41, can't wc then determine 6ui
from stee!"ing (otaxn;,uv)? What does steering mean?

12
HEIDEGGER: In the experiment which we undenake. there is no
q~eslion of wanting 10 c~nju~e lip Hcraditus himself. Rather. he speaks

with us and ~e spc,,:k with him. At present, we reflect on the phenomenon of neenng. ThiS phenomenon has today, in the age of cybemctics,
become 50 fundamemal that it occupies and detennines we whole of
nalu~1 science a~d the be~a...ior of. humans so that it is necessary for us
to gam ~o~ dam)' a~ut It. You said first that steering means "bringing
somethmg mto a deSired course." Let us attempt a still morc precise
description of the phenomenon.
FINK: Sleerin~ is ~he bringing-imo-control [In-dit Cewalt-Bringen J of
a movement. A ship without rudder and helmsman is a plaything of the
waves and wi:,ds. It is .for~ibl)' ~rought into the desired course only
through steenng. Steenng IS an Intervening, transfiguring movement
that compells the ship along a specifIC COUTSe. It has the character of
violence in itself. Aristotle distinguishes the movement that is native to
things and the movement that is forcibly conveyed to things.
HEIOEGGER: Isn't there also a nonviolent steering? Does the charac
ter of violence belong intrinsically to the phenomenon of steering? The
phenomenon of steering is e\'er and again undarified in reference to
Heraclitus and to our present-day distress. That natural science and our
life today become ruled by cybernetics in increasing measure is not accidental; rather, it is foreshadowed in the historical origin of modern
knowledge and technology.
FINK: The human phenomenon of steering is characterized by the
moment of coercive and precakulated regulation. It is associated with
cakulative knowledge and coercive inteTVendon. The steering ofZeus is
something else. When he steers he does not cakulate. but he rules effonlessly. There tends to be noncocrcive steering in the region of the
gods, but not in the human n=gion.
HElDEGGEK: Is there really an essential connection between steering
and coerdon?
FINK: The helmsman of a ship is a man of skill. He knows his way
a.bou,t in the tides and winds. He must make use of the driving wind and
tl.de III correct manner. Through his steering he removes the ship coerel\'el)' from the play of wind and waves, To this extent one mUSlthus see
~nd also posit the moment of coercive acts in the phenomenon of steer-

lIlg.
HElD~:GGEIl: Isn't presclH day cybernetics itself also steered?
FINK: If one would think of Ei~ap~tvY] [destiny] in this. or even fate.
lh:IOEGGER: Isn't this steering noncoercive? We must look at various phenomena of steering. Steering can be. on the one hand, a coercive
holding in line, on the other hand, the noncoercive steering of the gods,
The gods of the Greeks. howc\'cr, havc nothing to do with religion.

The Greeks did not have faith in their gods. Thcre is--lo recall Wilamo\\itz-no faith of the Hellenes.
FINK: However, the Greeks had myth.
HIDI::GGK: Nevertheless, myth is something other than faith.B~llto com.e back to noncoercive steering, we could ask how things stand
With genellcs. Would )'ou also speak of a coercive steering there?
FINK: Here one must distinguish between the natural behavior of
genes. which can be interpreted cybernetically, on the one hand, and the
manipulation of factors of inheritance, on the other.
HEIDGGR: Would you speak of coercion here?
~tNK: Even if coercion is not felt by the one overpowered, it is still
coercion. Because one can today coercively intervene and alter the behavior of genes. it is possible that one day the world will be ruled by
druggists,
HEIDEGC.ER: Re~rding genes, the geneticist speaks of an alphabet,
?f a ston: of IOformauon. which stOTeS up in iuelf a definite quantity of
lIlformatlon, Does one think of coercion in this infonnation theory?
FINK: The genes that we discover are a biological finding. However,
as soon as one comes to the thought of wanting to improve the human
race th~ugh ~ alte~g stee,ring of,genes, it i.s thereby not a question of)
compulSIon whICh bnngs pam, but IIldeed a question of coercion.
HEIDEGGER; Thus, we must make a two-fold distinction: on the one
hand, the infonnation-theoret.ical interpretation of the biological; and
on th~ ,:,thcr, t~e a.llempt, grounded on the former, to actively steer,
What IS III questIOn IS whether the concept of coercive steering is in place
in cybernetic biology.
FINK: Taken stricLl)'. one cannot speak here of steering.
HEIOEGCER: At issue is whether an ambiguity presents itself in the
concept of infonnatKIO.
FINK: Genes exhibit a determinate stamping and have, thereby, the
character of a lasting stock [umgs/Jeitllem], A human Iivcs his life, which
I~e appar~ntly spel~ds as a .free being, through genetic conditioning.
F.v~~onc IS deternuncd by hiS ancestors, One also speaks of the learning
abllu)' of genes. which can Icarn like a computer.
. HEJl)EGCER: BUI how do things st.and with the concept of infonnatlOn?
FINK: By the concept of information onc understands, on onc
hand,. irifor11lar", thc stamping, impl'cssing of form; and on the other, a
tcchmquc of communication.
.HEIOEG(;ER: If gcnes deter'mine human behavior, do they develop
the Information that is innale to them?
. FINK: In some measure. As to information, .....e are not dealing here
wlIh thc kind of information that onc picks up, What is meant here is

14

that he behaves as if he were (0 gel a command from the genetic stock.

From this point of view, freedom is planned freedom.
HEIDECCER: Information thus implies. on the one hand, the stamping and, on the other, information-giving, upon which the infonned
being reacts. The human mode ofbehavior becomes formalized through
cybernetic biology, and the entire causal structure becomes convened.
We need no philosophy of nature; it suffices. rather, if we clarify for
ourselves where cybernetics comes from and where it leads 10. The general charge. that philosophy understands nothing of naturnl science and
always limps along behind it, we can take without being perturbed. It is
imponam for us to say la natural scientists what they are, in effect,

doing.
We now have seen a multitude of aspects in the phenomenon of steer
ing. KEQ<l~. lv, OO<p6v, ~, 1til(l, rllLos:. and n6A.E~ are not one
and the same, and we may not simply equate them; rather. certain rela
tions hold sway between them which we wish to see, if we want to become
dear to ourselves about the phenomena. Heraclitus has described no
phenomena; r<tther, he has simply seen them. In closing, let me re<:aU Fr,
47: IJ.Tt dxi} ltEQl 'tOw IJ.EYWtwv au~lJ.oE9a.. Translated, it says: concerning the highest things, let us not coUect our words out of the blue,
that is, rashly. This could be a mono for our seminar.

2
Hermeneutical Circle.-Relatedness of ~v
and navta (Correlated Fragments: I, 7, 80, 10,
29,30,41. 53, 90, lOO, 102, 108, 114).

Fls,,: As a result of Fr. 64, we are driven to the diffICulty of elucidating

the espression 'to J'tlIvta. I intentionally do not speak of the concept of
'ta J'ta~a in order to avoid the idea of a Heraclitean technical vocabulary. The expression 'ta nlIvta has shown itself to us in Fr, 64 as that on
which lightning comes to bear in a steering way. Lightning. as the open \
ing light, as instantaneous fire, brings 'ta naVtu to light, outlines each
thing in its form, and guides the movement, change, and passage of a1)
which belongs in la l'ta~a. In order to focus more sharply the question
of what or who 'ta nlIvto are, whether individual things or elements or
counterreferences. we began with a preliminary look at other fragments
that also name 'ta nCtvta. 1f we disregard what we have already brought
into relation to Fr. 64, fifteen text citations follow in which we wish to
examine how far, that is, in what respects 'tanclvta are addressed. In Fr.
64 it has been indicated that lightning is the steerer. It is not a question
of all immanent selfregulation of tcCtvtu. We must distinguish lightning
as the one from the quintessential many of l'tvtu.
PARTICIPAI't'T: (fthe steering principle does not lie within the whole,
must it be found outside or above the whole? But how can it be outside
the whole?
FINK: If we press it. the concept of the whole means a quintessence
that allows nothing outside itself; thus, it apparently does not allow what
}'OU call the steering principle. But with Heraditus, it is a question of a
counterreference, at present still not discernible by us, between the br of
lighllling and la tcavta, which are torn open. steered. and guided by
lightning, As a lormallogical quintessence 'ta 1tavto signifies a concept
of "everything," which allows nothing outside itself. It is, nevenheless,
questionable whether the steering is something external to 'to. 1tCtvta at
all. Here a very peculiar relatedness lies before us, which cannot be
expressed at all with current relationship-eategories. The relatedness in
~ILJcstion, bct .... een lhe lightning that guides 'tu J"{avta and 'to. navta ilself,
IS the relatedness of one to many. It is not. however, the relationship of
the singular to the plural, but the relaledness of a still unclarificd one to
the many in the one, whereby the many are meant in the sense of quintessence.
1-1t:1D~:GCE:R: Why do you I"cjt:."Ct Dicls' translation of- 'to. no.vtu as
universe?

16

FINK: If. in Fr. 64, to Tuiv [the whole] were to stand in place of TO
1favta. it would bejuslifiable to translate with "universe," to. xQvta do
lIot form the universe; rather, the)' [ann the quintessence of things
found in the world. The universe is not tCJ.1t6.vt:a; rather. lightning ilSClf
is world-forming. In the gleam of lightning, the many things in entirelY
come into differentiated apP'=arance. to. nCtv'ta is the realm of differences. lightning as lv. howc\"cr. is not COntrasted ,,jlh la 1tUvta 35

onc neighborhood against another or as cold against wann.

HEIDEGGER: On your interpretation, are lightning and universe
thus the same?
FINK: I would like to fonnulate it otherwise. Lightning is not the
universe. but it is as the worldforming. It is only as world-form. What is
to be understood here by world-fonn must be elucidated more precisely.
HElDEGGER: I myself would like to add a supplement to what 1
explained during the la'it session concerning cybernetics. I don't want to
allow a misunderstanding to arise from my allusion to modern cyber.
netics in the course of the discussion about what steering is. Misunderstanding would arise if we restricted ourselves to what is said about
steering in Frs. 64 and 41, and if we constructed a connection .between
Heraditus and cybernetics. This connection between Heraclllus and
cybernetics lies much deeper hidden and i~ not ~ easy to grasp. It goes
in another direction that we could not diSCUSS III the context of our
present awareness of Hcraditl~s. Neverthcl~, the mea,~ing of cy~rn~t
ics lies in the origin of that which prepares Itself here wnh Heracluus III
the relatedness of f:v and "ta 1tavra.
FINK: If we now make the attempt to look at how"ta nav-ea is mentioned in other fragments. we still intend no explicatK)Il of the separate
fragments.
HElDEGGER: If I have postponed a question put by one of the par.
ticipants, it has happened under the constrai~t ~f a f~nd.amenta~ difficulty in whkh we now find ourselves. Wherein lies thiS dlfrKulty.
PARTICIPANT: The questions thus far touched on can only be answered when we have won a deeper understanding of what our considerations have referred to up to now. But above all: we are supposed to
know al the very beginning. as well as after consideration of a f:dgment,
what "ta nuvta means. However. we can undcrstand the meanmg of ta
nUvtCl only in thc COlHcxt of all the fragments in which ta nclvto is
mClllioncd. On the OIlier hand, we can work Ollt the cOlHcxtllal whole
onl)' through a step-by-sl,ep procedurc Ihrou.gh individ~al fragmcnts,
which alrcady presupposes a prior lInderstandmg of what IS meant by"ta
no'vta. The basic difficult) bcfOle which we stand is. therefore, the hermencutic,ll circle.
lh;lm;ca:R: Can wc gel OUl of this circle?
FINK; Mustn'l wc rather enter into this circ~.

17

HEIOEGGER: Wiugenstein says the following. The difficulty in

which thinking stands compares with a man in a room. from which he
W;lIlts 10 gel out. At first, he attempts to get out through the wind~w, but
it is tOO high for him. Then he attempts to get out through the chimney,
"'hich is too narrow for him. If he simply tumed around, he would see
th.1t the door was open all along.
Wc ourseh'es are permanently set in motion and caught in the her.
meneutical circle. Our diffICulty now consists in the fact that. we search
for a clue about the meaning of la navra in ce.mral H~rac~tean frag.
ents without having already involved ourselves ID a detailed Interpreta.
:'n. For this reason our search for the meaning of Heraclitus'"to. nav-eo.
must also remain provisional.
.
PARTICtPANT: If we attempt to make clearto ourselves th~ mea.mn.g
of"tanclvto starting from a fragmcnt, can't we revert to Fr. 50 m whICh It
is said, "Everything is one?"
.
H.,;tDEGGER: But everything we have of HeracJitus' fragments IS not
the whole, is not the wh?le HeracJitus.
.
.
I'INK: I don't imagme that one can Jump at Herachtus obscure
saying as a maxim for interpretation. Likewise, we cannot appeal to Fr.
60. which says that the way up and the way down are one ~nd LJ:'e same,
for an understanding of what a way is, for instance, a way In philosophy
or a way through the fragments of Heraclitus. Here HeracJitu~ does not
express the customary understanding of way. It also pertams to ~he
hermeneutical difrw:ulty mentioned by us that each fragment remalOS
fragmentary in its explication, and in connection with all other frag.
ments, it does not yield the whole of Heraclitus' thought.
HEIDEGGER: In the course of our seminar we must make the attempt to come through interpretation imo the dimension. req~i~ by
HeracJitus. Indeed, the question emerges how far we Implictlly or
explicitly interpret, that is, how far we can ~ake the dimensions of
HeracJitus visible from out of our thought. Philosophy can only speak
and say, but it cannot paint pictures.
FINK: Perhaps also it can never even point out.
HEIDEGGER: There is an old Chinese proverb that runs, "Once
pointed out is beuer than a hundred times said." To the contral)', philosophy is obligated to poilll out precisely through saying.
.
.
F1NK: We begin with the passages in which nO,vt(l are mentl<,,:ned 111
ordcr to look at how no'vto are spoken of. Wc begin with Fr. I, which has
alrcady cOllcemed us. The phrase which alone now interests us runs:
YIV0f.l.tvwv yag nuvtWV XUto."tOv A6yov. Wc ask in what respect1tO,vt(l are
11lt;:lHioned. mivtu are design;tted as Ylv6f.l.EVCl. But what does that mean?
If wc conceive Y(YVEa6m narrowly, it means the coming-forth, lhe burgeoning of a living being from another. But in order to un~erst~nd the
eXlt;:1H to which nUvto arc Ylv6~a in Fr. I. wc rouSI bear III nHnd the

18
xcrtQ tQv Myov. nclVta are moved in accord with Myoo;. YWOf.l
VU no.V'tQ

allhe same time stand in a relatio nship to human s who becom e

ullcomprehen ding (Q!;UvE'tOL y(VOvt Ul 6:v6Q<1.lJtOl). woo do not unders tand
the
Myoo; in accord with which ttCrvtu happen and are moved .
Ht:IDEGGU: Let us also include among xala 'tOv ),f:,yov the t6vbE.
FINK: The demon strativ e y6vbE means: in accord wilh this A.6YOS.
whid) then is discuss ed in what follows.
PARTICIPANT: Isn't it more approp riate 10 transla
te d;UvEt Ol
YlVOVYUl not with "becom ing uncom prehen ding:' but with "prove
to be
uncol1 lprehen ding"?
FINK: When I transla te y(VOVtUL with "becom e." and put it
in a
relatio nship to yLvoldvW'V yilQ Jttlvt:WV, I unders tand by it onl}' a colorJe
ss
becom ing.
HEIDECGU: The beginn ing of our consid eration was Fr. 64.
in
which we view the related ness of steerin g lightni ng to 'to. nclvtO.,
that is,
the related ness of f.v and ItUvta. Furthe r fragme nts should now show
us
in what manne r and in what respect s this related ness is mentio ned.
FINK: In Fr. I, in which Itclvta are spoken of as moved , their
movem ent is related to A6yo~. In the same fragme nt, the relatio nship
of
human s to Myo; is also mentio ned in so far as human s do not
understand the ~ in its moving related ness to the moved ItclVtO.. From
Fr.
I, I would like to move to Fr. 7: dItclV'[Q 'to. ma XWtVOsytvOl'tO, (liVE;
av
btayvoi.Ev. 4 In what manne r are Itclvta spoken of here? Do 6vta
(things
that actuall y exist] elucida te 1to.Vta or is ItclVtO. meant as an indeter
minate numbe r of a quhHes sential kind, so that we must transla te:
every
6vta? I belie\'e that ttclVta are unders tood here as distinc tion.
HEIDEGGER: That they are distinc t emerge s from lhayvolEV (would
discrim inate].
FtNK: In Fr. 7, a familial' phenom enon is mentio ned, a phenom
enon which disguis es diITerences, namely , smoke. In smoke , to be
sure.
distinc tions becom e ellusi\'e, but it does not elimin ate those distinc
tions
which be<:ome eviden t in blayvolEV. Alxwe all, the momen t of
being
distinct is to be noticed in the word combin ation Ito.vta 'to 6vta.
Ht:IOEGGt:K: How is 1tclvta thus to be compr ehende d?
FtNK: 1tclvta to. 6vt(l docs not mean an enume ration of 6vta and
does not signif)' "all which is," but the Itclvt(l which are. are set off
from
onc anothe r, arc disting uished . 1tclvtCl, collectively as 6vta, arc the
correlate of a lHayvwOl; [diagnosis]. The diagno slic charac ter of a disting
uishing is shaqlC ned in regard to smoke as :l distinc tion-ob scuring phenom
enon. Thus, XclvtCl in Fr. 7 arc viewed as distinc t.
HEIDEGGt:R: What inform ation concem ing ItclvtCl does Fr. 7 gi\'e
us
vis-<'l-vis Fr. I?
FINK: In Fr. 7, thc empha sis lies on the distinc tness. 011 the indi

19

vidualit)' of 1tclvta that, in Fr. I, are spoken of as moved , and

moved ,
that is. in accord with the ~.
HEIDGGR: FoUowing the overall sense of Fr. 7, 1tClvta are thus
related to yvWoU; (inquir y], to graspin g humans_
FINK: yvoxn;: with respect to Itclvta is possible, howev er, only in
so
far as xavra are distinc t in themse lves. ItavtCl are moved in accord
with
A.6yo;. In their movem ent, in their change and passage, which lightni
ng
SlCen, they are al the same time distinc t by themse lves. The rno\'em
enl
of the outbre aking lightni ng gleam lels 1tavta come forth as distinc
t by
themselves.
HEIDEGGEK: Yet with the prelim inary orienta tion, concer ning the
.....ay 'tCr.Itclvt(l are addres sed b)' Heradi tus, }'ou have already landed
us in
an entire philoso phy.
FINK: But I still want to stick to the point that the essenti al thing
in
Fr. 7 is the referen ce of 1to.vta back to yvOXH; and lhclyvWOlo;.
HEIDEGGER: While xclvra in Fr. I are seen in their referen ce
to
A6y0:;:, which is not of human charac ter, they are mentio ned in
Fr. 7 in
their referen ce to human cogniz ance. Subseq uently, 6IavoEi:a9al
[think
lhroug h] and 6loUy ea9al [dialog ue] then develo p themse lves
out of
lhayrYVtOOxElV [disting uish]. 6laYVOlEV is an indicat ion that Xclvta
are
charac terized as what is disting uishab le, but not what is already
distinguishe d.
PARTICIPANT: If ).6yo; is discuss ed in Fr. I, and 6layvw Ol; is discussed in Fr. 7, can't one then refer the YVWol; of ItclVtu to A6yoo;?
HEff)EGGER: You assume too much thereb}'. You pursue the COIlnection betwee n human YVWOlo; and Myo:;:. But ",'e want first
to get
acquai nted with the differe nt wa}'s in which Heracl itus speaks
of to.
ItCtvta.
PARTICIPANT: BUI isn't the onlic being [Seie"d5ei"J of XOvtCl, ",'hich
comes to speech in 6vtCl, a quality of ItOvta which is a necessa ry
presuJ>'"
positio n for liLtlyvw(llo;?
FINK: 1 conced e tha! the ontic being ofnclvtCl is a neceSS<try pr'esup
IXISitioll 101' the discern ing human cogniz ance. But 6VTCl is no quality
of
nOvta. Wc musl, howev er, keep in mind that 6Vla is added to Ihe
COIltent of no.Vla in Fr. 7 as hithen o treated .
HEff)EGGEK: BUI do we then know what 'to. 6vta means? We would
Hnly come closer to the malleI', if we .....ould be concer ned with the
nose,
lhe eyes, and with hearing .
FI .... K: III OUI' contex t, the phrase xat Ylv61.lEVUXclvta xa1' lQlV 'Kat
l.QECUV in Fr. 80 now interes ts us.~ Here also n6.vta ylv6tJ.E'VCl are
named ;
IlOW, howc\'c r. not XClto. tOv Myov 10v6 as in Fr. I, but xat' lQIV
[<lCc:nrdillg to strife}. AI firsl, wc leave OUI of accoun t the phrase Kat
XQWv
lac.:cul'ding 10 obligat ion]. Now xovra and lheir m'lIme , of movem
ent

20
arc referred nOl to ).6yo;. but to strife. In FT. 80, navta enter into 3
context of meaning with slrife. It is reminiscent of .n6A.Etwt;-Fr. 53. la
which we will yet turn.-From Fr. 10. we single out the phrase: tx
:n:clvtWV fv xat 1:1; bot;, :n:avrQ,' Here also we meet with a becoming. but
not with what is meant by the movement of individual entities; rather. we
meet with the becoming of a whole.
HEIDEGGER: If wc view it naively. how could be, navrwv fv be
understood?
P.... RTICIPANT: Read nai\'cly it woukt mean that a whole gelS put
together oul of all the parts.
HEIDEGGER: Bm the second phrase, t1; tv~ n6:vta, already iodie.Hes 10 us that it is not a question of a relationship of a part and a whole
which is composed of parts.
FINK: In Frs. I and 80, 1tCtvtQ y~yv6~a are mentioned. Their
being moved was referred on onc hand le> ~ and on the other hand
to strife. In accord with ~ and strife means: in accord with the
movement of A.6yoc; and strife. We have distinguished this mO\'ement
from the bting moved of navta. It is not the same kind of movement as
the movement of nana. In Fr. 10, movement is brought up. but in the
sense of how one comes out of everything and everything comes out of
one.
HEIDEGGER: Which movement do you mean here?
FINK: The worldmovement. With this, nevertheless, too much has
been said. We have noticed that one can understand tx navtwv fv
nai\'ely as a relationship of part and whole. That one comes out of many
is a familiar phenomenon. Ho.....ever, the same thing does not alLow ex
pression in ~\'erse manner. Many does not come out of one, unless we
mean only bounded allness in the sense of a multiplicity and a set. 'ta
navt(l is, however, no concept of bounded allness, no concept of set, but
a quintessence. We must distinguish the concept of allness, in the sense
of quintessence as it is given in
navto, from the numerical or generic
allness, that is, from a concept of relative allness.
HEIDECCER: Do all the books thal are arranged here in this room
constitute a library?
PARTICIPA/'Io'T: The concept of a library is ambiguous. On one hand,
il can mean the entire sel of books lying here btfore us; but on the other
hand. it can also mean the equipment other than the books, that is, the
room, the shelves, etc. The library is not restricted 10 the books that
belong lO il. Also, when some books are taken out. it is slill a library.
HEIDEGCER: If we take out one book after another, how long does it
remain a library? But wc see already that all thc individual books togcther do not make up a library. "All," understood as summ.nive, is quite
different from allness in the sense of the unit of the pttuliar sort that is
not so easy to specify at first.

la

21
FISK: In Fr. 10, a relatedncss is articulated bet.....een navto, in the
sense of many in entirety, and the one, and a relatedness of the one to
the many in entirely. Here. the one does not mean a part.
HElDt:GGU: Our German word Eius [onc] is fatal for the Greek fv.
To ....,hat extent?
FISK: In the relatedness of lv and navto, it is not only a mattcr of a
counterrcference, but also of a unifICation.
PARTICIPANT: I would like to understand fv as somcthing complex
in opposition to a numerical conctption. Tht tension between fv and
1tavto has the character of a complex.
F1NK: fv is lightning and fire. If one wishes to speak hert: of a
complex. one can do so only if one understands by it an encompassing
unity that the many in entirety gather in themselv~s.
. .
HEIDEGcn: We must think lv, the one [das E'1h!], as the umfymg.
To be sure. the one can have the meaning of the one and only, but here
it has the character of unifying. If one translates the passage in question
from Fr. 10, ~out of everything. one; and out or one, everything," this is
a thoughtless translation.lv is not by itself a one that woukl have nothing
to do with ntlvto; rather, it is unifying.
F1NK: In order to make clear the unifying unity of lv, one can take
as a comparison the unity of an element. However. this is not enough;
rather. the unif ing unit)' must be thou ht back to t~e one.o ..b.1I!iIl~.
which. in its gleam, gathers and unifies the many III entirety m their
distinctness.
HEIDEGGER: f:v runs throughout all phHosophy till Kanfs Transcendental Apperception. You said just now that one had to consider lv
in its relatedness to navta, and navta in its relatedness to lv in Fr. 10,
together with Myos; and strife in its reference to nana in Frs. I and 80.
However. that is only possible when we understand Myos; as gathering
and ~QIS; [strife] as dismantJing. Fr. 10 begins with thc word auVQ.'l'IES;
(contact]. How should we translate this?
PARTICIPAt'O'T: I would propose: joining-together [Zusarnmnifiigen).
HEIDEGGER: In this, we would be concerned with the word 'to
gether:' Accordingly.lv is that which unifies.
FINK: Fr. 29 seems at first not to belong in the series offragll1enLS in
which ltQvtO are mentioned: olQUvtol yO.Q fv civri. ivtanwv oI6QlOlOI,
>tUo; atvoov Ovrjltirv. 7 For here lto.vtO art: not mentioned directly in a
specific rcspect; rather, a human phenomcnon is mentioned, specifiC<llI)', thatthc noble minded prefer one thing rather than all else, namely
everlasling glory rather than transient things. The comportment of the
noblc minded is opposed to that of the noU,oC. the many, who lie there
like well-fed cattle. And here, nevertheless, the reference in question of
lv and navto is also to be seen. According to the prima f'lcie meaning, fv
is here the everlasting glory that occupies a special place vis-a-vis all else.

Fr. 5.2

22

23

But the fragment expresses not only the comportment of the noble
minded in reference to glory. Clory is standing in radiance. Radiance.
howc\'cr. reminds us of the light of lightning and fire. Glory relates itself
to all other things as radiance to dullness. Fr. 90 also belongs hCl'c in so
far as il speaks of the relationship of gold and goods. Gold also relates

Ihe same for all beings." By beings, he evidently underSlands living

beings. Wc wish, however. 10 translale tiJtOvtwv: for the entirety of

iuelf 10 goods as radiance to dullness.

HEIDEGGER: Fr. 29 also names the nollo( next to Ihe lrQlatot [the
best). In fr. I. the l'toUo( .. re compared with the cbtdQOIOlV. with the
untried, who are contrasted with tvW, that is. with Hcrac1itus. BUl we
may not undersland this opposition. as Nielzsche did. as a separation of
the prideful from the herd. Heraclilus also mentions one of the se\'cn
wise men. Bias, who was born in Priene, and says of him that his reputation is b>Tcatcr than that of others (Fr. 39). Bias has also said: at nAlmOl
6:VB(K.OJtol xaxol. most men are bad. The many do nOl strive. like tht:
liable minded. after the radiance of glory: they indulge in tr:msitoll'
things and therefore do not sec the onc.
FINK: In Fr. 29. we must think of gloll' in regard to radiance. The
radiant is the fiery in opposition to that which the mallY :lIld lhe bad
prefer. The noble minded, who aspire above all else to glory, stand near
tht: thinker, whose glance is oriented not only to novta, but to lv in its
rf'latedlless to nOvtCl.
Ht:IDt:GGt:R: Pindar also conllt,.'cted gold, and thus the r;ldiant, with
fire ,md lightning. The preceding inspection of Fr. 29113S indicated to us
that a specific human comportmellt is at first mentioned.
FINK: In this comportment of the noble minded, the fundamental
relatcdness of fv and navta is mirrored in a certain manner ill everlasting glorl'. Also in Fr. i, nOvta stepped into association with human
comp0l1ment. There, however, it was discerning cogni1-<lllce. In Fr. 29.
rt<!vTCl arc also seen in their reference back to a human comportment.
But it is not a question of a knowledge relationship: r<tther. it is a question of a relationship of preference of one thing o\'cr another. Glory,
I)()wc\'er, is not distinguished b)' degrees from other possessions: rather,
it has the character of d islincl ion in opposition to all othcr things. It is
not a question or preference for onc O\'er another. but of prefelence of
the on I)' important malleI' as againsl all othcrs. As the noble minded
prerer Ihe (111)' in'lX)rtant malleI', lhe radiance of glory nllher than all
olhcl' Ihings, so thc lhinker lhinks on the unifying onc of lightnillg. in
Ihe lighl of which JrUVH.l cOllie to ,tppearance, nOI on I)' aboul 11"Uv"'[(.I. And
jlul as Ihe m~ny prefer tr.msiCIIl things LO lhe radiaru;e of glory. SO
hUllIans, the many. do 1101 understand Ihe unifying tv (which includes
JTUVT(t in their distinction) Inll ollly Ihe n6.vto. lhe man)' things.
III Fr. ;\0. t he focus of thought is oriclIled to the relal iOllShip of rtUvtO
and x60floC. The cilation \\"hilh alone is IlOW intcresting lu us runs:
x60llOV T6\'0, TOV alnov artuvtwv. Dicls Iranslalcs; "This world-oreter.

;tCl\"tO.

HElDEGGEM.: 'tOY aiJT(~v ti.,'t<!vTWV stands only in Clement of Alexandria. and is missing in Phnarch and Simplicius. Karl Reinhardt strikes it.
I would like 10 mention him once ag-.tin. because I \\'oukt like to refer to
his essay. "Heroic/its Lthre vom Feuer" (first published in Herme5 7i, 1942,
pp. 1-2i), which is especi~lIy import.ant in l~ethod?logical respects. I It
\\'as just thirt), years ago, III the period durmg which I held t~e three
leclUres on the origin of the work of art, that I spoke at length With Kart
Reinhardt, in his garrel. about HeracIitus. At the time. he told me of his
plan to write a commentary on Heraclitus with an orientation to~'ard
tnldition and hist01l" Had he realized his plan, we would be much aided
toda),. Reinhardt had also shown in the aforementioned essa)' that Jtilq
cpQ6vlllOv (sagacious fire), standing in the ~olltext of Fr. 64, ~s genuine
and on that account is to be looked at as a lragrnenl of Hcrachtus. Whal
the discovery or new Heraclitus fragments implies, he indicated thus:
"An unpleasant outcome results. It is not imlx>ssible thal with Clemcnt
and the Church Fathers a few unknown words of Hcraclitus flood about,
as though in a great river. which we will never' succeed in catching unless
we were referred to them from another source. To recognize an impor
lant word as important is not always easy:' Karl Reinhardl is still with us.
FINK: In Fr. 30, the rcference of rtUvtCl and x601lO~ is thought. We
leave open whm x6o}.to; means with Hcraclitus. Let us look once ag-.tin at
Fr. 41 \\'hich has already occupied us: b TO ooq>6v. trt(ma08at yvWIl'l'\V.
Oto, tx1J~qVfJO rtOvta bta nCtvnov.' Here oocp6v is added to bo. Wc
have alread)' looked for the relatedness of fv and JtOvtQ in the fr.tgments. We IIlUSt ask whether oo<p6v is only a propert)' of bo as unifying
unit),. or whether it is not precisely the essence of bo.
Ht:IDt:GGER: Then we could put a colon between f:v and oocp6v. f:v;

<X><f<\v.
FISK: ao<p6v, as the essence of the unif)'ing f:v, gr.lsps Ev in its com
plcte fullness of sense. If fv up till now appears to us LO withdraw, wc
have in Fr.4 I Ihc firSI more accurate characterizatinn as a kind offvuKn;
lunification), all hough this concept. is laden with Ncoplatonic meaning.
1-1 ~:I UE(:GEIl.: EV runs 1hrough all of melaphysics: and dialectic is also
!Till 10 be though 1 without fv.
FINK: In Fr. 53, to \\'hich we have already alluded in connection
with FT". 80, nuvlO gt'IS placed in relatiurlShip 10 rt6AEllOS. Thc fragmclll
bas the following \\'01"(1 order: n6AfllOS nuvtw\, IlE\' nun;Q tau. l"{uvtWV
~t IlootAEuS, xal TOU; IlE\' Owu; tbnl; TOU; bE ltv9QcimotJl;. "tou; ~ttv
OouAnu~ t:Jto('l0e tOUS be l:Aw6tQou;. Dids Il':lIlslatcs: "War is the father
and king or all things. He cstablished some ;IS gods and the othcrs <IS
human::.: somc he made slaves and thc others free:' The reference of

25
luivtClto :n:6Af:lW; has already indicated itsclflO us in Fr. 80. wherc f{ll; is
mentioned. Now war, th:1l is. strife, is named f,uhcr and king of all
things. As the father is the source of children. so is strife. which we must
think together with lv as lightning :md fire. the source of 1tavta. The
connection Of1l6Af:lW; as father to navtClrepea15 itself in a celtain way in
the relationship of n6AJ.l0; as so\'ereign to navtCl. We must bring
PaolAil; (king] into association with the steering and dirt.'Cting of lightning. As lightning tears open the fteld of 1tavta and works there as the
driving and reigning. SO war :IS ruler direcLS and reigns o\'cr 1tavtQ.
HEIDEGGER: When he speaks of father and ruler, Heraclit.us grasps
in an almOSI poetic speech the sense of the aQXf) (ultimatc principle) of
movement: 11'QWTov 68v illtQXil Tft; XLvftOEW;. The origin of movement.
is also the origin of ruling and directing.
FINK: The phrascs 11'6M:lW; nav[(ov nanl{l and no:vtwv ~aOlM:6;
are not only two new images; rather. a new moment in the rclatedness of
fv and nO:vta comes to speech in thcm. The way that war is the father of
1tO:vto..is designated in ~6El!;E Lcswblished, brought to liglHJ; thc way that
war is king of 1UlvtCl is said in tno(l1oE [made].
Fr. 90 mcntions the reference between navto. and the exchange of
fire: :n:uQ6; tE CvtaJ.lOl~Tj"tCl :n:clvta xai nU{l <mavtwv. 1O Here lv is addressed by name as fire, as it was fonned)' designated as lightning. The
relationship between fire and ltQvta does not have the characlcr here of
bare ytvEOl;, of bring-aboUl or bringing-forth (making), but rather the
character of exchange.
HEIDEGGER: The talk of exchange as the way that fire as fv relates
itsclf to JUlvta has the appearance of a cenain le\'eling.
FINK: This appearance is perhaps intended. Fr. 100 offers itself
now for consideration. It runs: WQa; ai :n:clvta q!tQOUOl "The seasons
which bring ltQvta." Till now we ha\'e heard of steering and directing,
showing and making, and now Heraditus speaks of a bringing. The
hours. that is. the times. bring 1tclvta. Therewith, time comes into fv in
:1Il express manner. Time was already named in a coven manner in
lightning. and is also thought in the seasonal times of fire and in the sun.
nQvta are what is brought b}' the times.
HEfl}EGGEk: Do you lay more emphasis on limc or on bringing?
FtN": I am concerned with the very connection bet .....een them. But
wc must stillleavc open how time and bringing: are hCI'e to be thought.
Ht:lIlEGGER: Bringing: is im imponallllllOlllcnt which we must. later
heed ill thc qucstion conccrning dialectic in OUllqlE(?6IlEVOV lsomcthing
thal is hroug-llI togetherJ ;lIld 6LCHPEQ6IlEVOV (somcthing that is brought
apart].
FIN,,: In Fr. I02.1tovto. is \'icwcd in a lwo-fold manner. It runs: tW
1lV 6E(!J xw..o. ;[OVto. xai. llyo.80 xo.l 6IXOIo.. aV8QW;[0l bt li IlEv ab,x~
UltElA1'Jq><.tOlV a 6 6(x(lt0.. Oids translales: "For god cverything is beami-

fill. good. and just; but humans have assumed some to be unjust and
others to bejust." In Fr. i. :n:ovta ....ere related to human grasping. Now
Hcraditus speaks not only from the human but also from the divine
reference to navto.. E\'eT),thing is beautiful. good, and just for god. Only
humans make a distinction between lhejust and the unjust. The genuine
and true viev,' on nclvtu and lv is the divine; the human is ingenuine and
deflciem. In Fr. 29. we see a similar double relatedness of:n:6:vta and lv.
There it was the noble minded who preferrtd the radiance of glory
rdther than all else. whereas the many indulged themseh'es in transient
things and did not aspire to e\'erlasting glory. Here it is the divine and
lhe human aspe<:ts that are placed in opposit)on.
Fr. 108 names ooq>6v as that which is set apart from evcT),thing: ooq>6v
tatl1tavtWv xexW{lLOJA-tvOV.11 Here oocp6v is not only a detennination of
Ev as in Fr. 4 I, but as fv it is that which is set apart from ltavta. ao<p6v is
that which holds itself separated from 1lavtCl, while still encompassing
them. Thus. ltclvta are thought from the sepal'alion of fv.
HEID(;Gt:JC xe).wQ~ol-ltvov [set apal'l] is the most dimcult question
.....ith Hel"acliLUS. Karl Jaspers says about this word of Heraclitus: "Here
the thought of tr:lIlscendcnce as absolutely other is ..eached, and indeed
in full awareness of the uniqueness of this thought." (D~ grO$$ef1
Philosopherl, Bd. I, S. 634).11 This interpretation of XEXWQlOJ.LEvoV as transcendence entirely misses the point.
FINK: Again. Fr. 114 provides another reference to"tcl rtclvto: !;iN
vixp )"tyovm; laxuQll;.Eo6o.l xQil "tiP EUVtP rtavtwv, 6xW01tQ v61l-Q.llt6AL;'
xai. ltOA.U laxUQOlEQWl;. t{lEcpovtal YUe ltavtE; ol o.V6Q<hJlElOl v6J.1Ot UltO
tvOl; '(ov 8Ei.ou. We can skip O\'er the last sentencc for our present con
sideration. Diels translates: "If one wanLS to talk with understanding, onc
must strengthen himself .....ith what is common to all, like a city with the
law. and e\'en more strongly:' Here also, 1ttlvtO are viewed from a specifIC human behavior. It cannot be decided at first glance whether only
the XOlv6\' (public realm] of the cit)' is meant by v,'hat is common to
c\'erything, or whether it does not also refer to ltQvto. In the latter case.
the fundamental relatedness of fv and navta would reflect itself in the
human domitin. As the one who wants to talk with understanding must
make himself strong with what is common to c\'c'1,thing, so must thc
judicious one make himself strong in a decper scnse with the lv, which is
in comp;my with :n:o.vto.
HfIllEGGER: After l;uv6v (commonl wc must put a big <!uestioll
mal'k, just as we do after XEXWQlotJEVOV. The qucstion mark. hO\\'c\'cr,
means that we mUSI sel aside all familial' ideas and ask and I'cnL'Ct.l;uv6v
a separate. complex problem, because hCI'e l;i.tv v6cp [with mind] comcs
mlo play.
FtNK: Now wc ha\'c examined in which I'espccl la :n:avta arc mcntioned in a serics of fragments. We ha\'e still gi\'en no interpretation.

!s

26
thcrewith. Nc vcl1heless, in passing through the many citations whal "to.
navta means has not become clearer La us. R;uhcr, the expression "ta
nCtvta has become morc questionable in rclc"encc to the G.lseS cxhibitcd.
.Il has becomc 1lI00'C questionable la us whaL novta arc. what theil'comIIlg to appearance is, and how the rclcl'cnce of nCtvta and EV must be
thougl~t. ~l1d .where this reference belongs. When wc say "qucstionable"
[fr~gl~urdlg], I~ means that the cmerging questions [Fragen] arc wonhy
Iwurdlg] of bemg asked.
PARTlCII'ANT: Frs, 50 and 66 also belong in thc se,'ics of enullIcrated fragments that treat of JTovta.
l-h:IDEGGER; Fr. 66 is disputed by Clcmclll. whom Karl Rcillhardt
~haracteri~esasthe Grcek Isaiah. For Clement secs HcradiluscschatoJog_
Ica~ly, Agalll, I emphasize Ih:lt it would be of inestimabfe value if Kart
Relllhardt's conHl~~ntary, ~}ricllled toward tradition and history. had
come down .to us. I I'll';, Relllhardt was no pl'OfessionaJ philosopher, but
he could thmk and sce.

3
nuV"ta-OAOV, J'tuvta-ovw-Differcl1l
Exposition of Fragmcl1l 7 (Correlated Fragmcl1l 67).
nav iQJ'tE"tov (Fragment. J J).
~ifatllralion Character of the Seasons (Fragment 100).

HElm:G(a:w: Let liS look back to the theme of the last scminar.
l'AWTlCIPANT: In passage Ihl'Ough the fragments in which 'ta nOvtCl
is mcntioned, wc attemptcd 10 view the rcspeos in which the phrase"ta
novto is spoken by Heraclitus. These respects <Ire the reference of J'tovta
to MYOl;, to strife. to war as fathcr and king ofJTuvta.to thc unifying h,
to x6o~l;. to the exchange of firc, 10 ooq>6v, to XEXWQlO""VOV, 10 lhe
seasons, moreover. to thc human componment of discerning cognizance. to lhe preference for onc rathcr than all else, to strengthening
oneself with what is common to all, and to the diffcrenl divinc and
human relation to nCtvta.
HlClDEGGER: Have we yct cxtracted what "to novto mcans from
these manifold rcfcrcnces?
I'AKTlCII'AN"': Provisionally, we have interpreted "ta J'ttlvtu as the
quintesscncc of what is individual.
HElDt:GGER: But where do you gel thc individual from?
PARTICII'ANT: In all the fragmcnts. the view is oriented toward Ihe
individual, which is taken togelher in the quintcsscllce. to nuvto.
!hIOECCt:W: What does "individual" mean in Greek?
PAMTICII'ANT: EXUO'tOV.
HEJI)EGGEK: In passage through a series of fragmcllls. we have
vicwed the reference ofta novta to h and that which belongs to V. nUl
in pursuit of the manifold relcl'enccs in which to.nuvtu are mentioned,
we are still not successful in char:lclcl'izing more close I) the phrase ta
JTuvta. ta novta arc also spoken of as distinguished within thcmselves.
How is that 10 be understood?
Pt\KT1CII't\NT: The clHirelY 01' JTuvtU can be addressed as "to lll..ov.
This entil"(:t), is the quintesscnce of Self-distinguishing J'tuvru.
lh:IOEG<:t:K: But whal is lhc quintessence? Doesn't it mean the
whole?
P,\MTlCII'ANT: The quinlessence is that which incloses.
HEIIlEGGER: Is there something like an inclosing quilllesscnce with
Heradilus? Obviouslr nol. QUillllsscllce. inclosing. grasping :lod COIllprehending is alrcady by ilself ull-Grcek. With HeracliHls. there is no
concept. Alld also Wilh Aristol1e, there still are no concepts ill the proper
SCllSC. When does the cOllcept :lrise for Ihe lint timc?

29

28
PARTIC ...ANT: When A6YOli. specifically the stuic xat(U..'l~lli [direct
apprehension]. gelS transl:ucd <llld understoud as COllrt'ptll.f [concept].
HEIOt:CGEK: To talk of the concept is not Creek. It is llot consonalll
....jllt what we will Ireat in the next seminar. There wc must also deal
call1iously wilh the word "quintessence:'
FINK; When I speak of quilllcssence. I would like to la)' the emphasis on ouvExoV (keep togetherJ. When the panicipanr 5.1id that I have
explained Tll ItQvta as the quilllcssence of the individual. he has claimed
more than I have said. I have precisel)' not decided whether ta ;UIVTQ
means an cmire constell:ukm of what is individual. or whether this
phrase does not ralher refer to the elements and the countcn-efcrcnces.
At first. I understand nl navY only as the entire region to which nothing is lacking; to which region. ne\'ertheless, something is opposed. That
to which .n:avtu stands in opposition, however. is not alongside them;
rather. it is something in which .n:avta are. Thus seen, KEQClllV6; is no
longer a phenomenon of light among othcl's in the emirely of ta
navla. Wc do not deny that in the entirety of what there is, lightning too
is included in a pre-emincnt manner which points in the direction of a
SlImmUIII I'IIS [supreme entity). Perhaps KEQClUv6; as thought by Herac1itus is. however, no ms [emit)'J which belongs \\'ith
navta. also no
distinct ms, but something which stands in a relationshil), still unclear to
liS. to ta nCtvtu. We ha\'e first fonnulated this relationship in a simile. As
lightning tears open light, :lIld gives visibility to things in its gleam, so
lightning in a deeper sense lets navta come forth to .appearance in its
clearing. .n:ltvta, coming forth to appearance, an~ g'dthered in the brightness of lightning. Becausc the lightning is not a light phenomenon interior 10 the entiret)' of navta, but brings navta forth to appeardnce, the
lightning is in a certain sense SCl apan from navtCL Lightning is. therefore, the KEQOUVOS: navtwv XXWplOJ.li;vos:. But as thus sct apan, lightning is in a certain manner also the joining and again the dismantling in
reference to navta. ta ltavta means not ani)' the entirety of individual
things. I~recisely when one thinks fmm out of ltUQ6; tQOltal (transfonnations of fire), it is rather the transformations offire throughout the great
lI11mllCl' of c1emcllls which makes up the entirety of individual things.
Individual things are then JUXta, Ihat is. mixed, out of the clements.
HEIIJI,:Cct:K: III what would )'011 Sce Ihe distinction belween enlirety
and wholcness?
FINK: We speak of wholeness in the whole structure of Ihings which
wc Gill address as (jAa. and of the entircty of things, of the 6Aov. in which
cvcr)'lhing distinguished is gathered and set apart in a specific ordering.
l'h:lm:GG~:K: Do you undersland entirety as 6wv 01' xaMwv
lunivcl''s''lI)?
FIN'" But l'lMlV, thc clllircty of nCl\"ta. is derivati\'c frOI11 lv, which is
a wllolencss of:l completely differCllt kind than the structural wholeness

to.

of things, 01' th;1l1 the wholeness of a summative kind. lv is also not to be

understood like the x60IlO; in Tlj.lalOS: I Timaf!us}, which Plato spt.."Cifies as
a living being with extremities turned inside. IS The wholeness of Or
means the totality which we must rather think as I:qxtiQO; (sphere). Thus
\\'e must discriminate the manifold of things and elements, the quillles.
sential entirety of navta, and the totalit}, lhought in 0., which lets the
entiret)' of ltavta come fonh to appearance, and which surrounds it.
HEIOEGGER: What do }'OU mean by cntirety? Once one has arrived
,H entirety in thinking, the opinion may emerge that one is at the end of
thinking. Is that the danger which }ou see?
FINK: At this point, I would like to speak of a double ray of thought.
We must distinguish the thought of things in the whole and the thought
that thinks the universe. the totality, or lv. I would like thereby to avoid
to. .n:avta, which arc referred back to 0. as lightining, becoming understood as a universe closed in itself.
HEIDEGGER: If we speak of wholeness in reference to to.1t6.vta, the
danger thcn consists ill fv becoming slIpernuous. Therefore, we must
speak of elllil'ety ,md not of wholeness with regard to ta navta. The
word "cntirely" means that .n:clvta are in entirety not as in a box, but in
the manner of their thol"Ough individuality. We choose the .....ord "cntirety" on two grounds: first, in order not to run the danger that the last
word be spoken with "the whole"; and second, in order not to understand ta 1t6.vta only in the sense of lxaO'ta.
FINK: In a cenain manner to. navta are the many, but precisely not
the many of an enumerated set; rather, of a quintessential entirety.
HEIDEGGER: The word "quintessence" is on the one hand too static,
and on the other it is un-GTeek in .so far as it has to do ""jth grasping. In
Greek, ",'e could speak of nEPltxov [embrace). But fxuv [to hold) does
not mean grasping and gdp. What comes into play here, we will see from
the following fl"3grnents.
In order to return now to the fragmems which we went thl"Ough in the
last seminar: we have seen that they speak of to. 1t6.vta in different ways.
For example, Fr. 7 is the only one in which Heraclitus speaks ofn6.vta as
6vta, and in which 6vta is used at all. Precisely translated, it runs: If
evcrything which is wcre smoke, noses would discriminate. Here
6laytyvwOXEtV is mentioned. We also speak of a diagnosis. Is ,I diagnosis
also a distinguishing?
PARTICIPANT: A diagnosis distinguishes what is heahh)' and whal is
sick, what is conspicuous and what is not conspicuous in relat.ion LO
sickness.
PARTICIPANT: To spe;:tk in the terminology of the physician: the
ph)'sician seeks specifIC S)"ll1ptolUS of sickncss. The diagnosis is a passing
thmllgh the body and a precise, distinguishing cognition of symptoms.
HEIOEGGEk: Thc diagnosis Tests on the original meaning of bia and

30
means, first of all. a running through and a going through the entire
body in order to come then to a distinguishing and a decision. From this
wc already obscn'c that the lhaylyvlixJxlv is nOI only a distinguishing.
We must, therefore. sa)': If everything that is were smoke. noses would
have the possibility to go through them.
PARTICIPANT: The distinguiShing of entities would then happen by
means of the scnse of smell.
HEIDEGGEN.; BUl can the senses distinguish at all? This queSIKJn will
still occupy LIS later with Hcraclillls. BUI how does Heraditus come 10
smoke? The ill1SWCr is not diflieulllO find. Where there is smoke, there is
also fire.
1"11'11<: Jr HCl'adilUS speaks of smoke in Fr. 7, then it means that the
smoke makes O'$l~ [sighlj more diflicuh in reference to navta "tU 6vt:u.
that, ne\'el1heless. in passing through the concealing smoke a
lhaYlYVWaxElv is possible by way of j)lVE; (the nostrils). We must also
observe that Heraclitus does not say something like: If everything that is
becomes smoke. R;lther, he says: If everything which is would become
smoke.
HEIDECGER: We must underSland the yLvEaOaL (coming into e>:istcnce) in YEvol'tO (.....ould becomc} as "coming-fonh." If cverything that is
.....ould come fonh as smoke ... In the fragment, the nuvta 'tcl 6vt(l are
straight away allied with a 6lUyvWOl;. In the background. howcvcr. they
arc spokcn of in respect to a character that is connectcd with fire.
FtN": You bring smoke illl.o connection with lire. Smoke stands in
relation to the nose. That would mcan that the nose also stands over lhe
smoke in a relation to fire. However. is it nOI precisely the 6$L; which is
the most fire-like in meaning? I would suppose that the sunlikc nature of
sight can receive the firey morc than the nose. Additionall)'. smoke is
something derivative from firc. Smoke is, so to speak. the shadow of fire.
One must S"ly: I f everything which is ,,'ould become smoke. as that which
is deri\'ativc from firc. then noses could cognize "'hat is by means of
resistance. Ho,,'c\cr. I would suppose that 6$t;. r.lther than the nose. is
allied wilh fire.
HEIDEGCJ;Il:: Ne\enheless. I believe Ihat something-else is mealll by
the nose and slUoke. Let us look al Ft. 67. There il Si'IYS. among other
things: aMOlouwl 6E XWOItEg (rrUg). o1t6tav OtlflfllYll 8t1WflOOIV.
6vofl6.1;uaL xoO' t'ibovilv bdlOTOtl. "HLlI he changes just like fi"e which.
when it is mixed with incen."C, is named ;lccordillg to the frag"ance of
e...(:h onc." III uurcOlltcxt of mcatlillJ{. the word ....'c arc concerned with is
OUwflo. incense. Depending 011 the inccllse, which is mixed wilh fire. a
fragrance is spread by whicll llle fragrance is thcll named. It is important
here thal the smuke of fi"e can be \'ariollsly fragr:lllt. That means lIml
the smoke itself has:m inhercnt mallifold of distinctions. so that itcan Ix'
cognized with the nose i1S a spL"Cific this or that.

