REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 2013

G.R. No. 174082

January 16, 2012

GEORGIA T. ESTEL, Petitioner,

vs.
RECAREDO P. DIEGO, SR. and RECAREDO R. DIEGO, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1
promulgated on September 30, 2005 and Resolution2 dated August 10, 2006 by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77197. The assailed Decision affirmed the Decision dated October 7, 2002 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gingoog City, Branch 27, Misamis Oriental, while the questioned
Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
The present petition originated from a Complaint for Forcible Entry, Damages and Injunction with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order filed by herein respondents Recaredo P. Diego, Sr., and
Recaredo R. Diego, Jr. with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Gingoog City, Misamis
Oriental. Respondents alleged that on April 16, 1991, they entered into a contract of sale of a 306
square-meter parcel of land, denominated as Lot 19, with petitioner; after receiving the amount of
P17,000.00 as downpayment, petitioner voluntarily delivered the physical and material possession of the
subject property to respondents; respondents had been in actual, adverse and uninterrupted possession of
the subject lot since then and that petitioner never disturbed, molested, annoyed nor vexed respondents
with respect to their possession of the said property; around 8:30 in the morning of July 20, 1995,
petitioner, together with her two grown-up sons and five other persons, uprooted the fence surrounding
the disputed lot, after which they entered its premises and then cut and destroyed the trees and plants
found therein; respondent Recaredo R. Diego, Jr. witnessed the incident but found himself helpless at that
time. Respondents prayed for the restoration of their possession, for the issuance of a permanent
injunction against petitioner as well as payment of damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.3
On July 26, 1995, the MTCC issued a Temporary Restraining Order4 against petitioner and any person
acting in her behalf.
In her Answer with Special/Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims, petitioner denied the material
allegations in the Complaint contending that respondents were never in physical, actual, public, adverse
and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot; full possession and absolute ownership of the disputed
parcel of land, with all improvements thereon, had always been that of petitioner and her daughter; the
agreement she entered into with the wife of respondent Recaredo P. Diego, Sr. for the sale of the subject
lot had been abrogated; she even offered to return the amount she received from respondents, but the
latter refused to accept the same and instead offered an additional amount of P12,000.00 as part of the
purchase price but she also refused to accept their offer; the subject of the deed of sale between petitioner
and respondents and what has been delivered to respondents was actually Lot 16 which is adjacent to the
disputed Lot 19; that they did not destroy the improvements found on the subject lot and, in fact, any
improvements therein were planted by petitioner's parents.5
On February 16, 2002, the MTCC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
[herein respondents], dismissing defendant's [herein petitioner's] counterclaim and ordering the defendant,
her agents and representatives:
1. To vacate the premises of the land in question and return the same to the plaintiffs;

2. To pay plaintiffs, the following, to wit:

a) P100.00 a month as rentals for the use of the litigated property reckoned from the
filing of the complaint until the defendant vacates the property;
b) P5,000.00 representing the value of the fence and plants damaged by the defendants as
actual damages;
c) P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
d) P2,000.00 for litigation expenses;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay the cost of suit;
Execution shall immediately issue upon motion unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to
stay execution files a supersedeas bond which is hereby fixed at P10,000.00 approved by this Court and
executed in favor of the plaintiffs, to pay the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the
judgment appealed from and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, defendant deposits with the
appellate court the amount of P100.00 as monthly rental due from time to time on or before the 10th day
of each succeeding month or period.
SO ORDERED.6
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC of Gingoog City.7
On October 7, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision8 affirming the assailed Decision of the MTCC.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the CA.
On September 30, 2005, the CA promulgated its Decision which affirmed the Decision of the RTC.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated August 10,
2006.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following arguments:
[THE] COURT OF APPEALS, 23rd DIVISION, ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE
RTC BRANCH 27 OF GINGOOG CITY ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE MTCC OF
GINGOOG CITY HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ACTION.
[THE] COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT THE RTC BRANCH 27 OF
GINGOOG CITY FAILED TO MAKE A FINDING OF FACT THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO
CAUSE OF ACTION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED LIKEWISE IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 27 OF GINGOOG CITY OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT
ITS FINDING OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE AGAINST OR NOT SUPPORTED BY
COMPETENT MATERIAL EVIDENCE.9
Petitioner contends that since respondents failed to allege the location of the disputed parcel of land in
their complaint, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the said complaint.
Petitioner also avers that the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for failure of respondents to
specifically allege facts constitutive of forcible entry. On the bases of these two grounds, petitioner argues
that the MTCC should have dismissed the complaint motu proprio.
Petitioner also avers that the complaint states no cause of action because the verification and certificate of
non-forum shopping accompanying the complaint are defective and, as such, the complaint should be
treated as an unsigned pleading. As to the verification, petitioner contends that it should be based on
respondent's personal knowledge or on authentic record and not simply upon "knowledge, information
and belief." With respect to the certificate of non-forum shopping, petitioner claims that its defect consists

