Noam Chomsky's Linguistic Theory

Author(s): JAMES HIGGINBOTHAM

Source: Social Research, Vol. 49, No. 1, Modern Masters (SPRING 1982), pp. 143-157
Published by: The New School
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Noam Chomsky's/
/
Linguistic
T IGO ry

/BY JAMESHIGGINBOTHAM

A WENTY-FiVE
of Noam
yearshavepassedsincethepublication
x
a slendervolumethatis widely
Structures,
Syntactic
Chomsky's
concededto have inaugurateda revolutionin linguistics.
The
period has witnessedmanytrendsand tidesof thought,and
ownviewshave notstoodstill.In booksand articles
Chomsky's
he has expoundedand defendedhis ideas on mattersof general scientific
and philosophicalinterestno less than on particularquestionsof linguisticanalysis.His mostrecentbook,
Lectures
on Government
andBinding,2
is thebroadestin scope of
on linguistics
sincethe 1965 Aspects
any of his writings
ofthe

3
4
Theoryof Syntax. The title essay of Rules and Representations,

based upon lecturesgivenat ColumbiaUniversity

in 1978 and
at StanfordUniversity
in 1979, is Chomsky'slateststatement
of his general views,incorporating
replies to critics(mostly
and
note
of developmentsin the field.
philosophers)
taking
Despitechangesin formulation,
Chomsky'slinguistic
theory
fromSyntactic
Structures
to the presenthas maintained,in my
opinion,a centralcore thatconstitutesthe essentialsof his
position.It is my purpose in thisessay to outlinethe theses
thatmakeup thiscore,and to considersomeof the questions
aboutthemthathave been,earlyand late,topicsof concernin
linguistics,
philosophy,and psychology.
1Noam Chomsky,
Structures
Syntactic
(The Hague: Mouton,1957).
2 NoamChomsky,
Lectures
onGovernment
andBinding(Dordrecht:ForisPublications,
1981).
3 Noam Chomsky,
Aspects
oftheTheory
ofSyntax(Cambridge:MIT Press,1965).
4 Noam
Rulesand Regulations
Chomsky,
(Oxford:Blackwell,1980).

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144

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State
Languagea Cognitive

be underIn Chomsky'sview,language cannot profitably

stoodas a systemof habits,or conditionedresponses,or dispostudiedas a
sitionsto verbalbehavior;it is moreappropriately
knowlof a systemof knowledge,specifically
manifestation
edge of grammar,thatis put to use in speech and thought.
of
The negativepartof thisthesisreflects
Chomsky'scriticisms
behaviorism;the positivepart articulatesthe alternativeconceptionof languagewithwhichhis workis identified.But the
behavioralaccountof
criticism
appliesnot onlyto a narrowly
notion
of
and
languageas a productof
Chomsky's
language,
researchof
knowledgeof grammarsetsthestageforlinguistic
a distinctive
type.
in anyof itsvariousforms,does not have the
Behaviorism,
are not so reluctant
appeal that it once did. Psychologists
mental
to
processesfor the sake of
nowadays positinterior,
explainingbehavior,or changesin behavior,and to hypothesize mechanismsof learningthat go beyond conditioning.
The point is thereforeperhaps worthemphasizingthatlinguistictheory,conceivedas an accountof knowledgeof language, is not a liberated"scienceof behavior,"freed from
adventitious
scruples.If grammaris a system
methodological
of knowledge,thena theoryof grammaris a theory,not of
languageuse, but of a cognitivestatethatis availableforuse.
Grammaralone explainsno behaviorat all.
In AspectsoftheTheoryofSyntax,Chomskycalled the state of

this
a personwho knowsa languagehiscompetence,
contrasting
to verbalbehavior,or
withhisverbalbehaviorand dispositions
here seems
In retrospectChomsky'sterminology
performance.
The term"competence"suggests
to have been unfortunate.
thatthepossessorofcompetencepossessesa skillof somesort;
and "performance"
suggestsa domain of actual
correlatively
behaviorthatfallsshortin variousrespectsof being ideally
"competent."Both suggestionsare misleading.The contrast
betweencompetenceand performanceis a contrastbetween

