Journal of Islamic Studies 2010 Liow 29 58

Journal of Islamic Studies 21:1 (2010) pp.
2958
doi:10.1093/jis/etp026
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND REFORMIST

ISLAM IN THAILANDS SOUTHERN BORDER
PROVINCES: THE ROLES OF HAJI SULONG
ABDUL KADIR AND ISMAIL LUTFI JAPAKIYA
INTRODUCTION
The topic of Islamic education in southern Thailand has been the subject
of relatively extensive academic inquiry. However, most of this scholarship has centred on the relationship between the Thai state and the
Malay community of Pattani,1 Yala, and Narathiwat, commonly referred
to in the literature as the southernmost border provinces of Thailand.
From the prevailing literature, a number of assumptions can be gleaned
that inform the states perception of the Islamic schools in these
provinces.2 First, schools are often seen to encourage separatism by
perpetuating Malay culture in an insular and exclusivist manner. Second,
the system of Islamic education privileges religious over academic and
vocational training, and by that token does not prepare students for
modern Thai society. Concomitantly, this has resulted in the widening of
the gulf between communal and national identities. Finally, many
This paper uses Patani to denote the historical Malay-Muslim kingdom,

and Pattani as the current administrative province in southern Thailand.
2
Uthai Dulyakasem, Education and Ethnic Nationalism: A Study of the
Muslim-Malays in Southern Siam, PhD diss. (Stanford University), 1981; Surin
Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslims of
Southern Thailand (Bangkok: Thai Khadi Research Institute, Thammasat
University, 1985); Wan Kadir Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of
Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand (Singapore: Oxford
University Press, 1990).
The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Oxford Centre for Islamic
Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012
JOSEPH CHINYONG LIOW

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
Nanyang Technological University
30
j o s e p h c hi ny o ng l i ow
it is only in recent times that the Thai language has been elevated as the language
of Islam in Thailand. Consequently, there is a growing corpus of Islamic religious
literature in Thai. There have already been a few versions of translations of the
Qur8:n. Collections of Hadiths too have been translated into Thai. The
expanding role of the Thai language within Thailands Muslim public sphere,
however, has not dislodged the entrenched position of Malay as the traditional
language of Islam, especially among the Malay Muslims of Thailand.4
Notwithstanding the salience of these anachronistic dichotomies, there

is a tendency evident in both trains of thought to view the Malay
community and Islamic education in the southern border provinces as
monolithic entities. Bearing this in mind, it should not be surprising to
find that these perspectives paper over major shifts and trends in Islamic
education in the southern provinces. In addition, the fact that the vast
majority of the literature that deals with Islamic education in the
3
The allusion to Jawi or Yawi as a Malay dialect is problematic as Jawi is

more accurately described as a written script rather than a spoken language.
Scholars know of the spoken dialect as either Kelantanese or simply the Pattani
dialect or language.
4
Omar Farouk Bajunid, Islam, Nationalism, and the Thai State in Wattana
Sugunnasil (ed.), Dynamic Diversity in Southern Thailand (Chiang Mai:
Silkworm Books, 2005), 10.
quarters within the Thai political establishment see Islamic schools

teaching a radical brand of Islam that legitimizes violence against the
state.
Needless to say, these assumptions fundamentally contradict those
held by the Malay community itself regarding the nature and function of
religious education. To them, Islamic education is seen as a core feature
of Malay identity, which is in turn built on a historical narrative that
speaks of the greatness of the independent Patani Sultanate that was
annexed by Siam in 1909. According to this narrative, the centrality of
Islamic education is expressed in the ubiquitous institution of the pondok
or Islamic boarding school, a key institution in traditional Malay cultural
and communal life. Nowhere is this uniqueness and exclusivity more
patently expressed than in the realm of language. Malays in the border
provinces by and large speak a local dialect commonly but problematically referred to in Thai as Jawi or Yawi (local Malays refer to it as
Bahasa Tempatan or the local language), and which is linguistically
similar to the dialect spoken in the neighbouring northern Malaysian
state of Kelantan.3 Given the significance of linguistic disjuncture, it is
notable how they carry religious overtones as well. Here, Omar Farouk
observes:
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND REFORMIST ISLAM
31
southernmost provinces privileges the separatist conflict in the region as

the point of entry further obscures the complex nature of this topic. This
paper aims to move the discussion away from the separatist conflict and
to identify shifts and trends in Islamic knowledge and education in
Thailands Malay-majority southernmost provinces. It focuses in
particular on the rise of reformist conceptions of Islamic knowledge
and education (reformist in that they challenge prevailing religious
thought and praxis) personified in two prominent ulema, and critically
scrutinizes the impact that they have had on the religious and cultural
terrain of Thailands southern border provinces.5
Historically, the Patani Sultanate consisted of the area that today more or
less corresponds geographically to the provinces of Pattani, Yala, and
Narathiwat in southern Thailand, and was known between the sixteenth
and eighteenth centuries as a d:r al-Isl:m. At the same time, Patani was
also a flourishing centre of commerce and trade, where traders from
Southeast Asia met and transacted with counterparts from elsewhere on
the Asian continent as well as Europe.6
More specifically for our purpose here, it is important to note that
Patani was during this time emerging as a major centre for Islamic
learning in Southeast Asiato the extent that scholars would later
describe it as the cradle of Islam in Southeast Asia, not unlike Aceh or
Melaka.7 The pondok schools of southern Thailand and particularly the
5
This paper is cognizant of the fact that ethnic Malays are not solely
congregated in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. For instance, Satun, another
province in what is broadly known as southern Thailand or even a southern
border province, has a large number of ethnic Malays who nevertheless have
been assimilated into Thai culture, as indicated by the popularity of the Thai
language, as opposed to Malay, in the province. That said, the focus of the paper
is on Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, where most Islamic schools are found, and
where tension remains between Thai and Malay cultural practices and identity
markers.
6
One of the foremost progenitors of this nationalist narrative of Patani
history is Ibrahim Syukri. See History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani (Sejarah
Kerajaan Melayu Patani), transl. Conner Bailey and John N. Miksic (Bangkok:
Silkworm Books, 2005).
7
In this respect, Patani competed with Aceh, Kelantan, and Melaka for the
mantle of Serambi Mekkah or the Veranda of Makka.
ISLAM, HISTORY, AND TRADITIONALISM
32
The definitive study of Islamic schools in southern Thailand available in the

English language remains Hasan Madmarns Pondok and Madrasah in Patani
(Bangi: Penerbit University Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1999).
9
William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (Kuala Lumpur:
Oxford University Press, 2nd edn., 1994), 435.
10
See Madmarn, Pondok and Madrasah in Pattani; Peter Riddell, Islam and
the MalayIndonesian World: Transmission and Responses (Singapore: Horizon
Books, 2001), 184204; Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism in
Southeast Asia (New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 2004), 1226.
11
See Raymond Scupin, Muslim Accommodation in Thai Society, Journal of
Islamic Studies 9/2 (July 1998): 22958.
12
Numan Hayimasae, Hj Sulong Abdul Kadir (18951954): Perjuangan dan
Sumbangan Beliau Kepada Masyarakat Melayu Patani [Haji Sulong Abdul
Kadir (18951954): His Struggle and Contributions to the Malay Community of
Patani] (MSc. diss., University Sains Malaysia, 2002), 85.
southern border provinces, played a critical role in establishing and

sustaining this reputation.
Pondok schools have a long tradition in Malay history.8 The pondok
plays an integral role in Malay society in the southern border provinces
of Thailand, including the key task of providing religious instruction.
To Thailands Malay minority however, these schools are not merely
religious institutions; as a physical and symbolic entity the pondoks are
closely associated with Malay identity in that they function as
repositories and progenitors of Malay language, history, and culture.
By the nineteenth century Patani had gained a reputation as a regional
centre for Islamic learning, where Muslim students from both the
Southeast Asian mainland (primarily Cambodia) and the archipelago
would sojourn in any of the several hundred pondok schools in the
provinces, before making the trip to the Middle East and North Africa to
further their religious education.9 Patani was renowned for its religious
teachers and scholars, a point already well documented in the works of
Azyumardi Azra, Peter Riddell, and Hassan Madmarn.10 Aside from the
path-breaking work of Raymond Scupin however, comparatively less is
known of scholars associated with patterns and trends of reformist Islam
in Thailand.11 Patani Muslims were notable educators in major Islamic
institutions in the Arab-Muslim world, and in the nineteenth and early
twentieth century several Patani scholars such as Ahmad Patani, Zayn alAbidin Patani, and Daud ibn Abd-Allah Patani taught in the Malay
Aalaqa (study circle) at Masjid al-Earam in Makka, where they were
popularly known as 6ulam:8 J:w;.12 Back home, tok guru (pondok
religious teachers) were instrumental in translating religious commentaries and sermons from Arabic to Jawi (the modified classical Malay
script that includes, among others, Arabic and Khmer influences),
33
making them accessible to a wider audience largely illiterate in Arabic.

It is informative to register the reflections of Snouck Hugronje, the Dutch
bureaucrat and scholar of Islam in the Dutch East Indies, on the influence
of the Patani ulema in Makka:
While the prominence of Patani as a regional centre par excellence of

Islamic education and Malay identity may have eroded over the decades,
its historical legacy continues to inform the conception of identity among
the Malay population in the southern border provinces and hence
remains poignant to any assessment of contemporary Islamic education.
By the early twentieth century, just as a reawakening of religious
consciousness was underway across the Muslim world, Patani had the
largest number of pondok schools in the Malay Peninsula, drawing
students from all over the Southeast Asian region. Following the
administrative consolidation of Siamese rule over the Sultanate in 1909
after the signing of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty, southern resistance to the
centralization policies quickly emerged, led by aristocratic Malay elites
displaced as a result of these changes. Indeed, it would be these elites
who would lead Malay resistance to Siamese rule for the first half of the
twentieth century. Nevertheless, the Siamese governments attempts to
exert control over traditional institutions such as the pondok and Shar;6a
courtsthe educational and judicial backbone of Malay society
ensured that disenchanted religious teachers and jurists also provided a
fertile source of intellectual leadership and religio-cultural legitimacy for
movements opposing the incorporation of the southern provinces into
the Siamese central state. Religious leaders were further emboldened by
the Islamic reformist movement of the early twentieth century that swept
through the Malay world. As we will see later, this reformist tide
witnessed an influx of ideas from scholars that threatened to transform
Muslim mindsets and assertiveness, placing them further at odds not
only with central authorities, who in any case never fully comprehended
the implications of Islamic reformism for Muslims in Thailand, but also
the traditional Malay religious monopoly.
13
Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World, 198.
During his visit to Mecca in the 1880s, Snouck Hugronje had occasion to have
extensive contacts with the Malay community there, and to observe who were
the most influential writers living in the community at the time. One of his
interesting observations was that the writings of scholars originating from the
Patani area were significant, as measured by the regularity of their publication by
Meccan presses. Thus those Patani thinkers who made a mark in Mecca must
have left a legacy throughout the Malay world via returning students.13
34
CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO: HAJI

SULONG ABDUL KADIR
14
The traditionalists however, had insisted that the language of the Qur:n
and the khu3ba remain Arabic, the original language of Islam. The debate over
translation and the khu3ba was won by the reformists. Today, sermons are
conducted in the vernacular: Thai in Bangkok and the north as well as in the
upper southern region, and Malay in the southern border provinces. These were,
however, until more recently, two of the rare victories for the reformists.
15
This contention will be expanded in greater detail below.
16
Muhammad Kamal K. Zaman, Fatani 13 Ogos [Pattani 13 August] (Kota
Bahru: n.p, 1996), 1.
At the time of its inception, Islamic reformism in Southeast Asia differed

from ongoing trends in the rest of the Muslim world in a number of
respects. In particular, reformism in the region was primarily a reaction
to folk traditions, seen as expressions of decadence and indulgence in the
practices of the j:hiliyya (the age of pre-Islamic ignorance), and was
aimed more at purifying Southeast Asian Islam through the exercise of
ijtih:d (independent judgement) rather than rejecting classical commentaries of the Qur8:n and Aad;th. These early reformers also rejected the
convention of uncritical acceptance of textual sources and prevailing
religious authority. Rather, they advocated a return to the true and
authentic sources of Islamthe Qur8:n and Sunnain their emphasis on
tawA;d, the oneness of God. One of the initiatives undertaken by
reformists to facilitate this was the move to translate the Qur8:n into the
vernacular languages (Thai in Bangkok and Malay in the southern
provinces) in order to make it accessible to ordinary Muslims, and to
have the khu3ba (Friday sermon) delivered in the vernacular as well so
that the public could comprehend the messages.14 Given its reliance on
uncritical acceptance of authority and rote memory of the Qur8:n and
Aad;th, it is hardly surprising to find that reformists were highly sceptical
of Islamic education in Thailand, which they saw as on the verge of
decline.15
One of the most prominent leaders of the reform movement in
Thailands southern border provinces was Haji Sulong Abdul Kadir. Born
in 1895 in Kampung Anak Ru (now transformed into a thriving trading
and commercial district serving as a gateway to Pattani town), Haji
Sulong came from a line of eminent 6:lims. The most renowned of them
was his grandfather, Syeikh Zainal Abidin bin Ahmad al-Fatani, who
continues to be fondly remembered by the Malays of the border
provinces as Tok Minal.16 Following his family tradition, Haji Sulong
was schooled in Arabic and Islamic texts. Kamal Zaman notes that Haji
35
17
Ibid, 2.
Hayimasae, Hj Sulong Abdul Kadir, 83.
19
Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 115.
20
With the outbreak of the First World War (191418) and its expansion into
the Arab world, Haji Sulong decided to return to Patani, which he did towards
the end of 1915. On his overland journey home, he made a stopover at Kampung
Cham in Cambodia and spent time among the local Muslim community. During
his sojourn at Kampung Cham he was arrested by the French colonial
administration in Indochina on suspicion of being a Turkish spy. Though the
charges quickly proved unfounded and he was released a few days later, the
incident may well have had a profound effect on his political outlook and ignited
in him strong anti-colonial sentiments, which further resonated with his interest
in the modernist religio-political thought of 6Abduh and Rash;d Ri@:, both not
only renowned scholars of Islam but also staunch anti-colonialists.
18
Sulong was a gifted and intelligent student who memorized the entire
Qur8:n by the tender age of eight.17 Haji Sulong attended Pondok Haji
Abdul Rashid in Kampung Sungei Pandang, Patani, for his early Islamic
education before proceeding to Makka Ma8had D:r al-6Ul<m, then a
well-known institution popular among Malay-speaking students in the
vicinity of the Ka6ba.18 The years which followed were possibly the most
consequential and formative for Haji Sulong in terms of pursuit of
Islamic knowledge and his subsequent emergence as the progenitor of
reformist Islamic education and thought in the border provinces. It was
during these early years in Makka that he established a firm grounding in
formal religious studies, particularly in the classical texts. At Ma8had
D:r al-6Ul<m, Haji Sulong was trained in tafs;r (Qur8:nic exegesis),
Aad;th, uB<l al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) and nahw (Arabic
grammar).19 However, it was also during this time that he was exposed
to, and began to explore, reformist ideas as a result of the normative
influences through socialization, interaction, and discussions with
eminent Arab 6:lims who were followers of the Egyptian reformist
MuAammad 6Abduh.
Haji Sulongs return to Patani in 1915 was shortlived, and he went
back to Makka a year later.20 There, he was introduced by Malay 6:lims
to, and subsequently joined, the Malay-speaking Aalaqa in the Masjid alEaram. Among the 6:lims to whom he was closest were Syeikh Wan
Ahmad bin Mohamed Zain al-Fatani, a famous Patani scholar, and Tok
Kenali, a renowned Islamic scholar from the northern Malayan state of
Kelantan, which bordered Patani. Both Syeikh Wan Ahmad and Tok
Kenali were by then already prominent 6ulam:8 J:w;, a title that
recognized their stature as distinguished scholars of Islam from the
Malay world. In 1927, Haji Sulong joined the ranks of his distinguished
mentors and became a junior lecturer on Islamic jurisprudence of the
36
RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM

Haji Sulongs early activism in Patani was focused primarily on the task
of guiding the community back to the path of pristine Islam from which
they had strayed. To him, Islam was not just a spiritual obligation built
around the five pillars of faith but rather a total ideological orientation
that encompassed both personal and public spheres, thereby governing
every aspect of Muslim life. On his return to Patani, Haji Sulong
apparently saw in the local Muslim community a people who were poor
and backward, akin to the j:hiliyya society in pre-Islamic Arabia.22
Patani, once the cradle of Islam in Southeast Asia, now seemed, in his
eyes, to be plagued with declining religious consciousness and an
alarming dilution of faith and piety.
21
Hayimasae, Hj Sulong Abdul Kadir, 109; Imtiyaz Yusuf, The Role of
Chularajmontri/Shaikh al-Islam in Resolving Ethno-religious Conflict in
Southern Thailand: The Human Security Dimension, 1315. Available at
http://humansecurityconf.polsci.chula.ac.th/Documents/Presentations/
Imtiyaz.doc.
22
Shafi6i school. Additionally, while participating in the Malay Aalaqas in