in respondents' failure to make an undertaking therein that if they should learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other
tribunal or agency, they shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein
the original pleading and sworn certification have been filed.
The Court does not agree.
A review of the records shows that petitioner did not raise the issue of jurisdiction or venue in her Answer
filed with the MTCC. The CA correctly held that even if the geographical location of the subject property
was not alleged in the Complaint, petitioner failed to seasonably object to the same in her Affirmative
Defense, and even actively participated in the proceedings before the MTCC. In fact, petitioner did not
even raise this issue in her appeal filed with the RTC. Thus, she is already estopped from raising the said
issue in the CA or before this Court. Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case
before challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court.10 One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate the lower
court's decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against
one's opponent or after failing to obtain such relief.11 The Court has, time and again, frowned upon the
undesirable practice of a party submitting a case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.12
In any case, since the Complaint is clearly and admittedly one for forcible entry, the jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case is, thus, upon the MTCC of Gingoog City. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129, as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, as well as Section 1, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court, clearly provides that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts. Hence, as the MTCC has jurisdiction over the action, the question whether or not the suit
was brought in the place where the land in dispute is located was no more than a matter of venue and the
court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the case, could determine whether venue was properly or
improperly laid.13 There having been no objection on the part of petitioner and it having been shown by
evidence presented by both parties that the subject lot was indeed located in Gingoog City, and that it was
only through mere inadvertence or oversight that such information was omitted in the Complaint,
petitioner's objection became a pure technicality.
As to respondents' supposed failure to allege facts constitutive of forcible entry, it is settled that in actions
for forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction.14 First,
the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property.15 Second, he must also allege that he
was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised
Rules of Court, namely, force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.16
In the present case, it is clear that respondents sufficiently alleged in their Complaint the material facts
constituting forcible entry, as they explicitly claimed that they had prior physical possession of the subject
property since its purchase from petitioner, who voluntarily delivered the same to them. They also
particularly described in their complaint how petitioner, together with her two sons and five other
persons, encroached upon the subject property and dispossessed them of the same. Respondents'
complaint contains the allegations that petitioner, abetting and conspiring with other persons, without
respondents' knowledge and consent and through the use of force and intimidation, entered a portion of
their land and, thereafter, uprooted and destroyed the fence surrounding the subject lot, as well as cut the
trees and nipa palms planted thereon. Unlawfully entering the subject property and excluding therefrom
the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force and this is all that is necessary.17 In order to
constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war.18 No other proof is necessary.19 In
the instant case, it is, thus, irrefutable that respondents sufficiently alleged that the possession of the
subject property was wrested from them through violence and force.
Anent respondents' alleged defective verification, the Court again notes that this issue was not raised
before the MTCC. Even granting that this matter was properly raised before the court a quo, the Court

finds that there is no procedural defect that would have warranted the outright dismissal of respondents'
complaint as there is compliance with the requirement regarding verification.
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC provides:
Sec. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be
under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein
are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief" or upon
"knowledge, information and belief" or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading.
A reading of respondents verification reveals that they complied with the abovequoted procedural
rule.1awp++i1 Respondents confirmed that they had read the allegations in the Complaint which were
true and correct based on their personal knowledge.1wphi1 The addition of the words "to the best"
before the phrase "of our own personal knowledge" did not violate the requirement under Section 4, Rule
7, it being sufficient that the respondents declared that the allegations in the complaint are true and correct
based on their personal knowledge.20
Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the instant case, one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and
when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.21
As to respondents' certification on non-forum shopping, a reading of respondents
Verification/Certification reveals that they, in fact, certified therein that they have not commenced any
similar action before any other court or tribunal and to the best of their knowledge no such other action is
pending therein. The only missing statement is respondents' undertaking that if they should thereafter
learn that the same or similar action has been filed or is pending, they shall report such fact to the court.
This, notwithstanding, the Court finds that there has been substantial compliance on the part of
respondents.
It is settled that with respect to the contents of the certification against forum shopping, the rule of
substantial compliance may be availed of.22 This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the
provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in
that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.23 It
does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances, as
the Court finds in the instant case.24
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171855