31
FISK: I understand smoke as a phenomenon that veils the distinctions of 1tCtvta. without the distinctions disappearing entirely. For it is
the nose that. in passing through the \'eil of ncivta, cognizes distinctions.
HEIDECCU: Thus you take bt.6. as '"throughout the smoke.~ To the
contrary. I understand 6Lci as "along the smoke:' bu:rylyv<OOxIV here
means that the possible manifold. immanent to the smoke, can be gone
through and cognized.
FIN"; Whereas. on my preliminary interpretation. smoke veils a
lIlultiplicity, on your explication sllloke is itself a dimension of multiplicity. The question aoout 'ta 6vta depends on the way we understand
smoke. OIOYIYVWoxElV in the sense of distinction and decision presup
poses the 6Lci in the sense of "throughout" (minced).
PARTtCIPA1'/T: If all things would become smoke, then isn't evcrything one, without distinction?
HElm;CCER: Then noses would have nothing more to do. and there
would be no bui. Fr. 7 denies precisely that e\'cl"ything that is would
become homogeneous smoke. If that were Ihe statement of the fragment. then no 6WYVOlV could follow. We have brought Fr. 67 into play
precisely because it contains an allusion to the fact that smoke is filled
with a manifold .
FIN": OUI" attempt at interpreting thc fragments of Hel1lclitus
began with Fr'. 64. Although we have already discussed a number of
other fragments, this was alxwe all because we wallled to leam in what
respects 't<1 ltUv'to are mentioned. From Fr. 64, with which we began OUI'
sequence of fragments. we no\\' turn to Fr. 11. It runs: ltUV yilg tQttE'tOv
ttf..llYU VEflUUl, LlCils translates; "Eveq'thing that l;r.lwls is tended by
(god's) (,,'hip)blo.....:' What can be the reason for arranging this fragmelll.
which declares that all crawling things are dri\'en to pasture with a blow,
hehind the KEQ<luv6~-fragment?Approaching from another \'iewpoilU.
is it also decl,lred here how lightning steers and how it guides ttuvta: or
is somcthing entirely differel1l aimed at in this fragment? Let us proceed
in the explication of this fragment from the word It).'lYU (blow]. Dids
Ir.tJlslates: with god's whipblow. Tl"Ue. god is mel1lioned in the context,
hut nOI in the fragment itself. Wc attempt an explication of lhe sa)'ing
without thereby pUlling il in thc comex!..
'h:mECGEIl:; You wish nOI to include the god. But with Aesch)'lus
ilnd Sophoclcs we find Itf..'lY'l in connection with the god (Ab'dlTlelllllOn
%7. Ajax 137).
FIN": In nf..'lY'l, I sce ,ll1othcr fundameTltal word for liglllning. It
lIlt'ms. then. the lightning IXlIL On this ground, it is justified to turn
fl'om the KEQClUv6;-fr.lgmelll to Fr. 11. But let LIS lil'SI slay with Ihc
literal language of HeraclilUs' Silying: e\'erything IIlal Crd\,'!s is tended
;llld driven to pasture h)' lhe blow. The whil> blo"' ch;ves the hcrd for.....ard and tends it while it is on the I>asturc. Apparently. in the litel7l1

32

33

language, a grazing herd is spoken or. which is driven forward and

tended by means of the blow of the whip. But if we now refer the blow to
the lightning bolt. then the blow is also thunder. ",'hich resounds
through the wide spaces. the voice of lighlning. ",'hich dri\'cs forward
and guides all cra",'ling things. vtJ!EtV means on onc hand 10 drh'c 10
pasture. lend and feed; on the other. howe\er. 10 dispense and allot. Wc
can then say: everything which crawls is allOled b)' Ihe blow as the voice
of lighming.
HIO(;GR: VEllnaL also refcrs 1.0 NtJ!EOLS 19oddcssof retribution].
FINK: NEIlEOl~. ho\vcvcr. does not havc only thc mcaning of alloting
and dispensing.
PARTICII'ANT: vj.ltal refcrs equally to v61J.O~ [cuslom, law].
FINK: v61l~ regulates for all the citizens of the city the dispcnsingof
what is appropriatc to them. The obvious image. which is. however. no
allegory, means that everything ",'hich crawls is put to pasture wilh a
blow being allotted to it. In VEJLEl"Cllthe coerci\'eness of what befalls one
(being driven forward b)' a blow) connects with the tranquility of grazing. We must hear many things together in vEll1:al: guiding. pursuing.
and steering of the blow and being driven. To the latter there also
belongs a tending and being steered. Allotment also belongs to the tranquil sense of grazing. Grazing as allotment is protection as well as geuing
steered in lhe sense of being forced.
HEIDEGGER: I would like to read a few verses from Holderlin's
pocm, "Peacc."
Unyielding and unvanquished, you strike alikc
The lion-he~1'led, Nemcsis. and the weak,
And from the blow your victims Iremble
Down to the ultimate generation.
You hold the secret power to goad and curb
For thorn and reins are given into )'our hands,
(Stuttgart edition. \'01. 2, I. p. 6. lines 13_18)14
FINK: A strophe from Holdcrlin's poem. "Voice ofthe People" (first
edition). also belongs here:
And, as the eagle pushes his young and throws
Them from the nest. to look in the fields for prey.
So, too, the sons of man arc driven
Out and away by Ihe God's own kindncss
(SllIttgan edition. vol. 2. I, p. 50. lines 33-36)14
The kindncss uf the gods unites ill itself the grace and the coerdon
which \"e must listen for ill VE~lE'tal in Fr. 11. Therewith wc have a
preliminary llI'ientation concerning th,n which ItA.rrvf! and VEIlU(U mean.
But does the blow, ",hidl guides and allots, refer gener::l1ly to "'Ca Ito.vto?
In the saying itself. 'ta lto.vta are nut mentioned. Instead of Ihis. il
mentions l"uiv Q.I",,[1'6v. It would seem as though a spedflC field were

can'ed out of 'to. mivta. luiv QJ1l:6v means everything which cnlwls.
Here it is not a question of the grammatical singular. but of a singular
Ihat means a 1)lurality: everything that crawls. Is the sphere of land
creatures that crawl outlincd in opposition to creatures which live in lhe
ail' and in lhc water? Is the manner of movement of land creatures
characterized as crawling in contrast to the quicker night of birds or the
<Iuicker swimming of water creatures? I would like to answer the question in Ihe negative. My hunch is that with Itav QIttT6v we are not
conccrned with bordered region, but rathcr with Ihe entire rcgion of
'ta rro.vto; that is, from a specific aspect that spccifics ItCtvta in entirclY as
aawling.Itav Ql'tu6v mustthell be rcad 'to. 1lo.VtO w~ Q1tUQ (everything
as crawlingJ. In that case, Fr. I I speaks of 1tClvtO in so far as they are
crawling. To what extent? What crawls is a conspicuousl)' slow movement. the slowness of which is measured by a quicker movement. Which
quicker movement is meant here? If we bring Itav QJ1t6v, or 1to.vtO Wt;
Qlt;to. into connection with ltA:rryll, it is the unsurpassably quk.k mm'ement of the lightning bolt by which the mo\'ement of ItCtvtO as crawling
must be measured.
HEIOEGGER: If we no longer understand the lightning bolt only
phenomenally bUI in a deeper sense, then we can no longer say of its
movement that it is quick or quicker than the movement of ItCtvta. For
"quick" is a speed charactel"istic Ihat only pertains to the mo\'ement of
:n:avta.
FINK: The talk about "quick" in relation 10 the lightning bolt is
inappropriate. Measured by the quickness of lightning, everythi,.g that
comes to appearance in the brightncss of lightning, and has its passage
and change, is crawling. Secn in this way. nav Q1t't6v is also a statcmelll
aboul ta ItClvta. Now, howe\'ever, 'ta :rt6:vtO are looked back at from
lightning. The crawling of 1lUvta is a trait that we could not immediatcly
auribute to them as a qualitative determination. The manifold
mO\'ements that 1tO::vta in entirety wem through are a lame movement as
compared to the mO\'ement of the lightning blow that tears open lighted
space.
HEIOEGGEIt: In order to bring 10 mind again the course of thc int,crprelatioll of Fr. I I, juSt now put forward. we ask ourselves how the
fragment is. thcrcfore, to be read.
P... RTICIl... NT: The explication. the purpose of which was to relatc
J1UV QItE't6v to 'ta J1avto, began not with ItCtV QJ1E't6v, but wilh ItA'l'ffl
and vt~EtCll.
HEIOt:GGEIol: That means Ihal Ihe saying is to be T'e,ld hackwards.
Ho"" il is possible that we can rcad 1lav Qnu6v <IS 1lQvta w~ ()1lt."ta,
dcvcloped oul of 1lA.TJYU and VEIltOl. From nav QItEt6v alone, ...e cannot
leam thc eXlent 10 which 1to.vtO are also melllioned with 1tav Q!tt6v.
But b)' means 01 nA.'lyfj and VEIlYOl. which refers back to the lightning-

,I

34

35

fragment, it becomes understandahle why nav tQ1tEt6v must be under

stood as
n6v'to..
PAKTICIPANT: I ..... ould like to ask a foolish question. Can one really
understand nav tQ1tfl6v as Ta navta? For only the living being is spoken
of in nfrv tQ1tY6v. but -ca l1avte.t also encompasses the inanim;lte.
HEIDEGGER: The explication of Fr. 11 began with the word nA.m
that was refclTed 10 the lightning boIL tha! steers
navm. as is S<lid in
Fr. 64. The explication .....as directed to lv. In starling from lv in the
specific form of the lightning bolt. it was made dear that and how nav
tQ1tt6v is to be comprehended as 'ta navta. Your question about the
inanimate which WQu:d also belong to 1tavlQ is in fact foolish. because a
specifIC domain is therewith marked oIT in opposition to another ~o
main. The presenl explication of Fr. 11, however. has shown lhat wllh
;citv QttElOV it is nOI a matter of a demarcated domain but of somelhing
univcrs,'J1.
FISK: We must read ttiiv EQtttOV as ;cclvta ~ EQttEta. Cr-dwling
does not mean here a propert), of specifK lhings. namel)' living lhings on
Ihe earth. Rather, crawling is a characler of ttavta in emiret)'. which
does nOI I'e\'eal itself immedialel)', but only in relation 10 the suddenness
of Ihe lightning which lets to. ttO,vta appear in its brighlness, In
comparison 10 the suddenness of the lightning bolt lhallears open lighl.
lhe movement of ttavtCl lhal are galhered in the brightncss of lightning
is a crd.....ling movemenl. nelween the suddenness of lighlning ;md lhe
crawling of 1tc1vtCl, there is no relationship as belween the extratemporal
and the inlr.llemporal. 011 the other hand, il is also not a malter of Ihe
relationship of Achilles and Ihe lortoise. Evcr),thing Ihal movcs about in
liKhtning's dimension of brightness is driven b)' Ihe blow. In this being
drivcn. ;Cavta gain the character of crawling in refcrence back to lighlning. Fr. I I does not memion a shepherd who. Iuming out to pasture.
distdbules and guides. }--r. 11 says nOlhing of a guider, bUI mcmions
ttClvtO in Ihe character of lheir being struck and being the subject vis-avis Ihe lightning boil. Fr. 11 does not relale to F,. 64 as a pal'lial domain
tu Ihe entirel)' of llaVla. Much more. il expresses something 'lbout the
relalionship of 1l0,vta 1,0 nakcd power which driv<:s and guides.
,
H.:l1n:GGEH: J::xpliC:llion of FI. I1 pUlS before us lhc qucsuon
whether llA11Y(] and v~~tQL actually allow a reference to Ihe lightning
bolt. so that nav tQnu6v is to be understood. not regionall)' ;IS:t single
area wilhin dle entirety of navtct. but as lhc cllIirety of nO,vra ilself.
FtNlc We (Urn to Fr. 100: wQa; at no.vra <pegolJOL Diels translutcs:
"thc seasons. which bring evcl'ylhing.' In the contexl ~HAtO; is mendoned. which is :m(llhcl' name for fire as well as lightning. In this fragmcnt there is a conllcction between "HAlo;, light and limc. Wc call ask
ourseh'Cll whethcr lightning iSH't only a momentary fire in contrast lO
~HAtO;. wllich is a fil"C of greater constanq, if not everlasting. but begin-

'to.

'to.

!ling 10 glow faintly and become dim. ~ f, no~. r!AlO; in the sense of lhe
long enduring lightning bolt replaces hghtnll1g, then we ":,ust not forg~t
thal this fire nOI on I)' illuminates, but also measures Ihe times. rH.LO; IS
the clock of the wol'!d. the world-dock; not an instrument that indicates
times, but thal which makes lhc seasons possible. which brings all. Wc
cannOI understand the seasons in thc sense or fixed sX'lIs of time or as
stretches in homogeneous lime. bUI as the times of da)'s and or years.
These times of )'ears ;ue not the lingering but Ihe bringing. Jt6.vta are
not so gathered that Ihey are conlemporaneous, bUI they are in the
lIlanner lhal lhe)' arrange themselves XQT' fQlv and xata tOY AfJyov.
nO,vta rise, act. and are steered b)' the begeuing. fulfilling. and producing seasons.
.
.
.
HIDGGER: Let us 11")' 10 c1arif}' the extent to whKh ume IS mentioned in Fr. 100. What are seasons? Alongside the three Hesiodic
seasons. Eirvo..,w. AEx'l, and ElQiJvr1 [Good Order, Junice, and Prosperous Peace), I~ there is also 9a>J..W. Au;w, and Kae-'"lw. 9a>J..W is the
springtime. which brings the shool and blossom. .A~;w means ~umme.r.
ripening and maluring. KQttw means aUlumn, plckmg of the npe fruIt.
These lhree seasons are nOl like three time periods; rather, we must
undersland them as the whole malU'dUon. If ....' e wanl lO speak of
movement .....,hich form of Arislotlian mm'cment would come into ques
tion? Firsl of all, whal arc lhe four forms of movement ...., ilh Aristotle?
PARTICIPANT: aU;1)Ol; and lp9(OlS [growth and wasting away),
ytvOl; and cp6oQ6. [genesis and corruption]. lJlOQ6. and as fourth
illolWOl; [productiveness and altcrdlion),t
.
HEIPGGER: Which fOl'm of mo\'ement .... ould be most approlmate
to the seasons?
PARTICIPANT: au;'l0U; and lp9EOI; as well as YEVf:m; and <p90Q6.,
HEIDEGGH: Q}J.oCWOl; is containcd in these fomls of movement.
Spring, summer and aUlumn are nol imcrmitlenl. but somelhing conlinual. Their maturation has the characler of continuit)" in which an
oJJ..oilOOU; is contained.
FtNK: The movemenl of life in nalUrc is. ho\\'c\'cr. b'Towth as well as
withering. The first pa ..t is all increasing 1.0 o.x~it (acme]. thc second pari
a withering.
.
1IElln:GCEH: Do you undcrst;lnd fruil a!i being already a stage of
dedinc?
FINK: The life of a living beil1g forms a rising and falling ~>ow,
Human life is also a slcady bUI arching movemenl, in its successl\'c1)'
following aging.
j-h.lIn:c.GER: Age cOlTcsponds to fmil in lhe sense of ripening.
which I U11derslalld nul ;IS a declining bUI as a kind of self fulfillmelll. If
lime comes into play with lhe sc<lsons. lhen we Illusllet go or calcllh~tcd
lime, \Ve must ;ItlCmpllO understand from olher phenomena whatlnlle

36
means here. Also, we may not separate the conlelH of lime from the
form of lime. The character of bringing belongs to time. In our language wc also say: lime will tcll. 17 So long as we understand Lime as b.,rc
succession, bringing has no place.
FINK: In order to will an understanding of the maturation charac.
lcr of the seasons, wc mllst disregard homogenous lime. which onc
represents ilS a line and as bare sllccession and in which the time content
is abstracted. Such an abstraction is impossible with the seasons.
HElDEGGER: Fr. 100 plilces us before different questions. To what
extent may onc take the seasons together with nclvta? How must time be
thought. if onc wishes to speak of it here, especially if onc says orit that it
brings. We must simply gel clear to ourselves in what sense time brings.
FINK: In this, it is necessary nol to think time as a colorless medium
in which things swim about. Rather, we must seek to understand time in
reference to the y(yvw8(U of nCtvta.
HEIDEGGER: We must think time together with qnJOLS.
FINK: Presently, we stand before the question whether Fr. 100 is
able 10 give liS still further references lO the matter that we atlempt to
think, or whether it is not more appl'Opriate to revert first to Ft". 94.
HEIOEGGER: The 2500 years that separate us from Heraclitus are a
perilous affair. With our explication of Heraclitus' fragments, it requires
the most intense self--<::riticism in order to see something here. On the
other hand, il also requires a venture. One must risk something, because
otherwise one has nothing in hand. So there is no objection to a speculalive interprcl<Hion. Wc must therefore presuppose that we can only have
a presentiment of Heraclitus, when we ourselves think. Yet, it is a question whether we still can measure up to this task.

4
"HALO" Daylight-Night, ~hQ(HEQ~ata
(Correlated Fragments: 94, 120,99,3,6,57, 106, 123).

FINK: In the last seminar session we have let some questions stand unmastered. Today wc are still not in a position to somehow bring the
openness of the explication situation to a decision. After discussion of
the PHA.LOs-fragment [sun fragment] we atlempt to come back to Frs. 11
and 100 in which nCiv Q1tEl6v and wga~ [seasons] are mentioned.
We have seen that WgaL, the hours and the times. are not to be takeD as
a stream of time or as a temporal relation that. subjected to metric
leveling down, is measurable and calculable. Hours and times arc also
not to be taken as the empty form in contrast to thc content of time. but
as filled time which begets and produces each thing in its' own time. Wgal
arc no hollow forms, but rather the times of the day and of the season.
The times of day and seasons apparently stand in connection with a fire
that does not. like lightning. suddenly tcar open and place everything in
the stamp of the outline. but that holds out like the heavenly fire and, in
the duration, travels through the hours of the day and the times of the
season. The heavenly fire brings forth growth. It nourishes growth and
maintains it. The light-fire of "HAWS tears open--<lifferent from
lightning--continually; it opens the brightness of day in which it allows
growth and allows time to each thing. This sun-fire. the heaven
illuminaling power of "HA.LOl;, does not tarry fixed at one single place,
but travels along the vault of heaven; and in this passage on the vault of
heaven the sun-fire is light- and life-apportioning and time measuring.
The metric of the sun's course memioned here lies before every calculalive metric made by humans.
If we now turn to Fr. 94 in which the talk is explicitly about this
heaven-lire, then we remain on the trail of lire, which we have already
trod with the KEQouv6s-fragmem. Fragment 94 runs as follows: ~HA.Wl;
yae OUX iI7tEQ(3i10EtOl ~ttQa' Et be Ilit, 'EQLvUEl; ~~V d(XES 'rn(XOlJQOl
V;EllQTJOOUOW. Diels translates: "(For) Helios will not overstep his measures; otherwise the Erinyes, minislers of Dike, will find him out." If we
Ict this fragment work upon us without particularly thorough preparation. what is expressed in it, supposing that wc be permitted to take the
sayings of Heraclitus as a model of a thematic statement?
First of all, thc word j.lttQo [measure] is problematic. Which measure
does the sun have or set up? Does the sun itself have measures in which it
travcls along the vault of heaven? And if the sun sets up measures, which
l11easurcs arc thcse? Call we dClerminc more closely this distinction be-

38

39

(.....eell the measures that belong 10 the sun itself and those that it selS up?
First......e can understand ~tt:QCl in reference to the passage and coursc of
the sun. '"HMo;. as the fire that travels the heaven, has specific measures
in its course like the measures of morning light, of midday heal and of
subdued twilight. If we look only to\\'ard Ihe phenomenon of the sun's
course, we see that ~A.LO; exhibits no even, homogeneous radiation, but
r.l.lher timely differences in the way of being luminous. Allhe same time,
howc\'cr. by !.he measures through which the sun passes in its passage.
the nourishing fire is apportioned in various ways to the growth of the
earth that is found in the sun's brighmcss. The second meaning of ~QCl
lies therein: the measures of light and warmth which the sun apponions
10 growth. We can on onc: hand distinguish the measures which are
exhibited by the course of the sun itself, and on the other hand those
measures which the sun sets up to "'h'll it shines on in thc way that the
sun apportions the fiery to it. ~hQ<lcan thus be undcl"slOod in a two-fold
manner: the f,lt'tQ<l of the sun's course and thc 1!f:t:Q<lthal works down
from lhc sun's course to what nourishes itself from the sun's light. How
evcr, does the sun also have J.4E'tQCl in )'ct a completely differCllI sellse?
Is "HALO;, \\'hich is bound to the measures of ils course and which appor
tions fl"Olllthere the nourishing lire toeverylhing found in the sunlight,
is this iiAlo;squcezed into measurc..'S in a completclyother sense? Is there
perhaps also (.ltQ<l in such a manner that the entire double domain of light
is determined by measures? When Heraditus sal's. "For "H),UX; will not
overstep his measures," a natural law of"HA~ is in no way fonnulated
here. It is not a maucrofthe insight that the sun'scoursc is subject to any
inviolable natural law, for then the second sentence would have no
meaning. In this sentence it says that in case "HALO; should overstep his
measures the Erin)es. helpc:1'"S of Dike. would track him down and bring
him to account. But what is a restriction, a holding to measure of"HAu>;?
"HAw; will not o\'crstcp his measures. Can we imagine at all that he
would be able 10 ovel'step his measurcs? We have brought to mind t\\'o
ways in which he would not take the correct way across the vault of
heaven. One could imagine Ihal he suddenly StopS, perhaps <It the commend of Joshua for the time in which Joshua waged bailie against the
Amorites. That \\'ould be an overstepping of the !!EtQ<l of his own na
Elm:, In such a case he \\'ould no longer be in accord with his own nature
of liery power. The sun t.:ould change her own essent.:e if she travek-d
along lhe vaull of heaven ill a lIlanncr mher than in accord with nature.
Thc sun could overstep her measurcs if she ran from nO!"lh to south
inSlead or from easl to west. Howcvcr. a cumpletely different manllcr of
overstepping [he boundary "'ould bc supposed if~H).,lo; werc to break
into a domain or \\'hicb we cOllld lIot speak further;1I the moment, for
this domain lies l>e)'und lhe brighUlcss ofH)"\o~ in which the many arc
g<lthered. Then "H),LO; gues out of the sun's dom'lin ill which c\'cr)thing

is one in another sense. That would also be a going aStrAY of the sun;
now. however, not in the mannerof deviation from the sun's path. but in
the manner of a breaking into the nightly abyss to which "H4o; does not
belong.
In order to bring this thought somewhat nearer, let us include fragment 120 in which lE(M.la'ta (boundaries) and not f,lt'tQCl are mentioned:
flou;; xal onlQa; 'tQI!Qta " 6Qxlat; xai.ltvt(ov n;; iiQXlou O{,QOl; al9QCou
.6l6;. Diels' translation runs: "The boundaries of morning and evening:
The bear and, opposite the bear the boundary stone of radiant Zeus:'
My question now is whether the domain of the sunny is encirded b)' the
T@ata (which with uQJ.4atll;.Elv = to confine. to connect). that is, encircled on onc hand by morning and e\'ening, and 011 the other hand by the
bear and by the boundary stone of radiant Zeus, which lies opposite the
bear. I identify thc bear with the Nonh SI"r so that the boundary stone of
radiant Zeus. which lies opposite the bear, would lie in the south of the
vault of heaven, Fr. 120 implies then that "HAlO;. which moves across the
vault of hcaven from morning to evening, isconfined in the possibility of
its deviation toward north or south by thc bcar and the boundary stone
of radiant Zens which lies opposite the bear. Thcrefore. wc must think
radiant Zeus together with ~AUX; as the power of day which illuminates
the entirety of 'ta 1tCtVta. This entire domain of the sun is closed in four
dirc.."Ctions of the heaven, in which case wc must understand 'tEQIlata as
the outer boirders of the domain of light in distinction from (.ltQCl in the
sense of specifIC places on the familiar path of the sun.
HEIDEGGER: How do you read the genctive: ftou; xai. 01tEQ<l;?
Dicls translates, "Boundaries of morning and e\'ening:' which is to be
undel'"Stood as. "Boundartes for morning and evening:' But do you \\'ish
to read, "The boundaries which form morning and e\'ening'"?
FtSK: I stick with the laller, but I ask. myself whclherthe meaning is
fundamentally changed by this diffcrence and also by the manner of
reading, "Boundaries for morning and c\'cning:' If we unclel'"Stand
tEQJ.4Ula as boundary placcs. the Illorning as thc C.ISt boundary.thcc\"en.
ing as the west bounda'1" lhe bear as north boundar)' and the boundar)'
stone opposite thc bear as the south boundary, then we ha\'e, as it werc,
lhc four corners of the world as the Iield of the sun's rcalm. Thus seen,
TfQftOTU would not l>e c<IU<ll.cd with the two mcanings of J,lTQCl just
mclltioned. That which Fr. 120 says in refcrcnce to TEQflUta would be a
third meaning of ftftQ<t thal wc IllUSt include willl both of the othcrs in
ordcl"to takc in vicw the full mC<lningof fIEtQ<.t in Fr. 94. In this case-as
a deeper-going explication of this fragment will reveal 10 us-prccisel)'
the third mcaning plays a prominelll role. The lirSI meaning of J.4f:tQa
that we accentuatcd concerned the places and timcs through which thc
Sun passes from mOl'lling through midda)' to e\cning. In a second sense,
J,ltT(>O. means Lhe measures that arc sent from lhe sun for things. A

40

41

deviation frol1llhe mC;lsurcs that arc scnt .....ould. for gl'Owing :llld living
things. mean that the sun is too hOl, too close or (00
away. The third
meaning of ~QO, which wc have picked up out of Fr. 120, signifies
tfQIlO:tO in which the sun's entire domain of light is enclosed. Were
rn..IO:; to overstep the bOllndary that is fixed by the lour corners of the
.....orld. the Erill)'cs. helpers of Dike. would find '"H).IO:; OllL Such an
overstepping would not ani)' mean a deviation from the familiar path;
mlher, such an oventepping would mean a breaking into a nightly abyss
to which the sun's domain does nOI belong.
l-h:mEGGER: When )'OU grasp Tt<:ru:; xai 01tEQ<l; as gmit;vus subiec
tivw (subjective genitive) then you come into proximity of the third
meaning of }1hQ<l.
FISK: I do not wan I at first to maintain this as a thesis. Rather, I am
onl)' concerned to show three possible meanings of }llt"QCl, whereby the
third signifies that which Fr. 120 !klYs about TEQI.lOl"Cl.
HEIDEGGER: In ordinary language use, we distinguish, in reference
to ~QCl. between the measure and the measured.
FINK: We can understand measure in a topical and in a chTOnos~
related sense. The first signifICance of ~QCl means the measures that
the sun will not o\erstep. the measures in the sense of the places and
times of its path across the vault of hea\en. Measures mean here, however, not naturdllaws, but they concern rather the qnjOl~ ofrt>..~. The
constancy of the sun in its daily and )'early path derives from its !pOOU;.
rO.loO; remains held in the measures of its path by its own essence. The
second meaning of ~QCI signifies the measures, dependent upon the
measures of the sun's path, in reference to the growth in the sun's field.
Here a growth and decline is possible, above all when one thinks on the
tx..-rUQWOu;-teaching, on the overstepping of the sun's measures which
consumes everything. If"HAlOS holds in his natur<ll path, the growth that
is illuminated by him has its blossoming and its proper times. The third
me:ming of f.ltQCl is to be seen in the confinement of the sun's realm by
the four corners of mOl'lling, evening, the bear and the boundary stone
which lies opposite the bear. Inside this encircled domain, rtAlOS travels
and rules. The jurisdiction of~HAloS is closed in by the four 'tEQI!Cl'tCl.
HEIDEGGEIt: Then we must strike the genitive "of' in Dids' tr,mslation. Then onc must not translate, "boundaries of morning and. cvening," but rather, "boundaries which form morning :.lI1d evcning:'
I'ANTICII'ANT: In the commenl<lry of the Diels-Knmz cdition, it is
indicated how the translalion is to be understood. There we rcad, "The
int,erpret:ltion of Kranz, Ber!. Sitz. Bcr., 1916, 1161, is chosen hcre:
Morning and evening: land get separated by the COllullunicalion linc of
the North Sw!' wilh lhe (daily) culmination lX>iut of the sun's pal h which
Hc1ios 1m3)' nOI overslep (U 94) (- ZEiJ; aiOQIOS [radiant Zcusl comp:.rc
22 C IZ, 4, PhercC)'dcs A 9, Empcdodcs B 6, 2 et al)."

",If

FINK: BUlthen tEQI!U'tCl would no longer have the sense of boundaries that fonn morning and evcning. In such a view, morning and
evening become almosl a delennination of a region that secms to me
questionable.
P"RTICII'ANT: The translation is oriented around the idea of Orient
::md Occidcnt, which get separated by thc communication line of the
North Star ",'ith the daily culmination point of the sun's passage. I myself
would not follow lhis interpretation either, since there was not yet the
idea of Orient and Ocddent in Herac1itus' lime. Rather, this idea can be
assibTfled only from Herodotus on.
FINK: The Kranl interpretation does away with the boundary
chaJ<lCtcr of morning and c\ening. If one speaks of the one line between
the North Star and the daily culmination point of the sun's passage. then
also Ihe plural. tEQI.lUtCl, is no longer <Iuite understandable. Although
the explication given by Kranl is a possib~ answer to the diffICulty that
Fr. 120 presents. still it s("'ems to me a if the (alia dijfJCilior [more diffICult
rendition] is thereby precluded.
We have brought to mind the ambiguity of ~QCl of~lJ.oS in reference to Frs. 94 and 120. That has httn only an attempt. We must now
take into consideration the other sun fragments as well as the fragments
concerning day and night.
HEIDEGGER: In talking through the three meanings of the ~QCI of
"HALOS, )'ou wallled to concentrate on the third meaning that you indi
cated at the beginning ofthe discussion of Fr. 120. In Fr. 94, this third
meaning is given by the St.-cond sentence which is started by El OE I!l)
(otherwise), <lnd in which Dike and the Erin)'es are mentioned.
FtNK: Perhaps ~AlOS, who apportions everything. is himself conlined by another power. The jurisdiction thal finds him out in a case of
overslepping and brings him to account is Dike with her helpers. Dike is
the diety of the just, the dicty who watches the boundary between the
domain of the sun's brightness and of what is found therein, and the
domain of the nighl1y abyss that is denied to us. The guardians of this
lX>undary are the helpmates of Dike. They watch out that ~HALOS does
not ovcrstep his own domain or l)Owel' ,md attempl 10 break into the
dark abyss.
HEun:GGEN: On this third possible meaning of I!EtQ<l you point to
Fr. 120 as support.
FINI.:: If wc now go back t.o lhc phenomena, we find thc strange facl
Ihat da)'lighl rllllS out in boundlcssncss. Wc havc no boundary to dayliKhl. If we speak of lhe vault of hcaven, wc do not mean thereb)' a dome
which closes off; rather we mcan the SUII'S domain of d::l)'light ,.,.hich
runs out in endless openness. Wc also know, however, lhe phenomenon
of locking lip of the opell heavcns, the heavcn clouded over. BUI Ihere is
still one mher boundary of the light domain, and that is the soil on which

42

43

.....c walk. Ughl, as the element of the fiel)'. together with the element of
the air, lies on the c:.u'th and in :I certain manner also on the ocean. The
ocean also forms a boundary for the realm of light. although the ocean
lets in the light lip 10 a ccnain depth. Its trdl1sparency is confined. The
opaqueness of the earth .....hich leads to the boundedncss of the open
domain of light, is a peculiar phenomenon that is not e"ident 10 us for
the most pan. We find ourselves on the opaque eaMh. al \\'hich the
domain of light has its boundary. O\'er us. howe\'er, light'S domain of
power extends in open endlessness. The opaqueness of the earth has a
mcaning for the passage of the sun. In accord wilh the immediate phenomenon, rO.lo; rises OUI of the bowels of the C:lrth al moming: in
daytime he moves along the vault of he;wen and he sinks again into the
closed ground of earth ;n evening. That is said as a description of the
immediatc phcnomena without esoteric symbolism,
Now we turn 10 FI". 99. which evidences the gcnenil stnlClllre: t J.lT]
flAWS ~(;. bExa tWv dllwv QO'tgwv eilq>Q6VTJ QV ~v. Dicls translates:
"Were there no SUII, it would be night in spite of thc othcr stars," "HALOS
is the slar that alonc brings full brightness. Now, howevcr. hc is not only
indicated in his power. in his superiority over the othcr stars, but the
structure, which wc do not see in "HALOS himself, becomes clear in the
other stars. The othcr stars are lights in the nigh!. We ha\'e here the
noteworthy featurc that luminescence exhausts itself in its radiated light
slhlce and is walled in by the dark of night. The other stars are gleaming
points in the night heaven, The moon can also illuminate the night in a
stronger manner than the stars, butlhe moon cannot extinguish them as
alone "HALOS c::an. We must pUt the following question concerning the
othcr stars in the night. If "HALOS presents himself as a rcalm of light
above the opaque ground. and if he seems to go on in open endlessness,
can we not also understand the SlrUClUre of "HAWS and to. JtavtQ in
terms oflhe other stars as liglu.!> in the darkness of night? ThaI is, can we
understand the whole world of the sun as a liglu in the night which. it is
tme. is nOt certified by the phenomena? We would then havc to sa)' that
as the st.ars are a light in the night. and asthe SUll'S domain of light has its
boundal)' at the c10sedness of eanh, so the entirc .....orld of ''HAW;, to
which thc cntircty of nuvta belong, is cncin:lcd in a deepcr sense by a
nightly abyss which confincs the domain of power of "HAWS. The
hclpmates 01" Dike watch from the oound.u)' between the light domain of
~HAloS and lhc dark ahyss. Thc sun herself wc do IlCIl sce like one of the
Slars in the night. but only in her own brightness. Fr. 3 spcak~ thereof:
euQO; noM; avOgwnEiou. As phenomenon, the sun has thc h'ichh of a
human foot.
HEIOEGGER: When rOll speak of "phcnomcnon," yOll mean Ihat
which sho.....s itself in its immediacy. and not the "phenomcnologiCiII."
FI:\'t.:; Fr. 3 also speaks in the manner of allcgor)" To lx-gin with it

says that only a tiny. inSignificant placc belongs to the sun as a source of
light with its own brightness, so that the opening power ofin.L01i in the
opened light space itself appears to be only a ncgligible affair. Wh:n
opens \'eils itself in a cel'tain manner in what is opened b)' it, and takcs a
position belo..... the things encircled by it as the light power. To the extent
that the sun appears in the finnament in the width of a human foot,
ascends. sinks and disappears. she is new on each day. as Fr. 6 says: VEl)';
E'iJitflig1J EOllV. Heraditus gives no scientific stipulation that cach day the
sun arises new. The newness of the sun on eac::h day does not contradict
the fact that she is the same sun each day. She is the same. but always
nc...... We must hold on 10 this thought 1'01' the qucstion conceming the
sun as a form of rritg lr.dl;wov. which perpewaUy is, but-as Fr. 30
says-is kindled and <Iucnched according to measures, wherein the con
stant newness itsclf comes to expression. When we come to Fr. 30 the
concept of f.ltQ<l will allow itself to be dctcrmincd more precisely.
From Fr. 6 we tum 1,0 Fr. 57: blMoxaA.oS bE nAelOlWV 'HoloooS'
toiitov tJtlOlavtal .rtAt:lOla dbEval, bOllS itJ.lgllv xai Ell(P{l6V11v O'UX
EylVWOXEV' eou yag ~V. Dids' lranslalion rullS, "Hesiod is teacher of thc
many. They arc pursuadcd by him that he knows most; he. who does not
know day and night. Yet. one is!" In what does the supposed wisdom of
Hesiod consist? To what extent has he. who has ..... riuen about days and
.....orks, not known day and night? Day and night are alternating conditionsofthe SIIll'S land in which it is bright and dilrk in I'),thmic alteration.
The darkness of night in the domain of the sun is something other than
the dosedness of the soil into .....hich no light is able to penet dte. The
dark night is illuminated by the glimmering stars. In cont .tSl to the
doseclness of the earth, the dark of night has b)' itself fundamental
ilium inability. Together with the sun fmgmenLS wc must think the frag.
menu which treat of da)' and night. Fr. 57 belongs to these. The most
difficult plmtse in it is EOlI. yag V rVct, OIlC is). If da)' and night arc to be
onc. then wouldn't the plural ElOl (arej have 10 stand in place of the
singular EOll(isJ? Is the indistinguishability of d,ly and night meant here,
or else something completcly different which does not show itself .It first
J.tlancc, Ourl.lUestiull is: does Fro 57, spokell mll of lv. cOllwin a SlatcllIenl
culJccming day ;lIId nighl? Arc day and night in tv. or are they fv?
Hesiod has cvidclltl)' ullderSlOod most of day and flight. and yet hc is
reprovcd by Hcradilus hecausc he held day ;nuj night to be of diffcrcnt
kinds, In Hcsiod's Thl'lIJ,'fIll)' the contrast of da), and night mcans somelhing othcr than mcrely the contraSt of tWO conditions of transparellt
~p..ce in which light call be preSt::llt 01' absent.
Perhaps it is loo daring if wc thillk ill Ihis COil llcct iUII about the strife
of the Olympian gods with thc Titalls. Herc a def! nll1s through the
entirety thal dl'aws together for Hcradiws, ifnot in the evidcnt. tbcll in
Ihe UIISI..'en harlllOlI)'. 011(.' t.m read the Eon yO.Q b in this sellSt::. Da)' alld

44

45

night do not comprise any distinction you please. but rather the original
form of all distinctions. The contl,lst of day and night also plays :I role
",jlh Parmcnides (~Qqlas: yap xmtBEVto 600 yvw,aa; 6vo~ull;'uv) (For
they made up their minds to name IWO forms}.18 however. in reference
to mortals. If onc understands fan yap lv in the sense (h;:It day and night
are one in lv, then v.'Ou1dn'1 the plural dOL have to stand in pl.lce of fan?
Seen grammatically. is a plural possible here at all? For me the question
is whether, instead of reading, "day and night are onc l:v or are in lv,"
one must read. "there is tv." In this case. vanishing of distinctions would
have another sense. Hesiod knew his way around. but he did not know of
fv,lhal it is. "For there is lv," Thus read. fv is not to be comprehended as
predicath'e, but as the subject of the sentence.
HElDEGCER: Then fan yilQ fv is to be taken absolutel)'. To think of
it differently or to believe that Hesiod did not recognize day and night
would be an unreasonable suggestion.
FINK: When Heraditus 53)'S that Hesiod has not recognized day and
night, that is an illlemionally provocative statement.
HElDECCEIt: One does not need to be Hesiod in order to distinguish
day and night. When he treated of day and night he did so in a deeper
sense than in the manner of a mere distinction that each of us perfonns.
Thus, Heraditus cannot ha\'e wanted to say that Hesiod has distin
gl.lished day and night. but that he has erred since day and night are one.
We cannot accept Diels' lranslatKm. "Yet. one is!"
FISK: "Yet. one is'" sounds like "They are one of a kind:' I am
unable to connect any sense with this translation. Day and night are
familiar to us as the changing conditions, as the basK: rhythm of life. as
presence and absence of the sun in her light in the domain of the open.
The domain of the open can be daylight or dark night. This distinction is
familiar to us in iLS rhythmic return. In the way that the return is
adhered to. ro..lOS shows adherence to measures that he has and that are
protected from outside by Dike. When Heraditus says that Hesiod misunderSlood day and night. he does not thereby .....ish lo maintain that
Hesiod has overlooked thc fact that day and night form no distinction at
all. Rather, Heraclitus wishes to maintain that day and night are one in
thinking back to h. and that within fv they are set llpart as opposite
relations. as we can also find in Fr. 67, where it says thal god is day night.
winter summer, war pcace....atiety hunger. Heraclitus is much more
concerned here with ~v in quitc another manncr.
PAKTICII'ANT: Musn't wc also takc Fr. 106. in which 1-4(a ql1Jms
il1-4tQO.s [onc muurc of day] is mentioned. along with Fr. 57?
H":lllt:GGt:R: How do )'ou wish to bring both fragments into connec
tion?
PAKTICII'ANT: I would think 1-4(0 ({aims lonc nature) together with
lon yO.Q tv.

FINK: The 1-4a qnjms of d,ly, howevc,'. is held against a positing of

good and b..d, that is. propitiolls and unpropitious days. The onencss of
the Ilature of day stands :lgainst such distinction of the dllyS, This, howevcr. is not to be e<llI<lted with thc tan yap fv in reference to day and
night. The distinction of good and bad days does not have the ~me
importance as the distinction of day and night. Accordingly, fv is in cach
G1St' different.
HEIDEGCER: Nevertheless. you arc in a certain wa), right in connecting Frs. 57 and 106. In both fragmems lhe talk is about an ignorance
in ,'eference to Hesiod. The one time. he misunderstands fv in reference
to da)' and night; the other time. he misunderstands the one and the
s..me qnio~ of each day. To this extent. lv and 1-4(a qroOl; do hang together.
FINK: Fr. 106 is. rather. onl), a parallel to Fr. 57. In the latter,
Hesiod is found to be unreliable as the teacher of most peopk. He. who
is "ersed in the fundamental distinction of dOl)' and night, has not obsel"'\'ed that there: is lv.
HEIDECGER: Most pcopk are, for Heraclitus. the)' who do not know
what matters. The nUiatOl [the greatest number) are the same as the
noUo (the man)']' We cannotlranslate qnia~ in Fr. 106 with essence.
FtNK: When we sa)' "essence:' it is not mealll in the sense of f!SSnItia
[substance].
HEIDECGER: If we include Fr. 123. qroOU; xQu;ruo6a.l q:Jwi [Nature
10\'es to hldel, ho..... then is qnjats to be understood?
PARTICIPANT: In the sense of emerging.
HEIOEGGEIt: The connection of qroOI{; and fv will concern us III
greater detail later.
FINK: For me, the puzzling word in Fr. 57 is latl yO.Q b. We have
translated: For there is lv. But what kind of fv is treated here? Is it fv in
the sense of a countcrword to Ta navta, and thus the lv of lightning. of
the blow. of the sun and of fire: or is still another fv meant here? My
supposition tends to be that it is a <Iuestion here of fv in the sense of the
oneness of both domains of HAlOS and of night. which is guarded by
Oike and her helpmatcs. This new sellse of fv ....'i11 first become clearer
fol' us if '\'C include the life and death fragmcnts. The night meant here
is lhe nightly abyss by which the sun's domain is encircled at the four
TQ1-40tO as they arc called in Fr. 120. Apart from this interpretation. one
could also argue as follows. If lv is mentioned in Fr. 57 in reference 10
da), and night. i, is then a question of Ihe lv of the land of sun in ''Ihich
the sun is prescnt and absenl in rh)'thmic change; and indced in such a
manner thltt in the change of da), and night the domain remains in
which the sun is present and absent. There is b in so far as the structure
of the vaull on Wllich the sun moves remains. and in so far as thc relation
of opposition to the land that lies undc,' the sun remains. e\'en though

46

47

the SUIl lcmpcwarily is absent and new on each new day. Thus seen, fv
would be the vault of heaven. However, this explication is not acceptable
to me. I do 1101 understand. "thcl"e is lv," in this sense.
HElDECCE~: Why do yOll reject this inlerprelalion?
FINK: lk'Cause for me the union of day and night under the vault of
heaven is too easy a reading. When Henlclitus says "there is fv" in rererence to day and night. the land of sun is mcalll with the day, and the
dark abyss Ihal inclose5 and encircles the land of sun is meant with nighl.
The sun's domain and the nightly abyss logether form b.
HEIDEGGEIt: Is the fv that )'OU now have in view something like an
over-being that surpasses even being: I suppose that you want 10 get OUI
of being with )'OUI" interpretation of lv, which depans from the hitherto
existing illuminating b of lightning.
P"RTICIP""''T: I do not belie\'e that b as the double domain of the
land of sun and the nightly abyss surpasses being. If the preceding
interpretation has, in starting OUt from the KEQ<luv6;-fmgmem. fOCUSt:d
first on the slructu,dl moment ofthe light chamcter in being, the uncov.
ering. then the current interpretation, when the nightly abyss is men.
tioned, focuses on the structural moment of closedness in being, on the
concealment that belongs essentially to unco\eling. Therefore. the explication does not surpass being: rather, it goes deeper into being than the
preceding awareness. since it takes in view the full dimensionality of
being.
FINK: Our cxplicdtion of Herdclitus began by our illuminating the
reference of lightning and 'to. llavtU. Lightning tears open the brightness, lets la llUvtCl come fOl1h to appearance and arranges each thing in
its fixed outline. Another name for lv is the sun. The sunlight. which
runs out U\'er us in open endlessness, finds a boundary at the dosedness
of the soil. In his own field of light. "B40; has onl)' the width of a human
fool. He mo\'es along in fixed measures on the \'auh of heaven. By his
own measures. growth and living Cl"ealllres. which are shined upon by
1iklO;. have their specific measures. Within the realm of the sun there is
a genen'll distinction betwcen day and night that is posited willl lhe
prcsence and absence of the SUII. The domain that is cncircled by the
four lEQ~Cl't(l remains even when the sun seems to sink away. The structure of v then shifts over from the temporary prescncc of the sun to
oUQav6; lhcavenJ. One can lhell say rhatlhc distinction of day and nighl
is nol :>0 important 10 grasp hecause under oupav6; day :md night altel
nate :lIld the relalion of a vault of heaven to the man>' thCt'CllndCI' n:
maillS. Hcsiod had dislinguished dar and night and therebr not considcrcd lhat day and night is only one dislinclion wilhin oUQavo;. This
inlcrprel,nion slill docs not appeal to mc. Precisely when wc consult the
fl~lgmcnrs 011 dcalh and lire, the otherdimcnsion of closcdncss will show
il.Sclf to us bcside the alrcady familiar dimensions of the light character

and openness. The b which Heraclitus attempts to think in Fr. 57 is the

unity of lhe double domain.
HElI)EGGEIt: But how do both domains hang together?
FISK: The light space of lightning or of 1ikLO;. in which 1l:<lvtQ
come fonh to appearance and move into their outline, is encircled by a
dark abyss. fiklO; is not permiued to overstep the boundary set to his
domain of power and go into the nightly foundation, because he will be
brought 1.0 account by lhe Erinyes, who guard the boundary of the
double domain.
HE1DEGGEK: Is it here a question of two domains or of one and the
same which is distinguished in itself? Let us put this question aside for
the moment. We will come back to it later. I would like once again to go
imo lon yiJ.Q b. Can one place the plural [{ol here at all? Diels sets a
semicolon before fan yiJ.Q lv. Seen purely stylistically, a period and not a
semicolon would suitably have to be placed in Heraclitus' language.
Perhaps Diels was misled into using the semicolon by the subsequent yQQ
hctJ. A period is therefore called for. becauSl= in fon YOe b something
uncommon fonows which must be sharply contrasted with what has preceded.
FINK: Most people are familiar with the distinction of night and
da}'. Hesiod, \\'ho treated of day and night, also belongs to them. But he
did not understand day and night because he did not know l;uv6v. The
lon yiJ.Q b works like;1 blow. It is intentkmally thematic and is said like a
dictate.
HEIDEGGER: Because Hesiod did not know l;uv6v, Heraclitus cannot associate with him. They both speak a different language.
FINK: In fan yap b Heraditlls does not think the vanishing of
distinctions. but the b of the double domain. There is b. Here b is the
subject of the sentence. Onc Illust come into the dimension of b as the
double domain in order to go be>'ond lhe noUoL Heraditus would not
say that Hesiod is a blockhead. When he rcproves Hesiod it is only
because Hesiod is a Slx:cul:uivc blockhead. lOll yaQ b is foundation for
oux Ey(VWOXEV (does not kno\\'J.
l-It:lDEGGEk: Hcradiws does nOl llame the ground but only says
lhal Hesiod does not know it.
Ftt''': The ignorance 01" Hesiod is unmasked by the eOll yaQ E'"
PARTtCll'ANT: It remains a difficulty for me 10 what extent lon yap
E" should be illuminating about the ignorance of Hcsiod. which shows
itself in thinking about tlar 'Illtlnighl. It must thercfore be dctermined
by us in whidl relation fOll yap ~ stands to Hcsiod's knowledgc of dar
and night.
FIN": You refcr yap too directly 10 l-IesiO<.l's misunderstanding
alx)U1 clar ami nigh!. Hcsiocl has intcl'pn:lcd thc phenomenon of day
and night 1l0tjuSl fliffcrcntl)' from J-1eraditlls. There is not ;lI1othcl' \'ic\\'

48

of day and night that I~placcs Hesiod's differentialion of day and night
heT'c. Rather, Hcraclitus speaks out of the Kllowledge of fv when he says
thal the partition of day and night contradicts the fundamental charac-

The Problem of a Speculative

Explication.-nuQ Q.Et;wov and
Time? (Fragmem 30).

tcr of being.
HEIDEGGER: Hesiod belongs to the people who are named in Fr. 72:
XQi or~ xaO' i1lltpav lYXUQOUoL. Ta\n:a aUTOi:~ I;tvQ qJO.lVO'tClL... And lhpse

things with which the)' JOStle C\'cry day seem smmge to them." Hemid
josl1es dail)' with the diuinclion of day and nigh!.
FINK: Day and night arc for him the 11l0st daily and the most
nightly ...
HElDt:GGER: ... but it remains strange 10 him in what they actually
arc, when thought from b.
FINK: If we finally view the Helios and the day/night fragments
together. wc can say the following. The hea\'cn-fire
the sun beha,'es
similarly toward e,erything that has continuence by the sun's passage, as
the lightning toward nvtu. The sun gives light, outJine and gro",th and
brings the time for evcrything that grows. The sun is detcrmined in her
passage by !1hQO, which has to check her, because she is otherwise
brought to account by the helpmates of Dike. The sun also detcnnines
the!!itQO for the increase and gro""th ofthings. She will not overstep the
I1hQCl but will remain within her domain of power, which is confined by
the four "(tQllatcl. The deeper meaning of Dike still remains obscure for
the present. Till now, Dike is clear only as a power superior to the power
of "HALOIi. Although "HAlOli and Zeus are the highest powers on earth,
"HAlO~ has a power on the earth that overpowez-s brightness. The vtQO
of~AlOli have been explained to us in a three-fold sense. First .....e distinguish the ~QCl of the sun's course, second the Ilttl}Q of things under the
sun's course and third the vtpa, which encircle the emire domain of the
sun's brightness. Reference to Fr. 3 has shown us the structure of the
emplacement of"HAlO~ in t.he brightness proper to him. Fr. 6 thinks the
daily newness and always-the-sameness of the sun together. The one
q>\lOtl; of day is the same q>\lOlli also with respect to the well known
distinction of good .llld bad, propitious and un propitious days. We must
(;lke all these thought motifs together, without rashly identifying them.
Still it becomes conSlamly more difficuh for us to hold in view the manifold of relations. This difficulty alread)' sho.....s itself in reference to the
differences of the immediate phenomena wc have considered and the
paths of thought determined by thelll.

or

HEltlt:GGER: When Professor Fink interpreted nUQ iu:Ctwov. which occurs in Fr. 11, I asked what he was actually doing. I wanted to drive at
the question of how this attempt to think with Her.lclitus should be
made. In this connection, there was mention of a specul.uive leap that
suggested itself in a certain way in so far as we.start re~ding t~e text from
the immediacy ofthe expressed contelll and, III so domg. arn\e through
the process of thinking at the expression of something that ~annol be
verified by way of immediate intuition. If one thinks schemaucally. one
can say that we go from a statement according to perception to an unsensuous statement. But what does "speculative" mean?
PARTICIPANT: "Speculative" is a derivative from speculum (mirror)
and specula'; (to look. in or by means of the mirror). The speculative.
then. is evidently a relationship of mirroring.
HEItlEGGER: Presumably, the mirror pla)'5 a role. But what does the
""01'<1 "speculative" mean in ordinary terminological use? Where in philosophy is Latin written and spoken?
PARTICIPANT: In the Middle Ages.
HEIDEGGt:R: There txistitltlltio speculativa (speculative judgment) is
mentioned in distinction from ~xistimatio praetica or also operativo (practicalor operati,'e judgment]. E:ristimatio speeulativa is synonymous with
aistimatio theorttica [theoretical judgment]. which is oriented toward the
species [t)'pe). Species is the Latin u",mslation of Elooli [form]. What is
meant here is, therefore, a seeing, a 9EWQiv that is. a theoretical consid
cring. Kalll also speaks of the speculative in the sense of theoretical
reason. But how does this affair stand with Hegel? What does Hegel call
speculation and dialectic?
l'ARTlCIPANT: The speeulatin~ and dialectic designate Hegers
method of thinking.
PARTlCIPAI\'T: With speculation. Hegel attempled to reach be)'ond
the finite into infinity.
Htmn:GGER: I-Iegcl does not first start out ....,ith the finite in ol'der
thell to rC<lch infinity: rather. he begins in infinity. He is in infinity from
the start. With my <Iuestlon about the speculative, I only wish to make
dear that the attempt to retllink. Heraclitus is not a matterofthc speculative in the proper sense of Hegel or in the sense of the theoretical. First
of all, .....e must renounce talking in .my manner about the method ac-