Saudi Arabia, Haji Sulong also came into close contact with Egyptian
scholarly circles, during the Aajj, many of whom were prominent
reformists and modernists. Haji Sulongs previous exposure to anticolonial Malay nationalism sparked in him further interest in the Arab
nationalism that was at the time sweeping across the Arabian Peninsula,
and which was distinctly captured in Islamist thinking emanating from
Egypt. He became further acquainted with the reformist ideas of 6Abduh,
as well as the works of Jam:l al-D;n al-Afgh:ni (18391897), also
popularly known as the Awakener of the East, through these exchanges
with Egyptian Islamists and intellectuals, and witnessed on a daily basis
how the ulema led the struggle to bring justice to the umma on the Arab
socio-political scene.21 Coupled with his active interest in Malay
nationalism, Haji Sulong increasingly began to see his role as an :lim
extending beyond the teaching of religion and into the socio-political
sphere. In turn, this generated in him an abiding interest in political and
social activism which was to preoccupy him for the rest of his life, and
catapulted him to a position of prominence as a leader of southern
Thailands Malay community.
37
23
For instance, if a particular tok guru was learned in fiqh, most likely the
pondok would focus the majority of its syllabus on the study of fiqh.
Sharing the Islamic reformist ideals of the aforementioned thinkers,

one of Haji Sulongs immediate courses of action was to transform the
stagnant traditional pondok education system that he identified as one of
the root causes for the socio-religious backwardness of the Malays in
Patani. He observed that the approximately 500 pondok that existed at
the time (ca. 1929) were not effective in addressing the diminution of
religion in Malay society by virtue of being enslaved in non-Islamic
cultural practices. Furthermore, he observed that the pondok curriculum,
which was relatively informal and far from the comprehensive,
standardized, and rounded curriculum of modern academic institutions,
lacked much-needed structure and direction. The pondok model of
education and its scope relied heavily on the tok guru, and hence was
dictated by the area and scope of his expertise.23 In addition, ineffective
administration allowed students to enrol and leave the pondok at will.
This created the problem of assessment, particularly when pondok
students were to be assessed alongside their counterparts from the
national education system in order to ascertain potential for scholastic
placement and advancement. Because of the lack of a proper accreditation system and excessive reliance on the personal assessment of the tok
guru, even a well-established pondok would not continue its tradition of
scholarly excellence if its tok guru did not annoint a successor to replace
him upon his retirement or death. This effectively meant that the
pondoks, particularly the better-known ones, were in danger of either
losing their reputation and status, or the successors of the tok guru might
be ill-equipped to transmit his teachings, thereby leading to the
possibility of misinterpretation and misrepresentation.
Haji Sulong found such shortcomings unacceptable if the community
and its educational institutions were to progress. To him, the study of
general academic subjects such as mathematics, geography and science
was a critical facet to Islamic education, and hence had to be taught
alongside the religious curriculum. He also stressed the need for greater
structure and regulation on matters such as the entry age of pondok
students, standardized duration of study courses, as well as compulsory
annual examinations to assess and track academic development. In order
to address these concerns, Haji Sulong began by teaching Islam as a tok
guru through tabl;gh, travelling across the Patani region from one village
to another. Very soon, his teachings attracted a mass following among
the Malays.
As one can no doubt imagine, the traditional religious elite did not
take kindly to these veiled charges of incompetence, and Haji Sulongs
38
24

Ibid.
26
Indeed, Haji Sulongs popularity and activism had also begun to occasion
discomfort in the central government. In particular, the Bangkok leadership were
never sure of either his intentions or those of his followers. One highly suspicious
element was his political affiliation with Tengku Mahmud Mahyuddin, youngest
son of the former raja of Patani who nursed ambitions of independence. In the
event the government approved pressures for Malay autonomy, it has been
argued that Haji Sulong had intended to appoint Tengku Mahmud as the first
Malay-born head of the autonomous Patani. See Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay
Nationalism, 157.
27
Thanet Aphornsuvan, Origins of Malay Muslim Separatism in Southern
Thailand, Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series no.32 (Singapore: Asia
Research Institute, 2004), 16.
28
Zaman, Fatani 13 Ogos, 8.
25
growing popularity met with not a small degree of disdain from them.24
They opposed Haji Sulongs reformist religious outlook, which
invariably undermined their religious authority and status within the
strictly hierarchical Malay community. Furthermore, his ideas were
construed as an attempt to undermine the centuries-old institution of the
pondok. At the height of this opposition from traditionalist quarters, the
pondok religious elite accused Haji Sulong of undermining established
authority, dividing the Malay community, fostering instability, and
threatening the peace in the region.25 They subsequently mobilized their
considerable influence to repel the reformist vision of a new Malay
religious identity. Complaints were registered with local government
authorities, and Haji Sulongs activities came under intense scrutiny.26
Though Haji Sulong was summoned for investigation as a result of these
complaints, he was released soon after as the charges made against him
by the traditional religious elite could not be substantiated. Needless to
say, this experience only served to further inspire Haji Sulong and
convince him of the need to push through Islamic education reforms.
At the same time that he had evoked the ire of the traditional religious
leadership, Haji Sulong also enjoyed significant popular support from
various segments of the local community.27 With this support, Haji
Sulong established Patanis first private Islamic school, Madrasah alMaarif al-Wataniah Fatani, in 1933.28 Madrasah al-Maarif was a
modern Islamic school which sought to craft a curriculum around
religious, academic and vocational education, and to introduce
systematic evaluation to replace the arbitrary assessment of traditional
pondok. The curriculum at the madrasa spanned both Islamic and
secular sciences and humanities. Under Islamic science, the subjects
taught were qir:8:t (recitation of the Qur8:n), tafs;r, Aad;th, fiqh, nahw
39
29

Part of the reason for this confluence of interests between the Peoples Party
government and Haji Sulong was the fact that the anti-feudal, egalitarian, and
modernizing (with a strong socialist influence, one should add) ideology of the
former was, broadly speaking, very much in line with Haji Sulongs idea of
Islamic reformism.
31
The office of the Chularajmontri or Shaykh al-Isl:m was first introduced
during the court of Ayutthaya, and the person occupying the position was tasked
to advise the court on matters pertaining to Islam. The Chularajmontri is today
seen as the official, if titular, head of Thailands Muslim community. He is
formally appointed by royal decree, and holds the office for a life term. In terms
of institutional capacity, the Chularajmontri supervises Thailands 29 provincial
Islamic committees and the Islamic Centre of Thailand, which was established in
1945 as an outgrowth of the Patronage of Islam Act. The Chularajmontri is
elected by the presidents of the 29 provincial Islamic committees (which together
make up the Provincial Council of Islamic Affairs) and 36 members of the
National Council of Islamic Affairs housed at the Islamic Centre, and then
endorsed by the king by royal decree.
32
30
and sarf (grammar and conjugation), tawA;d (theology), ta8r;kh (history),

and akhl:q (ethics). The general education syllabus comprised science,
geography and mathematics.29
The opening of Madrasah al-Maarif came at the time when Thailand
itself was undergoing a major transformation from absolute monarchy to
constitutional government. In its bid to improve its relationship with the
Malays in the south and demonstrate greater sensitivity to and
accommodation of their cultural needs, the Peoples Party-led government, returned to power immediately after the war, embarked on several
initiatives to relax the assimilation policies of preceding administrations
that had strained relations with the community.30 These included the
establishment of the Patronage of Islam Act, restoration of Islamic laws
governing private and family affairs, and the reinstatement of the office
of the Chularajmontri.31 To further drive home the point, Prime Minister
Phyara Phahol made a personal donation to Haji Sulongs Islamic school
building project and later even attended its inauguration ceremony as a
gesture of the governments support.32 Such demonstrations of support
for the Malay community on the part of the Bangkok establishment were
unprecedented given the erstwhile suspicion and antagonism that existed
between the Thai state and the Malay population.
On his part, Haji Sulong was aware that the greatest opposition to his
reform initiatives would likely come not so much from the state, but
from the tok guru of the traditionalist pondok schools. This was because
40
33
34
35
Ibid, 146.
Aphornsuvan, Origins of Malay Muslim Separatism, 22.
his agenda of reform and his establishment of the madrasa were seen as
an attempt to undermine the traditional primacy of the pondok and
challenge the revered status of the tok guru. Not only did Haji Sulong
anticipate these objections, he attempted to pre-empt them by embarking
on a public campaign to persuade the tok guru of the traditional pondok
of the benefits of his modern conception of Islamic education. These
attempts received an initial boost when Haji Sulongs efforts were
endorsed by several of Patanis more prominent educators like Haji
Mohammad Idris, a widely respected scholar of Islam, popularly known
as Tok Guru Bermin, Jambu.33
Support for Haji Sulongs education reform initiative was however
short-lived. As anticipated, his efforts were paradoxically undone not by
elements from within the state but by members of the Malay community
itself, the very community he sought to uplift. The reservations of tok
guru towards Haji Sulongs reformist agenda persisted despite his
attempts to win them over, and they continued to view his initiatives not
only as a threat to the status quo, but also as an attempt to undermine
their longstanding authority and influence over the local community.34
The response was the initiation of yet another round of concerted
attempts to discredit Haji Sulong in the eyes of the Thai state by calling
his loyalty into question. Efforts were made to sow suspicion in the
minds of government officials with vivid depictions of Haji Sulongs
megalomania. Thanet Aphornsuvan describes one such attempt: the
followers [of Haji Sulong] even knelt down to take off Haji Sulongs
shoes and clean his feet for him before entering a masjid. Others were
ready to carry the umbrellas to protect [him from] the sun when he
visited the Muslim communities in the four southern provinces including
some districts in Songkhla.35 Given the fact that by then Haji Sulong
possessed the credentials of a prominent Islamic scholar and eloquent
speaker with a wide following among the local population, and also
enjoyed a political base by virtue of his position as Chairman of the
Pattani Provincial Islamic Council, it was not difficult to see how a
whispering campaign of the above nature could resonate with detractors
who had been carefully scrutinizing his movements.
Viewed with some consternation by a state not entirely comfortable
with his transformative agenda, and unable to harness extensive support
from the traditional religious elite, Haji Sulongs madrasa was closed
down in 1935 on suspicions that it was operating as a political
organization. This act of closing down the modernist school however,
41
36
For a list of the demands, see Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 152.
To be fair, it was not Madmarns intention to deal substantively with Haji
Sulongs legacy in Islamic education. Be that as it may, because he does address
the issue of curricula it is important to consider this particular aspect of the
historical context behind various attempts, including Haji Sulongs, to transform
and improve the system.
37
only served to further harden the madrasa as a symbol of the MalayMuslim struggle, around which resistance would later coalesce when its
premises became the covert base for meetings and assemblies among the
Malay political leadership. The most significant event hosted by the
madrasa was the meeting of Malay elders convened by Haji Sulong to
chart the future of Greater Patani that culminated in the historic sevenpoint demand for autonomy presented by the Malay leadership to the
government in July 1947. Among other things, this document called for
the appointment of local Malays as governors of the Malay provinces,
the reservation of up to eighty percent of government administrative
positions in the region for Malays, and the creation of a Muslim board to
govern religious affairs.36 Hence, while not originally intended to be a
centre of subversive activity, Madrasah al-Maarif nevertheless became
an important symbol of resistance, as did its founder Haji Sulong.
It is important to note here that despite the closure of Madrasah alMaarif and the circumspection towards Haji Sulongs attempts at
reform, the momentum of change had, to certain extent, already been set
in motion. Gradually, more and more pondoks began to introduce the
reform curriculum conceptualized by Haji Sulong into their syllabuses, in
so doing transforming the pondok into an institution of systematic
education. This, however, was not captured in Hasan Madmarns major
study on the transformation of pondok education.37 In Pondok and
Madrasah in Pattani, Madmarn attributed the transformation to changes
in government educational policies which began in the 1960s and gained
momentum in the 1970s. He reasoned that the pondoks were compelled
to change or face the threat of irrelevance and extinction, and even
demonization, when new legislation enforced the teachings of general
and academic subjects in all Islamic educational institutions. Though
legislative pressure was undoubtedly one of the catalysts that precipitated change, the study of the evolution of Islamic education systems in
the southern border provinces needs also to appreciate and acknowledge
Haji Sulongs contributions in generating the subterranean momentum
for change, particularly since this occurred well before the advent of state
legislation to regulate education in the southern provinces with the
creation of the Islamic private school.
42
Notwithstanding the (halting) progress of his reformist project, Haji