October 15, 2012

FE V. RAPSING, TITA C. VILLANUEVA and ANNIE F. APAREJADO, represented by EDGAR

AP AREJADO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES, of RTC-Branch 47, Masbate City; SSGT. EDISON
RURAL, CAA JOSE MATU, CAA MORIE FLORES, CAA GUILLEN TOPAS, CAA DANDY
FLORES, CAA LEONARDO CALIMUTAN and CAA RENE ROM, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, filed by
petitioners Fe Rapsing, Tita C. Villanueva and Annie Aparejado, as represented by Edgar Aparejado,
seeking to set aside the Orders dated December 6, 20051 and January 11, 2006,2 respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City, Branch 47, in Criminal Case No. 11846.
The antecedents are as follows:
Respondents SSgt. Edison Rural, CAA Jose Matu, CAA Morie Flores, CAA Guillien Topas, CAA Dandy
Flores, CAA Leonardo Calimutan and CAA Rene Rom are members of the Alpha Company, 22nd
Infantry Battalion, 9th Division of the Philippine Army based at Cabangcalan Detachment, Aroroy,
Masbate.
Petitioners, on the other hand, are the widows of Teogenes Rapsing, Teofilo Villanueva and Edwin
Aparejado, who were allegedly killed in cold blood by the respondents.
Respondents alleged that on May 3, 2004, around 1 o'clock in the afternoon, they received information
about the presence of armed elements reputed to be New Peoples Army (NPA) partisans in Sitio Gawaygaway, Barangay Lagta, Baleno, Masbate. Acting on the information, they coordinated with the
Philippine National Police and proceeded to the place. Thereat, they encountered armed elements which
resulted in an intense firefight. When the battle ceased, seven (7) persons, namely: Teogenes Rapsing y
Manlapaz, Teofilo Villanueva y Prisado, Marianito Villanueva y Oliva, Edwin Aparejado y Valdemoro,
Isidro Espino y Arevalo, Roque Tome y Morgado and Norberto Aranilla y Cordova were found sprawled
on the ground lifeless. The post-incident report of the Philippine Army states that a legitimate military
operation was conducted and in the course of which, the victims, armed with high-powered firearms,
engaged in a shoot-out with the military.
On the other hand, petitioners complained that there was no encounter that ensued and that the victims
were summarily executed in cold blood by respondents. Hence, they requested the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to investigate the case. After investigation, the NBI recommended to the Provincial
Prosecutor of Masbate City that a preliminary investigation be conducted against respondents for the
crime of multiple murder. In reaching its recommendation, the NBI relied on the statements of witnesses
who claim that the military massacred helpless and unarmed civilians.
On February 9, 2005, the provincial prosecutor issued a Resolution3 recommending the filing of an
Information for Multiple Murder. Consequently, respondents were charged with multiple murder in an
Information4 dated February 15, 2005, which reads:
The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses SSGT Edison Rural, CAA Jose Matu. CAA
Morie Flores, CAA Guillen Topas, CAA Dandy Flores, CAA Leonardo Calimutan and CAA Rene Rom,
stationed at Alpha Company, 22nd Infantry Battalion, 9th Division, Philippine Army, Cabangcalan
Detachment, Aroroy, Masbate, committed as follows:
That on May 9, 2004, at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon thereof, at Barangay Lagta, Municipality of
Baleno, Province of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-

named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with one another, taking advantage of their
superior strength as elements of the Philippine Army, armed with their government issued firearms, with
intent to kill, by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Teogenes Rapsing y Manlapaz, Teofilo Villanueva y Prisado,
Marianito Villanueva y Oliva, Edwin Aparejado y Valdemoro, Isidro Espino y Arevalo, Roque Tome y
Morgado and Norberto Aranilla y Cordova, hitting them on different parts of their bodies, thereby
inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their deaths.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Masbate City, February 15, 2005.
On July 28, 2005, a warrant5 for the arrest of respondents was issued by the RTC of Masbate City, Branch
47, but before respondents could be arrested, the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) filed an Omnibus Motion6 dated July 20, 2005, with the trial court
seeking the cases against respondents be transferred to the jurisdiction of the military tribunal.7 Initially,
the trial court denied the motion filed by the JAGO on the ground that respondents have not been arrested.
The JAGO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,8 and in an Order9 dated December 6, 2005, the trial court
granted the Omnibus Motion and the entire records of the case were turned over to the Commanding
General of the 9th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, for appropriate action.
Petitioners sought reconsideration10 of the Order, but was denied by the trial court in an Order11 dated
January 11, 2006.
Hence, the present petition with the following arguments:
I
HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO ABLES GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO TRANSFER THE
INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE OF MULTIPLE MURDER TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE
MILITARY COURT MARTIAL, AS THE SAID TRIBUNAL, BASED ON FACTS AND IN
LAW, HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT MURDER CASE.
II
IT IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS IN JURISDICTION IF
NOT GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW ON THE PART OF HONORABLE JUDGE
MAXIMINO ABLES TO HOLD THAT HIS ORDER DATED DECEMBER 6, 2005 COULD
ONLY BE REVIEWED THROUGH AN APPEAL, AS THERE IS NO TRIAL ON THE MERIT
YET ON THE INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE.12
Petitioners alleged that the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
when it transferred the criminal case filed against the respondents to the jurisdiction of the military
tribunal, as jurisdiction over the same is conferred upon the civil courts by Republic Act No. 7055 (RA
7055).13 On the other hand, the respondents and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) alleged that the
acts complained of are service connected and falls within the jurisdiction of the military court.
The petition is meritorious. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in not taking cognizance of the
case, which actually falls within its jurisdiction.
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is conferred
by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.14 As a necessary consequence, the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the
motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing

from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought are the matters to be consulted.15
In the case at bar, the information states that respondents, "conspiring together and mutually helping with
one another, taking advantage of their superior strength, as elements of the Philippine Army, armed with
their government-issued firearms with intent to kill, by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot the [victims], hitting them
on different parts of their bodies, thereby inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused
their deaths."16 Murder is a crime punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, and is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.17 Hence, irrespective of whether the killing was
actually justified or not, jurisdiction to try the crime charged against the respondents has been vested upon
the RTC by law.
Respondents, however, contend that the military tribunal has jurisdiction over the case at bar because the
crime charged was a service-connected offense allegedly committed by members of the AFP. To support
their position, respondents cite the senate deliberations on R.A. 7055.
Respondents stress in particular the proposal made by Senator Leticia Ramos Shahani to define a serviceconnected offense as those committed by military personnel pursuant to the lawful order of their superior
officer or within the context of a valid military exercise or mission.18 Respondents maintain that the
foregoing definition is deemed part of the statute.1wphi1
However, a careful reading of R.A. 7055 indicate that the proposed definition was not included as part of
the statute. The proposed definition made by Senator Shahani was not adopted due to the amendment
made by Senator Wigberto E. Taada, to wit:
Senator Taada. Yes, Mr. President. I would just want to propose to the Sponsor of this amendment to
consider, perhaps, defining what this service-related offenses would be under the Articles of War. And so,
I would submit for her consideration the following amendment to her amendment which would read as
follows: AS USED IN THIS SECTION, SERVICE-CONNECTED CRIMES OR OFFENSES SHALL
BE LIMITED TO THOSE DEFINED IN ARTICLES 54 TO 70, ARTICLES 72 TO 75, ARTICLES 76
TO 83 AND ARTICLES 84 TO 92, AND ARTICLES 95 TO 97, COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 408
AS AMENDED.
This would identify, I mean, specifically, what these service-related or connected offenses or crimes
would be. (Emphasis supplied.)
The President. What will happen to the definition of "service-connected offense" already put forward by
Senator Shahani?
Senator Taada. I believe that would be incorporated in the specification of the Article I have mentioned
in the Articles of War.
SUSPENSION OF THE SESSION
The President. Will the Gentleman kindly try to work it out between the two of you? I will suspend the
session for a minute, if there is no objection. There was none.
It was 5:02 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF THE SESSION
At 5:06 p.m., the session was resumed.
The President. The session is resumed.
Senator Taada. Mr. President, Senator Shahani has graciously accepted my amendment to her
amendment, subject to refinement and style.

The President. Is there any objection? Silence There being none, the amendment is approved.19
In the same session, Senator Taada emphasized:
Senator Taada. Section 1, already provides that crimes of offenses committed by persons subject to
military law ... will be tried by the civil courts, except, those which are service-related or connected. And
we specified which would be considered service-related or connected under the Articles of War,
Commonwealth Act No. 408.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
The said amendment was later on reflected in the final version of the statute as Paragraph 2 of Section 1.
Section 1 of R.A. 7055 reads in full:
Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law,
including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances,
regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or
juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before
arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by courtmartial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at
any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles
54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended. (Emphasis
supplied)
The second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. 7055 explicitly specifies what are considered "serviceconnected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act No. 408 (CA 408), as amended,21 to wit:
Articles 54 to 70:
Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.
Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
Art. 56. False Muster.
Art. 57. False Returns.
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
Art. 59. Desertion.
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President, Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of
National Defense.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.

Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.

Articles 72 to 92
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.
Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 84. Military Property. Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage or Wrongful Disposition.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to Soldiers.
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.
Art. 88-A. Unlawfully Influencing Action of Court.
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Articles 95 to 97:
Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
Art. 97 General Article.
In view of the provisions of R.A. 7055, the military tribunals cannot exercise jurisdiction over
respondents' case since the offense for which they were charged is not included in the enumeration of
"service-connected offenses or crimes" as provided for under Section 1 thereof. The said law is very clear
that the jurisdiction to try members of the AFP who commit crimes or offenses covered by the RPC, and
which are not service-connected, lies with the civil courts. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it
must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is
obeyed. There is no room for interpretation, but only application.22 Hence, the RTC cannot divest itself of
its jurisdiction over the alleged crime of multiple murder.1wphi1

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate City, Branch 47, dated
December 6, 2005 and January 11, 2006, respectively, in Criminal Case No. 11846 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Masbate City, is DIRECTED to reinstate Criminal
Case No. 11846 to its docket and conduct further proceedings thereon with utmost dispatch in light of the
foregoing disquisition.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179488

April 23, 2012

COSCO PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
KEMPER INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 75895, entitled
Kemper Insurance Company v. Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. The CA Decision reversed and set aside
the Order dated March 22, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila, which granted the
Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc., and ordered that the case be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
The antecedents are as follows:
Respondent Kemper Insurance Company is a foreign insurance company based in Illinois, United States
of America (USA) with no license to engage in business in the Philippines, as it is not doing business in
the Philippines, except in isolated transactions; while petitioner is a domestic shipping company
organized in accordance with Philippine laws.
In 1998, respondent insured the shipment of imported frozen boneless beef (owned by Genosi, Inc.),
which was loaded at a port in Brisbane, Australia, for shipment to Genosi, Inc. (the importer-consignee)
in the Philippines. However, upon arrival at the Manila port, a portion of the shipment was rejected by
Genosi, Inc. by reason of spoilage arising from the alleged temperature fluctuations of petitioner's reefer
containers.
Thus, Genosi, Inc. filed a claim against both petitioner shipping company and respondent Kemper
Insurance Company. The claim was referred to McLarens Chartered for investigation, evaluation, and
adjustment of the claim. After processing the claim documents, McLarens Chartered recommended a
settlement of the claim in the amount of $64,492.58, which Genosi, Inc. (the consignee-insured) accepted.
Thereafter, respondent paid the claim of Genosi, Inc. (the insured) in the amount of $64,492.58.
Consequently, Genosi, Inc., through its General Manager, Avelino S. Mangahas, Jr., executed a Loss and
Subrogation Receipt3 dated September 22, 1999, stating that Genosi, Inc. received from respondent the
amount of $64,492.58 as the full and final satisfaction compromise, and discharges respondent of all
claims for losses and expenses sustained by the property insured, under various policy numbers, due to
spoilage brought about by machinery breakdown which occurred on October 25, November 7 and 10, and
December 5, 14, and 18, 1998; and, in consideration thereof, subrogates respondent to the claims of
Genosi, Inc. to the extent of the said amount. Respondent then made demands upon petitioner, but the
latter failed and refused to pay the said amount.
Hence, on October 28, 1999, respondent filed a Complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages4 against
petitioner before the trial court, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95561, entitled Kemper Insurance
Company v. Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. Respondent alleged that despite repeated demands to pay
and settle the total amount of US$64,492.58, representing the value of the loss, petitioner failed and
refused to pay the same, thereby causing damage and prejudice to respondent in the amount of
US$64,492.58; that the loss and damage it sustained was due to the fault and negligence of petitioner,
specifically, the fluctuations in the temperature of the reefer container beyond the required setting which
was caused by the breakdown in the electronics controller assembly; that due to the unjustified failure and
refusal to pay its just and valid claims, petitioner should be held liable to pay interest thereon at the legal
rate from the date of demand; and that due to the unjustified refusal of the petitioner to pay the said
amount, it was compelled to engage the services of a counsel whom it agreed to pay 25% of the whole