51

50
wrding to which HeradilUS .....ould think. On the onc hand. we must see
to it-as Professor Fink has done up 10 this poim-IIl,ll .....e make clarifications w~th the imcntKlIl of helping the partieipalHs follow more dearl)'
an.d ~n.'Clsel)' the steps that we have made thus far while reading and
Ihmkmg the text and thal we h'ill make later on. We can c1arif)' the
problem which stands behind thal when Professor Fink gi\'cs us an

example.
.
FINK: The manner of our reading and procedure is characterized
III that ""C start out from what is made present 10 us orllle mallCr" flamed
in Heraclitus' S<l),jngs. as though this m'llIer were .lYing immediately
before our c)'cs. In his frdgments, Heraclilus does not speak in any
veiled manner like the god in Delphi. of whom Heraditus says: OUTE
AtYEt oun XgUJtl"1 6JJ.1:t cnUlalvl."1 His manner of speaking cannot be
equate.d with Ulat of the god in D~lphi. In reading the fragments, wc
first pick up the phenomenal findmgs and aHempt their c1al'ification,
Wc do not, however. make the phenomenal findings clear in their full
extent; rather, our clarification is alread), selectively steered.
HEmE;GGt:R: By what is it selectively delennillcd?
FINK; The selection is determined in thott wc always come back from
Hcraclitus' saying and seek each feature in the imlllediate phenomena
that are lllel~tioncd in the fragmcllI. An cmpiriGl1 phenomenology of the
sun would )'leld an abundance of phenomenal features which would not
be meaningful at all for the sense of the sun fr.,gments. First we read the
fmgmellt with a certain naivcte. Wc attempt to bring imo relief a few
fealures in refel'ence to the things which are correlates of our sensuous
perceptions ill order, in <I second step IowaI'd the features and references thus extmctcd, to ask how they (<In be though I in a deeper sense.
From immediate seeing of senSllOus phenomena, we go o\"er to an unsensuous, though llot transcendent, domain. Here. we may nOI utilize
the scheme, which wc find in mel:lph)'sics, of phenomcnal. Le., sensible,
and illlelligible \\'orld, ;lIld 0pcl<tle with a t\\'o-\\"Orld doctrine of
IIlClal>hysics. Talk about a sensible and intelligible domain is highly
dangerous and doubtful.
I-h:mECGEw: It would be morc approprial(' if wc designate the phenOlllcnal dOlllain as ontic , , ,
FINK; , .. and lhe UIlSCIlSllOUS domain as allied with being:, \Yha: is
remarkablc, however, is thal wc can comprehend lhc fragmcnts of
HCl'ildiltlS in ,I llai'vc lllanllCr also, and lhen still corlllCCI it deep sellSC
k il./,." tit'J~" SiulIJ with thcl11. so thal wc GUlIH)t cv('n call Ihc gcnuine
philusophlGl1 sellse a deep scrIS(: t Tirfiil/II J.
11t:lln:(.Gl::w: Can onc spc;lk uf a philosophical St.usc at all?
FI~K:. Ccr~ainl)' .~,'e ma)' not speak of a ('onceptual lIIeanillg of
Ilel";lCllIlIS siI)'lngs. SlIlCC wc have Ihe language of Illclaph)'sics behind

liS, we must allcmpt to avoid being misled by the developed thought

p.'lths of metaphysics, In order to indicate the mallner of our proceduI'"C,
let us go once again into Fr. 11. Translated, it I"Uns; Everything thal
crawls is driven to pasture or tended with the blow. An image is men.
tioned there that we know from the phenomenal environment and that
we can easily bring to mind. In a I"Ural region or in an agrarian state.lhe
beast is driven to pasture with the whip blow. We can then read l'tQv
Eg!tn6v as pasture animals, The image that Her.tclitus mentions implies
that the pasture animals will be dri\'en to pasture by the shepard with the
whip blow, indeed so that they change pasture ground from time to
time.
HEIl>ECGER: Tending is a driving as well as a leading.
FINK: For our explicalion of VIitOt, dri,'ing and leading are the
meaningful moments of sense, Now. when wc also heal" N~olS: in
V}iEl"Ql as lhe power lh,lt allots and fatefully detel'mines, then we have
left thc immediatc phenomenon of tending and CllIcrcd lhoughtfully
upon the ullsensuous domain. Wc understand VE}i'tOl no more as the
driving and leading of the shepard in the sense of allOling and dispensing of what is apl>ropriatc 10 aClUal pasturc animals, but as an anoting
and dispensing rcign, Then the question suggcsts itself whether that
which is said in small scale in the fragmelll c;mnot also be said in luge
scale. The microcosmic and macrocosmic relationship suggests itself as
perhaps a most harmless expression. The thoughtful transposition of
phenomenal structures illlo another dimension, however, brings with il
a lI-allsfonll;ltion of the structures from which we lirsl stan OUI.
HEIDEGGER; Yel, Ihe thoughtful transposition implies a specifIC
kind of ulinking about thc appearance of which \\'C are still ignorant.
FINK: When I speak of thoughtful transposition into another di
mension. thal is only a first attempt 10 circumscribe the manner of our
procedure. bcc;llIsc we still do not know what it means to go over into
another dimension, If wc wish to spc;lk of ;111 analog)' in Ihis connection.
thcll we mUSI Ihink it in a specific wa)'. In this analogy, onl)' one side is
gi\'cll to us. namely thc phenomcnal onc. As wc hold selecti\'e1)' to specific phcnomenal structllres, we translate them illlo large scale in an
ad\'clllurous aHempl. In Fr. 11, wc translate the wa)' and m,mllel' in
which a hcrd is Icad to pasHlre into thc large scalc of the entire aClualil)'
in which a tending and alloting rcign of things and clcmCllls happclls,
rll c clll,lrgclllcllt of a special individual phen(J1llcllun inlo the whole
\\'ould pcrhaps be a flll"ln undcr which \\,(' could spcak of thc way of our
aHcmpl to lilink wilh Hcraclitus.
HElm:l:(:t;R: I rcg;lnl Ihis fOnllUl:ltioll of your procedure as
Cl.lI1gerolls, Perhaps wc Gm say that Ht:raditus does not St:e the largc
-.c:ale from thc small but, the other Wil)' rOll lld, SCC) the small sc,llc from

52

53

the large. We must distinguish on onc hand our attempt 10 rethink the
frngmenlS of Hcraclitus and all the other hand the ..... <iy that Heraditu$
himself has thought.
FISK: What Heraclitus thinks in large scale. he can only say in small
scale.
HEIOEC('.t:lt: Thinking and sol)'ing have their special diffICulties. Is it
;1 question of t .....o different malleTS? Is saying only the expression of
thinking?
FINK: The distinction bclw(.-ell inner thinking and the articulation
of thinking in language is an idea that we have from the hislOI)' of
philosophy. There is the vie..... that philosophical thinking callnot say
completely everything that illhinks; so that. in a cerlilin way, what philosophy thinks remains behind the Iinl;.tUistk expression. The deepest
thoughts arc then uQQ1ttov [unspeakable). This model does not apply LO
HeradiLUs. His sayings are no hierophamic. withholding speech about
the Iinguisticall)' inscrutable mystery. Heraditus does not know the 0P'"
position of the linguistically open and the impenetrable m)'stery tha~ geLS
thought as rtJugium or OS]lum ignDral1liat [refuge or asylum of IgnOrance]. It is something elsc when we think the mystery in a completely
different manner. HeradiLUs speaks in a language which does not know
the stark difference between inner thinking and outward saying.
HEIDECCER: BUI how aboul thinking and saying? We will also have
to say for HcraclilU.!i that there is a saying to which the unsaid belongs,
but not the unsayable. The unsaid, however, is no lack and no ban'ier for
saying.
FINK: With Heraclitus we must always have in view the multidimensionalit), of speaking that we cannot fix at one dimension. Seen from the
immediate statement. only the pasture animals in their manner of
movement are named in nav tQ1tt6v. But now we ha\'e attempted to
read and interpret nav tQ1tt6v as nUvtQ U>c; tQ1tE't6.. and we have referred ltA'lY"l to the lightning bolt. In this consists our jump-off into the
non phenomenal domain. Measured by the tremendously sudden
movement. everything that stands under the lightning in its light-shine
and is brought into its sl<lmp has the character of an animallike. Le . slow
movement, It is to be asked, hO\\'cver, whether it is a maueroftwo le\'els,
so that wc can say: as in the scnsory domain the animal herd is put to
paslure hy Ihe whip hlow. so in the whole all Ihings are steered by
lightning. I would like lO think that we may nOI sel both thesc levels off
so sh,n'ply in COllll"ast from each other. If we speak of two levels, then
tllt:re is the d:lllger that .....e make comparisons from thc phenomenal
Icvel and begin 10 move il1lu unrcstrictcd analogies. If .....e suppose the
t.....o levels to be sharply distinguishcd, thcn wc miss precisel)' their interplay. Heraditus knows no fixed Icvels; but wc must pr(:ciscly notice. \\,jth
iIHcrpretatloll of his fragmclll.s. that and how they interpla)'. The furce

of his sayings consists in the fact that working frOI11 the large scale.
Hcraditus can also $.'ly something in referencc to the cvcl)'day_
Ht;IDEGCER: Perhaps you have already said too much.
FINK: Our staning point. howe\'er. in explicating the fragments,
consists in Ihe more or less known traits of the phenomena. I want to
attempt to darif)' still another fragment which has already concemed us.
Fr. 99 reads in tr,.mslation, "If the sun werc nOI. it \\'ould be night on
account of the other stars." Here is pmllounccd not only a eulogy of the
power. of the strent,rth of'"HAtot; which drives out darkness, bUI .....e sec in
the other Still'S the possibility of being lights illlhe darkness. Liglll shines
in the darkness. That mcans that the circuil of lights is surroundcd by
the night. The stal'S and the moon indicate the possibility of the lights
being imbcdded in the dark of night. Here lies the jump-off for OUl'
question. Could it not be that as the stars arc imbedded in the night. the
open-endless domain of the sun i also imbedded in a nonphenomenal
night?
HEII)EGCER: When )'OU speak of "endless:' that is no Greek idea.
FINK: With the exprcssK)Il "open-endless" I mean only the phenomenal feature that we see no wall when looking up, but rather only
the character of running out and of not arriving. The phenomenal state
of affairs addressed in Fr. 99. that lights can be imbedded in the dark of
night, has put before us the question whether or not the sun's d~main,
and thus "HAIOt; in his reference to 'ta 1t6.Vta. can have ~QO. on hiS pall
which we cannot immediately sce. Injumping-off from the phenomenal
imbeddedness of the stars in the night. we have auempted to take in view
the non phenomenal encirclemem of the sun's domain by a Ilonphenomenal night. We have auemptl...d to clarify .....hat the ~Q<l of the sun
pertain to in three ways: first, as the Id"rQCl of the sun in her course;
second. as the ,d'lQ<l which arc apportioned by the sun to everything
lying under her; and finally. as the jdTQCl in the sense of the 'ttQJ1Q"tQ
named in Fr. 120, which encircle Ihe sun's domain, the domain of the
sun's brightness and the nQV"tQ found in it.
HEIOEGGER: In this conncction, you have sfX>ken of the night. But
how do )'OU understand the night?
FINK: The four "tEQI.l.a"ta confine the sunny .....odd al its four ends.
This encircled domain is characteri7.ed by the temporal)' prescnce and
abscnce of the SUll, from which the pmblem of day and night arises. As
seen from the phenomenon ilself. we are all of Hcsiod's opinion. Immediate seeing indic:ues that day and night alternate. AgainsI this.
Her-Iclitus formulates the provocative sentence and says: ahhough
I-Iesiod appears 10 understand most about human .....orks and days, he
has not understood thal day and night are one. For our part. we have
asked whether this l.-eing onc is 10 be read directly a it is s.""Iid, or whether
we must avail OUl'sclves ofa more difficult renditKJn. In the latterca.se .....1.'

54

55

must say: Hesiod had held day and night distinguished: however, there
is lv. So understood. day and night do not coincide: but from knowledge
of b e"cn the most conspicuous distinction between day and night cannot in the end be accepted as such. There is the one. and if there is
success in coming into knowledge of the OIlC (61.>).oyt:i:v), then that
which is torn asunder in opposition is suffused by the single unit)' of b.
So far as Heraclillls thinks from out of lv, he cannOI allow the demarca(Km made between day and night by the mOSI knowledgeable leacher.
HEIOGGER: YOll thus distinguish a manifold essence of night. On
onc hand. }'OU distinguish the night from the daily da)', and then )'Oll
understand night also 015 the c10sedness of earth....
FIN": ... whereby the dosedness of earth is the boundary of the
sun's domain. The realm of the sun in her reference to 'ta navtQ is the
domain of openness in which day and night are in exchange, .. ,
HI::IDEGGER: .,. and day and night in their exchange arc still in
another night?
FINlC Perhaps,
Ht:lDt:GGt:R: With my questions. I would only like to get .1( the place
from which you speak of another night.
FINK: If I have spoken of another, marc original night, of the
nighLly abyss in explication of the sun fragment. I did so in prcview of
thc death-life frdgJnents. From there I have vic....cd the deeper sense of
the phcnomenon of c10scdness of the earth and in a certain way also of
the sea as the boundary of the sun's domain. Only when we first consider
the relation of life and death will we sec how thc realm of life is the sun's
domain and how a new dimension breaks open with the reference to
death. The ne....' dimension is neither the domain of openness nor only
the doseclness ofthe earth. although the earth is an excellent symbol for
the dimension of the more original night. Hcgel speaks of the earth as
the elementary irldividu,w' into which the dead retul"Il. The dimension of
the more original night is denoted b)' death. That dimension. however, is
the rcalm of death. which is no land and has no extension. the no-man'sland ....
HEIDEGGEK: ... that cannot be traversed and that <llso is no dimension. The dirtiwlty lics in addressing thc domain denoted by death.
FINIC Perhaps language ill its articulation is:lt home in the domilin
lhat is itself artkulaLCd, in the domain of the SUIl, in whkh one thing is
scparated fn>m the other and set imo relief agilinst the other, :md in
which the individual h:ts spccilic outline, If 1101.... howcvcr, we undcrstand EV not only ill thc sensc of the dimension of opcnness, of thc
hrightness Qf lightnin!{ and the nuvta found in it, bm also as the man:
origin<ll night, as t he nloulltain range of being It'tL( Gtbi,'K dn Stiru] \\'hich
is no countryside, \\'hidl has no name and is tHlsl>C:lkablL--ahhollg-h nol
ill Ihe sellst. of'l limit of languagt.'----then \l'C must also take in view Cl

second dimension in lv, alongside the dimension of the sun's domain,

The dimension of brightness is imbcdded in this second dimension, and
death points to it. Still, that at which dealh points is Cl domain that
nobody can find in life-time_ The more frngments we read, the more the
questlon marks accumulate for us,
HEIDEGGER: In connect.ion with what has been said conceming language, I would like to refer to the lecture "Sprahe au Rythmus" ["Language as Rhythm] by Thras)'bulos Gcorgiades, delivered in the lecture
series" Die Spracht" ["Language"] of the Bavarian Academy of Fine Ans
and the Berlin Academy of Arts, as well as in his book MwiA und RJthmus
INi dm Criedum,20 In both works. he has spoken excellently about langaugc. Among other things, he asks about rh),thm, and shows that
~uo~~ has nothing to do with ~tW (now). but is to be understood as imprint. In recourse to Werner Jacger, he appeals lo Cl verse of Archilochos.
Fr. 67a. where ~}l6~ has this meaning, The verse reads: Y(yv<ooxE b' oIos
QUOIlO~ ltv6Qci)l1:ou~ ~XEt. "Recognizc which rh),thm holds men," Moreovn, he cites a paSS<lge from Aeschylus' Pro/1/etheus, to which Jaeger
likewise has referrcd and in which the QUOIl6t; 01' Qu61ll;w [bring into a
measul'c of time 01' proponion] has the same meaning as in the AI'chilochos fragment: 00' QQUOIlIOIlUl (Promtlheus 241), Here Promethcus sa)'s of himself, ", .. in this rhythm I am bound:' He, who is held
immobile in the iron chains of his confinement, is "rhythmed:' that is,
joined, Georgiades points out that humans do not make rhythm;,rnther.
for thc Grttks, the QuBIl6t; (measure) is the substrnte of language,
namely the language that approaches us. Gcorgiades understands the
archaic language in this .....ay. We must also have the okllanguage of the
fifth century in VK:..... in order to approximate understanding or Her..ditus, This languagc knows no sentences .. ,
FINk: ... that ha\'c a specific meaning,
}-h:IDI::CGER: In the sentences of the archaic language, the state of
affairs spe'lks. not the conceptual meaning,
FISk: Wc have begun our cxplication of Heraditus \\'ith thc lightning fragment. We ha\'c turned then 10 F,'. 11, in which it is said that
C\'cl1,thillg ....,hich cra....,ls is tcnded by the blow, .....hcreby wc brought the
hlow into connection with the lightning boiL Finally. we have taken the
Sun and lhe day-night fragmcnts into vie....', Here it was above all the
lhree-fold SC11S(' ofIlETQU, the reference OI'SUII and time and thc imbeddedness of the sun's domain in an original night. The boundaries betwecn the sun's domain and the nightly abyss arc the four TEQflaTu, In
the SUII ....'c havc seen a time-dclcnnining !)()\,'Cl' ..... hich pl'Op0l'lions the
measllrcs of time. The next fragmclH in our series is Fr. 30. x6ollov
T6vo, TOV aim>\' o."to.vrw\,. oiiu ur; Oewv outt: chOQWnwv b:ollloev.IJ)J..'
~\' Oet xai EOUv xui Emut nUQ oEil;wo\'. a."Tt:6~lEVOV IlflQU xui It.'100~Ey..
\,UIlE\'OV Ilf1:QCl. Dit:ls translates, "This 1"ol'ld order. lhe sallle 101' all be-

56
ings,. was crc~ted ncithcl' by gods 1101' by humans; rather, it was always
and IS and wIll be clcrnalliving fire kindled in measures and quenched
in measures," At first we illlcrprct only the second half of the fnlgmcllt.
Lightning, we could say. is the sudden fire. the sun is the lire in orderly
passage, of the course of time, but rrUQ &Ei~U)()v [eternal living fil'cJ is
solllclhmg that we do not find in the phenomenon like the lightning and
the sun.
HEIJ)EGGi;R: How do yOll wish to translate x6ollo~?
FINK: I would like to pass over the first half of Fr. 30 and <tllempt 10
interpret only the second half. If we translate XOOf.lOt; wilh world order
or ornament, then wc must bring that translation imu connection with
Fr. 124, where the talk is of the most beautiful x6ollor; as ajunk heap.
Whcn wc now allcmpt to read and illlcrpret Fr. 30 from the end, we
must.also return to naiveLC. A phenomenal fire cOlllinues in burning.
The conflagration of lire is a process in timc. The firc was ycsterday, is
today and will be tomorrow. Now, howevcr, my qucstion is: are l)v lIft
lwas always], fo'tLV [is}. and fO't(ll [will bel, in refercncc to 1tuQ cidtwov,
dcterminations of the ways of fire's being-in-time? Is the t'itltwov [eterllal livingl of fire thought by always-having-been, being-now, and
coming-ta-be? But must we think the fire in tel'lllS of the familiar way
that we specify duration. with only the difference that the lISualfire that
is ignited lasts a while and goes out again and thus has not always been, is
not always, and will not always be? How is cidttOOv to be undel'stood?
Does it mean the pel'durance of lire through the whole time? Do we not
thcn think the lire named here by HeraclilUs too nai'vely, if wc suppose
that its distinn charactel' would be thal it always was, is present and will
always be? I would rather suppose that we must think the other way
around. The fire is not always past, pl'csem, and coming; rathcr, it is fire
that first tcars open having-becn, being-now, and coming-to-be.
1IElDt:GGt:R: BUI what is the subject of the second half of the sentence 011 your interpl'clation? For Dids it is x60f!oS. of which he says
that it has been brought fOl"lh neither by gods 1101" hUlmlOS. Rather
x60ft.OS always was, is, and will be eternal living fire.
FINIC I reject this translatioll. I understand 1tuQ [fire] as the subject
of the second half of the sentence.
Ht:lIlt:C::(;ER: Do yOll make a break before ill' [rather], so that the
following has nothing to do with the preceding?
FINK: Tbe x6ol-lOS as the beauliful joining of 1t(lvta is thal which
shines in fire. To Ihis extent the first and second halvcs of the scmcncc
ha.\c ~nuc~ l,{) do with one anolher. Thc fire is thc productive power of
bnnglllg-Ionh. Cods and humans shine up and arc brought to unconcealed being only heciluse therc is lire to which they sI and in it preeminC;nt relation.

57

i
I

J-h:IOGGEII.: Then wc must also plll "the eternal living fire" as the
subject of the second half of the sentence instead of Dids' translation
"she" (i.e., the ....'orld order).
FINK: When Heraclitus now says of eternal living fire that it is kindlcd after measures and quenched aftcl' measures, that appears to COIlIradict the cid [eternal], and sounds like a shocking specification to liS.
HEIIlEGGER: Let us at first leave this question out of accoont. In
order to stay with what you have first said: do yOll reject saying that the
world order is thc fire?
FINK; The world order is no work of gods and humans, but the
work of the cternalliving fire. It is not, however. the work of the fire thal
always was and is and will be, becausc the etemal living fire first tears
open the three time dimensions of 'having-been, being-now, and
coming-to-be. Heraclitus speaks in Fr. 30 first in a denial; the x60J.l0~ is
not brought forth (Die!s' translation, "created," is out of place) by onc of
the gods or one of the humans. We can also say: the x60fiO~ is not
bmught forth to appearance by one of the gods or by a human. Therein,
we already hear the fiery chanlcter of fire. The x6ol-loS as the beautiful
joining of1ttlvta comes forth to appearance in the shine of fire. ThaI the
x6afiOS as the beautiful jointed order is not brought forth to appearance
by one of the gods or by a human, is first only to be understood in the
scnse that gods and humans have a share in the power of fire among all
the beings of the x.6alloS; and they are productive. Gods and humans are
productive, however, not in the manner of the most original nO(lJalS
[production), which produces the 1tilQ cidtwov. In the explication of Fr.
30. however, I wish first to question whether time charaneristics are
assened in the term 1tuQ cid~tOOv. The 1tilQ cidttOOV is neither like a
process within time, nor is it comparable with what Kant calls the world
stuff as the basis of the t:ol1stantly extant time. The fire mentioned by
Heraclitus is not in time, but is itself the time-allowing time that first and
foremosllets flv (wasj, Ean [is) and fO'taL [will beJ break out; it does not
stand under these. If we tentatively take 1tuQ 6dttOOv as the timeallowing, time-opening. then ad stands in a taut relationship to ~v, EO'tl.
and fatal, and furthermorc to what the concluding phrase of Fr. 30
cont:cms, in a taut relationship to the kindling after measures and
quenching after measures.
Hf:II>EGGER: For me the cClltral question now is whel'e you start OUI.
Do you start out from ~v, EO'tl, and [O'taL {)I' rather from nul' afltwov?
FtNK: I start OUI with JtuQ adtwov and go fr0111 it to flV. O'tl, and
EO'tOl. If one reads word for word. the lhree-fold of lime is said from
adtwov.
HEun:Gq;R: In other words. il is said OUI of ...., hat is pcrpelually,
that it was, is, and ,"'ill be.

58

59

FINK: This thought is hard to carry through. So long as we read the

frdgment nahcly. we must s;'y thal the talk is of an elemal living fire
that al.....ays .....as and is and ..... ilI be.
HEIDEGGER: The"" and f<nm have no sense in reference to

rather, it is the time-Iorming in the sense of thc appol1.ioning of time for

all that is in time. We have prcviously thought this apponioning of time
in the drh'ing lightningbolt and in the fire of~Mo~. We may not determine the time of fire. "'hich forms the times for 'la nUvta, in a capttous
reference from concepts of being-ill-time back to the most original time.
The cas)' venion runs: Fire was always and is and will be. Comprehended thus, fire is something standing, extant and merely lying
there. which subsists through the course of time. This remilining is
characteri7.ed by the temporal dimensions of having-been, being-now
and coming-ta-be. But then onc all'eady has time, and onc bt'ings tempond concepts to bear on the time-forming lire. Thc more difficult
version, on the contrary. I"lIns: Thai the ~v, EO'lL, and EO'taL fint arise
from the time-allowing of fire.
HEII)EGGt:R: Fire is. thereby, not only as glow, but as light and
warmth...
FINK: ... and is. therefore. to be understood as the nourishing.
HEIOEGGEK: Above all. the moment of shining is imponalll to :ltUQ
ci(twov.
Flsx: The fire is that which brings-fol1.h-to-appearance.
HEII)EGGEK: If we understand fire only as a nash in the pan, it
\\'ould yield no shining.
FtNx: From out of shining we must think b.."Ick to x6<Jv.0~. It is what
shines up in the shine of fire. Firsl we must ask ourselves how. by wa)' of
the innencmporal charact.eristic of :ltug ci(l;wov. can 1tuQ ltdl;wov be
rcl~rred to as that which first of all releases past. present, and fulure
from out of itsclf7
HEIOf.CCK: You speak of reicasing. How is this usage to be understood marc closely? Nature is also released with Hegel. How does nUQ
ci(twov release past, present, and future? For me the question is
whether thal which subse<luently comes in any way supports )'our interpretation, or \\helher that which comes makes )'our interpretation
possible.
FISK: What Il"Oubles me is the taut relationship belween ltd~wov
and ~v. ton. and tmat. The ad of nug and the three time determinaliollS don't appeal' tu me 10 go logether so easily. What has been. is, and
comes to be do nOI refer to lile. Rather, \\'c must understand the springing up of having-been. being-now, ;md coming-tu-Ix' for to nOVTa from
Olll or lire.
1-IEllnxa:t:R: I \l'ould like to have a clue for Ihis step of )'om' illterprelatioll. S(llollg as I do not sec this clue, OIlC could sa)' that Ihe step
frolll nClV lQ1tuo\' 10 1tOVTO w~ cQ1tUO and from the night, which sur"()und~ the Slars and mOOll, to a marc original night, which conlincs Ihe
domain of the sun. is indecd 10 be carried thl"Ough. It is to be C<lITied
through because a clue is gi\'cn, howe\er. th"t Ihe step from nu", lu:(twov

lu:l;wov:
FINK: The ~v means whal is gone; the Utm means being nol )"el. h
is not fire tha. is past and will be; rather, fire first and foremost opens
the way for arising in time, tarrying in time, and going under in time.
Fire as the time-allowing time fil'SI and foremost breaks open the three
time ecstacies of past, prescllt, and future.
I-h:IOt:GGl:lC There is the possibility for passing. so that it itself' calllIo1 always have been. But when yOll speak of limc-.illowing. in what
scnse do you lllean th",?
FINK: In the sense of apportioning of time.
Ht:lln:GGt;K: You understand the allowing as apportioning. But how
is time mealll in the time-allowing?
FINK: We must distinguish lime-allowing and the apponioned time
that things have in such a wa)' thal they have already been for a while.
are present, and will also be )'et a ",hi le. This manner of being-in-time
belongs only to things: it does not. however, belong to the eternal living
fire which fir-st lets the three time ecstasies break OUL 1rUQ ltdl;wov is Ihe
learing open of having-been. being-now and coming-ta-be. ThaI which
stands in the shine of fire receives the time apponioned 10 its ta'T)'ing
from this ol"iginaJ opening of time. The fire sets measures. The hanlness
of the problcm would dilmppcar ifone supposed Ihal :ltuQ adl;wov werc
determined by the temporal cvidence of being-in-lime. The question.
howevel', is whether it is mea 111 that the fire always was and is and will bc,
or whelher it produCli\'e relation is to be thoughl between Ihe fire and
~v. ton. and totaL
HElm:CGt;K: When you speak of the time-allowing of lluQ cin;.wov,
don't }'ou mean Ihal in the ordinal)' sense, as we sometimes say, ".someol1e 311o"'s ,mother time"?
FINI.;: The time that the fire allows, by appol1-ioning timc to things.
is no cmpty time form. no medium sep.ardtcd from COlllelll, but is. so to
speak, lime with its contelll.
!-h:UH:(;Gt:K: Of the time thus Ki\'CII, onc musl say: it tarries. It is lIol
a d(~positol')' in "'hich things appeal' as dispensed; 1",lIhel', time as apportioned is already referred 10 Ihat which tarries.
FlNK: To what is illdh'idu:tl.
J-h;mt:GGt:K: l.et us leave aside what i,~ individual. Hut do )'ou wish
10 sar Ihat wc KII heyond the llrdillal')' cOlllprchell~iUll of lime with )'OUI'
interpretaliol! of time and 01 time-allvwing?
FINK: I I'Ioc['(.d lirSI fl'OlII Ihe Jilrangene,s thal1fuQ ltdtwov in Fr.
30 i:. mentlolled as ;1 process ill tilll('. whik- it i!> pn.:('i:.c::l)' 1101 in lime;

60

and the three time determination!! toward the time forming of Jt\lQ
ddtwov, in the sense of the Jelling spring lip of havingbecn, beingpresent, and coming-to-bc. has no due, and OIlInOI, therefore, be rightly
carried through.
FINK: For me the clue is this. that it is im)XJssible to talk of 1tUQ
iLtU;wov as within time. Otherwise, it becomes a thing thal happens in
the world. perhaps also the highest thing, the summum ens, which. however, is an ens in the midst of things. Seen thus. it \\'ould be suoordinate
to time. My question is, however, whether the determinations of being.
intime arc not subordinated to nUl} uEL1;wov.
HEIDEGGf.R: So far as I can see, there is only this clue. that !tug
ltd1;wov is no thing and that. therefore. no "was," "is" and "will be" can
be predicated of it, ...
FINK: ... and also no perpetuity in the ordinary sense.
Ht;.IDEGGER: We stand before the question of how miQ odtwov relates itselfw time. One does not get further. In the summer semester of
1923 in Marburg, while working out Being and Tinu. I held a lecture on
the history of the concept of lime. As I investigated the archaic idea of
time with Pindar and Sophocles, it was striking that nowhere is time
spoken of in the sense of the sequence. Rather, time is there taken in
\'iew as that which first grAnts the sequence-similady as in the last
paragraphs of Being and Time, although thc problem is there viewed
from Dasein.--I look at my watch and find that it is three minutes
before 7 P.M. Where is the time there? Tl)' t.o find it.

1tUQ and 1tCtvta (Correlated

Fragments: 30, 124,66,76,31).

The seminar began with the report of one of the participants on Hermann Frankel. "Die ZeilauffassuIIg ill der Friihgriechischen Literalur,"
printed in Wege ulld Formerl frilhgriechis1u!n Denkens. 1960. 11
FINK: In her report, she has shown t.hat in Homer xQ6vo<; [time]
means the long, lingering time. the endur.tIlce of time understood in
a.....aiting. or rather the time that still remains for mortals who suffer
long. 80th are speeiftc forms of time.
HEIDEGCER: It is important for us that there is no theon=tical con
ceptual detennination of time as time with Homer and Hesiod. Rather,
both speak of time only out of experience.
FINK: Professor Heidegger's question started out from Fninkel's
expression of day as a unity of encounter. i.e., from the idea of a manner
of givenness according to the encounter. The question was whether time
refers to an encountering subject. or is rnther to be understood as concrete time in the sense of the different ways that we are ip time. excepting that we encounter time. It is dangerous if we speak about the encounter of time, because it is then referred to consciousness. Then we
move into the distinction of the time of consciousness, in which we live.
and objective time, which is separated from subjectively encountered
time. The question was what specific time is; whether the speeificity of
time is to be grasped from its encountered character or from another
approach, which lies outside the dislinctK)Il of subjective and objective
time.
HEIOECCR: I object to the expression "unit}, of encounter.:' \V.hen
it was said by one of the participants that Homer presenls a spttlfK: l~ea
of time. and that this speeificity rests in the encounter of long tarrymg
and wailing. Ihis is correct. I objen only to the fonnulation. For the
Grecks did not "encounter." Let us break off discussion connected with
thc report. because we lose too much time otherwise. But ~'.hat does it
mean "'hen wc s.~y thal we lose time? On what presupposHlon can we
lose time at all?
PAItTI(;If'ANT: Only when time is limited 10 us can we lose timc.
HElm:GGt:R: Being limited is not decisive. Rather, in order to lose
something, we must havc it. I can only lose time. if I have time. If I say
that I have no time, how is time then char<lclerized?
PARTICIPAl'.'T: I presuppose that time is available to mc.
HEIOGG.II.: Regarding lime, that means that it is chardcterizcd as
lime for ....

62
PART.IC~P"".NT: As time for this, time is not the time for something
else. For 11 1$ lime to do this rather than something else.
HEIDEGCEIl: Time, as "not the time:' is the privative characteriza.
tion of time. The one character of time that we have emphasized is time
as time for.... Another character of lime to which I would like to refer
shows itself when I look at the dock and say that it is 5:45 P.M. Now I
ask, whe~ is time?
PARTICIPA1".'T: Thcl'cwith, time shows itself as clock-lime or measured time.
HElllI::cGEJt: When I look. at the dock and say that it is 5:45 P.M.,
and ask where time is. does this question make sense at all?
PARTICIPANT: It is a problem whether onc can ask where time is.
HtlDEGGER: Hence, I ask ),ou, can onc ask at all where time is?
PARTICIP"""T: In 1962, in )'our lecture "Znl und Sd"," )'ou have said
that time is prespatial. u Accordingty, that would mean that one cannot
ask where time is.
Ht:IDEGGER: On the other hand, we read ofT the lime from the
clock. I look at the clock and read that it is 5:45 P.M. Clearly 50mething
doesn't make sense here. With Hegel, we must write it on a sheel of
paper. But how? We must write that now it is 5:45 P.M. In the now, we
thus have time. I do mean time with the now. We will come back to this
question when we enter into FT. 30 and observe the diffICulty that lies in
the saying of Itv, fatlv, and tatal in reference 10 1tUQ OEU;,WOV. h seems to
me that here would be the place to consider whether time is mentioned
at all in Fr. 30.
FINK: Yet Heraclitus speaks of od Itv, lan, and fataL
HEIDEGGt:R: If we say that Fr. 30 speaks of time, do we go beyond
the text?
FINK: Sul still, Heraclitus clearly used time determinations.
HEIOEGGER: That means, therefore, thal he did nOl speak thematically about time. This observation is imjX)rtant in order to follow up the
step that ),ou pursue in your interpret.'l.lion of FT. 30, the step in which
you determine the relationship of nUQ ltt~wov and x60IlOS. We can read
the fragment also trivially, if we say that 1)v, lan and tmm arc the
anticipatory interpretation of ad~wov. In this case, what would ltt
mean?
l'ARTICIl'ANT: The aEt would be understood as a connection of dvm
[to bel, fOEo8m {about to bel. and yEV08Cll [to have been].
H.:mECGER: What kind of a connection is that? If we read Fr. 30
almost trivially and understand llv, Ecrtl, and fatm as anticipator)' in~
tcrprclalion of ell:(, whal does it then mean? Is time prcsupposed in
"always"?
. l'ARTICII'ANT: The "always" can be an innencmporal dctenninalion.

63
HEIDEGGER: The "always" is then understood as "at all times"
"permanent." In Latin one speaks of the sempiumilas [always-elernity').
That we do not really make progress here is based on the fact that in the
fragment time is not sjX)ken about thematically; nevertheless, the interpretation attempts to take time into view in a decisive sense. Only
thus, I belie,'e, can we make clear to ourselves the way of your interpretation. While, according to the trivial rendition, the first half of the
sentence says that the x.6o}.lOs is brought fonh neither by one of the gods
nor by a human, and the second half, whkh begins with lUJ.6., says that
the xOOllOli always was, is, and will be eternal-living fire, according to
),our interpretation the subject of the second half of the sentence is not
x6cJv.0s but triiQ.
FINK: According to the smoother \'ersion, as Diels proposes, fire is a
predicative determination of~. Yet the antecedent phrase should
already draw auention. If we translate, "this ~ is brought forth to
appearance neither by one of the gods nor by a human," then x6atJ0salthough sjX)ken negati\'ely-mo"es into view as something brought
fonh. Thereby, the connection to fire as that which brings forth is already gi,en. We do not understand fire as a predicative detennination
of~; rather, we understand xOOlJOS from OUI of fire as the beautifuljoining ohQ ttCrvta which is brought forth 10 appearance neither by
one of the gods nor by a human. There was always and is and will be
eternal-living fire in the light-shine of which the beautiful joining of 'lcl
ttUvtQ shines up. "It always was and is and will be" we must undersland
in the sense of "there is." Thus seen, x6op.o<; is comprehended from OUl
of fire, and not fire from out of~. This rendition wouJd fit in with
the trail in whkh we have interpreted the connection of lightning and
sun to Tcl rtCtvta up to now. The reference of ttiiQ and x6aJ.u>s would be a
special relationship of fv and 1tCtvta, according to which 'la nCtvta stand
in the light-shine of fire. The smoother rendition has the advantage lhat
the subject remains the same in both halves of the sentence. Thus, fire
becomes a determination of x6o~ instead of, the other way around,
x6olJoS being brought f0l1h to appearance in the shine of fire. Only if
the subject in the second half of the sentcnce is not ~ , is there a
supcriol"ity of fire vis-a-vis x60IlOS. Here wc could also point 10 FT. 124:
WonEQ OCtQIJO dXll XEX"IlVWV 6 XCtUlatOS (6) x60IlOS. Diels translmes:
"(Like) a heap of things (?) scattered at random, thc most beautiful
(world) order." Hc,c the most beautiful world order is said to be likc a
junk heap.
HEIDEGGER: One could translal,e xCtUlO'tOIi x60JlOS: thc x6olJoS as it
can only be in general.
FINK: The most beautiful x6ollOS, thc most beautiful ordered entircty of allnCtvta, comes forth to appearance in the shine of fire. If this
".60IlOS is like a junk heap, we have a hard contrast belween XCtUlO'tOS,

64

65

which is referred 10 ,wallo;. and the derogatory manner of talking about

o6.QJla. To what extent can the most beautiful xoa~ be compared to a
heap of scaucred things? To the extent that we compare it with the ttUQ
that brings forth. Compared with Ihe fire that brings forth to appear
ance, the most beautiful xOOIlO; seems like a heap of scattered things. If
\\'C read FT. 124 in this \\'a)'. it GIn SUppol1 our inlCI-pretatKln of Fr. 30,
which depends on the supcl"ioril)' of fire vis;ivis the x60~;.
HElI)t:CGE't: It is difficuh for me to comprehend that the most
beautiful x6oJ.loC; stands in need of yet anmher determination.
FINK; I understand the fragmclll such that the most beautiful
)(60110; receives the negative character of a heap of scaucrcd things in
reference 10 the lv of rig.
HElDt;GGt:R: Thus. the question is whether Fr. 124 can be used as
support for the explication of FT. 30.
FINK; The x6:lli.o'lot; x6oll0; can be characterized as a confused
heap not only in reference to the fv of xiiQ, bUI also in reference to the
other fv. whkh first comes to view with the dimension of death.
HEtOGGIt: Abo\'e all. I am concerned to make dear to the partki.
pants the manner in which you proceed. You set yourself off from the
more naive, smoother version and prefer the more dilTlCult version. If
we read FT. 30 smoothly, then il concerns a statement about the x6o}.lo;
that is brought forth neither by one of the gods nor by a human, but that
always was. is. and will be eternal-living fire. Thcn the x60lW; is some
thing that is. This statement is then. as you wish to say. complelely
unphilosophical.
FINK; A certain philosophical element would then lie only in the
ad, in the cternalness of the world.
HEIDGGER: You sa)' that, however, under thc presupposition that
Hemcliws is a philosopher. In Heraditus' timc. howevcr. there were as
)'et no philosophers_
FINK: To be surc, Heraditus is no philosopher, but he is still a cp()..Ot;
tOU oocpou. a friend of CJOql6v.
HIDGGEIt: That means ,hat )'OU do not interp"ct Hel'ilditus
mctaphysicall)'. As against the nah'e rendition. )'OU n."quire a philosophical rendition chat is not )'et metaphysical. From what hermeneutical
position do YOll attempt that?
FtNK: II puzzles me Ihal nUQ 6.e~wov should be spoken of as the
es:'tCluial predicate of x60IWt;, while x60IlOc;. as the joining of n<'.tvta.
steered hy lightning and standing in the liglu-shine of ~H)..LOc;. C:1Il not
itselfbe the fire bUI is the work of fire. In the antecedent phrase it is said
thal this x60flO; is brought forth to aplX':ll<lllCC neithcr br onc of the
guds nor by a human. Surprisingly, we mllst no... ask to what extent it
can be ..aid Ih.1t 110 human has hrougln forth the entire order of things.
This neg-.ttion is on I)' possible becausc humans arc dislinguishC.'d b)' a

productive [poidil:ehttJ power. But this negation sounds paradoxical, because it would never readily occur to an)'body that a human has brought
forth the entire order of navtQ. Humans do not bring forth the x60~;
in the sense ofthe entirejoining of n<'.tvta. except the x60Ju>; in the sense
of the n6)"u; [cit)J: while the b>'Q(1s bring forth the x6<Jlwc; in the sense of
the world-rule, though in a limiled manner in so far as they cannot
inten'ene in the power of MOlQCt 19oddess of fate). Humans and gods are
productive because they partake of the productive power of fire in an
extraordinary manner. Humans make only little x60f.lOl and not greal
ones, but only because they partake in the nO(T(OlC; of nUQ. Gods and
humans are distinguished beings in the x60IlO;, while gods are deter
mined by a still greater neaJ'lless to :rWQ lu:(~wov. Out of participation in
the productive power of fire. humans have the capacity ofTxvrI and of
establishing states. Gods bring forth no state. but rather world dominion.
Gods and humans are enfeoffed with their own productive po...er b)' the
productive dominion of fire. ",'hich o\'errulesthem. and onl)' therefore
can it be said of them in a denial thac they ha\'e not bmught forth t~
great x60flOc;. Before aua in Fr. 30, I would put a semicolon. and then
translate further: but it was always and is and will be eternal-living fire.
The JtO(T(Ol5 of fire is the blax6o}1T(0\5 [selling in order). Wh;u was
earlier spoken of as o{axU;'u and txUPEQVT(OE is now the productive
power of fire for the x60~5.
Ht:IOEGGEM.: You do nol think power metaphysically. You do not
think metaphysically any longer. Heraditus does not yCllhink metaphysically. Is that the same? 15 it a question of the same situation ofthillking?
FINK: Presumably not. For we. in discinction from Heraclitus. are
stamped by lhe conceptual language of metaphysics. Perhaps. with the
fundamental ideas of metaphysics. we get scarcely be)'ond metaphysics.
HEIDEGGIt: That is to be noticed for the interpretation, and also
for the connection of the noc-)'et-metaphysical and the nomoremetaphysical. which is a special. histori<::al connection. The expression
"notmct3ph)'sicar' is insufficient. We no longer imerpretmetaphysicall)'
a lextlhal is 1I0t )'ct metaphysical. In back oftha, a <Iucstion hides that is
not no.... 10 be raised but that will be necessary in ol'dcrlo bc able to make
the way of ),OUI' interpretation clcar.
F'NK: Now we Gm refer' to the less smoOlh explanation to the COIlc1uding phrase: Q,;"'tT61l1o'Vov ~Q<l xal Wtoa~EVVUIU'VOV. flkrQ<l. If fir(- is
always living. it is not quenched as such. Rathc.:r, it is kindling and
quenching in refercllce 10 the x6oJ.to;. :md it sets measures for day ami
nig:ht and all things that st:llld in the openness of Ihe aheTllatiolJ of day
and night. The MtOfll:"'VOV IlhQCl xal lL"'tOO13l'VVil~E\'OV IlhQCt is no dtI<'rmilled Slate of fire. It is 1I0t something that happens 10 fire. Rather.
Ihe kindling .11ld <Iuenching according to mC;ISUI'CS happens in refCf'Cnce
tu that ""hich comcs and guc:s in the shine of firC.'. Thc ~v. EOtlV. and

66

67

~otal also perlains 10 whal shines up in the shine of fire. We understimd

the duce time determinalions not as temporal marks of distinction of
1tUQ cu:i.twov but, the other wa)' around, from Olll of the o.d of nUQ we
understand the having been. the now, and the coming of things that
come fonh 10 appearance in Ihe shine of fire. Things havc their beingin-time in the milllner' of originating, tarrying, and disappearing. While
thcy tarry, they spread themselvcs out betwccn thc now, Ihe ha\'ing
been, and Ihe coming.
HEIOEGGER: In the fragment, "was," "is;' and "will be" arc mentioned_ You, howcver, speak of having-been, being-preselll, and
coming-to-be. Clearly, it is a matter of something differelll. While time
detennimtlions al'e uSt.-d in the frdgment, in )'our intcrprclation you take
time as such to be thematic.
FINI\: The always living source of time can onl)' be add"essed with
names taken from 'IQ nclvta.
H.:IOt:CGK: I agree with that, but what concerns me now is the
hint that tlV docs not mean having-been as ha\'ing-been.
FINIi.: I am amazed at the hard bond of nVQ ai.twov and 1}v, EO'UV,
and fotaL Perhaps we can say that in a cenain manner it cannot be said
of nVQ lu:(1;wov that it onl)' is, because it is not eternal Rather, \\'e must
say that as the b,ightness of the lightning and sun brings ntivta fonh 10
appearance and into the outline of its gestalt, 50 il is the QEl of rruQ that
brings it about that ntivta. \'I'hich stand in the light-shine of fire, \'I'ere,
are. and will be. Howe\'er, the diffiCulty lies in the facl that the characterislic of being-ill-time of navtCl places itself back upon nUQ lu:f;,wov as
the source of the wa)'s of being-in-time. Of 1tUQ lu:i.twov, however, one
cannot say that it W4tS, is, and will be. For then one comprehends it like
something eX(;lnt. \Vhat would il mean to say that nUQ lu:(twov is now?
Does it have a specific age, so that it is older in e<lch moment? And \'I'hat
would it mean to sa)' that it always was and will be? Always having-been
means that it has past times behind it,just as coming.to-be means that il
has a fUlOre before il. COIn one say of nUQ o.Etwov that it has past times
behind it, that il no\\' has prcsence and has 01 coming presence in the
future? Here nUQ ati.twov is mcntioned in the manner in which things
arc ill time, spring forth, tarry. and disappear. have past, prescht, and
future, But nUQ cidtwov, on its pan, lets past, present. and coming
spring forth. Wc must be wary of comprehcnding nUQ o.t(twov as a
perpetual sluck.
H.:lIn:GGEK: For me, the queslion is, what is the reason for this
reversed step of the interpretation. For yOll, the 6.( becollles the source
for llV. EO'tlV. ami EotUt.
FINK: As 10 the 5Olll'ce of the three time dctermin,llions, the reason
for my rl'verscd interpretivc SICP lies in the fact that nUQ o.ECtwov, which
is not itself innel1emporal, is addressed by means of what is first made

possible through it. Herein lies a covering of the original by the derivative. Were we 10 appease ourselvcs with the immediate wording of the
fr,lb'lllcnt, and give preference 10 the smoother rendition. then 1tUQ
6.(twov would have past and future; and it would now no longer be
what it was, and not )'et be that which it is coming to be.
HElDEGCU: Wc have said that we no longer interprct metaph)sically a text that is not yet metaphysical. Is the no-longer-metaphysical
alrcady included in the not-yet-mclltphysical.
FINIi.: That wouk! be Her'lclitus interpreted by Heidegger_
HElDEGGER: It does not concern me to interpret Heraditus by
Heidegger; rather. the c1abo .....dtioll of the reasons for your interpretation
concerns me. Both of us are in agreement that if we speak with a thinker,
we must heed what is unsaid in what is said. The question is only which
way leads to this, and of what kind is the foundation of the interpretive
step. To answer this question seems to me especially diffICult in reference to time in Fr. 30. Consequently. I have asked about the "always."
How should we understand it? In the selling of )'our illlerpl'Ctation,
what does "alwa)'s" mean? If I ask you, is it the nUllc slans [the standing
now), and you answer no. then I ask, what is it? Here we are faced with a
question mark.
FINIi.: The special diffiCulty lies in the fact that what precedcs as the
source oftime cannot be said at all in appropriate manner. In reference
to the source of time, we lind ourseh'es in a special predicamem.
HEIDEGGER: You rightly emphasize the predicament in which we
find ourselves. The difficulty before which we stand consists not only in
the step oflhought but also ill our rethinking. We must have sufficient
c1aril)' about what is to be thought in order to hear Heraditus in the
correct manner. Nevertheless we cannot resolve what has to be thought
in terms of one fragment; rather, we must-as you have already saidhave all the fntgments in vicw fol' the interpretation of one fragment. I
am again and again concel'l1ed to make clear the sequcnce of steps of
),our intel'pl'Clation. Therefore. I have indiclltcd that time becomes
thematic with ),our step of thought ......hile in Fr. 30 time comes to view
only as an understanding of time, without becoming thematic for HcradilUS.
FINIi.: Concerning lhc phrase. ~v (u:1. Xal Eonv xal. EotQl nUQ
<ti~wov lit was alwa)'s and is and will be elernal-living fire]. I will not
Contcnd that wc have within easy reach all inlerpretive possibility that will
allow us to address tile soun;e of till1e, which is hidden b)' intra temporal
dt:lCnninatio!ls. without intratemponil determinations. For thal would
mean that wc would already be able to relrieve the prcmctaphysical
language.
In this connection, let us glance at Fr. 66, which should be correlated
now only in order LO indicate the supel'iol'ity of nUQ vis-a-vis x6o~os and

(is

69

t~ nQV'ta, It nlnS: nQvta YOQ to 1CUQ btEABOv XQ~VEl xal xatw.:fJtjlEtat.

life and death-a pl'Oblem to which wc will pay attention separmcly. Also
concel'lling Fr, 3 I, we .....ish to use here only the words of Hcr.lditus
himself in ollr considcration: llUQb; TQOJlalJlQWTov O<'U..aooa. OalQOOT\;
bt: TO IJ.V lllJ.lOlJ 'Yli. TO bE fllJ.l<JU JlQ1JOn'IQ. ('Yli) 06:llaooa bLOXtuQl, xal
IJ.tTQEETOl Et; 'TOY ainOY )Jyyov, bxoto; 1CQ600'V 1)v fJ yEVEoOal vii. Diels
translates: "Change of fire: first sea: of sea. howevcr, one half eanh, thc
other half brcath of firc. The eal1h melts as sea, and this receives its
measure according to the samc sense (relationship) as it acknowledged
before it became eanh."
HEIDEGGEM: Let me n.-fer at this poilll to all essay by Bruno Snell on
t{)DJTtl in H,,.,,,,s 61. 1926,
FINK: Diels translates. "Change of fil'e," ",'hile Heraditus speaks in
the plural of 't{)DnaC, changes. transfonnalions. But ho",' should we
understand the transition of fire into sea and from sea into eanh and
breath of fire, as well as from ~arth into sea and sea into fire? Is it here a
question of the famili.ar phenomenon of one aggregate state passing
O\er into the other? Is it intended here that some elements go over and
turn themselves into others? Does Heraclitus speak of transformations
of clemcnts. such as we .see aggregate states going over: as, for instance.
IKluid goes over into steam or fire into smoke? What are the T{)D::ta(?
Does Heraditus speak of a multitude because fire com'ens itself into a
serics of different things? At first. it looks like a series: fire com'ens itself
illlo sea. sea com'ens it.self half into earth and half into breath of fire.
C.1n we inquire hcre at all about c\eryday. familiar kinds of events?
From the phenomenon, we kno..... only the change of aggregate states.
Howevcr. we are not witnesses of a cosmogonie process. What is very
dimcult to see is the conversion of fire into sea. while the sea, that is,
.....atcl, is nevcrthelcss that which 1I10st quenches fire. The general question is whether wc arc right if .....c take the transformations of fire as if
evcrything werc first fire. and as if there were thcn a separation of water.
of ..... hich one half would be canh and the othcr half the breath of fire.
Presumably. we are not dcaling at all with a relationship of mixing in
SC411ence and at the level of ::tQvtG. Rather. 1 would suppose that the fire
is opposed to the sea. lhe eanh, and thc breath of firc, that the fire thus
relatcs ilself in opposition 1.0 the sea, thc earth and the brcath of lirc as
)u'QUuv6r; and wHALOC; arc in Opposilion to ::tOV'TU, The lire, as thc fv,
would then turn alxHII in diffcrellt ways. as ta JlQvtU show themselvcs.
This intcrprctation should 011 firsl be fonuulatcd only as a qucstion. I f wc
ulIderstand tQO::tiJ only as IUl'llingovcr in a local motion, Fr. :~I is nOI OIl
all illlclligiblc_ For wc cannot say that firc turns illl.o .....atcr, earth. and
breath of fi,-e in a local motion. If'TQOl'ttl mcal1s turning in a loc<ll motion.
\\'hal thcll do the o\'ertllrnillb'"S of firc mean? Nevertheless, Heraclitus
S<I)'S lhat fire turns first into sea. YCt herc Of local motion is cvidelllly not
Ihought. Does Iirc mo\'c in such a \\'ay that ;t first becomes .....ater. and

Du:1s translates: "For firc. having come upon them, will judgc and apprehend (condemn) all things:' In this translation it is qucstionablc
whcther XQlvEi must be translated as "will judge" in the sense of an cnd
situation, or whether it must nol rdther be translated as "will divide:'
And it is qucstionablc whcther xatw..tl*Etal must be comprehended as
"will be struck illlo its imprint:' We must thcn say that fire will, at the
time it brings Ta nQvta f0l1h (0 appeardnce, divide thcm and strike cach
thing into its implint. Thus. the superiority of fire is also indicated hcre
,is-ft-vis 'Ta nQvra. which are mentioned in Fr. 30 b)' the name of the
x6oJ,I.o;. that is, the cntire ordcr. The more difficult rendition of Fr. 30.
suggested by me, requircs that the subjccl of the first and second halves
of the semence changes. According to the smoother rendition, thc subject of the antecedent phrase. ~OS, will also be retained in the second
half. Seen linguistically, this version might be the more easy: but seen
thoughtfully. it appears to mc objectionable. The more difTrcuh rendi.
tKm implics that in the antecedcnt x6oJ.t,o; comes into view and is named
as something brought fonh. but xoo,wr; is held away from the power of
gods :and humans to bring fonh. As something bl'Ought fonh. thc
x60J,lOr;. which arises ncither from the notTJOU; of gods nor of humans,
points to fire's bringing-fonh-t(?appearance. Therefore. the subjcct can no
longer be x6<Jl.wr; in the .second half of the sentcnce. For otherwise miQ
ad~wov would be a predicative determination of x6oIw;. notwithstanding the fact that xOOJ,lO; is something brought fonh by fire. Thus. we
must read: ncither a god nor a human brought the xOOIJ.O; forth to
appear.mce: r.uher. it was always and is and will always be living firewhich brings the xOOJ,lOr; forth to appearance. We can understand the
phrase. "was always :md is and will be." almost in the sense of "there is:'
But l,hc way in which therc is 1WQ cU(~wov is the manner in which 1WQ
OE(~WOV bestows the threc ways of being-in.time on ttclvta, If we read Fr.
30 tl~lIs. a decisive advantage of fire ovcr x60lJ.or; cmelges. an advantage
that IS supportcd by Fr. 66. The question, howevcr. is whether wc maY
read Fro 30 such Ihal1CuQ 6.E~wov. which is mentioncd in thc thrce tim~
dctenninations. is the decisivc factol'. In this connection, we can ask
whcther wc can also draw the supcriority of firc from Fr, 31-althollgh
it includcs ncw motifs of thought.
P .... W'l'ICll.... NT: Musn't we also include Fr. 76 here: ~1j nUQ tOV Y'is
Oova'Tov xal. 6.ilQ ~lj tOV JI'uQOS Oova'Tov, MWQ ~1j TOV 6.tQOS OQvatov. Y'i
tOY ubatOS. Translatcd hy Diels. it runs: "Firc lives the death of carth
and ail' 1i\'CS thc dcath of firc: watcr lives thc dc'lIh of ;Iir and earth that
of walCI':'
FIN~: 11,1 this frah"llclll the movement is spokcn in the joining of
words: flrc lives Ihe death of earth, That means that it is nOI a question
hcrc of:t simple going ()vcr; I'athe,-. it is'l question of the interlocking of

)0

does water move in such a way that half becomes earth and the other half
becomes breath of fire? If we understand '(QOno( in this sense, then we
take fire as a kind of primar)' substance, which assumes differenl forms
of appearance in sequence. My queslKm. ho\.{e\'cr. is whether olle can
make mJpOli 'tQOlIo( clear b)' the changoovcr of aggregate stales familiar
to us.
H.EIOEGG~R: Would )'OU sa)' that lire stands behind evcl),thing?
What IS questionable. however, is what "!>chind" means here; above all.
whether fire stands behind everything in the manner of a primary substance, ...
FINI\: ... or whelher onc must nOt begin here also from the "clalcd~lCSS of fv and ](avta, and whether onc Illust give up the thought of
a baSIC mallcl". Our task here will ag-din be to wOJ"k out the more difficult
rendition.

