VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA,

MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO

PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON FARMERS PARTY, petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO,
NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL,
BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS
CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA,
MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS -All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as
Speaker of the House of Representatives, respondents.
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act
(RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected
under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall
be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck
down for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce and
administer election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them. Neither does it have
authority to decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement election laws -not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of parliamentary
democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified by unique Filipino statutory parameters,
presents new paradigms and novel questions, which demand innovative legal solutions convertible into
mathematical formulations which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.

The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
[1]
assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second
[2]
[3]
Division, in Election Matter 98-065; and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution of the Comelec en banc,
affirming the said disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38)
additional party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of
Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.

The Facts and the Antecedents

Page | 1

Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government -- the
party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or
organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of party-list
representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as
[4]
regular members. In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district congressman
[5]
and another for a party-list representative.
Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
which provides:
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the selection or election of party-list
representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statutes policy declaration,
the State shall "promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State
shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
(italics ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA
7941) in this wise:
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including
those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall
not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes;

Page | 2

Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847,
prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list representatives through the partylist system.

Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives

On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the
national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions
participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives
from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC,
which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor were as
[6]
follows:
Party/Organization/ Number of Percentage of Nominees
Coalition Votes Obtained Total Votes
1. APEC 503,487 5.5% Rene M. Silos
Melvyn D. Eballe
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% Leonardo Q. Montemayor
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% Diogenes S. Osabel
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% Eduardo P. Pilapil
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% Joy A.G. Young
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% Ariel A. Zartiga
7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60% Gorgonio P. Unde
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% Patricia M. Sarenas
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 2.54% Loreta Ann P. Rosales
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% Benjamin A. Cruz
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% Renato B. Magtubo
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% Cresente C. Paez
After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the Comelec
en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters Federation, Inc.) was entitled to
one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total
votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on
[7]
September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government
Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim
[the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up
of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as
provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two
percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional
provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who
should actually sit in the House.
[8]

Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations filed their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking
the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds.Likewise, PAG-ASAs
Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28,
1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP,
AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang

Page | 3

Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and
BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution
granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition
to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total
[9]
number of congressional seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and
twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percentvote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the
party-list system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the
system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in
the House of Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the
Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system. (Boldface in the
original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA
7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one
representative. It thus disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves
to GRANT the instant petition and motions for intervention, to include those similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the list of names
submitted by their respective parties, organizations and coalitions are PROCLAIMED as party-list
representatives, to wit:
to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided in Section 5,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its Resolution
No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated a set of Rules and
Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System.
Under these Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every two percent of the vote,
a formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex A. It apparently relied on this method when it proclaimed
the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified
parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said unanimous Resolution and proclaimed,
[10]
based on its three elements, the Group of 38 private respondents.
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis of
having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to the
proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that (1)
under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of
the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2)
additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had garnered the two
percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said
Section 11.

Ruling of the Comelec En Banc

Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House "should be filled up, the Comelec en banc resolved
only the issue concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats. In other words, the
issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1) to the thirteen

Page | 4

qualified parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 herein private respondents - even if they had not passed the two percent threshold?
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two
percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two political parties, three
coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict application of
the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the legislature -- to
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives x x x. Additionally, it
"will also prevent this Commission from complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for partylist representatives to compose 20% of the House of Representatives.
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority -- with
[11]
[12]
three commissioners concurring and two members dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of its
st
Second Division. It, however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51 party (AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of petitions for correction of manifest errors.
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote requirement imposed by
RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented its application, holding that there were more
important considerations than this statutory threshold.
Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the
issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this Court by
the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two per cent of the total votes cast for the party[13]
list system. In the suits, made respondents together with the Comelec were the 38 parties,
organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list seats
in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the proclamation of additional
representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of which had obtained at least two
percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec to CEASE and
DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other
date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in
the dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further
orders from this Court.
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor
appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana, for petitioners in GR No. 136786;
Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and Pete Quirino
Quadra, for all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P.
Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner
Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae.Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for
any party but also as a friend of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective Memoranda in
[14]
amplification of their verbal arguments.
The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the winners of the
subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for
party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA
7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be
determined?

Page | 5

The Courts Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions
should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.
First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
[15]
The pertinent provision of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Representatives
reads as follows:
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at
the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into
a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
---------------------------------- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
[16]
This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be
provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To
illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national
elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
-------- x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic
question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time
and under all circumstances? Our short answer is No.
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list.
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up has
been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it
prescribed that a party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list election must obtain at least
two percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of
Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with this
legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations or coalitions
which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list
allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up completely. The Comelec
cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the
exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties, avers that the
twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two percent vote requirement
in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict application would make it mathematically impossible to
fill up the House party-list complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally
simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics

Page | 6

of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the
total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier,
Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-list
representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties,
organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes
cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this
percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. Furthermore, no
winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of
Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes;
Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a mathematical
impossibility, suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this
[17]
percentage requirement rests in Congress. Our task now, as should have been the Comelecs, is not to
find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an
innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the
actual election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is to
apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional,
ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of
sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed
bill. We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:
SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that was raised by,
I think, Senator Osmea when he said that a political party must have obtained at least a minimum
percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under the party-list system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5 percent
or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate political party
groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their
constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name
[18]
of the party-list system, Mr. President."
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of Representatives, as
the following shows:
MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at, arriving at a five
percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats among the different sectors. There is a

Page | 7

mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned after that of the party list of the other parliaments or
[19]
congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany.
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the
specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine. Constitutional Commissioner Christian
S. Monsod explained:
MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes. Our
proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20
million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean 500,000
votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If
we bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is
three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many sectors who will be
able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have memberships of over 10,000. In effect,
that is the operational implication of our proposal. What we are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors,
the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job to open up the system and that we should not have
within that system a reserve seat. We think that people should organize, should work hard, and should
[20]
earn their seats within that system.
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and
the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all
government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by
[21]
them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might
be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which
might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned
according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
[22]
ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and
crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or
[23]
circumvention.
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a
multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system
because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty
system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the implementation of a
concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for
opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the
ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit
within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way, we will open it up and enable sectoral
[24]
groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the fifty. x x x.
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to
three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two
percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the
legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list
seats, if not the entire House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not seriously challenged
in these consolidated cases.

Page | 8

Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats

Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the
constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we
now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations
and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according
to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the
total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those
garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind
the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.

One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment

One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of the votes
[25]
obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first seat. Translated in figures, a party
that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats; another party that gets
four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two percent will be entitled to one seat
only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems arise,
however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for example, when Party A receives 20 percent of
the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just described, Party
A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat
limit imposed by law, all the parties will each uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the
spectacle of a party garnering two or more times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the
same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional representation
will be contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court
discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was developed by a
German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of distributing party-list seats in the
Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled
is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total number of votes
obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered by all the qualified
parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will be the number of additional seats that the party
concerned is entitled to. Thus:
No. of remaining seats
to be allocated No. of additional
--------------------------- x No. of votes of = seats of party
Total no. of votes of party concerned concerned
qualified parties (Integer.decimal)
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the descending order
of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998 election results, the distribution of
party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be as follows:
Party Number of Guaranteed Additional Extra Total
Votes Seats Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7

Page | 9

2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5

3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4
4. VETERANS 304,802 1 3.47 4
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4
6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4
7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64 1 4
10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21 3
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16 3
13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12 3
Total 3,429,338 13 32 7 52
However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party, those obtaining
more than the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our present set of facts, the thirteen
qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats, resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like the
previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of "proportional representation," a
basic tenet of our party-list system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the Philippine
setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty percent
allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold requirements -- two percent for us
and five for them. There are marked differences between the two models, however. As ably pointed out
[26]
by private respondents, one half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list members. More
important, there are no seat limitations, because German law discourages the proliferation of small
parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the
promotion of the multiparty system. This major statutory difference makes the Niemeyer formula
completely inapplicable to the Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the Arctic
because of fundamental environmental differences, neither can the Niemeyer formula be transplanted in
toto here because of essential variances between the two party-list models.

The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines

It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands an
equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number
of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters of the Filipino
party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected
under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.

Page | 10

Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall
be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate proportional representation into a
mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well
as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio
for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the
system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these
parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number
of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to
be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional
representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to
which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to
two additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same
number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party. Depending on the
proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats has already been
predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two
reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the
formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a
seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An
academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because the present
set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will
definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.
[27]

The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales that a fractional membership cannot
be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional
membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said
further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x.
In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature. Since
Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The Supreme Court does not
make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by
the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one
seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it
should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing
the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes of
-------------------- = first party relative to
Total votes for total votes for party-list system
party-list system

Page | 11

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six
percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two
additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to
or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a
total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to
any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the
maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total
number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank
and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties
are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of
Representatives.
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to one
additional seat or a total of two seats.
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats
the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other
qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene the
proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total
number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional
seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of
votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same number of seats as the second party would violate the
statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will
have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution,
therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional
seats in proportion to those of the first party.

Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the
following complex fraction:
No. of votes of
concerned party
-----------------Total no. of votes
Additional seats for party-list system No. of additional
for concerned = ----------------------- x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
-----------------Total no. of votes
for party list system
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = ------------------ x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party

Page | 12

Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is computed as
follows:
No. of votes of
Additional seats ABA No. of additional
for concerned = -------------------- x seats allocated to
party (ABA) No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)
Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:
Additional seats 321,646
for concerned = ----------- x 1 = .64 or 0 additional seat, since
party (ABA) 503,487 rounding off is not to be applied
Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be as follows:
Organization Votes %age of Initial No. Additional Total
Garnered Total Votes of Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.64 1
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.62 1
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.61 1
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.51 1
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
PINAY
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.46 1
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.43 1
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.39 1
12. COOP- 189,802 2.07% 1 189,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.38 1
NATCCO
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.37 1
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes
for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional
seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional
seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is
necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not
rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a
number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional
representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An
increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a
more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional
seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides with the
present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve other
qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the
use of a different formula and methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say, however, that
our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical equation, no more no
less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it less strict, then the formula will
also be modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.

Page | 13

Epilogue
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38)
herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it
glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional
representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec effectively
arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the power and
the discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety
of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion
[28]
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and respondents - have
failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in prescribing such
requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
[29]
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
[30]

The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws, cannot
simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing
body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an
amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by the
strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as
unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the
[31]
statute permits.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of three
each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the proportional representation
mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted as a total
failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of representation. It should not be deemed a
conclusive indication that the requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of
the system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already popular in parliamentary
democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should allow it some time to take root in the
consciousness of our people and in the heart of our tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec
and the defeated litigants should not despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve as
a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more active and vigilant in
their campaign for representation in the State's lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call for
innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we are
confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience,
perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full
representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the
Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list
representatives - two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Page | 14

BENJAMIN
U.
BORJA,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., respondents.

JR., petitioner,

MENDOZA, J.:
This case presents for determination the scope of the constitutional provision barring elective local
officials, with the exception of barangay officials, from serving more than three consecutive terms. In
particular, the question is whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law
and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of
the three-term limit.
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term
ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of
the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years
which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years
1
ending June 30, 1998.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros
relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja Jr., who was also a candidate for
mayor, sought Capco's disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor
for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term
after that.
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and
declared private respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of
2
Pateros. However, on motion of private respondent the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the
3
decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections. The majority stated
in its decision:
In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers
to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to
succession to an office to which he was not elected. In the case before the Commission,
respondent Capco was not elected to the position of Mayor in the January 18, 1988 local
elections. He succeeded to such office by operation of law and served for the unexpired
term of his predecessor. Consequently, such succession into office is not counted as one
(1) term for purposes of the computation of the three-term limitation under the
Constitution and the Local Government Code.
Accordingly, private respondent was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558 votes against
petitioner's 7,773 votes and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
This is a petition for certiorari brought to set aside the resolution, dated My 7, 1998, of the COMELEC and
to seek a declaration that private respondent is disqualified to serve another term as mayor of Pateros,
Metro Manila.
Petitioner contends that private respondent Capco's service as mayor from September 2, 1989 to June
30, 1992 should be considered as service for one full term, and since he thereafter served from 1992 to
1998 two more terms as mayor, he should be considered to have served three consecutive terms within
the contemplation of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution and 43(b) of the Local Government Code. Petitioner
stresses the fact that, upon the death of Mayor Cesar Borja on September 2, 1989, private respondent
became the mayor and thereafter served the remainder of the term. Petitioner argues that it is irrelevant

Page | 15

that private respondent became mayor by succession because the purpose of the constitutional provision
in limiting the number of terms elective local officials may serve is to prevent a monopolization of political
power.
This contention will not bear analysis. Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
This provision is restated in 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160):
Sec. 43. Term of Office. . . .
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected. . . .
First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in the
constitutional provision in question. The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the
people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that
office whether by election or by succession by operation of law would be to disregard one of the
purposes of the constitutional provision in question.
Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Article X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the
members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of
choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they
rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive
terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they
adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred
from running for the same position in the of the succeeding election following the expiration of the third
4
consecutive term. Monsod warned against "prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will
choose" as a result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution
5
contained provisions "recognizing people's power."
Commissioner Blas F. Ople, who supported the Monsod proposal, said:
The principle involved is really whether this Commission shall impose a temporary or a
perpetual disqualification on those who have served their terms in accordance with the
limits on consecutive service as decided by the Constitutional Commission. I would be
very wary about this Commission exercising a sort of omnipotent power in order to
disqualify those who will already have served their terms from perpetuating themselves in
office. I think the Commission achieves its purpose in establishing safeguards against the
excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. We do put a cap on
consecutive service in the case of the President, six years, in the case of the VicePresident, unlimited; and in the case of the Senators, one reelection. In the case of the
Members of Congress, both from the legislative districts and from the party list and
sectoral representation, this is now under discussion and later on the policy concerning
local officials will be taken up by the Committee on Local Governments. The principle
remains the same. I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of
continuous service and frequent reelections, officials from the President down to the

Page | 16

municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to

accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to
transfer these posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. I think that is
taken care of because we put a gap on the continuity or the unbroken service of all of
these officials. But where we now decide to put these prospective servants of the people
or politicians, if we want to use the coarser term, under a perpetual disqualification, I
have a feeling that we are taking away too much from the people, whereas we should be
6
giving as much to the people as we can in terms of their own freedom of choice. . . .
Other commissioners went on record against "perpetually disqualifying" elective officials who have served
a certain number of terms as this would deny the right of the people to choose. As Commissioner Yusup
7
R. Abubakar asked, "why should we arrogate unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want?"
Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino spoke in the same vein when she called on her colleagues to "allow the
people to exercise their own sense of proportion and [rely] on their own strength to curtail power when it
8
overreaches itself."
Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani stressed: "Why should we not leave [perpetual disqualification after
serving a number of terms] to the premise accepted by practically everybody here that our people are
politically mature? Should we use this assumption only when it is convenient for us, and not when it may
also lead to a freedom of choice for the people and for politicians who may aspire to serve them
9
longer?"
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The
first is the notion ofservice of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result
of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of
the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the
assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election. This is clear from the following
exchange in the Constitutional Commission concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI, 4 and 7 of
the Constitution, for members of Congress:
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second
term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he can run again?
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before if the Gentlemen will
remember was: How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election which is
three years or one term which is six years?
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the
view that during the election following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether
such election will be on the third year or on the sixth year thereafter, this particular
member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a period of hibernation for six years.
That was the Committee's stand. 10
Indeed a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose
11
those whom they please to govern them. To bar the election of a local official because he has already
served three terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election,
would therefore be to violate this principle.

Page | 17

Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC
that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election.
The first sentence speaks of "the term of office of elective local officials" and bars "such official[s]" from
serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local
official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that "voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected." The term served must therefore be one "for which [the official
concerned] was elected." The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on
the number of terms an elective local official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which
he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official
cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office
prior to its expiration.
Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas' comment on Art. VI, 7, which similarly bars members of the
House of Representatives from serving for more than three terms. Commissioner Bernas states that "if
one is elected Representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how
short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms
12
allowed."
This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide in answer to a query of
Commissioner Suarez: "For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly
elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the
unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the
correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the
meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President?" Commissioner Davide said: "Yes,
because we speak of "term," and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion
of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the
13
Lower House."
There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of
Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from
14
office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the other hand, the
15
Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such Representative serves a
term for which he was elected. As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit the right to be
elected and to serve in Congress, his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term.
Rather than refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. X, 8 with regard to elective local officials,
the case of a Representative who succeeds another confirms the theory.
Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the Vice-President to
the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. After stating that "The President shall not be eligible for
any reelection," this provision says that "No person who has succeeded as President and has served as
such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time." Petitioner
contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to have served a full term as
mayor if he succeeds to the latter's office and serves for the remainder of the term.
The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the Vice-President, who
simply steps into the Presidency by succession, would be qualified to run President even if he has
occupied that office for more than four years. The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, 8 on elective
local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. It underscores the constitutional
intent to cover only the terms of office to which one may have been elected for purposes of the three-term
limit on local elective officials, disregarding for this purpose service by automatic succession.
There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that office
for more than four years is ineligible for election as President. The Vice-President is elected primarily to
succeed the President in the event of the latter's death, permanent disability, removal, or resignation.

Page | 18

While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming, so is entirely dependent on the good graces of
the President. In running for Vice-President, he may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. For their
part, the electors likewise choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency
in the event it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the Presidency for more than four years may rightly be
considered as service for a full term.
This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the Local Government Code, he is the presiding officer
of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of such local assembly. He has distinct
powers and functions, succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one of
16
them. It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in the
Presidency, that, in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the
mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that
office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as
well asthe right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual
has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the
same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. This point can be made
clearer by considering the following cases or situations:
Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of
the incumbent. Six months before the next election, he resigns and is twice elected
thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next election?
Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and
subsequently resigned from office before the full term expired, he has not actually served
three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art. X, 8, voluntary
renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term only if the term is one "for which he was elected." Since A is only
completing the service of the term for which the deceased and not he was
elected, A cannot be considered to have completed one term. His resignation constitutes
an interruption of the full term.
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended
for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one
more term in the next election?
Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.
In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of
the disqualification provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been
elected three consecutive times and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case,
even if the local official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation
before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three times. In the second
case, the local official has been elected three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three
consecutive terms.
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a
total failure of the two conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X, 8.
Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the next
election?

Page | 19

Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found
himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he
only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor.
To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third
time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to
choose whom they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can
remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand, he proves to
be a good mayor, there will be no way the people can return him to office (even if it is just the third time
he is standing for reelection) if his service of the first term is counted as one for the purpose of applying
the term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional
Commission that while the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power
may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

BARANGAY
ASSOCIATION
FOR
NATIONAL
ADVANCEMENT
AND
TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS
(sitting
as
the
National
Board
of
Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS
BUSINESS
AND
SCIENCE
PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT
TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS),Intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179295
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS
EDUCATIONAL
REFORMS,
INC.,
and
ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
The House of Representatives, represented by Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, filed a motion for leave to intervene in G.R. Nos. 179271 and
179295. The House of Representatives filed a motion for clarification in intervention and enumerated the issues for clarification as follows:
A. There are only 219 legislative districts and not 220. Accordingly, the alloted seats for party-list representation should only be 54
and not 55. The House of Representatives seeks clarification on which of the party-list representatives shall be admitted to the
Roll of Members considering that the Court declared as winners 55 party-list representatives.
B. The House of Representatives wishes to be guided on whether it should enroll in its Roll of Members the 32 named party-list
representatives enumerated in Table 3 or only such number of representatives that would complete the 250 member maximum
prescribed by Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. In the event that it is ordered to admit all 32, will this act not violate the
above-cited Constitutional provision considering that the total members would now rise to 270.
C. The Court declared as unconstitutional the 2% threshold only in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. Yet, it distributed first seats to party-list groups which did not attain the minimum
number of votes that will entitle them to one seat. Clarification is, therefore, sought whether the term "additional seats" refer to 2nd
and 3rd seats only or all remaining available seats. Corollary thereto, the House of Representatives wishes to be clarified whether
there is no more minimum vote requirement to qualify as a party-list representative.
D. For the guidance of the House of Representatives, clarification is sought as to whether the principle laid down in Veterans that
"the filling up of the allowable seats for party-list representatives is not mandatory," has been abandoned.1

Page | 20

On the other hand, Armi Jane Roa-Borje (Roa-Borje), third nominee of Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), filed a motion for leave
for partial reconsideration-in-intervention, alleging that:
The Supreme Court, in ruling on the procedure for distribution of seats, has deprived without due process and in violation of the equal
protection clause, parties with more significant constituencies, such as CIBAC, Gabriela and APEC, in favor of parties who did not even meet
the 2% threshold.2
Following the Courts Decision of 21 April 2009, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) submitted to this Court on 27 April 2009 National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 09-001. NBC Resolution No. 09-001 updated the data used by this Court in its Decision of 21
April 2009. The total votes for party-list is now 15,723,764 following the cancellation of the registration of party-list group Filipinos for Peace,
Justice and Progress Movement (FPJPM). Moreover, the total number of legislative districts is now 219 following the annulment of Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Thus, the percentage and ranking of the actual winning partylist groups are different from Table 3 of the Decision in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The
Number
in the 2007 Elections

of

Members

of

the

House

of

Representatives

Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1987 Constitution fixes the maximum number of members of the House of Representatives at 250. However, the 1987 Constitution
expressly allows for an increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives provided a law is enacted for the purpose. This
is clear from the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law" in Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The Legislature has the
option to choose whether the increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives is done by piecemeal legislation or by
enactment of a law authorizing a general increase. Legislation that makes piecemeal increases of the number of district representatives is no
less valid than legislation that makes a general increase.
In 1987, there were only 200 legislative districts. Twenty legislative districts were added by piecemeal legislation after the ratification of the
1987 Constitution:
Republic Act

Year
into Law

Signed

Legislative District

7160

1992

Biliran

7675

1994

Mandaluyong City

7854

1994

Makati (2nd District)

7878

1995

Apayao

7896 and 7897

1995

Guimaras

7926

1995

Muntinlupa City

8470

1998

Compostela Valley

8487

1998

Taguig City (2nd District)

8526

1998

Valenzuela City (2nd District)

10

9229

2003

Paraaque (2nd District)

11

9230

2003

San Jose del Monte City

12

8508 and 9232

1998 and 2003

Antipolo (1st District)

13

9232

2003

Antipolo (2nd District)

14

9269

2004

Zamboanga City (2nd District)

15

9355

2006

Dinagat Island

16

9357

2006

Sultan Kudarat (2nd District)

17

9360

2006

Zamboanga Sibugay (2nd District)

18

9364

2006

Marikina City (2nd District)

19

9371

2007

Cagayan de Oro (2nd District)

20

9387

2007

Navotas City

Page | 21

Thus, for purposes of the 2007 elections, there were only 219 district representatives. Navotas City became a separate district on 24 June
2007, more than a month after the 14 May 2007 elections.
The
in the 2007 Elections

Number

of

Party-List

Seats

Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads in part:

The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. x
xx
The 1987 Constitution fixes the ratio of party-list representatives to district representatives. This ratio automatically applies whenever the
number of district representatives is increased by law. The mathematical formula for determining the number of seats available to party-list
representatives is

Number
of
seats
to legislative districts

available
x

.20

Number
of
seats
party-list representatives

available

to

.80

As we stated in our Decision of 21 April 2009, "[t]his formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available
for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law." Thus, for every four district representatives, the 1987
Constitution mandates that there shall be one party-list representative. There is no need for legislation to create an additional party-list seat
whenever four additional legislative districts are created by law. Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution automatically creates such
additional party-list seat.
We use the table below to illustrate the relationship between the number of legislative districts and the number of party-list seats for every
election year after 1987.