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CHOMSKY

145

knowledge, on the one hand, and behavioral repertoire,on

the other.
The firstthesis, then, that I would identifyas central to
Chomsky's position over the years is that a theory of our
linguisticnature may be sought whose firstobject of study is
linguisticknowledge, not verbal behavior.
A recurrenttheme, especially in philosophical discussion of
Chomsky'swork,has been skepticismover his use of cognitive
notions in characterizingthe object of study. A speaker of
English, who is said in the normal way to "know English,"
obviouslydoes not have knowledge of it in the sense of being
able to state the rules and principles governing its grammar.
In consequence, when Chomsky speaks of "knowledge of
grammar," or further of "knowledge of the rules of
grammar," many philosophers have been led to question
whetherthe notion of knowledge is appropriate here. Noting
in addition that knowledge of grammar does not amount to
possession of a skill,hence not a case of "knowinghow" to do
something, these philosophers have often concluded that
there is no appropriate sense of the term "knowledge" according to which linguistic theory can be a theory of the
knowledge that native speakers have of their languages, or
grammars.
To which it may be responded thatthese philosophical considerations merely show the impoverishmentof the conceptions of knowledge that analytic philosophers have typically
allowed in recent years. The conception is impoverished in
that it makes no room for the types of description that linguistictheoryprovides for such an obviouslycognitivestate as
"knowing English," and in that it does not allow for tacit,or
implicit,or unconscious knowledge.In several places Chomsky
has suggested that if the term "knowledge" gives offense,one
may substitutea technical term,say "cognition,"and speak of
a person's "cognizing" his grammar rather than "knowing" it.
In any event it will be cognizing that is the criticalnotion for
linguistics.

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The debate over whether there is, properly speaking,

knowledgeof grammaror of the rules of grammaris far from
over: see Michael Dummett's review of Rules and Representationsin the LondonReviewofBooks.The debate is not simply

to a more nearly
as we may see by switching
terminological,
It
is
essential
to
neutralinitialposition.
Chomsky'sresearch
programthat it be true or false to attributegrammarsto
personsas descriptionsof theircognitivestates.Simplifying
is thatpersonsare in thestateswe
theassumption
onlyslightly,
commonlycall "knowingEnglish,"or "knowingChinese,"etc.
G are to be attributed
to them.To
just whencertaingrammars
characterize
competenceis to solveforG. We mayat
linguistic
thispointleave open the questionjust whatrelationa person
withgrammarG standsin to G itself;but it mustbe trueor
falsetosaythathe hasG. The philosophical
questionis whether
as a case of knowledge.
thisrelationis interpretable
whether
the
grammarsare in somesense
Although question
it is not as significantfor the
knownis not insubstantial,
the
as
of
practice linguistics
priorquestionwhetherattributionsof grammarsare a corrector fruitful
way to describe
cognitivestatesin the firstplace. The questionof fruitfulness
but it will be
can certainlybe answeredin the affirmative;
usefulto describethe workingsof grammarsin more detail
beforecontrasting
Chomsky'sapproachwithothersthathave
been suggested.
to the varietyof
I willfollowcustomary
usage in referring
thatemergedchieflyin consequenceof Chomsky's
linguistics
work as "generativegrammar."What does a generative
grammarof a languagesay about it,and how do generative
grammarsdifferfrom traditionalgrammars?Quite apart
and specifically
or metatheory,
fromquestionsof methodology
of
own
from
interpretation his enterprise,
Chomsky's
apart
thereis an importantrespectin whichgenerativegrammaris
an intellectualnovelty:it is the firsttypeof linguistictheory
whose avowed aim is to make grammaticaldescription
fully
that
in
observation
the
There
is
generative
explicit.
justice