Difference of Interpretation: Truth of Being

(Fragment 16) or Cosmological
Perspective (Fragment 64).-Heraclitus and the
Matter of Thinking.
-The Not-Yet-Metaphysical and the
No-Longer-Melaphysical.-Hegel's
Relationship to the Greeks.-nuQO<; "tQOna and
Dawn.
(Correlaled Fragmenls: 31, 76).

HElDt:GCER: Since we ha\'e interrupted our .seminar for three weeks

over Christmas, a short synopsis of the way of our undertaking till now
might prove useful. If an outsider were to ask )'ou what \\'e work at in
our seminar, how would )'ou ans.....er such a (lue51ion?
PARTICIPANT: Discussion of the problem of time in FI'". 30 was centrdl in the last hours before Chrislmas,
HElDt:CGEK: In other ,,'"ords, )'Oll have indeed let yourselrbc misled
by Ihe explication of Fr. 30 which Mr. Fink has given. For-as we have
emphasized again and ag-din-time does not comc to the fOl"e al all with
Heraclitus,
PAKTICIPANT: BUl Fr. 30 leads 10 lime determinations, and our
queslion was ho"' thcse ought 10 be understood,
HEIDECGEK: With Ihal, you go into a special question. But if somebody askcd you what we .....ork at in our Heraclitus seminar. and if he
wanted 10 hcar not about individual questions but aboul the whole; if hc
askcd whal .....c havc begun with. what "'ould your answer be?
PAKTlClI'AI'T: We h;we begun with a methodical preliminary considcr.llion. thal is, wilh the (IUcstion of ho"' Hcraclitus is 10 be under!ilood.

1-1t:IOECGEK: What has Mr. Fink donc at the beginning or his inIcqlrclation?
I'AKTlCII'AST: He has startcd with a considcration of t<l 1tavto..
!-h:mt;Gc:a;lt: Bul. how does hc l:omc l.O to. 1tavta?-lf I speak wilh
)'ou now. I thus speak with <:"'<:1')'011<:.PAKT1CII'ANT: Through Fr. 64: to lit 116.\'To. Oto.Xll;,t KEQO.uv6~.
J-1t:l1>t:GGt;R: In lhe explic;ltion. h;we we begull with to. 1tavra or
wilh lightning? For it is imponalll 10 distinguish Iha!.
P"KTlCII'ANT: First. wc h,l\'c asked oUI1iCh'cs how ta 1tUvt is 10 be
tnlllslitted: lhen. wt. !timed 10 Iht: lighlning; and finally. wc ha\'c looked
at alllhe fr.tgmenLS in which to. 1tavt is mentioned.

72

73
. Ht:m.EGGER: Mr. Fink has thus begun the explication of HcradilllS
.....Ith the lightning. Is this beginning a malleI" of course? Is it nOI surprising?
PARTICIPANT: If onc considers the sliIning points made elsewhere.
this beginning is ullusual.
HElDt:CGER: Mr. Fink. who begins with the lighlning. is. as it were,
struck by lightning. With what does Hcidegger begin?
PART/CII'ANT: With the J\6yo<; [g;llhcring.processJ.
HElUt:CGEIl: And beside that ...
PARTICIPAST: . with 'Al'l')eElU Inollconcealmcl1l}.13
HEIOEGGER: BUI how does Heideggcr come 10 'A>"Tj8Elu?
PARTICII'AST: By Fr. 16: 'to In) ~irvOv nOTE 1tW; ov n; Mle(k2~
HIl>EGGER: When" this fragment is used as a basis for a Heraclitus
explication, onc lIlust also rcad it as the first rragmelll. BUI how do Frs.
64 and 16 come tOgethCI, or how is Fr. 64 distinguishcd from Fe 16?
Wherein lies the distinction betwecn both beginnings?
PARTICIJ'A~T: In Fr. 16, '[0 ~il 6itvov JtO'[E (that which nevcr sets]
stands at the central poilll: in Fr. 64. it is XEQauvO;: (lightning].
HEIIH:GGEfl.: Are both fragments, and thus both beginnings, idcntical?
P.... fl.TICIl.... NT: No.
HEIDEGGER: Take Fr. 16 cntire. and compare it with t-r. 64.
PARTICIP.... :,OOT: The distinction between the two fragmelltsconsislS in
this, that only '[cl 1tavw is melllioned in Fr. 64. ",'hile the human being
comes into play in Fr. 16.
HEmt:CGER: We arc thus concerned with a great difference. The
question will be what thc different starting point of Frs. 64 and 16.
respectively. signifies; whether or not an opposition is displayed herc,
We will have to ask this question explicitly. But ""hat could one repl)' ifit
were said that the human becomes thematic in Fr. 16. while he is nOI
mentioned in Fr. 64?
1}.... RTlCIl.... NT; Jr tcl 1tavta comprehends all entities, then the
human is co-thought as an entit),.
P.... RTlCIP....NT: Fundamentally, I agree with that. Bm then it is not
said in Fr. 64 how a human, in distinction to all nonhuman lICtvrQ. is and
st:mds in rclationship to lighming. On the contr;u)'. Fr. 16 expressl)'
n;lI11eS the way that a human behavcs toward 1:0 ~il 6iJvov 1101:.
Hf.IIH;CGER: A human is also named in Fr. 64 in so far as hc IS and
be.longs .as an emit)' to TU .n:avta. But the qucstion is whether we already
tlllnk 01 ;1 human whcn ""C take him as an entity which belongs to '[Q
novUl tike all other entities. whether wc must not think of him olher",i.se
as all cmit), in thc midst of .n:avl:(l. Let us, thercfore. keep in mind th<lt
till' .Ilt:lfllnil~g of Mr. Fink's Hcraditus explic'ltion is surprising. This
bCgll1lllllg ..... Ilh Ihe lighltling thcll Icads to ...

PARTlCIP.... NT: ... our taking into view thc rel:tlionship between
lightning alld tcl navl:(l.
HElt>EGGER: What follows aher that?
PAKTlCIPAI'o"T: An explication of Fr. 11.
Ht:IOEGGER: But how do wc come to this frdgmem? What is (he
pertinent motif that lcads us from Fr. 64 to Fr. II?
P.... RTlCIP.... NT: What Heraclitus himself s..,id g<lve us support for (his
transition. In Fr. 64, hc spc:lks of ta rtOVl:(l, in FI". 11 of rtav EQrttov,
which we ha\'c understood as rtavra
EQ1IeTa.
HIOIOEGGER: But .....here lay the pertinem support for sllch a procedure?
P.... RTlCIP.... /'I,T: Lightning (lightning bolt) led us to 1IA.\.1 (blow).
HElDEGGt:k: Besides. wc saw a relevant connection betwecn steering (otQ)({~u) and driving (vtllE'tUl). Thercforc, wc took up first the
relationship of lightning and ta :n:avra, and finally, .....e took up the
relationship of 1tA.T\'Y1\ and 1Iciv EQrtEl"OV. Then we turned ...
P....RTICIPA/'I,T: ... to the sun fragments.
HEIDECGER: The explication began with the lightning or lightning
1X)lt, then turned to the sun, and after that to m,jQ lu;:U;wov. L,ter, we
lllUSt specify more exactly the refercnccs of lightning, sun, and lire.
What we have thematically t10cated up to this point has now become
dcaI'. But how docs Mr. Fink IHnceed in explication of the frdgmenlS?
P.... RTICIPA:,OOT: The explication has become a problem for us.
HEIDECCt:R: To .....hat extcnt is the explication a problem? How
would you characterize the procedure of Mr. Fink? The manner of his
cxplication is by no means to be taken for gramcd, but is rather to be
dcsignatcd as venturcsome.
PAKTICIP..../'I,"'T: More has been said in (he interpn~tation of the fragments than stands in them.
Ht:lDEGGER: The interprctation is hazardous. But Mr. Fink docs
1I0t intcrpret arbitrarily; rathe,, he has his grounds for preferring the
marc difficult rcnditlon and the hardncss of the problem. What is the
problcm wc arc conccmcd with hcre? With what right does he prefer the
marc difficult rcndition? Let us take Fr. 30 as an example.
I~""RTICIP""~T: In each case we havc preferred the mol'C difficult
rendition so that thc subject malleI' comes to the fol'c.
1-It:IDEGGf.R: What malleI' is that?
I'.... RTtCll.... NT: The maller is already suggest,ed in a manifold.
pedlaps most explicilly in reference (0 the time <Iuestion.
lh:IDEGGt;R: J do nOI allow talk about time now. Let us hr;lcket
being and time now. Whal matter is Ircalcd that should comc to thc
lorc? Think of Mr. Fink's introduclOI)' remarks.
IARTICll.... NT: The malleI' of thinking.
J-h:mECGF.w.: And the malleI' of lhinking is? W<.' must say that the

w;

74

75

malleI' of thinking is that which we seck. that of which we still do not

know. The same outsider, after he has listened to what yOll answer to his
question, could reply to you that when we deal with Heraclitus we sit. as
it were, in an ivory lower. for what we are doing would have nothing LO
do wilh tcdmology and industrial society; rather. it is nothing but
worn-out. stories. What would be the answer hCI'c?
PARTICII'ANT: 1L is doubtfulth;:tt wc arc dealing here with worn OUI
glOries. Fm' we do 1101 take Her-aditus ;IS a thinker of the pasl. It is rather
our intention 10 bring something to the fi:Jrc in the expositioll of HcradilllS that is possibly somclhingother or <luile the same. For us, there is
no concern for <In exposition that has to do with a past maller.
Ht:IOEGGt:R: Do wc thus provide no conlTibutioll to Heraclitus research?
PARTICII'ANT: I would not say that, because our pmblematic can
also be helpful for research.
Ht:IOEGGt:R: We seek the determination of the mallerof thinking ill
convc,sation with Heraclitlls. We intcnd thercby no thematic conllibution to Heraditus rese,uch. We arc not interestcd in this dircction.
Perhaps whm we are doing is also inaccessible for Heraclitus rcsearch.
Thc way and man ne, in which wc speak with the fragments and listen to
them is not the simple, evcryday way and manne,of forming an opinion,
as when we read the newspaper. Mr. Fink forces you to think otherwise.
The greater difficulty of the morc difficult rendition is lIot only related
by degrees to our cap:lcity of apprehension. What seems here like a
grammatical comparative is presumably another distinction.
PARTICIPANT: A comparative presupposes that something which
s(;lIlds in a COil text gcts compared. Bctween the simple, cvcI)'day thinking and understanding and that which is called the more difficult rendi
tion. there is cleady a gulf thal is worthy of emphasis.

HEIUEGGt:K: We have thus looked at the reference of1:u llQVtQ and

lightning. 1:0 no.vtu and SUll, 1: n:o.vta and lire. In Fr. 7. nUVto"la ovtU
was mentioned. Inthe reference of to 1tQ.vtU to lightning. to the sun, to
lire and to tv, which we have come acl'OSS, what is the greater difficuh.y
of the more difficult rendition in distinction to the naY\'e manner of
reading?
PAKTICII'ANT: The question is whether the reference of n:o.VlU to
light.ning. to the .'lUll. 10 fire, 10 ~v, to n:64f.lo~. or to Myo~ is in each casc
different, or whether the expressed multiplkil)' of that to which to.
1U'.tV"l(l refers is onl)' the name of a manifold.
Ht:IIlEGGF.K: The difficult)' before which we stand is the manifold of
li~hlnillg, the Slln. lire, v, war and Myo in their relationship to to.
1tCtvtU, or 10 to. 6vt(l. The manifold does 1l0t belong LO n:o.VTU or to 6vtu.
BUI to ,... h:ll does it lhen I~long?
I'ARTlCII'AI"'I': I scc the difliclIh)' in this. that on onc hand tU 1t<lvta

fonn a totality, and thal on the other hand ta Jto.vt(l are supposed to
stand in a reference to something thal does not belong to the totality.
HEIDEGGt:R: You would say that with the totality wc havc everylhing, that with it we are at the end of thinking. On the other hand, a
manifold is mentioned that exceeds t.he totality. Ifta :1tavta is the totality
of 6vtu, what is as a whole, is there still something which leads further?
PARTICIPANT: Although you have said that the word "being" should
he bracketed. wc cannot now refrain from naming being as what leads
further than what is as a whole.
Ht:lOt:GCt:R: Till now, the conversation was not aoom being. Being
is something that is not an elllity and that does not belong to what is as a
whole. The more difficult rendition consists in this, that we do 1l0t read
the fragments onlically. as we read the newspaper, that reading of the
fragments is not concerned with things that become clear simply. Rather,
the difficulty is that here it is obviously a matter of a kind of thinking that
lets itself into something that is inaccessible to direct represcntation and
thought: that is the genuine background.
Anothc, difficulty is the following. The kind of thinking thal thinks
what is as a wholc in regard to being is the way of thought of
metaphysics. Now we said in the lasl seminat" thal Henlclitus does not yet
think metaphysically, whereas wc no longer altempt to think mctaphysically. Has the "not-yet-metaphysiC<II" no referencc at all to metaphysics?
Olle could suppose the "not-yet" to be cut off from what follows, from
metilphysics. The "not-yet" could, however, also be an "already," <l certain preparation, which onl)' we sec as we do, and must sec as we do.
whereas Hcnlditus could not see it. But what aoout the "no-longermetaphysical"?
I'AKTICU'ANT: This ~h .. racteri.... ation of ou,' thinking is temlXJrarily
unavoidable. because wc simply cannot put asidc the history of
metaphysics from which wc come. On the other hand. regarding what
the "not-yet-metaphysical" deals with, perhaps too much is already said
in tbis charactclization.
Ht:IIJE(:Gt:R: If Heraditus canllot say that his thinking is not yet
1l11:taph)'sical because he cannOI yet prcview the coming mctaphysics. 5C;l
must wc say of ourselves that wc no longer allcmptlo think metaphysically. and im!(.'cd becausc wc cOllie from mctaphysics.
PA~TICIl'ANT: .'\Il ambiguity lies in "lIo-longer:' 011 onc hand, il Gill
he cOlllprehelldcd in the sense of a superficial. temporal detcnnin:uiol1.
Then it implies that metaphysics lies behind us. Outhe other hand. it call
alsu be understood such thatlhc bearing on mClaph)'Sics is Inaintailled,
althou!-:h not ill tlte manlier of a metaphysical (,olllHcrposition wilhin
tllct;lpbysics.
I-It:Il1t:GGEIC You wish tu sar that "no-longer-metaphysical" dues
llol llIt:all Ihal wc have dismissed metaphysics: rather. il implies Ihal

76

77

metaphysics still clings to liS. that we arc not free of il. Where within
Western philosophy is Ihe relationship of epochs 10 each other thought
in most decisive manner?
PARTICIP.... lIo'T: With Hcgcl.
HEIOEGGER: If we SOl)' that ...e no longer allempt 10 think metaphyskalif. but remain nevertheless referred 10 met3ph)'sics. then we could
designate lhis relationship in Hegelian fashion as sublation. None of us
knows whether metaph)'sics will reappear. In :my GIS(:, Ihe Uno-longer_
mClaphysicar is mo,'C difficult to specify than the "nOI-)'CImetaphysical:' But what about Hegcl and the Creeks? Doesn', he take
them 10 some CXlelll all in the s,,'1me breath?
P.... RTlCIPANT: With Hegcl. another understanding is presented of
what a beginning is.
HEIOECCl:R: The question aoout the beginning is too diffICult for us
now. The answer which I wish is simpler, What ch:Jr;lcter. according to
Hegcl, has Greck thinking for philosophy?
PARTICIPANT: A charactcr of preparation,
HEmEGC):R: This answer is too general. More specifically said ..
PARTICIPANT: In the preface to the Plletlomello[ogy of Mi"d, Hegel
says that cverything depends on comprehending and expressing truth
not only as substance. but just as much as subject,
HEIDEGGER: How is that to be understood? But first: is the "Preface" you mention the preface to the PhnlOmmology'
PARTICIPAl'o'T: It is the preface to the system of science. whereas the
"Introduction" is the real preface to the Phenomenology.
HEIOECCR: The "Preface"thus pertains to the Logic. and not only
to the Phmommology of Mind, In the "Preface" Hegel sa)'S something
fundamental about philosophy. that it should think the truth nOl only as
substance. but also as subj~t. In Greek. substance means."
PARTtCIPA!\'T: ... ultoxdVVov. and what is underlying.
HEIDECGt:a: How is substance thought by Hegd? If I say that the
house is big or tall. how is the manner of thinking that only thinks
substance to be characterized? What is not thought here?
PARTICII'ANT: The mo\'ement between the house and being tall.
lh:IDEGGER: The Greeks. who according to Hegel think only of
substance, U:n:OXElIiEVOV. havc categories for this.
PARTICIPANT: The movement can only come imo view whell yet
anothel' basis Sllpclvcnes, the slll~jcct.
H.:mEGCER: When it is said that the house is lall, what is not
lhoughl lherein?
PARTICIPANT: The onc ",,'ho thinks.
Ht:mEGGEIt: Thus. what kind or thinking is that ....hich simply views
\lltOXF(llEVOV and not the subjt:ct?
PAXTICIPANT: I hesitate 10 say Lhe overused ""'ords.
HEmt:GGER: In philosoph)' no word or concept is overuscd. We

11IIISt think the concepts new each day. Wc have, for example, the statement that this glass is full. Something is said. therewith. about what lies
before us, but the reference to an I is not thought. When this reference
becomes thematic for thinking. for the I, then what lies before us becomes what lies 0PIXlsite us, that is. it becomes an object. In Greek there
arc no objecLS. What does objec:t mean in the Middle Ages? What does it
mean literally?
PARTICIPAI'o'T: What is thro.....n up ag-dinst.
HEIDEGGER: The object is what is thrown lll) against whom? Can
)'ou throw t.he glass up against yourself? Ho..... CIII Ithro..... something up
against m)'self, without something happening? What does subieclum
(substance] mean in the Middle Ages? What does it mean literally?
PAItTICII'ANT: Whal is thro.....n under.
HEIDECCER: For mcdicvalthinking, the glass is a slIbilul1l, ..... hich is
the translation ofu1loxd~EVov,OhiecWm [representation]. for the Middle
Ages, meant, on thecontrar)', what is represented. A golden mountain is
an objcct. Thus thc object here is that .....hich is precisely not objective. It
is subjective. I h:lVe asked how the Greeks think according to Hegel's
interpretation, We have said that in their thinking the reference to the
subject does 110l become thematic. Blit were the Creeks still thoughtful?
For Hegel, nevertheless, their thinking was a turning toward what lies
before and whal underlies. which Hegel called the thinking of the immediate, The immediate is that between which nothing intervenes.
HegeJ characterized all of Greek thought as a phase of immediacy. For
him. philosophy first reaches solid land with Descartes. by beginning
with the I.
PARTICIPANT: But Hegel sa"'" a break already with Socrates, a turning toward subjcctivit), that goes along with mores, in so far as the~
become monllity.
HEIDEGGEIt: That Hegel secs a break with Socrates has a still simpler ground. Whcn he characterizes Greek thinking as a .....hole as a
phase of immediacy. he does not le\'el down inner distinctions like that
bet\\'een Anaxagoras and Aristotle. Within the phase of immediacy, he
secs a di\'isioll comprehended by the samc three-fold scheme of
immediacy-mediation-unity, He does not, ,heleb)'. apply an arbilral)'
scheme; rather. he thinks out of that which is for him the u'uth in lhc.
s('nsc of the absolutc cCI'laint)' of lhe absolule spirit. Nevel1helcss, the
dassification of metaphysics and Creek thinking is not so cas)' for us,
because lhe question ahollt the detcrmination of Creek thinking is some
thing thal wc lUust first put to question and awakcn as a CJucstion.
The {jllestioll from the seminar before last, cOllccl'Iling what the
spc.:culative means with Hegel. stilll'cmains unanswel'cd.
I)AItTICll'M~": Speculation for Hegcl means the vicw {AIIMlml.llmgl
of etcrnal trulh,
HElDEGGER: This :mswel' is lOO genenll and sounds only approxi-

78

79

male. With such academic questions, onc has no recourse to an index,

but 10 the Encyclopedia, There the speculative is a determination of the
logical. How many dctcnninations arc there and what arc the remaining
ones?
PARTICIPANT: In all there are three dimensions of the logical, which
corrcslXlnd 10 the three dctenninations already named. immediacy.
mediation, and unity.
HEIDEGGER: Are the tlll-ee dctermillatiolls of the logical three
things side-br-side? Evidently not. The first moment. which corresponds
to immediacy. is the abSlr:lCl. What does abstract mc,m with Hegcl?
PAIl.T1CIVANT: What is separated and isolated.
HEIOEGGER: BeneI': the thinking of one-sidedness. which only
thinks onc side. h is peculiar that the immediate should be the abstract,
while for us the immediate is rather the concrete. But Hegel calls the
immediate abstract in so far as one looks at the side of givcnness and not
at the side of the I. The second moment of the logical is the dialectical,
the third is the speculative. The Hegelian determination of the speculative will be significant for us, when we will be concerned at an important
part of the seminar with the apparent opposition of beginning with
xEQauv6t; or with "to Ill) oiiv6v :1tO"tE :1toot; UV ns ACt9m.
Now I still have a question for you, Mr. Fil1k, which concerns h. 30.
no I understand you correctly when )'OU comprehend x60llOS as identical with la XCtVta in your interpretation?
FINK: x60Jl0S and la XaVta are not identical, but x60v.os does indeed mean the jointed whole of la :1tavta, the whole stamping, which is
not fixed but moved. Heraditus speaks of manifold ways of movement.
as in strife or war.
HEIOEGGEtc Does x601l0r; then belong in the sequence of lightning.
sun, and lire?
FINK: Not without further consideration, That (QuId only be said if
x6o!J.Ot; were thought not as the order brought forth by fire. but as the
ordering lirc. If x60IlO; had the function of Owx601lllOLS, thcn it would
'Ilso belong in the sC{lucnce of basic words.
HElDEGGEH: In Fr, 30, x601l0v "t6VOE is mentioncd. If we hold that
togcther with XQ1:a lOV A.6yov 16vOE. then couldn'l x6ollov 16v6E, wrrcsponding with 'A.6yov 16v()E, mean thc same as this x6Oj.tot;, which is still to
bc trealcd. which is slillLO be thematized?
FINt\: Above all, the demonstrative 't6vbe does not mean an individual this, not this x60Il0t;. which is 110W as opposed to other XOOIlOl.
When it is said that the x601l0; is brought '<>rIh as the jointed order. a
xbOIlOt; in the singular, which belongs to a pluralily of x60IlOI, is not
mealll thereby. Of this x6o~0; it is said: 'tov at'.llOv anclv"twv [the same
ror .. 11 beings]. Whether this is I-leraclitus' phrase, wc leave aside now.
Dids translates UnCtV1Wv a.~ "all living beings." 1 reject this translalion. I

also reject the interpretation that thinks Ihis phr<tse together with Fr. 89.
in which it says that those who are awake have one common world, while
those who sleep turn each onc to his own world. I do not understand lOV
at'nov WtCtvtWV as the same. that is. the one lInd common world of those
who arc awake (xmvot; x60v.o;) in opposition to the private world (tc'hot;
x6ov.oS) of those who sleep. I interpret t'mavta in the sense of'ta l'tCtvta.
Although futavtEt; customarily refers to humans and living beings.
CmCtvtWV, just as lIlllch as :1tCtvtWV, here means only that Heraclitus
speaks by reason of the flow of language. instead of from nclvtwv
Cmavtwv.
HEIDEGGER: Blit what then does l'tCtvta mean?
FINK: l'tCtvta form ajoining and come forth in the shining up 01" fire
in their determination and character.
HEIDEGCER: C,m't one also start from a plur.tl, where x60llOl arc
the many states of an entire order of l'tCtvta? x60IlOV 't6V()E would then be
this one stale in distinction la others,
FINK: But there is no passage in Heraclitus in ....hich he speaks of
many x00l-un,
Ht:IDEGGEH: However, thc 16vbE marks a place at which a new
themc begins. On your interpretation, x60!J.O~ is to be understood ontologically as much as ontically.
FtNK: Heraclitus stands neither on the side of n6vta nor on the side
of firc; rather, he takes up a curious position between them.
I-lEIOEGGER: With that we can now return to Fr, 31.
FINK: I attempt first to expose a thought that contains a proposal
for an interpretation of Fr. 31. In the last seminar wc expressed our
doubt as to whether transformations or overturnings are mC'lIlt with
'rQOlTaL If it is a qucstion of transformations. then we think of the
&')J..O(WOlS, of a basic substance. If we translate 'tQOl't(tl wilh overturnings.
then-we could ask---do wc Illean lhe turning points in the way of the
sun-fire in thc firmamcnt which measure time?
H ElllEGGH: Is nUQOt; lQO:1tat a gellitivtLS $lIbiecfu5 or a gel/iliTJUs obicclll.~ lsubjcctive genitivc or objective genitiveJ?
FINK: The 'tQOlTa( are assel1cd of lire. However, a difficult)' lics in
the fact thal wc havc from the history of mel'aphY-5ics familiar and common ideas and dcveloped and gcneral \\'ays of thought in which we are
always alread)' moving. and frolll which we are also apt at first to intcrprCI Fr, 31. One such idea, already given to us frolll metaphysics. is thc
idea of an underlying subst;'lI1ce that shows itsclf in Illany disguists.
HEIt)EGGEH: xUQOt; is thcn gel/ifivlls obier.fivIlJ.
FINK: Gmitivll.1 Qbi"clivus and ~ubiectillus. Another schemc presents
itsclf 10 liS from ancient speculatioll on the clements. ill which one or
another clement is declarcd to Ix: thc original clement. Docs nilQ also
have thc function of a basic clement Ihilt converts itsell" lhrough that

80

81

which emcmues out of it? Two common schemes with which we could
attempt to illlcrprct rruQ6; lQOl'toJ arc the all,o(WOI; of
uncierl),jng
substance and the emcn3tion of an oribrinal element. But I belicn~ that
we must entertain ,Ill extreme distrust of such conceptions. In the leXI it
says: ovenumings of fire, first into sea. The li,"c turns itself over into sea,
that is, into that which we IIndcrsl:lIld as a !>o....'cr opposed to lire. At
firsl, we could suppose that it is a question orlhe sharp. on tie opposition
of fire and water'that is familiar to us. In the small domain of the human
environment. thcl'c is the phenomenon that w:lIer quenches fire and
that fire can vaporize water. But such reciprocal contest and annihilation
is only possible olllhe soil of earth. Clearl)'. the frdgmem does not refer
to this small domain. bUl rather to the great domain of the world. Here
we have a view of fire in the he;u'ens. the sea. and the earth-the sea that
girds the earth. In the great domain of the world, the domain that
presents itself to us in the view of the wodd. tire and water do not
annihilate each other.
The view of the world [Wtll-A"J"chmmng) is not undcrstood hcre
ideologically; rather, it means the immediate vicw of the great relationships of the heavenly stars. the sea that lies under them and the earth.
When Heraditus says that fire first turns itself o"er into sea. we suspend
the schemata of all.o{wo~ and emanation, e"en though we are still not
able to think what "turning over" means. The sea turns itself half illlo
earth. half illlo breath of fire. Then we read that the earth is passed illlo
sea and that earth dissol"es in the measure in which sea was before. when
sea became earth. Nothing more is s.1.id in the fragment concerning
whether and how the breath of lire turns further. With the breath of
file. the overtuming is bl"Ought to a dose. All th;lt is spoken of is the
tlll'l1ing of fire illlo sea and the sea's turning half illlo earth and half illlo
breath of fire, and finally of earth luming into sea. Fire turns itself over
into sea. this splits into earth and breath of lire. and half of the earth
turns bad. into sea. Apparently a reciprocal exchange of water and
earth, of nuidity and solidity. is mentioned. What is for us a familiar
distinction of opposites dissolves itself. No further turning and no returning to fire is dedared concelTling the breath of fire. The differences
of sea, earth. and breath of fire ;1I'e "eferred nack to a common origin. to
a genesis which is posited step by step: but we still do not know the
character of the genesis. If now wc cannot apply the familiar scheme of
lUJ"o(WOl<;. that is. the scheme of the original subslance with its slates and
modes and the scheme of emanation. then we get into a difficulty. How
then should we il1terpret the JtuQ6~ tQO)lui? Wc musI ask \\hat Hemditus has Ihouglufull)' experienced and c.,ughl sight of. I atlcmpt
now-if ),ou ~'ill-IO gh'e a fantastic meaning to .ltuQO<; TQ01IaC which is
thought as a possihle .lIlswer to the qucsttoll of wh;lt Hel,lclilus has
thuughtfully caught sight of. We could make the tUl"Iling of fire in-

,In

lelligible to Ollrseh'es by startingoul from the phenomenon of the brcak

of dOl)'. from the phenomenon of dawn on the Ionian coast. At dawn. the
expanse of the sea nashes up out of lhe fire which breaks out from night
and drives Olll night: and opposite the sea there nashcs up the shore and
land. and above the sea and land the zone of the vault of heaven which is
filled by the breath of fire. A deeper sense would lie in wh,lt is familiar to
us as the break of day, if wc do not now think the relationship of lire to
se;l. eanh. ,md breath of fire. namely the bringing-fonh-lO-appe;mlllce
Ihat is the basic e\"e11l of lire, simply as the casting of light 1.0 and lettingbe-seen of that which is already determined thus and so. A deeper sense
~'ould lie in that ~'hich is familiar to us as the break of day. if ",'e also do
not undcrstand bringing-forth in the sense of a building manufacture or
of a creative bringing-forth, but attempt to ad"ance thoughtfully ~hind
the two expressive fonns. coming-forth-to-appeamnce in the sense of
technical and creative achievement and casting of light. In order to win a
deeper sense of the break of day. it would depend on avoiding the
scheme of technical bringing-forth in the sense of a material transform ation and also the scheme of C1"ealive bringing-foI1h; and beside that, it
would depend on taking away from the letting-shine-up in the light of
fire the basic trait of impotcnce. If we could succeed in thinking back
behind the familiar schemata of making. bringing-forth, and casting
light or letting-bc-seen, then we could understand the break of day in a
deeper sense. We could then say that in the breaking of the ",'orld-day
the basic distinctions of the world area. sea, earth. and vault of heaven,
first come forth to appear-dnce. For this deeper thought we have an
immediate phcnomenon in the break of day. But nowhere do we have a
phenomenon corresponding to the return course of earth into sea.
l-h:IIlEGGt:R: How would you translate "tQOxa{ in your projection,
which you yourself call fantastic. but which is not at all so fantastic
hec;mse it includes reference to immediate phenomena.
FINIC Wc see the arising of fire. and in its arising the lQO.l'W( are the
lurnings of lire around toward that which shows ilsdf in the fire shine.
lQOltU{ signif)' no material transformations ...
HEIDEGGER: ... and ;llso no mere illumination.
FINK: In announcement of the deeper scnse of ""pO; lQOxa(, I was
concentrating on a commonness. not known in untic relationships, of
lwinging-fonh into visibility and letting-arise in lhe sense of cpiJOt<;. That
is an auempt to avoid the scheme in which fire converts like;m original
c1emcnt over into other c1el1l(.'nts like water and earth. And I auelllptto
think this in a simile bet\\'cell the arising of the articulated world in the
light-shine of the wodd illuminating fire. ;md the regions of nuvta laying themseh'es out.
HEIDF.Gl~ER: You (hus take the I>hcnomenon of dawn as the basis of
your inlerprel:uion ...

82

83

FISK: ... in order to <I\'oid the phenomenon of transformation.

HEIDEGGEK: You mean thereby the dawn or the world and nOl of a
specific day, just as you have in view the wodd-fire and nOl the sun.
FINK: Bm in the phenomenal SlIlI, we call think fire.
Hlmn:CGEK: How should ",'C think fire? In order to heighten the
diffKUhy. I refer to Fr. 54, in which the word 6.rpavi)1i [invisible] comes to
the fore. The lire is invisible: it is the fire which does nOI appear.
FINK: As we have said at the outset: the fire is that which is not there

thal masks itself through its emanations, Rather, we will \'iew the entire
range thal binds fire. sea, earth, and breath offirc in connection with life
and death, Apparently, wc I"CVC1110 anthropological fragments in opposition 10 cosll1ological fragments. In truth, however, it is not a question of
a rcstriction to human phenomena: rather, what penains to being human. such as life and death. becomes in a distinctive sense the clue fOT
understanding of the entirety of the opposing relatedness of fv and
Itavta.

in

ta no.vta.

HElOt:CGEK: If YOll proceed from day (0 world-day, so we could

think from the sun thither to fire.
FINK: Nowhere do we find the sudden change of fire into sea as an
antic phenomenon.
PARTICIPAl'I.T To what is 9al.6.o<n1; refclTcd?
FINK: To "tQOltuL For the tuming over of sea into earth and breath
of fire is a continuation of tQ01taC
HEII>EGCEII.: I propose that we bracket Fr. 31, The difficulty we got
into lies in this, that we havc not spoken clearly enough about ltuQ, which
we still have to do, I understand neither the intel-pretation which is
accompanied b)' chemical ideas nor can I follow through the aucmpted
corresrxmdencc of da)' and \\'orld-<Iay, For me, there is a hole here,
FtNK: The difficulty ..... iII perhaps clear itself up if we come to Fr. 76,
in which fire, sea, and earth appear in "el>ealed SC<luence. The most
important thing there is the manner in which -rQOIto.( arc characterizcd,
What is named only as tUl'Ilingovcr in Fr. 31, is here slx>ken of as tO live
tllC death of the othcr." With lhat, we mcet a new, surprising thought. At
first, it should sound notcwonhy 10 us that the dark formula of death,
which first becomes de.ar to us in the donHlin oflhe living. is referred to
such cntities as neither li\'e or dic, like water or earth. In the small
domain of human ambit. we kno\\' well the phenomenon that firc vaporizes walel' and waleI' qllcnchcs firc, Here wc can sa)' Ihat lire livcs the
dcstruction of waleI' and wmer livcs the dcStl'uctioll of fire,
HElIn:C(;ER: To live \\'ould mean here "to sul'vivc.....
FINI':: '" to slIl'vivc the I)<lssing of the other. 10 survive in the annihilation of the other, 8uI we hil\'e here onl)' a poetic metaphor. In
ordcr to understand thc l:QOtnl<hardcl,er, wc lIluSI gel away from thc
idea of a chemical chan/{c, Starting from Ihc life-death fraglllcllIs, \\'C
muSt repl'CM:nl 10 ourselves \\,h;u J-1craditus lhinks by life allt! death,
From Ihere we can also undcrstalld the aVTCl~tOll'h), Ihat is. the cxchallge
"I' naVtO 1'01' fire and of lirc for ItllVl:u. This is a relationship likc Ihat of
h'uld ;md goods, in which con necl ion il is more a m;lIleroflight thanlhe
\alm.' of gold. We dn 1I0t ulU.lcTsl;lIId Ihe wnting O\'cr of firc into \\'hat is
nOI fire ill the .'loCnsc of it chemical change or in Ihe sense of an original
subslance I hall'h;lII/{es (lUJ.o(WOI;) or in the sense of ;In original clement
h

8
1I1lertwining of Life and Death
(Correlated Fragments: 76, 36, 77).
-Relation of Humans and Gods
(Correlated Fragments: 62,67,88).

FINK: Frdgmcnt 31 remained closed to us for many reasons: first. because the pIUrdll"QOItu{ proves itself to be a matte... of dis~ule. on Ihe one
hand, as a le<:hnicaltenn, and on the other, as a plurahty of turns that
happen in sequence; and second, because ?f the resulti~g pro~lem of
whether the concept of turn can be thought In the usual cndc o,r Ideas of
the transformation of an original stuff (bUo{wo~) or emanatIon of an
original element that conceals itself in its mani~~ld apJX:arances as alien
fanns. I am of the opinion that we must mobilize a mistrust of all the
usual schemes of thought that are familiar to us from the conceptual
tradition of metaphysical thinking. Here, these are abo\'c all the two
schemes of It)J..o{wau; and emanation. The attempt to clarify Fr. 31 from
the phenomenon of dawn on the Ionian coast falls shon, in ~he charac
teri;r.atKUl of thc letting-arise and shining-up of the world regions of sea.
eanh, heaven. and breath of fire, of the task of thinking this neither as a
realtransfonnation of an original substance, nor as the emanation of an
original element, nor as bringing-forth in the t~~nical ~~ creative ~nse,
nor as the impotent illumination of already-exlstlllg entities by the hghtshine of fire. Perhaps it is necessary to go back behind the distinction of
actual manufacture and creati\te bringing-forth and of bare casting of
light and illumination. if we wish to think the shining-up of en~i~ie5 in an
all encompassing shine of lightning. of the sun, or of eternal hvmg fire.
HEIDEGGER: You 53y that the coming-forth-to-appear.Ulce of what
is is no actual making. no creative bringing-forth and also no bare il
lumination. In this connection. you have some time ago referred to the
fact that a similar predicament is hiddcn in Hussed's concept of constitution.

FINK: The problem of constitution in Husserl's ph.CIlOlllcnolog)' has

iu place in the subjecLfobjcct-l"eference. The per~ep~lon [.Celll(~}iI'Imj ~f
the unilY of an object in the multiplicity of ways 01 bclllg given IS C~I1SIi
LUIl.d in thc intcrplay of aspects of the object. With the concept.oJ constitution Husscrl auempts. to begin with. 10 avoid a complete realism and
idealism. Complete realism holds that 1~1.ception is only. a con~prehen
sion ae<;ording 10 consciousness of ....,hat IS mdependelll 01 consCiousness.
As againsl this. complete idealism holds that the subject makes things.

85
The predicamcnt
of finding .a concept that does .not refer to build'
.
b
. IIlg,
C:C~UOI~ or arc ~cpresel~latlon al.....a)'s prcSCnts Itself .....ith l-Iusserl. In
distinction to ancient phIlosophy, modern philosophy does not think
appeara.nce so much from the iss~le of wha~ is in the openncss of a genc.<tl
prescncmg, but rather as becommg an obJCct and presenting itself for a
subject. ~n the general concept of appeardnce, nevertheless, selfpresentauon belongs to each emit)'. But each entity presents itself to
e\'cl),thing that is, and, amOllg others. to the emit)' that is characterized
by co~ition. Prcsc.ntation, thcn, is a collision among .....hat is, or a represenlallQn of what IS b)' the one who represenLS. But what is cannot be
understood .....ith the categories of attraction and repulsion.
HEIDEGCER: Another manner of explaining representation occurs
in reference to receptivity and sponlaniety.
FINk: Kant speaks of receptivity in reference to sensory data, and in
a cen~in manner al~ in. reference to the pure forms of intuition, space
and time. Spontamety 15 based on the categorical s),nthesis of transcendental apperception.
HEIDEGGER: Which moment do you see no..... in Husserl's doctrine
of constitution?
FtNK: In his ~oncept?fconst~tution, ~usserl means neither making
nor bare perception of thmgs whICh are mdependent of consciousness,
Ne\'e~e1~ss, the positive characterization of the concept of constituion
remams difficult. When Husserl strove to think. back behind the distinc
tion of making and bare perception, this problem remained in the path
of cognition, that is, in the relationship of the subject to an entity that is
alread)' posited from the beginning. The prior question, however, is
.....hether, ..
HEIDEGGt;R: ... objectivit) necessarily belongs ...
FINK: : .. to the being of what is, or whether objectivity first be
comes a umversal approach to what is in modern philosophy, with which
another, more original approach is covered up.
HEIDEGCER: From this it follows once again that we may not interpret Heraclitus from a latcr time.
FINK: All the concepts that arise in the disputc ovcr idealism and
I:calism arc insufficient 10 characterize the shining-forth, the coming.
fO.l'lh.. t?-ap~arallce, of what is. It seems 10 me more propitious to speak
of .sl~mlllg-f~rth thall of shinillgup. For .....e arc easily led by the idea of
shmll1g-up mlo thinking as if ..... h:lI is already were. and werc subsequently illuminated. ),T)OEla would thell be only an elicillltioll of ..... hat
~llread)' is in a light. Ho.....ever. the light, asl.V..T)BEl(l and lire, is productivc
111 it sense still unknO\\'1l to us. We know onl), Ihis much. that the "prodU~ifivit)'''of lire is ncither a making nor;1 generative bringing-fOl1.h nor
an Impotent casting of light.

86

87

HEIDI::GGER: One could then S<I)' that coming-forth-to-appearance is

neither cytI;Q [creation] nor illumillotio (illuminationl nor constitution .
FINK:
nor 'ttxv'l as bringing forth. For YExvrJ is the bringingforth of a specific rOml Olll orthe substratum of an available, though not
manufactured, malcl"ial ...
HElln:CGER: ... in distinction 10 crtaliQ ...
FINK: ........ hich brings-forth living creatures. Wc must thus bracket
QUI an entire caialog of cUlTent wa),s of thinking in order nOI to think
corning-fonh-Io-appearance in an inappropriate manner. But such a
procedure has onl)' the character of a via 'iegationis [way of negation),
and does not lead a step nearer to an understanding of what the
shining-fonh of to. navta or Qvm in the ht of fire. sun or wyO;; means.
HEII>EGGER: Coming-forth-to-appearance concerns a general reference ...
FINK: ... the puzzling referencc of lv and n6.vta. This reference is
puzzling because the ho never occurs among to. navra. to. n6.vta means
all of what is. But what kiud of allness is thal? We know relative, specific
allness like that of genus and species. For example, we think an aUness of
species in the concept "all living things." to. navra, however, form no
relative allness, but rather the allness of everything which is_ Yetlv does
not fall under the allness oho. n6.vta. Rather, the other way around, to.
nCrvla are housed in lv, but not-as you have once said in a lecture-like
potatoes in a sack, but rather in the sense of what is in being.
HEIDEGGER: We must ask still more closely about 'la n6.v'ta and
6vta. How should we interprct 6vta? What are to. It6.vta?
FINK: For onc thing, we could make thc attempt to enumerate
whatever there is. What is, for instance, is not just nature and her things.
We could begin an enumeratiou with the elements: sea, earth, heaven.
HEIOEGGER: The gods belong to what is.
FINK: But with that, you already refer to what is and is unphenomenal. At first, let us stay with what is phenomenal. After the elements, we
could name the things made up Oul of them. But there are not only
things of nature. Rather, there are also artificial things that we do not
come across in nature and for which there is no pattern in nalure. A
human shares in bringing-forth. A human begets a human, sal'S AristolIc. That means thal he has a part in the creative power of nature. Beside
that, a human brings fOlth artificial objects. It is an open problem
whether the Aristotelian analysis of the things manufaclured in tEXVT),
with the help of the scheme of the four causes, is a sufficient delCmlinalion of lhe artifact. 11 is <Iuestionable whether anificial things have a
random character or whether thc)' have a character of ncccssil)'. Some
time ;tgo. )'OU askcd whether there are shoes because there arc shoemak-

el's or whether there are shoemakers becduse there are shoes_ To human
Dasein bekmg such things as are bound up with Dasein's manner of
being, and those are necessary things. Alongside thcse. there arc also
luxury itcms. Also the political orders, like states, cities, settlements, la\\'s.
belong lO what is, but also idols and idc'lls. This rough overview refers to
a great man)' entities. We do not, however, know straight away how all
thal we have mentioned coincides in ils common feature of being which,
nevertheless, makes il different. But ,Ill cver morc complete overview of
all that is ....'ould never lead to uncovering lv with or alongside Ta nOvta.
Rather, understanding lv in i15 unique character in distinction to TO
navTU depends on a tQOml of our spirit.
HElot:GGu: When ....c speak of 'l0 Itavw, do we suppose Ta ovta
from the start. or is there a distinction bet.....een the two?
FINK: We think the being of what is in an inexplicit manner when
we talk about Ta l'tavta. If the being of what is is referred to explicitly, if
to. :7t6.vta arc designated as 6vt<:t, then it can mean that they stand in the
horizon of questionability, whether they are actual or supposed entities.
Images, for example, which are perceived by dxao(a [apprehension of
or by phantasms], are also entities, but they are not that which they
represent. Among things. there are grddes of being of what is. There are
possibilities of the appearance of things which exhibit themselves as
other than what they are, without this appearancc having to be seen as
subjective deception. Reneclion on water, for example. is such a phenomenon of appearance. But it is not easy to describe the manner of
being of the reflection on water. If'la l'tOvt<:t are designated as 6vta, that
can mean, on the one hand, that they have proved their quality of actual
being, and on the other hand it can mean that the being of what is should
be expressly named.
HEtDECCER: It seems to me that still another <Iuestion conceals itself
behind this onc. Are 1tavta TO Itavra in so far as they are 6vta, or are
6vta 6vt<:t in so far as they are 'la ltavra?
FINK: A decisi\'e question is now raised, in which t.....o ways of
philosophical thinking are indicated. When .....e think 6vta from OUl of to
l't6vta, we move into an explicit relation 10 the world, but without alrcady thinking of the world. But if we understand ta navra from out of
Ma, we move in an understanding of being and think toward ils wholeness. Two possible points of departurc for thinking have revealed themsdves to liS.
HEIOEGGER: You touched on thc problcm of the renection in water
and the appearance connected with it. AnOlher problem about which I
:lIn still nol clear is Ihe perception of the sunset and the Copernican
n:\'ohuion. The <Iuestion is whether the sunset is a nccessal")' representalion, or .....hether a sceing is possible for ,,-'hich the sun does not sel.