Sulongs demise in 1952, when he mysteriously disappeared after being
arrested by Thai police, led to its swift deceleration owing to the lack of
charismatic leaders of the calibre and popularity of Haji Sulong and of
firmly established structures. Indeed, with Haji Sulong removed from the
religio-cultural scene, it certainly appeared that the reformist movement
in the southern border provinces had run its course.
THE CONTEMPORARY REFORMIST

MOVEMENT AND ISMAIL LUTFI JAPAKIYA
38
Kaum Tua refers to the traditionalists or older generation, and Kaum

Muda to the reformists-modernists or young turks.
39
Interview at Yala Islamic University (formerly Yala Islamic College),
Pattani, 15 January 2006.
Tension between traditionalists and reformists that echo the Kaum Tua
Kaum Muda contestations in the pre-war Malay world, and which were
illustrated by Haji Sulongs attempt to transform Islamic education, have
surfaced again in Thailands southern border provinces.38 This time, the
contestation finds expression in the form of the threat posed by Salafi
reformists to mainstream traditionalist Islamic education. This challenge
echoes in part Haji Sulongs previous attempts at transforming Islamic
education and takes the familiar form of a movement seeking to reform
Islamic education through the introduction of academic and general
subjects into the curriculum of Islamic schools, yet with a distinct
emphasis on the need to Islamize epistemology and pedagogy. In the
minds of this new generation of reformists, it is in Islam (and specifically,
the Qur8:n) that Muslims will find the resources to address the many
problems they face as they struggle to find their place in the modern
world. How the reformists attempt and explain this reconciliation of
knowledge and faith will be addressed later in a discussion on the
curriculum of the Yala Islamic University. Suffice for now to note that for
these reformist intellectuals, this could be accomplished by combining
Islamic knowledge with familiarity with Western scholarship in sciences,
whilst at the same time advocating a return to a Salafist interpretation of
pristine Islam.39
Echoing the logic of those who came before, this move was described
by reformists as stemming at least in part from the realization that
traditional institutions of Islamic learning required urgent reform.
Additionally, it was also largely a consequence of the perceived
failure of traditionalists and secularists from the Islamic educational
43
40
Interview at Bamrung Islam Mukim Pujud, Pattani, 14 January 2006.

This is despite the fact that Lutfis formative years were spent in a
traditionalist Malay-Muslim family, and his father was a traditionalist tok guru.
42
Alexander Horstmann, Class, Culture and Space: The Construction and
Shaping of Communal Space in South Thailand (Tokyo: Research Institute for
the Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 2002), 80.
41
establishment to meet the demands of an Islamic community increasingly

conscious of the challenge posed by Western intellectual traditions and
politico-strategic hegemony.40 Hence, while the austere and literalist
interpretations of the Qur8:n commonly associated with Salafism anchor
these transformational ideas, in the realm of education they are also
distinctly reformist and modernist in the sense that they challenge the
traditional perspectives of religious education, which, among other
things, are premised primarily on the authority of the tok guru, the use of
Jawi (as opposed to Arabic) literature, and resistance to the introduction
of sciences and other general academic and vocational subjects into the
Islamic curriculum of the pondok. Beyond its attempt to restructure
Islamic education in terms of contents and pedagogies, the contemporary
reformist movement also aims to contest the ideational and cultural
practices associated with the Malay-Muslim community, which they
deem to be either shirk or bid6a (unIslamic innovation).
This contemporary reformist movement is led by Ismail Lutfi Japakiya
or Ismail Lutfi al-Fatani, who graduated in 1986 from the Islamic
University of Imam Muhammad bin Saud with a doctorate in Shar;6a.
Ismail Lutfi is widely seen as the leading reformist Muslim educator in
Thailand today, and on the back of his connections with various Saudibased interests cultivated during his sojourn in the Kingdom he has
played an instrumental role in charting the course and directing the
expansion of the contemporary reformist movement in the southern
border provinces.41 Summarizing the impact of Ismail Lutfi and his
brand of reformist Islam on the landscape of Islamic education in the
Malay south, Alexander Horstmann writes: Lutfis scholarship challenges the authority of the traditional ulama.42 A popular reformist
scholar not unlike Haji Sulong in his heyday, Lutfis appeal has
undoubtedly been facilitated by the influx of large amounts of financial
support from the Saudi government and Saudi-linked charities that have
overseen the establishment of a number of mosques and madrasas.
Ismail Lutfi is currently the rector of the Yala Islamic University, which
boasts modern educational facilities in both its campuses in Pattani and
Yala. Lutfi is also principal of Bamrung Islam Mukim Pujud, a madrasa
located in Muang, Pattani, where he teaches and holds weekly lectures
for the general public from its mosque, often in front of audiences in
44
43
See Ernesto Braam, Yala Islamic University as an agent of the

institutionalization of Islamic reformism in South Thailand, paper presented
at the workshop Studying Islam in Southeast Asia: State of the Art and New
Approaches (Leiden, 78 July 2008), 15.
44
Ibid.
45
This view was expressed on numerous occasions to the author in the course
of regular conversations with locals.
excess of a thousand people. In addition to his high profile as an 6:lim

and educator, Lutfi enjoys an accommodative relationship with the Thai
government, and as a consequence holds a number of prominent
positions, such as Chairman of the Consultative Committee of the
Foundation for Islamic Education in Southern Thailand and a Member
of Parliament under the interim government of Prime Minister Surayud
Chulanont. More recently, Lutfi has also been appointed advisor to the
Chularajmontri as well as Amir al-Haj (leader of those making the
pilgrimage to Makka) by the Thai government.43 Apart from his
religious, educational, and political responsibilities, Lutfi is also a
popular speaker in Islamic scholarly circles in northern Malaysia (he is
well-known in the religious circles of the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia or PAS,
the Islamist opposition party that runs the state government of
Kelantan), though he himself notes that since September 11 his speaking
engagements in Malaysia have been markedly reduced.44 The intensity of
his preaching and forcefulness of his personality, not to mention personal
charisma, have ensured that, while certain aspects of his reformist dogma,
which challenge long-held traditional beliefs, are met with caution by the
traditionalist custodians of the faith (a point discussed further below),
he himself has emerged as one of the most popular religious scholars
in Thailand. Here it should be noted that Lutfis competence and fluency
in Arabic have proven a strength, allowing him to demonstrate a deep
knowledge and access to authentic scripture that few among Thailands
Islamic religious intelligentsia can match. Because of this, Lutfi is viewed
as a scholar who has the ability to simplify complex concepts of Islamic
thought, a factor which has no doubt contributed to his appeal.45
Ismail Lutfis overall popularity has been enhanced by his embrace of
modern technology. His transmission of knowledge is often facilitated by
communication devices such as microphones, cassette recorders, and
CDs, clearly distinguishing him from traditional religious teachers. Aside
from his religious credentials and oratorical skills, Lutfis popularity is,
as alluded to earlier, further augmented by his access to substantial
amounts of Saudi financial support, which he manages and disburses
through local Islamic charity networks across the three Malay provinces.
The Saudi government, in particular, had been instrumental in the
45
establishment of Yala Islamic University. That said, it is observed that

while Ismail Lutfi is no doubt an immensely popular and respected 6:lim
in Thailand and his public lectures and khu3bas attract audiences in the
thousands, his pool of committed followersthose who imbibe his
reformist ideas to the extent that they are prepared to critique their
traditional religious leadersis likely from anecdotal evidence to be
significantly smaller, probably because most Malays in the southern
provinces remain respectful followers of long-held practices.
Yala Islamic University
The commencement of the initial conception [sic] Islamic educational philosophy

set forth by the founders of the college is to offer courses like sharia, usul-addin,
and Arabic language so as to pave the way for the YICs [Yala Islamic Colleges]
infrastructural platform of fardain. After four years of its first phase the YIC
submitted its proposal for establishing new departments in order to fulfil the fard
kifayah in its second phase. They are Department of Public Administration,
Department of Finance and Banking, and Department of Information
46
Interview with Ismail Lutfi, Pattani, 14 January 2006.

Interview with Sukree Langputeh (Yala Islamic University), Pattani, 15
January 2006. The Yala Islamic University was initially Yala Islamic College.
47
The Yala Islamic University, founded by Ismail Lutfi, and to a lesser

extent the College of Islamic Studies at the Prince of Songkhla University
(Pattani Campus) have been major conduits of reformist Islam in the
southern provinces. A major component of ilmu in the Yala Islamic
University curriculum is its attempt to make Islamic studies speak to
modern science in a manner that emphasizes the Qur8:nic roots of
modern knowledge, and for that matter, modernity itself. Lutfis
education project stresses the adoption of an exclusively Islamic
vocabulary, and rests on the twin concerns for the moral health of the
Muslim community as well as the dangers of excessive rationalism,
which, to his mind, lures Muslims away from tawA;d in its attempt to
conquer nature.46 To Lutfi and his reformist colleagues, reforming
Islamic education through the introduction of general academic subjects
into the traditional education system is in line with the teachings of
Islam. Accordingly, deans at the Yala Islamic University have been tasked
to expand their curriculum so as to embrace information technology,
business and finance, and the social sciences in a manner which allows
the injection of Islamic principles and considerations into these erstwhile
secular fields.47 The idea of how the sacred and the secular can be fused
into a modern curriculum is envisaged in the following description of the
Universitys degree programmes which is worth quoting in its entirety:
46
Technology. This second phase reminds us of the task of the Prophets Madinan
period while the first phase of the college presents a picture of the first period of
Islam in Makkah. The categories of fardain and fard kifayah are integratively
[sic] blended into the YICs curriculum in order to do justice to each individual by
respecting ones unique capacities and interests. Fardain knowledge is religiously
obligatory. It is to be studied and mastered by all mature and free Muslims,
whereas fard kifayah is obligatory not for all, but for a sufficient number of such
Muslims in the community.48
Traditionalists, reformists, and arenas of contestation

There is no question that Ismail Lutfi views his reformist agenda for
transformation of Islamic education in the southern provinces as part of
48
Sukree Langputeh, The Islamization of the Discipline of Public

Administration in a Thai Higher Education Institution: The Experience of Yala
Islamic College, paper presented at the International Workshop on Voices of
Islam in Europe and Southeast Asia (Nakhon Si Thammarat, 2022 January
2006).
49
Ibid.
50
Interview at Suksana Sasana Witthaya, Narathiwat, 19 April 2007. Clearly,
the ust:dh interviewed is of the opinion that most, if not all, scholars trained in
Saudi Arabia are of the reformist persuasion.
It appears from the above statement that insofar as the reformist

agenda is concerned, the Yala Islamic University is seen to be as a
microcosm which reflects the Prophet in knowledge and action in its
duty to produce Muslim men and women who reflect the qualities of the
Prophet as much as possible according to their respective potentialities
and abilities. This is the noble task for every Muslim to uphold the
Qur8:nic dictum that the Prophet is the best model for Muslims (Uswah
Hasanah).49 Explaining further their mission in the field of education, a
Saudi-trained Salafi ust:dh stated that those who graduated from
Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia return to build schools with the aim of
giving back to the community in a way that allows them to live a pure
Islamic lifestyle that reflects the practices of Muslims during the era of
the Prophet in every aspect of their lives.50 It is clear from these
statements that the objectives of education were not so much to
contribute to the national developmental and economic enterprise;
instead, it was driven foremost by a moral ethos and a sense of individual
personal obligation, and referred ultimately to the religion of Islam and
teachings of the Prophet as they understand it. Instructors at the Yala
Islamic University however hesitated to dismiss the secular education
that currently forms the bulk of national education as unIslamic.
Rather, it was often described as not Islamic enough.
47
The conflict usually arises when those in masyarakat bawahan [grassroots] that
accept these new teachings through an interlocutor who himself does not have indepth knowledge, is biadat [lacking in courtesy], and who claims that Kaum Tua
are not adhering to the correct Islamic teachings. Likewise, those who reject the
Salafi-Wahhabi movement do so in a harsh manner as well. Usually, the conflicts
arise due to trivial comparative religious issues such as the prohibition of
weaving a three-sided ketupat [rice dumpling] because it is associated with
Hinduism and the worship of Hindu idols, the recitation of qunut [special
prayers] during subuh [dawn prayers], celebrating mawlud nabi [the Prophets
birthday], and others. The Salafi-Wahhabi movement always rejects such
observances which have become customary to the local population without
considering the positive or negative aspects of these issues, and whether it is
really against religious teachings or not. But we [Kaum Tua] see that if such
observances do not contradict the religion, then it should be protected, but the
Salafi-Wahhabi movement view it categorically as bid6a which is prohibited in
religion.51
Crucially, the root of this disquiet, as suggested earlier, can perhaps be

found in Lutfis perspective on Patanis place in the history of Islamic
knowledge in Southeast Asia. Contrary to conventional wisdom that
portrays Patani as a centre of excellence in Islamic studies, Lutfi argues
controversially that earlier epochs of Islam in Thailand (for which he
means periods prior to the advent of the current wave of reformist
thinking) could be characterized as ilmu kurang (lacking in knowledge).52 It follows then, that the advent of reformist Islam was both a
51
52
Interview with Babo Broheng Payedueramae, Narathiwat, 21 May 2008.

the advancement of Islamic knowledge in the region, and it is precisely

this view that has caused some disquiet in mainstream traditionalist
Islamic circles. Reminiscent of their reaction to Haji Sulong when he
attempted to transform traditionalist Islamic education practices decades
earlier, Lutfis charisma and communicative skills have raised concerns in
certain circles among the traditionalist religious establishment who fear
the appeal his brand of Islam appears to enjoy among the younger
generation. Among the more vocal tok guru of the Kaum Tua who speak
out against the Salafi-reformists are Heng Lubok Sawa (or Tuan Guru
Ibrahim, from Narathiwat), Loh Saroh (or Tuan Guru Abdullah, from
Pattani), and perhaps the most famous of Pattanis contemporary
generation of 6ulam:8 J:w;, Tuan Guru Ismail Sepanjang of the famed
Pondok Darul Muhajirin in Pattani. The points of departure between
Kaum Tua and Kaum Muda have been described in the following
manner:
48
53
Ibid. In the course of my interview I had used the term traditional Islam to
refer to the predominant Shafi6i-Sunni as well as Sufi Islam that continues to be
widely practised in southern Thailand.
54
Interview at Sad Samaki School, Pattani, 16 January 2006.
55
Interview at Chongraksat Witthaya, Pattani, 14 February 2006.
56
basis and consequence of an increase in ilmu. In Lutfis own words,