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CHOMSKY

147

grammar,particularlyin syntax,representsfirstof all the

applicationof formalmethodsmade available in the twentiethcenturythroughlogical and mathematicalstudies of
formalizedlanguagesto empirically
given,naturallanguages
as
Harris
took
this
step earlyas the 1940s). Only with
(Zellig
these methods in hand are the problems of generative
grammarformulable.
As an illustration,
considerthenotion"sentenceof English."
An adequate generativegrammarof Englishmustin all cases,
by purelyformalmeans,correctlyclassifystringsof English
wordsas sentencesor as nonsentences.Chomsky'sdiscussion
in Syntactic
Structures
was devotedbothto generaland specific
the
construction
of such a grammar.
for
proposals
It turnsout that the construction
of adequate generative
natural
grammarsfor
language,even if consideredonlyas a
chalproblemof technicalinterest,
poses a seriousintellectual
thedepthof thechallengeearly
lenge.Chomsky,appreciating
thatseveralinitially
on, demonstrated
plausiblemodelsforthe
formof grammarwere not adequate to the task.
It is a fact,notonlythatwriting
a grammarfora languageis
a difficult
(and so farunaccomplished)
job, butalso thatit can
be difficult
to appreciatejust how difficult
thejob actuallyis.
The conditionsof adequacy are so stringentthat literally
nothingcan be omitted.Fromthe pointof viewof generative
grammar,therefore,it is a powerfulblow to a theoryof
language that it cannot deliver explicitaccounts at critical
junctures.Inversely,sincethatpointof viewis not yetwidely
adopted,the forceof the generativegrammarian'scriticisms
of othertypesof accountsof languageis frequently
blunted.
is
known
for
his
of
Chomsky widely
critique behaviorism,
with
his
1959
review
B. F. Skinner'sVerbal
of
commencing
Behavior.But I believe that,if we look a littlebeyond the
proximatetargetsof Chomsky'scriticalremarkson psychologicalpracticeand considerwhatChomskyseems to take to
be the centralargumentsin supportof his criticisms,
we shall
findthatthe impactof these argumentshas been marginal.

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An essentialcriticismof Skinner is thatthe learning process as

he describes it is at crucial points left to notions such as
"analogy" and "generalization," notions whose inexplicitness
deprives them of explanatory power. That these notions still
flourishis a measure of the noveltyof the typeof approach to
language exemplified by generative grammar.
An aim of linguistictheory according to Chomsky, then,
is by constructingfullyexplicit,or generative,grammarsthat
may be ascribed to persons- to understand in some measure
in what linguisticcompetence consists.This research,however,
stillleaves to be filled in the nature of the relation between a
person and the grammar to be ascribed to him.
A number of linguists and psychologistshave suggested
that, for a grammar correctlyto be ascribed to a person, it
should be in some sense directlyused by the person in the
course of verbal behavior. The pertinentnotion of "directuse"
is not easy to formulate,and in any case varies from proposal
to proposal. On one interpretation,a grammar would be directlyused to the extent that its rules and the descriptionsof
sentences that it provides correspond in some experimentally
- for indeterminate ways to properties of mental activity
stance, whatever activityis involved in the perception and
production of speech.
The thesis that grammarsare correctlyascribed only to the
degree that they can be directlyimplicated in verbal behavior
is often expressed as the view that grammars should be "psychologicallyreal."5 We can see this view as prompted by the
desire to pin down an appropriate sense in which grammars
are to be ascribed to persons.
On the question of "psychologicalreality,"as on the question whether grammars ascribe knowledge, Chomsky's view
has consistentlybeen that no grounds for skepticismabout the
objectivityor cogency of the linguisticenterprise,or charac5See forinstancethediscussion
The
inJ. A. Fodor,T. G. Bever,and M. F. Garrett,
1974).
ofLanguage(New York: McGraw-Hill,
Psychology