BB

B9

FINIC Pcrceplion of the SUIlSCI is the right of Ihe llai\'c1)' encoun

Lcred .....orld as against the scientific iTllcrprclation of the world. Through
cultivation and indirect knowledge, a human can come to the point
where he no longer secs what lies before his eyes. to the point. for
instance, where he no IOllger secs the sunsct as that which displa)'s il.self
immediately 10 his view. bUl displays itself only in the manner seen in
scientific explanalKlO.
HEIOEGGEk: The truth of the immediate experience of the .....orld
disappears b)' reason of the scientific interpretation of the world.
FINK: In earlier limes. two hundred years ago for instance, life was
still centered in the Ileal'by region. Information about life al thal time
came out of the neigh boring world. That has fundamentally changed
today in the age of world wide transmission of news. Hans Freyer, in his
book Theorie dts gegenwiirtigm ZtiJalttrs. describes the technical world as
an environment of surrogates. n For him, scientific knowledge of the
environment is a surrogate. I regard this description as an inappropriate
view, because in the mealllime technological things have become a new
source of human experience. Today a human exists in the omnipresente
of complete global information. The world is no longer divided into
neighboring zones, distant and more distant zones; rather, the world
that was once thus dh'ided today becomes covered over by technology
that, through iLS skilled intelligence service, makes it possible to live in
the omnipresence of all information.
HEIDEGGER: It is difficult to comprehend how the world, divided
into near and distant zones, gets covered over by the technological environment. For me. there is a breach here.
FINK: To a cenain extent, modem man lives schizophrenically.
HEIDEGGER: If we onl)' knew what this SChizophrenia meant. But
what we have said up to now is sufficient to see that we are not talking
about out of the way malleI's. The problem for us is the refer'ence of lv
and 1ttlvta. From where do we experience this reference, from 1tavta or
from lv or frOIll the to and fro in the Hegelian sense? How would you
answer this problem with reference to HeradiLUs?
FINK: The beginning of our inter'pretation of Heraditus by \\'a)' of
lightning was supposed to indicale that there is the basic experience of
the oUlbreak of thc whole. In the e\'er)'da)' manner of life. this experience is hidden. In e\'cryda)' life we are not intcreslcd in such experience.
In everyday living we do lIot expressly comport ourselves toward lhe
whole. and also not whell we knowingly pellctr<uc into the distanl Milky
Wa)', Hut a human has the possibility of lelling become explicit that
implicit relationship 10 the whole as which relationship he alw;l)'s already
exists. He exists essentially as a relationship to being. to thc wholc_ For
the 1lI0st pari. howe",r. this relationship stagnates. III ~ealing with the
thinker J-!eraclitlls" one can pt:J:haps tome_t!>, such :Ill experience in

which thc....whQlc-, IQ which we alwa)'s already implicitly comport ourselves, suddenly' nashes ~
HEll>ECGER: Thereby wc turn our questioning to the refcrence of
fv and its many forms, :lIld to its inner reference to 'la 1tavta. It is always
:t difficulty for me that too little is said about 1:0. 1t6.vta in the text of
He.dclillls_ We an~ forced to supplement .....hat we do not learn about'tb.
;uivta from Heraditus with what we know about the Creek world, and
perhaps .....e let 'to. navla be expressed by the poets,
FINK: I said that wc still do 110t have the possibility of declaring what
lhe coming.forth-to-appearance of tamIvta is in the always living fire.
In order to investigate this problem further. we cite Fr. 76, which appears to be one of the least cenain fragments. There are more versions
of it in which a turning (1:Q01t~) is thought. The Greek text handed down
by Maximus Tyrius runs: t'i 1tUQ 'tov yiis 9<.tvawv xai. UllP tii tOY :rruQb<;
9tlva1:ov, MwQ tii "[OY aeQOS 6avmov, yii 'tQv \1&1"[<><;. Diels translates:
"Fire lives the death of earth, and air lives the death of fire: water lives
the dcath of ail", and the eanh that of wat.er (?)."
What is surprising in the fragment is that the turning of eanh into fire
is mentioned in the formula: to live the death of something else. What is
disconcening is not so much the talk of arising and binh, but rather the
pronouncement that fire lives the death of eanh. air lives the death of
fire, water li\'es the death of air, and eanh lives the death of water. The
most imponant thing seems to me to be that the annihilation of what
precedes is the birth and arising of what follows. What follows comes
fOl'lh in that it lives the death of what precedes. The fall of what precedes appears to be the .....ay on which the ne..... and other comes fonh. It
is not. thereby. a question of a superiority of annihilation O\'er what is
arising, That is of signirw:ance. because later when .....e consider in greater
detail the formula. "to li\'c the dC:lth of something other," we will nOt be
able to say that it is tt malleI' of a circular argument. For life turns illlo
death. but death does IlOt tUI'll illlo life.
In Fr. 76, il says that the death of what precedes is the life of what
follows. An amendment that Tocco (Studi Ital. IV 5) has made in the
text .....hkh is handed down by Maximus and which makes the relationship ambiguous. runs: Fire li\"es the death of air and ;Iir li\'es the death of
fire. Water Iivcs the de;lIh of earth. earth lives the death of water. Here
lhe connections of firc and air and water and earth arc positcd as mutual
rclations. In the comments of Dicls-Kranz wc I'ead that 611(1 [air] is prcsumabl)' sllluggled in b)' the stoics. The following is given as a further
\'ari:lIlt from this: Fire leaves the death of water, waleI' lives the death of
fire 01' the dealh of earth. earth lives the death of water. We have 110
familiar phenomena of'l change O\'er of elements. When sea and earth
are talkcd about, it is a matter of c1emems on a large scale. :1 mallCI" of
t.hc world regions. If \\'aler is mCllliolled, howcver. it is not dear whcther

90

91

the sea is also meant. In Fr. 76. a revolut ion of fire, air, walCl', and
c;:trlh
is perhap s mentto nt.'.<l. The overtu rnings mentio ned here cannot
<Iuite
be followe d throug h by us.
In this connec tion. we look at Fr. 36: 'Vu;(1jOLV etrvatrn; ubwQ yEVt06
ut,
Ubo:n El. 8avmo ; yiiv yev08 0l, X Yii~ bE MWQ ylVtUl. l; ul)crto; be
~UX'\. Dicls transla tes: 'It is death for souls to becom e ",'ateI',
but for
water. death to becom e earth. But OUI of eanh comes water, and
out of
watcr comes soul." The turnov er is here named with the hard
and
obscur e word, YEvEalS [to become ]. The issuanc e and the hard change
of
soul over into water. of watcr into eart.h. of earth into water,
of ,",'OIler
into soul, do not allow the idea thal the same origina l substan
ce lies
behind its transub stantia tions. The fragme nt mentio ns ytVEo8
ut and
yiv'tal and the hard word tx [out of). We must ask ourselv es whethe
r b,
in the sense of the issuanc e of someth ing is also to be unders tood
in the
sense of the whenc e or else in the sense of the Aristot elian tl; ou
[out of
itselfl. as that which lies at the base and would change over in a ~atk>).
fJ
Ichang e]. At first, it is strikin g that in Fr. 36 the four elemen ts
are not
clarifie d more, Rather , 'l1uXa{ (souls) are mentio ned. What could
'l1\JXCl(
be? What is though t by 'l1UXa(? Do we abando n .the appare nt
way of
alterna ting change over of elemen ts when the rubnc ~uXa( now emerg
es
in issuanc e and passag e? I am of the opinio n that the soul in the
sense of
the human solll is not primar ily meant by 'i'UxaC An elemen t of
endow ment with conscio usness does not enter into the activit), of the elemen
ts
with 'l1uxaL
Perhap s we can ascerta in this in a referen ce to Fr.
,*~xii?llt~lv ii
6aVQlov ilyQilol yEVEa6m. The second part runs: 1;,Tl" ~!J.a~ lOV
b,ElVWV
6Q.vmo v xa1 l;1)v b,t(va; ; lOV lI~QOV 6Qva1ov. Diels' transla
tion is: "For
souls it is desire or (?) death to becom e wet. We live the death
of those
souls and they live our death: ' When it says that we live the death
of the
souls and that the souls live our death, when, in other words, the
souls
stand in relatio nship to us so that they live our death and vice versa,
th.en
they cannot easily be identif ied as human s. But we also have no
motl\'e
for determ ining 1puxaL We could at first only say that a new
though t
motif in the tuming of fire appear s with 1puXaC
HElIlEGGER: The difficu lty here is that onc does not know where
the matter under consid eration belong s. and where it has its
place in
HeraclilUs' though t.
FINK: I have taken up this fl-agmelll Ix.G1Use the formul a, "to ,
live
the death of someth ing," also occurs in it, e\'cn though we still
d~ ~lOt
knO\,: who or what lives death i1S lpUXaL This strange . most Slll'pnS
lllg
fOl"lIlula must be though t explicil.!y by us. jfwe wish to keep aw'I)'
fr?1ll
pure ideas of Chellli c:lltran smutilt ioll, lhe &AAolWOli; and thc cmana
llon
of the tm'm; of fire.
Wc turn to a first consid er.niol l uf Fr. 62: aOo.V(ll:Ol Ovtl10i.. 9vtl'lOi

?7:

aOOVQ10l, l;wVlE~ lOY txELvWV 66.vUlov, lOY bt tXlvWV 13Lov l9vtwn

:~.
Diels transla tes: "Immo rtal: mortal . mortal : immon al, for the
life of
these is the death of those, and the life of those is the death of
these."
Herad itus speaks here in a shol"l. tightly worded way. Here we have
the
formul a. "to live the death of someth ing other: ' in a special way_
DielsKranz separa te the "immo rtal mOl1at"' and "morta l immortal," each
time
with a colon. One could suppos e that in one instanc e it is a matter
of a
determ ination of 9vtll:o{ [morta ls] and in the other a determ ination
of
&66.V010l [immo rtals]. In the first case lt86.va1ol would ~ the
subject
and 9vTl10( the predica te; in the second case 9vTllO{ would be the
subject
and ltOava1:01 the predica te, Does it mean that there are immor
tal
Illortals and mortal immor tals? Docsn 'tthe phrase contrad ict itself?
Or is
a relatio nship of the immOl1als to the mortal s though t here, a relatio
nship which is fixed by their being placed tOI:.'Cther?
HEIDEGGER: It is notewo rthy that 6vr(10{ stands betwee n
the
lt6aVQ1ol.
FINK: Do you take o.8avUlol as the subject of the sentenc e? One
could ask what kind of a distinc tion is though t in o.6ava10l and
9vrrtoi?
A simple answer ",'Quid be that o.8ava dl;lv {to be monal ] is the negatio
n
of 86.va'lO~ [death] .
HEIDEGGER: How is 6ava"to~ to be determ ined in referen ce to what
,",'C have .said up to this point?
FtNK: We cannot give such a determ ination )'et. becaus e we ha\'c
mo\'ed till now in the domai n of "tll1to:vtQ in referen ce to JrUQ tidl;wo
v.
Perhap s onc could view death from 6.t{~wov, if onc thinks it as thc
always
living, in contra st to the experi ence that evcl1' li\'ing thing is finite,
But it
is diffICult to think the tidl;wo v,
HEIDEGGER: Don't we learn from Fr. 76 that 66.vato ; is distinguishe d in contra sl to YVEOl~?
FINK: There it is said that throug h the death of onc, anothe r comes
forth.
lh:II)EGGER: Does e(rv(no~ mean Ql6oQ(l?
FIN": I regard this identif ication as doubtf ul. Death and life arc
not
nOl'mally referre d to fire. air, water, and earth. in any CilSC so long
asone
does nOI unders tand firc in the sense of Hel'<Ic1itus, Looked .11 from
the
phenom enon, we speak of life and death only in lhe domain of
living
Ihings. In rcfcrcm ;e to the domain of what is lifeless, we could speak
only
in :t figurat ive sellse of death and life.
Hut let us remain at firSI with Fr. 62, in which 0.86.V(l101 and
OVT(lO{ are
mentio ned, We could say thal the immon als arc the gods. and
that the
lIIortals arc human s, The gods arc not deathle ss in the sense
of an
U-/)/11Iilll1U (alpha- priv'Hi vej. They are not ullrela
tcd to thc fate of death.
Ralhcl". Ihey are in a certain W:lY referre d to Ihe death of
mortal s
throug h thc re,'el'Se re1'llion tu death, from which the)' arc
f1't.'C. As

93
coobsen'crs, the gods ha\'e a reOlltion to death. which relation we can S..l y
though not comprehend, Their re\'crse relation to death has only the
character of exclusion, As 66ltvatOl, the gods ha\'e a relation to monals.
which relation appears in thc form that the life of the immortals is the
death of monals. We are accustomed to undel"Sl<lllding life and death in
hard opposition. the hardness of which cannot be surpassed. The oppo.
sition or lire and death is not the same as that of wann and cold, or of
young and old. In the oppositions familiar to us, there ilre transitions.
for example. the transition of being wann to being cold, and the transition of being young into bcingold, Still, t:lkcll strictly. thcrc is no transi.
tion of being warlll into being cold, Rather, that which ,11 first has a sharc
in being warm maintains a share in bcing cold. Also. being young does
not turn. strictly speaking, into being old. Rather, that which ,It first is
)'oung turns into something old. becomes old. Such transitions are in
pan reversible. so that they can return their course, and in pan one way
and in"eversiblc. What at first has a share in being warm and then turns
cold can also turn again into being warm. Howe\'er. what is first young
and then old cannot become )'oung again, In Fr. 6;, whidLsars that god
is daynight. wintersummer, war peace, satiety.hunger, Heraclitus
names different oppositions t.hat are familiar to us; however, they all
have a character fundamentally other than the opposition of life and
death. Is the juxtaposition of life and death in any way still measurable
and compamblc to the juxlapositions familiar to us? In the phenomenon, thc fall of living things into death is irrcvocable .lIld final. Truc, il is
hoped in myth .lIld religion that a new life awaits us after death, and lhat
death is only an entrance door. This postmortal life is nOI the same life as
the pl"emortallife here on eanh. But it is questionablc whether talk of
"afterwards" and "previously" continues to ha\'e any sense hel'e al all.
Evidently. there is exprcssed in this only a perspective of Ihose who are
living and who fill the no-man's-Iand with ideas of a life to be hoped for.
With familiar oppositKms. which wc know and which have transitions,
we find a going underof one into another and. roughly, the binh of the
warlll out of the cold and of the cold out of the warm. But do we also
find in the phenomenon a binh of life OUI of death? Clearly not. The
birth of whm lives is an issue out of the union of the two sexes. The ncw
life is bom out of a special inlensity of being alive. Thercby, we do not
necd to share Ihe same view with Arislotle. that the new life is already
preformed as a seed in thc parents, and that birth is thcll only the
CtIJ...o(W(J~ or <I still germinal kind of being into a developcd kind of
being, BUI could \<I'C im,lgine hO\<l' life and dealh are intcl1wined, and
indeed nUl in thc scnsc lhatlifc turns illlodcath, but in the sense that lilt.'
transition is thought as "10 livc the dc'lth of somcthingother"? That does
not mcan: 10 come OUl of dealh into life. Let us begin \~'ith Ihe form of

speech. We ,1I'e accustomed to s<1)'ing that life li\'cs. that death dies. Thai
is not meant in the sense of a I'edundanl manner of expression, For we
could say thal the individual dics his or rather anOlher's death. or rather
that the individual li\'es his life in his separation against the alienation
that each one experiences from the practices and institutions and the
social situation, In such formulations the refel'ence of an intransitive
verb to an inner accusati,'e is at once familiar to liS.
HEIDEGGER; In order to clarify the inner accusative that you name,
wc could think about Hegel's speculative sentence. Hegel gives the
cxample: "Cod is being," Al first. it appears 10 be a normal declal'<lIive
senlence in which God is Ihe subject and "being" is Ihe predicatc. If this
sentence is comprehended as a speculative sentence, however. then the
distinction of subject and predicate is cancelled in that the subject turns
into the predicate, God disappears in being; being is what God is. In the
speculati\'e sentence, "God is being," the "is" has a transiti\'e character:
ipmm eSSLest deus (being itself is God], This relationship of the speculative
sentence is nc\'enheless only a remote, risky analogy to the problem that
now occupies us.
FINK: But "God is being," thought speculative1y. is a cenain analogy
only to the fonnula, "to live life," but not to the other foromla, "to live
the death of something other:' Here "to live" is not referred to life, but
to something that appears to be the contrary,
HEIDEGGER: But the qucstion is what "death" means here. We do
not know which opposition is thought between life and death.
FINK: Thal depends on the conception of whcther death is the process of dying, of becoming dead, or completed death. This distinction
makes the pl"Oblem still more difficult.
HEIDE('.GER; What is astonishing is that the matter that is so estranging to us appears to be so glibly .said by Heraclitus.
FISK; What Heraditus says here about life and death is in general
most estranging. If we represelll the Slate of affairs s)'mmetrically, t.hen
we could not ani)' sa)' thal the immortals live Ihe death of the mortals.
but we could also ask whether there is a transitive dying of something.
The entanglcment of life and death has ils place only on the const,mt
foundation of life. That pl"et:ludes a verbal dying,
HEfOUlCJ;R: If tdtvEWtE~ is 10 be understood in the presem. then
Hcraclilus I\'ollld say that the)' die the life of those,
FISK: Thus seen. the mattcr to be thought hy us becomes stilt more
complkalcd. It would not onl)' bc a malleI' of "to livc the dcath of
~llIethillgolher." but also a m'Hler of the COllll"al"}' course in a Iransitivc
d)'ing. t;,Wvt~ mcans 10 livc anothcr's death, whercas T(&vciItE~ mcans
being dead. If we make the transition from life and dC'lth to bcing alive
and being dead. wc mUSI ask what"being" actually means in reference 10

94

95

Is being dead a manner of being? .I\n act is memioned in l;.OWtEl;:

Il\'lng the death of those. That corresponds to the fannula of Fr. ;6: Fire
li\'cs the death of eal1h.
HEIDECCER: In order 10 c1arif)' UDvEWtEi;, understood in the acti\'c
sense, .we are reminded of Rilkc's phrase. "to achic\'c death:' BlII the
question is whether UDvEWUli I"CfeTS to an active dying in the presenl or
to being de'ld (finished) in the perfect.
FINK: DyinR in the present is the end phase of life. What is questionable is who or \..hat lives or dies. In the phrase 6.06.vU10L 9vT]lO( it is
not decided ..... hether o.6avatm is a predicative dcLCrmimHion of OV'lto(
or, conversely. whether 9vTJtOL is a predic.'l.li\'c determination of o.86.valOL.
At first, the immorlals and the lIlorlals are confronted wilh one another
and ticd up with onc another ...
HEIDEGGER: ... and aftcr Ihlll follows the illustration.
FINK: The phrase a8aVatOl 8vrrto( is no enumeration. For in that
case, the reverse formulation would not be possible. We see that the
immortals and the mortals stand in a relation. The concept ofthe gods is
ulllouched by death and ne\'enheless we conj(.'Cture a relationship to
death. For it is said: while they li\'e the death of those. To what does this
phrase refer? What is the subject of l;wvu~? Is it the immortals or the
mortals? And what is the subject of'tE9vEwu~?The gods live the death of
humans. The gods are spectators and witnesses who accept the death of
humans as offcrings.
HElDEGm:R: And humans dic the lifc of the gods.
FINI':: Let LIS also include Fr. 88: taut6 t lVl twv xal t6vTlxO~ xal
(to) tyQllyQQO~ xat xa8Eilbov xat vtOV xat Y'lQQl6v' tube YUQ
~cmE06Vla ExElva fon xaxElva n6).lv ~cmE06vta taUta. Diels translates: "And it is always olle and the SClmc, what dwells (?) within us: living
and dead and waking and slCt'ping and )'oung and old. For this is
changed over to thal and tlmt ch'lIlges back o\'cr to this:' When Hcraditus says tauto t Vt l;Uw xai t.E6vrlx6~, is li\'ing and d)'ing or being
dcad., .
HEIOEGGEM: ... or being lIble to die meant?
FIN",: Iflhe living lInd Ihe dc'ld are paralleled with the waking and
slccping. thc young and old,lhcn 110 ability is mcant. Waking and sleeping, as altcrnating states. arc thc most altcl'I1ating fOl'lllS of the cuurse of
human life. Beillg young and bcing old arc the inilial and final times of
the human course of life. The relation of waking and slecp, and of
),oung and old, ar(' ccrtain parallels to lhe relatiollShip of life and death.
The relatiollship of life and dealh Ix:comes still mort: complicatcd by
Ihem .. , .
11t:1I)t;l~(;t:R: ... because the kind of Ihe three diSlinctions is quite
diffcrent.
FISK: Living and d)'ing arc onc and Ihc same; wilking and slt."t:ping

al'e the same; young and old arc thc ~me_ He'dclitus declares the sameness of what seems 10 be different. How is '[aim.} {the same] to be understood here?
HEIDEGGER: We could understand il as "belonging together:FINK: Indeed. each pair. living and d}'ing, waking and sleeping,
young and old, belongs togcther. BUI ho...., do living and dying, for
example, belong together in a "samc"?
H[ID[GGER: In referencc to what is same.
FINK: If being alive and being dead arc the S<"lmc, Ihen they form a
samencss thal hidcs itself. The distinctness of life and death becomes
clear for the most part when they are positcd as analogous to the former
two relationships. Sleeping and waking, as well as being young and being
old are familiar differences to us, which are referred to the course of
lime of our lives. Waking and sleeping are alternating states in the
course of time, being young and being old are two distinctive phases in
the course of time of our lives. Against that, life and death is a relationship of the entire lifetime to something that overshado.....s it but that does
nOI occur in the lifetime.
is the saying of the thinker Heraditus a slap in the face to the currelll
opinion that insists on the distinctness of life and death as well as on the
difference between waking and sleep, being )'oung and being old? Is it a
mallcr of directing thc thrust of his thinking against the trend toward a
world that is divided up in differences. and doing so with respect la a
sameness? This would not mean that phenomena would loose their distinctions; rather, it would mean lhat they are taut6 in relation to lv.
I-Icraclitus says lhal being alive-bcing dcad, waking-sleeping, and
being young-bcing old. are the same. I-Ie does nOI say, as Diels-Kranz
lranslate and therewith interpret: "the S<"lme which dwells in us:' ft~iv
(us] is added to lvl {within] by Dids, It is precisely queSlionable whether
we are the place or the sameness of greal oppositions of life and death or
whether the place of sameness must not rather be sought in lv. to which
humans compon themselves and ...., hich they thus resemble in a certain
sense. Certainly it is at first a mattcr of a dictlltorial assenion that the
Ih,jng and thc dead ......aking and sleeping. the roung and Ihe old. are thc
same. It is nOt said that lhe three opposing pilirs of oppositcs are the
same. blll mtller' Hcraditus names thrc.:c opposit.ions lhat stand in :I
specified cOlTcspondencc and he thinks the l:aut6 in .-clation to each onc
or the oppositions, Thc lifetimc forms the COJllmon basis for the
t,h,n.:diAd opposites. Thc cllIire lifctime is confined by death. Within
hie, slecp is the analog to dc.lIlt, being old has a spccific refercnce 10
~Ica~h. and waking and bcing young arc most relaled to being alive. But
IJ1 fr. 88. there is no melllion of lifc and dcath. bUl of .....hat is ali\'c and
\\'hat is dead. nUl ho\\' are the expressions "Ihe Ih'illg" and -thc dead"to
be undcrsl,ood? If .....c S;l)' the jusl ('to c5lXUlOV) and Ihe be<tutiful (to

~c~th.

96
xol.6v), then do we mean what isjuSI or beingjusl. what is beautiful or

being beautiful?
HEIOEGGER: Your intcrpreL:lIion thus goes in Ihe direction not of
understanding the three distinctions as three cases of a species, but
rather in the direction of classifying the three distinctions in reference to
the phenomenon of time ...
FIN"; ... and thus toward constructing an analogical relationship.
Here it is nOI a question of fixed distinctions. Nevertheless. we are concerned with differences Ihal form distinctions. Being alive and being
dead do nol stand in a gradual relationship 10 one another, because

being dead does not allow of degrees. As against that, we are accustomed
10

intensifying being alive. and to distinguishing inert and high fonns of

lifc.perfonnance. Waking and sleep, however, turn almost unnoticeably

inlo one another. Life and death do not form an opposition like beautiful and ugly, nor is their distinction one of degree. The nature of their
being differelll is t,he problcm. As soon as we attempt to be clear about
the all-too-familiar dialectical interpenetration the questionable character of the text disappears. If we start from the fact that each analogy is a
likeness of what is unlike, then we could say that sleeping and waking, as
well as being old and being young. relate in a certain sense to being dead
and being alive. Perhaps it is a comparison all too full of hope. nevertheless, when we call sleep the brother of death and when we regard sleep as
an in-between phenomenon, Also, regarding the question about the
sense of the fomula. "to live the death of something," the tying together
of life and death is the strange thing in the trdnsitive use of "to live." It is
a matter of interpretation whether the current model can also be
applied: so that we not only say that death lives, but also that life dies,
We came to no result, and perhaps we will come to no-final result at all,
But the all too familiar explication of l"QOm'( has \\'andered imo the
foreignness and darkness of the fonnula, "to live the death of something:' We could perhaps think the relationship of fire to earth, to air,
and 10 water rather in refe..ence to life and death. so that. with refe..ence
to the diflicult relalionship of tension of life and death, we could come to
a ccl'tain alllhropological key for the non anthropological foundational
relaledness of lv and navta.

9
Immortal: Mortal (Fragmem 62),Ev to ooq:>6v (Correlated Fragments: 32. 90),

FISK: Mr. Heidegger cannot come toda) since he is prevenled b), an

important trip. He asks us. howe\'er, to cOlllinue explication of the text,
S(} that we make some further progress in our interpretation of the
fragments. By means of the summary, he will infonn himself about the
progress of this session in order then 10 express an opinion.
Let us bring to mind the way of Ihought. better. the giSI of open
qucstionabilities, th:lt has led us in the last session, We started out from
the problem of the transfomlations of fire with the question whether the
change of an original stuff is thereby thought, or whether a rel:ltedness
of ~v and 1tavta is aimed at. Finally. wc arrived in Fr. 76 al the dark
formula, diflicuh to comprehend, that something lives lhe death of
anOlher, This formula is then used in Fr. 62 as a mark orthe relationship
of immortals to mortals, or monals to immOl1als. Is it only a manel' here
of another domain for Ihe employment of the problematic formula. "to
li\'e the death of something"? Is the formula also meant here in the
fundamental breadth, as we have leal'llcd it in Fr. 76 in the relationship
of the elements, fire. air, water, and eanh? Is il a maner of cosmological
references. or of cosmological coumerrefel'ences in so far as the for
mula is here applied to things that stand open in a special manner to the
whole. thal is, to gods and humans? Is the above mentioned fannula
applied here to cosmological living beings? Perhaps that happens. because the relarioflShip of immortal to m011.31 is analogous to the reference of b' in Ihe forl11 of lightning, of sun, and of fire, to the ltclvto. Is
lhe fundamental relaledncss, e\'er disconcerting 10 us, of fv and ltavto
rather s.ayable froUl OUI of its renection? Is the world-relatedness of fv
and llavtO I":lther sayable from out of the relalionship of gods and humans ,.. ho understand being? With this, the palh of our problem situa
lion is first of all indicated, Let us now attempt to c1arif)' the SlrUctlll'C of
FI', 62, For we cannOt s,a)' that its structure has become dear and distinct
OIl this Ix)int.
The.: fragmellt rllIlS: lt8o.vatOL 8vtltOl, OvtltOL ltOaVo.tOL, ~Wvtf.S tOY
hE(VWV 6avatov, tOv bE ExElVWV l3(ov U8vEWtES' Vie could translale.
"Immortal: moria!, mortal: illlmol1al." Dicls Ihereby brings imlllonals
into a relationship 10 lIlonals and mortals inlO a refe,encc 10 immortals.
In addition. Ihis relationship is explained b}' the dilrk pl"Oblcm-formula
that Dids translates as follows: "fOlthe life oflhesc is lhe death of those,
and the life oflhosc is Ihe death ofthcsc." This lranslalion appears to me

98

99

to be too fn..-e. For it does sa}': l;wvw; tOv txdvwv Oo.VQtov. n)v bE
ooivrov ~(ov lE9vEtlnE;;, "in that they live the death of those and in that
they die the life of those," If \\'C interpret ci9avQWl ill the familiar sense
as gods and 9vt)to( as humans. then it is a matter of an interpreti\'c step
that we cannot assert with unconditioned certainty. To be sure, the immortals arc the gods in Greek myth. But there are also intermediate
beings, the heroes. who are bom as mortal. half gods, and are elevated lo
become immortals. Is the milieu of immortals and mortals familiar with
reliability and certainty? The problem is what is indicated by ltOavatOL
and 9vrjtoC But first wc take up the mythological meaning, and comprehend the immortals as the gods and the mortals as humans.
The gods are also characterized in Fr. 62 from out of death. True,
immortals are indeed removed from death. They are not delivered over
to death, but they stand open to it. As immortals they must know themsel\'es as the ones who win their ~If-understandingin the neg-dtion of
dying. They know themseh'es as the beings who are open to death, but
who do not encounter death, the beings who obser\'e the death of hu
mans, and the beings who come to know their own permanence in tbe
sight of the passing away of trdllsient humans. The mortals are humans
who know that they are delivered over to death in reference alone to the
gods who always are and are removed from death. 9vTjto( is not some
objective designation which is spoken from an extra-human point of
view; it points. rather, to the self-understanding of humans in under
standing that they are delivered over to death, in so far as they know
themselves as morilu"i [those about to die]. Humans know themselves as
transient in view of and in reference to the everlasting gods who are
removed from death. With immortals and mortals the greatest inner
worldly distance is named between innerworldly beings. the taut bow
stretching between gods and humans who. however, 'are nevertheleS5
referred to one another in their self.understanding and understanding
of being. Mortals know their own disappearing being in view of and in
reference to the everlasting being of the gods; and the gods win their
perpetual being in contrast and in confrontation with humans who are
constantly disappearing in lime. The distinction of immortals and
martals is characterized from out of death. But this distinction is not one
like the distint.:tion between life and death itself. For. in their selfundel'st;lI1ding, the immorlals and the m01'lals live and comport themselves toward the being of the other. The "c1ationship of the g:ods to
humans is not to be equated with the relationship of the living 10 the
dead. ami )'et Ihe taut bow stretching betwccn ci6avatOlOvf)to( and
9vrjTOf-6.0avcltol is thought Ollt of the reference to life ;lI1d dealh. The
most widely stretched out distinction between gods and humans. immortals and mortals. is illlen~'illed .md is tightened together with its

opposite extreme-perhaps in an analot,"Y to the relatedness of fv ~nd

1tt'lvta.
The question which leads us is whether, with the admission of the
relationship of immortals to mortals. more than just an anthropological
due is found for indicating how the fire, the sun. the lightning, as special
lorms of lv, comport themsd\'es toward 1tavta. There is not fv and 'ta
rravta next to one another. They do not lie on the s...me plane. do not lie
on a comparable plane of the usu.11 son. but they are unique in their
rclatedness. Their relatedness can be indicated with no known relationship. lv is not among rtavta; it is not already thought when wc think 'tQ
navta strictly and include in this (!uimessence ever}'thing that is ai, all.
When we ourselves think ta rtOvta as quintessence, it is not inclusive of
lv. It remains separated from ta nCtvtQ. but not in the manner, familiar
to us. of being separated by spatial and temporal boarders or by belonging to another kind of species. All usual kinds of separation are inapplicable to the fundamental relatedness of fv and nvta. But at the same
time we must also say that the unique belonging-together of fv and
nvta, the intertwining of what is separated, must also be seen in the
unique separation of fv and ta nvta.. fv and ta 1tclvta are tightened
together in their intertwining.
Up to now we have met with a manifold of similics; for example. as in
the night, things shine up in the light-shine of the lightning flash and
show their relief, so in an original sense, the entirety of things comes
forth to appearance in the outbreaking lightshine of b, thought as
lightning. Or again: as the things that stand in sunlight shine up in their
imprint in the light of lhe sun, so the entirety of inner-worldly things
comes forth to appearance in the fv thought as sunlight. Here, things do
not come forth side by side with the sunlight, but the sunlight surrounds
the things and is thus separ.l.ted from them and at the same time bound
with them in Ihe manner of an including light. Just so. lhere is also an
entirety of the many 'tu rtUvta. not side by side with the light of shiningfonh; rdther. the light of shining-forth envelops the entirety of nOvta
and is "sep:umed" from it and "bound" with it in a manner difficult to
comprehend. which we could probably best darif)' for ourseh'es in coml>arison with the all-cmbracing light. Are immortals and mol'tals no.....
also refen'ed 10 each other like Ev and to. nCtvtQ ~'ith their gre.ltest
separation? Thereby we undcrstand the immortals as Ihose who know
t heir own perpetual being only 011 the background of the temporal perishing of humans. And we understand the morlals as humans who only
know their transient beillg by having a relalionship to the immortals ..... ho
al.....ays arc and \\'ho know their pcqx:tual being. \Ve could read ciOavQ'tOl
&v1]'t01. Ovf)mi '6UVClTOl in 111:111)' ways; either with Dicls or else in the
following \\'ay; imlllortal mort:lls. mon,al immortals. This hard phr:t5e

100

101

appear~ 10 be self-contradictory. But one does nOI go especially far off

base with a paradoxical concepl of immortal mortals and mOl1al immonals. The gods li,-c the dCalh of mortal humans.
Does that mean thatlhe life orlhe gods is the slaying of humans? And

humans to themselves and 10 C\'cl"),thing around thclIl. Thus we understand "to live the death of humans" and "la die the life of the gods" as a
reciprocal. imel"twining relationshil) of the self-understanding and
understanding of being of gods and humans. The gods li\'e the death of
humans in the sense that they could only understand themselves as
immortals in their perpetual being against the background of what is
Iransiem. They are only perpetual when, at the s.1me time, they are
referred to the sphere of change in time.
According to Fr. 62, gods and humans behave p"ccisely not as in
Holderlin's poem, "J-1yperion's Song of Fate." "YOll walk above in the
light,1 Weightless tread a soft noor, blessed geniill Radiant the gods'
mild breezes 1 Gently play on you 1 As the girl artist's fingers IOn holy
strings. - Fateless the Heavenly breathe 1 Like an unweaned infam
asleep: 1 Chastely presen'ed Iln modest bud 1 For ever their mindsl Are
in nower I And their blissful eyes I Eternally tranquil gaze,1 Eternally
clear. - But we are fated 1 to find no foothold, no rest, I And suffering
mortalsl Dwindle and fall I Headlong from onel Hour to the next. 1
Hurled like water I From ledge to ledge I Do\\'nward for years to the
\'ague abyss."tI Here the domain of the gods and the domain of humans
are separated like two spheres that do not imenwine with each other, but
lie opposite one another without mutual reference. High above in the
light, the gods wander without destiny, their spirit eternally in bloom,
while humans lead a restless life and fall into Ihe cataract of time and
disappear. The wa)' in which Holderlin here views the eternal life of the
gods indicates that the view of monals does notllecessarily belong 10 thc
self-understanding of the gods. But if gods and humans do not form two
separated domains, but rather 1'01'01 two domains turned toward each
other, then we could apply the intertwining relalionship to the beginning of Fr. 62, which ties mortals and immortals together \\'ith each
other in a hard manner.
P... RTlC1P"ST: The tying together of the gods' perpetual being and
the being of humans wandering in time has ils analogy in Goethe's
thought of perdurance in oscillation [Dau~T im Wuh.sefJ.
FINK: There is, ho.....ever. a perdurance as constancy in time. Kant,
fol' cxanlple_ thought the continuation of the '....orld stuff in rough I)' this
manner.
PAItTlCIl... NT; Gocthc's thought of pcrdurance in oscillation does
1IOt mean constancy in time. but gl)es in the dil'ection of HeraclilllS'
thoughts.
FINK: Still, wc would first have to kno..... to ..... hich passage of
Goethe's you refer. FOT'lhere is also perdm,Hlce that stands IhlUughout
uscillation like, for example, Ihe world stuff of Kilnl, which does not
itself pass away or come inlO being, but only appears ,IS diffcrelll. Thus,
however, wc think the relationship bct\\'cen substance and its alllibutcs.

on the other side. do humans die the life of the gods? Neither could ~'e
connect an)' correct sense wilh this rcndiliOI1. I would, therefore. r,lIhcr
believe that l,he following suggests ilSClf. T~le gods live in comp:.ring
themselves with monal humans who experience death. They live the
death of mortals in that, in theiJ self-understanding :md their understanding of being. they hold themselves over against the transience of
humans and the all-too-finite manner in which humans understand what
is. But it is more difficult if we ask ourselves how we should Iranslalc l:av
6E Exe(yWv filoy U9vEWl:Ei; (in that they die the life of those]. Could we set
u:9vEWt:El; (they, having died] par-dllel to l;,<iwtEl; (those living]? But the
question is \\:h~ther the perfecl pal1iciple has the meaning of the perfect
or whether It IS 10 be translated as in the present participial form like
On:OEMiOXOVTEl; (those who are d)'ingJ. This question can only be decided
by the philologists. The life of the immortals is the death of mortals. The
gods live the deat~ of.the morlals, and the mortals die the life of the gods
or become alrophled In reference to the life of the gods. We also use Ihe
phrase: to dic a death, to live a life. In Fr. 62, howevcr, it sa)'s; to live the
death of the other, to die thc life of the other. If we wish to make clear to
ourselves what it means that the gods live the demh of humans, we could
at first rcject ~he .I"~dica~ interprctation <Iccol'ding to which the gods
would be canlllbahstlc bemgs. They do not live the death of humans in
the sense tha! they devour them. For Ihey do not need humans as food
nor, in the final analysis, do they need the offerings and pr-dyers of
humans. But \\'hat then does the formula mean; the gods live Ihe death
of humans. I am able to connCCI only one sense with this semcnce. I say
thal the gods understand themselves in their own e\'erlasting being in
e.xp~e55 refere~lce to ~01".al humans. The COI1Slam being of Ihe gods
slgmfies a persistence In \'Iew of humans' beingconSlantly delivered O\'er
to time. In this manner the gods live the death of humans. And in the
s.ame way I am able 10 connect only one sense with the semence which
says that hlll~l:lns die the life of the gods, or Ihat they atrophy in reference to the .lIfe of the gods; namely, it is thereby said that humans, by
tlnderstandlllg themselves as the ones who mnst disappear, always comport themselves toward the pCl'lnancncc that the lifc of lhe gods appears
10 us to be.
J-1u.m:ll1s d~c as thc. transiClll (lnes not only in SO rar as they sland in
assocl.'Hlon wllh Ir.JnSlenLS. '~hey are not only the oncs who mOSI dis:.tppear III the realm of what disappears, but rather the)' are OIl Ihe same
time 1IlHJc,rslandingly opt'n 10 the permanence of Ihc gods. A fundamental "elcrcncc to that which IIC\'cr IlCrishes belongs to the relalion of

102

103

PARTICIPANT: For Goelhe. perdurance constitutes itself first and

foremost in oscillation.
F1NK: That is also true in regard 10 substantial perdurance. But
HeradilU$ means precisely not that something endures in temporal
changing. For then we would have only the relationship of an original
stuff to its forms of appc;mlllcc. But that was pn~ciseJy the question.
whether the relationship of fire, sea. and earth is the relationship of a
perduring OJoiginal slUff (fire) in the oscillations of its conditions or al'
pearanccs as alien forms. or whether it is a mauer of quite another
unique distinction. All inner-worldly entities h.lVC the structure of relatively pcrduring substances with changing conditions, or lhey belong to a
unique subst<tncc as the continuous substrate that goes on and neither
passes a.....a) nor comes illlo being. If \o,'C apply this scheme of thought for
the turning ovel' of firc, then fire behaves toward sea and earth no
differently than an original stuff to its many fonns of appea'dnce. How
e\'er, we ha\'C sought after another relationship of fire to sea and earth
that pertains to the relatedness of f:v and 1tavro._ The relationship of
immortal gods and mortal humans takes on an analogous representation
for this relatedness of hand 1tavru_ Thereby, we think gods and hu
mans not only in reference to the opposition of power and fragility, but
such that gods and humans, in order to know their o\O,'n being, have to
know one another. If fv is fv to OOQl6v [the one, which alone is wiseJ, it
can only know itself in its highest opposition to t01tQvtu and at the same
time also as that which steel's and guidcs to1tavta. With this, we view a
relatedness Ilot of the kind in which a supenemporal sphere of entities
n~altes itself to a temporal sphere of things. It is not a maller of a
two-world doctl"ine of Platonic kind, but rather of a theory of thc world,
of the unity ofthc f:v and of the individual things found in the pass:.lge of
time. Whcn Goethe speaks of pcrdurance in oscillation, he means,
perhaps. the cunstancy of nature O\'er against the appearances of nature.
But he thereby finds himself in the neighborhood of the thought of an
original stuff.
l'ARTlCIPAI.rr: I cannot associate myself .....ith this conception. I am
of thc opinion that Goethe's thought of perdurance in oscillation comes
into the ncighborhood of )'our interpretation of I-Ieraditus.
FINK: In h. 30, lv is mcntioncd as 1tuQ cidtwov, which is an im
monal lirc. The immortal gods arc the analogical keepers of t.he immortal fire. In Fr. 100 it says: wQOS at 1tUvtU (pEQ<>UOI (the scasons which
bring all things). Accordingly, 1t6.VtCl. which is bruught forth by the
seasons, is thcrefore not pcrpetual, but somcthing Ihat abides in time.
From Ihcrc, lv behaves tOI..: ard TCt n:6.VU1:lS lTuQ adtwov or-since ProfcsStJr Heidegger is not presentloday. wc could dare sa)'-as IJeing itself.
Ihought ;I!'I timc, behaves towOll'd whal is dl'i\'cn in lime. temporally determined IhinKs. I did not say either thal a9aVU'T0l and 9vr)to( arc to be

identified with fv and lTavt:u, but thal they represent symbolically the
relatedness of fv and 1t6:v'Ta. Immortal and mortal are not themselves
cosmic moments that are: separated and at the same time embraced like
V and lTavru. Rather both are cosmological beings who understand the
"'hole, the gods from above and humans from below. If we want to speak
here of an analob'}', we must be clear that it is always thoroughly a matter
of similarity by means of unsimilarity, whereby the unsimilarity is al.....ays
greater. Talk about humans as imago d,i [image of God] d~~ not mcan
that a human is a mirror image of the Godhead and snmlal' to the
Godhead likc a mirror image to the original image. A human is an image
of God through the infinity of distance. Wc havc no languagc for the
purpose of addressing the relatedness of fv ~'TCt 1ta~o.. The fv ligl~ts up
to LIS only in lightning, in sun, in the seasons, 111 fire. Fire. howc\'cr, IS nOl
the phenomenal. but the un phenomenal fire, in the shine of which 'TO
lT6.vtU come forth to appearance.
Because "'e have no language to characterize thc fundamental re
latedness of f:v and 1tcXvtQ, and because we wish to keep 1tUQOS TQOlTa(
away from the traditional blunt schemes of thought, according to which
an always cxtant original stuff changes its conditions or disguises itself in
its fonns of appearance, we ha\'e staned out from Fr. 76, in which the
fundamental relatedness of fv and 1tavtu is addressed in thc formula,
"to live thc death of another." From there, we turned to Fr. 62 in which
the fOl"lnul;l, "to live the death" and "to die the life" is said, not of lire,
air, wat.er, and earth, but of immol'tals and mortals, Application of that
formula to gods and humans appears at first to stand closer to our
human powel' of comprehension, The transition from Fr. 76 to Fr. 62 is
no narrowing of a general cOSl1lological referencc to an anthroplogical.
theological relationship. The anthropological-theological relationship is
no reference of two kinds of beings, but rather the "e1ationship of ho.....
thc two different kinds of beings understand themselves and that ..... hich
is. The gods understand their own perpetual being in reference to the
death of humans. If the gods did not have before them the fall of
humans and lTavt:U into time. could the)' live their life. which is never
hroken off. in blissful self-indulgence. and could they become aware of
Iheir divinity? Could fv, which is repl'escntcd by the immortals, be by
itself without thc view of 1tclvt:a: could nuvta, which are representcd by
llTortals and their understanding of being, be wilhout knowing of the
endlcssness of 1tuQ ciEU;,WOV? I would like to repcat again that thc rela
liUIIShip of immortals to mortals is not to be equated with that of fv and
1t6.vta. I was ollly concerned to IXJinl out that one Gill find an indcx to
the relmedness of lv and lT6.V'TO in the intcrtwining rchlliollShip of gods
and humans in Iheir self-knowledge :lIld knowledgc of the olher. Thus,
il is it mattcr neither of a par.lllclnor of an anaJo&'Y in thc usual sense. All
Ihe fragments of Heldclitus' theology speak of god only likc onc could

104

speak of lv. All distinctions fall a..... ay in the god. Thereby. not only a
sublimity orthe god \'is-a-vis the other living beings isexpressed, but that
.....hich Heraditus says aboullhc god must be thought from the peculiar
analogous relationship of the god to lv 10 ao<pOv.
In Fr. 32, Herac1itus says Ihe following: lv 'to CK>qlOv IJoUvov Atyt09Ql
DUX t6EA.E1 xai tetAEl Zl\VOS 6voIJu. "The one, which alone is wise, is not
willing and yet willing to be called by the name Zeus:' In a certain
manner we could think lv in ZellS, if the surrounding lv of the whole is
also represented b)' Zeu! as the highest innerworldly being. It is important, therefore. that Hentdilus says DUX lOau (is 1101 willing] first and
then t6U..El [is willing). Only after the neg-.uion can a cenain analogical
correspondence be said of lile god and lv.

PARTICIPANT: In order to can)' out )'our imerpretation of lv, one

must understand lv in a two-fold meaning. On one hand.lv is in opposition to 'to. navtu. and on the other, fv is as the unity of opposites of lv
and nt'.tvta. One cannot posit the opposition between fv and navtu without presupposing a bridging unity between them. Perhaps I can clarify
myself by a reference to Schelling. Schelling says that the absolute is not
only the unity, but the unity of unity and of opposition. Thereby it is
meant that behind each opposition stands a bridging unity. If we wish to
avoid a two-world doctrine, then fv stands not only in opposition to 'to.
navtu. but we must think lv at the same time as bridging unity.
FINK: lv is the unity within which there first is the entirety of navta
in their manifold oppositions. You argue formally with the scheme of concepts from German idealism. that the absolute is the identit)' of identity
and nonidentit)'. This relationship can be de\'e1oped in other fashions.
Thereby. we do not. howe\er. come into the dimension of Heraclitus.
lv and navta form a unique distinction. It is better if we speak
here of distinction and not of opposition. Otherwise. we think all too
casil)' of the usual oppositions like warm-cold. male-female. and so
on. and thus of re\'crsible and irreversible oppositions. One could project here an entire logic of oppositions. Our question is directed toward
lv. We came onto its trace in departure from lightning. In the view of
natur.il science. lightning is nOlhing other than a specific elcctrical appe.lrance. But Heraclitus thinks the nonphenomcnal rising of the entirct)' of nCtvta in it. Although we have uncovered more nuances of the
lv-navta relatedness in going Ihrough various fragmenLS, we still cannOl
comprehend this relatedness complctely. After we have learned about
lhe lv in the form of lightning. lightning bolt. sun, and seasons, we also
mct ~,'ith the determination of lv as lire. Sincc we did not walll 10 comprehend J't\lpOt:; TQOnat in a blunt physiological sense .....'e had to search
for anothe, comp,'ehension.
In h. 76. we lcal'lled for the lil'st lime the formula. "to live the death
of something:' In Fr. 62. wc found the formula again as the relationship
of immonals to mortals. \Ve auempted with this forlllula uf countcr-

105

reference. i.c., "to Iivc the death of the othel'" and "to die the life of
another," to think toward thc relationship of gods and humans. Gods do
1I0t live the dealh of humans in the sense that a slaying of humans
belongs to their life. We inlerprel "to live the death of mortals" as a life
"fthe gods in sight of the beingofli\ring beings .....ho understand being in
;1 linite. temporal manner. In sight of humans who are delivered o\'er to
death and who are not sheltered b)' perpetual being. the gods understand their ad [{Vat (to be ill.....ays] and arc. as it wcre, the rrUQ tidt;,wov,
even if lhe)' are ne\'er ad in the strict sense like 1tUQ lu:it;,wov is. Ag-dinst
this. humans die the life of the gods. In under tanding of the perpetual
being of the gods, they are not allo.....ed thereby to Il<'lrtake of it. Humans
win no share of the perpetual being of thc immonals, but lhey undersland themselves and their disappearance in reference to the fact that
the gods are not delivered over to death. I auempt to give one sense to
the formulas. "to live the death of mortals" and "to die thc life of immortals," in which I interpret Ihem as the intertwining of the selfundcrstanding and understanding of being of gods and humans. This
intertwining relationship represenu the counter reference of lv. the
always living fire, and the temporall)' Iinite being of navtu in general
which are brought fonh by the seasons. The immortal gods arc thc
reflection. the innerworldl)' representations. of the al....'ays living fire as a
form of fv. In this interpretation. I see a possibility of understanding
how the gods live the death of humans. They live the death of humans
not in the sense of an encounter; rather, tlle.r-are..tefer~tothe.deathe:y
othwnan!-iIHhe..CJK.Ounter of their own perpelual being.
In thc first and second versions of"Mnemosyllc:' HOIderlill says: "For
thc hea\'enly ones are unablel To do everything. lamel>" ,be wQJ:Lals I ~
Rei!.Qu.bs.abrss. l1ms. the. echo returns I With lhem. Long is Ilhe time.
hut 1 What is true happens." That means that the gods, those who do not
stand in need. ne\'el1heless m:ed one thing. name I)' monals .....ho pass
further into lhe abyss. We have a simile of ~ to lhe n6;vra. which are
constantly driven about in time, in that .....c seC how the gods cannot. ill
their perpeluity, sclf-suflieientl)' enjoy their infinit),. and how thcy are in
need of the COli mer ,'efcrcncc 1,0 mortals. We havc a simile of lv and
navta in that .....c see how humans, drivcn about in timc. are in nced of
1he countcr reference to perpetual gods for the sake of kno..... ledge of
Iheir OWll tinitlldc. Humans and gods havc the commonalit)' that they
arc not only el'llitics in the world. but that they live in the manncI' of
understanding n:I'llionships to being. Humans understand being in a
finite way. the gods in infinitc manner. The gods excced humans not
on I)' in force gencrally. bUl in the power of their understanding of what
is. The rtUv is lllol"lal immortal. The nav is, howe\er. no coillcidmtia
opposilQrUm, no night in which all oppositions are obliterated. t6 nav is
the word in which ~ .. nd rtQvtC1 are comprehended togelher. We can
apply paradoxical phrases to it alone.

107

106

ta.

We turn now 10 Fr. 90: l'tuQ6s 'lE ltvtaJ.l.Ol~i) JtClvta xulniJQ WtavHov.
6XWOl'tEQ XQ\loou XQ1')""uta xal XQ1Uux"'{{l)V XQu06C;. Dids translates: "Al-

ternating change: of c\'crything for fire and fire ,for everythinl?' like
goods for gold and gold for goods." We appear 10 Interrupt l,he III~e ~r
interpretation with this fr.lgment. Her~ the exch~ngc relationship IS
thought. which wc could more or less thmk and which does not seem to
go along with the way that gods and humans alternately lIndcrslal~d
themselves and being. AI first the fragment seems to offer no special
difficulty. The fragmcllI speaks of an alternate coumerexchange. of a
counterrelationship. ~'here the onc is replaced by the other and enters
the place of the other. It appears that here the relationship of nUQ and
l'tvtQ is spoken of in comparison to an e\'ent in the market. W~ know a
market of natural exchange. or else in the more de\'e1oped form of the
exchange of money. in which goods. are exchan~ for money and
money for goods. The goods. as mulutude and vanety, behave toward
the single form of gold like the multitude in general behaves. to that
which is simple. but that corresponds, ne\'ertheless, to the multitude of
goods. Is this relationship also a form of the fundamenta~relatednes~ of
ho and 1tCtvto? The ho, as the most simple and all embracmg. stands m a
relatedness of opposition to 'to. 11:0:0"[0. In the fragment. \\'e read: exchange of'tClnCtvt:o for fire and of fire for Wtavto. We also understand
Wtavta here in the sense of nO:vto as in Fr. 30. in which we have con
ceivcd Q:navto not as living beings. but as s)'nonymous with 1tCtvta.
Heraclitus speaks of an alternating exchange of'tQ 1tCtvra for fire and of
fire for 'to. 1tCtvto. What we could say about the relationship of goods and
gold, ne\'ertheless. does not hold in the same way regarding the
exchange-relationship of 'to. 11:(IV[(l and fire. In reference to 'to. nCtvto
and fire, \\'e could not say that there, where the one is, the other will go.
The vendor in the market gives up the goods and I'(..-'Ceives money for
them. Where previously the goods were. mane)' comes in and, the other
way around. where the money was. goods come in.
May we comprehend the rclatedness of !v and novto so bluntly?
Clearly noL The comparison becomes clearer, if~.e do not take gO,ld only
as a specific coinage. as a form of gold, but I1 wc rather notl~e th,e
\ glimmer of gold which is a symbol of the sunny. Then the sunny. lllunuHated gold behavcs 10 lhe goods like h to to. 1to.vtO and. thc oth~r \\''',y
around, 'to. Jro.vtO behaves IOwaI'd &v like the goods to the SUllny. IlIuml-,
natcd gold. The glimmer of g'old suggests thou it is 1I0t ;.1 question here 01
any simile rOll please. in which wc could replace gold \\'Ilh money. In our
simile it is lcss a malleI" of alternate exchange of real and IOken valucs;
rather. it is a matter of Ihe rel,lIionship of the glimmer of gold to goods.
Tht.' gold stands for Ihe glimmcr of li,'c of rrUQ udtwov. the goods IQI' 'tQ
no.vta. The JriiQ ltEitwov and 'to. J((lvta in their relationship of exchange
could nUL intelligibly be direcliy expressed. LikcI\'isc, the simile of gold

and goods in their relationship of exch.mge will ultimately ,fail. Nc:ver.

thcless, the relatedness of JtUQ UE(twav (0-) and nCtvta receives a direction thl"Ough the failure of that simile.
If one thinks here of the lXJtuQWOlfi-doctrine. then one must charac
terize the relationship of tr.msposition as follows: in place of 11:CtvtO, fire
steps in and-what blOx6ol!'lOlfi (ordcringl is about-in p,lace ~f fire 'tQ
JrOvtO step in, In this case. wc would unde~stan~ the relationship of fire
and 'tu nCtvto in a strict analOg)' to the relationship of gold and goods, In
the sense of the lx.."riIQWOlfi-doctrine, in the rigid st)'le of the StoOl. one
could say that no.vto disappears in the !xnuQWOl; of fire, and in the
bLox6oll'lo~ the fire turns into 'to. JrCtvta. But in that case v.-e declare the
fundamental structure of a perpetual happening to be a temporal process.
The diffICulty we are confronted with in the simile of ~'c:t a,:,d ~oods
in alternating relationship consists in the fact that the Simile mdlCates
something essential in the relationship of 1tUQ 6U;,tooV and ~Ctvt(l, but
that as soon as we adopt it and comprehend it in a strict sense. It does not
sound right any longer. The JriiQ 6(ttoov as a form of fv is in a constant
reference to '[0. nCtvto. just as th~ gods stand in a constant reference to
humans. This constant referencr gru 'ost, if we wish to understand the
relationship of the eternal living fire to l'tCtvtO ~n terms ~f the
lxmJQWOv;-docuine. radically comprehended. The Dlels translatlon of
'to. l'tclvrO and MtYvtlU'V with "the all" is questionable. 11 points in the
direction of the t,xnUQWOlfi, Heraclitus. however. does not say 't6 nclv or
'tOil Jr<lvt6;, but '[a novto and MCtvtlU'V (nCtvtrov). to. nCtvto. however, \
apply to the entirety of entities. The exchange of fire into 'tQ. JrCtvro and
of 'to. l'tCtvra into fire beha\'es analogously 1.0 the alternate exchange of
the glimmering gold into goods and of goods into glimmering fire of \
gold.
. .
The question that we must first leave open is the characte~zatlon of
the l'e1atedness of fv and Jro.vtO as a relatedness of transmutation. When
we try to illustrate the rclatedness of ~v and nclvra by the exa.mple of ~hc
market. certain fealures of the fUlldamelllal l'elatedness 1Il quesllon
come 10 light. Nevertheless. this relatedness eludes us throughout all
similes indicating comparisons, and it brings us cl~sc to the ~undal'Y ~lot
only of the sarable. but also of t.he thinkable. In Fr, 62, the II1tCl:wmmg
relalionship of gods and humans rcpl'cscnlS the rclaledne~s 01 Ev ;~~d
mh'Ta. The gods. in lheir cOllllterrcference to humans, are III a specdlc
scnse thc repl'csclllalivcs of ~v in its rcl:ucdncss to l'to.v'ta. and mdeed
hec;lUsc the)' 11l1derst;lIld lIIoSt ,,1X)ut niiQ udtwov. Finally, wc could say
Ihal an unhappy consciousness hefalls us nOI onl)' as the inlerprcters of
the sa)'ings of Heraclitus: r:lthel', it Iit:s above all in the sayings thcllIselves.

10
The Standing Open of Gods and Humans
(Fragmclll 62). The "Speculative" in Hegel.Hegcl's Relationship to Heraclilus.Life - Death (Correlated Fragments: 88, 62).