Election
Year

Number of Legislative Districts

Number of Party-List
Seats

Total Number of Members of the House of

Representatives

1992

200

50

250

1995

206

51

257

52

261

New
Biliran
Mandaluyong
Makati
(2nd
Apayao
Guimaras
Muntinlupa City
1998

Districts:
City
District)

209

New
Districts:
Compostela
Valley
Taguig
City
(2nd
District)
Valenzuela City (2nd District)
2001

209

52

261

2004

214

53

267

54

273

55

275

New
Districts:
Paraaque City (2nd District)
San
Jose
del
Monte
City
Antipolo
(1st
District)
Antipolo
(2nd
District)
Zamboanga City (2nd District)
2007

219

New
Districts:
Dinagat
Island
Sultan Kudarat
(2nd District)
Zamboanga Sibugay (2nd District)
Marikina
City
(2nd
District)
Cagayan de Oro (2nd District)
2010

220

New
Navotas

District:
City

Page | 22

(assuming no additional districts are

created)

We see that, as early as the election year of 1995, the total number of members of the House of Representatives is already beyond the initial
maximum of 250 members as fixed in the 1987 Constitution.
Any change in the number of legislative districts brings a corresponding change in the number of party-list seats. However, the increase in
the number of members of the House of Representatives went unnoticed as the available seats for party-list representatives have never
been filled up before. As of the oral arguments in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, there were 220 legislative districts. Fifty-five party-list seats
were thus allocated. However, the number of legislative districts was subsequently reduced to 219 with our ruling on 16 July 2008 declaring
void the creation of the Province of Sharif Kabunsuan.3 Thus, in the 2007 elections, the number of party-list seats available for distribution
should be correspondingly reduced from 55 to 54.
The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends on the number of participants
in the party-list election. If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election, then, despite the availability of 54 seats, the maximum
possible number of occupied party-list seats would only be 30 because of the three-seat cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the
mandatory allocation of all the 54 available seats.
Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast guarantees a party one seat. This 2% threshold for the first round
of seat allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the Court upholds this 2% threshold for the guaranteed seats
as a valid exercise of legislative power.1avvphi1
In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the Court has
struck down the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats. Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b) of the PartyList Act stating that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the proportion to their
total number of votes" can no longer be given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the total membership of the House of
Representatives as provided in the 1987 Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill up.
However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the second round of seat allocation. What is
deemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of each election, such as the number of participating parties, the
number of available party-list seats, and the number of parties with guaranteed seats received in the first round of seat allocation. To
continue the example above, if only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election and each party received only one thousand votes,
then each of the ten parties would receive 10% of the votes cast. All are guaranteed one seat, and are further entitled to receive two more
seats in the second round of seat allocation.
Similarly, a presidential candidate may win the elections even if he receives only one thousand votes as long as all his opponents receive
less than one thousand votes. A winning presidential candidate only needs to receive more votes than his opponents. The same policy
applies in every election to public office, from the presidential to the barangay level. Except for the guaranteed party-list seat, there is no
minimum vote requirement before a candidate in any election, for any elective office, can be proclaimed the winner. Of course, the winning
candidate must receive at least one vote, assuming he has no opponents or all his opponents do not receive a single vote.
In the absence of a minimum vote requirement in the second round of party-list seat allocation, there is no need to belabor the disparity
between the votes obtained by the first and last ranked winning parties in the 2007 party-list elections. In the same manner, no one belabors
the disparity between the votes obtained by the highest and lowest ranked winners in the senatorial elections. However, for those interested
in comparing the votes received by party-list representatives vis-a-vis the votes received by district representatives, the 162,678 votes cast in
favor of TUCP, the last party to obtain a party-list seat, is significantly higher than the votes received by 214 of the 218 elected district
representatives.4
The
Actual
in the 2007 Elections

Number

of

Party-List

Representatives

The data used in Table 3 of our Decision promulgated on 21 April 2009 was based on the submissions of the parties. We used the figures
from Party-List Canvass Report No. 32, as of 6:00 p.m. of 31 August 2007. The NBC issued NBC Report No. 33 on 11 June 2008, updating
the 31 August 2007 report. The parties did not furnish this Court with a copy of NBC Report No. 33. In any case, we stated in the
dispositive portion of our Decision that "[t]he allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the
procedureused in Table 3 of this decision." Party-List Canvass Report No. 32 is not part of the procedure.1avvphi1
The computation of the COMELEC in NBC No. 09-001 applying the procedure laid down in our Decision requires correction for purposes of
accuracy. Instead of multiplying the percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for party-list by 36, the COMELEC multiplied the
percentage by 37. Thirty-six is the proper multiplier as it is the difference between 54, the number of available party-list seats, and 18, the
number of guaranteed seats. Only the figures in column (C) are affected. The allocation of seats to the winning party-list organizations,
however, remains the same as in NBC No. 09-001. Our modification of the COMELECs computation in NBC No. 09-001 is shown below:

Rank

Party

Votes Garnered

Votes
Garnered
over
Total Votes for Party List, in
%
(A)

Guaranteed Seat
(First
Round)
(B)

Additional
Seats
(Second Round)
(C)

(B) plus (C), in whole integers

(D)

Applying the three seat cap

(E)

Page | 23

BUHAY

1,169,338

7.44%

2.68

N.A.

BAYAN MUNA

979,189

6.23%

2.24

N.A.

CIBAC

755,735

4.81%

1.73

N.A.

GABRIELA

621,266

3.95%

1.42

N.A.

APEC

619,733

3.94%

1.42

N.A.

A Teacher

490,853

3.12%

1.12

N.A.

AKBAYAN

466,448

2.97%

1.07

N.A.

ALAGAD

423,165

2.69%

N.A.

COOP-NATCCO

409,987

2.61%

N.A.

10

BUTIL

409,168

2.60%

N.A.

11

BATAS

385,956

2.45%

N.A.

12

ARC

374,349

2.38%

N.A.

13

ANAKPAWIS

370,323

2.36%

N.A.

14

AMIN

347,527

2.21%

N.A.

15

ABONO

340,002

2.16%

N.A.

16

YACAP

331,623

2.11%

N.A.

17

AGAP

328,814

2.09%

N.A.

18

AN WARAY

321,516

2.04%

N.A.

19

UNI-MAD

251,804

1.60%

N.A.

20

ABS

235,152

1.50%

N.A.

21

ALIF

229,267

1.46%

N.A.

22

KAKUSA

229,036

1.46%

N.A.

23

KABATAAN

228,700

1.45%

N.A.

24

ABA-AKO

219,363

1.40%

N.A.

25

SENIOR CITIZENS

213,095

1.36%

N.A.

26

AT

200,030

1.27%

N.A.

27

VFP

196,358

1.25%

N.A.

28

ANAD

188,573

1.20%

N.A.

29

BANAT

177,068

1.13%

N.A.

30

ANG KASANGGA

170,594

1.08%

N.A.

31

BANTAY

169,869

1.08%

N.A.

32

ABAKADA

166,897

1.06%

N.A.

33

1-UTAK

165,012

1.05%

N.A.

34

TUCP

162,678

1.03%

N.A.

35

COCOFED

156,007

0.99%

N.A.

Total

18

54

Page | 24

Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) and Ang Laban ng Indiginong Filipino (ALIF) both have pending
cases before the COMELEC. The COMELEC correctly deferred the proclamation of both BATAS and ALIF as the outcome of their cases
may affect the final composition of party-list representatives. The computation and allocation of seats may still be modified in the event that
the COMELEC decides against BATAS and/or ALIF.
To address Roa-Borjes motion for partial reconsideration-in-intervention and for purposes of computing the results in future party-list
elections, we reiterate that in the second step of the second round of seat allocation, the preference in the distribution of seats should be in
accordance with the higher percentage and higher rank, without limiting the distribution
to parties receiving two-percent of the votes.6 To limit the distribution of seats to the two-percenters would mathematically prevent the filling
up of all the available party-list seats.
In the table above, CIBAC cannot claim a third seat from the seat allocated to TUCP, the last ranked party allocated with a seat. CIBAC's
2.81% (from the percentage of 4.81% less the 2% for its guaranteed seat) has a lower fractional seat value after the allocation of its second
seat compared to TUCP's 1.03%. CIBAC's fractional seat after receiving two seats is only 0.03 compared to TUCP's 0.38 fractional seat.
Multiplying CIBAC's 2.81% by 37, the additional seats for distribution in the second round, gives 1.03 seat, leaving 0.03 fractional seat.
Multiplying TUCP's 1.03% by 37 gives a fractional seat of 0.38, higher than CIBAC's fractional seat of 0.03. The fractional seats become
material only in the second step of the second round of seat allocation to determine the ranking of parties. Thus, for purposes of the second
step in the second round of seat allocation,7 TUCP has a higher rank than CIBAC.
Roa-Borjes position stems from the perceived need for absolute proportionality in the allocation of party-list seats. However, the 1987
Constitution does not require absolute proportionality in the allocation of party-list seats. Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations. (Boldfacing and
italicization supplied)
The phrase "legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number
of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" in Section 5(1) of Article VI requires that legislative
districts shall be apportioned according to proportional representation. However, this principle of proportional representation applies only
to legislative districts, not to the party-list system. The allocation of seats under the party-list system is governed by the last phrase of
Section 5(1), which states that the party-list representatives shall be "those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system," giving the Legislature wide discretion in formulating the allocation of party-list seats. Clearly, there is no constitutional
requirement for absolute proportional representation in the allocation of party-list seats in the House of Representatives.
Section 2, on Declaration of Policy, of R.A. No. 7941 provides that the "State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof x x x." However, this proportional representation in Section 2 is qualified by Section 11(b)8 of the same
law which mandates a three-seat cap, which is intended to bar any single party-list organization from dominating the party-list system.
Section 11(b) also qualifies this proportional representation by imposing a two percent cut-off for those entitled to the guaranteed seats.
These statutory qualifications are valid because they do not violate the Constitution, which does not require absolute proportional
representation for the party-list system.
To summarize, there are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:
1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum number of seats
available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for every four existing legislative districts.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one seat. The
guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two percent of the total party-list
votes.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the party-list
organizations including those that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically and
physically prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a second
round of seat allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this
Resolution.
4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from dominating the
party-list system. There is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality
for the party-list system. The well-settled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not
violative of the Constitution.

Page | 25

These four parameters allow the mathematical and practical fulfillment of the Constitutional provision that party-list representatives shall
comprise twenty percent of the members of the House of Representatives. At the same time, these four parameters uphold as much as
possible the Party-List Act, striking down only that provision of the Party-List Act that could not be reconciled anymore with the 1987
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the Courts Decision of 21 April 2009 in the present case is clarified accordingly.
SO ORDERED.

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R.
VEGA, respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J p:
The Case
In this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) assails and seeks to nullify (1) the February 8, 2012
Resolution 1 of the Second Division, Commission on Elections (COMELEC), in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and (2) the May 10, 2012
Resolution 2 of the COMELEC en banc affirming that division's disposition. The assailed issuances, in turn, affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55 declaring Abundo as ineligible,
under the three-term limit rule, to run in the 2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for the position of
municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty
candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of
canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of
mayor. Abundo protested Torres' election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral
contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a
period of a little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of
candidacy 3 for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former's disqualification to run, the
corresponding petition, 4 docketed as SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. On June 16, 2010,
the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution 5 finding for Abundo, who in the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes 6 and was
accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted disqualification case Torres initiated against Abundo,
herein private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto 7 action before the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes,
docketed as Election Case No. 55, to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
By Decision 8 of August 9, 2010 in Election Case No. 55, the RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, Decision is, hereby, rendered GRANTING the petition and declaring Abelardo Abundo, Sr. ineligible
to serve as municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
SO ORDERED. 9
In so ruling, the trial court, citing Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC, 10 found Abundo to have already served three consecutive mayoralty terms, to
wit, 2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence, disqualified for another, i.e., fourth, consecutive term. Abundo, the RTC noted, had
been declared winner in the aforesaid 2004 elections consequent to his protest and occupied the position of and actually served as Viga
mayor for over a year of the remaining term, i.e., from May 9, 2006 to June 30, 2007, to be exact. To the RTC, the year and a month service
constitutes a complete and full service of Abundo's second term as mayor.
Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the COMELEC, his recourse docketed as EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010.
The Ruling of the COMELEC

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On February 8, 2012, in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010, the COMELEC's Second Division rendered the first assailed Resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 73, Virac, Catanduanes is
AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 11
Just like the RTC, the COMELEC's Second Division ruled against Abundo on the strength of Aldovino, Jr. and held that service of the
unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is considered as service for one full term within the
contemplation of the three-term limit rule.
In time, Abundo sought but was denied reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc per its equally assailed Resolution of May 10, 2012.
The fallo of the COMELEC en banc's Resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution of
the Commission (Second Division) is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 12
In affirming the Resolution of its Second Division, the COMELEC en banc held in essence the following: first, there was no involuntary
interruption of Abundo's 2004-2007 term service which would be an exception to the three-term limit rule as he is considered never to have
lost title to the disputed office after he won in his election protest; and second, what the Constitution prohibits is for an elective official to be in
office for the same position for more than three consecutive terms and not to the service of the term.
Hence, the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction.
Intervening Events
In the meantime, following the issuance by the COMELEC of its May 10, 2012 Resolution denying Abundo's motion for reconsideration, the
following events transpired:
1.On June 20, 2012, the COMELEC issued an Order 13 declaring its May 10, 2012 Resolution final and executory. The following day, June
21, 2012, the COMELECissued an Entry of Judgment. 14
2.On June 25, 2012, Vega filed a Motion for Execution 15 with the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes.
3.On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC, acting on Vega's counsel's motion 16 filed a day earlier, issued an Order 17 directing the bailiff of
ECAD (COMELEC) to personally deliver the entire records to said RTC.
On June 29, 2012, the COMELEC ECAD Bailiff personally delivered the entire records of the instant case to, and were duly received by, the
clerk of court of RTC-Br. 43.
4.On June 29, 2012, or on the same day of its receipt of the case records, the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes granted Vega's Motion for
Execution through an Order18 of even date. And a Writ of Execution 19 was issued on the same day.
5.On July 2, 2012, Sheriff Q. Tador, Jr. received the Writ of Execution and served the same at the office of Mayor Abundo on the same day
via substituted service.
6.On July 3, 2012, the Court issued a TRO 20 enjoining the enforcement of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.
7.On July 4, 2012, Vega received the Court's July 3, 2012 Resolution 21 and a copy of the TRO. On the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M.
Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes of Viga, Catanduanes took their oaths of office 22 as mayor and vice-mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes, respectively.
8.On July 5, 2012, Vega received a copy of Abundo's Seventh (7th) Most Extremely Urgent Manifestation and Motion 23 dated June 28,
2012 praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or status quo ante Order. On the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor
Cesar O. Cervantes who had taken their oaths of office the day before assumed the posts of mayor and vice-mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes. 24
9.On July 6, 2012, Vega interposed a Motion (To Admit Attached Manifestation) 25 and Manifestation with Leave to Admit 26 dated July 5,
2012 stating that the TRO thus issued by the Court has become functus officio owing to the execution of the RTC's Decision in Election Case
No. 55.
10.On July 10, 2012, Vega filed his Comment/Opposition with Leave to the Petitioner's Prayer for the Issuance of a Status Quo
Ante Order 27 reiterating the argument that since Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes already assumed
the posts of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, then a Status Quo Ante Order would serve no purpose.
11.On July 12, 2012, Abundo filed his Most Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Convert the July 3, 2012 TRO into a Status Quo Ante Order
(In View of the Unreasonable and Inappropriate Progression of Events). 28
It is upon the foregoing backdrop of events that Abundo was dislodged from his post as incumbent mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. To be sure,
the speed which characterized Abundo's ouster despite the supervening issuance by the Court of a TRO on July 3, 2012 is not lost on the
Court. While it is not clear whether Vice-Mayor Tarin and First Councilor Cervantes knew of or put on notice about the TRO either before
they took their oaths of office on July 4, 2012 or before assuming the posts of mayor and vice-mayor on July 5, 2012, the confluence of
events following the issuance of the assailed COMELEC en banc irresistibly tends to show that the TRO issued as it were to maintain
the status quo, thus averting the premature ouster of Abundo pending this Court's resolution of his appeal appears to have been
trivialized.
On September 11, 2012, Vega filed his Comment on Abundo's petition, followed not long after by public respondent COMELEC's
Consolidated Comment. 29

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The Issues
Abundo raises the following grounds for the allowance of the petition:
6.1The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
declared the arguments in Abundo's motion for reconsideration as mere rehash and reiterations of the
claims he raised prior to the promulgation of the Resolution.
6.2The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
declared that Abundo has consecutively served for three terms despite the fact that he only served the
remaining one year and one month of the second term as a result of an election protest. 30
First
Arguments
Reconsideration Not Mere Reiteration

in

Issue:
for

Motion

The COMELEC en banc denied Abundo's motion for reconsideration on the basis that his arguments in said motion are mere reiterations of
what he already brought up in his appeal Brief before the COMELEC Second Division. In this petition, petitioner claims otherwise.
Petitioner's assertion is devoid of merit.
A comparison of Abundo's arguments in the latter's Brief vis- -vis those in his Motion for Reconsideration (MR) reveals that the arguments
in the MR are elucidations and amplications of the same issues raised in the brief. First, in his Brief, Abundo raised the sole issue of lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC to consider the quo warrantocase since the alleged violation of the three-term limit has already been rejected by
the COMELEC First Division in SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), while in his MR, Abundoraised the similar ground of the conclusiveness of
the COMELEC's finding on the issue of his qualification to run for the current term. Second, in his Brief, Abundoassailed RTC's reliance
on Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he argued that the Court's pronouncement in Aldovino, Jr., which dealt with preventive suspension, is not
applicable to the instant case as it involves only a partial service of the term. Abundo argued in his Brief that his situation cannot be equated
with the case of preventive suspension as held in Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he argued before that the almost two years which he did not
sit as mayor during the 2004-2007 term is an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term.
Thus, COMELEC did not err in ruling that the issues in the MR are a rehash of those in the Brief.
Core
Whether
or
to have served three consecutive terms

not Abundo is

Issue:
deemed

The pivotal determinative issue then is whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from his being
declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the
three consecutive term limit for elective local officials.
On this core issue, We find the petition meritorious. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo's three successive,
continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably
disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the
electorate.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected. (Emphasis supplied.)
and is reiterated in Sec. 43 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, thusly:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
xxx xxx xxx
(b)No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. (Emphasis Ours.)
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the
following requisites must concur:
(1)that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and
(2)that he has fully served three consecutive terms. 31
Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the different factual milieus, has its complicated side. We shall
revisit and analyze the various holdings and relevant pronouncements of the Court on the matter.
As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43 (b) of the LGC, voluntary renunciation of the office by the
incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall NOT, in determining service for three consecutive terms, be considered an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. In Aldovino, Jr., however, the
Court stated the observation that the law "does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that
does not affect 'continuity of service for a full term' for purposes of the three-term limit rule." 32

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As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections, 33 the principle behind the three-term limit rule covers only consecutive terms and that
what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. Put a bit differently, an elective local official cannot, following his third
consecutive term, seek immediate reelection for a fourth term, 34 albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term for the same position after the
election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by reason of the prohibition.
There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs
when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a "voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official concerned was elected." This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the
three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary
interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.
While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-term limit rule has engendered a host of disputes resulting from the varying interpretations
applied on local officials who were elected and served for three terms or more, but whose terms or service was punctuated by what they view
as involuntary interruptions, thus entitling them to a, but what their opponents perceive as a proscribed, fourth term. Involuntary interruption is
claimed to result from any of these events or causes: succession or assumption of office by operation of law, preventive suspension,
declaration of the defeated candidate as the winner in an election contest, declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an
election contest, proclamation of a non-candidate as the winner in a recall election, removal of the official by operation of law, and other
analogous causes.
This brings us to an examination of situations and jurisprudence wherein such consecutive terms were considered or not considered as
having been "involuntarily interrupted or broken."
(1)Assumption of Office by Operation of Law
In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr. 35 (1998) and Montebon v. Commission on Elections 36 (2008), the Court
delved on the effects of"assumption to office by operation of law" on the three-term limit rule. This contemplates a situation wherein an
elective local official fills by succession a higher local government post permanently left vacant due to any of the following
contingencies, i.e., when the supposed incumbent refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or
is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. 37
In Borja, Jr., Jose T. Capco, Jr. (Capco) was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On
September 2, 1989, Capco became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent mayor, Cesar Borja. Capco was then
elected and served as mayor for terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. When Capco expressed his intention to run again for the mayoralty
position during the 1998 elections, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was then also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco's disqualification for
violation of the three-term limit rule.
Finding for Capco, the Court held that for the disqualification rule to apply, "it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply." 38 There was, the Court ruled, no violation of the three-term limit, for Capco "was not elected to the office of the
mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law" 39when a permanent vacancy occurred in that office.
The Court arrived at a parallel conclusion in the case of Montebon. There, Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as
municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. However, in January 2004, or during his second term,
Montebon succeeded and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When Montebon filed his
certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor, a petition for disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule.
The Court ruled that Montebon's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an interruption of his continuity of service as
councilor. The Court emphasized that succession in local government office is by operation of law and as such, it is an involuntary
severance from office. Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office as vice-mayor, his
occupation of the higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his position as councilor.
(2)Recall Election
With reference to the effects of recall election on the continuity of service, Adormeo v. Commission on Elections 40 (2002) and the
aforementioned case of Socrates(2002) provide guidance.
In Adormeo, Ramon Talaga, Jr. (Talaga) was elected and served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During
the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao's 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in
May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his
candidacy was challenged on the ground he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms for violation of the three term-limit rule.
The Court held therein that the remainder of Tagarao's term after the recall election during which Talaga served as mayor should not be
considered for purposes of applying the three-term limit rule. The Court emphasized that the continuity of Talaga's mayorship was
disrupted by his defeat during the 1998 elections.
A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in Socrates. The petitioners in that case assailed the COMELEC Resolution which declared
Edward Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in a recall election. It appeared that Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto
Princesa City for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit principle,
Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and eventually won. However,
midway into his term, Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the former's unexpired term as
mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorn's disqualification under the three-term limit rule.
In upholding Hagedorn's candidacy to run in the recall election, the Court ruled:
. . . After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of
September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates.
During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the

Page | 29

continuity of Hagedorn's service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal
prohibition. 41
The Court likewise emphasized in Socrates that "an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term [and, hence], [a]ny subsequent
election, like recall election, is no longer covered . . . ."42
(3)Conversion of a Municipality into a City
On the other hand, the conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute an interruption of the incumbent official's
continuity of service. The Court said so in Latasa v. Commission on Elections 43 (2003).
Latasa is cast against the ensuing backdrop: Arsenio A. Latasa was elected and served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur
for terms 1992-1995, 1995-1998, and 1998-2001. During his third term, Digos was converted into a component city, with the corresponding
cityhood law providing the holdover of elective officials. When Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy as mayor for the 2001 elections, the
Court declared Latasa as disqualified to run as mayor of Digos City for violation of the three-term limit rule on the basis of the following
ratiocination:
This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has
been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal
mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short
period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the
local government unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of
Digos. (Emphasis supplied.)
(4)Period of Preventive Suspension
In 2009, in the case Aldovino Jr., the Court espoused the doctrine that the period during which a local elected official is under
preventive suspension cannot be considered as an interruption of the continuity of his service. The Court explained why so:
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be
considered an interruption that allows an elective official's stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive
suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office
although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension
period. The best indicator of the suspended official's continuity in office is the absence of a permanent
replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists. 44 (Emphasis supplied.)
(5)Election Protest
With regard to the effects of an election protest vis- -vis the three-term limit rule, jurisprudence presents a more differing picture. The
Court's pronouncements inLonzanida v. Commission on Elections 45 (1999), Ong v. Alegre 46 (2006), Rivera III v. Commission on
Elections 47 (2007) and Dizon v. Commission on Elections 48 (2009), all protest cases, are illuminating.
In Lonzanida, Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995
and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and then
by COMELEC null and void on the ground of failure of elections. On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998
elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued. Lonzanida's opponent assumed
office for the remainder of the term. In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli,
filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served three consecutive terms in the same post. The Court,
citingBorja Jr., reiterated the two (2) conditions which must concur for the three-term limit to apply: "1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms." 49
In view of Borja, Jr., the Court ruled that the foregoing requisites were absent in the case of Lonzanida. The Court held that Lonzanida
cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections since his assumption of office as mayor "cannot be
deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation." And as a corollary point, the Court stated that
Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term having been ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term, a
situation which amounts to an involuntary relinquishment of office.
This Court deviated from the ruling in Lonzanida in Ong v. Alegre 50 owing to a variance in the factual situations attendant.
In that case, Francis Ong (Ong) was elected and served as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for terms 1995-1998, 1998-2001, and
2001-2004. During the 1998 mayoralty elections, or during his supposed second term, the COMELEC nullified Ong's proclamation on the
postulate that Ong lost during the 1998 elections. However, the COMELEC's decision became final and executory on July 4, 2001, when
Ong had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the
municipality of San Vicente. In 2004, Ong filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position as mayor, which his opponent opposed for
violation of the three-term limit rule.
Ong invoked the ruling in Lonzanida and argued that he could not be considered as having served as mayor from 1998-2001 because he
was not duly elected to the post and merely assumed office as a "presumptive winner." Dismissing Ong's argument, the Court held that his
assumption of office as mayor for the term 1998-2001 constitutes "service for the full term" and hence, should be counted for purposes of the
three-term limit rule. The Court modified the conditions stated in Lonzanida in the sense that Ong's service was deemed and counted as
service for a full term because Ong's proclamation was voided only after the expiry of the term. The Court noted that the COMELEC decision
which declared Ong as not having won the 1998 elections was "without practical and legal use and value" promulgated as it was after the
contested term has expired. The Court further reasoned:
Petitioner [Francis Ong's] contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation as the duly
elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous

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exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full
term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean
that Alegre would under the three-term rule beconsidered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably
meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in
due course after an election. 51 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court did not apply the ruling in Lonzanida and ruled that the case of Ong was different, to wit:
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of
the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election", and, as a consequence
thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office
of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary
severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of
service. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)
Ong's slight departure from Lonzanida would later find reinforcement in the consolidated cases of Rivera III v. Commission on
Elections 53 and Dee v. Morales. 54Therein, Morales was elected mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the following consecutive terms: 19951998, 1998-2001 and 2001-2004. In relation to the 2004 elections, Morales again ran as mayor of the same town, emerged as garnering the
majority votes and was proclaimed elective mayor for term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. A petition for quo warranto was later
filed against Morales predicated on the ground that he is ineligible to run for a "fourth" term, having served as mayor for three consecutive
terms. In his answer, Morales averred that his supposed 1998-2001 term cannot be considered against him, for, although he was proclaimed
by the Mabalacat board of canvassers as elected mayor vis- -vis the 1998 elections and discharged the duties of mayor until June 30,
2001, his proclamation was later nullified by the RTC of Angeles City and his closest rival, Anthony Dee, proclaimed the duly elected mayor.
Pursuing his point, Morales parlayed the idea that he only served as a mere caretaker.
The Court found Morales' posture untenable and held that the case of Morales presents a factual milieu similar with Ong, not
with Lonzanida. For ease of reference, the proclamation of Francis Ong, in Ong, was nullified, but after he, like Morales, had served the
three-year term from the start to the end of the term. Hence, the Court concluded that Morales exceeded the three-term limit rule, to wit:
Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He
served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the
RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as
held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any
break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve
(12) continuous years. 55 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court ruled in Rivera that the fact of being belatedly ousted, i,e., after the expiry of the term, cannot constitute an interruption in Morales'
service of the full term; neither can Morales, as he argued, be considered merely a "caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto officer" for
purposes of applying the three-term limit rule.
In a related 2009 case of Dizon v. Commission on Elections, 56 the Court would again find the same Mayor Morales as respondent in a
disqualification proceeding when he ran again as a mayoralty candidate during the 2007 elections for a term ending June 30, 2010. Having
been unseated from his post by virtue of this Court's ruling inRivera, Morales would argue this time around that the three-term limit rule was
no longer applicable as to his 2007 mayoralty bid. This time, the Court ruled in his favor, holding that for purposes of the 2007 elections, the
three-term limit rule was no longer a disqualifying factor as against Morales. The Court wrote:
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales' involuntary severance from office with respect to the 20042007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to
an interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was
effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayor's office of our decision. The vice mayor
assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the
office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales' continuity of
service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. 57 (Emphasis supplied)
To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption, viz.:
1.When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession
under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as
contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term
limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said
position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).
2.An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth term,
but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the official's service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the
end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).
3.The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent
official's continuity of service (Latasa).
4.Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer's continued stay and entitlement to the office remain
unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).

Page | 31

5.When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election
protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office had
the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida andDizon). The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of
the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of
service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6.When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official had served the full term for said office,
then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full
service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the
expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).
The Case of Abundo
Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC erred in uniformly ruling that he had already served three consecutive terms and is, thus,
barred by the constitutional three-term limit rule to run for the current 2010-2013 term. In gist, Abundo arguments run thusly:
1.Aldovino, Jr.is not on all fours with the present case as the former dealt with preventive suspension which does not interrupt the continuity
of service of a term;
2.Aldovino, Jr.recognizes that the term of an elected official can be interrupted so as to remove him from the reach of the constitutional threeterm limitation;
3.The COMELEC misinterpreted the meaning of "term" in Aldovino, Jr. by its reliance on a mere portion of the Decision and not on the
unified logic in the disquisition;
4.Of appropriate governance in this case is the holding in Lonzanida 58 and Rivera III v. Commission on Elections. 59
5.The COMELEC missed the point when it ruled that there was no interruption in the service of Abundo since what he considered as an
"interruption" of his 2004-2007 term occurred before his term started; and
6.To rule that the term of the protestee (Torres) whose proclamation was adjudged invalid was interrupted while that of the protestant
(Abundo) who was eventually proclaimed winner was not so interrupted is at once absurd as it is illogical.
Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC counter that the ratio decidendi of Aldovino, Jr. finds application in the instant case.
The COMELEC ruled that Abundo did not lose title to the office as his victory in the protest case confirmed his entitlement to said office and
he was only unable to temporarily discharge the functions of the office during the pendency of the election protest.
We note that this present case of Abundo deals with the effects of an election protest, for which the rulings in Lonzanida, Ong,
Rivera and Dizon appear to be more attuned than the case of Aldovino Jr., the interrupting effects of the imposition of a preventive
suspension being the very lis mota in the Aldovino, Jr. case. But just the same, We find that Abundo's case presents a different factual
backdrop.
Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases wherein the individuals subject of disqualification were candidates who lost in the
election protest and each declared loser during the elections, Abundo was the winner during the election protest and was declared the
rightful holder of the mayoralty post. Unlike Mayor Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who were both unseated toward the end of their
respective terms, Abundo was the protestant who ousted his opponent and had assumed the remainder of the term.
Notwithstanding, We still find this Court's pronouncements in the past as instructive, and consider several doctrines established from the
1998 case of Borja, Jr. up to the most recent case of Aldovino Jr. in 2009, as potent aids in arriving at this Court's conclusion.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the "monopolization of political power" and prevent elected officials
from breeding "proprietary interest in their position" 60 but also to "enhance the people's freedom of choice." 61 In the words of Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza, "while people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of power may bring about, care should be taken that
their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed." 62
In the present case, the Court finds Abundo's case meritorious and declares that the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres,
was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo's case from the ambit of the
three-term limit rule.
It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for the 2004 election for the term starting July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, was the duly elected
mayor. Otherwise how explain his victory in his election protest against Torres and his consequent proclamation as duly elected mayor.
Accordingly, the first requisite for the application of the disqualification rule based on the three-term limit that the official has been elected is
satisfied.
This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not Abundo had served for "three consecutive terms," as the phrase is juridically
understood, as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes immediately before the 2010 national and local elections. Subsumed to this issue is of course
the question of whether or not there was an effective involuntary interruption during the three three-year periods, resulting in the disruption of
the continuity of Abundo's mayoralty.
The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007 term.
There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his
favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one
year and one month. Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong inOng and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able
to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.
A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals, 63 means, in a legal sense, "a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes
that an officer may hold an office." 64 It also means the "time during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes
the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another." 65 It is the period of time during which a duly elected official has

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title to and can serve the functions of an elective office. From paragraph (a) of Sec. 43, RA 7160, 66 the term for local elected officials is
three (3) years starting from noon of June 30 of the first year of said term.
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly
claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor
serve the functions of the said elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right
to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office
and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May
2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected
officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually
served less.
Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo's opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an
involuntary interruption ofAbundo's continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be
considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold. 67
The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the concepts of interruption of service and voluntary renunciation of
service. The wordinterruption means temporary cessation, intermission or suspension. 68 To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or
prevent. 69 When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to the continuance of the
service by the concerned elected official by effectively cutting short the service of a term or giving a hiatus in the occupation of the elective
office. On the other hand, the word "renunciation" connotes the idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to give up,
abandon, decline or resign. 70 Voluntary renunciation of the office by an elective local official would thus mean to give up or abandon the title
to the office and to cut short the service of the term the concerned elected official is entitled to.
In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC en banc, applying Aldovino, Jr., 71 held:
It must be stressed that involuntary interruption of service which jurisprudence deems an exception to the three-term
limit rule, implies that the service of the term has begun before it was interrupted. Here, the respondent did not
lose title to the office. As the assailed Resolution states:
In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to have lost his title to the office. On the contrary, he
actively sought entitlement to the office when he lodged the election protest case. And respondentappellant's victory in the said case is a final confirmation that he was validly elected for the mayoralty post
of Viga, Catanduanes in 2004-2007. At most, respondent-appellant was only unable to temporarily
discharge the functions of the office to which he was validly elected during the pendency of the
election protest, but he never lost title to the said office. 72 (Emphasis added.)
The COMELEC's Second Division, on the other hand, pronounced that the actual length of service by the public official in a given term is
immaterial by reckoning said service for the term in the application of the three-term limit rule, thus:
As emphasized in the case of Aldovino, "this formulation no more than three consecutive terms is a clear
command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule." Therefore we cannot subscribe to the argument that since
respondent Abundo served only a portion of the term, his 2004-2007 "term" should not be considered for purposes
of the application of the three term limit rule. When the framers of the Constitution drafted and incorporated the three
term limit rule, it is clear that reference is to the term, not the actual length of the service the public official may
render. Therefore, one's actual service of term no matter how long or how short is immaterial. 73
In fine, the COMELEC ruled against Abundo on the theory that the length of the actual service of the term is immaterial in his case as he was
only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor.
The COMELEC's case disposition and its heavy reliance on Aldovino, Jr. do not commend themselves for concurrence. The Court cannot
simply find its way clear to understand the poll body's determination that Abundo was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as
mayor during the pendency of the election protest.
As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired
portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo's full term has
been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the
term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term.
This is what happened in the instant case. It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his election
protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was
occupying the mayoralty seat. In other words, for almost two years or from July 1, 2004 the start of the term until May 9, 2006 or during
which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen warming his heels while awaiting the outcome
of his protest. Hence, even if declared later as having the right to serve the elective position from July 1, 2004, such declaration would not
erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor's office and, in fact, had no legal right to said
position.
Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to respondent's cause of action, or to COMELEC's resolution against Abundo. In Aldovino Jr., the
Court succinctly defines what temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective office means, thus:
On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if
involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title
to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred
from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law. 74
We rule that the above pronouncement on preventive suspension does not apply to the instant case. Verily, it is erroneous to say
that Abundo merely was temporarily unable or disqualified to exercise the functions of an elective post. For one, during the intervening period
of almost two years, reckoned from the start of the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office

Page | 33

as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to assume and serve such elective office. For
another, not having been declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot plausibly lose a
title which, in the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes, even if the belated declaration in the election protest
accords him title to the elective office from the start of the term, Abundo was not entitled to the elective office until the election protest was
finally resolved in his favor.
Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and effective interruption of his service, until he assumed the
office and served barely over a year of the remaining term. At this juncture, We observe the apparent similarities of Mayor Abundo's case
with the cases of Mayor Talaga in Adormeo and Mayor Hagedorn in Socrates as Mayors Talaga and Hagedorn were not proclaimed winners
since they were non-candidates in the regular elections. They were proclaimed winners during the recall elections and clearly were not able
to fully serve the terms of the deposed incumbent officials. Similar to their cases where the Court deemed their terms as involuntarily
interrupted, Abundo also became or was a private citizen during the period over which his opponent was serving as mayor. If in Lonzanida,
the Court ruled that there was interruption in Lonzanida's service because of his subsequent defeat in the election protest, then with more
reason, Abundo's term for 2004-2007 should be declared interrupted since he was not proclaimed winner after the 2004 elections and was
able to assume the office and serve only for a little more than a year after winning the protest.
As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as interruption of service, the "law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective
official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local
government unit." 75 Applying the said principle in the present case, there is no question that during the pendency of the election
protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the good people of Viga, Catanduanes. Consequently, the period during
which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period or break in his service because, as earlier stated, prior to the
judgment in the election protest, it was Abundo's opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid
proclamation.
As a final note, We reiterate that Abundo's case differs from other cases involving the effects of an election protest because
while Abundo was, in the final reckoning,the winning candidate, he was the one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his
constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was a victim of an imperfect election system. While admittedly the Court does not possess the
mandate to remedy such imperfections, the Constitution has clothed it with enough authority to establish a fortress against the injustices it
may bring.
In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling would work damage and cause grave injustice to Abundo an elected official who was
belatedly declared as the winner and assumed office for only a short period of the term. If in the cases of Lonzanida and Dizon, this Court
ruled in favor of a losing candidate or the person who was adjudged not legally entitled to hold the contested public office but held it
anyway We find more reason to rule in favor of a winning candidate-protestant who, by popular vote, deserves title to the public office but
whose opportunity to hold the same was halted by an invalid proclamation.
Also, more than the injustice that may be committed against Abundo is the injustice that may likewise be committed against the people of
Viga, Catanduanes by depriving them of their right to choose their leaders. Like the framers of the Constitution, We bear in mind that We
"cannot arrogate unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want" 76 and hence, should, as much as possible, "allow the people to
exercise their own sense of proportion and rely on their own strength to curtail the power when it overreaches itself." 77 For democracy
draws strength from the choice the people make which is the same choice We are likewise bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED.Accordingly, the assailed February 8, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on
Elections Second Division and May 10, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in
the May 2010 elections and is accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position. Withal, Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O.
Cervantes are ordered to immediately vacate the positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively, and shall revert to
their original positions of Vice-Mayor and First Councilor, respectively, upon receipt of this Decision.
The TRO issued by the Court on July 3, 2012 is hereby LIFTED.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen,
JJ., concur.
||| (Abundo, Sr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201716, January 08, 2013)

SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N. TALABONG, vs COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS and wilfredo asilo
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for
purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of
Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?
The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an
effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service
for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.

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[1]

The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
THE ANTECEDENTS
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three
consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September
2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days
in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the
Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished
his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners
Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due
course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had
served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its
Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo
failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan
had ordered.
The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Divisions ruling in its October 7,
2008 Resolution; hence, the PRESENT PETITION raising the followingISSUES:
1.

Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the

three-term limit rule; and

2.

Whether preventive suspension is considered

contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160

involuntary

renunciation

as

Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of whether Asilos preventive suspension constituted an
th
interruption that allowed him to run for a 4 term.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
General Considerations
The present case is not the first before this Court on the three-term limit provision of the
Constitution, but is the first on the effect of preventive suspension on the continuity of an elective officials
term. To be sure, preventive suspension, as an interruption in the term of an elective public official, has
[2]
been mentioned as an example inBorja v. Commission on Elections. Doctrinally, however, Borja is not
a controlling ruling; it did not deal with preventive suspension, but with the application of the three-term
rule on the term that an elective official acquired by succession.

a.

The Three-term Limit Rule:

The Constitutional Provision Analyzed

Page | 35

Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than threeconsecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.

Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any difference in
wording does not assume any significance in this case.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an
elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the
rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a term as a period of time three years during which an
[3]
official has title to office and can serve. Appari v. Court of Appeals, a Resolution promulgated
on November 28, 2007, succinctly discusses what a term connotes, as follows:
The word term in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which
the law describes that an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term
of office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of the officers
term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a
public officer must ipso factocease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural
frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the
terms for which he was elected or appointed. [Emphasis supplied].
[4]

A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, reiterated that [T]he term means the time during which
the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another.
The limitation under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. This formulation no more than three
consecutive terms is a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no
exact indication of what to serve. . . three consecutive terms exactly connotes, the meaning is clear
reference is to the term, not to the service that a public official may render. In other words, the limitation
refers to the term.
The second branch relates to the provisions express initiative to prevent any circumvention of
the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it expressly states that voluntary
renunciation of office shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected. This declaration complements the term limitation mandated by the first
branch.
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that voluntary
renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect continuity of service for a full
term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. It is a pure declaratory statement of what does not serve as
an interruption of service for a full term, but the phrase voluntary renunciation, by itself, is not without
significance in determining constitutional intent.
The word renunciation carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce is to give
[5]
up, abandon, decline, or resign. It is an act that emanates from its author, as contrasted to an act that
operates from the outside. Read with the definition of a term in mind, renunciation, as mentioned under
the second branch of the constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that results in cutting short the
term, i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive word voluntary linked together with renunciation

Page | 36

signifies an act of surrender based on the surenderees own freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of
title to office by conscious choice. In the context of the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not
considered an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to avoid the application of the
term limitation.
The following exchanges in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the term
voluntary renunciation shed further light on the extent of the term voluntary renunciation:
MR. MAAMBONG. Could I address the clarificatory question to the
Committee? This term voluntary renunciation does not appear in Section 3 [of Article
VI]; it also appears in Section 6 [of Article VI].
MR DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG. It is also a recurring phrase all over the Constitution. Could
the Committee please enlighten us exactly what voluntary renunciation mean? Is this
akin to abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE. Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent
the restriction by merely resigning at any given time on the second term.
MR. MAAMBONG. Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation
is more general than abandonment and resignation?
MR. DAVIDE. It is more general, more embracing.

[6]

From this exchange and Commissioner Davides expansive interpretation of the term voluntary
renunciation, the framers intent apparently was to close all gaps that an elective official may seize to
defeat the three-term limit rule, in the way that voluntary renunciation has been rendered unavailable as a
mode of defeating the three-term limit rule. Harking back to the text of the constitutional provision, we
note further that Commissioner Davides view is consistent with the negative formulation of the first
branch of the provision and the inflexible interpretation that it suggests.
This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances
surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a high priority
constitutional objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor
sacrificed for, values of less than equal constitutional worth. We view preventive suspension vis-vis term limitation with this firm mindset.
b.

Relevant Jurisprudence on the

Three-term Limit Rule

Other than the above-cited materials, jurisprudence best gives us a lead into the concepts within
the provisions contemplation, particularly on the interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
that it speaks of.
[7]

Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections presented the question of whether the disqualification on

the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the
proclamation as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a
final and executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification
(viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms) were not present. In so ruling,
we said:
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time

Page | 37

respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident
in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in
the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from
office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before
the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did
not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. [Emphasis supplied]
Our intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or to be exact, loss of title, that
renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.
[8]

[9]

Ong v. Alegre and Rivera v. COMELEC, like Lonzanida, also involved the issue of whether
there had been a completed term for purposes of the three-term limit disqualification. These cases,
however, presented an interesting twist, as their final judgments in the electoral contest came after the
term of the contested office had expired so that the elective officials in these cases were never effectively
unseated.
Despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled to the office (and thus was never validly elected),
the Court concluded that there was nevertheless an election and service for a full term in contemplation of
the three-term rule based on the following premises: (1) the final decision that the third-termer lost the
election was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the
contested office had expired; and (2) the official assumed and continuously exercised the functions of the
office from the start to the end of the term. The Court noted in Ong the absurdity and the deleterious
effect of a contrary view that the official (referring to the winner in the election protest) would, under the
three-term rule, be considered to have served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest
ruling, when another actually served the term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an
election. This factual variation led the Court to rule differently from Lonzanida.
In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected the theory that the official who finally lost the
election contest was merely a caretaker of the office or a mere de facto officer. The Court obeserved
that Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when an official
fully served in the same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as caretaker or de facto officer,
he exercised the powers and enjoyed the perquisites of the office that enabled him to stay on
indefinitely.
Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-term limitation because of what
they directly imply. Although the election requisite was not actually present, the Court still gave full effect
to the three-term limitation because of the constitutional intent to strictly limit elective officials to service
for three terms. By so ruling, the Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit
rule. Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation
rather than its exception.
[10]

Adormeo v. Commission on Elections dealt with the effect of recall on the three-term limit
disqualification. The case presented the question of whether the disqualification applies if the official lost
in the regular election for the supposed third term, but was elected in a recall election covering that
term. The Court upheld the COMELECs ruling that the official was not elected for three (3) consecutive
terms. The Court reasoned out that for nearly two years, the official was a private citizen; hence, the
continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the election for the third term.
[11]

Socrates v. Commission on Elections also tackled recall vis--vis the three-term limit
disqualification. Edward Hagedorn served three full terms as mayor. As he was disqualified to run for a
fourth term, he did not participate in the election that immediately followed his third term. In this election,
the petitioner Victorino Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor. Less than 1 years after Mayor
Socrates assumed the functions of the office, recall proceedings were initiated against him, leading to the

Page | 38

call for a recall election. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election, but
Socrates sought his disqualification on the ground that he (Hagedorn) had fully served three terms prior to
the recall election and was therefore disqualified to run because of the three-term limit rule. We decided
in Hagedorns favor, ruling that:
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for
the
same
office
following
the
end
of
the
third
consecutive
term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no
longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local
officials, the question asked was whether there would be no further election after three
terms, or whether there would be no immediate reelection after three terms.
x x x x
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth
term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a
subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after
the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the
third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the
third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate
reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of
[12]
office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.
[13]

Latasa v. Commission on Elections presented the novel question of whether a municipal

mayor who had fully served for three consecutive terms could run as city mayor in light of the intervening
conversion of the municipality into a city. During the third term, the municipality was converted into a city;
the cityhood charter provided that the elective officials of the municipality shall, in a holdover capacity,
continue to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials. The
Court ruled that the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal
mayor into a local government post different from the office of the city mayor the territorial jurisdiction of
the city was the same as that of the municipality; the inhabitants were the same group of voters who
elected the municipal mayor for 3 consecutive terms; and they were the same inhabitants over whom the
municipal mayor held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. The Court said:
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically
included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern
them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power
over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same
office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served
for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent
of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three
consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly
holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a
total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the
[14]
Constitution, if not abhorred by it.

Page | 39

Latasa instructively highlights, after a review of Lonzanida, Adormeo and Socrates, that no threeterm limit violation results if a rest period or break in the service between terms or tenure in a given
elective post intervened. In Lonzanida, the petitioner was a private citizen with no title to any elective
office for a few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private
respondents lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months, respectively. Thus, these cases
establish that the law contemplates a complete break from office during which the local elective official
steps down and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a
particular local government unit.
Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v. Commission on
[15]
Elections, where the highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the position of vice-mayor by
operation of law. The question posed when he subsequently ran for councilor was whether his
assumption as vice-mayor was an interruption of his term as councilor that would place him outside the
operation of the three-term limit rule. We ruled that an interruption had intervened so that he could again
run as councilor. This result seemingly deviates from the results in the cases heretofore discussed since
the elective official continued to hold public office and did not become a private citizen during the
interim. The common thread that identifies Montebon with the rest, however, is that the elective
official vacated the office of councilor and assumed the higher post of vice-mayor by operation of
law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor an interruption that effectively placed him outside the
ambit of the three-term limit rule.
c.

Conclusion Based on Law

and Jurisprudence

From all the above, we conclude that the interruption of a term exempting an elective official
from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The
elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective
interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to
be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than three
consecutive terms, using voluntary renunciation as an example and standard of what does not
constitute an interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective
interruption of service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability or
disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered
an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an
effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising
the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on
to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during an office
holders term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons established
by law. Of course, the term failure to serve cannot be used once the right to office is lost; without the
right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is really lost.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X both by structure and
substance fixes an elective officials term of office and limits his stay in office to three consecutive terms
as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a
circumvention. The provision should be read in the context of interruption of term, not in the context of
interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position. The voluntary
renunciation it speaks of refers only to the elective officials voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of
title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary cessation of the exercise of power or authority that
may occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension being only one of them. To quote Latasa v.
[16]
Comelec:

Page | 40

Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps
down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the
territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. [Emphasis supplied].

Preventive Suspension and

the Three-Term Limit Rule

a. Nature of Preventive Suspension

[17]

Preventive suspension whether under the Local Government Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
[18]
[19]
Practices Act, or the Ombudsman Act is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of an
official who have been charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily indicates
the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code when the evidence of guilt
is strong and given the gravity of the offense, there is a possibility that the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
other evidence. Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed after a valid information
(that requires a finding of probable cause) has been filed in court, while under the Ombudsman Act, it is
imposed when, in the judgment of the Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is strong; and (a) the charge
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; or (b) the
charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing
the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title
to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled conditions
and gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to the interests of the individual office
holder. Even then, protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary prohibition on the exercise of
the functions of the officials office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the
preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no
position is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened
to Asilo.
That the imposition of preventive suspension can be abused is a reality that is true in the exercise
of all powers and prerogative under the Constitution and the laws. The imposition of preventive
[20]
suspension, however, is not an unlimited power; there are limitations built into the laws themselves that
the courts can enforce when these limitations are transgressed, particularly when grave abuse of
discretion is present. In light of this well-defined parameters in the imposition of preventive suspension,
we should not view preventive suspension from the extreme situation that it can totally deprive an
elective office holder of the prerogative to serve and is thus an effective interruption of an election
officials term.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective officials
service in office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned above, preventive suspension involves
protection of the service and of the people being served, and prevents the office holder from temporarily
exercising the power of his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an elective official
has served his three terms in office without any break. Its companion concept interruption of a term on
the other hand, requires loss of title to office. If preventive suspension and term limitation or interruption
have any commonality at all, this common point may be with respect to the discontinuity of service that
may occur in both. But even on this point, they merely run parallel to each other and never

Page | 41

intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render service during an
unbroken term; in the context of term limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been
a break in the term.
b. Preventive Suspension and
the Intent of the Three-Term
Limit Rule

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension
should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three
terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official
continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the
office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is
the absence of apermanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no
vacancy exists.
To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to
close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the
temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of term that the constitutional
provision contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary some of them
personal and some of them by operation of law that may temporarily prevent an elective office holder
from exercising the functions of his office in the way that preventive suspension does. A serious extended
illness, inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some
involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the functions of his office for a time
without forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery of
service for a time within a term. Adopting such interruption of actual service as the standard to determine
effective interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at least the possibility of confusion in
implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual service may be interrupted in
the course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the enforcement of the three-term limit
rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-sawing determination of what an effective interruption is.
c.

Preventive Suspension and

Voluntary Renunciation

Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a voluntary
act on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may have voluntarily
committed the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From this perspective, preventive
suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither
does it contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely involves the temporary
incapacity to perform the service that an elective office demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension is
by its very nature the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and
involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the office. The easy conclusion therefore is that
they are, by nature, different and non-comparable.
But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the more important
consideration of how they affect the three-term limit rule.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render service, is
disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a mode
of circumventing the three-term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and
should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we
shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a

Page | 42

preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does not require
relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an easily fabricated
administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed. In
this sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a
circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly disallows as an
interruption.
Conclusion
To recapitulate, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed
preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective officials
term. Thus, the COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
when it granted due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing,
the COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
its action was a refusal to perform a positive duty required by no less than the Constitution and was one
[21]
undertaken outside the contemplation of law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly NULLIFY the
assailed COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run,
and perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth term. Costs against private
respondent Asilo.
SO ORDERED.

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., v. COMELEC, ET. AL., G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013

Political Law; The three-term limit rule for elective local officials; Elements. To constitute a disqualification
to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the
following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms;
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the different factual milieus has
its complicated side.
In the instant case, the Court revisited and analyzed the various holdings and relevant pronouncements
of the Court on the matter.
The Supreme Court further held that there has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive
terms of the official after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not
seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a
voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. This
qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term limit
rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished
from involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its
secretary-general, MOHAMMAD
OMAR
FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.

Page | 43

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS
LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; C
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our
people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves,
empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make
the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but
active participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and
groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate
in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism
into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.
1
3785 issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved
the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list
elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list
system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political
parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by
sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made
as to the status and capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and
night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal
and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in
order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus
Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and processes
observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the
2
Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001."
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated
December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating
their intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and
organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with
Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their
Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and
organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No.
3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional
representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or
sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a
need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level,

Page | 44

keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the
3
sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions."
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the
names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and
that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the
4
said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. On
April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration
5
and Nomination against some of herein respondents.
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file
6
Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, but
7
subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion
8
merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a
9
Petition before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec
10
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, the Court directed respondents to
11
comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice.
12

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, docketed as GR No.
147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9,
13
2001, the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in
the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the
parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting
and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner
therein, until further orders of the Court.
14

Thereafter, Comments on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the
Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to
15
submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days.
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is
there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented'
sectors and organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
16
Resolution No. 3785."
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will
determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in

Page | 45

the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified
in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are
17
other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. The Office of the Solicitor
General argues that petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification
or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No.
18
19
3307-A dated November 9, 2000.
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party20
list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution and the Rules of Court, such challenge may
be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc;
hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d),
21
Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation
22
of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. The Comelec, however, did not
act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from
this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the
urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it.
But a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
has made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any
23
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding
the presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is
24
involved, and in case of urgency." Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and
with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of
Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court
must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
25
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules."
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue
involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when
26
the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available."
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the
27
party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." For its part, Petitioner
28
Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major political parties." On the other hand, the Office of the
Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow

Page | 46

political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open
29
to all "registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations."
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be
disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered
under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except
for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall
not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
30
accordance with law."
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that
the participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,
31
32
UNIDO, Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao." This was also clear from the following
33
exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople:
"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban,
PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the
system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district
34
elections to win a seat in Congress. He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the
past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each
of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six
representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is
essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is
"either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines
"political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public
office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the partylist system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
"x x x

Page | 47

"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall
not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political
party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties
or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional
Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our
people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first
day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine
35
power to our people in the legislature."
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with
phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt
in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory
policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack welldefined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
provide the simplest scheme possible."

Page | 48

The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the
Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino
citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and
of
"lack well-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because
the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or
oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as
exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or
party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned
36
in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral
group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to
those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to
those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves.
Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x,
to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be
37
applied according to its express terms.
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are
enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition
for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list
system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that

Page | 49

the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates
the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a
fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in
connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which
they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or
38
specialized by those in immediate association.
The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No.
7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented
39
sectors of society." In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section
40
6 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an
organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could participate in the
41
party-list elections.
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We
stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of
Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized
and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and
overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be
appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly
disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In
42
contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan admitted during the Oral Argument
that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as
43
representatives of their respective sectors.
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political
power more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily
emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and
amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow
in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them
not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the
specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the
larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and
ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the
past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement to
come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the last elections.
The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice
vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district
elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the
House of Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who
normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the

Page | 50

remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the
congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
44

As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to enhance
the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives
45
through the simplest scheme possible. Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who
have never gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who
therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the
system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged sectors that have long dominated the
congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student
dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open
house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even
without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who
cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or
overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the partylist system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented,
contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the
underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended
beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are
neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear
state policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations
under the party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza,
are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their
deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to
ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that
the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
46
attained. In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear
and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the
47
true intent or purpose of the provision being construed.
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v.
48
Executive Secretary that "the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be
consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the
large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave
that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by
the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof."

Page | 51

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the
mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In
understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only
when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof
unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to
"enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no
need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event,
the framers' deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in
construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here.
Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear
policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list
system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the
non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the
Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of
49
discretion. Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as
50
they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the
major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP on the ground that under
Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major
political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of
getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We note,
however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of
district representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under
Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether
respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary
qualifications to participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),
because "it is a government entity using government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is
51
not a trier of facts. It is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual
allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that
they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right
to participate in and be elected under the party-list system.

Page | 52

Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the
party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to
lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its
work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a
conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House
of Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are
political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties
admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party
must claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."

52

53

Third, in view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong,
which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious
sector may not be represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is
demonstrated by the following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members and
supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of
those parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established
religious faiths, will that also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the
54
Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction."
The following discussion is also pertinent:
"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of
course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community
sector to represent their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic
55
Church, the Protestant Church et cetera."

Page | 53

Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be
56
57
registered." The prohibition was explained by a member of the Constitutional Commission in this wise:
"[T] he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any
prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of
58
a religious sect as a political party."
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious
purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
59
the constituency in which it has registered."
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to
comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that
the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives." A party or
an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be
a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the
government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not
60
only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of
Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so.
Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able
to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day
of the election.

Page | 54

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty
(30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be
Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban
poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give
genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must
likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the
61
nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x."
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in
life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have
less in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to
the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an
invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents
that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the
electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the
substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of
enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941
are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on
the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the
Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately
conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the
guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the
last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that
appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives.
The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from
notice hereof.1wphi1.nt
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any
winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have
complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Page | 55

SO ORDERED.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

by

its

President,

Mr.

Alan

Igot, Petitioner,

The Issues
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by
cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; and second,
whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
49
Elections (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
The Courts Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of
this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional,
and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied
by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for
the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in
the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the partylist system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in
50
legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. The voter elects two
representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his
or her party-list group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C

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Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or
other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party51
list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." The constitutional
provisions on the party-list system should be read in light of the following discussion among its framers:
MR. MONSOD: x x x.
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is not
synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the
dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. In making the proposal on
the party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely cited by Commissioner Bacani of
which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean
that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in
those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will notice in
Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals,
business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were
identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had in
trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or
include other sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included
which went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting
the law become because when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in the
enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the farmers and
the laborers. These days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor may be
a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a
farmer" so he would be included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the
Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid
these problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats
for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will
then register and present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially, under the
party list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the
representative of his legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party
or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in the Assembly? And here will be attached a
list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are
entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,
Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers'
party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the
COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization one
does not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a party and count the votes
and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or
coalition.
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be for the
party list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party
can get out of these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list of 15 names. They
have to submit these names because these nominees have to meet the minimum qualifications of a
Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets the
percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a

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womens party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and
the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000
nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate
legislative districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason
why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest group, should not
have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three or four labor groups,
they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one
percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a
common interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and,
therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time
making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance
to have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the constituency to
win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely,
they will have votes on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain
groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But
they were always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would
not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party list system.
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party list
system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors and
party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have to
mention sectors because the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can be sectoral
parties within the party list system.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system
because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x
x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That
is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any
single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties.
My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under
the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned
can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can
also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats
that we are allocating under the party list system.

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MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also
participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only
sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents
the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a
farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly
minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can
prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is
precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all
sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will
dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang
party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner
Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned
from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone,
UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor leader
or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of sectoral
representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?

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MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is really
organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political party may
submit a list of individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be
published to give individuals or organizations belonging to such sector the chance to present
evidence contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to question the claims of the
existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be conducted by the
COMELEC and shall be summary in character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this matter
52
are final and unappealable. (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only
sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a
part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta,
political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who
53
come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in the
House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties.
As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution
took off from two staunch positions the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the
20 per centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be
reserved to appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed
by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed
representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors would stunt their development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent
enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was
apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest
would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established political
parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when it banned the first five major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives from participating in
the party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with
the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort
towards a compromise that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized
sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list
system to candidates from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The majority
was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of
the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group
was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms
after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather and solidify
their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran
54
political groups. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead,
the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive
55
terms. There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected
the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly
intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in
legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of
votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the
entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that
could not compete in legislative district elections.

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The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both
sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which
states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the words
"national," and "regional," separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of
the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would
have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never their
intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the
party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the
three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are
separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations;
(2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional
parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties
or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list
system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to nonsectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for
sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of onehalf of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first
three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class
or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral
parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list system
prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

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Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of
which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the
most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who
share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No.
7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government." On the other
hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of
citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different
definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in
the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list
system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed
struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently
contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a
sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any
particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must
represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of
citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
56
and professionals." The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and
underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented,"

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not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth
may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in
advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require
national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or
cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration
of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious
purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized
and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 on
57
Declaration of Policy. Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos
belonging to the"marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies," to become members of the House of Representatives.
While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to "marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No.
7941 do not define or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and
underrepresented." On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are
"marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its specific
implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the
matter?

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The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that
are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party
must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party
either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector
represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must
"wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle
class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in the
58
low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly,
women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the
House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the
margins of society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats
in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multiparty system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and ideological
status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This
interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for
relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and
infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major political
parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined political
constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or
regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major
political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system
to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in
the House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of parties
under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and
the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy
of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to
the House of Representatives. "However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline,
that "the political party xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically
disqualified major political parties from participating in the party-list system. This inherent
inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the COMELECs refusal to register
sectoral wings officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing
practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list system,
even through their sectoral wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the basis of
party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from
59
participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. Thus, major political parties can participate in
subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list
elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their
sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose
members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies," will

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facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections
so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies." The participation of major
political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of
Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major
political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the
party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program
of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The
sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a
coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component parties
or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition
of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes a
special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able
to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day
of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term.1wphi1
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to
represent.In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either
belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in the
party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House
of Representatives." x x x.
xxxx

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Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.
xxxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious
purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government. x x x.
xxxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so.
Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write,
a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty
(30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)

Page | 66

In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In BANAT,
60
the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list elections, abandoning
even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that
major political parties can participate in party-list elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the party-list
system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political parties in
party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and
R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the
exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and
61
the law." The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion and
absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying
petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse of
discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate
the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the
COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT,
however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly,
even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare
that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
62
party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule that a party may appeal to this Court from
decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major
or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections
only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking
in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they

Page | 67

represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "welldefined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not
satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC
because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors
they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their
sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not
belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees
failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the
disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from
engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained.
Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should
be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted
Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners in the
printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for determination whether
petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this
Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have
been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are
remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register
under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters
prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for
this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
. [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow
of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the
existing order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson
[1]
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make
different choices choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may

Page | 68

shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different,
and the right to disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill
of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in
opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and demands of
morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is
an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox philosophical justifications about what is moral are
indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that
practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason
more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at
least, civilly.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the
[2]
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December
[3]
16, 2009 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The
case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act
[4]
(RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with
the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no
[5]
substantial membership base. OnAugust 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the
COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and underrepresented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that
LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are
constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by
[6]
this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national
membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of
[7]
governance.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division)
dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual
attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different
gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender.
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates
immorality which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their
women did change the natural use into that which is against nature: And
likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust

Page | 69

one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and
receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women ye are
indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds. (7.81) And we rained down on
them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who
indulged in sin and crime! (7:84) He said: O my Lord! Help Thou me against
people who do mischief (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as
indicated in the Petitions par. 6F: Consensual partnerships or relationships by
gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the
Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or
MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history
of Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license,
relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and
the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be complied
with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines
nuisance as Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property,
or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or
morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting
parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that
Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy are inexistent and void from the
beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent
shows as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and
indecent shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall
be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines
openly contrary to public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their
knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and the
owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other
place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being

Page | 70

understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes,

acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall
include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other
purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend
any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5)
are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies,
lawful orders, decrees and edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings,
sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral
doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the
elections.
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an
environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible
teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that older practicing homosexuals are a threat
to the youth. As an agency of the government, ours too is the States avowed duty under Section
[8]
13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.
[9]

When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed
Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three
commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer,
Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority
in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
I.

The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even
assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be
said that Ladlads expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list
system of electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to
represent its constituencies, then all representative organizations would have found themselves
into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is
not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons.
Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized
individuals whose interests are also the nations only that their interests have not been
brought to the attention of the nation because of their under representation. Until the time comes
when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender
identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list
system will remain just that.
II.

No substantial differentiation

Page | 71

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence,
courts do not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a special class
of individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally
protected fundamental right, and that nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable
intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations, as in the case of
race or religion or belief.
xxxx
Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is elevated,
there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will
remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all
citizens alike.
xxxx
IV. Public Morals
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious
practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious groups moral rules on Ladlad.
Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public
morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its
more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts
espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly
accepted moral norms.
V.

Legal Provisions

But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land.
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon Those who
shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals. It penalizes
immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows. Ang
Ladlad apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is clear from its Petitions paragraph
6F: Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age It is
further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex
with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the
Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks,
[10]
defies or disregards decency or morality x x x. These are all unlawful.

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions
and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the
issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced
that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of
[11]
COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010. Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a
[12]
Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment. Somewhat surprisingly, the
[13]
OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioners application. Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity
[14]
to fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own comment. The COMELEC, through its Law Department,
[15]
filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January 12,
2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and
[16]
desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.

Page | 72

Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to
[17]
Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention. The CHR opined that the denial of Ang
Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene.
[18]

On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene
[19]
on February 2, 2010.

which motion was granted

The Parties Arguments

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the
Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal
protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination
based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioners
application for registration since there was no basis for COMELECs allegations of immorality. It also opined that
LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a
separate classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioners freedom of speech, expression,
and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national
political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for
the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is
neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the
enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only
those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
[20]
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not
exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it
had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon
verification by its field personnel, it was shown that save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not
[21]
exist in almost all provinces in the country.
This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was not being truthful when it said that it
or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations

Page | 73

relating to the elections. Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners accreditation mentioned or even alluded
to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioners alleged nonexistence were already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best,
this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and a serious violation
of petitioners right to procedural due process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial
petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the
LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates
[22]
and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. Ang Ladlad also
represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of
the following LGBT networks:

Abra Gay Association

Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City
Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG)
Metro Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila
Naga City Gay Association Naga City
ONE BACARDI
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) Metro Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
[23]
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no
surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are
to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlads principal place of
business.

Page | 74

Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of nonexistence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as
a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The
difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads
Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
[24]
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
[25]
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause
for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead,
on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious
doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular
[26]
effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as
the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may
influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds
articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating
public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what
some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be
compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a
"compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions
upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly
disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result,
government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that
those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed
in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes
this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the
beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might
have a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be
considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a
religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them;
the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a
uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or
Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible
secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the
religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the
Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality.
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but
at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
[27]
compelling state interests.

Page | 75

Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads Petition

for Registration

Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct
may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC
argues:
Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of
LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is
recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in having
sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the
standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts
[28]
is in danger of losing its own existence.

We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals
themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this
censure religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or
distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not
seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these generally accepted public morals have not
[29]
been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the
OSG agrees that there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups members have committed or
[30]
are committing immoral acts. The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different
gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is
a great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be
penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the
[31]
straights and the gays. Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is
required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission
into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course,
do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and
sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered
detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of
intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal
reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of
morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment,
condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for
which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
[32]
judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of
violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on
purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to

Page | 76

further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that
the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible
act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides nor shall any person be
denied equal protection of the laws, courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on
[33]
classification. Equality, said Aristotle, consists in the same treatment of similar persons. The equal protection
clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is
[34]
enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect
class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government
[35]
[36]
end. In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, we declared that [i]n our
jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the rational basis test,
coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a
[37]
showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as
immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the
respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual
behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public
opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of an
unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal
protection clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute
to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than
disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same
interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State
intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to
LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar
as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and
homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs position that
[38]
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause. We are not prepared to
single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received
sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has
merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the
COMELEC made an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case.
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society
[39]
of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply held
[40]
convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the
public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every
moral discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their life
together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious
belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative
democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may

Page | 77

be proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the people
deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus,
when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely
reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median
groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it
specifies including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small not
only for a majority, however large but for each of us" the majority imposes upon itself a selfdenying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the
dissenting minorities.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this
freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any
restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state
interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the
COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message
or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It
follows that both expressions concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that
supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception that
[41]
homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct. European and
United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality grounds,
[42]
citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts. To the extent that there is
much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have
persuasive influence on the Courts analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free speech
doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular
expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were caused by something more than a mere
[43]
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant
human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may
campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and
the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas
that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper
opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or
[44]
unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population. A political group should not be hindered solely
because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying
[45]
everyone concerned. Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
[46]
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful,
offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their
supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are
morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as
far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the
community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be
that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court
and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal,

Page | 78

reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect
individual perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed
on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been
no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied.
[COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a
sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be
said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.
xxxx
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the
petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by
said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the
denial of Ang Ladlads petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly
nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally participate in public life through
engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject
[47]
to limitations imposed by law. x x x
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list
system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation
imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELECs action,
from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with
other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners
fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International Law

In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human
rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For
individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights
norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms
may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human rights.
In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral
participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee
to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.

Page | 79

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to
elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not
specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights
Committee has opined that the reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to include sexual
[48]
orientation. Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual
[49]
orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or
through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will
of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is
elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the
Right to Vote) as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take
part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access
to public service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires
States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens
have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic
government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the
Covenant.
xxxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective
office ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on
the right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and
reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be
excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or
descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage
of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the
[50]
legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from elective office.
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to
the Philippines international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all
social ills. We refer now to the petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International

Page | 80

[51]

Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),

binding principles of international law.

which petitioner declares to reflect

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not
reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law
[52]
enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken
any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.
We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of society wants or
demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or
subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context
of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states to
sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if
wants are couched in rights language, then they are no longer controversial.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated
by various international law professors, are at best de lege ferenda and do not constitute binding obligations on
the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the soft law
nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect
for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State
[53]
practice or opinio juris.
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally
charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This
Courts role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as
best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough
to withstand vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The
Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.

BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented by MR. AMEURFINO E. CINCO, Chairman,
AND URBAN POOR FOR LEGAL REFORMS (UP-LR), represented by MRS. MYRNA P. PORCARE,
Secretary-General, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIYAHENG PINOY, KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKAKULONG NA
WALANG SALA (KAKUSA), BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEM

Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside
certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have
manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for
short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the various Comelec resolutions
accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections
on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess
the requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent. In the second,
docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay
Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectively denying their

Page | 81

request for the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited
participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales previous letter-request.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
1
nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, the petitioners in G.R. No. 177271 have
the following additional prayers: 1) that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as
unqualified to participate in the party-list elections as sectoral organizations, parties or coalition for failure
2
to comply with the guidelines prescribed by the [Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec ]" and, 2)
correspondingly, that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the
May 2007 elections.
In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the Court en banc required the public and private
respondents to file their respective comments on the petitions within a non-extendible period of five (5)
3
days from notice. Apart from respondent Comelec, seven (7) private respondents in G.R. No. 177271
4
and one party-list group mentioned in G.R. No. 177314 submitted their separate comments. In the main,
the separate comments of the private respondents focused on the untenability and prematurity of the plea
of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR to nullify their accreditation as party-list groups and thus disqualify
them and their respective nominees from participating in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections.
The facts:
On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to
govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under the
party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a
number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Among these and ostensibly
subsequently accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups,
namely: (1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3)AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON
PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN;
(11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UPLR presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list.
Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify,
thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear
not to have the names of the nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list
of nominees. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be
resolved.
Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the aforementioned 14
party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner
5
Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter dated March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the
6
Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of that groups nominees. Another letter of the same tenor
dated March 31, 2007 followed, this time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the particular
urgency of the subject request.
Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner Rosales requests.
The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the front-page banner headline
7
"COMELEC WONT BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES", with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says
party-list polls not personality oriented."
On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own behalves and
8
as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter to the Comelec formally requesting action and
definitive decision on Rosales earlier plea for information regarding the names of several party-list
nominees. Invoking their constitutionally-guaranteed right to information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga
at the same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for the

Page | 82

Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either confirming or denying the
banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx" Evidently
unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 079
0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees names confidential and in net effect
denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request. In its relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as
follows:
RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission will disclose/publicize the names of party-list nominees in
connection with the May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00 p.m. on election day.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution and reply to all letters addressed to the Commission
inquiring on the party-list nominees. (Emphasis added.)
According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to obtain a copy of the April 3, 2007 Resolution only on
April 21, 2007. She would later state the observation that the last part of the "Order empowering the Law
Department to implement this resolution and reply to all letters inquiring on the party-list nominees is
apparently a fool-proof bureaucratic way to distort and mangle the truth and give the impression that the
10
antedated Resolution of April 3, 2007 is the final answer to the two formal requests of Petitioners".
The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the foregoing factual setting, albeit petitioners BA-RA
7941 and UP-LR appear not to be aware, when they filed their petition on April 18, 2007, of the April 3,
2007 Comelec Resolution 07-0724.
To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would have the Court cancel the accreditation accorded
by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these
groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified. In the words of petitioners BA-RA
7941 and UP-LR, Comelec xxx committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations even
withoutsimultaneously determining whether the nominees of herein private respondents are qualified or
not, or whether or not the nominees are likewise belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector they claim to represent in Congress, in accordance with No. 7 of the eight-point guidelines
11
prescribed by the Honorable Supreme in the Ang Bagong Bayani case which states that, "not only the
candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must
its nominees." In the case of private respondents, public respondent Comelec granted accreditations
without the required simultaneous determination of the qualification of the nominees as part of the
accreditation process of the party-list organization itself. (Words in bracket added; italization in the
12
original)
The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of
accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. For, such course of action would entail going
over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral groups or parties in question, particularly whether or not
they indeed represent marginalized/underrepresented groups. The exercise would require the Court to
make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil
action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the
13
case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to
address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the
14
tribunals evaluation of the evidence.
Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency before the Comelec of SPA Case No. 07-026 in which
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR themselves seek to disqualify the nominees of the respondent partylist groups named in their petition.

Page | 83

Petitioners BA-RA 7941s and UP-LRs posture that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the qualifications of their
nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a
party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. And as aptly
pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941
requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to be filed with the Comelec "not later than
ninety (90) days before the election" whereas the succeeding Section 8 requires the submission "not later
than forty-five (45) days before the election" of the list of names whence party-list representatives shall be
chosen.
Now to the other but core issues of the case. The petition in G.R. No. 177314 formulates and captures
the main issues tendered by the petitioners in these consolidated cases and they may be summarized as
follows:
1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various
party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as
guaranteed by the Constitution; and
2. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the
names of said nominees.
While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of
subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941. This provision, while commanding the publication and
the posting in polling places of a certified list of party-list system participating groups, nonetheless tells
the Comelec not to show or include the names of the party-list nominees in said certified list. Thus:
SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.- The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before
election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which
have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute
copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. The names of the partylist nominees shall not be shown on the certified list. (Emphasis added.)
And doubtless part of Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the
public is deducible from the following excerpts of the news report appearing in the adverted April 13, 2007
issue of theManila Bulletin:
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) firmed up yesterday its decision not to release the names of
nominees of sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions accredited to participate in the party-list election
which will be held simultaneously with the May 14 mid-term polls.
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. said he and [the other five COMELEC] Commissioners -- believe that the party list elections must not be personality oriented.
Abalos said under [R.A.] 7941 , the people are to vote for sectoral parties, organizations, or
coalitions, not for their nominees.
He said there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees. xxx
(Words in brackets and emphasis added)
Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with merit.
Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the right to
15
information enshrined in the self-executory Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Page | 84

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another constitutional provision
enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II
of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to
be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the
part of those who govern to respect and protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in a
16
constitutional regime. Without a governments acceptance of the limitations upon it by the Constitution in
order to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the
rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry.
By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his right to
17
information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since every citizen by the simple fact of
his citizenship possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily
18
unavailing.
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to
official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the peoples right to know is limited to
"matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly,
the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving "public interest" and is subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of preserving a measure of
confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting
19
national security.
The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded precise definition. But both terms embrace,
to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because
these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally whet the interest of an ordinary
citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to determine, on a case to case basis, whether or not at
issue is of interest or importance to the public.
If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons employed as
sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service eligibles, surely the identity of candidates for a
lofty elective public office should be a matter of highest public concern and interest.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list
groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be
shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested
disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and
duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted
in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read
into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that
prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List"

Page | 85

the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect
of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation
thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7
of R.A. No. 7941.
The Comelecs reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to a point. It
cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a
20
weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to information. While the
vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its
nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
The Court is very much aware of newspaper reports detailing the purported reasons behind
Comelecs disinclination to release the names of party-list nominees. It is to be stressed, however,
the Court is in the business of dispensing justice on the basis of hard facts and applicable statutory
decisional laws. And lest it be overlooked, the Court always assumes, at the first instance,
presumptive validity and regularity of official acts of government officials and offices.

the
that
and
the

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives
on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that have
a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably
advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v.
21
Romulo, has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that
22
would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election. So it must be here for
still other reasons articulated earlier.
In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and
release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the
accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to
disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to
participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the
names of the nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the
May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court its
compliance herewith within five (5) days from notice hereof.
This Decision is declared immediately executory upon its receipt by the Comelec.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 177271. May 4, 2007.]
BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented by MR. AMEURFINO E.
CINCO, Chairman, AND URBAN POOR FOR LEGAL REFORMS (UP-LR),
represented by MRS. MYRNA P. PORCARE, Secretary-General, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIYAHENG PINOY, KAPATIRAN NG MGA
NAKAKULONG NA WALANG SALA (KAKUSA), BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR
NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), AHON PINOY,

Page | 86

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ALLIANCE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (AGAP),

PUWERSA NG BAYANING ATLETA (PBA), ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI
NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA MAMAMAYAN, INC. (AGHAM), BABAE
PARA SA KAUNLARAN (BABAE KA), AKSYON SAMBAYANAN (AKSA), ALAY SA
BAYAN NG MALAYANG PROPESYUNAL AT REPORMANG KALAKAL (ABAYPARAK), AGBIAG TIMPUYOG ILOCANO, INC. (AGBIAG!), ABANTE ILONGGO,
INC. (ABA ILONGGO), AANGAT TAYO (AT), AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN (ANAK),
BAGO NATIONAL CULTURAL SOCIETY OF THE PHILIPPINES (BAGO), ANGAT
ANTAS-KABUHAYAN PILIPINO MOVEMENT (AANGAT KA PILIPINO), ARTS
BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONAL (ABS), ASSOSASYON NG MGA
MALILIIT NA NEGOSYANTENG GUMAGANAP INC. (AMANG), SULONG
BARANGAY MOVEMENT, KASOSYO PRODUCERS CONSUMER EXCHANGE
ASSOCIATION, INC. (KASOSYO), UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS (UNIMAD), PARENTS ENABLING PARENTS (PEP), ALLIANCE OF NEOCONSERVATIVES (ANC), FILIPINOS FOR PEACE, JUSTICE AND PROGRESS
MOVEMENT (FPJPM), BIGKIS PINOY MOVEMENT (BIGKIS), 1-UNITED
TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UNTAK), ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS
(ABC), BIYAYANG BUKID, INC., ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY (ANAD), AKBAY PINOY OFW-NATIONAL INC., (APOI), ALLIANCE
TRANSPORT SECTOR (ATS), KALAHI SECTORAL PARTY (ADVOCATES FOR
OVERSEAS
FILIPINO)
AND
ASSOCIATION
OF
ADMINISTRATORS,
PROFESSIONALS AND SENIORS (AAPS), respondents.
[G.R. No. 177314. May 4, 2007.]
REP. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION, BANTAY
KATARUNGAN
FOUNDATION, petitioners, vs.
THE
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS,respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J p:
Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside
certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have
manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for
short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the various Comelec resolutions
accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections
on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess
the requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent. In the second,
docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay
Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectively denying their
request for the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited
participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales' previous letter-request.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, 1 the petitioners in G.R.
No. 177271 have the following additional prayers: 1) that the 33 private respondents named therein be
"declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections as sectoral organizations, parties or
coalition for failure to comply with the guidelines prescribed by the [Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v.
Comelec 2 ]" and, 2) correspondingly, that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups
from participating in the May 2007 elections. aTEHCc
In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the Court en banc required the public and private
respondents to file their respective comments on the petitions within a non-extendible period of five (5)
days from notice. Apart from respondent Comelec, seven (7) private respondents 3 in G.R.
No. 177271 and one party-list group 4 mentioned in G.R. No. 177314 submitted their separate comments.
In the main, the separate comments of the private respondents focused on the untenability and
prematurity of the plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR to nullify their accreditation as party-list
groups and thus disqualify them and their respective nominees from participating in the May 14, 2007
party-list elections.

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The facts:
On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to
govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under the
party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a
number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Among these and ostensibly
subsequently accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections are 14 party-list groups,
namely: (1)BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON
PINOY; (7) OFW
PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG
PINOY; (9) ANAD;
(10) AANGAT
ANG
KABUHAYAN;(11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA
7941 and UP-LR presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list.
Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify,
thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear
not to have the names of the nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list
of nominees. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be
resolved. EACIcH
Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the aforementioned 14
party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner
Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter 5 dated March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the
Comelec's Law Department requesting a list of that groups' nominees. Another letter 6 of the same tenor
dated March 31, 2007 followed, this time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the particular
urgency of the subject request.
Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner Rosales' requests.
The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the front-page banner headline
"COMELEC WON'T BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES", 7 with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says
party-list polls not personality oriented."
On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own behalves and
as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter 8 to the Comelec formally requesting action and
definitive decision on Rosales' earlier plea for information regarding the names of several party-list
nominees. Invoking their constitutionally-guaranteed right to information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga
at the same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for the
Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either confirming or denying . . . the
banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. . . ." Evidently
unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 070724 9 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees' names confidential and in net effect
denying petitioner Rosales' basic disclosure request. In its relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as
follows:
RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission will disclose/publicize the names of
party-list nominees in connection with the May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00 p.m.
on election day. DaACIH
Let the Law Department implement this resolution and reply to all letters addressed to
the Commission inquiring on the party-list nominees. (Emphasis added.)
According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to obtain a copy of the April 3, 2007 Resolution only on
April 21, 2007. She would later state the observation that the last part of the "Order empowering the Law
Department to 'implement this resolution and reply to all letters . . . inquiring on the party-list nominees' is
apparently a fool-proof bureaucratic way to distort and mangle the truth and give the impression that the
antedated Resolution of April 3, 2007 . . . is the final answer to the two formal requests . . . of
Petitioners". 10
The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the foregoing factual setting, albeit petitioners BA-RA
7941 and UP-LR appear not to be aware, when they filed their petition on April 18, 2007, of the April 3,
2007 Comelec Resolution 07-0724.
To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would have the Court cancel the accreditation accorded
by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these
groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified. In the words of petitioners BA-RA
7941 and UP-LR, Comelec
. . . committed grave abuse of discretion . . . when it granted the assailed accreditations
even without simultaneously determining whether the nominees of herein private

Page | 88

respondents are qualified or not, or whether or not the nominees are likewise belonging
to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they claim to represent in Congress,
in accordance with No. 7 of the eight-point guidelines prescribed by the Honorable
Supreme in the Ang Bagong Bayani 11 case which states that, "not only the candidate
party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so
also must its nominees." In the case of private respondents, public respondent
Comelec granted accreditations without the required simultaneous determination of the
qualification of the nominees as part of the accreditation process of the party-list
organization itself. (Words in bracket added; italization in the original) 12 DEScaT
The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of
accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. For, such course of action would entail going
over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral groups or parties in question, particularly whether or not
they indeed represent marginalized/underrepresented groups. The exercise would require the Court to
make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil
action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the
case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record.13 The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to
address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the
tribunal's evaluation of the evidence. 14
Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency before the Comelec of SPA Case No. 07-026 in which
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR themselves seek to disqualify the nominees of the respondent partylist groups named in their petition.
Petitioners BA-RA 7941's and UP-LR's posture that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneouslydetermining the qualifications of their
nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a
party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. And as aptly
pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No.
7941requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to be filed with the Comelec "not later
than ninety (90) days before the election" whereas the succeeding Section 8 requires the submission "not
later than forty-five (45) days before the election" of the list of names whence party-list representatives
shall be chosen.
Now to the other but core issues of the case. The petition in G.R. No. 177314 formulates and captures
the main issues tendered by the petitioners in these consolidated cases and they may be summarized as
follows:
1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of
the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free
access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and
2. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the
public the names of said nominees.
While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of
subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941. This provision, while commanding the publication and
the posting in polling places of a certified list of party-list system participating groups, nonetheless tells
the Comelec not to show or include the names of the party-list nominees in said certified list. Thus:
SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty
(60) days before election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their
desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all
precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. The names of the
party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list. (Emphasis
added.) aEDCSI
And doubtless part of Comelec's reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the
public is deducible from the following excerpts of the news report appearing in the adverted April 13, 2007
issue of the Manila Bulletin:
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) firmed up yesterday its decision not to
release the names of nominees of sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions

Page | 89

accredited to participate in the party-list election which will be held simultaneously with
the May 14 mid-term polls.
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. . . . said he and [the other five
COMELEC] Commissioners believe that the party list elections must not be
personality oriented.
Abalos said under [R.A.] 7941 . . ., the people are to vote for sectoral parties,
organizations, or coalitions, not for their nominees.
He said there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names
of nominees. . . . (Words in brackets and emphasis added) HEDSCc
Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with merit.
Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the right to
information enshrined in the self-executory 15 Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another constitutional provision
enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II
of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to
be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the
part of those who govern to respect and protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in a
constitutional regime. 16Without a government's acceptance of the limitations upon it by the Constitution
in order to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by
the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry.
By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his right to
information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. 17 And since every citizen by the simple fact of
his citizenship possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily
unavailing. 18
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to
official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the people's right to know is limited to
"matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly,
the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving "public interest" and is subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of preserving a measure of
confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting
national security. 19
The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded precise definition. But both terms embrace,
to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because
these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally whet the interest of an ordinary
citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to determine, on a case to case basis, whether or not at
issue is of interest or importance to the public.
If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons employed as
sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service eligibles, surely the identity of candidates for a
lofty elective public office should be a matter of highest public concern and interest.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list
groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be
shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested
disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and
duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted

Page | 90

in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read
into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that
prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List"
the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect
of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation
thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7
of R.A. No. 7941.
The Comelec's reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to a point. It
cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a
weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to information. 20 While
the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its
nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
The Court is very much aware of newspaper reports detailing the purported reasons behind the
Comelec's disinclination to release the names of party-list nominees. It is to be stressed, however, that
the Court is in the business of dispensing justice on the basis of hard facts and applicable statutory and
decisional laws. And lest it be overlooked, the Court always assumes, at the first instance, the
presumptive validity and regularity of official acts of government officials and offices.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives
on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that have
a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably
advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v.
Romulo, 21 has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that
would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election. 22 So it must be here
for still other reasons articulated earlier.
In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and
release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. cIECaS
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the
accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to
disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to
participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the
names of the nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the
May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court its
compliance herewith within five (5) days from notice hereof.
This Decision is declared immediately executory upon its receipt by the Comelec.
No pronouncement as to costs. HcaATE
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr. and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez and Corona, JJ., are on leave.
Carpio-Morales, J., I certify that J. Morales voted in favor of the Decision.
Footnotes
1.At least nine (9) party-list groups subject of the second petition are respondents in the first petition.
2.G. R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698.
3.ABS, Babae Ka, PEP, ANC, FPJPM, AAPS, AANGAT ka Pilipino and KALAHI.
4.AKSA.
5.Annex "E," of Petition in G.R. No. 177314.
6.Annex "F," of Petition in G.R. No. 177314.
7.Petition (G.R. 177314), p. 8.
8.Annex "G," of Petition in G.R. No. 177314.
9.Annex "B," of Petition in G.R. No. 177314.
10.Petition in G.R. SP. No. 177314, p. 3.
11.Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Part v. Commission on Elections, Supra note 2.

Page | 91

12.Page 5 of the petition in G. R. No. 177271.

13.Pobre v. Gonong, G. R. No. L-60575, March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 553.
14.Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 138270, June 28, 2001, 360 SCRA 173; Oro
v. Diaz, G.R. No. 140974, July 11, 2001, 361 SCRA 108.
15.Gonzales v. Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000, 337 SCRA 733.
16.Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G. R. No. L-72119, May 19, 1987, 150 SCRA 530, citing
Cooley.
17.Tanada v. Tuvera, G. R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27.
18.Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 334.
19.Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998, 299 SCRA 744.
20.Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. No. L-82380, April 29, 1988, 160 SCRA 861.
21.G. R. No. L-8921, January 9, 1914, 26 Phil. 521.
22.Rodriquez v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. L-61545, December 27, 1982, 119 SCRA 465
||| (Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177271, 177314, May 04, 2007)

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EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004.]
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B.
HONASAN, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 ("Resolution
No. 01-005") and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 ("Resolution No. 01-006") of
respondent Commission on Elections ("COMELEC"). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13
candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared
"official and final" the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.
The Facts
Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. ("Senator Guingona") as Vice-President. Congress
confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingona's confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84
("Resolution No. 84") certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on
COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular
elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that
election. 1 Resolution No. 84 further provided that the "Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.,"
which ends on 30 June 2004. 2
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the provinces but one
(Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as
the elected Senators. Resolution No. 01-005 also provided that "the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve
for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3)
years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President." 3 Respondents Ralph
Recto ("Recto") and Gregorio Honasan ("Honasan") ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution No.
01-005.
On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica ("petitioners"), as voters and taxpayers,
filed the instant petition for prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as respondent. Petitioners sought to
enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest
number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly,
petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to
such effect.
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it
failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2
of Republic Act No. 6645 ("R.A. No. 6645"); 4 (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in
their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as
allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; 5 and, consequently, (3) it failed to
specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular
senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 ofRepublic Act No. 6646 ("R.A.
No. 6646"). 6 Petitioners add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast
for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that "there were no two
separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of
term." 7
Stated otherwise, petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be
distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. To support their claim,
petitioners cite the special elections simultaneously held with the regular elections of 13 November 1951
and 8 November 1955 to fill the seats vacated by Senators Fernando Lopez and Carlos P. Garcia,
respectively, who became Vice-Presidents during their tenures in the Senate. 8 Petitioners point out that
in those elections, COMELEC separately canvassed the votes cast for the senatorial candidates running
under the regular elections from the votes cast for the candidates running under the special elections.
COMELEC also separately proclaimed the winners in each of those elections. 9

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Petitioners sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition.
Without issuing any restraining order, we required COMELEC to Comment on the petition.
On 20 July 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the results from all the provinces, it issued Resolution
No. 01-006 declaring "official and final" the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01005. The 13 Senators took their oaths of office on 23 July 2001.
In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required petitioners to file an amended
petition impleading Recto and Honasan as additional respondents. Petitioners accordingly filed an
amended petition in which they reiterated the contentions raised in their original petition and, in addition,
sought the nullification of Resolution No. 01-006.
In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all claim that a special election to fill the seat
vacated by Senator Guingona was validly held on 14 May 2001. COMELEC and Honasan further raise
preliminary issues on the mootness of the petition and on petitioners' standing to litigate. Honasan also
claims that the petition, which seeks the nullity of his proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo
warranto petition and the Court should dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. For his part, Recto, as the
12th ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper party to this case because the petition only involves the
validity of the proclamation of the 13th placer in the 14 May 2001 senatorial elections.
The Issues
The following are the issues presented for resolution:
(1) Procedurally
(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the
Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge;
(b) whether the petition is moot; and
(c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate.
(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat
was validly held on 14 May 2001.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Nature of the Petition and the Court's Jurisdiction
A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right of a public officer in the exercise
of his office and to oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded. 10 Under Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
qualifications of the members of the Senate.
A perusal of the allegations contained in the instant petition shows, however, that what petitioners are
questioning is the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected.
Petitioners' various prayers are, namely: (1) a "declaration" that no special election was held
simultaneously with the general elections on 14 May 2001; (2) to enjoin COMELEC from declaring
anyone as having won in the special election; and (3) to annul Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 in so
far as these Resolutions proclaim Honasan as the winner in the special election. Petitioners anchor their
prayers on COMELEC's alleged failure to comply with certain requirements pertaining to the conduct of
that special election. Clearly then, the petition does not seek to determine Honasan's right in the exercise
of his office as Senator. Petitioners' prayer for the annulment of Honasan's proclamation and, ultimately,
election is merely incidental to petitioners' cause of action. Consequently, the Court can properly exercise
jurisdiction over the instant petition.
On the Mootness of the Petition
COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001 of the 13 Senators and its subsequent
confirmation on 20 July 2001 of the ranking of the 13 Senators render the instant petition to set aside
Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 moot and academic.
Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or board to desist from committing
an act threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. 11 Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already done. 12 However, as
an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review. 13 Thus, in Alunan III v. Mirasol, 14 we took cognizance of a petition to set
aside an order canceling the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan ("SK") on 4 December
1992 despite that at the time the petition was filed, the SK election had already taken place. We noted
in Alunan that since the question of the validity of the order sought to be annulled "is likely to arise in

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every SK elections and yet the question may not be decided before the date of such elections," the
mootness of the petition is no bar to its resolution. This observation squarely applies to the instant case.
The question of the validity of a special election to fill a vacancy in the Senate in relation to COMELEC's
failure to comply with requirements on the conduct of such special election is likely to arise in every such
election. Such question, however, may not be decided before the date of the election.
On Petitioners' Standing
Honasan questions petitioners' standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because
petitioners do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds. Neither do petitioners claim that
they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006.
"Legal standing" or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act. 15 The
requirement of standing, which necessarily "sharpens the presentation of issues," 16 relates to
the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies. 17 Thus, generally, a
party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. 18
Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the instant petition. In questioning, in
their capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm
classified as a "generalized grievance." This generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal
measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted in that election. 19 Neither have
petitioners alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to the petition
because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 "tax money [was] '. . . extracted and spent in
violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power' or that there [was]
misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to any improper
purpose." 20
On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due
course to voters' suits involving the right of suffrage. 21 Also, in the recent case of Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora, 22 we gave the same liberal treatment to a petition filed by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines ("IBP"). The IBP questioned the validity of a Presidential directive deploying elements of
the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Marines in Metro Manila to conduct patrols even though
the IBP presented "too general an interest." We held:
[T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule
of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no
other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to
preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to
clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry . . . .
Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit
which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is
involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus
standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance
to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a
reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless
violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao
insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not
go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the
rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later. 23 (Emphasis
supplied)
We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacity as voters since they
raise important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is
likely to arise again.

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Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term

Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the
Senate and the House of Representatives "in the manner prescribed by law," thus:
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election
may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the
unexpired term. (Emphasis supplied)
To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, which provides in
pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in
the House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the next regular election for
Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the
existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a special
election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official communication on the
existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the Senate
or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be
sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election,
which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from
the date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things the office or
offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general
election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with
such general election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as follows:
Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. . . . In case a permanent
vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year
before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election
to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after
the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the
special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term, Section 2
of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of the
special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the
occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of, among
other things, the office or offices; to be voted for.
Did COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial election simultaneously with the 14 May 2001 regular
elections, comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645?
A survey of COMELEC's resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections reveals that
they contain nothing which would amount to a compliance, either strict or substantial, with the
requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions 24 or even in
its press releases 25 did COMELEC state that it would hold a special election for a single three-year term
Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give formal
notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of
votes in the special election.
The controversy thus turns on whether COMELEC's failure, assuming it did fail, to comply with the
requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, invalidated the conduct of the special senatorial
election on 14 May 2001 and accordingly rendered Honasan's proclamation as the winner in that special
election void. More precisely, the question is whether the special election is invalid for lack of a "call" for
such election and for lack of notice as to the office to be filled and the manner by which the winner in the
special election is to be determined. For reasons stated below, the Court answers in the negative.

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COMELEC's Failure to Give Notice

of the Time of the Special Election
Did Not Negate the Calling of such Election
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence, whether made
by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the election's
validity. 26 In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without
any call by the body charged to administer the election. 27
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to fill
a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be
held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed
is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do
so. 28 This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any
call for the election by some authority 29 and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and
place of the election. 30
Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers
some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory
provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a
nullity. 31
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the
special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular
election. Accordingly, the special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator
Guingona's appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be held at any other time but must
be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law charges the
voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELEC's failure to give the additional notice did not
negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.
Our conclusion might be different had the present case involved a special election to fill a vacancy in the
House of Representatives. In such a case, the holding of the special election is subject to a condition
precedent, that is, the vacancy should take place at least one year before the expiration of the term. The
time of the election is left to the discretion of COMELEC subject only to the limitation that it holds the
special election within the range of time provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes
mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, for COMELEC to "call . . . a
special election . . . not earlier than 60 days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of the vacancy"
and give notice of the office to be filled. The COMELEC's failure to so call and give notice will nullify any
attempt to hold a special election to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it will be well-nigh impossible for the voters in
the congressional district involved to know the time and place of the special election and the office to be
filled unless the COMELEC so notifies them.
No Proof that COMELEC's Failure
to Give Notice of the Office to be Filled
and the Manner of Determining the
Winner in the Special Election Misled Voters
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the
special election is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as
would change the result of the special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of
voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill a vacancy, a choice by a small
percentage of voters would be void. 32
The required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001 special senatorial election covers two matters. First,
that COMELEC will hold a special election to fill a vacant single three-year term Senate seat
simultaneously with the regular elections scheduled on the same date. Second, that COMELEC will
proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special
election. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that COMELEC's failure to give this required notice
misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the special senatorial election or led
them to believe that there was no such special election.
Instead, what petitioners did is conclude that since COMELEC failed to give such notice, no special
election took place. This bare assertion carries no value. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended,
charged those who voted in the elections of 14 May 2001 with the knowledge that the vacancy in the

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Senate arising from Senator Guingona's appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 was to be filled
in the next succeeding regular election of 14 May 2001. Similarly, the absence of formal notice from
COMELEC does not preclude the possibility that the voters had actual notice of the special election, the
office to be voted in that election, and the manner by which COMELEC would determine the winner. Such
actual notice could come from many sources, such as media reports of the enactment of R.A. No.
6645 and election propaganda during the campaign. 33
More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party who stands most prejudiced by
the instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan, in the absence of
proof that COMELEC's omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of suffrage so as to negate
the holding of the special election. Indeed, this Court is loathe to annul elections and will only do so when
it is "impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain
result whatever, or that the great body of the voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation, and
threats from exercising their franchise." 34
Otherwise, the consistent rule has been to respect the electorate's will and let the results of the election
stand, despite irregularities that may have attended the conduct of the elections. 35 This is but to
acknowledge the purpose and role of elections in a democratic society such as ours, which is:
to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their government, either in
determining who shall be their public officials or in deciding some question of public
interest; and for that purpose all of the legal voters should be permitted, unhampered
and unmolested, to cast their ballot. When that is done and no frauds have been
committed, the ballots should be counted and the election should not be declared null.
Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in the affairs of their
government for mere irregularities on the part of the election officers, for which they are
in no way responsible. A different rule would make themanner and method of
performing a public duty of greater importance than the duty itself. 36 (Emphasis in the
original)
Separate Documentation and Canvassing
not Required under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645
Neither is there basis in petitioners' claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the special
senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document separately the
candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirements exist
in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC "fix the date
of the election," if necessary, and "state, among others, the office or offices to be voted for." Similarly,
petitioners' reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and
on Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim
is misplaced. These provisions govern elections in general and in no way require separate documentation
of candidates or separate canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and special elections.
Significantly, the method adopted by COMELEC in conducting the special election on 14 May 2001
merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft
of Resolution No. 84 as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad ("Senator Tatad") made no mention of the
manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the
suggestion of Senator Raul Roco ("Senator Roco"), the Senate agreed to amend Resolution No. 84 by
providing, as it now appears, that "the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number
of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr." Senator
Roco introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC and the candidates needless expenditures and the
voters further inconvenience, thus:
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move that we now consider Proposed Senate
Resolution No. 934 [later converted to Resolution No. 84].
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is
approved.
Consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 is now in order. With the
permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title and text of the resolution.
T[HE] S[ECRETARY]. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 entitled
RESOLUTION CERTIFYING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A VACANCY IN THE
SENATE AND CALLING ON THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(COMELEC) TO FILL UP SUCH VACANCY THROUGH ELECTION TO BE

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HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE REGULAR ELECTION ON MAY 14,

2001 AND THE SENATOR THUS ELECTED TO SERVE ONLY FOR THE
UNEXPIRED TERM
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator of the
Philippines in 1998 for a term which will expire on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
nominated Senator Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been confirmed by a majority
vote of all the members of both House of Congress, voting separately;
WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as Vice-President of the
Philippines on February 9, 2001;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for twelve (12) Senators,
all elective Members of the House of Representatives, and all elective provincial city
and municipal officials shall be held on the second Monday and every three years
thereafter; Now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved, to certify, as it hereby certifies, the
existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the
regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senator thus elected to serve only for the
unexpired term.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. TATAD
Senator
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move for the adoption of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. John H. Osmea is recognized.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Thank you, Mr. President. Will the distinguished Majority
Leader, Chairman of the Committee on Rules, author of this resolution, yield for a few
questions?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. With trepidation, Mr. President. [Laughter]
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). What a way of flattery. [Laughter]
Mr. President, I think I recall that sometime in 1951 or 1953, there was a special
election for a vacant seat in the Senate. As a matter of fact, the one who was elected in
that special election was then Congressman, later Senator Feli[s]berto Verano.
In that election, Mr. President, the candidates contested the seat. In other words, the
electorate had to cast a vote for a ninth senator because at that time there were only
eight to elect a member or rather, a candidate to that particular seat.
Then I remember, Mr. President, that when we ran after the EDSA revolution, twice
there were 24 candidates and the first 12 were elected to a six-year term and the next
12 were elected to a three-year term.
My question therefore is, how is this going to be done in this election? Is the candidate
with the 13th largest number of votes going to be the one to take a three-year term? Or
is there going to be an election for a position of senator for the unexpired term of Sen.
Teofisto Guingona?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, in this resolution, we are leaving the mechanics to
the Commission on Elections. But personally, I would like to suggest that probably, the
candidate obtaining the 13th largest number of votes be declared as elected to fill up
the unexpired term of Senator Guingona.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Is there a law that would allow the Comelec to conduct
such an election? Is it not the case that the vacancy is for a specific office? I am really
at a loss. I am rising here because I think it is something that we should consider. I do
not know if we can . . . No, this is not a Concurrent Resolution. aTcIEH
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. May we solicit the legal wisdom of the Senate President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. May I share this information that under Republic Act No. 6645,
what is needed is a resolution of this Chamber calling attention to the need for the

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holding of a special election to fill up the vacancy created, in this particular case, by the
appointment of our colleague, Senator Guingona, as Vice President.
It can be managed in the Commission on Elections so that a slot for the particular
candidate to fill up would be that reserved for Mr. Guingona's unexpired term. In other
words, it can be arranged in such a manner.
xxx xxx xxx
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco is recognized.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest, subject to a one-minute caucus, wordings to
the effect that in the simultaneous elections, the 13th placer be therefore deemed to be
the special election for this purpose. So we just nominate 13 and it is good for our
colleagues. It is better for the candidates. It is also less expensive because the ballot
will be printed and there will be less disfranchisement.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. If we can just deem it therefore under this resolution to be such a
special election, maybe, we satisfy the requirement of the law.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. In other words, this shall be a guidance for the Comelec.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. to implement.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec will not have the flexibility.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already consider the 13th placer of the forthcoming
elections that will be held simultaneously as a special election under this law as we
understand it.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. That will be a good compromise, Senator Roco.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the sponsor can introduce that later, maybe it will be
better, Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the sponsor say?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, that is a most satisfactory proposal because I do
not believe that there will be anyone running specifically
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Correct.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. to fill up this position for three years and campaigning
nationwide.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Actually, I think what is going to happen is the 13th candidate will
be running with specific groups.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever gets No. 13.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. I think we can specifically define that as the intent of this
resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Subject to style, we accept that amendment and if there will be
no other amendment, I move for the adoption of this resolution.
xxx xxx xxx
ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934
If there are no other proposed amendments, I move that we adopt this resolution.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. There is a motion to adopt this resolution. Is there any objection?
[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved. 37
Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means and methods to conduct the special
election within the confines of R.A. No. 6645, merely chose to adopt the Senate's proposal, as embodied
in Resolution No. 84. This Court has consistently acknowledged and affirmed COMELEC's wide latitude
of discretion in adopting means to carry out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections
subject only to the limitation that the means so adopted are not illegal or do not constitute grave abuse of
discretion. 38 COMELEC's decision to abandon the means it employed in the 13 November 1951 and 8
November 1955 special elections and adopt the method embodied in Resolution No. 84 is but a legitimate
exercise of its discretion. Conversely, this Court will not interfere should COMELEC, in subsequent
special senatorial elections, choose to revert to the means it followed in the 13 November 1951 and 8
November 1955 elections. That COMELEC adopts means that are novel or even disagreeable is no
reason to adjudge it liable for grave abuse of discretion. As we have earlier noted:

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The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct

and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it
should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a
less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It
should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure
the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free, orderly and
honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are
clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. 39
A Word to COMELEC
The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the electorate of necessary
information regarding a special election, are central to an informed exercise of the right of suffrage. While
the circumstances attendant to the present case have led us to conclude that COMELEC's failure to so
call and give notice did not invalidate the special senatorial election held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC
should not take chances in future elections. We remind COMELEC to comply strictly with all the
requirements under applicable laws relative to the conduct of regular elections in general and special
elections in particular.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr.
and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., joins Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent.
Puno, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Vitug, J., Ynares-Santiago, and Tinga, JJ., join Justice Puno's dissent.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., dissenting:
The case at bar transcends the political fortunes of respondent Senator Gregorio B. Honasan. At issue is
the right of the people to elect their representatives on the basis and only on the basis of an informed
judgment. The issue strikes at the heart of democracy and representative government for without this
right, the sovereignty of the people is a mere chimera and the rule of the majority will be no more
than mobocracy. To clarify and sharpen the issue, I shall first unfurl the facts.
I. Facts
The facts are undisputed. In February 2001, a Senate seat for a term expiring on June 30, 2004 was
vacated with the appointment of then Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. as Vice-President of the Philippines.
The Senate adopted Resolution No. 84 certifying "the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy through election to be held
simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001, and the senatorial candidate garnering the
thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr." In the deliberations of the Senate on the resolution, the body agreed that the
procedure it adopted for determining the winner in the special election was for the "guidance" and
"implementation" of the COMELEC. The COMELEC had no discretion to alter the procedure.
Nobody filed a certificate of candidacy to fill the position of senator to serve the unexpired three-year term
in the special election. All the senatorial candidates filed the certificates of candidacy for the twelve
regular Senate seats to be vacated on June 30, 2001 with a six-year term expiring on June 30, 2007.
COMELEC distributed nationwide official documents such as the Voter Information Sheet, List of
Candidates and Sample Ballot. The List of Candidates did not indicate a separate list of candidates for
the special election. The Sample Ballot and the official ballots did not provide two different categories of
Senate seats to be voted, namely the twelve regular six-year term seats and the single three-year term
seat. Nor did the ballots provide a separate space for the candidate to be voted in the special election and
instead provided thirteen spaces for thirteen senatorial seats.
Without any COMELEC resolution or notice on the time, place and manner of conduct of the special
election, the special election for senator was held on the scheduled May 14, 2001 regular elections.
A single canvass of votes for a single list of senatorial candidates was done. On June 5, 2001,
respondent COMELEC promulgated COMELEC Resolution No. NBC01-005, the dispositive portion of
which reads, viz:

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NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it under the

Constitution, Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, the Commission on
Elections sitting En Banc as the National Board of Canvassers hereby proclaims the
above-named thirteen (13) candidates as the duly elected Senators of the Philippines
in the May 14, 2001 elections. Based on the Certificates of Canvass finally tabulated,
the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth
(13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr., who was appointed Vice-President of the Philippines pursuant to Section
9, Article VII of the Constitution, in relation to Section 9, Article VI thereof, as
implemented under Republic Act No. 6645. (emphasis supplied)
On June 21, 2001, petitioners filed with the Court their petition for prohibition to stop respondent
COMELEC from proclaiming any senatorial candidate in the May 14, 2001 election as having been
elected for the lone senate seat for a three-year term. Copies of the petition were served on respondent
COMELEC twice, first on June 20, 2001 by registered mail, and second on June 21, 2001, by personal
delivery of petitioner Mojica. On June 26, 2001 the Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent
COMELEC to comment within ten days from notice. Even before filing its comment, respondent
COMELEC issued Resolution No. NBC-01-006 on July 20, 2001, the dispositive portion of which
reads, viz:
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it under the
Constitution, Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, the Commission on
Elections sitting as the National Board of Canvassers hereby DECLARES official and
final the above ranking of the proclaimed 13 Senators of the Philippines in relation to
NBC Resolution No. 01-005 promulgated June 5, 2001.
Resolution No. NBC-01-006 indicates the following ranking of the 13 Senators with the corresponding
votes they garnered as of June 20, 2001:
1. De Castro, Noli L. 16,237,386
2. Flavier, Juan M. 11,735,897
3. Osmea, Sergio II R. 11,593,389
4. Drilon, Franklin M. 11,301,700
5. Arroyo, Joker P. 11,262,402
6. Magsaysay, Ramon Jr. B. 11,250,677
7. Villar, Manuel Jr. B. 11,187,375
8. Pangilinan, Francis N. 10,971,896
9. Angara, Edgardo J. 10,805,177
10. Lacson, Panfilo M. 10,535,559
11. Ejercito-Estrada, Luisa P. 10,524,130
12. Recto, Ralph 10,498,940
13. Honasan, Gregorio 10,454,527
On the day of its promulgation, respondent COMELEC forwarded Resolution No. NBC-01-006 to the
President of the Senate. On July 23, 2001, the thirteen senators, inclusive of respondents Honasan and
Recto, took their oaths of office before the Senate President.
With the turn of events after the filing of the petition on June 20, 2001, the Court ordered petitioners on
March 5, 2002 and September 17, 2002 to amend their petition. In their amended petition, petitioners
assailed the manner by which the special election was conducted citing as precedents the 1951 and 1955
special senatorial elections for a two-year term which were held simultaneously with the regular general
elections for senators with six year terms, viz:
(a) A vacancy in the Senate was created by the election of Senator Fernando Lopez as
Vice-President in the 1949 elections. A special election was held in November 1951 to
elect his successor to the vacated Senate position for a term to expire on 30 December
1953. Said special election was held simultaneously with the regular election of 1951. A
separate space in the official ballot was provided for Senatorial candidates for the two
year term; moreover, the candidates for the single Senate term for two years filed
certificates of candidacy separate and distinct from those certificates of candidacy filed
by the group of Senatorial candidates for the six year term.
(. . . the votes for the twenty (20) candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for the
eight Senate seats with six year terms were tallied and canvassed separately from the

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votes for the five candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for the single Senate
seat with a two year term . . .)
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Again, a vacancy was created in the Senate by the election of then Senator Carlos
P. Garcia to the Vice Presidency in the 1953 presidential elections. A special election
was held in November 1955 to elect his successor to the vacated Senatorial position
for a two year term expiring on 30 December 1957.
Said special election for one senator to fill the vacancy left by the Honorable Carlos
Garcia was held in November 1955 simultaneously with the regular election for eight
Senate seats with a six year term. Here, separate spaces were provided for in the
official ballot for the single Senate seat for the two year term as differentiated from the
eight Senate seats with six year terms. The results as recorded by Senate official files
show that votes for the candidates for the Senate seat with a two-year term were
separately tallied from the votes for the candidates for the eight Senate seats with sixyear term . . . 1 (emphases supplied)
Petitioners thus pray that the Court declare the following:
(a) that no special election was conducted by respondent COMELEC for the single
Senate seat with a three year term in the 14 May 2001 election.
(b) null and void respondent COMELEC's Resolutions No. NBC01-005 dated 5 June
2001 and NBC01-006 dated 20 July 2001 for having been promulgated without
any legal authority at all insofar as said resolutions proclaim the Senatorial
candidate who obtained the thirteenth highest number of votes canvassed
during the 14 May 2001 election as a duly elected Senator. 2
Respondents filed their respective comments averring the following procedural flaws: (1) the Court has no
jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto; (2) the petition is moot; and (3) the petitioners have no
standing to litigate. On the merits, they all defend the validity of the special election on the ground that the
COMELEC had discretion to determine the manner by which the special election should be conducted
and that the electorate was aware of the method the COMELEC had adopted. Moreover, they dismiss the
deviations from the election laws with respect to the filing of certificates of candidacy for the special
elections and the failure to provide in the official ballot a space for the special election vote separate from
the twelve spaces for the regular senatorial election votes as inconsequential. They claim that these laws
are merely directory after the election.
II. Issues
The issues for resolution are procedural and substantive. I shall limit my humble opinion to the
substantive issue of whether a special election for the single Senate seat with a three-year term was
validly held simultaneous with the general elections on May 14, 2001.
III. Laws on the Calling of Special Elections
Section 9, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for the filling of a vacancy in the Senate and House
of Representatives, viz:
Sec. 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special
election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for
the unexpired term.
Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, "An Act Prescribing the Manner of Filling a Vacancy in the Congress of
the Philippines," to implement this constitutional provision. The law provides, viz:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in
the House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the next regular election for
Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the
existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a special
election to fill such vacancy. If the Congress is in recess, an official communication on
the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the
Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall
be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

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SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election,
which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from
the date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things, the office or
offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general
election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with
such general election.
SECTION 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in
number sufficient for due distribution and publication, to the Provincial or City Treasurer
of each province or city concerned, who in turn shall publish it in their respective
localities by posting at least three copies thereof in as many conspicuous places in
each of their election precincts, and a copy in each of the polling places and public
markets, and in the municipal buildings. (emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 6645 was amended in 1991 by R.A. No. 7166 which provides in Section 4, viz:
SECTION 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Election. The
postponement, declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as
provided in Sections 5, 6, and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the
Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members . . .
In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at
least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold
a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than
ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy
in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election. (emphases supplied)
IV. Democracy and Republicanism
The shortest distance between two points is a straight line. In this case of first impression, however, the
distance between existing jurisprudence and the resolution of the issue presented to the Court cannot be
negotiated through a straight and direct line of reasoning. Rather, it is necessary to journey through a
meandering path and unearth the root principles of democracy, republicanism, elections, suffrage, and
freedom of information and discourse in an open society. As a first step in this indispensable journey, we
should traverse the democratic and republican landscape to appreciate the importance of informed
judgment in elections.
A. Evolution of Democracy from Plato to Locke
to Jefferson and Contemporary United States of America
In the ancient days, democracy was dismissed by thoughtful thinkers. Plato deprecated democracy as
rule by the masses. He warned that if all the people were allowed to rule, those of low quality would
dominate the state by mere numerical superiority. He feared that the more numerous masses would
govern with meanness and bring about a "tyranny of the majority." Plato predicted that democracies
would be short-lived as the mob would inevitably surrender its power to a single tyrant, and put an end to
popular government. Less jaundiced than Plato was Aristotle's view towards democracy. Aristotle agreed
that under certain conditions, the will of the many could be equal to or even wiser than the judgment of
the few. When the many governed for the good of all, Aristotle admitted that democracy is a good form of
government. But still and all, Aristotle preferred a rule of the upper class as against the rule of the lower
class. He believed that the upper class could best govern for they represent people of the greatest
refinement and quality.
In the Middle Ages, Europe plunged when the Roman Empire perished. Europe re-emerged from this
catastrophe largely through reliance on the scientific method which ultimately ushered the Industrial
Revolution. Material success became the engine which drove the people to search for solutions to their
social, political and economic problems. Using the scythe of science and reason, the thinkers of the time
entertained an exaggerated notion of individualism. They bannered the idea that all people were equal;
no one had a greater right to rule than another. Dynastical monarchy was taboo. As all were essentially
equal, no one enjoyed the moral right to govern another without the consent of the governed. The people
therefore were the source of legitimate legal and political authority. This theory of popular
sovereignty revived an interest in democracy in the seventeenth century. The refinements of the grant of
power by the people to the government led to the social contract theory: that is, the social contract is the
act of people exercising their sovereignty and creating a government to which they consent. 3

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Among the great political philosophers who spurred the evolution of democratic thought was John
Locke (1632-1704). In 1688, the English revolted against the "Catholic tyranny" of James II, causing him
to flee to France. This Glorious Revolution, called such because it was almost bloodless, put to rest the
long struggle between King and Parliament in England. The revolution reshaped the English government
and ultimately brought about democracy in England.
John Locke provided the philosophical phalanx to the Glorious Revolution. For this purpose, he wrote
his Second Treatise of Government, his work with the most political impact. In his monumental treatise,
Locke asserted that the basis of political society is a contract whereby individuals consent to be bound by
the laws of a common authority known as civil government. The objective of this social contract is the
protection of the individual's natural rights to life, liberty and property which are inviolable and enjoyed by
them in the state of nature before the formation of all social and political arrangements. 4 Locke thus
argues that legitimate political power amounts to a form of trust, a contract among members of
society anchored on their own consent, and seeks to preserve their lives, liberty and property. This trust
or social contract makes government legitimate and clearly defines the functions of government as
concerned, above all, with the preservation of the rights of the governed.
Even then, Locke believed that the people should be governed by a parliament elected by citizens who
owned property. Although he argued that the people were sovereign, he submitted that they should not
rule directly. Members of parliament represent their constituents and should vote as their constituents
wanted. The government's sole reason for being was to serve the individual by protecting his rights and
liberties. Although Locke's ideas were liberal, they fell short of the ideals of democracy. He spoke of a
"middle-class revolution" at a time when the British government was controlled by the aristocracy. While
he claimed that all people were equally possessed of natural rights, he advocated that political power be
devolved only to embrace the middle class by giving Parliament, which was controlled through the House
of Commons, the right to limit the monarchical power. He denied political power to the poor; they were
bereft of the right to elect members of Parliament.
Locke influenced Thomas Jefferson, the eminent statesman and philosopher of the (American) revolution
and of the first constitutional order which free men were permitted to establish." 5 But although Jefferson
espoused Locke's version of the social contract and natural law, he had respect for the common people
and participatory government. Jefferson believed that the people, including the ordinary folk, were the
only competent guardians of their own liberties, and should thus control their government. Discussing the
role of the people in a republic, Jefferson wrote to Madison from France in 1787 that "they are the only
sure reliance for the preservation of our liberties." 6
The wave of liberalism from Europe notwithstanding, a much more conservative, less democratic, and
more paternalistic system of government was originally adopted in the United States. The nation's
founders created a government in which power was much more centralized than it had been under the
Articles of Confederation and they severely restricted popular control over the government. 7 Many of the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 adhered to Alexander Hamilton's view that democracy
was little more than legitimized mob rule, a constant threat to personal security, liberty and property.
Thus, the framers sought to establish a constitutional republic, in which public policy would be made by
elected representatives but individual rights were protected from the tyranny of transient majorities. With
its several elitist elements and many limitations on majority rule, the framers' Constitution had
undemocratic strands.
The next two centuries, however, saw the further democratization of the federal Constitution. 8 The Bill of
Rights was added to the American Constitution and since its passage, America had gone through a
series of liberalizing eras that slowly relaxed the restraints imposed on the people by the new political
order. The changing social and economic milieu mothered by industrialization required political
democratization. 9 In 1787, property qualifications for voting existed and suffrage was granted only to
white males. At the onset of Jacksonion democracy in the 1830s, property requirements quickly
diminished and virtually became a thing of the past by the time of the Civil War. In 1870, the Fifteenth
Amendment theoretically extended the franchise to African-Americans, although it took another century of
struggle for the Amendment to become a reality. In 1920, the Nineteenth Amendment removed sex as a
qualification for voting. The Progressive Era also saw the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution to
provide for direct election of United States senators 10 and established procedures for initiative,
referendum and recall (otherwise known as direct democracy) in many states. 11 Poll taxes were
abolished as prerequisites for voting in federal elections through the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in 1964.

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Finally, the voting age was lowered to eighteen with the ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in
1971. 12
B. Constitutional History of Democracy
and Republicanism in the Philippines
The Malolos Constitution was promulgated on January 21, 1899 by the short-lived Revolutionary
Government headed by Emilio Aguinaldo after the Declaration of Independence from Spain on June 12,
1898. Article 4 of the Constitution declared the Philippines a Republic, viz:
Art. 4. The government of the Republic is popular, representative, alternative, and
responsible and is exercised by three distinct powers, which are denominated
legislative, executive and judicial . . .
Shortly after the promulgation of the Malolos Constitution, the Philippines fell under American rule. The
Americans adopted the policy of gradually increasing the autonomy of the Filipinos before granting their
independence. 13 In 1934, the U.S. Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie Law ". . . the last of the
constitutional landmarks studding the period of constitutional development of the Filipino people under the
American regime before the final grant of Philippine independence." 14 Under this law, the American
government authorized the Filipino people to draft a constitution in 1934 with the requirement that the
"constitution formulated and drafted shall be republican in form." In conformity with this
requirement, 15 Article II, Section 1 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution was adopted, viz:
Sec. 1. The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention understood this form of government to be that defined
by James Madison, viz:
We may define a republic to be a government which derives all its power directly or
indirectly from the great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding
offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is essential to
such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an
inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it. It is sufficient for such government
that the person administering it be appointed either directly or indirectly, by the people;
and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just
specified. 16 (emphases supplied)
The 1973 Constitution adopted verbatim Article II, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution. So did the 1987
Constitution. The delegates to the 1986 Constitutional Commission well understood the meaning of a
republican government. They adopted the explanation by Jose P. Laurel in his book, Bread and Freedom,
The Essentials of Popular Government,viz:
When we refer to popular government or republican government or representative
government, we refer to some system of popular representation where thepowers of
government are entrusted to those representatives chosen directly or indirectly by the
people in their sovereign capacity. 17 (emphasis supplied)
An outstanding feature of the 1987 Constitution is the expansion of the democratic space giving the
people greater power to exercise their sovereignty. Thus, under the 1987 Constitution, the people
can directly exercise their sovereign authority through the following modes, namely: (1) elections; (2)
plebiscite; (3) initiative; (4) recall; and (5) referendum. Through elections, the people choose the
representatives to whom they will entrust the exercise of powers of government. 18 In a plebiscite, the
people ratify any amendment to or revision of the Constitution and may introduce amendments to the
constitution. 19 Indeed, the Constitution mandates Congress to "provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or
approve or reject any law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body. . ." It also
directs Congress to "enact a local government code which shall provide for effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum." 20 Pursuant to this mandate, Congress enacted the Local Government
Code of 1991 which defines local initiative as the "legal process whereby the registered voters of a local
government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance through an election called for the
purpose." Recall is a method of removing a local official from office before the expiration of his term
because of loss of confidence. 21 In a referendum, the people can approve or reject a law or an issue of
national importance. 22 Section 126 of the Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local referendum

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as "the legal process whereby the registered voters of the local government units may approve, amend or
reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian."
These Constitutional provisions on recall, initiative, and referendum institutionalized the people's might
made palpable in the 1986 People Power Revolution. 23 To capture the spirit of People Power and to
make it a principle upon which Philippine society may be founded, the Constitutional Commission
enunciated as a first principle in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies under Section 1, Article II
of the 1987 Constitution that the Philippines is not only a republican but also a democratic state.
The following excerpts from the Records of the Constitutional Commission show the intent of the
Commissioners in emphasizing "democratic" in Section 1, Article II, in light of the provisions of the
Constitution on initiative, recall, referendum and people's organizations:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . May I call attention to Section 1. I wonder who among the members
of the committee would like to clarify this question regarding the use of the word
"democratic" in addition to the word "republican." Can the honorable members of the
committee give us the reason or reasons for introducing this additional expression?
Would the committee not be satisfied with the use of the word "republican"? What
prompted it to include the word "democratic"?
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think as a lawyer, the Commissioner knows that
one of the manifestations of republicanism is the existence of the Bill of Rights and
periodic elections, which already indicates that we are a democratic state. Therefore,
the addition of "democratic" is what we call "pardonable redundancy" the purpose being
to emphasize that our country is republican and democratic at the same time . . . In the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions, "democratic" does not appear. I hope the Commissioner
has no objection to that word.
MR. SUAREZ. No, I would not die for that. If it is redundant in character but it is
for emphasis of the people's rights, I would have no objection. I am only trying to clarify
the matter. 24 (emphasis supplied)
In other portions of the Records, Commissioner Nolledo explains the significance of the word
"democratic", viz.
MR. NOLLEDO. I am putting the word "democratic" because of the provisions that we
are now adopting which are covering consultations with the people. For example, we
have provisions on recall, initiative, the right of the people even to participate in
lawmaking and other instances that recognize the validity of interference by the people
through people's organizations . . . 25
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE. The Committee added the word "democratic" to "republican," and,
therefore, the first sentence states: "The Philippines is a republican and democratic
state."
May I know from the committee the reason for adding the word "democratic" to
"republican"? The constitutional framers of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were
content with "republican." Was this done merely for the sake of emphasis?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, that question has been asked several times, but
being the proponent of this amendment, I would like the Commissioner to know that
"democratic" was added because of the need to emphasize people power and the
many provisions in the Constitution that we have approved related to recall, people's
organizations, initiative and the like, which recognize the participation of the people in
policy-making in certain circumstances."
MR. OPLE. I thank the Commissioner. That is a very clear answer and I think it does
meet a need . . .
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. According to Commissioner Rosario Braid, "democracy" here is
understood as participatory democracy. 26 (emphasis supplied)
The following exchange between Commissioners Sarmiento and Azcuna is of the same import:
MR. SARMIENTO. When we speak of republican democratic state, are we referring to
representative democracy?
MR. AZCUNA. That is right.

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MR. SARMIENTO. So, why do we not retain the old formulation under the 1973
and 1935 Constitutions which used the words "republican state" because "republican
state" would refer to a democratic state where people choose their representatives?
MR. AZCUNA. We wanted to emphasize the participation of the people in government.
MR. SARMIENTO. But even in the concept "republican state," we are stressing the
participation of the people . . . So the word "republican" will suffice to cover popular
representation.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, the Commissioner is right. However, the committee felt that in view
of the introduction of the aspects of direct democracy such as initiative, referendum or
recall, it was necessary to emphasize the democratic portion of republicanism, of
representative democracy as well. So, we want to add the word "democratic" to
emphasize that in this new Constitution there are instances where the people would act
directly, and not through their representatives. 27 (emphasis supplied)
V. Elections and the Right to Vote
A. Theory
The electoral process is one of the linchpins of a democratic and republican framework because it is
through the act of voting that government by consent is secured. 28Through the ballot, people express
their will on the defining issues of the day and they are able to choose their leaders 29 in accordance with
the fundamental principle of representative democracy that the people should elect whom they please to
govern them. 30 Voting has an important instrumental value in preserving the viability of constitutional
democracy. 31 It has traditionally been taken as a prime indicator of democratic participation. 32
The right to vote or of suffrage is "an important political right appertaining to citizenship. Each individual
qualified to vote is a particle of popular sovereignty." 33 In People v. Corral, 34 we held that "(t)he modern
conception of suffrage is that voting is a function of government. The right to vote is not a natural right but
it is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons as are most likely
to exercise it for the public good." The existence of the right of suffrage is a threshold for the preservation
and enjoyment of all other rights that it ought to be considered as one of the most sacred parts of the
constitution. 35 In Geronimo v. Ramos, et al., 36 we held that the right is among the most important and
sacred of the freedoms inherent in a democratic society and one which must be most vigilantly guarded if
a people desires to maintain through self-government for themselves and their posterity a genuinely
functioning democracy in which the individual may, in accordance with law, have a voice in the form of his
government and in the choice of the people who will run that government for him. 37 The U.S: Supreme
Court recognized in Yick Wo v. Hopkins 38 that voting is a "fundamental political right, because [it
is] preservative of all rights." In Wesberry v. Sanders, 39 the U.S. Supreme Court held that "no right is
more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws,
under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to
vote is undermined." Voting makes government more responsive to community and individual needs and
desires. Especially for those who feel disempowered and marginalized or that government is not
responsive to them, meaningful access to the ballot box can be one of the few counterbalances in their
arsenal. 40
Thus, elections are substantially regulated for them to be fair and honest, for order rather than chaos to
accompany the democratic processes. 41 This Court has consistently ruled from as early as the oft-cited
1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo 42 that the purpose of election laws is to safeguard the will of the
people, the purity of elections being one of the most important and fundamental requisites of popular
government. We have consistently made it clear that we frown upon any interpretation of the law or the
rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but
also the correct ascertainment of the results. 43 To preserve the purity of elections, comprehensive and
sometimes complex election codes are enacted, each provision of which whether it governs the
registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process
itself inevitably affects the individual's right to vote. 44 As the right to vote in a free and unimpaired
manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the U.S.
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, 45 cautioned that any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to
vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized. It was to promote free, orderly and honest elections
and to preserve the sanctity of the right to vote that the Commission on Elections was

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created. 46 The 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC to ensure "free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections." 47
B. History of Suffrage in the Philippines
In primitive times, the choice of who will govern the people was not based on democratic principles. Even
then, birth or strength was not the only basis for choosing the chief of the tribe. When an old chief has
failed his office or committed wrong or has aged and can no longer function, the members of the tribe
could replace him and choose another leader. 48 Among the Muslims, a council or ruma
bechara chooses the sultan. An old sultan may appoint his successor, but his decision is not absolute.
Among the criteria for choosing a sultan were age, blood, wealth, fidelity to Islamic faith and exemplary
character or personality. 49 In times of crises, the community may choose its leader voluntarily,
irrespective of social status. By consensus of the community, a serf or slave may be voted the chief on
account of his ability.
As far back as the Spanish regime, the Filipinos did not have a general right of suffrage. 50 it was only in
the Malolos Constitution of 1899 that the right of suffrage was recognized; 51 it was a by-product of the
Filipinos' struggle against the Spanish colonial government and an offshoot of Western liberal ideas on
civil government and individual rights. 52 The life of the Malolos Constitution was, however, cut short by
the onset of the American regime in the Philippines. But the right of suffrage was reiterated in the
Philippine Bill of 1902. 53 The first general elections were held in 1907 54 under the first Philippine
Election Law, Act No. 1582, which took effect on January 15, 1907. This law was elitist and discriminatory
against women. The right of suffrage was carried into the Jones Law of 1916. 55 Whereas previously, the
right was granted only by the Philippine Legislature and thus subject to its control, the 1935
Constitution elevated suffrage to a constitutional right. 56 It also provided for a plebiscite on the issue of
whether the right of suffrage should be extended to women. On April 30, 1937; the plebiscite was held
and the people voted affirmatively. In the 1973 Constitution, 57 suffrage was recognized not only as a
right, but was imposed as a duty to broaden the electoral base and make democracy a reality through
increased popular participation in government. The voting age was lowered, the literacy requirement
abolished, and absentee voting was legalized. 58 The 1987 Constitution likewise enshrines the right of
suffrage in Article V, but unlike the 1973 Constitution, it is now no longer imposed as a duty. 59 The 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 60 and the 1976 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 61 also
protect the right of suffrage.
VI. Voter Information:
Prerequisite to a Meaningful Vote in a Genuinely Free,
Orderly and Honest Elections in a Working Democracy
A. Democracy, information and discourse on public matters
1. U.S. jurisdiction
For the right of suffrage to have a value, the electorate must be informed about public matters so that
when they speak through the ballot, the knowledgeable voice and not the ignorant noise of the majority
would prevail. Jefferson admonished Americans to be informed rather than enslaved by ignorance, saying
that "(i)f a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and
never will be." 62 Jefferson emphasized the importance of discourse in a democracy, viz:
In every country where man is free to think and to speak, differences of opinion arise
from difference of perception, and the imperfection of reason; but these differences
when permitted, as in this happy country, to purify themselves by discussion, are but as
passing clouds overspreading our land transiently and leaving our horizon more bright
and serene. 63
Other noted political philosophers like John Stuart Mill conceived of the "marketplace of ideas" as a
necessary means of testing the validity of ideas, viz:
(N)o one's opinions deserve the name of knowledge, except so far as he has either had
forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which
could have been required of him in carrying on an active controversy with
opponents. 64
In the same vein, political philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn, in his article "Free Speech Is An Absolute,"
stressed that, "(s)elf-government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity,
sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to
express." 65 To vote intelligently, citizens need information about their government. 66 Even during the
diaper days of U.S. democracy, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution postulated that self-governing

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people should be well-informed about the workings of government to make intelligent political choices. In
discussing the First Amendment, James Madison said: "The right of freely examining public characters
and measures, and of free communication thereon, is the only effectual guardian of every other right . .
." 67 Thus, the United States, a representative democracy, has generally subscribed to the notion that
public information and participation are requirements for a representative democracy where the electorate
make informed choices. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which establishes freedom of the
press and speech supports this proposition. The First Amendment's jealous protection of free expression
is largely based on the ideas that free and open debate will generate truth and that only an informed
electorate can create an effective democracy. 68
The First Amendment reflects the Framers' belief that public participation in government is inherently
positive. An informed citizenry is a prerequisite to meaningful participation in government. Thus, the U.S.
Congress embraced this principle more concretely with the passage of the Freedom of Information Act of
1966 (FOIA). 69 The law enhanced public access to and understanding of the operation of federal
agencies with respect to both the information held by them and the formulation of public policy. 70 In the
leading case on the FOIA, Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 71 Justice Douglas, in his dissent,
emphasized that the philosophy of the statute is the citizens' right to be informed about "what their
government is up to." 72 In Department of Air Force v. Rose, 73 the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged
that the basic purpose of the FOIA is "to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny". These rulings
were reiterated in the 1994 case of Department of Defense, et al. v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, et
al. 74Be that as it may, the U.S. Supreme Court characterized this freedom of information as a statutory
and not a constitutional right in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., et al., 75 viz: "there is no constitutional right to
have access to particular government information, or to require openness from the bureaucracy. . . The
Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act." 76 Neither the
courts nor Congress has recognized an affirmative constitutional obligation to disclose information
concerning governmental affairs; the U.S. Constitution itself contains no language from which the duty
could be readily inferred. 77 Nevertheless, the U.S. federal government, the fifty states and the District of
Columbia have shown their commitment to public access to government-held information. All have
statutes that allow varying degrees of access to government records. 78
While the right of access to government information or the "right to know" is characterized as a statutory
right, the right to receive information 79 was first identified by the U.S. Supreme Court as a constitutional
right in the 1936 case of Grosjean v. American Press Company. 80 The Court also stated that the First
Amendment protects the natural right of members of an organized society, united for their common good,
to impart and acquire information about their common interests. Citing Judge Cooley, the Court held
that free and general discussion of public matters is essential to prepare the people for an intelligent
exercise of their rights as citizens. 81 The Court also noted that an informed public opinion is the most
potent of all restraints upon misgovernment. Many consider Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council 82 the seminal "right to receive" case. 83 In this 1976 decision, the Court
struck down a Virginia statute forbidding pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs.
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun held that the free flow of information about commercial matters
was necessary to ensure informed public decision-making. He reasoned that the protection of the First
Amendment extends not only to the speaker, but to the recipient of the communication. Although the case
dealt with commercial speech, the majority opinion made it clear that the constitutional protection for
receipt of information would apply with even more force when more directly related to self-government
and public policy. 84
In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court highlighted the connection between self-government and the right to
receive information in Board of Education v. Pico. 85 This case involved a school board-ordered removal
of books from secondary school libraries after the board classified the book as "anti-American, antiChristian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy".86 Justice Brennan, writing for a three-justice plurality,
emphasized the First Amendment's role in assuring widespread dissemination of ideas and information.
Citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 87 the Court held that "(t)he State may not, consistently with the spirit of
the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge." The Court noted that "the right to
receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech,
press, and political freedom." It then cited Madison's admonition that, "(a) popular Government, without
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps

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both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must
arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." 88
The U.S. Supreme Court has reiterated, in various contexts, the idea that "the Constitution protects the
right to receive information and ideas." 89 Kleindienst v. Mandel 90acknowledged a First Amendment
right to receive information but deferring to Congress' plenary power to exclude aliens. Lamont v.
Postmaster General 91 invalidated a statutory requirement that foreign mailings of "communist political
propaganda" be delivered only upon request by the addressee. Martin v. City of Struthers 92 invalidated a
municipal ordinance forbidding door-to-door distribution of handbills as violative of the First Amendment
rights of both the recipients and the distributors. 93
Whether the "right to know" is based on a statutory right provided by the FOIA or a constitutional right
covered by the First Amendment, the underlying premise is that an informed people is necessary for a
sensible exercise of the freedom of speech, which in turn, is necessary to a meaningful exercise of the
right to vote in a working democracy. In 1927, Justice Louis Brandeis gave the principle behind the First
Amendment its classic formulation, viz:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make
men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the deliberative forces
should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of
liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty;
and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They
recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that
order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is
hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression;
that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of
safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the
power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced
by law the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies
of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and
assembly should be guaranteed. 94
The U.S. Supreme Court also held in Stromberg v. California 95 that the First Amendment provides "the
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means . . ." 96 The Amendment is "the repository of .
. . self-governing powers" 97 as it provides a peaceful means for political and social change through
public discussion. In Mills v. State of Alabama, 98 it ruled that there may be differences about
interpretations of the First Amendment, but there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose
of the Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes
discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is
operated or should be operated, all such matters relating to political processes. 99 Justice William J.
Brennan summarized the principle succinctly in his opinion for the Court in Garrison v. Louisiana, viz: ". . .
speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of selfgovernment. (emphasis supplied)" 100
2. Philippine jurisdiction
The electorate's right to information on public matters occupies a higher legal tier in the Philippines
compared to the United States. While the right to information in U.S. jurisdiction is merely a statutory right,
it enjoys constitutional status in Philippine jurisdiction. The 1987 Constitution not only enlarged the
democratic space with provisions on the electorate's direct exercise of sovereignty, but also highlighted
the right of the people to information on matters of public interest as a predicate to good governance and
a working democracy. The Bill of Rights sanctifies the right of the people to information under Section 7,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to

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official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as

basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. (emphasis supplied)
This provision of the right to information sans the phrase "as well as to government research data" made
its maiden appearance in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The original draft of the provision
presented to the 1971 Constitutional Convention merely said that access to official records and the right
to information "shall be afforded the citizens as may be provided by law." Delegate De la Serna pointed
out, however, that the provision did not grant a self-executory right to citizens. He thus proposed the
rewording of the provision to grant the right but subject to statutory limitations. 101 The 1973
Constitution thus provided in Section 6, Article IV, viz:
Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
The change in phraseology was important as in the pre-1973 case of Subido v. Ozaeta, 102 this Court
held that freedom of information or freedom to obtain information for publication is not guaranteed by the
constitution. In that case, the issue before the Court was whether the press and the public had a
constitutional right to demand the examination of the public land records. The Court ruled in the negative
but held that the press had a statutory right to examine the records of the Register of Deeds because the
interest of the press was real and adequate.
As worded in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, the right to information is self-executory. It is a public right
where the real parties in interest are the people. Thus, every citizen has "standing" to challenge any
violation of the right and may seek its enforcement. 103 The right to information, free speech and press
and of assembly and petition and association which are all enshrined in the Bill of Rights are cognate
rights for they all commonly rest on the premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion
which alone can protect and uphold the values of democratic government. 104
In "splendid symmetry" 105 with the right to information in the Bill of Rights are other provisions of
the 1987 Constitution highlighting the principle of transparency in government. Included among the State
Policies under Article II of the 1987 Constitution is the following provision, viz:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest. (emphasis supplied)
Related to the above provision is Section 21 of Article XI, National Economy and Patrimony, which
provides, viz:
Sec. 21. Foreign loans may be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of
the monetary authority. Information on foreign laws obtained or guaranteed by the
Government shall be made available to the public. (emphasis supplied)
The indispensability of access to information involving public interest and government transparency in
Philippine democracy is clearly recognized in the deliberations of the1987 Constitutional
Commission, viz:
MR. OPLE. Mr. Presiding Officer, this amendment is proposed jointly by
Commissioners Ople, Rama, Treas, Romulo, Regalado and Rosario Braid. It reads as
follows: "SECTION 24. THE STATE SHALL ADOPT AND IMPLEMENT A POLICY OF
FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF ALL ITS TRANSACTIONS SUBJECT TO
REASONABLE SAFEGUARDS ON NATIONAL INTEREST AS MAY BE PROVIDED
BY LAW."
xxx xxx xxx
In the United States, President Aquino has made much of the point that the
government should be open and accessible to the public. This amendment is by way of
providing an umbrella statement in the Declaration of Principles for all these safeguards
for an open and honest government distributed all over the draft Constitution. It
establishes a concrete, ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely
open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. 106 (emphasis
supplied)

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Commissioners Bernas and Rama made the following observations on the principle of government
transparency and the public's right to information:
FR. BERNAS. Just one observation, Mr. Presiding Officer. I want to comment that
Section 6 (referring to Section 7, Article III on the right to information) talks about the
right of the people to information, and corresponding to every right is a duty. In this
particular case, corresponding to this right of the people is precisely the duty of the
State to make available whatever information there may be needed that is of public
concern. Section 6 is very broadly stated so that it covers anything that is of public
concern. It would seem also that the advantage of Section 6 is that it challenges
citizens to be active in seeking information rather than being dependent on whatever
the State may release to them.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. There is a difference between the provisions under the Declaration of
Principles and the provision under the Bill of Rights. The basic difference is that the Bill
of Rights contemplates coalition (sic) (collision?) between the rights of the citizens and
the State. Therefore, it is the right of the citizen to demand information. While under the
Declaration of Principles, the State must have a policy, even without being demanded,
by the citizens, without being sued by the citizen, to disclose information and
transactions. So there is a basic difference here because of the very nature of the Bill
of Rights and the nature of the Declaration of Principles. 107(emphases supplied)
The importance of information in a democratic framework is also recognized in Section 24, Article II, viz:
Sec. 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in
nation-building. (emphasis supplied).
Section 10 of Article XVI, General Provisions is a related provision. It states, viz:
Sec. 10. The State shall provide the policy environment for the full development of
Filipino capability and the emergence of communication structures suitable to the
needs and aspirations of the nation and the balanced flow of information into, out of,
and across the country, in accordance with a policy that respects the freedom of
speech and of the press. (emphasis supplied)
The sponsorship speech of Commissioner Braid expounds on the rationale of these provisions on
information and communication, viz:
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. We cannot talk of the functions of communication unless we
have a philosophy of communication, unless we have a vision of society. Here we have
a preferred vision where opportunities are provided for participation by as many people,
where there is unity even in cultural diversity, for there is freedom to have options in a
pluralistic society. Communication and information provide the leverage for power.
They enable the people to act, to make decisions, to share consciousness in the
mobilization of the nation. 108 (emphasis supplied)
In Valmonte v. Belmonte, 109 the Court had occasion to rule on the right to information of a lawyer,
members of the media and plain citizens who sought from the Government Service Insurance System a
"list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who
were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal
note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos." 110 In upholding the petitioners' right, the Court explained the
rational of the right to information in a democracy, viz:
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy directly involving
the constitutional right to information. In Taada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24,
1985, 136 SCRA 27 (involving the need for adequate notice to the public of the various
laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens) and in the recent case of
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 530
(involving the concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil
service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles), the Court upheld the
people's constitutional right to be informed of matters of public interest and ordered the
government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by the petitioners.
xxx xxx xxx
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic
thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of

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issues thereon is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution.
The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the
people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate
within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information
on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and
caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The right of access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered
nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential
element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State
that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, thisopen
dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able
to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in a discussion are aware of
the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and
expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of
and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of
the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional
policies of full public disclosure (footnote omitted) and honesty in the public
service (footnote omitted). It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental
decision-making
as
well
as
in
checking
abuse
in
government. 111 (emphases supplied)
The Court made a similar ruling in Gonzales v. Narvasa 112 which involved the petitioner's request
addressed to respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora for the "names of the executive
officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients
of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacaang." 113 The respondent
was ordered to furnish the petitioner the information requested. The Court held, viz:
Under both the 1973 (footnote omitted) and 1987 Constitution, this (the right to
information) is a self-executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen before
the courts . . .
Elaborating on the significance of the right to information, the Court said in Baldoza v.
Dimaano (71 SCRA 14 [1976] . . .) that "[t]he incorporation of this right in the
Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in
a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's
problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to
information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society
to cope with the exigencies of the times." 114 (emphases supplied)
The importance of an informed citizenry in a working democracy was again emphasized in Chavez
v. Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation115 where we held, viz:
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest
reinforces the people's right to information on matters of public concern.
xxx xxx xxx
These twin provisions (on right to information under Section 7, Article III and the policy
of full public disclosure under Section 28, Article II) of the Constitution seek to promote
transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as
provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional
rights. These twin provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. If
the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and decisions to
citizens, whatever citizens may say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be
speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to hold
public officials "at all times . . . accountable to the people," (footnote omitted) for unless
citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for
anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions
leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An

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informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any

democracy. 116 (emphases supplied)
B. Elections and the voters' right to information on the elections
1. U.S. Jurisdiction
An informed citizenry's opinions and preferences have the most impact and are most clearly expressed in
elections which lie at the foundation of a representative democracy. The electorate's true will, however,
can only be intelligently expressed if they are well informed about the time, place, manner of conduct of
the elections and the candidates therein. Without this information, democracy will be a mere shibboleth
for voters will not be able to express their true will through the ballot.
In Duquette v. Merrill, 117 which the ponencia cites by reference to 26 American Jurisprudence 2d
292, 118 a vacancy in the office of Country Treasurer in York County occurred on July 24, 1944 upon
the death of the incumbent Maynard A. Hobbs. The vacancy was filled in accordance with the law
providing that the governor may appoint a resident of the county who shall be treasurer until the 1st day
of January following the next biennial election, at which said election a treasurer shall be chosen for the
remainder of the term, if any. The next biennial election was held on September 11, 1944. In the June
1944 primary election (prior to the death of Hobbs) where nominations of candidates for the upcoming
biennial elections were made, there was no nomination for the office of County Treasurer as Hobbes'
term was yet to expire on January 1947. Neither was a special primary election ordered by proclamation
of the Governor after Hobbes' death. Nor were other legal modes of nominating candidates such as
through nomination of a political party, convention of delegates or appropriate caucus resorted to.
Consequently, in the official ballot of the September 11, 1944 election, there was no provision made for
the selection of a County Treasurer to fill the vacancy for the unexpired term. The name of the office did
not appear on the ballot. Petitioner Duquette, however, claims that he was elected County Treasurer in
the special election because in the City of Biddeford, the largest city in York County, 1,309 voters either
wrote in the title of the office and his name thereunder, or used a "sticker" of the same import and voted
for him. At the September 11, 1944 biennial election, there were approximately 22,000 ballots cast, but
none included the name of the petitioner except for the 1,309 in Biddeford. In holding that the special
election was void, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court made the following pronouncements, the first
paragraph of which was cited by the ponencia in the case at bar, viz:
Although there is not unanimity of judicial opinion as to the requirement of official
notice; if the vacancy is to be filled at the time of a general election, yet it appears to be
almost universally held that if the great body of the electors are misled by the want of
such notice and are instead led to believe that no such election is in fact to be held, an
attempted choice by a small percentage of the voters is void. Wilson v. Brown, 109 Ky
229, 139 Ky 397, 58 SW 595; Wooton v. Wheeler, 149 Ky 62, 147 SW 914; Secord v.
Foutch, 44 Mich 89, 6 NW 110; Bolton v. Good, 41 NJL 296 (other citations omitted).
Notice to the electors that a vacancy exists and that an election is to be held to fill it for
the unexpired term, is essential to give validity to the meeting of an electoral body to
discharge that particular duty, and is also an essential and characteristic element of a
popular election. