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G.R. No.

L-48006

July 8, 1942

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner. Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the
death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there
was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro
Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries
from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision
correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario,
parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto
Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First
Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint.
This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time
the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on
the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who
had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) violation which appeared
in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs
under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his
liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable,
Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other
words, The Court of Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is
found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability arising from a crime
as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903
of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission
not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is not a civil
obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article
1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus
making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an
employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his
property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many
confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and

remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the
perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as
by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under the Civil
Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon
this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of
employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and omissions which are
unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
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ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law,
intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
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ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for
the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor children
who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages caused by their employees while
engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the damage shall have been caused
by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
next preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are
under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove that they are exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from the latter what he may have
paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions
1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by any imbecile or insane person,
and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that
there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if
such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property
exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall
be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to
the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damage has been
caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by
special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fear shall be
primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the
latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of establishment. In default of persons
criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes
committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police
regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses lodging
therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance
the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore
have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care of
and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall
also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
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ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it
been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the driver's
negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But

inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence,
the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that
makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to
negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from
a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient
lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this
responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or
negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque,
como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en dao al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one of the five sources of
obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero
de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI
of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of
culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code
are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly
covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes."
However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in
contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin
and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the employer's primary and
direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a diferentes personas. Asi, existe una
responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que
es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different persons. Thus, there is a civil
responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a
necessary consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a collision between two trains
belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter had been
prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages.
The employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been
exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against
the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia menos parece sostenible que exista
cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes.

El titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles
nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que motivan sanciones
penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones,
reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma ataen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas,
de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado
excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad
originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento y que tiene otro regimen),
dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daos o perjuicios, en que
intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil
cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del
Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de
responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina
aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre aquellas
ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las
diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean
por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio
de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de los que sean
responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el
articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe
responder; personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o
empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia,
que las empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil
por razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los
tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la
separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos
cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder, habiendose, por aadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la
Compaia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de indemnizacion por
los daos y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que
permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad,
mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues del proceso; pero al declararse que no
existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se
redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento
permanece incolume, extraa a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable that there should be res judicata with
regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon
which the action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there
exists in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to penal measures
that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions,
reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily
entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses and damages are repaired,
the injured party no longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar
nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not pertinent and belong to another
scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages in
which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the civil courts
without the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind the
spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code, develop and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising
from a crime, separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with
legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison between the former

provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to
point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil responsibilities among those who, for
different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and
establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the
wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not coincide
because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts
and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the
subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their service or on the occasion of
their functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or
enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime,
are sued and sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation, before the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive justice and the civil courts being a
true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have different fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different
modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaa del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the
criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for indemnification for
the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was not sub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject
of a sentence, but it remained intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of
acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but
because of the declaration of the non-existence of the felony and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from the
crime, which was the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the
civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the Spanish Civil Code is
largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code,
says, referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without including the author of the act.
The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the
employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the
act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a
principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that the responsibility of the
employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones de aquellas personas por las que
se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que
se funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera
vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que las faltas son personales,
y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un
delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia del
padre, del tutor, del dueo o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que
enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad, incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un dao, la ley presume
que el padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir o evitar el dao. Esta falta es la
que la ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad
se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente
inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of those persons for who one is
responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what
the legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight;
but such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and that everyone
is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime
or fault, but not because of the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the

father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons
enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law
presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the
damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act
of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is,
therefore, completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil Espaol," says in Vol. VII, p.
743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por
excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o
razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase
distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda
(articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo
que impone la responsabilidad precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his own faults, this being the
doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie
which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal
Code distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other, declaring
that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the
scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should be understood as direct, according to the tenor
of that articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one should be responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the principles above set forth: that a
quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility
arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly
responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case, Ramon Lafuente died as the
result of having been run over by a street car owned by the "compaia Electric Madrilea de Traccion." The conductor
was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car
company, paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the company
appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final judgment
the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al condonar
a la compaia Electrica Madrilea al pago del dao causado con la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el
valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho,
cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos, y como la de lo criminal
declrao dentro de los limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por no haber
mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el
concurso de la culpa o negligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo, y que
alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los daos causados por
sus dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo hehco baho este
ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compaia recurrente a la indemnizacion del dao causado por uno de sus empleados,
lejos de infringer los mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha
atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el
fallo recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the trial court, in sentencing the
Compaia Madrilea to the payment of the damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value
and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act, when
it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects, and as the criminal
jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that the act in question did not constitute a felony because there was
no grave carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of fault

or negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in
accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the
damages caused by employees under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the
same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its
employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly
followed the same, without invading attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the
decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car company. This is precisely
what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his
employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that
this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had
even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages,
and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his
primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence which he did not overcome under article 1903.
Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising
from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The
plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting
within their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of
relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably without property
which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held liable civilly, notwithstanding
the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason should Barredo, the
employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been
convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi driver,
Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while the latter was found guilty of criminal
negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was brought against a railroad
company for damages because the station agent, employed by the company, had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to
deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly under
article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigna con relacion a las pruebas del
pleito: 1., que las expediciones facturadas por la compaia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que
en su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2., que
llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe de la estacion sin motivo
justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3., que la falta de entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el
demandante le originaron daos y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era
de vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los pedidos que se le habian hecho
por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que integran este recurso, porque la
demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte,
toda vez que no se funda en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las
partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio, en que principalmente
descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los daos y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio
del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas,

segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil,
que obliga por el siguiente a la Compaia demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter
economico y de jurarquia administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it declares, in relation to the evidence in
the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty
receptacles referred to in the complaint should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the
said merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the station agent without
justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when they were demanded by the
plaintiff caused him losses and damages of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors
and he failed to realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of the receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error, as the original complaint did
not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a contract of transportation, because the action was not
based on the delay of the goods nor on any contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of
the Code of Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to asking for
reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the unjustified and fraudulent
refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's
responsibility is clearly laid down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant
company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage by relations of economic character and
by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code.
In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal
action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be
noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the trial court awarded
damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in
consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken.
This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary conclusion from these collated laws is
that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible
must be made primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff
should have procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing the track, and on his
prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes
obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI.
Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair
the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but
also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with
them.
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"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by their employees in the

service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
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"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out that nowhere in our general
statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation
therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be
a broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific codes, such
as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will
from the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper
criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even
if these articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their
meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though
never in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law,
both classes of action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was
pending the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started, the civil remedy should be
sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings
for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private
complaint, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23
and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these articles suffices to show that the civil
liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in
the law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should
seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil
right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal
actions against his employees only while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of
the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is
not barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been instituted,
growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction
renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the
laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now in force in the
Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the briefs before us to have arisen
from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to the
comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an
employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence
punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall
within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the
Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing
duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from
contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A
typical application of this distinction may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery
supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to the
passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child Salvador Bona brought a civil
action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been run over by an automobile
driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:

If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to stop his auto before crossing
Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming from the opposite
direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when he again started to run his auto across said Real Street and to
continue its way along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating
until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run
over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred if the auto had been
running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana
Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the
right to that on the left, and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of
the child, and the child's body had already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance
of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high
speed without the defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable
accident which caused the death of the child would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his
negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same
act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a
crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully
and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising
from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso vs. House and
Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil
action to recover damages for the child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants.
On the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her
daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend the same. After the procession the mother
and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric &
Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The little
girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she
fell into the street gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the
burns. The trial courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on
appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at
the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of
the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the court depart
from the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of
Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the
child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing
and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much
debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must
again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery,
but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that
although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but
also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent
civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the death of the plaintiff's
daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the child. It
appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile
from the International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas.
Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed the
judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised the care of a good father of a family, thus

overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. He
obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were
likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and
apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear
from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the defective condition of the steering
gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also provides when the liability shall
cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee
there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is
juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to
the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the latter case,
the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by
defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying
article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of a business or enterprise and
the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged in his master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil.,
18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son
Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and
pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were
working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through
reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias. This theory bases the liability
of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30
Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff brought an action for
damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This
Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly licensed captain, authorized
to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a
captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the
defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain
Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore
absolved from all liability.