HEIOEGC,;ER: I was not prescnt at the last seminar session. I am asked to

express myself on the course of thought. That. howc\'er. is a different
maUeT from immediate participation in the discussion. For there is the
danger that I approach the matter from the outside.
First, I would like to touch on the difficuhy that was prevalent in the

last session: the determination of the relationship of gods and humans in

relation to the I'clalcdncss of f:v and 1tCtvta. It is thus a question of a
relation bet.....een relationships. I intcntion;llly speak fOI'mally now in
order to let the structure be seen that lies at the basis of the thoughts of
the laS! session. Ifwe notice the approach and the course of the sessions
till now, the difficulty appears to me to have been to find the transition
from a relationship, still undetennined, of lightning. sun, seasons, and
fire to "la JtCrvta, to the relationship of gods and humans in their relation
to the relatedness of band 1tavru. The diffICulty can be seen in the way
lv suddenly reveals another character. So far as I have understood lhe
course that Mr. Fink has in view for the seminar, it is that of deliberately
selling out from the fire-fragments and only then to bring into view all
that which one knows as logos-fragments and as specifically Heraclitean.
In this, I see the difficulty that by the interpretation of the peculiar state
of affairs, "to live death, to die life," which is said of gods and humans, a
correspondence-and not an equation-becomes \'isable to the actual,
thematic relatedness in (Iuestion of Ev and 1ttlvta. When we speak of the
"relatedness of fv and 1to.vm," then it seems as if we were thinking about
a connection bet.....(.-cn both which we ha,'e localized concretely and for
which relatedness .....e then sought a bow which spanned them. In the
end. however, the malleI' stands in such a way that fv is the relatedness.
and that it relates to 'to. 1tCtvta by letting them Ix: what they are. So
understood. the relatedness is. in my opinion. the decisive point that our
detel'lllinalion IUllst reach: thereby the idea of two terms is eliminaled.
Precisely this idea must henceforth be held off. cvcllthough it is nOI yet
scukd what all the references are which belong in the wholeness of
1tCtvtu. ;:tnd what the reference is of all thc rcferences to !v 01' in Ev itselr.
Something is conspicuous to me l.enninologically in the summary of
the last session. 'lOll. Mr. Fink. make a distinction between "cosmic" and

109
"cosmological," and you speak of cosmic moments and cosl11ological entities.
FINK: One could bluntly conceive the relationship of gods and humans. which has been fonnulated in the d:lrk formula "to live death, to
die life," and sa)' that the gods win the substance of their lives out of the
death of hum:ms, as humans win their life out of the death of animals
they consume. To live the death of another would then be a process, a
perpetual style of the process of life. We cannot connect any meaning
,.,jth the idea that the gods need the life of mortals like they need the
sacrificial animals of mortals in early religion. If one wants to disregard
the blunt idea, one must turn from a mere cosmic relationship between
gods and humans to the cosmological reference of humans and gods.
Gods and humans are not only like other living things; rather, they are
both determined by an understanding relationship to themselves and to
each other. The understanding relationship does not encapsulate the
gods by themselves. The gods do not refer only to themselves; rather,
they can experience their own perpetual being only in refel'ence to the
changeable being and being bound to death of humans. In ~rder to
understand their own perpetual being in their self-understandmg, they
must understandingly hold themselves close to the death of humans.
Understood thus, holding close is not to be understood as ontic but as
ontological or cosmological. Vice versa. humans, who relate to their own
",'asting away, must understandingly hold themselves dose to the per
petual being of the gods. This ontological understanding contains an
analogy to the original relatedness of lv and l'tavra.
HEIOEGGER: If )'ou reject the cosmic relationship as ontic and speak
of a cosmological relationship instead of an ontological one, then you use
the word "cosmologica)" in a special sense. In )'our use of the word
"cosmological," you do not mean the common meaning of cosmology as
the doctrine of the cosmos. But what, then, do )'ou have in view?
FINK: The holding (wrhaltmde] lv, \\'hich contains allnlrvto., and
not the cosmos. for instance. as a system of spatial points.
HEIOEGGER: Thus. you do not use the word "cosmology" in the
sense of natur-tl science. It anI)' concerns me to sec the justification on
accoullI of which you speak of cosmology. You have your gmunds, because you do not say "ontic" .and "ontological," hut rather "cosmic" and
"cosmologic;:tl."
FINK: Thc criterion lies there. where you yourself criticize ontology.
HEII)EGGER: You speak about the relatedncss of lv and 1tCtvto.as a
.....orld-rc latiollShip.
FISK: I do 1101 thereb)' understand it as a relalionship of t...,o terms.
I think the lv as the one which lets everything arise as many in the sense
of 1tCtvta. blll which wkes them back again.

110
HEIOEGGER:

I don't

wal1t to tic ),ou

III

down

to

Heideggcr, but

fvwl'tCtvto as world-relationship indeed implies that lv, like the world,

worlds.
FINK: The fv is the gathering, letting-be. and also annihilating

power. Beside the moment of gathering and Ictting-be. the Illoment of

laking back again and annihilating is important for me.
HEIDEGGER: If wc think now of Fr. 30. which speaks of x60~
t6vbE, what is the use of XOOIWS here in comparison to your use of the
word "cosmology"?
FINK: x60J,lOv TGvbE does not mean the galheringof nclvtQ in b. but
rdlher the jointed whole of nlrvta.
HEIDEGGt:R: Thus, )'Oll do nOl use "cosmological" in the sense of the
Greek~. But why. then, do )'OU speak of the ~cosmological"?
FINK: J do nOl think. the cosmological fTOm out of Hcraditus. but
rather from out of Kant and from the antinomy of pure reason. Pure
~ason attempts to think the whole. The_ whole is a concept that is first
oriented toward things. In this manner, howe'-er. we can never thought.
fully expe~nce the gathe~d whole. Kant exhibits the aporias of an
attempt at thought that belie"es itselfable to think the whole on the model
of a spatial thing. Because the attempt does not manage with this approach, Kam subjectivizcs the whole as a subjective principle in the pro
cess of expemnce, which is complimented by the regulative idea of W
totality of all appea ....,lIlces.
HEIDECCR: The justification of your use of "cosmic-<osmological"
in distinction to "ontK"'Ontological" is thus the allness ...
FINK: " _which, however, is the allness of lv, of the self.gathering,
letting-arise, and letting.pass.away_ In reference to the clamping together of letting.arise and letting.pass.away, I refer to Nietzsche's motif
of the coupling of building and breaking, joining and undoing, of the
negation in the sway of the world.
HEIDEGGER: I would like to touch on yet another difficulty. I share
your interpretation of Fr. 62. For me also it is the sole possible way to
interp~t the formula, "to live thc death of another, to die the life of
another," in the manner you indicated. For me the question is how much
we know, according to the purcst sources, about the gods in their rela
tionship to humans with the Greeks_ In reference to )'our interprClation
of the relationship of the gods and humans, onc could bluntly say that
you imputc an existell1.-{)lllolob'Y to the gods_ According to its sense, your
intcrpretation goes in the direction of an existenz--ontology not just of
humans in relationship to the gods. but also. vice versil. of the gods in
thcir rcl:ltiollship to humans.
FINK: In the world of religion we find the strict dcmarcation be
twcen gods and humans_ Professor Hcidegger mcans to say. however.
that when I <tscr-ibc an cxistem.:-ontology 1.0 the gods. this would be be

cause the gods are not only distinguished from humans, but because
they distinguish themselves in their 0 ....'1\ being from humans b)' holding
themselves understandingl), toward the death of mortals .. _
HEIOEGGEK: ... and because they cxperience themselves as perpetual beinKs only in their sclf..diSlinctlon from mOllals_
FINK: Only because they have view of monals can thcy expericnce
themseh'es as perpetually being_ The immortals are those who do not
meet death; mortals are those who are bound to death. But Heraclitus
com-erts this customary comprehension of Greek mythology, which lets
1l10l1als and gods be for themselves, and which lets them turn toward
each other only occasionally. He makes this occasional relationship into a
relationship constituting gods and humans in their own being_ The immortal being of the gods is only possible if they relate themselves toward
the mortal being of humans. The knowledge of human being bound to
death constitutes the understanding of imperishable being proper, and
"Ke versa, the knowledge of the perpelUal being of the gods constitutes
the understanding of mortal being proper. Gods and humans do not
fonn two separated spheres_ It depends on seeing not the chorismos
[separation], but the intertwining of the godly and human understand
ing of self and of being_
HEIOECCER: It is not a question of speaking in a blunt manner of
gods and humans as of different living beings, of whom the former are
immortal, the other mortal. Spoken in the tenninoSogy of Bnng and
Timt, immortality is no category, but rather an existentiale, a way that the
gods relate themselves toward their being.
riNK: The godly knowledge of the being bound to death of humans
is no mere consciousness, but rather an understanding relationship.
With Athena, who appears as mentor to monals in order to bring help to
them, it is perhaps a matter of still another theme. The epiphany of the
gods is no actual mortal being of the gods, but a masking. When Aristotle
says that the life of 6EwQ(a [contemplation], which exceeds qJl}6VT\OLC;
(practical wisdom]. is a kind of godly life, an a6ava't(tElv [to be im
mortal] (whereby a6avadtElv is formed like UJ'llV(tnv [to be Greek]),
that implies that in 6EwQ(a we comport ourselves like immortals. In
8EwQ(a, mortals reach up to lhe life of lhe gods. Conespondingly, we
must say of the gods. that their comportmcnt toward humans is a
"eavm{tElv" (to be morwl]. presupposing that onc could fOlm this word.
The emphasis lies in this. thalthe relationship of humans 10 gods canllot
be described externally, but rather that ,hcy themselves exist as their
alternate and countcfrclatiollship, except that thc gods, to a certain ex
lent. havc ,he more ravorablc cxistcnz-ontology .lOd humans, 011 lhe
CuntrOl!,),. the less favorable. The godly ~l1ld human undcrstanding of self
Olnd being must project itself in Ilnltual undcrstanding.
l-h:rm:GGtc In the relationship of gods and humans, it depends on

112

113

a phenomenon that had not been treated till now in reg-dTd to band
1tclvt~: thr sl~ndin~ open of gods and humans. You called the openstandmg relauonshlp between gods and humans a representative of the
relatedness of lv and llUvt(l..
FINK: With this, the oo<p6v-character of fv is foreshadowed. The lv
~s gathering unity in the manner of MyoS and ao<p6v. We may not
Interpret the ooq>6v-character of lv as knowledge. In it. the moment of
understanding reference of lv to novta is thought. In the light-character

their C01l\'crsation we touch on a historical question, and not just :t qucsdon concerning the study of histor,'. In what sense. then, both arc
Hcraditeans is another question. In Tubingen, they joined with Schclling in the molto fv y.al :itQV [the onc and wholc). This relationShip
among them, which stands under this common molto. later dissolved.
But where does H61derlin first name Herdclitus?
PARTICIPANT: In "Hyperion." Therc he speaks of fv lhacpEQOv
tau'[<p [one sel against itselll
Hf:IDEGCER: The one that in itself distinguishes itself. Holdcrlin
understands it as the essence of beauty. At that time. howcver, beatify is
for him the word for being. Hegel's intcrpretation of the Greeks in the
Ltctures Oil the History of Philosophy goes in the sallle direction; being as
beauty. With recourse to Heraditus' word, HOIderlin names no
formalistic-dialectic Structure; rather, he makes a fundamental declaration. This thought has then been changed by him into a relationship of
gods and humans, according to which humanity is a conditKUl of the
existence of the god ...
FINK: ... and humanity is nearer to the abyss than the god.
HEIDECCER: For that reason, the relationship of gods and humans
is a higher and more difficult one, a relation that is not to be determined
with the terminology of customary metaphysical theology,
FINK: The relationship of humans and gods is also no imago relalionship in so far as mortals, in their relationship to themselves. undcrstandingly stand out into the other being of the gods, without participating in it. On onc side an estrangemcnt rules betwecn gods and humans;
on the other side, however, a clamping together also prevails in mutual
understanding.
.
HEIDEGGER: From Hegel's \'iewlX'int-wherein c.:onsists the affinity
between him and Heraditus? There is a well-known sentence in the
l.LCtures 011 the HUlory of PhilosoPhJ.
PARTICIPA:'I.'T: "There is no sentence of Heraclitus' that I ha\'e not
taken up in l11y Logic."
HElDECCER: What does this sentence mean?
PARTICIPAST: h is here a matter of Hegt:l's understanding of
I-Ieracliws.
HElDECCU; Wh,l( does the sentcnce s<Iy regarding thc relationship
of Hegel ami Heraclitus?
PARTICll'ANT; Hcraclilus is not only wken up by Hegel; rather, hc is

of lightning, sun, and fire. we first have a foreshadowing of the oo<p6vcharacter of ~. BUI we must also warn against an explication of lv as
worldl'cason and as the absolute.
HEIDEGGER: let me jusl cha,dcterize ),our way of thinking. You
prepare the understanding of oa<p6v or nu,? qlQ6Vlj.1OV [sagacious firc) in
FT. 64a in a departure from lightning, from sun, from the seasons, from
fire, light. radiance, and shine. In this manner, it is somewhat more
~irr.cuh to make the transition from the thingly reference of fv as lightnmg, sun, and fire. to :itUvTa. over to the open-standing reference of gods
and humans to each other, 'A'hich the reference of fv 'to ocxp6v to llcivta
represents. Your way of Heraditus interpretation starts out from fire
toward A.6yos; my way of Heraditus interpretation starts out from ),6yo;
toward fire. A difficulty is hidden behind that which is still not unraveled
~y us. but ~hich we have already ~ouch~d on in various forms. For your
mterpretauon of the mutual relationshIp of gods and humans you have
drawn upon ,~6Ide~lin as a comparison, that is, firstly on "Hyperion's
Song of Fate, III whIch the gods are separated from humans and are not
referred 10 one another.
FINK.: Without fate. like the sleeping infant. breath the heavenly
ones. ThIS poem speaks of the gods' indifference toward humans.
HEIDECCER: You ha\'l~ then interpreted H61derlin a second time,
and alluded to one verse out of "Mnemosyne," which expresses the
reverse thought, that Ihe immonals have need of mortaIs. Still. both
poems of H61derlin stand close by one another. The thought of
"Mnemosync" is already found in the "Rhine Hymn" (Slrophe 8), in
which it says that the gods stand in need of "heroes and humans I And
other mOrlals." This note"'ol'thy concept of standing in need concel1ls
only the refcrence of gods to humans in H6lderlin. Where does the
rubric of "need" occur as tenn in philosophy?
FINK; With Hegcl in the wriling "The Differcnce of Fichtc's and
Schclling's Syslel11 of Philosophy" (180 I), in which Hcgcl speaks of the
"need of philosophy."
Ht:IIU:t:Ct:R: Thus, in lhe same time thal Holderlin livcd in
FrdnHun. In the question aboul Ihal which Hegel and Holdcrlin call
"nced," h'C h:wc an essenlial document for thcir convcrsation in this
regard-for the convcrsation Ihal olheno.'ise is an obscure problem. With

.~llblalCd.

PA~"'IClI'AST:

Hcgcl sees Hcraditus dialcctically from

OUI

of 0PIX>-

~ilion.

HEIUEGGEIt: BUI what does "dialectical" l1lc:lll? Now wc can rccm'cr

the answer 10 the llucstion. posed in an carlicr season, .. boUI the speculaIh'e with Hcgcl. Whm does "speculati\'t:" mean in Hcgel?

114
PARTICIPANT; The presupJX>Sltlon of speculative thought IS the
identity of being and thinking.
HIDEGCER: Where does the speculative belong for Hegcl?
PARTICIPANT: The speculative is a moment of the logical.
Ht:IDGCER: What is a moment?
PARTICIPANT: Moment comes from movere. movimenltlm [to set in
motion, movement).
HEIDEGGER: The phase {fUr Moment] depends on "the moment"
["da.r Moment"]. When Hcgel sa),s the speculative is a moment, the phase
is not ~eanl l~ereby, but rath~r the moment. The moment is a mo\,jng
somethmg winch has a share In the mo\'ement of thinking. and whkh
gives an impetus. The moment becomes the impetus, and the impetus
itself is the instant; if happens in a phase (in nnem MOmnlt]. Thus. the
moment becomes the ph~. What is the first moment of the logical?
PARTICIPAI\'T: The abstract or intelligible.
HEIDEGGER: And the second moment?
PARTICIPANT: The dialectical.
HEIDEGCt:R: It is notewonhy that Hegel understands the dialectical
as the second and nOt as the third moment. And what is the third moment?
PARTICIPANT: The speculative.
H[IDEGGER: In what connection does Hegel call the dialectical the
second and not the third moment of the logical? When he speaks. at the
end of the lAgi, of the identity ofmauer and method, one would indeed
think that the dialectical is the third moment. Hegel also calls the dialec.
ticalthe negative-rational. What does the rational mean for Hegel? We
need all this information for our anaJysis of Heraclitus, even though
Hegel does not speak of Heraclitus in these pages.
PARTICIPANT: Spoken from the Phenom~tlQlogyof Mind, reason is the
sublation of the separation of subject and object.
Hi:IOEGGER: Where does Hegel's lenninology come from?
PART/CII'ANT: From Kant.
HEII>i:GGi:R: How does Hegcl characterize Kant's philosoph)'?
PARTICIPANT; As reflexivc philosoph)'.
HEIDi:GGER: And thal means?
PARTtCII'ANT: As Ihe division of two phases.
Hi:IllEGGi:IC Which phase? Whal does reason mean in Kant?
PARTICII'ANT: For him, reason is the thinking of"the ideas in dislinc
tion to understanding as the thinking of Ihe categories. The ideas arc
regulativc pl'ineiples, in which reason thinks totalil),.
l-h:mGGR: Reason in Kant is thus nOI refelTcd inuncdial.cl)' lO
apllCaranccs bUl on I)' to the rulcs and fundamental principlcs of underst,mding. The fundament"l funClion of reason consisLS in thinking the
highcst unif}'. Whcn Hegel sa),s the dialectical is the neg;llhc-Iational. hc

115
implies that the abSlract finite determination sublates itself and goes into
its opposite determination. Againsl Ihal, the abstmctthinking of undcrstanding is the adherence to the delcnninatioll and its distinctness vis.a.
vis the olher. The entire Ihinking, Hcgel's thinking, speaks first of all in
the fundamental schem~ oflhe subject-objcctl'c1ationship. The abstract
moment is lhe representation lhat is delivered O\'er 10 the object without
rcference back to the subject. h is the Ic\e1 of immediacy. The idea is
gi\'en over to the immediatel)' given object wilhout reference back to
mediation. If now the object qua object is thought. that is. in reference
back to the subject. then the unit)' between object and subject is thought_
But Yo'h)' is this unit)' a !leg-dtive onc?
PARTlCIPAI'o'T: Because thinking has not )'et rt.'Cognized the unit)' as
unit)'.
HEIDEGGER: Think historicall)' and concretel)' on Kant's s}'nthetic
unit)' of transcendental apperception. It is unity in reference to objectivit),. For Hegel. howe\'er, it is on I)' this whole itself, i.e. subject and object
in their unity, which is the posith'e unit)' wherein the whole of the dialectical process is deposited. The glimpse orthis unit)', that is, the glimpse
of the abstract and dialectical moments in their unity, is the speculative.
The speculati\'e, as the positi\'e-rational, comprehends the unit)' of determinations in their. opposition. When Hegel brings Heraclitus into
connection with his logic, how does he then think what Heraclitus sa)'s
about oppositions? How does he take up what is said by Heraditus about
oppositions in distinction to what we anempt? He takes the opposing
references of Heraclitus-spoken from out of Kant-as a doctrine of
categories at the level of immediacy. and thus in the .sense of an immediate logic. Hegel does not sce in Her.lclitus the cosmological refer.
enees as )'OU understand them.
FINK: Hegel interprets the relationship of oppositions from out of
mediation.
HE!DEGGE~: Hc understands the whole of Gt'cek philosoph)' as a
Icvel ~fllnmedlac)', and he S(.'t:scvcr~lhingundcr thcaslx:ct orlhe logiC:ll.
. FI~~: Onc. could also say Ihat for Hegcllhc thoughl ofbet:oming is
of slgn~hcanc~ III Heraclilus. One could also cilll Hcraclitus thc philosoI~her Ql nux. For Hcgcl, Ihc c1ClIlCIll of nux gai ns Iht.: characler ofa model
for undoing oppositions.
H t:1 Ot:GGt:R: nccomi ng is 1110VCrnCnt, fill' which Ihe Ihrcc momcnt&-n:ll11el~, the abstract, the dialt:ctical. ami thc speculative-arc what
~I\'CS IInpeUls {das AII.urhlaggf'bl'lull'J. This mOVClllCllt. this method,
IS Ihc malleI' itself 101' Hegel afler complclion of Ihe Logic. The Ihird
Heraclitcan, bcsidc Hdldcrlin ,md Hegcl, is Niclzsche. nul wc would be
j.{oingouI of Our wa), 10 j.{Q illlO IhisquCSlioll. I havc touchcd on alllhal is
~IOW said ani)' to SIIO\~' rou whcre.: we arc <11 this point. OUI" Hcraclitus
Interpretalion has a wide Ix:rslx:cti\,c: it also slx:aks in the lallhruage of

116

117

the tradition. We can speak only Ollt of the conversation that is funda
mental for thinking, and that is fundamental above all for the way on
which we move.
Perhaps it would be appropriate if you. Mr. Fink. indicated the further
step that yOll have in view for the progress of the seminar, setting OUI
from the allusion to the reference oflhe mutual open-standing character
of gods and humans that characterizes the phenomenon. "10 live the
death of another. 10 die the life of anothel"." Thus the participants will
see where the way leads us.
FINK: I believe that onc must drive on from the doctrine of fire and
the 1t\JQOl; lQOnQ( to the question of the relatedness of lv and 1tOvtQ. for
which we re<:eive help from the fragments in which the life-death relationship is thought. The relationship of gods and humans is not to be
equated with the relatedness of lv and nCrvta. In the standing open for
one another of gods and humans, we have. as it were. a brake against
thinking what is said in Fr. 90 simply as a change-over of familiar kind,
or as transfonnation of stuff into another fonn. or on the model of the
exchange of goods. We have indicated that in XQUOOs [gold], the glimmer
of gold must also be thought. Here a relationship is thought between the
light-character of fire and that into whkh it turns. We must not understand the tuming bluntly in the sense of a change of stuff.
HEIDEGGER: We must think the radiant, the ornamental. and the
decorative element together in ~, which was for the Creeks a cus-tomary thought.
FINK: But the most beautiful x6ov.o; is also. when measured against
the fire, a scattered junk heap. To be sure, it is in i1selfthe most beautiful
joining, but in reference to the lv it compares like a junk heap.
HEIDEGGER: I would still like to add something as to the relation
ship of gods and humans. I have called the mutual self-understanding
the openstanding character. But if the gods, in their relationship to
mortals represent b in its relationship to Jtavm. then Ihe b-character
gets lost .
FINK:
and indeed because the gods, as representatives of b,
stand in the plural. and thus appear as foreign forms. But in his theology, which we will turn to laler, Heraditus thinks Ihe coincidence of
oppositions in the god. In order now to darify the further course of our
interpretation of Hcradilus. we must auempt 10 go from the fragments
lhal Ircat the relationship of life and de:uh and lhe intermediate phenomenon of sleep over to a fundamental discussion of all oppositions
and their coincidence in the god. and finally to Zeus. wilh which name fv
to ooqJOv is unwilling and yet willing 10 be namcd. Before this. we would
also have to deal with thc serics of nux~ and movemcnt-fragmellls. then
with the pr'oblcm of ilpf.l.ov(a lJ.(pavi]~ [hidden harmony). life and dcmh
in the lyre and bow. the intertwining of life and death proper in the

double meaning of the bow. the explication of fire as q>Wt; [lightJ and as
Ihat which makes ooq:>t~ [dear}. aIlO\\'s shining-up, and blings to light.
and finally the c.:haracter of ooq>6v and the AbyoS' Thc way of our HCr<lditus interpretation is the relatedness of band navta. Our explication
begins with the appearances of fire; it then goes over to the. re~ationship
of life and death, to the doctrinc of the contrasts and the comcldence. to
the movement-fragments. the fragment about the god. and from there
to Ev TO oocpOv ~Uvov [one thing, the onl)' \\'ise),21 and finally to the
wyo;-fragments. It seems important to me first of all to gain an abundant arsenal of ideas and ways of thought. Heraditus operates with
many relationships. When he takes up a differentiation in the sleepfragments, this is not to be conceived of in the sense of copious \"oca~u.
la!)', but of ways of understanding. His fundamental thoughts are .mdeed relatively easy to fOmlulate. but the difficulty lies in the refraction
of these thoughts into the many ways of thought and ideas with which he
is concerned. The fundamental lhought of Heraditus is broken into a
great number of ways ...
HEIOEGGU: ... whkh gives an insight into Ta 1tCtVta.
fINK: The thinking of the one happens in a manifold manner. As
with Pamlenides, the b is thought of in a great many ("I\.laTa [signs) so
with Heraditus the relatedness of band 1tCtvta is thought of in a great
many ways of understanding.
HEIDEGGU: Where do gods and humans belong?
FINK: In one regard in 1tCrvta. and in another regard in ho.
HEIDEGCER: The other regard is precisely what is of interest.
FIN": The relatedness of band 1tCtvra mirrors itself in the relation
of gods and humans. Since b is no facLual unity but rather the unity of
).6yo~, gods and humans are those struck b)' the lighmingof).6yos. They
belong together in the Myos-happening.
HEIDEGCER: Gods and humans in their intertwining relationship
ha\'e a mirroring function in reference to l!v and Jt<lvt:Q.
FINK: In Heideggerian language. we could say that humans and
gods belong in one respect in what is. but ill the essential respect they
belong in being. This special position of gods and humans among all that
is. which position does 1I0t subsume them .
I-h:II)EGGt:K: ... under all that which is .
FINI\: ... is very much more difficult to grasp. Cods and humans
exist as understanding of being. The godly and the human undcrstanding of being arc ways of thc self.clearing of being.
1IEIUEGGEIC Hut that cannOl be read in HeraclilllS.
FINK: We could find the light-naturc of l!v b)' means or the relationship beLween gods and hum:lIls.
Ht:IO}:CGEH: Perhaps this is the appmpl'iate place Lo make the transition to Fr. 26.

118

119

FINK: First. I would like to return once again to Fr. 88: tairt6 t' tv~
l;wv xai. tE9vr)x6~ xed (to) yQ'lvOQOt; xal xaflriloov xal VEOV xal YTIQ<lI6v

ntlV'ta? Are the changes-over lliUllCd in Fr, 88 to be thought as mere

contentions aboul phenomena givcn ;lIld nOl gi\'cn in the animal ,-'orld,
or do they concern m:JQ cidt;.wov? Let us Icave this question open.
HElDEGCER: How does t;.ciw xaL u9vty.os: [living and dead] in Fr. 88
relate to t;.wvu:s: [those living) and u9vEwns: {those dyingJ in Fr. 62? How
are they mentioned in the one and how in the other fragment?
FINK: In Fr. 62, t;.WvtEC; and n8vEwu; are referred to ...
HEIDEGGER: ... the manner of being of immortals and mortals; in
fr. 88, on the cOlllrary, t;.iOv xal n9vrJxoc; is referred to what is.
FISK: Not to what is. but to being alivc and being dead. t;.w-v does
not mean a living being. but rather the living as lermi,IW (term) for being
alive, just as u6vr)x6c; does not mean something dead. bUl rather the
dead as terminw for being dead. The same also holds for the waking and
sleeping and for young and old. Waking and sleeping are tnmini for
being awake and being asleep. and )'oung and old are termini for being
roung and being old.
HElDEGGER: Is t;.Wv in Fr. 88 only the singular of t.he plural t;.wvu;
in Fr. 62? Are gods and humans also meant in Fr. 88?
FINK: t;.w-v xat 'tE6vTlxi>s: does not refer only to gods and humans,
for fr. 88 is stretched wider. But for whom are being alive and being
dead. being awake and being asleep. and being young and being old the
same. living beings or nVQ cidt;.wov?
HElDEGGER: Thus. in Fr. 88 something else is said than in Fr. 62.
Fr. 62 has a wider sense.
FtSK: t;.ciw and n.6vrp,0s: are to be understood like 'to xaAbv, 'to
6(xulQV. How is t.he anicle 'to lyQl'lYOQ6s: (the waking) to be understood?
Professor Heidegger has indicated that it is not a matter of relationships
and counteTl"eferences that would have a possessor. In the second sentence of the frdgmem. Herac!itus speaks in the plural, which does nolo
however, refer to facts but to the three different relationships. Of whom
can 'talho be said at all? The coincidence thought here does not signify
one such as in a distinction less indifference. What is meant is even a
mutual changeover. J.l,E'twt:E06vta (things changing around) refers to Fr,
90, in which ciV'taJ.l,Ol~ti is named. the exchange of gold for goods and of
goods for gold. But what change ovcr in Fr. 88 are not anI)' things as
against the gathering unity. but the h'lrder opposition of being alive and
being dead. Hcrt. a sameness is melllioncd that slaps in the face and
cOllll"adicLS the everyday opinion that insists on the diffcrencc bCI\\'ecll
life and death. On that accOll III , the qucslioll of where the place is, the
abode. of this change-ovcl' is disconcerting.
HEIDEGGER: Does being dead (tE8vrpto;) mcan the.same as having
deceased?
FISK: Yes, when u8v'lxos: is said against !;wv. It does IlOt mean what
is lifeless in the scnse of the mincrals ...

.6.6E yaQ j.ltQJ(EOOVTQ txE~va ton xaXElva llQ).lV ILtWlmovtQ luilta.

Diels translates, "And it is always one and the same, what dwells (?)

within us: living and dead and waking and sleeping and young and old.
For this is changed over 10 that and that changes back over 10 this."
Here a t{u,rto is expressed. but not a same-being (Selhigsein] of a s;:tme
thing [Sl'llbigt'll] lying before us, not the empty identity Ihal belongs 10
everything there is; rather a s...me-being that is referred to distinction. It
is referred to that which seems to us to be most distinguished. The
distinctions named here are not such as are in constant movement, but
are such as concern all living things. Being alive, being awake, and being
young have a posiu\'e character for our customary ideas vis-a-vis being
dead, being asleep. and being old. But the fragment that expres~s
same-being speaks not only against the customary opinion of the
superiorit), of living, waking, and being )'oung vis-a-vis the dead. the
sleeping, and Ihe old; rather, it also expres~s a belonging together of
the three groups. Being asleep, whkh stands in the middle, has a distinguished inbetween position out of which an understanding standing
open is possible for being dead and being old in the sen~ of wasting
away.
But the frdgment says still more. Not only are living and dead, awake
and asleep, )'oung and old one and the same, but this is the change~ver
of that and that again is the change~verof this. A phenomenal changeover i only to be seen in the relationship of \\'aking and sleep. For what
goes to sleep from waking also turns again from sleep back into waking.
Onl)' the change-over from waking into sleep is re\'ersible. Ag-dinst that,
the change-over of life into death and of being )'oung into being old is
nOI reversible in the phenomenon. But in the fragment it is said that as
being awake goes over into being asleep and vice versa, so also the living
changes over into the dead, the dead into the living, the young into the
old, and the old into the young. It treats the diSlinction of waking and
sleeping in the s...me manner as that of living and dead and of young and
old. BUl of whom is Ihis reversible change-over expressed? The expression, "changing ovcr again:' rt.'Calls the ltvta~~f3'" [inlerchange}, the
change of gold into goods and goods into gold. There. the relationship
of lhe change-over is referred to lhe relatedness of ~ ,1Ild ntlvta as well
as navta and h. 'rhe question is whether transitions, referred 10 the
living who arc named in Fr. 88. have their place within (lIli"lfIlia
(animalsJ, 01' whether changes-ovc,' in the sense of 1tuQ6s: 'tQOnal arc
meant by it. Is Jhe 'ta\m~ said of unimalia, or rather of nUQ CtEU;UJOV,
aboUl whkh wc hcar that it always was and is and will bc (~v od fOtlV xal
lorat). but ,,-'hkh itself is no inncr temporal constancy. but which rather
makcs possible the having been. being present, and coming to be of

120
1-It:IDEGGER: ... thus 110t dead nature. A stone, for example. is not

dead.
FINK: In Fr. 88. lif=: and de:llh ...... hich we know in phenomenon only
in a specific domain, :Ire n:fcrred to the whole relatedness of V and
naVto. BUI let us leave this question open. For without further verifealion, itcannOI be said what tQut6 is. We can at first only presume thatlhe
same-being of life and death rden to ht. Professor Heidcgger has designated the relatedness of v and .l'tUvtU as slatc-of-affairs [Verholl]. as
being. and world-statc-of.affairs. When this original statc-ofaffairs is
mentioned in the tau16 of Fr. 88. then we have a contradiction in the
phenomenon. For nobody dead becomes alive again. Living and dead,
waking and sleel)ing. young and old, are phenomena that in a certain
manner mean all thc sojourn of the living in timc. Ufe is the whole time
of a living being; death is the end of life-time. Waking and sleep form
the basic rhythm during life. Being young and being old refer to being in
the cOl'"I'"upting powcr of time which not only brings everything but also
takcs everything. The question for me is whcther the rclatedness of IN
and nCtvta is a relatcdness of maturation.
Finally, I would like to attempt an explication of Fr. 26. It runs:
{nt9QWl'tO~ tv Eil<PQ6VTJ <pCto~ Wt'tElal taut<j> (lvt09avrlN) lvto0f3Eaed~
6~Et.l;, t:<irv 6 OOttE'tal UOvEW'tOS Mwv, (lutoof3EaeE~ 6~ElS) tyQl1YOQ<Os
OmElal EC,OOvtos;. Diels translates: .. A human touches on (kindles) a light
in the night, when his eyesight is extinguished. Living, he touches on
death in sleep; in waking he touches on sleeping."
This fragment cLearly begins with a human. A human kindles a light in
the night. Fr. 26 begins with the human and his capacity of kindling a
light in the night, when his 6~l; is extinguished. Dicls translates a..~
pEaeE~ 6~l; with "\\,hen his eyesight is extinguisht.-d." But the meaning
thus suggests itself that a human sees in his dream-and that he is in a
light while in darkness during the dream. I would rather translate the
plural, cin~EaeEi.~ 6~t.l;, with "extinguished in his manners of seeing."
A human has his uneasy place between night and light. Thc fragment
refers to the unstcady place of a human between night and light. He is
near to the light. That is indicated when he is able to lighten the night. A
human is a kind of Prornethcan fire thief. He h;IS the ability to make
light in the night, when his manners of seeing are extinguished, i.e., 110t
whcn he sleeps bUI when he relates to thc dark. "Living, hc touches on
lhe dcad in sleep; in waking, hc louches 011 the slceping." Life and death
arc hcre bOlllld 10 onc another by the in-between position of sleep.
Sleeping is a manner of being alive akin with death; w;lkillg is a manner
of lingcring touching 011 dcath in the light in refercnce to the sleeping.
Being alive and being awake. being asleep and being dcad <Ire not three
conditions, hlll Ihl'ce possible manners of relationship of humans in

121

\dlich they comc into proximity to the dark passing of night and to light
openness.
HElDEGGEIt: Wc must get clear what touching (Qqn\) actually means.
L;llcr, "the touching" apJXars as 9l"fl:':lV with Aristotle in the M~t(lphJs;r.s.
010.
FtNK: What we have now said conceming Fr. 26 is only a
foreshadowing of the diHiculty with which \\'c must begin in the next
session.

11
The "Logi""I" in HegeJ.';Consciousllcss" and "Dasein:'Locality of Human Beings between Light
and Night. (Correlaled Fragmellls: 26, 10).

!-I!::lm:GG.:R: First, I must make a correction regarding the last seminar

session. In reference 10 Hcraclitus' word E\' 6lQqJEQOV tavtlj). :lIthe place
in the summary .....here it says that Holderlin interprets truth as beauty. I
said by mistake that the same thought is to be found in Hcgel in the

ucture$ on tlu flUiary of Philosophy. This thought appears. lather, in the

uClures QlI (hI: Philosophy of World History, in Volume Ill, "The Creek and
Roman World" (usson edition. p. 570 ff.). "Thus, the sensory is only the
appearance of spirit. It has shed fillilude, and beaUl)' consists in this
unit) of lhe sensory with spirit in and for itself' (I'. 575). "The true
deficiency of the Greek religion as opposed to the Christian is that in it
appearance constitutes the highest fonn, in general. the whole of the
divine, while in the Christian religion appearing obtains onl)' as a moment of the divine" (p. 580). "But if appearing is thc perennial forlll, so
the spirit which appears in its transfigured beauty is a thither side of
subjective spirit .. ." (p. 581). HCI'c Hegcl thinks the identity of appearing and bellUlY that is also charactcristic and esscl1tial for the early H61dedin. We cannot go into the details of Hegt'rs elaborations, but I rec
om mend that )'ou sometime reread his uctures 0'1 th,. Philosophy of lVorld
HislOlJ. Then )'OU will gain another idea of Hegcl, who had an inkling of
much ill Greek thought when, for exam plc, he thinks Apollo as the
knowing god, and thc god of knowledge, as thc elo<lucm, prophcsying,
foretelling god. as bringing evcrything concealed to light, as the god
looking into the darkness, as the god of light, and when he thinks the
light as what brings C\'cl)'thing to appearance.
Aside from that, I ha\'c still another omission to correct. Wc havc
spoken of thc three momelllS of the logical in Hegel in the last session,
the abstract-intelligible, thc dialectical, and the spcculative. nUL whal
have we omittcd Ihereb)'?
P,\KTIClI'ANT: We have 110 longer asked aoout what we understand
br the speculalive in regard to our own procedure in distinction to
Hegcl. For the qucstion about the meaning of the speculativc in Hcgd
camc up "'hcll onc or the participants chardctedzed our atlempt to think
b)' st;lrtillg out fmm Heraditus wilh the expression ... spcculathc Ical>.
Huon;m:K: Wc willt'llk 'Ilxlllllhis problem later. For the Illomt.'lll.
let us J'enmin wilhin Hege!'s philosophy. We followed Hegcrs text with

123

the elucidation of the three moments of the logical. But what remains to
be asked, if onc speaks of the three moments of the logical in Hegd?
PARTICLPAKI": One could perhaps say that the dialectkal and the
speeulatin= moments appear as IWO sides of negativity.. _
HELDEGGER: Let us nOI go into neg-onion and negauvlty,
PAKTICIPAlIT: We have forgotten 10 ask about the lotalit)' of the
three moments.
HEIDEGGEN.: How do you wish 10 determine. the course ~f the th.ree
moments? The abstract, dialectical, and spcculallve ale not Side by Side.
But what must we return to in order to find OUl how the lhree moments
belong together? As I subsc(!uently reflected on the course of our conversation, I was alarmed about our carelessness.
PARTICIPANT: We must ask where the Logic has its place in the
systcm.
HEIDEGGER: We do not need to go so far, but we must ask ...
PARTICIPANT: ... what the logical means in Hegel.
HEIOEGGER: We have spoken about the three moments of thc logical but we have not thereby reflected on the logical itself. We have failed
to ;sk what Hegel means by the logical. One sal's, for example, "that is
logical." Or one can hear it said that the great coalition is logical. What
does "logical" mean here?
.
.
.
PARTICtPANT: III the "Introduction" to the SCUPIU of Logu;, Hegcl
says that the content of logic "is the dcpiction of Cod, ~as, He i.s .in" His
eternal essence before the crt'ation of nature and of a lImte SptnL
HElm:CCER: Let us remain at first with what the "logical" means in
the customary sense, Le.. for the man on thc street.
PARTICIPANT: It means the same as "conclusive in itself."
HEIDEGGER: Thus, "consistenL" But is that what Hegel means when
he speaks of the three phases ofthc logical? ~rtainly not. Thus......e have
not madc clear to oursehes what we are talkll1g about. In paragrdph 19
of the E11cylopedia of Philosophial Scinlus. Hegel say "Logic is, th~ sci.~
ence of th, purl id,.a. that is, the idca in the abstract clement of thmklllg.
We do not wanl to d\\'ell too long on Hegcl here. I onl)' want to make
clear the gulf that separatcs us from !-lege!' when \\'e are dealing with
l-IeraclilUs. What does "science of the pure idea" mean with Hegd; whilt
for him is the idea?
PAKT1CII'AN'T: The complcte self-comprchcnsion of thought,
HElIn:CGt:K: What does Hege!'s concept of lhe idea presupposc?
Think about Plato's [Ma I form). What has happened betwccn the
Platonic idea and Hcgel's idea? What has in lhc meantimc happencd
when Hegcl and modern times speak of the idea?
PAKTICII'ANT: In the meanlime. Plato's rotu took the road towald
becoming a concept.
.
"
.
HEIl)EGGt:R: You must be somewh.u more cautious. \\ nh De.scaI1CS.

.,

124

19-

the idea becomes ~rceptio [perception]. With that, it is seen from the
representation of the subject and thus from subjectivity. The absolute
idea of Hegel is then the complete self-knowledge of the absolute subject. It is the i,mel' coherence of Ihe t1u(.'C phases in the process chanlClerizing the sclf-manilcsling of the absolute Spilit. In this absolute.
Plato's thought of the idea. lhe self-showing, still plays a role. despite
subjcctivit),. Wh)' can Hegel now say that the idea is thinking? That must
seem paradoxical to us at the first glance at Hegel's sentence. The sentcnce is only to be understood if onc observes that the Plalonic idea
becomes fNruptio in Descanes. Prior to that, the ideas become the
thought of God, and gain significance for the notion of crealw. We give
onl)' this brief determination of the logical in Hegel in order to see what
wc arc talking alX)ul when we name the three moments of the logical.
The logical ill Hegel is a "ubdc that has full importance and that hides a
rkhness that onc cannot quickly and easily comprehend. in paragraph
19 of the E"qdopedia, it says, among other things. "But in so far as the
logical is the absolute form of truth. and e\'en more than this. is the
pure truth itself, it is something quite other than UMful." \Vhat is truth
here? If one wants to understand Hegel's concept of truth, what must
one also lhink? Think back to what we have already said, that the idea in
Descanes becomes clam and r!istinclll peru/J/io lclear and dislinct perceplion], and lhis goes logether with ...
PARTICIPANT: ... certitudo
HElDEGCER: Thus, with certainty. In order to be able to understand
HegeJ'sconcept oftnuh.,e must also think truth as certainty. as place in
absolute self-knowlcdge. Onl)' thus can we understand that the logical
should be the pure truth by itself. This reference to the meaning of the
logical in Hegel will be important, when later-though not in this
semesler-we come 10 speak about the Logo~' with Heraclitus,
Now I wish to have another clarification. You. Mr. Fink, spoke about
the fact that the godl)' kno..... lcdge of a human's being bound b)' death is
no mere consciousness, but an understanding relationship. Thus )'ou
contrAst the understanding relationship. which we have also called standing open. to mere consciousness.
FtNK: A mere consciousness of something would be given. for
example, if onc said that a human. as animated. knows about inanimate
nature. Hcre onc can speak of a mere knowledge relationship. although
I belicve Ihal it is "Iso a matter of more than just a cOllsciousness
of ... Not on I)' the understanding of being of imlll0l1al being belongs to
the self-undcrstanding of the gods. but also. as an implicit component.
the understanding of being of mortal being. The !,rodly understanding
of IX'ing is not of a neulral kind; ralher. it is referred b.,ck to the mort.""
being of humans. The gods understand their blissful being in "icochel
back from the fr-litt), of 1110I't;lls.

HElDEGCER: When )'ou 53y that the reference of the gods to humans' being bound to death is no mere consciousness, then you mean
lhat the reference is no mere human repl'csentation that humans are so
and so. You said that the reference of the gods to humans is an understanding relationship. and you mean a self-understanding relationship.
FINK: The gods can have their being only in so far as they stand
open for monals. Standing open for mortals and the mortals' transient
being cannot be lacking from the gods. We may not understand this,
howe\'er, as Nietzsche says with Thomas Aquinas concerning the blissfulness of paradise. that the souls 'A'ilI view the tonnent of the damnw,
thereby suiting their blissfulness more. (Geneology oj Morals, First Essay,
15). The immorlals are undoubtedly 9vTJ'tOl. They know their eternal
being not only from viewing contemplation (6EwQ(a). but at the same
time in ricochet back from the transient being of mortals. They are
affected by humans' being bound to death. It is difficult to find the right
term her~.
HEIDEGGER: I want to get at precisely this point. Wh~th~r we find
the tenninologically appropriate form is another question. Standing
open is not something like an open window or like a passageway. The
standing open of humans to things does not mean that there is a hole
through which humans see; rather, standing open for ... is being addressed by [Angegangensein van] things. 1 speak about this in order to
clarify the fundamental reference which plays a role in the understanding of what is thought with the word "Dasein" in Bnng and Time. My
question now aims at the rdationship of consciousness and Da.sein. How
is that relationship to be clarified? If you take "consciousness" as a rubric.
for transcendental philosophy and absolute idealism, another fXtsition is
thus taken with the rubric "Dasein." This position is often overJookwor
110t sufficiently noticed. When one speaks of Being and Time. one first
thinks of the "they" or of "anxiety," Let us begin with the rubric "consciousness." Is it nol. strictly speaking, a curious word?
FINK: Consciousness is. strictly speaking, referred to the state of
affairs. So far as the state of affairs is represented. il is a conscious being
and not a knowing being. However. by consciousness we mean the fulfillment of knowing.
Ht:IOt:GGER: Strictly speaking. it is the object of which we arc conscious, Consciousness, then. means as much as objectivity. which is identical wilh the fil'st principle of all symheticjudgmcllls a priori in Kant.
The conditions of the possibility of cxpel'ience in gcncral are at the same
timc the conditions of the possibility of objects of experience. With consciousness, we arc concerned ",'ith a knowing. and knowing is thought as
representation, ;15 for example in KanL And ho'A' does it stand now ",'ilh
Dasein? If we wish to proceed pedagogically. from ""here must we sel
out?

126

127

PARTICIPANT: We can set out fmm the word. Thc concept ofhDa_
sein" in Kam means actuality.
HElDECCER: The concept of aaualit), in Kam is a dark pmblem.
But how does the concept of Dasein de\'e1op in the eighteenth century.
PARTICIPAl\'T: As a lr.lIlslmion of exi5JLnlin [existence].
HEIOECCEK: Dasein me'lIls.then: being present now. But how is the
word "Dasein" 10 be understood fmm out of the hennenuetic of Dasein
in Being mId Time'
PARTtCIPANT: The hcnncnclHic in Being mul Time sets out from
Dasein. whercby it docs lIot undcrSl.and Dascin in the customary manner
as presem at hand.
HElm:GGt:R: In Frcnch. Dasein is translatcd b)' eire-M (being there).
fOt example b)' Sanre. But with this. cverything that was gained as a new
position in Bring and Tim, is lost. Are humans thcl'c like a chair is there?
PARTICIl'AIIo'T: "Dasein" in Being and Time does not mean pure
human factual being.
HElDEGGEJl:: Dasein does not mean being there and being here.
What does the "Do" mean?
PAJl:TICIl>AST: It means what is cleared in itself. Human being. like
Dasein's being is no pure thing present at hand. bUl a cleared being.
Ht:IDEGGER: In Beillg ond Time, Dasein is described as follows:
Da-scin. The Du is the clearing and openness of what is. as which human
stands out. Representation, the knowlcdge of consciousness, is something totally different. How does consciousncss. knowledge as rcpresentation, relate to Dasein? III this you must not reOcct, but rather see.
Mr. Fink h:ts refcrred to the fact that consciousness is Pl"Operly the
knowledge of the object. In what is objectivity. and that which is represented, grounded?
PARTlCIPAIIoT: In represcnullion.
Ht:II>EGGt:It: Kant, and with him the absolute idealism of the absoIUle ide-d, was content wit.h Ihis answer. But whal is thereb)' supprcssed?
FIN": That wherein consciousness and objecl pia)'.
HElI>t:GGEk: Thus. the de'lnng in which something present comes
to meet something else present. Being opposite to ... presupposes the
dearing in which what is prcsent meets a human. Consciousness is only
possible on the gl'Ound of the Du, as a derivati\'c 1Il0de of it. From here
onc must llndcrsllllld the hist.orical step that is t.aken in lJt>illg (I./ld Timc,
which sets out from Dasein as npposcd to consciousncss. That is ;1 mattel'
that onc must see. I have alludc....d to this l)Cc,lusc Ihis rclati<'JIlship will still
pblya mic for us along side the other relatcdncss of Ev and nCtV'to. Both
belong together. Wilh Heraclitlls. llATj9HO. nonconccallllcnt, stands in
the backgmund. even if it is not Illcntioll(:'tl directly. He speaks on this
gl"Ound. although it is nol fUl"ther plll'Sucd by him. What I said in the last

session is also to be understood from out of this: lv is the re-Iatedness

I V".hiilt"isJ of nCtvta. n Re-Iating I V"-haltt>ll J and holding mean first of
all tending. keeping, and yielding in the widest sense. The content of this
holding is fulfilled for us in the course of lime. that is, in pass.'1gc
through the fragments of Heraclitus. Mr. Fink has repeatedly alluded to
the fact that the detenninations of lv, as lightning, sun, seasons. and fire
are no images, but rather characteristics that characteriz.e the holding
and the way and manner that "to. navto are for bo. and which char..lCtel"iz.e fv itself as the unifying, g.lthering ...
FINI';: ... and discharging. We must contrast this relatcdness of fv
and nUvta against the naive conception according to which ~ is thought
like a depositol)', like a pot in which allnavta arc. One cannot apply this
ontically familiar encompassing relation to the reference of h> and
1tavta.
HEIDEGCER: In Southern German, Topf[potl means Hafnl [jXll1.].
That is the same word as WttEo9at [to be brought together). The word
"ha",'k" (Habichl] also belongs here. that is, the bird which grasps. Language is much more thoughtful and open than we are. But pl"Obably this
will be forgonen in the next centuries. Nobod)' knows whether one will
ever come back to this again.
FINK: In the last session, we beg-dO to consider Fr. 26, and to em
phasize some elements, namely lhe peculiar situation of humans as fire
kindling beings placed betwcen night and light.
H~:IDEGGER: I'or me, the way in which the fragment is quoted by
Clement already creates a difficulty. When I read the context of Clement. it is unclear to me in which connection and out of which motive he
cites Fr. 26. There it says: 60a cY nU l'tpt U1tVOU Atyoucn,"to. aim} xQil xai.
nEQi 9ava"tou tl;oXOUElv. txCtt:EQO; yaQ b'1'.ol n)v 6.,tOOtoOtV rii;
6
~v ~,6 bi: "'nov, 6nEQ lad xai. naQiJ. 'Hpax>"d"tou ~Eiv.z. The
first sentence says in translation. "One must also hear the same about
death as what is said arout sleep." Ho..... this text should be connected
with fro 26 is incomprehensible to me. I myself can find no connection.
Clement's text is unintelligible to me in conm."Clion with Fr. 26 because
nothing is to be found in the fragment aoout a."'[6atO.ol~ rii; ",uxr);
Idepanurc of the soul]. Clemelll's texl is a completely different one than
lhat of the fragmenl. Anothcl' difficult)' for me is the follO\,'ing. HerotdilllS sars rhat humans kindlc a light in the night whcn cyesight is cxtin
g"uishcd. Is that on I)' IQ be thought in such a wa)' thar a human kindles a
liKht in the dark. eirher with a match 01" b)' pressing a bUllon?
FINK: I "'Quid suppose that lhe basic situation, mentic)Ilcd in the
fl"agment, is the human situation l)Ctwl.--cn night ,md light. :\ human is
not just like othcr living beings hell.'cen nighl and liglu: rather, he is a
living being who Slands in ,I relationship 10 nighl and lighl and who is not

,I

,,'urn;.