amount due as attorney's fees. Respondent prayed that after due hearing, judgment be rendered in its favor
and that petitioner be ordered to pay the amount of US$64,492.58, or its equivalent in Philippine currency
at the prevailing foreign exchange rate, or a total of P2,594,513.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate
from date of demand, 25% of the whole amount due as attorney's fees, and costs.
In its Answer5 dated November 29, 1999, petitioner insisted, among others, that respondent had no
capacity to sue since it was doing business in the Philippines without the required license; that the
complaint has prescribed and/or is barred by laches; that no timely claim was filed; that the loss or
damage sustained by the shipments, if any, was due to causes beyond the carrier's control and was due to
the inherent nature or insufficient packing of the shipments and/or fault of the consignee or the hired
stevedores or arrastre operator or the fault of persons whose acts or omissions cannot be the basis of
liability of the carrier; and that the subject shipment was discharged under required temperature and was
complete, sealed, and in good order condition.
During the pre-trial proceedings, respondent's counsel proffered and marked its exhibits, while petitioner's
counsel manifested that he would mark his client's exhibits on the next scheduled pre-trial. However, on
November 8, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss,6 contending that the same was filed by one Atty.
Rodolfo A. Lat, who failed to show his authority to sue and sign the corresponding certification against
forum shopping. It argued that Atty. Lat's act of signing the certification against forum shopping was a
clear violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
In its Order7 dated March 22, 2002, the trial court granted petitioner's Motion to Dismiss and dismissed
the case without prejudice, ruling that it is mandatory that the certification must be executed by the
petitioner himself, and not by counsel. Since respondent's counsel did not have a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) to act on its behalf, hence, the certification against forum shopping executed by said
counsel was fatally defective and constituted a valid cause for dismissal of the complaint.
Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration8 was denied by the trial court in an Order9 dated July 9, 2002.
On appeal by respondent, the CA, in its Decision10 dated March 23, 2007, reversed and set aside the trial
court's order. The CA ruled that the required certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory and that the
same must be signed by the plaintiff or principal party concerned and not by counsel; and in case of
corporations, the physical act of signing may be performed in behalf of the corporate entity by
specifically authorized individuals. However, the CA pointed out that the factual circumstances of the
case warranted the liberal application of the rules and, as such, ordered the remand of the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration11 was later denied by the CA in the Resolution12 dated September
3, 2007.
Hence, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, with the following issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT ATTY. RODOLFO LAT WAS
PROPERLY AUTHORIZED BY THE RESPONDENT TO SIGN THE CERTIFICATE AGAINST
FORUM SHOPPING DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACTS THAT:
A) THE PERSON WHO EXECUTED THE SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY (SPA)
APPOINTING ATTY. LAT AS RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY-IN-FACT WAS MERELY AN
UNDERWRITER OF THE RESPONDENT WHO HAS NOT SHOWN PROOF THAT HE
WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF RESPONDENT TO DO SO.
B) THE POWERS GRANTED TO ATTY. LAT REFER TO [THE AUTHORITY TO
REPRESENT DURING THE] PRE-TRIAL [STAGE] AND DO NOT COVER THE SPECIFIC
POWER TO SIGN THE CERTIFICATE.13

Petitioner alleged that respondent failed to submit any board resolution or secretary's certificate
authorizing Atty. Lat to institute the complaint and sign the certificate of non-forum shopping on its
behalf. Petitioner submits that since respondent is a juridical entity, the signatory in the complaint must
show proof of his or her authority to sign on behalf of the corporation. Further, the SPA14 dated May 11,
2000, submitted by Atty. Lat, which was notarized before the Consulate General of Chicago, Illinois,
USA, allegedly authorizing him to represent respondent in the pre-trial and other stages of the
proceedings was signed by one Brent Healy (respondent's underwriter), who lacks authorization from its
board of directors.
In its Comment, respondent admitted that it failed to attach in the complaint a concrete proof of Atty.
Lat's authority to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping on its behalf. However, there was
subsequent compliance as respondent submitted an authenticated SPA empowering Atty. Lat to represent
it in the pre-trial and all stages of the proceedings. Further, it averred that petitioner is barred by laches
from questioning the purported defect in respondent's certificate of non-forum shopping.
The main issue in this case is whether Atty. Lat was properly authorized by respondent to sign the
certification against forum shopping on its behalf.
The petition is meritorious.
We have consistently held that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal
parties.15 If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must
have been duly authorized.16 With respect to a corporation, the certification against forum shopping may
be signed for and on its behalf, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the
facts required to be disclosed in such document.17 A corporation has no power, except those expressly
conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied or incidental to its existence. In turn, a
corporation exercises said powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and
agents. Thus, it has been observed that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is
lodged with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers. In turn, physical acts of the
corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for
the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors.18
In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP),19
we ruled that only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of
non-forum shopping on behalf of a corporation. We also required proof of such authority to be presented.
The petition is subject to dismissal if a certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the
signatory's authority.
In the present case, since respondent is a corporation, the certification must be executed by an officer or
member of the board of directors or by one who is duly authorized by a resolution of the board of
directors; otherwise, the complaint will have to be dismissed.20 The lack of certification against forum
shopping is generally not curable by mere amendment of the complaint, but shall be a cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice.21 The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping
signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is
authorized to file the complaint on behalf of the corporation.22
There is no proof that respondent, a private corporation, authorized Atty. Lat, through a board resolution,
to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping on its behalf. Accordingly, the
certification against forum shopping appended to the complaint is fatally defective, and warrants the
dismissal of respondent's complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages (Civil Case No. 99-95561) against
petitioner.
In Republic v. Coalbrine International Philippines, Inc.,23 the Court cited instances wherein the lack of
authority of the person making the certification of non-forum shopping was remedied through subsequent
compliance by the parties therein. Thus,