Islamic knowledge in Thailand used to be weak, and traditional Islam
was based on this lack of knowledge. But it [ilmu] has improved over
time. This leads to a deeper understanding of Islam.53 In making this
argument, Lutfi is in effect donwplaying an important part of Patani
history and identity.
Schools associated with the contemporary reformist agenda in the
southern border provinces are predominantly run by Saudi-trained
teachers who do not subscribe to the traditional emphasis of the Shafi6i
madhhab that characterizes the jurisprudential inclinations of the vast
majority of Malays, not just in the provinces but across the Malay
archipelago as well.54 Indeed, such has been the deviation of the
reformist template from the norms of Sufi and Shafi6i Islamic
traditionalism in southern Thailand that it has been opined in certain
quarters that some of these teachers returning from Saudi Arabia are
introducing a new school of fiqh.55 To say that these reformists reject the
Shafi6i school, the dominant legal tradition in Southeast Asia, is,
however, not entirely accurate for these schools do provide madhhab
instruction, including Shafi6i jurisprudence. More appropriately, these
reformist scholars do not consider the Shafi6i madhhab, or any of the
other traditional schools of Islamic law for that matter, to be the blanket
authoritative statement of Islam on any given issue. These Salafi scholars
are quick to remind that the madhhabs, while an important compass for
Muslims in their conduct, were ultimately written by man and hence
could not be accorded a status similar to the Qur8:n or Sunna.
Aside from Saudi and some Kuwaiti-trained instructors, there are
more than a hundred graduates from the Yala Islamic University who
currently teach in Islamic private schools throughout southern
Thailand.56 To be sure, there would be much interest in the possible,
and in all likelihood, probable, correlation at least in certain respects
between religious instruction in Saudi Arabia and Wahhabi ideological
inclinations. That said, while such links may be instructive of trends in
Islamic thought and education, one should be careful not to interpret the
relationship in an overly-deterministic and axiomatic fashion, as is
often the case in popular perception, particularly among those seeking
indicators of the phenomenon of Arabization of local Muslim
49
The Wahhabi [i.e. Ismail Lutfi and his followers] understanding which brushes
aside generations of amalan sunnah [traditional religious practice] of the Islamic
ummah in this country can be said to be spreading among the educated and
young intellectuals. They reject the rituals of reading the Qur8:n for the dead,
recitation of Yasin, qunut, tahil, berdoa, berzikir [different types of formal
prayers], ziarah kubur [visiting of graves], and other rituals of the Ahli Sunnah
Wal Jamaah which have been allowed and encouraged.61
57
Interview with Nidae Waba, Pattani, 14 January 2006; interview with
Hasan Madmarn, Pattani, 16 January 2006.
58
Interview at Darunsat Witthaya School, Pattani, 5 February 2005.
59
Interview at Saiburi Islam Witthaya School, Pattani, 24 February 2005.
60
Interview at Aliman Foundation, Narathiwat, 18 January 2006.
61
Interview with Abdul Aziz Yanya, Pattani, 17 May 2008.
communities. Given its geographic location and symbolism in Islamic

history, Saudi Arabia has logically been a location of preference for
Malays seeking a more authentic religious education experience. Yet,
while numerous Malays from the southern border provinces have over
the years studied in noted Salafi and Wahhabi institutions, many among
them have also been actively involved and trained in distinctly Malay
Aalaqas at the Masjid al-Earam, where instruction commonly takes
place in Jawi, and where lessons are sometimes contextualized with
reference to Malay culture and history.57 Indeed, several prominent
traditionalist 6ulam:8 J:w; from the provinces, including Ismail
Sepanjang, continue to teach in these Aalaqas today.
Predictably, as was the case in the 1930s with Haji Sulongs Madrasah
al-Maarif al-Wataniah, the presence of these schools has been viewed as
a challenge to the traditional Islamic institutions and ideas, and has at
times elicited negative responses from religious teachers. One tok guru
interviewed assailed the reformists as sangat takbur (very arrogant) in
their attitude towards more established schools of Islamic thought.58
Others described the residual tension between the Kaum Muda and
Kaum Tua as being that between those who thought themselves
faultless (yang merasa sempurna) and traditionalists who resist
change.59 Several traditionalist ust:dhs have berated their reformist
counterparts who criticize local beliefs and practices as part of Islamic
education. Others see this influence as incompatible with local adat
(customary law) which remains an important institution in Malay
culture.60 Such tensions are captured in the following remarks by Abdul
Aziz Yanya, President of the Pondok Association of Southern Thailand
(Persatuan Pengajian Pondok Lima Wilayah Thailand Selatan):
50
I am not against the ideology of the Wahhabi movement under the leadership of
Dr. Ismail Lutfi and his companions as they teach and preach the Islamic ummah
to stay within the boundaries of the religion; I am less agreeable with their
approach that mengumpaskan [deliberates on] khil:fiyya [comparative
religious issues], which can result in conflict between Muslims and the public
62
Interview at Pondok Dalor, Pattani, 19 January 2006.

Interview with Abdul Aziz Yanya, Pattani, 17 May 2008.
64
Interview at Charoen Witthaya Nusron, Pattani, 18 January 2006.
65
Interview at Narawi Islam, Narathiwat, 2 August 2006. The ust:dh
interviewed was a retired officer from the Royal Thai Army.
66
Ismail Ali is an Assistant Professor at the Prince of Songkhla University
Pattani Campus, Abdulghani Kahama is Secretary of the Islamic Private School
Association and Principal of Prachasongkroh Bede Islamic School, Yusuf Sidek is
a lecturer at the Prince of Songkhla UniversityPattani Campus, while Ismail
Dusong-nyo has relocated to Bangkok.
63
While these reformists justify their attack on tradition as improving

the communitys understanding of and adherence to Islam, traditionalists have retorted that the former are, in the words of a tok guru from the
famed Pondok Dalor, self-righteous.62 In response, Yanya suggests that
even though these young reformists condemn traditional rituals as bid6ah
dan khurafat (innovations and superstitions), in truth they are only
attracted to the new thinking because they want to perform their rituals
fast and quick.63
Such is the acrimony that some traditionalist institutions, such as
Charoen Witthaya Nusron in Sai Buri (Pattani), make it official policy
not to engage reformist Salafi teachers.64 There are, of course,
traditionalists who are more measured in their response to the reformists.
The following opinion for instance, conveys a more conciliatory note:
fiqh starts with Qur8an and Sunna, and then some lean towards Sh:fi6;
but not too much. Traditional practices are left for individuals to decide,
especially when they go home. There is no condemning the locals beliefs
and practices.65
Given the stature of Ismail Lutfi and other more prominent ulema
associated with the Salafi-reformist movement, such as Ismail Ali,
Abdulghani Kahama, Yusuf Sidek, and Ismail Dusong-nyo,66 and the
broad respect they command among the local population (not least for
their eloquence in Arabic), some traditionalist scholars have attempted to
avoid direct confrontation by distinguishing between the religious
ideology of the reformists, which to these scholars is still acceptable,
and their approach. The following comment by a prominent
traditionalist scholar is instructive in this regard:
51
[non-Muslims]. And their thinking is not related to the organization that is

managed by the dakwah group, which is led by me.67
As the most prominent of the reformist scholars, it should be no

surprise that Ismail Lutfi has come to personify the challenge that the
reform movement poses to traditionalists, and hence come under intense
scrutiny. Nevertheless, typifying the patterns of contestations, Lutfi also
has his ardent supporters:
POINTS OF AMBIVALENCE
Despite his message on the need to transform Islamic knowledge, which
would no doubt resonate with government authorities who have always
been of the view that resistance to change on the part of Islamic schools
in the south has been a constant source of provocation, Ismail Lutfi has
been demonized in some (primarily Western) media and counterterrorism circles as a hardline Wahhabi cleric, as some pundits and
analysts have taken to calling him; his agenda for the transformation of
Islamic education in Thailand has likewise been dismissed as nothing but
a cover for a more insidious programme to radicalize the Muslim
population of southern Thailand.69 Many of these allegations come from
sceptics who cast a suspecting eye on Salafism, often equating it to
Wahhabism, the highly politicized fundamentalist offshoot of broader
Salafi dogma which has admittedly enjoyed a chequered history both as a
reformist as well as militant movement, and which has captured the
attention of the terrorism studies community since 9/11 with fairly
67
Interview with Nidir Waba, Pattani, 20 May 2008. Nidir Waba is the
Chairman of the Islamic Private School Association and a highly-respected 6:lim
in southern Thai Muslim circles.
68
Interview, Pattani, 20 May 2008.
69
See for example, Jane Perlez, Cracks in Thailands Peace, New York
Times, 8 March 2004; John Bradley, Waking Up to the Terror Threat in
Southern Thailand, www.yaleglobalonline.com, 27 May 2004. Accessed at
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=3985.
I, as a student of Dr. Ismail [Lutfi], want to state that he never taught his students
to create divisions, but taught them to hold firmly to al-Qur8:n and Sunnat alNab; [tradition of the Prophet]. Everyone loves him and he is our :bi [father or
teacher] even when some parties despise, hate, and create lies about him. I am
sure Allah will protect and guard him and his message will take us to the right
path. Those who blame him should repent and use their free time to seek
knowledge so as to understand the teachings of Dr. Ismail correctly.68
52
70
The problems inherent in how terrorism analysts have attempted to study
the southern provinces have been ably demonstrated in Michael Connors, War
on Error and the Southern Fire: How Terrorism Analysts Get It Wrong in
Duncan McCargo (ed.), Rethinking Thailands Southern Violence (Singapore:
Singapore University Press, 2006).
71
I would like to thank Muhammad Hanif Hassan for alerting me to this fact.
For information about Shaykh Sa6id Eaww:, see Al Mustasyar Abdullah al Aqil,
Mengenang Said Hawwa, www.boemi-islam.com, 27 May 2004. While he was
undoubtedly a Salafi, Sa6id Eaww:8 was also known to be sympathetic towards
Sufism, and this put him at loggerheads with Wahhabis under King Fahd,
resulting in his being expelled from Saudi Arabia.
72
See Ismail Lutfi Fatani, Ikhtil:f al-d:rayn wa :th:ru-hu f; aAk:m almunakah:t wa-l-mu6:mal:t [The Effect of theTwo D:rs (d:r al-Isl:m and d:r alAarb) on Islamic Personal and Transaction Laws] (Cairo: D:r al-Sal:m, 2nd edn.,
1998). For a detailed analysis of the text, see Joseph Chinyong Liow, Islam,
Education, and Reform in Southern Thailand: Tradition and Transformation
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Press, forthcoming).
considerable notoriety. Ismail Lutfis training in Saudi Arabia (where he