128

129

overcome by nighl and the dark. When his 61pU; is extinguished, he has
the capacity, as the being ....ith an affinilY 10 fire, to bring forth fire and
light. A human relales himself to night and day.
HEIDEGGER: Let us stay at first ..... ith night and day.
FINK: The human situalion is different from that of li\ing beings
which are exposed to nighl and day. When it is nigh I for a human, then
light is extinguished. Indeed. there is a Stting of the dark. 6'i'lS does not
mean here the capacit)' of seeing. but the capacity of seeing in adu [in
actuality]. When his 61plS is extinguished it means, therefore, when his
capacity of seeing is no longer in adu. The capacity of seeing as such is
not extinguished with the breaking in of darkness. We also do not say
that a human on I)' hears .....hen he hears sounds. For he also hears silence.
HEIDEGGER: A human sees nothing in the dark,
FINK: Nevertheless everyone sees something in the dark.
HEIDEGGER: I am aiming at precisely what extinguishing means.
FINK: Extinguishing can have two-fold meaning: first, it refers to
not seeing in lhe dark; second, to not seeing in sleep.
HEIDEGGER; Let us leave sleep aside. In the phenomenon, .....e must
distinguish between "not seeing anything in the dark" and "nOI seeing."
If .....e speak now of the extinguishing of sight, that is still not clear
enough to me. Not seeing means ...
FINK: ... that the abilily to see is dosed. With the open ability to see,
we see nothing determinate in the dark. But that is still a seeing.
HEIDEGGER: It concerns me now to determine what is negated by
the extinguishing of 6'l'1I;.
FINK: One can read Fr. 26 such that a human kindles a light in the
dream. Still, this way of reading appears questionable to me. When we
say that a human is extinguished in reference to 6'tpLS, it can mean either
a closing of the ability to see or a failing to find the visible on account of
the darkness. The latter means that the ability to see is open, but we
cannot make out anything specific in the darkness.
HEIDEGGER: In the dark I see nothing, and nevertheless I see.
FINK: This is similar with hearing. A sentry, for instance, listens
intensely into the silence without hearing somelhing detenninate. When
he hears no determinate sound, still he hears. His harkening is the most
intense wakefulness of wallling to hear. Harkening is thc condition of
possibility fOl' hearing. It is being open to the space of the hearable,
whercas hearing is meeting thc specifically hellrablc.
Ht:IDt:GGER: If .....e Ihink through what is Sl"lid about "seeing IIothing" and Unot seeing" in Ihe situatiOIl in which a human conccl"Ils himself
with a light, for example wilh a candle, thcn how is emJ'[lP Ifor himselfl
OUl Hf Fr. 26 to be understood? I am concernt."(1 to preserve Ihe tau'[w.
FINK: I do not rcgard it as pleonastic. A human has Ihe capacity,
akin to the da)" tu clear, even Ihough in a weak manner in comparison to

da)'. The human power to dear is something other than Ihe light Ihal
comes with the da}'light. The light kindled by the human is the littlc lighl
in thc great dark of night.
HEIDEGGER: When he kindles a liule light in the nighl, he does it so
Ihat something is still givcn to him in the darkness b)' the light.
F1NK: The little light stands in opposition to the rhythmic, great
light of day that befalls us and that has nothing dark about it. The
human is the light-related being who, it is true, can kindle light, but
ne\'er such as would be able to completely annihilate the night. The light
started by him is only an island in the dark of night on account of which
his place is clearly characterized between day and night.
HEIDEGGER: You emphasize night, and understand it speculatively.
But let us remain at first with the dark: in the dark, in t"'ilight, a hum,lIl
kindles a light. Doesn't this darkness in which he kindles a Iighl go
together with the light of which )'Oll speak?
FtNK: This light that a human kindles is already an offspring. All
fires on earth, and thal which is stat1ed by the fire kindling being, are
offsprings, as in Plato. The gods do not compon themselves in the same
way as humans toward light and night. A human has a Janus-like face;
he is turned as much to the day as to the night.
HElDEGGER: A human, who extinguishes in reference to the possibility of seeing, kindles a light. No..... lvtooPe06tls 61l'LS becomes clearer.
It thus means ......,hen he cannot see because of darkness" but not "when
he cannot see:'
FINK: I translate 61l'lS with possibility of sight.
HElDGGER: I don't quite understand that.
FINK: A human kindles a liule light in the dark measured by the
great light.
HElDEGGF.R: I would still like to stay with the little light; thereb}' we
clarify and preserve the eau'[lP.
FINK: J translate eau'[lP with "for himself:'
HElDEGGER: Blit what does UfoI' himself' mean?
PARTICIPANT: It means that the liule light is a private light ...
FINK: ... as against the great one.
lh:lDEGGI::R: a..TI'[Ql emJYlP [touches on himsclf]: why do I kindle a
candle for myself? To be sure, because the candle shows somclhing to
me. This dimension IlIUSt also be included.
FINK: I would like to accentullle the island-<:haracter of the little
light in which something still shows itself to me, The liule light in the
dark of nighl is a fl'agmclllary. insular light. Bec.llIsc a human does not
dwell in thc gre,lt light, hc resembles the nighl 0 ..... 1 (VUX1EQtl)E;;), Ihat is,
he finds himself on the boarder of day and night. He is distinguished as
a being akin lO light, but who stands at the same time in relationship 10
night.

130

131

HEIDEGCER: What indic.ates the relationship to night?

FINK: At the beginning it says that a human kindles a light in the
night. Then it says further that in sleep he touches on the dead. and in
waking he touches on the sleeping. Sleep is the twilight of life. A human
does not exist in the full richness of life in so far as he touches on the
dead through sleep. The dead stand in a reference to night.

limitation. cUt'!8uo (nonconcealmenl] is surrounded by A1'\8Tj (conccalment].

HEIOEGGER: In Fr. 26. I lay importance on prt.'Cisel}' the relationship of standing open.
FINK: The fragment does not speak of brightness. but oflight in the
night. It speaks of the curious human place between light and night
which is open 10 death and rcferred to death through sleep. Thc refercnce to death also belongs to thc underst;ll1ding of those who arc awake.
For those who are awake touch on the slceping and the sleeping touch
on the dead.
HEIDEGGEK: I am still with the light in the night. (m06avtiN [dying]
is stricken b}' Wilamo.....iu as an annotation.
PARTICIf'A~'T: If one retains wro6avWv. the frdgment mo\'es into
the neighborhood of meaning of the orphic-eleusinian world outlook.
Then the meaning of ttJtpQ6vrl [in the night] also changcs.
HEIOECGER: How do you understand l;fuv [living]? Doesn't one
have to strike OUl Wto6avWv on thc basis of l;fuv 6t [and living)?
PARTICIPANT: Wt06uvWv is an annotation to Wtoof}E06Eil; 61p~
[when his eyesight is extinguishcdj.
HEIOECCER: Referred to ti.'106avWv. cin:oaPE06Eil; 61pll; then means:
after the possibility of seeing is deprived.
FINK: But then the fragment mo\'CS into the domain of a mystic
assenion that I cannot follow.
HEIOEGGER: E\'e'1,thing that follows tUUl~ is pU7..zling to me. I do
1I0t see thc thrust of the frdgrnent. What is treated in this text? WtlElat
[touch on] is mentioned threc times, and each time in another reference.
First, it says that a human touches on (kindles) a light ill the night. Then
it says thm ..... hilc living. he l.Ouches in sleep on the dead, and in w'lking he
touches on the sleeping. How does WnElUl fit in here?
FINK: First, Heraditus speaks of WtlnQI in rderence to q><io;: [light
of the kindlcd fire). Touching on is also meant in firekindling. If a
human is the in-between being. between night and light. then he is also
the in-between being bet.....een life and death. the being who is already
ncar to death in life. In life. he touches on death while sleeping: in
waking, he touches on the sleeping.lurto~at[reciprocal touching] me.ms
.. more intimale manner than just thc abstrdct rep,'csentation. Slcep is
thc mean belwccn life and death. The slccping havc thc inactivity or the
dead and Ill(' IJI'calhing of thc living.
lh:'lDt:CGt:M: What does "awakc" mean?
FINI';': Thc wakcful one is he who stands rully open.
Ht:lDt:Gc;t:'K: Awake is cOllnectcd ..... ith "to aW;lken."
PAKl'ICIf>"NT: In w;tking up. om: touches on slcep. Waking up is the
counterpart 01 falling a.sleep.

}-h':IOEGGEI(: What does "10 touch on" mean?

FINK: To touch on here does not mean 10 touch. but aims at a

relalionshipofadjoining. And it is also impon:mt to notice here thal it is
not a question of simple boardering. but of'l relationship of adjoining.
HEIOEGGER: Here aithe table, when I lay the chalk b)' the glass, we
speak of a simple adjoining of both things on one anothel'".
FINK: BUl when a human touches 011 thc dead through sleep, he
does not adjoin thc dead like the chalk on the glass. In sleep, he touches
relatedly on the dark.
HEIDt:GGEIt: Thus it is a qucstion of an open-standing touching on.
That goes with the fact thal the kindlcd light also grants an openstanding quality to the little orbit of the room that is ilIuminaled by the
candle. l prefer that Fr. 26, and above all the Wunul tUU1lP. come into
Ule dimension of open-standing reference. To me, )"ou go much too fast
into the speculative dimension.
FINK: In that a human relates himself to the boardered space of
light. he relates himself at the same time to that which repels the quality
of standing open. One must find a word in ordcr to be able linguistically
to comprehend the referencc of the human nol only to the open but also
to the night that sunuunds the open.
HEIOECGEK: Thc dark is in a certain sense also the openness, if a
light is kindlcd in it. This dark opcnness is only possible in the clearing in
the sense of the Da,
FINK: I would suppose that wc ma}' think the concealmcnt of the
dark not onl}' out of the relationship of clearing of the Da. There is the
danger that one understands the dark only as boundary of what stands
open. as the exterior walling of the open. I would like above all to
indic.ltc that a human ,e1ates himself at the same time to the open and to
the concealing darkncss.
HEII)EGGEK: What )"ou say Illay be truc, but it is nOI direct I}' mentioncd illthc fraglllcnl. I wit1not comest thc dimension you havc in vicw.
FINK: Let us start from the situation of liglu in thc ni~ll1. Somebody
kindles it torch in the night. iI casts its shinc on thc way. so that one can
oriCI1l oneself on thc way. In that he moves in brightncss. and relates
himself to it, hc relatcs himself at the same time 1.0 Ihe mcn;lcing darkncss. fOI' which he is undcl'Slandingl)' open evcn though not in Ihe manner of standing open. The c1caring in the concealing darkness has its

132

. HEIDECCER: Do )'oU Ihus mean that in waking up we are at the edge

01 sleep? But in the fragmcnI il is a malter of an essential reference of
wOtking and sleep and of sleep and deOlth ...
.
FINJi.: ... and it is nOI a matter of whOtt is accidentally given. Here it
IS a matter of the human as the one who is belweeIHligllt-and-day.
HEIDECCER: For mc. Ihe in-between is slill not the tin. Also. we
sometimes call a wakeful human a bright, lively one. His .mention is
direcled toward something. He exisLS in that his bearings are directed
loward something.
FINK: The relationship bclwecll waking and sleep is similar lO that
between gods and humans. Comportment toward the sleep that permc.ues all wakefulness belongs to the sclf.understandingof being awake.
HElDt:GGER: Being waked up includes in itscif the reference to
sleepiness. Nat.urally, that is not. meant in Fr. 26. h is not a question here
of external relationships but of inner references. As understanding
comportment toward the 1110nal being of humans belongs to the selfunderstanding of the gods, so also the understanding reference to sleep
belongs to the self-understanding of those who are awake. Something of
the meaning of sleep in the life of humans shows itself here.
FINK: The countenension to sleep belongs to being awake. But the
sleeper touches on de~th. Sleep is the way of being engulfed and being
unued .from all t~l<ll IS many and structured. Thus seen, the sleeper
comes IIHO the nelghborhood of the dead, who have lost the domain of
lhe distinct.ions of no.vtU.
HElOI'GGER: Fm' the Hindu, sleep is the highest life.
FINK: That may be a Hindu experience. Sleeping is a manner of
being alivel as waking is the concentrated and proper manner of being
alive. Those who are awake do not immediately touch on the dead but
only in~irectly thro~gh sleep: SI~p is the middle pan between wa'king
and bemg dead. Bemg dead IS vle.....ed from sleep.
HEIDEGCER: Do )'ou say that the experience of sleep is the condition
of possibilit) of the experience of death?
.
FINK.: That would be saying too much. Sleep is a way of being simiI~r to .bemg dead, bu.t a way thal does nol occur only in an objective
biologIcal sense. For In the understanding of sleep wc have a twilight
understanding of being dead. In a cel1ain manner it is true that like is
cognizcd through like and unlike through unlike.
HElln:GGt;lc Isn't thc correspondence of slecp and death a rather
eXlcnwl ...ich'? Can onc expericncc sleep as sleep?
FINK: I .....ould like to ans\\'er this question positively in the same .....ay
that onc says Ihat onc GlII encoulller death intenlally. There are dark
ways of understanding in which a human kno.....s himsclf to be familiar
wilh. unde'lred being. We know of slt.:cp not onl)' in the moment of
"'akmg up. We sleep lhrough time.

133

HEIDEGGER: According 10 Aristotle, wc know nothing of sleep.

FINK: I would like to contest that. What Aristotle says in this way
about sleep does not spring from a phenomenological analysis of sleep,
which-as I belie\'e-is still undone today.
HEIDEGCU: I don't contest the possibility of experiencing sleep as
sleep, but I see no access.
FINK: When Heraclillls speaks of the (vn:oGa~ of those who are
awake in reference to those who are asleep, that cannot mean the exlerior appearance. Touching on ... is a coming into nearncss (Qv.
xl!iaah,), a form of appmach lhat does nol happen only objectively, but
which includes a dark mode Qf understanding.
HEIOEGGER: If we now summarize the whole, we can say that you
have already foreshadowed where you place WttEoGal. The three manners of WrtEoGal are relationships that a human encounters ...
FINK: ... but a human as distinctive elucidation of the basK: refer
enee. As t.he counterreferenee of gods and humans was thematic before,
now a human becomes thematic in the midst of oppositions. A human is
the twilight, fire-kindling being in the cou~terplayof da! and night. It.is
the basic situation of humans to be placed In an extr30rdmary manner ID
the counterpla)' of day and night. A human does not come fonh like the
other living beings in this coumerplay; rather, he comports himself toward it is near fire and related to ooqJ6v. What is said in Fr. 26 about
referen'ces, belongs in discussion of the counterplay of opposites. What
~ holds apart and togelher is thought in the image of the god. in the
image of bow and lyre and ill ~VLo. atpavTts. There the countertuming is taken in view. But here in Fr. 26, it is not a matter of counterturning, but of what is opposed ...
HEIOEGCER: ... which belongs together.
.'INK: A human is not only exposed to the counterplay of day and
night; rather, he can understand it in a special manner. But the many do
not understand it; rather, only he who understands the relatedness offv
and J"[vta.
HEIDECGER: With the difficulty that Fr. 26 creates for me, I
could-above all in order to clarify WntQl-solve the difficult)' only
....,hell I took Fr. 10 imo consideration: ouvo.'Pu:S 6).,a xat oUX 6w Otll!tpEQ6I!EVOV btatpEQOI!EVov. auv(tbov bt(tbov, xal tx J"[('t~wv fv ~al tl; tvbs
1'((1\'1a.3o The decisive ""'ord here is OtlVo.'PlES (connections). h IS the same
word as (brTW [la faslen}, but sharpened by the oUv [togelher]. QUI'
Gcl'lnan word hafttm (to fasten]. HaJt [al'l"cslj, is connected with .fut~{l).
Wc can place a semicolon behind ouvo.~tS. I do not lranslatc It With
"fastcned'logethcr," but with "lelling-belong'logether:' In the fragmem. it is not said what dctcrmined the auva~LES It simply stands there.
FiSK: I would say that the first l"'O illustrations of OUVo.~tES. 6w
xat oUx 6ka (wholes and nol wholes). prevent the aiJv from being under-

134

135

stood in the sense of a familiar wholeness. The usu:.1 idea of wholeness is

oriented lowardjoining I.Ogcthcr. But in the fragment it says: wholes and
not wholes. Thus. it is a matter of ouv{upu:;, not only of simple moment.s
into a whole, but of wholes and not wholes. as well as of harmonies and
not harmonies.
HEIDECGER: We can br.:td:et the xal betwttn 6).a and oUx 6).a.
riNK: The fragment then says further: tx :rtQvtwv Ev xal El; tv6s:
l'tCtvm (OUl of everything one and OUI of onc cvct'),thing).
HEIDEGGER: What is suq)rising is lhal1t<XvtCl and 6ka occur at the
same time.
FINl';: 6ka are in JtCtvta.
HEIDEGGER: Thus. '(0 6A.ov does nol mean the world.
FINK: The CragmclH speaks in the plural of whales ...
HEIDEGGER; ... that aTC nOl 10 be understood, however, In the

FINK: ... of wha! holds ...

HEIDEGGER: ... visible. The fragll1clII does not say that onc de\'e1ops out of everything combined. but that the unif).ing ht becomes
visible in the aline . from out of the allness. Is it a question here only of
the ratio t:ognOSU1ldi [order of knowledge) or the ratio ~SJe1uli [order of
being]?
flNI\: Of the ratio ~.sse"di.
HElOEGGER: But how? We understand the ~ tvos Jtclvta, but the tx
JtQVtWV Ev has not occurred up till now.
FIN"; We already came across tx llCtvrwv Ev in the relationship of
b'OOds and gold. The llCtvra as the many in entirct)', which stand fastened
by ht, refer to the one. All 6vtCl are already from the beginning held in
the care. in the guard. of ht.
HElOEGGER: I cannot follow that through sufficiently.
FINK: The words OUJ.l<pEQClf.I.EVOV 6LCl<pEQClj.l.evOV (concord and discord] sound vcry hard. The phrase brings us up short. which is its
exp"ess intention. But at the same time, it is taken back in thc OUVcl1.l'U:;.
HEtDt:GGEK: The reference of ntlV'ta and ht must be specified dif.
ferently than the rcference of fv and ltclvtCl. To be sure. both references
belong together, but as distinguished. The t; tvo~ ltUvtCl is not equal to
x :1tCtvtWV Ev, but it is the same in the sense of belonging together. Thc
difficult) that has shown itself again and again in the course of the
seminar lies in the methodological starting point, the justification of
which I certainly do not ,,:ant to contest. So long as one does not have
>.6yos in view, it is hard to get through the text. and Heraditus reads
with difficulty. For that reason. it seems to me that one must take Fr. I,
which is regarded as the beginning of Herac1itus' writing. as also the
basis for the beginning of the explication of Herac1itus. With the phrdse
b nQvr:wv Ev. the question wc have posed in reference to the relatednes5
of fv and JtclvtCl comes into play again, namely. how the relatedness is to
he detennined. if it is neither a matter of a making nor of a casting of
light. What is the basic character of navt(l as JtclvtCl in ho. lltlvtCl as
reined in by fv? Only when one secs this aspect can one determine the x
JtclvtWV Ev. uuvti~,t~ is probably the key to undcrstanding this.
)lA-KTlell'ANT: If we Illay also consider the context of Fr. 10. we find
lhe word uuv'ii~,t::v lconeordJ in it.
H~:lDE(:(:ER: Therc it says lhal nature brought about the lirst COllcord b)' the uniOll of opposites. The fl'agmclIl dues not. hO\\,cvcl. sa)'
Ihat the fv oU'urs ()llt of lhe many.
FINk: I would understand O'UVcl'VtE; \'erbally.
Hf.lDt:G<.a:R: I lay great impol1.imce on the \"orcl UUVcllVIE~ in reference to Fr. 26. Here. everything is still dark. I am cuncemed only 10 sec
what is questionahle in the Ill<lller. if onc :t\'oids operaling from the
beginning on the level of things.

sense of things.
FINK: At first, onc thinks it is a maller here of oppositions on the
same level. Hut at the close of the fragment it is said that it is not a matter
of the union of opposites; rather. everything can be thought only from
oul of the rclatedness of lv and 1tQvr:Cl.
HEIDEGGEK: How do you understand the tx [out of1?
FINK: From out of O\lV(llPLE~. That is a form.
HIDEGGER: Do )'ou mean a form or the form?
FINK: The form. You have interpreted the rdatedness of lv and
llQVta as state of affairs.
HIOEGGR; Is tx 1tQvr:wv (out of e\'erything] the s.1me as ~ tv~
(out of one]?
fINK: Here the auvcl1.l'U:~ is taken in view from both sides, the one
time as relatedness of llavta and lv. the other time as relatedness of band JtclvtCl.
HEIDEGGER: But we must determine that more precisely. because
the basic relatedness of lv and JtUvtCl lies at the basis of Fr. 26 on a
smaller scale.
FINK: I cannot see it there.
Hlm:GG~:R: When one reads bt JtclVTtIJV Ev at first reading. just as it
stands there. then il says that the one is put together out of everything.
FINK: That would be, thcn, an omic process-which. however. is
not me,mt in the f,agmenl.
H~:mf.GGEK: Hut what is the meaning oftx and lhcll t;? fv is indeed
the re-Jatedness of JtclvtCl. but 1tOvtCl are nOI on thcir part the rebtcdness of lv.
fINK: Thc tx must in each case be thought dilTerclltly. Thc JtOvtCl
:lre in UUVcl\IHf:; in rcfercncc 10 the lv. They arc held from out offv: they
art. OUVtlitt6f.1EVCl (fastencd).
HF.IDEGG~:K: Out of their being fastened is thc holding ...

136
PARTICIPANT: The \\'ord auvu'Vu:; has, among others. also been
contested.
,PARTICIPANT: Instead of <J1JVUlplES, oull6.lpL5 [laking together] is a
IX>SSlblc rendition, which is to be understood from oullaj3Tj [what holds
or is held together].
. . HEIDEGGER: <J\JUo.~VElV [to gather IOgclher) and OUVCuttElv [to
JOm together] are not so far from one another.
PARTICIPAl'o'T: aull6:'flU:C; would be simpler to undel'"Stand, and
means taking-together. The context gi\'cs examples of it.
HEIDEGCER: What is puzzling is the M, whether we now remain
with ouvcnjHE5 or O\JUa'l'I.;. The oUv comes first before C1U~HPEQ6~OV
lhacpE(>6j.1EVoV. O\lVa'lj.llS means the belonging-together of O'\lJ.lq>E{l6IJEVQV
and 6taQ>EQ6IJEVOV.
FINK: OUVCtlpLES means no simple clasping together, but the
clasping-together of what is clasped-together and what is not clasped.
together. That allows itself to be understood, however, fil'"St from the
relat~neS5, of fv.~Ovta. auvo"'ltS, thought ver~lIy, means not only the
condlUon of what IS clasped-together, but a happening, a constant counterplay ...
HEIDEGGER: ... a continuous bringing-toward"One-another. Think,ing in Greek. we can say that everything plays here in nonconcealment
and concealing. We must also see that from the beginning, because otherwise everything becomes opaque.

12
Sleep and Dream-Ambiguity of WrtEoSm
(Correlated Fragments: 26, 99, 55).

FINK: We mO\'e into a metaphoricdl manlier of speaking, when we

speak of sleep as the brother of death. SomCOlle who wakes up out of a
deep s!t:ep and reflects on sleep s.'lys, "1 have slept like a dead man." This
metaphorical interpretation is doubtful.
HEIOt:GGER: A second difficulty is expressed with the <Iuestion
whether ,Ill slt..-cping is also dreaming. Is sleeping to be identified with
dreaming? Today, ps)'chology maintains that all sleeping is also dreaming.
FINK: In dreaming, we must distinguiSh the one who dreams and
the dreamed 1. When we speak of a light in the dream, this light is not
for the dreamer, but rather for the dreamed I of the dream world. The
sleeper. or the sleeping l, is also the dreaming I, who is not the I of the
dream world who is awake and sees in the dreams. In the dream .....orld,
lhe I of thc dream world behaves similarly to the wakeful I. While the
dreaming I sleeps, the dreamed I of the dream world finds itself in a
condition of ",'akefulness. What is important, however. is that the light of
the dream world is a light not for the dreaming or sleeping I, bUI for the
dreamed I. The I of the dream .....orld can have different roles and vary
in its self-relatedness. A phenomenological analysis of lhe dream indic,ltes that not the sleeping, but the dreamed I kindles a light. Although
lhe sleeper does not see, still, as a dreamer, he has a dreamed I that has
encounters.
lh:IDEGGR: Thus onc cannot identify sleeping and dreaming.
FINK: Sleeping is a vivid form of human absorption. Dreaming is a
mode of the real I, while being a",'ake in the dream world is the mode of
an imentional I. The relationship of the sleeping I to the dreamed I, or
of the real I to the intentional I. one can compare ",'ith recollection. The
1'(."Collt."Ctor is not the subject of lhe recollected ",orld. We must also
distinguish here between the recollecting and the recollected 1. While
lhe recollecting I belongs in the ,lctual surroundings.lhe recollected I, or
lhe I of the recollccl,ed wodd, is I'crelTcd to the recollect,ed wodd. Only
because .....e customarily do not make the distinction between the
slceping-dreaming I and the I oflhe dre.un world. can one Sit)' that the
sleeper kindles a light in the dream. Seen phcnomenologically. however.
that is nOl correct. The I of the dream world. and Ilot the sleeping I,
kindles it light. If one wishes 10 illlCl'prel fire-kindling as a dream)' fire
making. then on the one hand lhe phenomenologKal distinction be-

138
t",cell the sleeping and the dreamed I will be overlooked ;md, on the
other h;~lld. th,c human situ.alion. aim~d at (in my opinion) in the frag.
ment, of standlllg between light and mght geLS lost. Dreaming is not the
essential distinetton of humans vis-fl-vis animals. Animals also dream, for
example. the hunting dog. when they make noises in their sleep. There
is also something like .1 dreamed dog-world. I myself reject the interpre_
tation according to which the human position between night ;l1ld light is
a matter of dreaming. Indeed. il is a possibility of interprCI:ltion. but one
must ask what philosophical rclc\'ance such an interpretation has in the
whole context of the fragments.
HEIDt:CCt;K: We must notice that the lhesis "no sleep without
dream" is an untic di.sco\cry that suppresses the existential distinction of
the sleeping and the drcamed I and only claims that all sleeping is also
dreaming.
FINK: The samc thesis also levels down the distinction between \\'aking in rcalit), :lIld the drcamed waking in the dream world.
HEIOECCEIC The phenomenological distinction between sleeping
and dreaming is lacking in that thesis which identifies sleeping with
dreaming. It is always an advantage to S3\'e the unity of the text, which i
philologically alwa)'s a principle to be positively valued. There are phases
in philolos>' in which e\'eT),thing is dropped and cancelled. and then
again, phases in which one tries to 5a\'e everything, When I came to
Marburg in 1923, m)' friend Bultmann had stricken so much out of the
New Testament that .scarcely anything remained. In the meantime, that
has changed again,
The whole of Fr. 26 is dirficult. especially because of 6.,Ttl"Ol. Perhaps
mOI'e clarity in this regard will come if we now proceed.
FtN": I would like to sa)' at the outset that the entire interpretation
thal I now give of Fr. 26 is only an attempt at interprelOltion. When we
proceed from the fact that a human kindles a liglu in the night, he is
spoken of as the firc kindleI'. that is. as the one who holds swa)' over' the
:ltO('l0lt; of fire-kindling. We must rttall that it was " dedsivc stcp in
human cultural development to gain power o\'el' fire-.....hich otherwise
was perceived only, 1'01' example, <IS lightning-to gel command and usc
of fil'C. A human is distinguished from all animals by the hcrilage of
Promcthcus, No animal kindles fire. Only a human kindles a light in the
nigh!. Ncvcrthelcss he is nOl ablc. like Hclios. lO kindlc a world-fire that
ncvcr goes out. Ihat drivcs OUI the night, Fr, 99 said thal if Helios "'ere
nol. it would be night despite the remaining stars. The moon and stars
arc lights in thc night. Hclios alone drives Otlt Ihe night. Hclios is no
island in the night. hut has overcome the insular nalUre. A human is not
able to kindle a TurruvTO-illlltllin<lting fire like Hdios. In the nighl. his
possibilities of sight arc extinguished, in so far as thc dark makes seeing
impossible despite open 61.\llt;, When ;\ human, in the siluation of want-

139
il~g l~ see and Ilot being able 1,0 sce in the night. employs his power of
kllldhng fire, he touches on thc powel' of light. Kindling fire is also a
touching on, Touching on the power of light is a kindling. In COlllrast,
lou~hi'~g on th~ night .has another character. Human fire kindling is a
proJecuon of a light bnghtness in \\'hich many. that is, the multiplicity of
no)).u are lit up. I intentionally speak of :lto)).a now and not of naVtO.
The finite, small liglnshine of human fire is also a fv in the sense of a
brightness in \\'hich many things show up, Hcre the relatednessoffv and
navta repeats itself in reduced manner as thc relationship of l:v (in the
sense of the brightness of the fire kindled b)' a human) and :ltoll.6. (that
is. the things that show up in each bounded brightness).
HEIDEGGER: When you speak about kindling fire, do you mean fire
on I)' in the sense of brightness and not also in regard 10 wanmh?
FINK: Helios brings fonh the seasons, which bring e\rerything
(ncivto). The strudure of lv, as the brightness of the sun, and :ltcIvto. as
the man)' in entirety which come fOI1.h to appearance in the sun's brightness, has a moment of repetition in reduced manner in the relationship
of lv as the brightness of the fire kindled b)' a human and noUci which
sho\\' up in this finite brightness. Human fire cannot illuminate e\'el)'thing (!lCtvto). but only many things (noll.6.). On the contrary. the
brightness of the sun-fire surrounds e\'el)'lhing (!lCtvto).
. HEIDEGGER: Does the distinction between the brightness of fire
prOjected b)' humans and the brightness of Helios consist in the fact that
one is restricted, while the lauer is referred to all?
FISK: Yes.
HElDEGGER: Is there brightness of fire witholll the light of Helios?
FINK: No. Rather, the bl"ightness of fire projttted b)' humans is
derivative from the sun's brighlness.
J-h:IDEGGER: Wc must also emphasize that the candlelight does not
show an),thing for itself. and that a human is not a seel' for himself alone.
The candlelight only shows something. and a human sees what is selfshowing in Ihc lighl-shine of the candle onl)' in so far as he stands always
and alt'cad)' in what is clearcd. Openness for the light in gene!'al is the
condition foJ' his seeing somcthing in Ihe candlcliglll.
FIN": The candlelight is an insulat light in the night, such thal we
can distinguish belween brightness and darkness, The brightlless of lhe
candlelighl disperses itsclf in th(' dark. \\'hile the brightness of Hclios is
no I,;mger cxperienced as hright ness ill the night. Thc brightness of lhe
Sll ~1.1ll gClleral makes possible ,lI1d support s human seeing and Ihc visual
ablltt)' to relate 10 what shows itself. In the brightllcss that a human
brings forth, in the light-Shine kindled hy him. there emerges a relationship of grasping human 1.0 Krasped statc of affairs in his surroundings
thal has the character of distalllialit),. Seeing: is a diSlillllial being with
things. As a distance sense, seeing necds an optimlll ncanu:ss 10 wh,lI is

140

HI

seen. There is a COllnitllli\'c distance between seeing and what is seen in

the unity of the o\'crarching light that illuminates and makes ,.jsible.
HEIDECGEk: Here wc can dl-dW on Fr. 55: 60wv 6'l'L; axe", ~U19tjO~

twccn the onc who grasps b). s<.'Cing and what is grasped. This distanti:'11
distance is a fundamental way of understanding. Contrary to that ",'ould
be an understanding grounded in a bcing-in-the-proximity in the sense
of immediate touching on. Touching on is an understanding that does
not come out of the survey. out of the expan~. or out of the region
toward I'o'h<tt is gr<tsped.
HEIDGGER: But what about whcn I now give you my hand?
FINK: That is an immediate touching of hands. In ltEQt "UX'ie; (On
the Soul], Aristotle calls flesh the medium of lhe sense of touch. But a
phenomenologicalobjection must be made here, because nesh is nOlthe
medium in the prope... sense for touching and what is touched. Seeing is
rcfe...red to a visible thing, to a visible object, which, howe\'er. meeLS us
out of a region. Encounter out of the open ambit, which is cleared by the
brightness. is distinctive of the special kind of g...asping that consislS in
the distance betl'o'een the one who grasps and what is grasped.
HEIDEGGER: And how does it relate with the reaching of hands?
FtNK: The ...eaching of hands is a coming up to one another of
touching hands. Between the touching hands there is an immediate
proximity. But at the same time. the hands can also be seen by us.
Touching ourselves is also a special phenomenon. A minimum of distance holds sway between what touches itself. Feeling and touching are
proximity senses, and as such they are the Wa)' of an immediate standing
at and lying near to an immediate neighborhood. Onc must understand
the relationship of the waking 10 the sleeping. and of the sleeping to the
dead. from the immediacy of the neighborhood of tOUChing on.
PARTICIPANT: In a phenomenological analysis of seeing and hearing as the two distance senses, you have worked out the phenomenological structure of the region that is identical with the space of seeing and
hearing. or with the field of seeing and hearing. You ha\'e then further
indicated that, in distinction to the two distance senses, feeling and
touching as proximity senses are due not to the phenomenological struc
ture of the region but to immediate proximity. Now it only concerns me
to indicate that the phenomenologically obtained structure of region in
the domain of both distance senses is not synonymous with the olltologically understood region in the sense of the openness and the clearing in
which something present mects a human being. For not only what is seen
and hcard, but also what is fell, is encountered out of the olllologically
understood region. If I have underslOod you correctly. you havc CIllplo)'ed the phenomenological distinction between disl<lI1ce sense and
Ilroximity sensc, that is, between lhe Iegion out of which the seer encoul1ters the seen and the hearer encounters the heard, and the immediate proximity of feeling and felt. as springboard for a speculative
thought according to which two different wa}'s of understanding being
are distinguished. Seuing out from the immcdiate touching of feeling

yaUto. tyW llQO Y41W.

FINK: ti'l'l<; and o.xot'j. sight and hearing. are both distance senses.
The one is a relationship to the light-sp.:1ce, the other a relationship to

the space of sound.

HElDEGGER: The Diels Lnlllslation, "E\'crything of \Ilh'ich there is
sight, hcnring, learning. that do I prefer," is inverted if you equate 6'VLo;,
axoiJ. and IlUOtJOl<; (learning]. and do lIot understand ('>-tlllo; and axot') as
l-u'.te'lO~<;. From this ~'e must say: "Everything of which there is learning
from Sight and heanng, that do I prefer. What Ollccan see and hear, that

gives learning."
FINK: It is thus a matte... of ~av86.vEW through seeing and hearing.
Every othe... sense also gh'es learning. Howe\e.... the leaming that sighl
and hearing gi\'e is prefe...red. Sight as well as hearing are distance senses
and as such a...e characterizt.-d by the distantial ...e1ationship of grasping
and grasped.
HEIOECGER: 6~t;: and Ctxoi( have an advantage that can be seen
from Fr. 55.
. FISK: Seeing .is a g... a~ping in visual space, hearing a grasping into
auditory space. With heanng, we do not so easily see a t;uy6v [yoke] that
spans hear.ing and what is heard, like light, with seeing, spans the eye
and what IS seen. And nevenheless-so I would think-there is also
something here like a t;uy6v. One would have to fo ...m here the concept
of an original silence that is the same as light with seeing. Every sound
breaks the silence and must be understood as silence-breaking. There is
also the silence into which we harken. without hearing something determinate. The original silence is a constitutive element forming the
distance of the auditory space of hearing.
HEIOEGGER: Perhaps the silence ...eaches still further into the direction of coUect;on and gathering.
FISK: You a...e thinking of the ringing of silence.
HEII>EGGER: I belie\'e that we can draw upon Fr. 55 as evidence for
your emphasis on the distance sense.
FINK: In contrast 10 the relationship. determined b}' distance, of
grasping and grasped in lhe light. or in lhe brightness. there is another
touching 011 which shows itsclf in feeling ITtaten]. Here there is an immediate proximity between f<"'t:ling and whal is felt. This proximity is not
u'ansmitted through the medium of distance in which lhe scer and I'o'hat
is seen. or the hearer .md what is heard, are set <tpart from one another.
In seeing, the g...asping in light is scp<tratcd fmm what is grasped. In the
unit}' of .the light th.u surrounds the onc who grasps :md the grasped.
the m:llufold of nollO. shows up. A distantial distance holds sway be-

142

143

and what is felt, you go over to the touching of the waking on the
sleeping and the touching of the sleeping on the dead.
FINK: I must make a slight correction of that. I am not so much
starting out from a phenomenolobrical im'estigation of secing hut more
in reference to the structure of brightness. A small, finite fire is also a
unity that is not alongside things. The brightness of the fire kindled by
humans is not only thc radiance on things, but the space-and-time+filling
light in which not only many things but many kinds of things sho..... up.
The way that the olle who grasps is in the brightness is the way of
distantial perception. If WttlQl taut4> is pleonastic when seen linguisti_
cally, I ",'ould not reject the pleonism. For one can say that a human
kindles a fire that is for him in contrast to the fire that is for all and in
.....hich, from the beginning, all humans reside as in the brightness of the
day-star. A human kindles for himself a light that illuminates him as the
one ..... ho is off the lrack and helpless. I started OUl from this phenomenon, and I have then characterized not only the relationship of lv (in the
sense of the brighll1ess cast by a human) to JtoUa, but also the human
dwelling in brighllless as a distalllial reference. Fire kindling cancels the
moment of immediacy of touching because the fire in itself is cast over a
distance.
HEIOEGGER: Somebody kindles a candle or a torch. What is produced with the kindling of tJ)(~ torch, the name. is a kind of thing ...
FINK: ... that has the peculiarity that it shines ...
HEIDEGGER: ... not only shines, but also allows seeing.
FINIi:: It makes a shine, casts out brightness and lets what shows
itself be .seen therein.
HEIDEGGER: This thing at the same time has the character that it fits
itself into the openness in which humans stand. The relationship of light
and clearing is difficult 10 comprehend.
FINK: The source of light is first seen in its own lighl. What is
note.....orthy is that the torch makes possible its own being seen.
HEIDEGGER: Here we come up against the ambiguity of shine. We
say, for example. the sun shines.
FINK: If we think in terms of physics, we speak of the sun as light
source and of the emission of its rays. We then determine the relationship of clearing to lighl such lhat the c1caring. in which the sun itself is
seen, is derivative from the lighl as the sun. We must put pre<:isely this
dcrivillive relationship into question. The light of the clearing does not
precede but. the other way around, the c1caring precedes the light. A
light is only possible as an individual because it is gi\'en individually in
the clearing. The SUII is seen in its o ....n light. SO Ihat the clearing is the
I1lQl'e QIigina!. If we trace Ihe brighlness lXtck only to the source of lighl,
we skip over lhe fUllclamcllIal characler of the clearing.
HEIDEG<iER: So long as onc thinks in terms of physics. the funda-

mental character of the clearing, that il is prior to the light, will nOI be
seen.
FINK: A human, as the heir of the fire thief. has the possibility of
bringing forth light in a certain sense, but only because there is a
clearing ...
HEIDEGGER: ... because a human stands in the clearing ...
FINK: ... and indeed by nature. Not only does the occurrence of
Ihings belong to standing within the clearing, but also the grasping occurrence of thc human who, however. is for the most part simply installed among things, and who does not lhink the lighl in which things
are grasped. Grasping indeed stands in the light. but it does not properly
grasp the light; rather. it remains lurned only toward the grasped things.
The task of thinking, therefore, is to think that which itself makes shining up and grasping possible ...
HEIDEGGER: ... and also the kind of bclongingness of the light to
the clearing, and how the light is a distinctive thing.
FINK: No better analogy shows itself for the special position of hu~
mans in the midsloftun:avta than that they, different from all other living
beings, are Iight~nigh. Touching on the power of fire is the way ~f fire
kindling. One can now interpret the phenomenal features mentioned
ontologically in that one understands the light not only as the light
perceptible by the senses, but as the light or as the light-nature of ooq>6v,
which makes all oocptS;. The human comportment toward oe><p6v is
human standing within the original clearing, a touching being-nigh
<JOq)6v in the manner of an understanding explication of things in their
essence. The danger here is thal the clearing or brightness itself is not
thought. In the brightness many and various things show up. There is no
brightness in which there is only one thing. In the brighLl1ess, many
things set Ihemselvesoff. In the light, their boundedness is outlined, and
they have boundaries against one another. The sceI' sees himself distin+
guished from the ground on which he stands, and from the other things
on the ground and round about him. BUI there is also no brightness in
which only one kind of thing would be given. III the brighlllcss. not only
a great number show up, but also many and various kinds, for ex,lInple,
stone. plant, animal, fellow-human. and alongside nalUr,,1 things also
artificially made things. etc. We do nOI sce only things of Ihe same kind,
but :llso differenl kinds of Ihings. A human. in lhe brightness brought
about by him, is as the finite rel1(,'t:tion of oo<p6v in the midsl of the
emirety thm is the articulated joining. HUlIlan 1I nderstanding in the light
happens as all understanding of n:o)J,.a. and this understanding is al the
same time variously articulated according 10 kind and species. l10Ua arc
not only a muhiplicit}' of number but also a multiplicity according 10
kind. In conlraSI to Ihis arliculalcd undcrswnding in the brightness.
thcre is perhaps a manner of dark underslanding Ihat is nOI articulated

144

145

and that does not happen in the shine of brightness Ihat sets apart and
joins together. The dark understanding is a kind of nightly touching on,
which can be characlcl"i1.ed as the neighborhood of antic relation. In the
position of Being (md Time. a human is regarded as the entity that is
unique in the constitution of its being. Although he is omically distin.
guishcd from all of what is. and customarily undcl'Sl:lnds himself es.
tranged from other entities. he has the understanding of the manner of

HEIDEGGER: But what do yOIl undcl"Stand by Ihe ontic proximity?

When you say proximity, do you not then mean a small distancc?
FINK: The ancients knew two principles or understanding; like
cognized through like and unlikc cognized through unlike. A human is
distinguished from all of what is. Ncvertheless, that does nOI predude
him from underslanding and determining all the rest of what is in its
being. Here the principle functions that unlike is cognized by unlike. But
in so far as a human is a living being. he also has still another characlerof
being with ,,-'hich he reaches into Ihe nightl)' ground. He has the double
charactcr: on the one hand, he is the one who places himself in the
clearing, and on the other, he is the one who is tied 10 the underground
of all clearing.
HEIDEGGER: This would become imelligible firSI of all through the
phenomenon of the body ...
FINK: ... as, for example, in the understanding of Eros.
HIOECGER: Body is not meant omic:ally here .
FINK: ... and also not in the HusserJian sense, .
HIDGGER: ... but rather as Nietzsche thought the body, even
though it is obscure what he actually meant by it.
FINK: In the section "Of the Ikspisers of the Body," Zarathustra
says, "Body am I entirely, and nothing else; ..." Through the body and
the senses a human is nigh to the earth.
HEIDEGGER: But what is ontie proximity?
FINK: Human lack or ontological affinity with other entities belongs
togethcr with thc ontological understanding of his manner or being. But
if a human exisu between light and night, he relates himself to night
differently than to light and (he open, which has the distinguishing,
joining togethcr strucl.ure. He relates himself to night or to the nightly
ground in so far as he belongs bodily to the earth and to the flowing of
life. The dark understanding rests as it were on the other principle of
undel'smnding according to which like is cognized through like.
HEIDEGGER: Can one isolate the dark undel"Standing, which the
bodily belonging to the earth determincs, rmm being placed in the clearing?
FINI\; T,ue. the dark undcrstanding can be addressed from the
clearing. but it doesn't let itself bc bmught funhcl" to language in the
Illanner of the articlllalcdjoining.
!h:lDt:GGER: Whcn you say ontie pmximity, lhen no small distance
is mcanl in whal )'ou call proximit)', bUl a kind of 0pcnness ...
FINK: ... but a Iwiliglll, dark, reduced openlless thal has 110 history
of concepts bchind it, to which we may havc to comc sometime. A human
has his placc between hC'lvcn and carth. between Ihc opcnness of
QA1'18lU and lhe dost.'dncss of AfJO'1. Ncn:nhclcss, wc musl say that all

being of all domains of things ...

HEIDEGGER: ... and indeed precise I)' on the ground of the antic
distinClness.
FINK: The antic distinctness of non human entities is no barrier for
human understanding of the manner of being, but precisely goes together with it. But a human is not only a cleared being; he is also oil
nalural being and as such he is implanted in a dark. manner in nature.
There is now also a dark understanding that presupposes not the ontic
difference, but precisely the ontic proximity, an understanding, how.
e\'er, thallacksclarity and historical investigation. One such dark understanding of the nightly ground is also meant wilh the Wutm in reference to uq>Q6vrj, and in the manner that the waking touch on the sleeping and the sleeping touch on the dead. This dark understanding is no
kind of distantial understanding, but an understanding that stands in,
that rests on. the ontic proximity, but that exhibits no ontological abundance. A human is predominantly a light kindler, he who is delivered
over to the nature of light. At the same time, however, he also rests on
the nightly ground that we can only speak of as closed. The sleeping and
the dead are figures indicated by human belonging in living and dead
nature.
HEIDEGGU: The concept of ontie proximity is difficult. There is
also an ontic proximilY between the glass and the book here on the tabLe.
FINK: Bctween thc glass and the book there is a spatial proximity,
but nOt a proximity in the manner of being.
HElDt:GGER: You indeed mean an ontological and not an ontK::
proximity.
FINK: No, herc it is precisely a matter of an ontic proximity. We can
make clear whal Ihe ontic proximity implies on the OPPOSilC structure.
As Dascin, a human is distinguished fmm lhe reSI of what is. bUI at the
same time hc has lhe ontological undcrstanding of all of what is. Aristotle says: t't\j1UX~ 1:C:t {)Vtcl 1tW~ eau .ltUvtCl. Thc soul is in a CCl11lin sense all
things (1tEQt 'Puxit~, r 8. 431 b 21). Thai is the manner in which a humlln
COIllCS nigh to oocp6v. to MSyoS. to thc articulated joining of the x6ofWli'
Ikcause he himself belongs in thc c1caring, he has a limited lighting
capacilY. As the onc who can kindlc fire, hc is nigh to thc sunlikc and the
rop1101I-like.

147

146

compol1mcnt lowfll'd the dark ground is to be experienced as cOll1on.

men! whell a residue of clearing remains. because in the absolute night
not only all cows arc black, but also all understanding is oblilcr<lIcd.
HEIDEGCER: A human is embodied [leibt] only when he lives (It'bt].
The ~Y in your sense is (0 be underslOod thus. Thereby. "to Jive" is
~~anl In the existential sense. Omic proximity means no spatial proxImity between two things. but a reduced openness, thus a human on.
lolo~cal moment. And ne\'~rtheless. you speak of an antic proximity.
FINK: You have, one lime when you came 10 Freiburg. said in a
leclUre that the animal is \\'oddpoor. AI that time, )'OU were underway
loward the arIinity of the human with nature.
HEIDECGEK: The body phenomenon is the most difflCuh problem.
The adequate constitution of the sound of speech also belongs here.
Phon~tic.s thinks too ph)'sicalisticall)'. when it does not see q>WV'i} (speech)
as VOice 111 the correct manner.
PARTICIPANT: Wiugenstein sa)'s an aSlounding thing in t~
Trae/alll.J. Language is the extension of the organism.
FINK: The onl), question is how "organism" is to be understood
here, whether biologicall)' or in the manner that human dwelling in the
midst of what is is essentiall), detemlined b)' bodiliness.
HEIDEGGER: One can understand organism in the sense of Uexkiills
or al~ as the functio~ing of a living system. In m)' lecture, which ),ou
mentioned, I have said that the slone is worldless, Ihe animal worldpoor, and the human world-fanning.
FINK: It is thereby a question whether the world-paveny of the
animal is a deficient mode of world-forming transcendence. It is questionable whether the animal in the human can be understood at all when
we see it from Ihe 'l11imal's \'iewpoint, or whether it is not a proper wa),
Ihat the human relates to the dark ground.
HEIDF.GGF.1t: The bodily in Ihe human is not something animalistic.
The mal1ner of undersl'lllding that accompanies it is something that
mClaphysics up till now has nol touched on. Qlllic proximit)' holds of
many phenomeml from which you want to comprehend WttflCU.
FISK: WttE"tm appears at first to be spoken from a clinging to and
touching on, from the sense of toll ch. In touching on the dark power', a
ncighborhood of proximit)' holds sway; while touching on the light is
standing in the light. Wh,1! is in the light has in itself thc moment of
disl.allliality, against which. however, it is no objection Iha! a human also
touches 011 tll(.' power of light {If (J()<pOv.
l"h;II>t:GGEK: How do )'ou now understand "touching un"?
FISK: Touching: on the powcr of liglu of oo<pOv is a dislallced touch
ing 011. To the COlllrar)', louching 011 the dark power' is a distanceless
touch ing on. Such a distanccless touching on is the il\\'akc one's touching

,I

on the sleeper and the sleeper's touching on the dead. How is the relationship of the wakeful to the sleeping to be detennined? The wakeful
one has a knowledge of sleep that is more than simply a memOI)' of
ha\'ing slept, falling asleep, and waking up. The knowledge of the wakeful concerning sleep is a manner of the dark flux of life where the I is
extinguished for itself in a reduced manner. The living touch in sleep on
the manner of uncleared dwelling. A human, who belongs to the domain
of light and harkens to it, has in sleep a kind of experience with being
returned to the dark ground, not in the state of unconsciousness but in
nondistinctness. While bt xat nCtvta stands for a thinking mandate for
the relationship in the domain of light, the experience of the dark
ground of life is the experience of lv xal. nw. In bt xal. JtQv we must
think the coincidence of all distinctions. The experience of bt xal. nixv is
the relationship of Ule human, who stands in individuation, to the
nonindividuated but individuating ground. BUI the danger here is that
we speak all lOO easily about metaphysical entities.
HEIOEGGER: When you speak of the uncleared, is that to be understood as privation or as negation?
FINIC The uncleared is not privative in regard to the cleared. To be
sure, we understand the uncleared from OUl of the cleared. But \\'e are
concerned here with an original relationship to ).Tj8Tt. Out of the situation of an essence determined by l&A.Tj9uQ, the human has at the same
time a relationship to ).Tj9rl. He does not always stand in l&A.Tj9Ela; rather,
he stands in rhythmic oscillation between waking and sleeping. The
night, whkh he touches on in sleep, is not onl)' to be understood privatively. but is to be understood as an autonomous moment alongside the
moment of day or of the brightness to which he relates in waking. As
CPlA.6ooqx>; [lover of wisdom], a hum,m is not only a cpo..oC; of ocxp6v, but
also of ).Tj6rl.
HEIOEGGER: Is ).Tj9TJ to be identilied with night?
FINK: Night is a kind of ).Tj8Tt.
HEIDEGGEK: Ho\\' do yOll understand the unclearcd? When yOll
speak of reduced openness, that sounds like mQTJOlC; (privation].
FISK: Being awake is, in its tautness, suffused by the possibilit)' of
the Sill king away of tellsion and the extinguishing of all intcrest. Sleep is
a way in which wc come illlo thc proximit), of being dead. and is not
merely a metaphor for death. Perhaps onc must also treat phenomena
like dyillg olllologically sometimes.
PAKTICU'ANT: I Ix:lieve that wc must distinguish between the rcduced dearedncs~ 01" the dark understanding, 1'01" cxample, of the
understanding of the dark ground in slcep. and the dark ground itsclf.
which is uncleared pure and simple. The undcrslanding of the dark
ground. and not the dark ground itself, is half cleared.

148

FINJi.: A human as a torch in the night implies that he is allied to the

light-brightness of day and to the night which extinguishes all distinc_
tions and the possibility of sight.
HEIDEGGER: The experience of sleep does not imply a mere re.
membering that l was falling asleep. The experience does nOI J'cfer to
sleep as a mere occurrence ...
FINK: ... in conscious life...
HEIDEGCER: ... but signifies a manner of my being in which I am
implicated .
FINK:
and that still dctennines me in being awake. The bright.
ness of being awake always stands upon the dark underground.
HElm:CGER: Do you mean that in the actual [a.tu~llro] sense?
FINK: Similarly to the way the gods relate understandingly in their
own life. by relating at the same time to the transient being of mortaJs. so
we relate ourselves wakefully to th~ manifold. ord~red cosmos which is a
joining. Thereby. we know at the same time in a dark manner about the
ability to be extinguished in sleep.
HIDGCR: But this knowledge is not necessarily actual (OAllUl/).
FINK: No. Perhaps this knowled~ may be characterized from the
problem of thrownness as being abandoned to that which a human has
to be, and which does not belong to reason. As soon as one speaks of
understanding of the dark ground as a relationship. one already means a
distantial understanding.
HEIDGGER: When we speak of the relationship to sleep. that is an
inadequate manner of speaking. Is sleep the genuine understanding of
the dark ground?
FINK: Not the sleeper, but the awake one relates himself to sleep.
HEIDEGGER: Concerning this reference. is there stilt anOlher ont.ological possibility?
FINK: If being awake is the intensity of the process of life, the t.autness is supported b)' the possibility of being able to let loose the tension
of all fixation, of distinction and contrast in relationship to things and to
the brightness. Someone could say that we are dealing here with an
obsen'ation to the effect that life relates to death like waking to sleep. or
like sleep to being dead. and that these analogical rdationships would be
spoken cxtcmally. But with th:tt. one misses our real problem. which
concerns thc manner in which the awake onc touches on sleep and the
living sleeper touches on the dead. TOllching on is our problem, and not
the everyday observation or e\'er)'day philosophy according to which
sleep is the brother of death. and life and death are regarded as
mediated through the link ofsk-ep. In lcibniz. "'c find the philosophK:a1
tendency to attempt to undersland the being of the Im,'er monads
through d"e:unless sleep. impotence. and death. which is uo death for
him in the strict sense. The three phenomena melllioned arc for him

149

grades of receding differentiation of understanding. For Leibniz, being

dead is still a manner of life. that is, of undifferentiated represelllOition.
since, slrictly speaking. the monads cannot die. Thereb)'. he illl.erprelJi
lhe seriollsness or death in tenns of:1Il extrcme weakness of consciousncss. He illlcrprets stecp, impolence, and death in rcference 10 a scale of
regression of differentiation of Ii\'ing represcnliltion of the lower
monads.
Heraclitus' fr. 26. however. is not concerned with an obsenalion conct::ming life and death and their mediation through waking and sleep,
but with a statement on the essence of humanily. A human. as the one
who is able la kindle fire and as the onc who is able 10 touch on the
powerof light. is al the same lime also the one who is able to touch on the
dark in sleep and in dealh. Bm whal is tbe meaning of touching on the
dark which does not have the disuUlliality of one who grasps and what is
grasped within the brighllless? Here we cling 10 the troublesome expression of ontic proximity. We are concerned with the philosophical Pl"Oblem of tht:: double relationship of the human wilh the relationship to
light and to fire. which is a dislantial understanding of one who grasps in
reference to what he grdSpS. and with the understanding which is
oriented to the immediacy or a~tV; [tollching] in which thc distinctions
between grasping and gl<lsped escape us. We ha\'e here only the modes
of escape and absorption, and ,,"'e cannot say more because otherwise we
easily decline intO a speculative mysticism.
Ht:IDEGGER: The relationship 10 death includes Ihe question about
the phenomenon of life and sleep. We cannot drcumvcl1lthe problem of
death, because death occurs in the fragment ilSelf. We cannot come to
grips with the problem independcntl)' on thc basis of sleep alone.