It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by the six cases above set forth.
He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to
article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric
Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co.
took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was
prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and
sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric
Company to obtain payment, claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the
defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The lower court rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the provisions of the Penal Code
govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil
Code negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed
by the provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the
Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not punishable by law.
Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other
words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal
negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
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Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by
the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the
master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be a
good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated on
conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the statements here made are
offered to meet the argument advanced during our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should be
disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court of Appeals based its
decision in the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his
subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila
Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising
from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is
the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a proper and
independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A motorman in the employ of the
Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay
the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the
defendant as employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil liability. But this Court
held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the exemption from civil liability
established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is not
applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because the action there had for its
purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the
plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil
Code. In fact, the above case destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the principle that the

employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from his subsidiary liability
under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the distinction between
civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that
the question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above
discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil
Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed
by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the
same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities
above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and
directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But
inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to
indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold
that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal
import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence even
the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any
intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to
uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana
or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil
case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust
his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome
method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which
is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the
law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and
productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public
conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required
in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts
have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence
are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order
to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of
these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and
patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness,
others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just

that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee,
and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his
confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the
employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited
(Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por
refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the
person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and
significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of
owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which
has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the
character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by
virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extracontractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we
pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana
to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code.
This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and
additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations
and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
defendant-petitioner.
GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, and ESTER FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO
INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT CO., INC., and PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL, respondents.
Paulino A. Conol for petitioners.
Dominador M. Canastra and Wilfredo C. Martinez for private respondents.
Hon. Mariano M. Florido for and in his own behalf.

ANTONIO, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III, in Civil Case No.
2850 (German C. Garcia, et al. vs. Marcelino Inesin et al.) dated October 21, 1971, dismissing petitioners' action for
damages against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala "without prejudice to refiling the said civil
action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan Zamboanga del
Norte", and from the order of said Court dated January 21, 1972, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife,
Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G
Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a roundtrip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals,
hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City. At about 9:30 a.m.,
while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned
and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid

collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization.
Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their respective
vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without
due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and
Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for
damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the
passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment.
On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their answer in the aforementioned Civil Case No.
2850 admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged, by way of defense, that the accident was due to the
negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus driver, as when Ricardo Vayson, driver of the PU car, saw the oncoming
passenger bus No. 25 coming from the opposite direction ascending the incline at an excessive speed, chasing another
passenger bus, he had to stop the PU car in order to give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite of such precaution, the
passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus causing the accident in question, and, therefore, said private respondents could
not be held liable for the damages caused on petitioners.
On September 29, 1971, respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss on three (3)
grounds, namely: 1) that the plaintiffs (petitioners) had no cause of action; 2) that the complaint carries with it a prayer for
attachment but without the requisite verification, hence defective under the provision of Sec. 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court; and 3) that the defendants (respondents), Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its driver, accused Pedro Tumala, had
operated said passenger bus with maximum care and prudence.
The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August
11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal
Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police for
"double serious and less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence", and that, with the filing of the aforesaid
criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated,
pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature,
because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered
finding the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art. 33
applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.
On October 14, 1971, petitioners filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss alleging that the aforesaid action for
damages was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the respondents under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code but
for their civil liability on quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles 2176-2194, as the same negligent act causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa
extra-contractual under the Civil Code, and the party seeking recovery is free to choose which remedy to enforce.
In dismissing the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 2850, the lower court sustained the arguments of respondents,
Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, and declared that whether or not "the action for damages is based on criminal
negligence or civil negligence known as culpa aquiliana in the Civil Code or tort under American law" there "should be a
showing that the offended party expressly waived the civil action or reserved his right to institute it separately" and that
"the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules
or regulations" and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally
liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages, the Court is of the opinion that the action was not based on
"culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict."
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on January 21, 1972, hence this appeal on certiorari.
There is no question that from a careful consideration of the allegations contained in the complaint in Civil Case No. 2850,
the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: a)
act or omission of the private respondents; b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the
passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical
injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision; d) existence of direct causal connection
between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing
contractual relations between the parties. The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic

rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation
of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature
and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the
failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in
violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the
criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by
petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the
same. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a
crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts.
2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. (73 Phil. 607, 620621). 1
It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January
1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal
case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither
Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made. In Tactaquin v. Palileo, 2 where
the reservation was made after the tort-feasor had already pleaded guilty and after the private prosecutor had entered his
appearance jointly with the prosecuting attorney in the course of the criminal proceedings, and the tort-feasor was
convicted and sentenced to pay damages to the offended party by final judgment in said criminal case, We ruled that such
reservation is legally ineffective because the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant. We explained in Meneses vs. Luat 3 that when the criminal action for physical injuries against the defendant
did not proceed to trial as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment and the Court made no pronouncement on the matter or
damages suffered by the injured party, the mere appearance of private counsel in representation of the offended party in
said criminal case does not constitute such active intervention as could impart an intention to press a claim for damages
in the same action, and, therefore, cannot bar a separate civil action for damages subsequently instituted on the same
ground under Article 33 of the New Civil Code.
In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of
Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or
acquittal of said accused.
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned
their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil
case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in
the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not
only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually
instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime
or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter
is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are
of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the
criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of
Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles,
for these articles were drafted ... and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now
Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of
substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso."
4 But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by
petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require
reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of
the trial of the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation
to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the
reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar

circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is directed to
proceed with the trial of the case. Costs against private respondents.
Zaldivar, Castro Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, Actg., C.J., concurs in the result.
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffsappellants, vs. REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor,
defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102,
Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs
for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the
defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the
plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules
of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the other
defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial,
reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining
the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above
entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following
assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE
111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS
APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE
WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page
4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was
prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants
do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint
against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the
motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for
civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character,
criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in
Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo
on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the
same given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion
holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a
criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is
also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his
negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same
act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a

crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully
and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising
from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that
although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but
also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent
civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But
inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to
indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold
that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal
import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application
in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs,
what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to
bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the
letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito,
which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a
civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p.
620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which
has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the
character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by
virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extracontractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we
pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana
to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code.
This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional
remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of
a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and
efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia
that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not
intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited,
but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the
Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed,
Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are
derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter
II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by
law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that

"killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana
or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because
Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be
noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law,"
thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of
the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code,
which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter
2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new
code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel
or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa
extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear,
sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177,
acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or
'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice
Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of
the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations
of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal
in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same
separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words,
the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not
as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict,
hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of
Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from
responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to
Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by
voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his
property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the
consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother

or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald,
although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question.
Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with
their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to
prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing
that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that
such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise
stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor,
does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be
done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill
has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the
foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.
RUBEN MANIAGO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (First Division), HON. RUBEN C. AYSON, in his
capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Baguio City, and ALFREDO BOADO,
respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas
Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority in Loakan, Baguio
City.
On January 7, 1990, one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private
respondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed on March 2, 1990 against petitioners
driver, Herminio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch III, where it was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 7514-R. A month later, on April 19, 1990, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against
petitioner himself The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2050-R, was assigned to Branch IV of the same court.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the
criminal case against his driver. But the trial court, in its order dated August 30, 1991, denied petitioners motion on the
ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action, in addition to the
fact that the petitioner was not the accused in the criminal case.
Petitioner took the matter on certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals, maintaining that the civil action

could not proceed independently of the criminal case because no reservation of the right to bring it separately had been
made in the criminal case.
On January 31, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition on the authority of Garcia v. Florido,1 and Abellana
v. Marave,2 which it held allowed a civil action for damages to be filed independently of the criminal action even though
no reservation to file the same has been made. Therefore, it was held, the trial court correctly denied petitioners motion
to suspend the proceedings in the civil case.3
Hence this petition for review on certiorari. There is no dispute that private respondent, as offended party in the
criminal case, did not reserve the right to bring a separate civil action, based on the same accident, either against the
driver, Herminio Andaya, or against the latters employer, herein petitioner Ruben Maniago. The question is whether
despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against
petitioner under the following provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Art. 2177 states that responsibility for fault or negligence under the above-quoted provisions is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal Code.
However, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, while reiterating that a civil action under these
provisions of the Civil Code may be brought separately from the criminal action, provides that the right to bring it must
be reserved. This Rule reads:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended party,
shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Based on these provisions, petitioner argues that the civil action against him was impliedly instituted in the
criminal action previously filed against his employee because private respondent did not reserve his right to bring this
action separately. (The records show that while this case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the criminal action was
dismissed on July 10, 1992 for failure of the prosecution to file a formal offer of its evidence, with the consequence that the
prosecution failed to prosecute its case. Accordingly, it seems to be petitioners argument that since the civil action to
recover damages was impliedly instituted with the criminal action, the dismissal of the criminal case brought with it the
dismissal of the civil action.)