[w]hile there were instances where we have allowed the filing of a certification against non-forum
shopping by someone on behalf of a corporation without the accompanying proof of authority at the time
of its filing, we did so on the basis of a special circumstance or compelling reason. Moreover, there was a
subsequent compliance by the submission of the proof of authority attesting to the fact that the person
who signed the certification was duly authorized.
In China Banking Corporation v. Mondragon International Philippines, Inc., the CA dismissed the
petition filed by China Bank, since the latter failed to show that its bank manager who signed the
certification against non-forum shopping was authorized to do so. We reversed the CA and said that the
case be decided on the merits despite the failure to attach the required proof of authority, since the board
resolution which was subsequently attached recognized the pre-existing status of the bank manager as an
authorized signatory.
In Abaya Investments Corporation v. Merit Philippines, where the complaint before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila was instituted by petitioner's Chairman and President, Ofelia Abaya, who signed
the verification and certification against non-forum shopping without proof of authority to sign for the
corporation, we also relaxed the rule. We did so taking into consideration the merits of the case and to
avoid a re-litigation of the issues and further delay the administration of justice, since the case had already
been decided by the lower courts on the merits. Moreover, Abaya's authority to sign the certification was
ratified by the Board.24
Contrary to the CA's finding, the Court finds that the circumstances of this case do not necessitate the
relaxation of the rules. There was no proof of authority submitted, even belatedly, to show subsequent
compliance with the requirement of the law. Neither was there a copy of the board resolution or
secretary's certificate subsequently submitted to the trial court that would attest to the fact that Atty. Lat
was indeed authorized to file said complaint and sign the verification and certification against forum
shopping, nor did respondent satisfactorily explain why it failed to comply with the rules. Thus, there
exists no cogent reason for the relaxation of the rule on this matter. Obedience to the requirements of
procedural rules is needed if we are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot
justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.25
Moreover, the SPA dated May 11, 2000, submitted by respondent allegedly authorizing Atty. Lat to
appear on behalf of the corporation, in the pre-trial and all stages of the proceedings, signed by Brent
Healy, was fatally defective and had no evidentiary value. It failed to establish Healy's authority to act in
behalf of respondent, in view of the absence of a resolution from respondent's board of directors or
secretary's certificate proving the same. Like any other corporate act, the power of Healy to name,
constitute, and appoint Atty. Lat as respondent's attorney-in-fact, with full powers to represent respondent
in the proceedings, should have been evidenced by a board resolution or secretary's certificate.
Respondent's allegation that petitioner is estopped by laches from raising the defect in respondent's
certificate of non-forum shopping does not hold water.
In Tamondong v. Court of Appeals,26 we held that if a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff
who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not
produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no
jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff.27 Accordingly, since Atty. Lat was not duly authorized
by respondent to file the complaint and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping, the
complaint is considered not filed and ineffectual, and, as a necessary consequence, is dismissable due to
lack of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice; that is, for hearing and
deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the
filing of the complaint, and to be bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the court's

jurisdiction.28 Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed with the RTC, Branch 8, Manila, the same
did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent.1wphi1
Since the court has no jurisdiction over the complaint and respondent, petitioner is not estopped from
challenging the trial court's jurisdiction, even at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. This is so because
the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.29
In Regalado v. Go,30 the Court held that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy31 doctrine to
apply, thus:
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by
laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is
analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is,
lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss
filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the
proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of
the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It
was only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise
the question of jurisdiction.32
The factual setting attendant in Sibonghanoy is not similar to that of the present case so as to make it fall
under the doctrine of estoppel by laches. Here, the trial court's jurisdiction was questioned by the
petitioner during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, and it cannot be said that considerable length of
time had elapsed for laches to attach.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
dated March 23, 2007 and September 3, 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75895 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court, dated March 22, 2002 and July 9, 2002,
respectively, in Civil Case No. 99-95561, are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171219