13
Reference to Dealh, Awaiting - Hoping
(CorrelaLCd Fragments: 27,28).The "Contraries" and their "Transition"
(Correlated Fragments: Ill, 126,8,48,51).Closing Question: The Greeks as a Challenge.

FINK; Till now. we ha\"c come across humans only in relationship to !.he
gods (Fr. 62). Fr. 26 deals with the human being alone, but without
ignoring the other references. 6..TtEtal is the fundamental word of the
fragment. There is. however, a difference between Wnl:Ol in reference
to the light, and WrtEtOl as the touching of those who 3rc awake on the
sleeping and the sleeping on the dead. In Fr. 26, no narrative is lold, no
passing event is reported; rather, the basic relationships of a human are
seen, on the onc hand to the power of light. and on the other, to the
JX>werof what is dosed, which he touches in a different manner. WttEtUl.
is first referred 10 the light. then to !.he darkness of those who sl~p and
to the greater darkness of the dead. Wnetal is common to all three
references. If we do not take fire as an element. but as that which casts a
shine, and makes possible the distantialit)' of !.he one who grasps and
what is grasped in the shine. then too liule is said with !.he possible
translation of fire-kindling as "contact." We must ask in what reference
the contact must be specified. On the onc hand. it is a mauer of contact
with the fire that makes a clearing, and not just burning and warming
fire; on the other hand it is a maller of contact with, or a touching on,
that which does nol shine up, but which closingl)' withdraws itself from a
human.
HEIDEGGER: What closingl), withdraws itself is not at first open. in
order then to close itself. It does not close itself. because it is also not
open.
FINt,;: Self-closing does not mean being locked up. Touching on is,
here. a seizing of what cannot be seized. a louching on what is untouch
able. In the dark of sleep. a human touches on death. 011 a possibilit)' of
his own. BUlth'll does not mean that he becomes dead. For it says: ~Wv

be

WtU'Wl l6vE(il'to~.

HElI)EGGEK: In my opinion. the distress of the whole Hcraditlls

illl.crpretation is to be seen in the fact that what we call fr::tb'lncnts arc not
fr::,gments. but citations from a text in which they do not belong. It is a
matter of citations OUI of diITerent passages ...
FISK: ... Ihal are nOI elucidated by the contcxt.
H.:IOEGCER: J\h. Fink "'ill now give us .. prcvicw of the further' way

151

of the attempted explication, and I will in dosing make an observation

on what has transpired thus far.
FINK: I go to Fr. 27. which I would like to relate to Fr. 26. The text
runs: tivOQWJ10UC; IltvEI ci.,"toOav6vta~ aooa oux f:k:tOvtal oMt
boxtOUOIV. Dids translates: "When they are dead. what awaits people is
not what they hope or imagine:'
We can start thc explication with the question of whal EM:(~W lto hope]
or E),;di) lexpeetationJ means. People 'Ire not related only to what is
immediately present. to what lies before them in their grasping apprehension. Thc)' arc not dependent only upon what they can get hold
of in the perceptible ell\'ironmem; rather, people are, as active beings in
the encounter with what is present. projected into an anticipation of the
future. This projection happens. among other instances, in hope. In
N6f,u)l (Th4! Laws) (I 644 c 10---644 d I) Plato distinguishes two fonns of
tA1t(~: fear (cp6fk>C;) and confidence (OCtQQo~). He specifies fear as anticipation of what is painful (<p6IX>~ Ilh''' nQtl )'i"t'l~ [)"Jt(~). and confidence
as anticipation of the opposite (9aQQOC; BE " 11(10 tOU tvavtCou). A human
behaves confidently toward the futurc in anticipation of future joy and
fearfully in anticipation of !.he approach of what threatens. Beyond that,
a human not only touches on !.he dead; he also cOlnports himself toward
death. So long as he $0 projects himself into the future, he stands in his
ways of componment in the project of the future, which is fonned and
mastered in pan by him, but which is for the greater pan determined by
fate.
Ht:lDEGGER: How is the relationship of awaiting and hoping to be
specified?
FINK: In hope, I hear the anlicipation of something positive; in
fear. on the contrary. the anticipation of something negative. The individual human lives beyond thc immediate present in anticipation of what
is oUl.Standing in the formable future. Thus the Athenians. for example.
stocked up in preview of the possible event that they should begin war
with Sp<trta. A human also has this relationship to the future beyond !.he
threshold of death. He comports himself not only toward the future of
his coming life. but also be)'ond his future life toward his death. All
people auempt in thought to populatc and settle the land behind
Acheron. They approach dcath ....,ith a hesit<lnt hupe.
Hf.IDEC(;ER: The rcallionship of hope and cxpectOllion is still not
dear to mc. In hope there always lies a "c(koning on something. In
awaiting, on the cOlllrar)'~in thc proper sense of the \\'{)I'd-therc lies
the altitude of a(ljoining what is coming.
FINK: To be sure, onc Gill spl.'cify hope and awaiting in this m;:mner, but hope does nOI need to be reckoning on somcthing. When
people set up hope al lhe gr::t\'c of the dead. thc)' bclie\'e themseh'es able
in a cenain sense 10 anlkipate thc sphere of what GlllnOI be anticipated.

152

153

l-h:IDECCER: Hope mcans "10 concern oncself with something very

illlcnsely," while therc is an adjoining "'ith wh.n is to come in awaiting,
Hope al the same time includes an aggressive moment; aw'liting, on the
contrary, includes the momelll of restraint, It is in Ihis thal I see Ihe
distinction of the two I>hcnomena.
FINK: In Greek, fuiC; cncolJlp.'Isses bolh. In N6~I, a human is determined by A.Um'l [pain) and 1)bovi) [pleasure]. EXJX'Clation (t).,"l(.c;) of
).,Um'l is qx)~; cXpl.."Ctation (tb(;) of ftOoviJ is 9QoooC;.
HEIDECCER: Roth altillldes fix themselves on that to which they
refer. But expectation is Ihc altilude of restraint and of adjoiningoncself
to what is coming.
fINK: Expecunion is thc philosophical attitude, A human does not
relale himself only to the futurc of his life, bllt he also reaches hopefully
beyond the threshold of death. BlII death is what is closed. indeterminate, and incoml>rehcnsible. Therefore, Ihc question is whcthcr there is
a land behind Achcron or a no man's land.
l-h:mEGCER: MOlal'l said a <Iuartcr of a cenLUry bcfore his death,
"Thc grim reaper speaks to mC,"
FINK: The grim rcapcl' also commissioned his Rc<luiern. Rilke's
epitaph also belongs here. "Rose. 0 pure contmdiction, desire, Ito be no
onc's sleep among so many I lids." Thc rose is the simile of the poet who
in many songs. or under his lids, is no more he who wrote songs, but who
has losl himself in the slt.'Cp of no onc. An expectant auitude lies in the
characterh.ation of dc-cuh <IS no onc's sleep. a rcfusalto projcct what I~s
behind Acheron. In V.n:(C;, human comportmelll is detel'mined by a pre\'icw. and indeed either in preview of the future of life or of the
thrcshold of demh in reference 10 a postmortal life. Heraclitus 53)'5,
however, that when they Me dead, something a"'aits people that they do
not hope for. Diels t r.mslates boXEOUOW with "imagine:' A derogatory
con notal ion of false opinion lics in imagining. But I bclic\'e that 6oxiv
does not mean imaginc here, bUI means "grasp," When they are dead,
such things await peoplc as they do not arri\'e at through alllicipatory
hope. such things as they do nol grasp. The I'ealm of death I'epels from
itself cvcry prematllre OCCUI>Ollion and cognition.
HEIOEGCER: We must elucidate 60xEiv still more closely.
PARTICIPANT: bEXOIlOl means to accept.
'-h:IOEGGER: "To accept." ho\\'evcr, is !lotto be undcrstood here in
the sense of a supposition. as whcn \IIC say "I suppose it will rain this
morning," "To accept" here means, I IOlcralc. I accept \\'hat "'ill be given
10 me. We are dC:lling hcre with the lIIoment of toleration. because
otherwise boXEiv means an incorrcctly held opinion. Wc must thercfore
tl";mslate boXEOtJOtV as 10 acccpt and to grasp. Accepting does nOt mean
hcre supposition. for example. Ihc supposition that is made thematic by

Meinong and with which Husserl stl'llggled. baxEiv is here nol mere
imagining, but an accepting grasp,
FINK: Later on, in Plato, b&;Q has predominantly the sense of opinion. BUI 6Q6i1 b6l;a (correct opinion). which has no negative sense, is also
found in Plato.
HEIDECCEIt: We also come across 6oXElV, in the significance which
we have drawn upon for Fr, 27, in Parmenides, when he speaks of
boxoiivta,
fINK: Thus, in conclusion, we can translate Fr. 27: "When they are
dead, something waits for people that Ihey do not arrive at Ihrough hope
and accepting grasping," That means that a human is repelled by the
inaccessibility of the domain of death.
Finally, we go 10 Fr. 28: boxtovta yo..Q 6 boXlfUlllQtOC; ylVwax.l,.,
q;u).,a.oou xal ~Ol xal. 6(xTJ XCltuAt)'PElOL 'PE"Ubrov tEXtOV(l(; xal J,lCl(>tuQClC;. Here again, \\'e must nOl understand 6oxtOvta in the negative
sense of imagining,
HEIDEGGER: Snell understands 6oxtovta as that which is only a
view, I cannot connect this translation with the fragment in any sense,
FINK: I would like to suggest an inlcrpretation as a kind of suppon
for the non imaginary ooxEiv of fr. 27. The boXllU.otato; is he who
grasps most, the one who has the greatest power of grasping_
PARTICIPANT: The OOXll.U.lnCIloc; is also the one most tested. Perhaps
we must view both meanings together.
HEIDEGCU: How does Diels translate Fr. 28?
FINK: M(For) whal the most credible witness cognizes, retains, is
what is only believable_ But certainly Dike will know and also seize the
fabricators of lies and witnesses," Instead of "what is believab!e one
would rather expect "what is unbelie\'ab!e." I am nOI of the opinion that
6oxEOVlQ has the sense of what is merely posited and not \'erified, ~a
in Greek by no me.ms signifies only men~ opinion. There is also the M;a
of a hero and of the commander. Here ~a means the manner of
standing in sight of something and not, for exam plc, having an illusion.
PARTICIPANT: OOXlI.l.OOlatOC; is also the onc of highest repule,.,
FINK: ". but not with the many: rathcr, with regard to the thinker.
The boXl~wtatOC; grasped Ihe ooxfovta, that is, the Jtav[O as thc many
elllities that shine up. appear, and become graspable in the appearing,
The onc who grasps the most grasps things in t heir shining up. I tr<lnslate {(m).,t'tooEl not as "retains them," but as "joins them," The one who
grasps the most reccivcs the many cntities and joins them. The Jtollo
arc also relatcd to 6oxtovlo in grasping, bm they are given over 10
boxtovto and lost ill thcm. The)' arc not 'lble to sce Ihe unification, thc
light, in which the boxtovta shine up, The boxl~oo'((no; is referred to
the appearing things. and hc holds them together. He watches over the
M

154

155

boxtovta in that he refers thcm 10 the tv. He is not only oriented to the
many that show themselves in the shine ofJight. but at the same time he,
as light related, has the power to join them, and he sees what makes the

imagining. then the assertion has a harder specification, Also in this

world, grasping does not suffice. We always move in a correcl and incor
reet grdsping. There is error and illusion in life. Heraditus. however,
says that the grasping that we are acquainted with and place in the
sen'ice of our life conduct is not sufficient for the poStmortal domain.
There is no grasping capable of penetrating into the no man's land.
I go to Fr. Ill: vouoo~ UyllfIV bOlllOEV ftbil xat ltya86v, M~l; x6QOV.
x6.~'to;ltVQ..,"'tC100lV. Diels translates: "Sickness makes health pleasalll and
good, hunger satiety. toil rest." This fragmclll app(."ars to be simple, Onc
could wondcr th,ll such an e\'er)'da)' cxperience turns up formulated
among the sayings of Heraditus. We could, hO"'e\'er, take it as an cntry in
the fragments that think the contraries in an unusual manner. When it is
said that sickness makes health pleasant. is it then as simple as when
Socrates says in the Phut!do that, after he is freed from the painful
shackle, he now feels the pleasant senS::ltion of scratching? Here the
pleasant feeling comes out of the past discomfort, Heraclitus says that
sickness makes health good and sweet. Either the past 01' the following
health can be meant thereby. Sickness-health is no distinction of a fixed
and opposing kind, but a phenomenon of contrast of such a kind that
health can develop out of sickness. The s,une holds for hunger and
satiety, and for toil and rest. It is a mauer of a procedure of opposites
going over into their counterpart, ofthe phenomenal )'oking of contrasts
in transition, i(bU (pl~asant) and ltyaOOv [good) are not specified as qualities in themselv~s, bUl are specified as coming out of a negative state
from theircoumerpart. which is left behind and abandoned. Past riches
make the following poverty biuer and, coO\ersely. past poverty makes
the following riches pleasant. These relationships of opposites are famil
iar to us. What is important here is only that o.ya86v and f1bU are
specified only out of the cOntrast.
With this. I go to Fr. 126: 'tcl '$UXQCl 9iQE'lm. 9QV.bv '$UxE'lQl, UyQOv
auaivE'tQl. xoQql<.lllovvm:ite'tm. Dicls'translation runs: "Cold things be
comc warm. the warlll cools. the wct drics, thc arid is moistcned:' Oicls
translates '\jJUXQU, 9EQI.l6v, uA.Q6v. xaQcpaAEov by cold, warm, wel. arid.
Blit wh,ll is mcant Ihereb)'? h is a maller of neutral words that are prol,.
lematic because. on Ihe onc hand. t hc)' express a spL-'Cilic sl:lle ofSOIllClhillg
and. on the other hand. they call Illean :-oilllplr being cold, being warm.
being wet, and bcillg arid. If a specific state of sOTllething is mea III , then \,'C
sa)' that Ihe cold thing lhat w:lnns lip goes 1)111 ()f tllc Slate ofbeillgcolcl ill
10 lhe stale of being wann. Tile goillg(I\'cr ora tiling from a Stale itUo all
opposite OIlC is something differenl from ~he Koin~ ovet' ol",bc~ng cold
into being warm as such, The going over 01 sOlncllllng out of bcmg cold
into being Wlll'lIl is a familiar phclloIllCnalmo\'cmellt of change. Therewith, less is said lhall with the :ituQ6~ 'tQO:itoL For hcre we arc concerned
with the transmutation of fire itself into somelhing else. It is noteworthy

boxEOvtCl possible.
HEIOt;CCER: Thus. YOll interpret qlUAClOOUV as holding together.
FINK: ThaI is, the holding together of things on what holds them
together: rclatedncss. as )'Oll ha\'c said. The onc who grasps most
grasps what shines up in a joining .-elatedness. The 00x1J!6rtator; is.
among common people. similar to the light itself. The second sentence
of the fragment Tuns in tnlllSlalion: But surely Dike will know and also
sei:r.e the fabricators of IM=5 ;lIld witnesses. The fabric'dlOrs of lies are the
oncs who have taken the 6o'Xtovtaout of the joint of the gathering unity,
and have grasped ooxovta only as such, but do not grasp the appearing
in the light of br. Dike watches over the right grasping :ltlitude. over the
guardianship of the boxqto.rtCl'tol;. who hold boxovta together.
HEIOEGGEW: xa'ta)"a~lp6.vw also means to take in.
FINK: Here in the fragmelH. however, still more is meant. Dike will
find guilty those who lie. She is the watching power who behaves in
accord with the box~~w'tQ"[Ol; when the laller hold 6vtCl together as the
many in the onc. The counterconcept to the boXl~<lnCl'tO; is the 1(0),,),0(.
who are merely lost in the many. and do not see the joining power of
light. To be sure, they see the shining up in light, but 1I0tthe unity of
light. In so far as they miss a fundamental human possibility, they a~
fabricators of lies. Their lies or their falsehood consists in their mere
reference to OOXEOvtCl. without grasping this in reference to the unifying
one. Oike is the inspiring power to the thinker who watches over the
unity of 1tUvta gathered in ho. Whether one can still refer ~6.:Qrupa;:
(witnesses) also to '$wbUw (false) is a philologic'.tl question. The I16.:Q'tupo.; are witnesses who perceive the OOxEovta. bUl only these. and not
also the brightness of the fire itself.
HEIOEGGER: This explanation is phHologically more elegant.
FINI{: By witnesses would be meant those who appeal to what the)'
immediately see and grasp. What those who al'c estmnged from the
unit)' offy take notice of with regard to their grasping things is nOI false
ill the sense that it turns Ollt to be imaginary. They ;:Irc witncsses of actual
things, but they do not rcfer the boXEOvtQ back (Q thc collcctingjoint like
the ooxq.lWtQ'tOl; does. I have dl'awn upon Fr. 28 in suppon of Fr. 27.
ooxEiv is herc mcant nOl in lhe sense ofa dcrogatory imagining. Wc also
have illusoq' and false comprehensions rcganling whal surrounds us. It
would be nothing special if I-Icraditus wcre onl)' to say that .....e do not
comport oursel\'cs imagillOlli\'cly in lhe facc of whal .mails LIS in death,
BUI when he speaks e)f;1 oux U,JtO\'Tal OU~E O<>XEOUOLV (neilher "'hatthcy
hope nOl' imagine) ill refcrcnce ltl lhe re<llm of dc.uh, which is \,'ith
dr;lwn f"om us, and if o..,XlV does nOI herc ha\'c Ihe signific;mce of

156

15i

mat Herdc!iws speaks once ill the plural (ta WtJXQO.) and three times in
the singular (9QJl6v, uyQ6v. x~ov). We must make dear to ourselves the distinction that lies between the goingo\'cr of something QUI or
being cold into being warm and the going over of being cold as such into
being wann as such. If it were said that a human's being alive can go over
into being dead. that wouldn't be an exciting thing to say. But the assertion that life itself goes O\'cr into death. and conversely, that death goes
into life, would be morc problematic. and a more trying proposition.
That would be simil:u' to the going over of being cold into being warm
and of being warm into being cold.
HEmEGGER: Arc 'la ",ux(>6 cold things?
FINK: That is precisely the question, whether cold things. or simply
being cold is meanl. Concerning things, there are such as are cold by
nature. such as ice. and there are such as are occasionally cold. like water.
which can be cold but also warm. But water can also go from the liqutd
Slate o\'er to the fonn of steam. There are, therefore. temporal and
essential transitions_ A more difficult problem. howe\er. is the relationship of being cold and being warm as such. Ifta ~vxQ6. are ta 6vta., then
are ta 6vta things that are in the state of being. and that can go over into
the state of lIot-being? Does 'to 6'1 mean the temporal state of something
which lies at the basis like a substrate? Or is no thing and no matter
meant with 'to 6\', but rather the being of what is? For Hegel, being g~s
over into nothing, and nothing goes over into being. Being and nothing
are the same for him. But in that, as in this sameness, there is an ambiguity. Is the relationship of the being of what is and not-being a relationship analogous 10 that Ix=tween cold and warnl? When he speaks of
cold and wann, does Herdditus mean only cold and wann things? That
cold things can warm up and vice versa is a oonal assenion. But it could
still be that the fragment includes a problematic that goes be)'ond this
banality, jfthe fragment indeed would have it that being cold and being
warm, as fixed contrdries. themseh'es go O\'er into one another.
PARTICIPANT: We must understand the opposition between cold
and warlll such that warming up is already included in the cold.
FtNK: With that. )ou f;an back again on lhe easicr rendition of the
fragmenl. Thc cold is then the cold thing that warms up. However, that
is no transition of being cold as such into Ix=ing warm as sllch. bm only
the transition of thcl'mal conditions in a thing. This thought crcatcs no
difliculty. But a more diflicuh problcm is given. ifthc cold and the warm
are nOI cold and warm Ihings. bUI being cold and Ix=ing warm as such. of
which il is then said thallhe)' go o\'cr into onc anolher. We mllst auclllpt
to read 9EQI.&6v 01' uyQ6v such as 'to xa16v. 'to OlxQlOv. arc to be underst(K)() in 1~"i10. TO xa16v is nOlthal which is be.mtifuJ. but what brings the
XaA.a 10 bcaUly. For us. the question is "'hclhcr onl)' the everyday. ramiliar phenomenon is meant ,,'ilh the )'oking of comrdsting contraries, or

whether a background lies therein. such that a phenomenally unfamiliar

transition and flowing-inlo-one-another of otherwise fixed contraries is
.seen. Fr. 126 is ambiguous. On the onc hand. it has a banal sense, and on
the other hand. a problematic sense. which concerns not the relationship
of cold and warm things. but rdther the mutual going over of being cold
as such into being warm as such and vice vcrsa. The going over of being
cold into being wann behaves like the going overofHfe into death and of
dcath into life. A human life. which goes over into being dead, is not now
meanl in this going over. The real challenge of the fragment is to be seen
in the gradual equation of opposites, and not in the going over of states
of a thing.
HEIDEGGER: The challenge lies in going over as such ...
FINK: ... in the going over of what olherwise stand as contrdry.
Perhaps the contrariness of life and death is also fixed like that of being
cold and being warm. In the domain of reference of this contrariness, a
movement of things can happen such that something which is first cold
then becomes wann. and vice versa. BUI the question before uS is
whether more is said in the fragment than the banal conception, whether
the provocative thesis also lics in it according to which the fixed contraries go over into one another.
PARTICIPANT; The relationship of being warm and being cold is a
going-into-one-another.
HEIDEGGER: You are thinking about Aristotle's UllowolA;.
FINK: QUoWOL<; presupposes a Ul'tO~tvov [what is underlying] on
which the ~afk>).it [change] is carried out. Then we have a going over
into one another of opposed states on a thing. A conductor can first ~
found in the state of zero degrees temperature, and then warm up In
increasing degrees. We can thereby ask where the coldness goes to and
from where the warmth comes. So kmg as we refer such phenomena of
going over to an underlying substance, these goings over are not problematic.
Hf:IDEGGER: But is ltUohlxJlli still a philosophical problem?
FINK: 1 agree with that. It is above all problematic because Aristotle
ultimately also interprets coming to be and p... ssing away rrom out of
cillo(WOI<;.

H.:mEGGER; His philosophy of movement belongs to a specific domain. We must thus distinguish three things; first, how a cold thing
be<:omcs warm; second. wc must illlcrpl'ct this becoming as It).).o(W<Jl<;.
which is already an omological problem becausc the being of what is
becomes specified; and third, ...
FINK: ... the going overor being cold in gcneral into being wal'm in
general. Therewith. Ihe distinction of being cold and being w;lTIn ~el.S
sublaled in thought. Thc going m'er of a fhing out of Ihe state of hemg
cold into being warm is only a mo\'ement of a fhingly subslr.ne. The

158

159

problematical coincidence of being cold with being wann is something

else, A still more difficult problem is the S,lmeness of Hades and
Dionysus (rou"[o~ bE 'A(bll~ XClt l\l6vuoo~).
Hli:IDEGGER: Can one bring thc distinction of cold and warm into
relation to the distinction of life and de'llh?
FIN": Life and death is a much harder distinction, , .
HEIDEGGER: ... with which there is no comparison.
FINK: The distinction between being cold and being warm is a distinction which resides only in life.
HEIDEGGER: The distinction of cold and warm belongs in the domain of thermodynamics, ' , .
FINft: ,., whilc the distinction of life and death does not allow itself
to be grasped in a going over such as from cold into warm. The cold and
the warm are substantivi1.Cd qualities. Thc cold can mean at once the
cold thing or being cold as such. The matter stands in a similar fashion
with "[0 c.'Sv. On the one hand. it means what is, what comes to being, and
on the other. the being of what is. The ambiguity holds for the cold, the
warm. the wct. the dry. If onc reads Fr. 126 without seeking a deeper
sense, then it is a malleI' only of thermodynamic phenomena. which
concern the going of cold things over into warm things and vice versa.
One runs into the problem of WJ..o(WOl;. but it apparently contains no
provoc;llive meaning. which we otherwise know of in the Heraclitean
disturbance of the standing opposites. If we read the fragment in the
sense that it brings to vicw a going ovel' of being cold as such into being
warm as such, then it brings the contrary. which otherwise rcmains as the
fixed structure of the phenomenal world with all change or things, nOt
indeed into liQllov(ll qJUVEQtl [visible hanl1ony], but into the lr.QIlOVL'l
aqJavij~ [hidden harmony].
HF.IOEGGER: I sec the difficulty in the fact that onc does not know in
which Hcraclitean cOntext Fr. 126 is found. Thus you do nOI mean the
going over. familiar to us, of a cold cntity into a warm cntity, and you
also do not mean the delel'mination of Ihe character of being of this
going over. but ...
FINK: ... the sameness of being cold and being warm which we
tCI'mcd provocative.
HElm:GGt:R: Can one approach this samcncss from I,he distinction
of being cold and being warm, and not just I"mm the colllrariness of life
and death?
FINK: I would still like 10 go into Fr. 8:"[0 ovrO;ouv OUllfjiEQOV xal tx
'lWV 6tCUpeQ6vTwv xall(OTIlv oQJlov(av. Dicls translates: Whal struggle
against each nl her harmonizing; oul of what goes apan, t hc most beautiful jnining:' to OvtO;ouv [what sll"Uggle against each other] is a neuter
noun.
HEII)EGCF.R: This word occurs only once in I-1eraditus. I have nevcl'

understood coneclly what is meant. strictly speaking. by TO avtO;ouv,

Rather, the word is to be underslood back.wards, from OUllqJQOv [harmonizing].
FINK: to ltvtO;ouv means what struggle apart. what slruggle against
each other. bUI not lik.e two living beings; rathcr, like something rebellious Ihat resists power. What strugglc against each other is rebellious
self-confrontatioll. What struggle apart are at the same time what collect
themselves and bring themselves together. If we start with the second
half of the fragment, the first half becomes readablc. The most beautiful
harmony proceeds out of what is bom apart. Contrary to the CU!Homary
opinion that struggling apart is something negative. what struggle here
in opposition are at the same time what bring together. What struggle
against each othel' harmoni7.e in a manner such that out of them. as what
is born apart. as the counterstruggling division, the most bcallliful harmony grows. With that. Heraditus thinks pmgrammatically beyond
what we previously encountered in }<'r, Ill, namely. the fact that cold
things can become warm and vice versa.
HElDEGGER: But where does the "most bealltiful harmony" belong?
[s it the visible 01" the invisible harmony?
FINK: That does not allow of saying right off the bat. Fr. 48 also
belongs in the group of fragments which deal with the contraries:"[1P om.
"[6;41 ovolla fUo;. ~QYOv 6 e6:V(l"[O~. "The name of the bow is life, but its
\oJork is death:' This fragment refers not only to the absurd idea that
there is a misrelalion between matter and namc.
PARTICU'ANT: Fr. 51 also belongs in this context. "They do not
understand how what is born apart agrecs with itself: struggling union.
like that of the OOW and the lyre:'
FIN"; In order to be able to explicate this fragment, one must first
have rcad Fr. 48. The bow unites in itself the contrariness of the striving
and the domain of death, The lyre is the instrument which celebrates the
festivaL It is also a unifyillg of what is at first struggling in opposition. It
unifies the community of the festival. FI'. 51 views not only the relationship of the lyre and the community festival, but also the ~e1at~onsh~p.of
Ihe dead. The work of the bow is death. a fundamental situation dlStlllguished from the festival. Death ,md the fcsliva.1 are lin~ed logether. but
nOI only as Ihe bow ends arc tautened by the stnng, but III the manncrof
manifold cOllnterrelationships. Still, we must break off here. because
these fragments require a fundamClllal consideration.
H.:II)EG(~t:1t: In conclusion, I dont want 10 make a speech, bUl I
would like lQ ask a <jucstion. You. Mr, Fink, said ;illhe beginning o~: ~I~e
first session that Uthe Crceks signify for liS an enormous challeng~, 10
what extent, I ask? YOll said further Ihat it is, therefore, a question of

160
"advancing toward the malleT ilSClf, that is, 10 the maller"thal muS! have
stood "before the spiritual vie..... of Hcraditus."
FINK: The queslklll is whether, out of OUT historkal silUation,
freighted with twemyfj\,c hundred years of fun-her thinking, we have
gene~lIy remm'cd QUl'"Selves fmlll the Creeks and their understanding
of bemg and world; and whether. nevertheless, we ~main inheritors of
the Greek ontology in all connections.
HEIDEGCER: When )'OU speak of the challenge of the Greeks, you
mean a challenge in though!. But what is it that challenges?
FINK: We arc challenged to turn aoout the entire direction of our
thinking. This does not impl)' the mending of a hisloricaltradition.
HlDEGGER: Aren', the ancients also a challenge for Hegel?
FINK: Only in the sense of the sublation and further thinking of the
thoughts of the Greeks. The question, however, is whether we are only
the extension of the Greeks, and whether we have come to new problems
and must give an account of three thousand years, or whether we have
lost, in an ominous manner, knowledge of how the Greeks dwelled in the
truth.
HEIDEGGER: Is our concern only to repeat Heraclitus?
FINK: Our concern is a conscious confrontation with Heraclitus.
HEIDEGGER: But we find this with HegeJ. He also stood under a
challenge by the Greeks. Only he can be challenged who him~lf ...
FINK; ... has a readiness to think.
HEIDEGGER: In what regard are the Greeks a challenge for Hegel?
FINK: Hegel had the possibility to gather up, sublate, and changr
the tradition in his language of concepts.
HElDEGGR: What does his language of concepts mean? Hegel's
thought is the thought of the Absolute. From out of lhis thought, from
the fundamental tendency of medialton, the Greeks appear for him _..
FINK; ... as giants, but as precursors ...
HEIDEGGR: ... as the immediate and still not mediated. All immediacy depends on mediation. Immediacy is always seen already from
mediation. Here lies a problem for phenomenology. The problem is
whether a mediation is also behind what is called the immediate phenomenon. In an earlier session we ha\'e said that need is a fundamental
1'Ubric in Hegel. For Hegel's thinking-which now is meant not in the
personal but in the historical sense-necd consistcd in the fulfilIment of
\
what is thought, whereby fulfillmelll is to be understood literally as the
n:conciliation of the immcdiate with thc mediatcd. HUI how about us?
Do wc also have a need?
FINK: To be sU~'e have a.nccd,~ut DOt a ground as in Hcgel. We
do nOI have a conceptual world at our disposal, into which wc ...
Ht;IDEGGEH: ... C'1Il int,egrate the Greeks, ...
FINK: ... rather. we muSt put aside the implimenuofthis tradition.

161

HEIDEGGER: And then?

FINK: We must begin in a ncw sense.
HEIDEGGU: Whel-e does the challenge lic for you?
FtSK: In that we havc come in lhc course of Ihe hislory of lhinking
10 an end in which a richness of trddition becomes questtonable. OUI'
question is whether. not in a new lum toward what the Greeks have
thought, we can encounter the Greek ....orld .....ith our new experience of
being. We must ask ourselves whether we already have an experience of
being thal is nOI slamped by metaph)'sics.
I-IEtOEGGER: Is that to be thought such that our experience of being
matches up to lhe Greeks?
FINK: This depends 011 lhe truth of our situation, out of .....hich we
can ask al\d speak. We can only speak with the Grecks as nihilists.
HElDEGGER: Do you think so?
FISK: That does not mean that a finished program lies in nihilism.
HElDI::GGER: But whal if there had been something unthought in
the Greeks, something which detcrmines precisely your thinking and
what is thought in the whole history?
FINK: BUI how do we calch sight of this? Perhaps this glimpse only
results from our late situalion.
HEIDEGGER: Th
nthoughl..would be...that whkh shows..itsdfonly
.J.2..m!.r view. But the question is ho..... far we understand ourselves. I make
a proposal: the umhought is llAtl9EW. In all of Greek philosophy, there is
nothing to be found concerning llAtlBEla as cUtlBEla. In paragraph 44 b
of Being and Time, it is said regarding a.-A.tlBEla that, "Translation by the
.....ord 'truth', and abo\'e all the theoretlcal conceptualization of this expression, covers up lhe sense of that which lhe Greeks made 'selfevidently' basic to the terminological use of (U,tlBEla as a prephilosophical understanding:' (B~;'lg mu! Tin", 7th unrevised edition,
1953, p. 262 - H 219.)
llAtlBEla thou htlU it.). BEla has nothing lO do wilh "truth"; rather, it
means 11l1concealme.nt. What I then said in 8~ing alld Time about UAtlBEla
already goes in this direction. cUtl6ElU as unconcealment had already
occupied me, but in the meantime "truth" came inbctween. cUtl6E1a 'IS
unconcealmelll heads into the direction of that which is the clearing.
How about the clearing? You said last limc that the clearing does 1101
presuppose Ihe light. bm vice versa. Do c1caring and light have anything
at all to do with each other? Clearl)' no!. "Cleat" implies: to cleal', t,o
weigh anchor, to clear oul. That does not mean thal where the clearing
clears, there is brightness. What is c1eMed is the free, the open. Al the
same time, ....,hat is cleared is what conceals itsclf. We may not underst:llld
lhe clearing from out of light: rather, we must understand it from the
Greeks. Light and fire can first find their place only in the clearing. In
the essa)', "On the Essence of Truth:' .....here I speak of "freedom:' I

NOTES

162

have the d~aring in view, except thal here trlllh '1lways walked behind.
The ~ark IS, to be sure. without light. but cleared . .Qw:..e.oocern is .10
~xpcneoct'.llQ<iOO(.eaJmenJ.oasdeat:ing. That is what is unthought in what
~5

though!

In t~e

\\'hole history of thought. In Hegel. the need consisted

II!" the sausfacuon ofthouglu. ~. on the COlll'.ary, the plight Qfwhat

.whawu.houg1u...rcigllS.
. FI.NK: Professor Heidegger has already officiall)' ended our seminar
with hiS words. I believc I can also speak on behalf of all the partidpanu
when I thank. Professor Heidegger in wannlh and admi .tlKlIl. The work
of thought can be like a lowering mountain range in stark. outline likt
"the .safely built AI~s:' But we have here experienced something
the
flowmg magma WhICh, 015 a subterranean force, raises up the mounlains
of thought.
HEID";GGER: At the dose, I would like the Creeks to be honored
and I return lO the seven sages. From Periander of Corinth we have th~
sentence he spoke in a premonition: ~EA.hCt"to nav. "In care, take the
whole as wholc:" Another word that also comes from him is this: qBl$WS
XCl1c:.. Q!Ct. "J;lmtil1g at. millill!' LaluB<., visible,"

r!LWl1hQlIghl jn

of

-1..1\
J/'

I. ).6yos is c\lswmarily translated into English <IS "~ason." "s~h." or

"""ord." HowC\'cr, Hcidegger says in thc "Logos" eSS3)' that the ....ord "nameli lhat
which gathers c\"C':I')'lhing present illlo presence. and lets il P~SCIll itklr."
cU'ljflua is cuStomarily translated into English as "truth," but Hcidegger specifi.
cally rejects the ~nn;m equivalem. IVnnrh,il, ;lIld uses UmJf:roorgnlMI. which
mOl)' be translated as "nonconcealment:'
2. Page 73 below.
3. Page 67 below.
4. Manin Heidegger. Xtmta"d the Probkm ofMtltlphysU:s. tr.James S. Churchill
(Bloomington: University of Indiana Press. 1962). p. 206.
5. Page 50 below.
6. Page 51 below.
7. Loc. cil.
8. Page 73 below.
9. Pages 82 f.
10. Page 96 below.

HERACLlTUS

I. Comments of the seminar panic::ipants. pl'edominantly of a philological

kind. are nOl included for copyright reasons.
2. See Kathlecn Frman, APlcilla 10 /he Pr,Sormtu- Philosoplrus: A Compl,te
Tran5/atioPl of Ill, Fr(l~PlIJ i" Dieb, Fragmmu d,r VorxM-rtllwr (C:ambrid~: Hno
\'ard Uni\ersit) "ness. 1966). Tho\lgh Freeman has been consulted, Die's' rendi
tions of the fragments arc lIewl)' lranslated lhroughoul the present work. (fr.)
3. Diels tr.ln Iiltes: "Of the Logos. as is here set forth. men are always unable lO
understand, ooth befol'e they h;1\'e heard it and when they ha\'c first he<lrd il,
t'or lhough C\'cl'lthing happens ilCcordillK to lhis Logos. lIlen slill reselllbk
inexpericnced people. e\'en \'I'hen they ha\'e experienced such ...ol'ds and deeds
as I discuss. illl;II)'1.ing e;lCh thing a<cording to its nalUl"e and eXI>laining ho... it
bcha\'cs. Blit other men rem;lin un;I.... :II"C of ....hatlheydo after they wake up. just
as they lose it ...arelless of .... hat they do in sleep:'
4. Diels' lramlalilm h;ls Ihe following wording: "If all thing\ wel'e to hecome
smoke. thell we \\'ould discrilllinate them wilh lhl' no'tC."
5. Dids' lI~I11~latioll runs: ";me! th,11 c\'eITthiIlK happens ilcn,nlinK 11.) (tis~Il'
sion and ohlig-;uiun:'
6. nicl~ lrallSlaleS: "OUl "I' t'\,crythillj{. onc: and ulIl olUllC. e\'t.'rything."
I. Oids \I'\Il~lall\: "(Fol') thcre is Ollt.' thilllo( \'I'hid! the I){'M prdcl' to all clM.':
elcnlill glol,)' ratlll'r 111:111 lrall~it.'nt thinKS:'
8. "l-Iel;lclilU~' Tcaching Oil Fire:' IllltnHllol:l1ed. err.)
Y. Dicb' tl"II\l:ItKIII hils Ihe follo\'l'inK wort! ortlt'r: -'nil: wi~ is onc thing unl).
to understand the thoUlo;llIs whit-h SIl't.'r c\'crythillg lhrough c\er}'thing."

164

165

10. Dicl'J Iral1Jilates: MA!lc:rn,ltC ch:l11ge; of c\'e'1,thillg for lire and of fire for
cl'ef),thing,"
I I. Dids translatc..-s; -The wiSt' i~ ~I ,'part from c\er),lhing."
12. Stt Karl Jaspers. 111, Cmlt Phi/tJMJphnl. ("lOll. Ralph Manhcilll (Ne""
York: Harcoun. Brace & World. Inc.. 1966), Vol. 11, p. 20. (f'r.)
1:S. S Timanu 30 it rr. (TT.)
14. From Alcair PO('m.$ by Fricdrkh Hillderlin. transl:ucd by Eliz.lbelh Hender.
SOil. 1962 by ElilaOCl.h Hcndcr!kll1. publisll(.-d by Oswald wolrr (I'ublishers),
Lld., London. (fr.)
15. The$C ,ITe Ihe offspring of ZCIIS and Thcmis I Law I. $toe HcsiOll, TJuwgonJ.
lr'dIlSI.llcd. with an IlllfOdu(tiol1, hy Norman O. Urowll (New York: BobbsMerrill Co., 1953), p. 78. (TT.)

Hcideggcr's USltge. But \\ilhout qualiflCa.tion, it coukl be mislc~ding:. "~or I.'tc

p..efix -re-- c.. rrics quile different me,lItltlg from lite .c;el'man t.'I':r-. ~ Et.'ghs~
"rt'-~ means ~agait\~ or ~back:' meanings that arc c:ar~d b)' German u.';du-,
but not b)' ~t.".r-." "Vtr-- has a "mge of meanings dcrh'ing from ~tin and
Golhic. The possibility on which Heidegger SII1S hNe 10 depend tS t~al of
illlensifying or heightening the meaning carried by the Slelll haltm, ~e~l1lng 10
keep or hold. For more information. see C. T. Onions. Thl Oxford Du:tloPlllr<j of
El1g1ish EIJrnology (Oxford: Oxford Univcrsil)' Press, .19(9): and Georgc. O.
Curme, If Grarnmflro!theGtrmtm l..lmgullg' (Ncw York: hedenck Ungar Publtshing Co. 1960). (Tr.)
.
.
,
29. Onc must also hear Ihe samc about dcath 35 whmls saId aoom sleep. For
each shows the dep:trwre of the ilOul. the one more. the other lcss, which il is
possible 10 get from Heracliws. (Tr.)
.
30. Dicls Iranslates: ~Connectiolls: IO'holes and nOI wholes, concord and diScord, harmony and dissonance, and Otll of everything one and OUI of one e\'ery-

16. Reg,trding growlh. scc AdslOlle. M,tapnJ5;fj 1069b 11; n:garding wasting
away. see lli.~o" 0/ Anim(,, 582b 2, and Gnuralit}ll of A,,i''l(4105 767- 4; regarding
genesis and ceasing to be. lICe 0" Gl'1Iernlwn ond COPT1lptiO", pauim; rrgarding
producli\rncss. see Physi.cs 2'13- 8, and Ge'lf'ration and Cormphon 319b 32: and
regarding ahcr.uion, see PhJ.sio 226- 26. (Tr.)
17...... die bil bringt mit .sidl Inw. die Zeil u~ird r.s hringm. ~ ulerally, ~Iimc
brings wllll itself, 11I:u is. lime will bring il.- n-r.)
18. Parmcnidrs. FragmcnI 8, line 53. The alx)\'e Ir.mslation is I..ken from G.
S. Kirk ..nd J. E. Raven. TIlL !)'-'-XKrtllit: Pllilt)Joplvr.s: A Critialllwo? wilJI a
Srlectio" of Texts (Camb"idgc: Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 278.
19. Dids lranslales: he "does nul say and does nUl conceal: ralher he gi\'cs a
sign." (Fr. 93).
20. A search of the Ubmry of COlIgrrss and N(I/ioll/lf U'liol/ Clllafogue and the
G1711rtlf C(jfologut Qf Pri"ud BoollJ uf till Rn'lisll M/utWII re\'c.. ls no English lransla
tion of this book. (rr.)
21. Wl'gt ,wd Formerl friihgriethishrll Drnlu:,u; lilr.rmisdu Il.nd phifosophi,ge..s{hichllit:he Slll.ditn. Hng. \'on Fran'l Tiel7.e. 2 crwcilene Aun. MUllchen, Beck.
1960. The book is nOltranslatcd. (Tr.)
22. Sce Marlin HeKicgger, lllr Sac"r dr.s Dr.nlu:ru (Tiibingen: Max Nteme)'er
Verlag. 19(9), pp. 1-25. esp. p. 15. Sce also Manin Heidcgger. On Time ond
8,illg, mms..JO:III Stambaugh (Ne\\' York: l-lal'pt'r & Row. 1972). pp. 1-24, esp.
p.14.
23. Rcgarding A&roi and AA:I\9no in HeKleggel"s Ihinking, sce "Logos
(Heraklit. Frdgmcnl 50)~ ..nd "Aletheia (Hemkli!. Fragment 16)" in Man.in
Hcideggcr. Vu,Ungr ulld AlifHilu (I'fullingcn: Verlag Gunthcl' Neske. 1954).
(fr.)
24. Dicls tl':lI1sl;lIes; "How Cllll onc hidc frOIl1 that which ncver sels?"
25. The book. puhlished in 1955 hy Dcutschc Vcrl;lgs.Anstalt. St uttgart, is nOI
translated. (TI'.)
26. This Ir,lIIsl;u iOIl is from fl'ird,.id, HQlderlill: 1'/11'''1' Will Fr(lgm,nl~. tr:lllslaled
hy Michacll-lamburJ;:er (Ann 1\I'IXlr: The Unh-crsilyof Michig:1Il I'I'C5S, 1966). p.
79. (fr.)
27. This t..:lIIsl:u ion is lakCII from C;. S. Kirk. Jlrmrlillu: Th, Cosm/( I'mgnvllt5,
c:dilnl Wilh:1II imroduclion lllld cOmmenl:.lI)' (C:unhridge: Cambridge Uni\'er~ily 1'1'(:. 1970). p. 393 ft. (1'1'.)
28. Scp,"r<ltKlIl of the English prefix "re" seems necessary 10 acknowledge

thing.~

GLOSSARY

The following glossary' sen'cs the basic funclion of any glossary" namely. 10
provide a panial lisl of Ihe morc frec:luclIll,' occurring i111I>onant words, with
some explanation of. heir meaning. Howc\'cr, some tlualific-.uions must be made.
First, the' l'cadt.'1" should understand that the mc;tnings gi\'en 10 the various
Greek words arc SOlllclimc.~ all English tr;lIls1:uiol1 of the Genn;m used by
Heidcggcl' and Fink. The English mc.millgs arc '/Of necessarily those gi\'en. for
instance, in Liddcl1 and ScOIt. A Gm'. EI/glbn I.n:;(.OII.
Second, not all of the words glossed arc Greek. Becausc il is important. sjlial
refercm:e is made 10 the German word Da.
Third. the glossary is highly Sdttli,'c. Man)' more ""ord5 could have bn
included. This selectivity is panly due 10 the facllhat the lirst occurrence of each
Greek word in the text is aa:ollll)'''lnied by an English gloss in square brad.eu.
pro\'idcd nOllc is gi\en b)' Heidcggu or Fink. The seleCli\'it), of the glossary also
results f mm other mothes.
The glossary has been constructed with the intent of helping the reader gain
better access to the text. First, J ha\e tried to include some of the more imponanl
Greek words, But the gloss.II"} may be supplemented with such other works as:
G, J. Scidd, MfI"';', flt>idtggtr fllld Int> p,t-Sacratic.s (University of Nebraska J)ress.
1964): M,u'lin I-Iddeggcr. (ll"Iy Gmlc Tltill*illg (Hilrper & Row. 1975), and
William Richardson, S.J., Nt>;l!fKKt>r: 'f1Irough PhtllOnumology 10 Thollghl (Martinus
Nijhoff. 1963), St.-conel. the glossary may he used to gain some grasp of lhe Greek
language, Thc English \Iansliteration, for ex,llllple, may be used ill learning how
to sound the \'al'ious Greek words. Eflon in handling the Greek ,""ill be: aided by
reference 10 such books as: Stcphen I';line, Btgilllll'llg Critic (Oxford Uni\'t,:rsity
Press. 1961). Fr.tncis Fobes. Phif().wphiad er,tIt.: All Illlrolll11titm (University of
Chicago I'ress, 1957). and F. f.. Pcters Grulc !'hi/o.wphiall TtnIU: If flutoriLa!
btlrodwtio!'t (Ncw YOl"k Uui\'cr5it)' ))rt"SS, 1967), Using iln inducti\e method, the
reader can graduall)' extend understanding IQ include words and phra~s flOC
treated in the present glossar),

I, a.b19E1u
2, UQIOlOl

nonconcealmenl. See Ihe

Tr.mslalOr's Forcwonl. eSI)l':dall)' thc first 1(otIlotc,
the best, Her<lditus \\":1.5 lradilion;llly said to h,l\'e Ix:ell
hum inw a pall'id:m family.
This bestOl.!cd UI)()lI him cer1:lill politiGll alld religious
pri\,ilq;:cs which he llc\'ertheIcs~ rcjt.'tled, Heun'. \>'hell he
refer... tu "lIle bc~(' among
hUIll:Ul~, it ma) not be di

167

ar,ht>

4, ytvEOtr;
5, yvw<Jt;

6. Da

7. btc'IyvWOt';

dillg"O~'~

t>m/ll

r1I) concluded that he was

an "elitist" in the sense often
criticized by modem (csp<:ciall)' leftist) political and so
dal critks. The countcrconeept is poIloi, the m,my, See
entry twcnty-six below.
ultimatc principlc, Though
\-oIl"iousl)' char'dClcriz<.'d, Her,,diluS st.-ems to hold that
lhe ultim,lte ptinciple ill the
changing Ico)moj is logos, &-e
entl'ies fifteen and seventeen
below.
gencsis.
inquiry. Sce entf}' sc\en below.
This German ....ord means.
literally. "here- or "there:'
Ho,",'evcr. in Chapter II or
the present book Heidegger
inlerpreu Dll in terms of
Lichlu'lg, which may Ix: trans1;lted by "clearing." The point
is Ihat a "here" or a "therc"
can hc manifesl to us ollly
within a "clearing" which is
primordial 10 the particular
"here" or "there." Interpretation of Du as "clearing" is
helpful iu understanding thc
word DllYin. D4Min is the
word Heidegger u~s to indicate the kind of being (3I"i,,)
unH:lue to humans,
This is the s:tllle as entry fivc,
except for addition of the
pl'efh "dill." As is poil1led 1,1lI
early ill Chapter I, this prefix
l11e:ms
'throughout:
or
perhaps "Ihonlughly," I'hor
oUKh inquiry leads to a
diaSllosi~.
10 bc. I\S HeideggcI' 11,15

);tid,
the ccntral question of his
Ihinl..ius is the question of thc
meaning of being. No single
work 01 l-IeKlegger's exh:Ubts

168

9. lv

10. '-f).u>~

Htlio~

11. oavQ1~
12. !Ma
13. xQa'UVOs
14. x("'1(J~<;

15. x6aIWS

16. b\fnl

logos

18. ,.u.'oj3o).l'j
19. ~tTQU

20.

vO~o;;

21. 6vTQ

~lahol,

IIlttm
'IO"'O~

O"ltl

169
,hi5 qUI.":Slion. The translator
has found the III(rodul'Iiem (0
M,(aph.JJic:~ helpful.
the one. The counter.
concept, with which htll is al.
ways associated in Heraclitus
is pallia, the many. &e enll1
t"'entyt....o bdow. Set' al50
the Tr.mslators Fore""ord.
the Sun. Along ....ith light4
ning, fire, and other images.
the Sun is a \'isible analogue
of !lnl. By providing an il.
luminating clearing, the Sun
brings thl.": many things ofthe
universe (pa7lla) together for
a unified (Am) ~rceplion.
death.
idea.
Iishtnins, See entry ten
..OO'e.
motion.
cosmos. The ....ord carries the
sense of a beautiful. ordered
whole.
forsetfulne. In mythology.
Lt-the is the rivu of forget
fulness whkh separates the
underwo"'d from the world
of the living. In the present
book, kthe indicates conceal
ment. Note the l'e1ation to
fll,thein, nonconcealment. See
entry I aOO"e.
reason, spee:h, word. For
more on logos, see the worb
referred to in the Translator's
Foreword.
change.
measures. Set' cnlr)' ,"'cnty
lIine helo"'.
custom or I......
things which are. The Western tradition del'i"es iu ""ord
"omolog}'- from this Greek
....ord. HeKlegl(er builds on
lhe Greek word ,IS weU as the
Western Iradition ",'hen he

22. JtUvtU

prll/UI

23. Jtoi"(JI~
24. :l6A.rlWi
25. :16).1;
26. :lollol

poi6is
pot""M
potu
pollui

distinguishes the homic" from

the "onlological" in B,iI1K f",d
Timt:. Sce elllries thirt) and
thirty-two belo......
all things, the universe. Sec
entry nine aOO"e for the
countetToncept, h"".
production.
war.
dt}'.
the many. The counterconcept is "the beSt:' amioi.
Sce ellll")' two abcne. An inleresting essilY is yet to be
luiuen comparing Hera
dims' expression polIo; with
Heidegger's analysis of daJ
Mall, -the lhe)'.- in Being fmd
Ti",r.

2;.

rrUQ

28. ooqXw
29. Tt~Ta
30. Ttx"'l 6VTU

tuhll~

31. TQ01t:U{

tropai
phJYi Ollta

32. qJUOEI6vTa

otlta

33. qJUOI;

pJlysi..

:S4. xQ6vor;

chro/loJ

fire. ~ items ten and thirteen abo"e.

wisdom.
boundaries. See eUll'y ninelccn above.
products of human technics.
See entry twenty~ne aoo\e.
The counterconcept is listed
in enlry thirty-two below.
Innsfonnations, ehans:el.
things which an! from nature. Sce cllIrics lwcllIy-one
and thirty :I1)()\e.
natun!.
lime. Note Ihat time is crucial
to Hddegger from Bril1g find
Timr to the essay "Timc and
!king."
soul.

PAGE GUIDE
The rollo"ing nt;IY help the rt'adcr tu rind p:hsagcS of p.-micular interest in
the Gerlllan original.

English

G,nmm

10

20

20

36

30

:.2

40

67

50

S:J

60

99

70

115

80

131

00

147

100

161

110

176

120

192

130

208

140

224

150

241

160

256