attained his bachelor and doctoral degrees) and continued ties with both
government and private interests in the Kingdom have been mustered by
these detractors to corroborate their accusations. Further underlying
these suspicions is an ideological reading of Wahhabism not only as an
austere and strict genre within Salafism, a reading which enjoys
widespread consensus, but more so as a militant and uncompromising
brand of Islam. Notwithstanding these perceptions that typify conventional wisdom, under more careful interrogation interesting anomalies
emerge that cloud the erstwhile clear picture of the impact of Lutfis
indoctrination in Saudi Arabia as described by these analysts.
Concomitantly, Lutfi appears a considerably more ambivalent
figure than their simplistic caricatures imply.70
Though Ismail Lutfi studied at the Islamic University of Imam
Muhammad bin Saud, a university with known Wahhabi links, those
who exercised the most influence on his intellectual and religioideological development were in fact not conventional Wahhabi
ideologues or educators at all. Rather, his tutor and supervisor was
Shaykh Sa6;d Eaww:, a Syrian lecturer and member of the Ikhw:n alMuslim;n (Muslim Brotherhood) who taught in Saudi Arabia during
Lutfis stay there.71 Notwithstanding the identity and ideological
proclivity of his mentor, Lutfis own ideas offer up intriguing
discontinuities insofar as the complexities surrounding his doctrinal
inclinations are concerned. For instance, in his dissertation on Shar;6a,
Lutfi in fact argued for the importance of time, space, and context when
applying precepts of Islamic law.72 In so doing, his views certainly appear
53
73
Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global

Jihad (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 1078.
74
See Maulid Klang Organizing Committee of Thailand, Holding Fast to the
Ideology of Harmony Among Thais (Bangkok: Islamic Committee of Thailand,
2006).
75
Ismail Lutfi Chapakiya, Status and Roles of Ulama in the Holy Quran and
Sunna in ibid, 21.
at least on the surface to echo what many Muslim scholars who are
today deemed progressive are propounding when discussing the
question of rigidity in the application of Islamic law, though the actual
substance of Ismail Lutfis personal understanding of jurisprudence itself
may, at the end of the day, depart fundamentally from the views of some
liberal-progressive Islamic scholars. Given Lutfis perceived Wahhabi
credentials, it is perhaps apropos to note here that while many have
criticized Wahhabism for its doctrinal conservatism and rigidity, we
should note that the importance of context is also a typical intellectual
trait of Wahhabi thought which believes, at least in theory, that the doors
of ijtih:d remain open.73 What is perhaps more important to register
though is the fact that, whether Lutfi is indeed a scripturalist, literalist
Muslim scholar, his emphasis on context speaks of an appreciation of the
complex and multifaceted nature both of the challenges confronting
Islam, and the avenues of response available to the Muslim community.
Some other aspects of Ismail Lutfis activities draw into further
question his Wahhabi credentials. For instance, while mainstream
Wahhabism rejects mawl;d (celebration of the Prophets birthday), the
fact is that in the past two years Lutfi has contributed to an annual
collection of essays compiled by Thai Muslim scholars and published by
the Islamic Centre of Thailand on the occasion of the Prophets birthday
to propagate the valuable teachings of the great Prophet [. . .] to all
human beings.74 Luftis contribution to the 2006 volume is titled The
Status and Roles of the Ulema in the Holy Qur8:n and Sunna, and is
remarkable both for its reiteration of distinctively Salafi beliefs and
practices as well as departure from patently orthodox Wahhabi
perspectives. In his discussion on the role and status of 6:lims in
Muslim society for instance, while acknowledging that they are to be
respected and sought out for their wisdom, Lutfi also cautioned, in
characteristic Salafi fashion, that esteem and respect from any society
for an 6:lim should not be frenetic and indulgent. The love and respect
has to be based on the foundation of the Qur8:n and Sunna and in
accordance with the level of his ;m:n to Allah and His Messengers.75 He
goes on further to elaborate that this is because however high the status
54
They try to propagate the errors of the 6:lim, try to dramatize small errors and
amplify them. They further try to destroy the dignity and fame of the 6:lim in
vicious ways. This is a root of catastrophes and fitna [conflict] that is traceable to
the past, such as fitna from those who disagreed with 6Al; in the armistice with
Mu6:wiya, fitna from the group of Khaw:rij [the group that protested both 6Al;
and Mu6:wiya and their respective supporters], and others because the attitude
and positions of these two groups is not based on knowledge and justice, but on
ignorance and bigotry, which cause extremism.77
While Islamic scholars continue to discuss the impact of the Battle of

Siffin (from which the armistice between 6Al; and Mu6:wiya arose) on
how the office of Caliph evolved, it appears that embedded in Lutfis
message is rather more of an expression of concern for the unity of the
umma as a whole than the polemics and hubris that often plagues the
historiography of Islam.
Finally, while much is made of the financial support that Ismail Lutfis
Yala Islamic University has received from the governments of Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait, little is said of the vast contributions that the
government of Qatar, not normally known for its scripturalist position
on matters of religion, has committed to the college.78 In this regard,
76
Ibid, 23.
Ibid, 234.
78
Although Wahhabi Islam played a special role in the establishment of the
nation-state of Qatar and the coming to power of its ruling familyAl Thaniin
the early 1970s, it has been used primarily as a legitimizing ideology rather than
enforced as a way of life. The Qatar Constitution recognizes Islam as the religion
77
of an :lim, he is also a human being who will have defects and errors.76
Lutfis view here accords with the practice of Salafi teachings to caution
against excessive celebration of human capabilities, even those of noted
religious scholars.
Again, compared to some Wahhabi and Salafi scholars, Lutfi appears
to demonstrate a more sophisticated appreciation for nuances in the
Islamic faith; his approach to Shi6ism departs from conventional
Wahhabism, and in so doing draws attention once again to his ambiguity.
While more orthodox Salafi and Wahhabi scholars tend to make
sweeping accusations of Shi6ism as apostasy, and of Shi6i Muslims as
heretics, in his discussion on bad and wicked ulema and the act of
fitna, where he alludes to key events in Islamic history associated with
the rise of Shi6ism, Lutfi reserves the harshest criticism for the Khaw:rij
as well as those who rejected the peace treaty between 6Al;, whom some
Muslims believe to be the fourth Rightly Guided Caliph, and
Mu6:wiya:
55
of the state and the Shar;6a as the primary source of law, but also provides
underpinnings for the existence and functioning of secular courts as well. In this
regard, Qatars legal system can be characterized as dual. It recognizes the
jurisdiction of both Shar;6a courts and 6adliyya courts (secular courts responsible
for conflicts/issues in labour, trade, business, criminal law, etc.). This dualism is
also exemplified by the emergence of a new legal elitemostly educated abroad
either in the West or Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordanvis-a`-vis the traditional array
of muftis and q:@;s. Furthermore, though Qatar and Saudi Arabia have
Wahhabism in common, Qatar is wary of its powerful neighbours ambition.
Al Jazeeras criticism of the Saudi monarchy has already led to a serious
diplomatic spat between the countries.
79
Interview at Asia Foundation Thailand Office, Bangkok, 17 January 2006.
80
See for example, Ismail Lutfi, Penyebaran Ilmu Salafi Khususnya Penulis
Syeikh Muhammad Abdul Wahab [The Expansion of Salafi Knowledge in the
Writings of Shaykh MuAammad 6Abd al-Wahh:b], paper presented at Seminar
Antarabangsa Shaykh MuAammad 6Abd al-Wahh:b in Perlis (Malaysia), 1617
March 2006.
even more astonishing is the fact that the University had previously
applied to the U.S.-linked Asia Foundation for a grant in support of
English language training for its faculty and study trips to Malaysia.79
While this is not the place to engage in a detailed discussion of
variations within Wahhabi ideology, due account must be taken of the
fact that if Ismail Lutfi is indeed a Wahhabi (and not just a Salafi, as he
himself claims), there are clearly aspects to his brand and practice of
Islam that deviate from the dictates of Wahhabism as commonly
understood. In trying to reconcile this discrepancy, it bears recalling
conventional wisdom on Islams arrival in the region, and how it had
adjusted itself to suit local cultures and belief systems when it arrived on
Southeast Asian shores, thereby giving rise to the syncretic Islam that has
become its trademark. Perhaps what we see in Lutfi is somewhat
analogous to thathis brand of Wahhabism might have undergone a
similar process of localization that has finessed it to an extent that some
of its features in effect differ from what we might commonly associate
with mainstream Wahhabi thought and praxis. It should be noted that
Lutfi himself refuses to acknowledge the term Wahhabi, but has
accepted the label of Salafi. This is not to suggest that Lutfis Islamic
thought is entirely devoid of explicit connections to Wahhabism, for he
has on other occasions also defended the teachings of Ibn 6Abd alWahh:b as well, and he does share in Wahhabisms traditional
apprehension of Sufi practices.80 Indeed, it is likely that, at the end of
the day, concern for the negative reputation that Wahhabism has accrued
recently, not to mention the unsubstantiated yet persistent links being
56
made between Wahhabism and the ongoing conflict in the southern