Private respondent admits that he did not reserve the right to institute the present civil action against Andayas
employer. He contends, however, that the rights provided in Arts. 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code are substantive rights
and, as such, their enforcement cannot be conditioned on a reservation to bring the action to enforce them separately.
Private respondent cites in support of his position statements made in Abellana v. Marave,4 Tayag v. Alcantara,5 Madeja v.
Caro,6 and Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals,7 to the effect that the requirement to reserve the civil action is substantive in
character and, therefore, is beyond the rulemaking power of this Court under the Constitution.8
After considering the arguments of the parties, we have reached the conclusion that the right to bring an action for
damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule 111, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed.
I.
A. To begin with, 1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for
the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil
actions are not limited to those which arise from the offense charged, as originally provided in Rule 111 before the
amendment of the Rules of Court in 1988. In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery
of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be
reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action.9
Thus Rule 111, 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.- When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
B. There are statements in some cases implying that Rule 111, 1 and 3 are beyond the rulemaking power of the
Supreme Court under the Constitution. A careful examination of the cases, however, will show that approval of the filing
of separate civil action for damages even though no reservation of the right to institute such civil action had been reserved
rests on considerations other than that no reservation is needed.
In Garcia v. Florido10 the right of an injured person to bring an action for damages even if he did not make a
reservation of his action in the criminal prosecution for physical injuries through reckless imprudence was upheld on the
ground that by bringing the civil action the injured parties had in effect abandoned their right to press for recovery of
damages in the criminal case. . .. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a
criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he
has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.11
The statement that Rule 111, 1 of the 1964 Rules is an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and
34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation is not the ruling of the Court but only an aside, quoted
from an observation made in the footnote of a decision in another case.12
Another case cited by private respondent in support of his contention that the civil case need not be reserved in the
criminal case is Abellana v. Marave13 in which the right of persons injured in a vehicular accident to bring a separate action
for damages was sustained despite the fact that the right to bring it separately was not reserved. But the basis of the
decision in that case was the fact that the filing of the civil case was equivalent to a reservation because it was made after
the decision of the City Court convicting the accused had been appealed. Pursuant to Rule 123, 7 of the 1964 Rules, this
had the effect of vacating the decision in the criminal case so that technically, the injured parties could still reserve their
right to institute a civil action while the criminal case was pending in the Court of First Instance. The statement the right
of a party to sue for damages independently of the criminal action is a substantive right which cannot be frittered away
by a construction that could render it nugatory without raising a serious constitutional question14 was thrown in only
as additional support for the ruling of the Court.
On the other hand, in Madeja v. Caro15 the Court held that a civil action for damages could proceed even while the
criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence was pending and did not have to await the termination of the
criminal case precisely because the widow of the deceased had reserved her right to file a separate civil action for
damages. We do not see how this case can lend support to the view of private respondent.

In Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals16 the ruling is that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case for physical
injuries through reckless imprudence on the ground of reasonable doubt is not a bar to the filing of an action for damages
even though the filing of the latter action was not reserved. This is because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code which provides
that when an accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. This ruling obviously cannot apply to this case
because the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the driver is the fact that the prosecution failed to prove its
case as a result of its failure to make a formal offer of its evidence. Rule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides that The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
To the same effect are the holdings in Tayag, Sr. v. Alcantara,17 Bonite v. Zosa18 and Diong Bi Chu v. Court of
Appeals.19 Since Art. 29 of the Civil Code authorizes the bringing of a separate civil action in case of acquittal on
reasonable doubt and under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure such action is not required to be reserved, it is plain
that the statement in these cases that to require a reservation to be made would be to sanction an unauthorized
amendment of the Civil Code provisions is a mere dictum. As already noted in connection with the case of Garcia v.
Florido, that statement was not the ruling of the Court but only an observation borrowed from another case.20
The short of it is that the rulings in these cases are consistent with the proposition herein made that, on the basis of
Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, except only (1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action,
is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action.
Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the
accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.
Indeed the question on whether the criminal action and the action for recovery of the civil liability must be tried in
a single proceeding has always been regarded a matter of procedure and, since the rulemaking power has been conferred
by the Constitution on this Court, it is in the keeping of this Court. Thus the subject was provided for by G.O. No. 58, the
first Rules of Criminal Procedure under the American rule. Sec. 107 of these Orders provided:
The privileges now secured by law to the person claiming to be injured by the commission of an offense to take part in the
prosecution of the offense and to recover damages for the injury sustained by reason of the same shall not be held to be
abridged by the provisions of this order; but such person may appear and shall be heard either individually or by
attorney at all stages of the case, and the court upon conviction of the accused may enter judgment against him for the
damages occasioned by his wrongful act. It shall, however, be the duty of the promotor fiscal to direct the prosecution,
subject to the right of the person injured to appeal from any decision of the court denying him a legal right.
This was superseded by the 1940 Rules of Court, Rule 106 of which provided:
SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. - Unless the offended party has waived the civil action or
expressly reserved the right to institute it after the termination of the criminal case, and subject to the provisions of
Section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
This Rule was amended thrice, in 1964, in 1985 and lastly in 1988. Through all the shifts or changes in policy as to
the civil action arising from the same act or omission for which a criminal action is brought, one thing is clear: The change
has been effected by this Court. Whatever contrary impression may have been created by Garcia v. Florid21 and its
progeny22 must therefore be deemed to have been clarified and settled by the new rules which require reservation of the
right to recover the civil liability, otherwise the action will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal action.
Contrary to private respondents contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought it
must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general
interest of orderly procedure. The requirement is merely procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by
providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a
separate civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be brought
separately.
Indeed, the requirement that the right to institute actions under the Civil Code separately must be reserved is not
incompatible with the independent character of such actions. There is a difference between allowing the trial of civil
actions to proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and requiring that, before they may be instituted at all, a

reservation to bring them separately must be made. Put in another way, it is the conduct of the trial of the civil action - not
its institution through the filing of a complaint - which is allowed to proceed independently of the outcome of the
criminal case.
C. There is a practical reason for requiring that the right to bring an independent civil action under the Civil Code
separately must be reserved. It is to avoid the filing of more than one action for the same act or omission against the same
party. Any award made against the employer, whether based on his subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 of the Revised
Penal Code or his primary liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable from the accused.23
In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the driver been convicted
and found insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable for damages. But if the right to bring a
separate civil action (whether arising from the crime or from quasi-delict) is reserved, there would be no possibility that
the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the
accused. In such a case the institution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil Code would not result in
the employee being held liable for the same act or omission. The rule requiring reservation in the end serves to implement
the prohibition against double recovery for the same act or omission.24 As held in Barredo v. Garcia,25 the injured party
must choose which of the available causes of action for damages he will bring. If he fails to reserve the filing of a separate
civil action he will be deemed to have elected to recover damages from the bus driver on the basis of the crime. In such a
case his cause of action against the employer will be limited to the recovery of the latters subsidiary liability under Art.
103 of the Revised Penal Code.
II.
Nor does it matter that the action is against the employer to enforce his vicarious liability under Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code. Though not an accused in the criminal case, the employer is very much a party, as long as the right to bring or
institute a separate action (whether arising from crime or from quasi delict) is not reserved.26 The ruling that a decision
convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to its civil liability but also
with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee27 is
true not only with respect to the civil liability arising from crime but also with respect to the civil liability under the Civil
Code. Since whatever is recoverable against the employer is ultimately recoverable by him from the employee, the policy
against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is
brought against the employee or against his employer. Thus in Dulay v. Court of Appeals28 this Court held that an
employer may be sued under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code and that the right to bring the action did not have to be reserved
because, having instituted before the criminal case against the employee, the filing of the civil action against the employer
constituted an express reservation of the right to institute its separately.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is RESERVED and the complaint against petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150157

January 25, 2007

MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners, vs. MODESTO CALAUNAN,
Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which affirmed in toto the decision2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio
Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay damages and attorneys fees to
respondent Modesto Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-478, owned by petitioner
PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by

respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.


At around 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with Marcelo Mendoza, was
on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for
Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan,
Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the
jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further
extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for treatment to the Manila Central
University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later
transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic
with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M89. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and
PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the
civil case. Among those who testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando
Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as the venue and the identities of the
vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the existence of the medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being ahead of the bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although there was a ditch on the right side where
the jeep fell into.3
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs)4 of the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence
in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime in November, 1989 and
has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took the stand and said that his brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman,
Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza testified that her husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She
narrated that she thought her husband went to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one month.
She went to her husbands hometown to look for him but she was informed that he did not go there.1awphil.net
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court where Criminal Case No. 684M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, 5 Marcelo Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7
in said case, together with other documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was
Enrique Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court and identified the TSNs of the three aforenamed witnesses and other pertinent documents he had brought. 8 Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs
and documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but since the same were not brought to the
trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs and documents could be offered by counsel for
respondent as rebuttal evidence.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The TSN9 of the testimony of Donato

Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was marked and allowed to be adopted in the civil
case on the ground that he was already dead.
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs 10 of the testimonies of Donato
Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is resolute in saying it was the former
who caused the smash up.
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took place. According to the plaintiff
and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when
the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the
rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In
other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos
corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on another jeep following the
Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. He said, the jeep of the plaintiff overtook
them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus
also overtook the jeep in which he was riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff swerved
to the right on a grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and they overtook the Philippine Rabbit
Bus so that it could not moved (sic), meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified that the jeep
of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep in question.
However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the
latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony before the
RTC in Malolos in the criminal case and before this Court in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the
manner how the collision took place was correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent
in the operation of their respective vehicles.]11
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic
and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the said defendants to
pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as well as the repair and the
materials used for the repair of the jeep in question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P15,000.00 as attorneys fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the defendants are also to
pay costs.12
Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals. 13
In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the decision of the trial court,
affirmed it in all respects.14
Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. They assign as
errors the following:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS

QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSNs AND OTHER DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE
CRIMINAL CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS RELIANCE ON
THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS UNFAIR
DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBLs DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION
AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS
QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEE.
With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with this Court, we granted the
Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio
Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan. 15
In their Reply to respondents Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision 16 of the Court of Appeals
acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge17 of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical
Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy thereof.
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,18 Marcelo
Mendoza19 and Fernando Ramos20 should not be admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the
requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify;
(b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same
parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case,
although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved
in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.22
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimony given in
a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in
Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was
filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability
of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
employees.23
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies of the three
witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence;
otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may
waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of
the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of
failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. 24
Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like
any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves. 25
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo

Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the
TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners. 26 Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even
offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues
that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case,
why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? It appears that petitioner
PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the
adverse party in the criminal case should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the
witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban
would be unfair.
We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLIs argument that it will be denied due process when the TSNs of the testimonies
of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late
for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for
objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that the
TSNs did not comply with Section 47.
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, 28 admitted in evidence a TSN of the
testimony of a witness in another case despite therein petitioners assertion that he would be denied due process. In
admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that the raising of denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner
waived his right to object based on said ground.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted in the instant civil case
because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or deposition." We find such contention to be untenable. Though
said section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former case or proceeding
cannot be admitted. Said documents can be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been
admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled. 29
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic as to how the accident occurred
is more credible than respondents version. They anchor their contention on the fact that petitioner Manliclic was
acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical
Injuries.
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclics acquittal in the civil case.
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from, or based on, quasi-delict.30
Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI
was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of its employees,
particularly petitioner Manliclic. The allegations read:
"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board the above-described motor vehicle
travelling at a moderate speed along the North Luzon Expressway heading South towards Manila together with
MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving the same;
"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the above-described motor vehicle was suddenly
bumped from behind by a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by
one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had
apparently lost control of his vehicle;
"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor vehicle was forced off the North Luzon
Express Way towards the rightside where it fell on its drivers side on a ditch, and that as a consequence, the abovedescribed motor vehicle which maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as
shown by pictures to be presented during the pre-trial and trial of this case;
"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which compounded plaintiffs frail physical

condition and required his hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and until July 22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate
is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;
"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-described motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic)
sustained by plaintiff, was solely due to the reckless imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove
his Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast speed without due regard or observance of existing traffic rules and
regulations;
"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of (sic) family
in the selection and supervision of its drivers; x x x"31
Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the declaration of the Court of
Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his part?
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent "when the bus he was driving
bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause of the accident was his having driven the bus at a great speed
while closely following the jeep"; x x x
We do not agree.
The swerving of Calaunans jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was beyond the control of accusedappellant.
xxxx
Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. 32
From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on
reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only to
a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. 33
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or
culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.34 It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding
that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.35
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime
may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the
author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this
second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this

case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal,
whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or
that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The
responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code.36 An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the
civil case37 based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to disregard that of respondents.
Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in the process of overtaking respondents jeep, the latter, without warning,
suddenly swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court. 38 Not being a trier of
facts, this Court will not allow a review thereof unless:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record.39
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would warrant our departure from the
general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner
Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which was the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the
version of the respondent, the trial court has this say:
x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, would be determinative of
who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective vehicle.
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) given to the Philippine Rabbit
Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made by him about the fact that the driver of the jeep was overtaking another
jeep when the collision took place. The allegation that another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was
testified to by him only in Crim. Case No. 684-M-89 before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this
Court. Evidently, it was a product of an afterthought on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could explain why he
should not be held responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away from the truth was also apparent when it would
be considered that in his statement given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the
Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep of Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In his
testimony before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged that the Philippine
Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the collision took place. For this inconsistency between his
statement and testimony, his explanation regarding the manner of how the collision between the jeep and the bus took
place should be taken with caution. It might be true that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit
Investigator CV Cabading, it was mentioned by the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act of overtaking another
jeep when the collision between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit Bus took place. But the fact, however, that his
statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic gave his statement should not escape attention.
The one-day difference between the giving of the two statements would be significant enough to entertain the possibility
of Oscar Buan having received legal advise before giving his statement. Apart from that, as between his statement and the
statement of Manliclic himself, the statement of the latter should prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh.
14), the unreliability of the statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly head" when he did not
mention in said affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake another jeep when the collision between the
jeep in question and the Philippine Rabbit bus took place.

xxxx
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar Buan, that the
Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision took place, the point of collision on
the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side thereof rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have
fallen on the road itself rather than having been forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the Philippine
Rabbit was running very fast as testified to by Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants. 40
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclics negligence that caused the smash up, there arises the juris tantum
presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a
family.41 Under Article 218042 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under
Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee. 43
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process
that petitioner Manliclic underwent before he became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the
supervision of its employees, it argues that presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof
that it exercised the required due diligence in the supervision of its employees.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience
and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures,
monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability,
employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was
incumbent on them.44
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 45 it was explained that:
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules and
regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the
public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary
disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts
indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through
dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and
plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and
supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer,
the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual
supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without
anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the formulation of various company policies
on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising
from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring
driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." x x x.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection but not in
the supervision of its employees. It expounded as follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good procedure of
recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence though that it is as good in the

supervision of its personnel. There has been no iota of evidence introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the
bus company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles
assigned to them. There is no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver
should behave while operating their vehicles without courting incidents similar to the herein case. In regard to
supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been negligent as an employer and
it should be made responsible for the acts of its employees, particularly the driver involved in this case.
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough to exempt petitioner
PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply with the guidelines set
forth in the cases above-mentioned. The presence of the investigators after the accident is not enough supervision.
Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have been shown and established. This, petitioner
failed to do. The lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the
rules and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. 46 How then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be
continually informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is being lent to all the drivers?
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclics negligence.
We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages
representing the amount paid by respondent for the towing and repair of his jeep. 47 As regards the awards for moral and
exemplary damages, same, under the circumstances, must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as
moral damages must be reduced to P50,000.00.48 Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good.49 The amount awarded by the trial court must, likewise, be lowered to P50,000.00.50 The award of
P15,000.00 for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by law. 51
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages shall be reduced to
P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.