September 3, 2012

ATTY. FE Q. PALMIANO-SALVADOR, Petitioner,

vs.
CONSTANTINO ANGELES, substituted by LUZ G. ANGELES*, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on September 16, 2005 dismissing the petition
before it, and its Resolution2 dated January 13, 2006, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, be
reversed and set aside.
The records reveal the CA's narration of facts to be accurate, to wit:
xxxx
Respondent-appellee ANGELES is one of the registered owners of a parcel of land located at 1287
Castanos Street, Sampaloc, Manila, evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 150872. The subject
parcel of land was occupied by one Jelly Galiga (GALIGA) from 1979 up to 1993, as a lessee with a lease
contract. Subsequently, Fe Salvador (SALVADOR) alleged that she bought on September 7, 1993 the
subject parcel of land from GALIGA who represented that he was the owner, being one in possession.
Petitioner-appellant SALVADOR remained in possession of said subject property from November 1993
up to the present.
On November 18, 1993, the registered owner, the respondentappellee ANGELES, sent a letter to
petitioner-appellant SALVADOR demanding that the latter vacate the subject property, which was not
heeded by petitioner-appellant SALVADOR. Respondent-appellee ANGELES, thru one Rosauro Diaz, Jr.
(DIAZ), filed a complaint for ejectment on October 12, 1994 with the Metropolitan Trial Court [MeTC]
of Manila, Branch 16, docketed as Civil Case No. 146190-CV.
The Assailed Decision of the Trial Courts
The [MeTC] rendered its decision on November 29, 1999 in favor of herein respondent-appellee
ANGELES, the dispositive portion of which reads, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter
and all persons claiming under her to:
1) vacate the parcel of land located at 1287 Castanos Street, Sampaloc, Manila, and surrender the
same to the plaintiff;
2) pay the plaintiff the sum of Php1,000.00 monthly as reasonable compensation for her use and
occupancy of the above parcel of land beginning November 1993 up to the time she has actually
vacated the premises;
3) pay the plaintiff the sum of Php5,000.00 as attorney's fees and the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
In the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant SALVADOR, she alleged, among others, that DIAZ, who filed
the complaint for ejectment, had no authority whatsoever from respondent-appellee ANGELES at the
time of filing of the suit. Petitioner-appellant SALVADOR's appeal was denied by the [Regional Trial
Court] RTC in a Decision dated March 12, 2003. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by SALVADOR
was denied in an Order dated March 16, 2004.3
Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review, but in a Decision dated September 16,
2005, said petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the factual findings of the lower

courts that Galiga, the person who supposedly sold the subject premises to petitioner, was a mere lessee
of respondent, the registered owner of the land in question. Such being the case, the lower court ruled that
Galiga could not have validly transferred ownership of subject property to herein petitioner. It was ruled
by the CA that there were no significant facts or circumstances that the trial court overlooked or
misinterpreted, thus, it found no reason to overturn the factual findings of the MeTC and the RTC. A
motion for reconsideration of said Decision was denied in a Resolution dated January 13, 2006.
Hence, the present petition, where one of the important issues for resolution is the effect of Rosauro
Diaz's (respondent's representative) failure to present proof of his authority to represent respondent
(plaintiff before the MeTC) in filing the complaint. This basic issue has been ignored by the MeTC and
the RTC, while the CA absolutely failed to address it, despite petitioner's insistence on it from the very
beginning, i.e., in her Answer filed with the MeTC. This is quite unfortunate, because this threshold issue
should have been resolved at the outset as it is determinative of the court's jurisdiction over the complaint
and the plaintiff.
Note that the complaint before the MeTC was filed in the name of respondent, but it was one Rosauro
Diaz who executed the verification and certification dated October 12, 1994, alleging therein that he was
respondent's attorney-in-fact. There was, however, no copy of any document attached to the complaint to
prove Diaz's allegation regarding the authority supposedly granted to him. This prompted petitioner to
raise in her Answer and in her Position Paper, the issue of Diaz's authority to file the case. On December
11, 1995, more than a year after the complaint was filed, respondent attached to his Reply and/or
Comment to Respondent's (herein petitioner) Position Paper,4 a document entitled Special Power of
Attorney (SPA)5 supposedly executed by respondent in favor of Rosauro Diaz. However, said SPA was
executed only on November 16, 1994, or more than a month after the complaint was filed, appearing
to have been notarized by one Robert F. McGuire of Santa Clara County. Observe, further, that there was
no certification from the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A, that said
person is indeed a notary public in Santa Clara County, California. Verily, the court cannot give full faith
and credit to the official acts of said Robert McGuire, and hence, no evidentiary weight or value can be
attached to the document designated as an SPA dated November 16, 1994. Thus, there is nothing on
record to show that Diaz had been authorized by respondent to initiate the action against
petitioner.1wphi1
What then, is the effect of a complaint filed by one who has not proven his authority to represent a
plaintiff in filing an action? In Tamondong v. Court of Appeals,6 the Court categorically stated that "[i]f a
complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff [by one] who is not authorized to do so, the complaint
is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court
should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the
plaintiff."7 This ruling was reiterated in Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance Company,8
where the Court went on to say that "[i]n order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the
merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction over
the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and to be bound by a decision, a party should first be
subjected to the court's jurisdiction. Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed with the [MeTC], the
same did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent [plaintiff before the lower court]." 9
Pursuant to the foregoing rulings, therefore, the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over this case and all
proceedings before it were null and void. The courts could not have delved into the very merits of the
case, because legally, there was no complaint to speak of. The court's jurisdiction cannot be deemed to
have been invoked at all.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court in Civil Case No. 146190, dated November 29, 1999; the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in
Civil Case No. 00-96344, dated March 12, 2003; and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP

No. 83467, are SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The complaint filed by respondent before the
Metropolitan Trial Court is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.