provinces, must weigh heavily on how Lutfi locates himself.
CONCLUSION
This article began by identifying the dearth of knowledge and analysis of

the Islamic reformist movements that have surfaced in Thailands
southern border provinces. It has attempted to address this lacuna by
considering the aforementioned phenomenon through the lens of two
major scholars of Islam, Haji Sulong Abdul Kadir and Ismail Lutfi
Japakiya, who, while making their mark in different epochs of history,
can nevertheless be widely considered as reformist in how their ideas
and activism challenged the monopoly of the traditional religious elite in
southern Thailand. By this token, several noteworthy observations
emerged.
In the first instance, it is immediately obvious that while there are
similarities in how Haji Sulong and Ismail Lutfi sought to transform
Islamic thought and practice in the southern border provinces by
reforming the practice of traditionalist Islam overseen by the traditional
Muslim elite, there have also been discernible differences in the pattern
of activism and degree of impact that both have enjoyed. Whether
entirely deliberate or otherwise, Haji Sulongs reformist agenda
eventually took on a decidedly political bent in how it was mobilized
to frame his approach to politics. While Haji Sulong never advocated
separatism, his push for religio-cultural autonomy was read by many,
including the Thai government, as an expression of sympathy for the
separatist agenda. Not surprisingly, this did not endear him to the
authorities, and subsequently led to major obstacles placed before him by
the state. Indeed, the situation was further aggravated with the
provocations of the local elite who nursed resentment towards his
reform agenda, which they interpreted to be an attempt to undermine
their authority and legitimacy as custodians of the faith. In contrast,
Ismail Lutfi distanced his reformist agenda from any explicit ties to
politics. While undoubtedly a political personality himself, given the
number of his appointments in local and state administration, not to
mention a stint in parliament, Ismail Lutfi was careful to distance himself
from the discourse of politics of the southern conflict. Indeed, insofar as
he has engaged in this discourse, it has been to speak out against the
unIslamic violence perpetrated by insurgents. The striking consequence
of this is that while Haji Sulongs reformist agenda was curtailed by the
state, Ismail Lutfis was endorsed. This was demonstrated most vividly in
57
the visit of the Crown Prince to the Yala Islamic University as well as the
Thai flag displayed proudly at the entrance to the university grounds.
In other words, regardless of Haji Sulongs contributions as an Islamic
scholar, it is his political contributions that have been etched in Patani
memoryhow he had agitated for greater autonomy for the Malay
people. Ismail Lutfi was far less prominent, though no less active, a
political personality. Instead, what is striking about Ismail Lutfis
politics, as opposed to Haji Sulongs, is how closely aligned it is with
the Thai state. Indeed, if Haji Sulong had provoked suspicion in Bangkok
circles, Ismail Lutfis active criticism of ongoing violence in the southern
provinces and his attempt to refashion the curriculum of Islamic
education in the provinces towards a more modernist orientation has
won the support and endorsement of the state.
Second, unlike the movement that Haji Sulong set in motion but which
effectively petered out upon his demise, the contemporary reform
movement appears not only to be resilient, but to have grown noticeably
in strength, facilitated no doubt by his accommodating relationship with
the Thai state. As a consequence, it has gained a foothold in the southern
provinces on the back of immense financial support that in all likelihood
was never available to Haji Sulong. This is expressed in the fact that the
Yala Islamic University, and the College of Islamic Studies at the Prince
of Songkhla University (which, under Ismail Ali, has taken on a reformist
bent as well), are now firmly entrenched in the terrain of Islamic thought
in the provinces.
This is not to say, however, that the rise of the reformist movement in
the southern border provinces has not generated tensions within the
Malay community. In fact, the resurgence of this Salafist genre of
reformist Islam has in many respects led to a reprise of the Kaum Tua
Kaum Muda that characterized intra-Muslim tensions across the Malay
world in the early twentieth century, and from which southern Thailand
was not immune. Reformist ideas on epistemology, methodology,
culture, and identity have been greeted with circumspection, if not
outright hostility, in many traditionalist quarters that harbour misgivings
about reformist dogma. Beyond the immediate tensions generated by this
contest on the local terrain of Islamic thought and practice lies the deeper
question of why the disjuncture exists between Patanis much-vaunted
traditional reputation of excellence in Islamic studies on the one hand,
and its resistance to change on the other. Perhaps, it is a function of the
highly-securitized environment, where the backdrop of Malay separatism and ethno-nationalism has overshadowed the development of
Islamic thought in the region (particularly when Islamic schools have
historically been viewed with hostility and suspicion by the Thai
government); or perhaps the emaciation of religious knowledge as a
58
result of decades of counter-insurgency policies that have taken their

toll on the production of Islamic teachers, many of whom have been
rightly or wrongly accused and apprehended for being complicit with the
separatist movement. Perhaps it is a function of social trends within the
Muslim community itself, which has seen its identity gradually erode in
the wake of the assimiliationist policies of various Thai governments.
Whatever the case may be, it is clear that, in the realm of Islamic
knowledge and education, debates over authenticity and legitimacy
within the Muslim community are likely to define the terrain of Islamic
thought and practice in the southern border provinces for many years
to come.
E-mail: iscyliow@ntu.edu.sg

Journal of Islamic Studies 2010 Liow 29 58

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Journal of Islamic Studies 2010 Liow 29 58

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Journal of Islamic Studies 21:1 (2010) pp.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND REFORMIST

This paper uses Patani to denote the historical Malay-Muslim kingdom,

Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012

JOSEPH CHINYONG LIOW

Notwithstanding the salience of these anachronistic dichotomies, there

The allusion to Jawi or Yawi as a Malay dialect is problematic as Jawi is

Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012

quarters within the Thai political establishment see Islamic schools

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND REFORMIST ISLAM

southernmost provinces privileges the separatist conflict in the region as

Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012

ISLAM, HISTORY, AND TRADITIONALISM

The definitive study of Islamic schools in southern Thailand available in the

Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012

southern border provinces, played a critical role in establishing and

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND REFORMIST ISLAM

making them accessible to a wider audience largely illiterate in Arabic.

While the prominence of Patani as a regional centre par excellence of

Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World, 198.

Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012

CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO: HAJI

Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012

At the time of its inception, Islamic reformism in Southeast Asia differed

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND REFORMIST ISLAM

Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012

RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM

Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012

Shafi6i school. Additionally, while participating in the Malay Aalaqas in

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND REFORMIST ISLAM

Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012

Sharing the Islamic reformist ideals of the aforementioned thinkers,

Hayimasae, Hj Sulong Abdul Kadir, 118.

Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND REFORMIST ISLAM

Hayimasae, Hj Sulong Abdul Kadir, 145.

Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012

and sarf (grammar and conjugation), tawA;d (theology), ta8r;kh (history),

Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND REFORMIST ISLAM

Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012

Notwithstanding the (halting) progress of his reformist project, Haji

THE CONTEMPORARY REFORMIST

Kaum Tua refers to the traditionalists or older generation, and Kaum

Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND REFORMIST ISLAM

Interview at Bamrung Islam Mukim Pujud, Pattani, 14 January 2006.

Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012

establishment to meet the demands of an Islamic community increasingly

See Ernesto Braam, Yala Islamic University as an agent of the

Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012

excess of a thousand people. In addition to his high profile as an 6:lim

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND REFORMIST ISLAM

establishment of Yala Islamic University. That said, it is observed that

The commencement of the initial conception [sic] Islamic educational philosophy

Interview with Ismail Lutfi, Pattani, 14 January 2006.

Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012

The Yala Islamic University, founded by Ismail Lutfi, and to a lesser

Traditionalists, reformists, and arenas of contestation

Sukree Langputeh, The Islamization of the Discipline of Public

Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at Universiti Malaya on April 19, 2012

It appears from the above statement that insofar as the reformist

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND REFORMIST ISLAM

Crucially, the root of this disquiet, as suggested earlier, can perhaps be