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CHOMSKY

149

terizinga normalspeaker'sgraspof his languagein termsof a

generativegrammar,have been educed; see thelateressaysin
I am inclinedto thinkthatChomsky
Rulesand Representations.
is rightabout thismatter,but thereis no space to argue the
issue here. In any event, Chomsky'sthesis that grammar
shouldbe viewedas an enterprisedescriptive
not of behavior
but of a capacitymanifestedin behavioris only the firstof
those thatsustainlinguisticresearchas he conceivesit. We
turnnow to some otheraspectsof his program.
Mentalismvs. Physicalism

The descriptions
providedbytheascriptionof grammarsto
of cogpersonsare, we have seen,to be abstractdescriptions
nitivestates of those persons. Now, these cognitivestates
doubtlessadmit of physicaldescriptionsas well, and surely
mustbe countedas havingthe cognitivepowersthattheydo
in virtueof theirphysicalorganization.I say"surely,"thereby
a positionthatis now as formerly
acquiescingin physicalism,
doubt,and controversy.
subjectto interpretation,
Supposing,
that
is in some sense true,we can bring
however,
physicalism
out a distinctive
featureof Chomsky'stypeof inquiry,a featurethatis bornealso byFreud'saccountsof mentallife.This
featureis the thesisthat the theoryof mind can fruitfully
proceedin theabsenceof all butthemosttenuousconnections
betweenits typeof descriptionsof cognitivestatesand their
in
physicalembodiments.
Chomsky'stheoryis thusmentalistic
a doublesense,abstracting
bothfromthedirectexplanationof
behaviorand fromthe physicalunderpinningsof the states
thatit is the theory'saim to describe.
It is interesting
to contrastChomsky'sadvocacyof mentalistic linguistics
witha view thathas been workedout in some
detail,namelythatof W. V. Quine as expressedin
systematic
severalof hiswritings
overtheyears.Quine's view,as I understandit, is thatexplanationof the growthof human knowl-

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edge, and of knowledge of language in particular, can be

expected to make progress along the course of firstconjecturing,and then tryingto understand in physical detail, the
mechanisms responsible for dispositions to behavior and for
changes in dispositions.6The research program thus envisaged has no place for abstract accounts of linguisticcompetence, because these are accounts neither of dispositions to
behavior nor of possible physical mechanisms.
Mentalisticaccounts of language may be viewed with suspicion fromseveral pointsof view less severe than thatof Quine.
But it should be noted that the wholesale rejection of mentalismalso carries risks,perhaps the greatestof which is that
of ignoringwhole domains of reasonable inquiry,because they
do not yield at once to methods of investigationthat are not
mentalistic.A good case can be made that the structureof
human language is one domain that received less than adequate investigationin part because the problems there posed
can, at present, only be put in mentalisticterms. Chomsky's
workhas been the firstand primaryinstrumentin opening up
this domain.

as Theory-Construction
LanguageAcquisition

Thus far I have identifiedtwo thesesthathave, I believe,

sinceits inception.The
guided Chomsky'sworkin linguistics
thirdthesisthatI willdiscussherewas firststatedexplicitly
by
the
in
the
that
ofSyntax:
of Theory
acquisition
Chomsky Aspects
of languagemightbe studiedas a kindof theory-construction,
in whichthe child,on the basis of his linguisticexperience,
comesto deduce the natureof the grammarof the language
to whichhe is exposed.Let us considerthisthesisin somewhat
more detail.
6 See
particularlyQuine's essay, "Mind and Verbal Dispositions," in Samuel D.
Guttenplan,ed., Mind and Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).

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CHOMSKY

151

If grammaris viewedas the outcomeof linguisticexperience, the experienceservingto convertthe stateof the child
fromignoranceto knowledgeof language,then thereis an
initialstateon whichthisexperienceactsin some determinate
Univergrammar.
way.The initialstateChomskycallsuniversal
sal grammarrepresentsthe contribution
of the child to the
state
attained
on
the
basis
of
cognitive
experience;it is, by
about both
definition,
innate,and mustincludeinformation
whatgrammarsare possiblefor human languagesand how
grammarsfromamong the possibleones are to be selected.
Chomsky'sprogramof research,fullyrealized,would characterizeboththe grammarsof humanlanguagesand the selection to be ascribedto universalgrammar.
Withinlinguistics
itself,whatnow principallydistinguishes
Chomsky'spositionand type of researchis the thesisjust
outlined,thatthe fundamentalaim of linguistictheoryis to
explain(insofaras explanationis possiblewiththetoolsavailable,and withinthelimitsof thedegreeof abstraction
presently
required)the acquisitionof language by normalhuman beings. From this perspective,the descriptionof featuresof
languageis neveran end in itself;rather,it is at bestpreliminaryto thetaskof deducingthosefeaturesfromthestructure
ascribedto universalgrammar,underthe conditionsof exposure to language thatchildrentypically
undergo.
The term"universalgrammar"misleadingly
suggeststhat
the studyof universalgrammarwould intimately,
or perhaps
exclusively,involvetaking a principledinventoryof those
featuresthatgrammarsof humanlanguageshave in common.
It may thereforebe worth stressingthat, understood in
Chomsky'ssense,universalgrammaris nothingelse but the
initialstateof the human language-learner.
This initialstate
well
involve
that
factors
determine
universal
featuresof
may
consistin princilanguage,but mayalso,and even principally,
that
select
of
forms
that
are verydifples
among
grammars
ferentfromeach other.To put the point anotherway,the
cogencyof Chomsky'sprogramis not underminedby obser-

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vationson the diversityof human languages; and the problem

in any case is to account forhow the child doescome to acquire
the grammar of the language to which he is exposed.
The research program, by parityof reasoning, can be extended to other domains than language; in several places
Chomsky has suggested so extending it. The picture that he
sometimespresentsis thatof the mind as composed of several
"mental organs," including language, knowledge of the behavior of ordinary physical bodies, knowledge of human beings,and so forth,each of whichmaturesunder the conditions
given by normal experience on the basis of an initial state,
which mightbe studied as leading to the knowledge in question on the basis of its specificconstruction.This thesisis best
viewed as additional to the thesis that the acquisition of language may be studied in the way Chomsky'slinguistictheory
aims for. The reason is that the formulationof the inquiry
into language leaves open the question whetherour cognitive
capacities for language are specific to the task at hand, or
rather representa specializationof some more general learning apparatus. Chomsky'sown positionis that,so far as we are
now able to judge, the capacityto acquire language should be
counted as a separable faculty of the mind- one among
perhaps many "mental organs." An alternative view, which
seems to be supported by the Piagetians among others,is that
knowledge of language is the result of applying generalized
learning strategies to linguistic material, strategies that,
applied to other domains, would yield knowledge of other
sorts.
Abstractingfrom the question of the specificityof the language faculty,we may note that there is a sense in which the
thirdstep that Chomskytakes, of formulatinga program for
research on language acquisition, is riskier than the step of
investigatinglanguage in comparativeisolation fromits physical embodimentand connectionswithbehavior. The reason is
simple: the study of grammar conceived in the generativist

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CHOMSKY

153

way,as aimingfor a fullyexplicitaccountwheretraditional

grammargave only incompletesketches,is valuable for our
understandingof the nature of language independentlyof
whatmay turnout withrespectto its physicalrealizationor
behavioralcorrelates(indeed,we can make a strongcase that
the latter);but the acquiforunderstanding
it is indispensible
withinthe
sitionproblemis one thatmightfail of tractability
limitsof grammatical
theoryalone.
in
the
acquisitionproblemcan proceed onlycorProgress
relativelywith a deeper understandingof what is in fact
acquired- that is, in Chomsky'sterms,what the nature of
Structures
competenceis. CommencingwithSyntactic
linguistic
and the longer work on whichit was based, Chomskyhas
competencewill
argued thatthe simplestmodelsof linguistic
of
devices
formal
powerfulsorts,not in general
incorporate
A technicalfeatureof
availablewithintraditionallinguistics.
the generativegrammarsof the typeChomskyhas advocated
is theiruse of certainformaloperationscalled grammatical
of
whoseroleit is to relatelevelsof description
transformations,
to one another.In the schemeofAspects
structure
of
linguistic
mediatedbetweentwo
theTheoryof Syntax,transformations
and surface
levelscalleddeepstructure
structure,
representations
functionswithinthe system
different
at theselevelsfulfilling
and of the disas a whole.Some versionof transformations,
tinctionbetweendeep and surfacestructure,
persistsnot only
in Chomsky'srecent work,but also in work withinother
The use of suchdeviceshas provedindispensible
frameworks.
to the projectof givinga clear and explicitpresentationof
linguisticstructure.
It is to be stressed,however,thattheprogramof explaining
languageacquisitionby internalmeans withinthe theoryof
deep and
grammaris not one thatis tied to transformations,
surfacestructure,
or any otherspecifictechnicaldevice. Indevices
can be employedforthe purposeof
technical
versely,
descriptions
quite independently
givingperspicuouslinguistic

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of the furtherquestion how such descriptionsmay be brought

to bear on the problem of acquisition,the distinctiveproblem
that Chomsky's type of research sets.
I have said thatChomsky'sresearchis to be distinguishedby
the degree to which it subordinates problems of linguistic
description to the overarching aim of explaining acquisition.
How much progress has been made on the latter?The recent
and Binding is an attempt to study the
Lectureson Government

a theory
questionof acquisitionmoreclosely,by formulating
of comparative
syntax thatis, a theoryof the wayslanguages
in theirsyntactic
and
do
differ
organization.
may
Given the psychologicalorientationof Chomsky'stheory,
comparativesyntaxfor him becomesprimarilythe studyof
availainformation
howthechild,on thebasisof thelinguistic
the syntaxof the languageto which
ble to him,distinguishes
A good theoryin
he is exposedfromotheradmissiblesystems.
thata
thisdomain,Chomskyargues,shouldhave theproperty
fewdetectablefeaturesof a languageshouldsufficeto fixthe
rules.A simple
of a hostof grammatical
formand functioning
image may help to conveyhow such a theorymightwork.
Imaginethata grammaris selected(apartfromthe meanings
of individual words) by setting a small number of
- 20, say- either"On" or "Off."Linguisticinformaswitches
howtheseswitchesare to
tionavailableto thechilddetermines
be set. In thatcase, a huge numberof differentgrammars
availa(here,2 to thetwentieth
power)willbe prelinguistically
to fix
suffice
ble, althougha smallamountof experiencemay
one.
of themetaphoraboveare in Chomsky's
The switch-settings
the "parameters"definedby universalgrammar.
terminology
Noticethatthisimageunderscoresthesense in whichuniverneed not
theinitialstateof thelanguage-learner,
sal grammar,
- to
in
common
have
comprisean accountof whatlanguages
could give
continuethe metaphor,differentswitch-settings
rise to verydifferent
systems.
grammatical
then
thisperspective,
from
If one viewscomparative
syntax

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CHOMSKY

155

grammatical
analysesthatmightbe formulatedfor,say, Ento
glishought have the propertythattheymeshwithanalyses
of similaror interestingly
different
phenomenain otherlanguages. For a concreteexample, consider that in English,
correspondingto the sentence(1), there are two formsof
directquestion,namely(2) and (3):
You boughtthe book forJohn.
(1)
Who did you buy the book for?
(2)
For whomdid you buy the book?
(3)
In French,however,only the formcorrespondingto (3) is
permitted(in otherwords,the form"Qui avez-vousachetle
livrepour?" is ungrammatical).
Any analysis,therefore,that
and
makesboth (2)
(3) routinelyavailableto the learnerof
Englishis likelyto be wrong,because it would not contribute
to the explanationof whyonly one of these formsexistsin
French.Withrespectto these forms,in fact,it appears that
Frenchis the normamonglanguages,and Englishthe exception. The problem,then,is to explain why English should
admitformslike(2). This is not the place to discusssolutions
thathave been proposed- whatis to be notedis thatthestatus
of (2) as a problem
is directlydependentupon the incorporation of the analyticaltask of linguisticdescriptionwithina
broaderprogramof the explanationof language acquisiton.
The broader programhas arguablymade some progress,
motivatedby the analysis of examples like those above.
Whetherthatprogramwillmakeprogressin itsownterms,or
indeed whetherthose termswillnot in timebe transformed
out of all presentrecognition,
remainsto be seen.
Chomskyys
Influence

I have outlined three theses that I would attributeto

his workduringthe last quarterChomskyas characterizing
that
in
is
the firstinstancemostprofitably
century:
language
as
a
state
ratherthan a typeof behavior;
pursued
cognitive

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that the study of this state may proceed in abstractionfrom

the knowledge of the physicalorganization ultimatelyresponsible for it; and that the question of how human beings acquire their native languages under the conditions of acquisition that we observe may be pursued internallywithin the
theoryof grammar. These theses I have given in what seems
to me a natural order of increasingstrength:skepticismabout
earlier ones will extend to later, though not conversely.
Chomsky'sinfluenceon linguisticshas been verygreat. But
in assessing the significanceof his work, it is as importantto
show the pointswhere it has failed to have much impact as it is
to note the places where the intellectualclimate has changed
through the influence of his arguments. In several places in
this essay I have remarked points where Chomsky's theses
have met withskepticismor have failed to arouse a significant
response. In conclusion I will speculate as to why this skepticism or de facto indifferenceobtains, not for the purpose of
charging that Chomskyis rightand the criticswrong, or vice
versa,but ratherfor the sake of understandingthe sources of
the skepticism. They include, I think, at least these two:
Chomsky's conception of linguisticsplaces the study of language in an area remote from traditional,humanistic concerns; and his method of inquiry,particularlyin its abstraction
from behavior and from physicalstructuresand mechanisms,
seems to be opposed to some views of what ought to count as
respectable science.
Documents criticalof Chomsky'slinguistictheory,both in its
details and in its general outlook, that draw arguments from
the two sources just mentioned are legion; I will not give
explicit referenceshere.
For the firstpoint, there seems to be a tendency to view
language, an object that arises only withinculture,and may be
said to have had a long and significanthistory,as a thingthat
mustthereforebe understood onlyfroma culturalor historical
perspective. The unwarranted belief, still common among
educated persons, that human language evolved from primi-

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CHOMSKY

157

and thatprimitive
tivebeginnings,
peoples speak moreprimia
reflex
of thisgeneralequationof
tivelythanwe, is perhaps
The
with
culture.
growthof languageseems,on this
language
and not,
view,properlyanalogousto thegrowthof civilization,
as in Chomsky'smetaphorof mentalorgans,analogousto the
growthof liver.This attitudetowardlanguage,I think,can
make Chomsky'sviewsseem bizarre.
The second point,whetherChomsky'sresearchprogramis
is muchdebated,particularly
scientific,
respectably
by philosI
on
some
features
of
have
remarked
this
debate
ophers.
above: the questionwhetherlinguisticcompetenceis knowland studiedin
edge,whethercognitivestatescan be identified
from
theirphsyicalunderpinnings
and
comparativeisolation
behavioralcorrelates,and others.Remarkably,
therehas been
littlediscussionof the details of grammaticaltheoryitself;
mostof the criticalremarkshave been externalto it, rather
than fromwithin.Not thatphilosophers,not expertsin the
sciences,should refrainfrom tryingto formulategeneral
criteriafortheevaluationof scientific
achievement
and underWe
all
about
the
sciences
standing.
speculate
anyway,and the
hope is thatphilosopherswill do it more clearlythan most.
But I am inclinedto thinkthat,until Chomsky'stheoryis
morecritically
examinedin itsown terms,whatit mayhave to
teach us, throughits successesand its failures,will not have
been taken up withinthe broader contextof our effortto
obtaina betterunderstanding
of humanknowledge,thought,
and discourse.

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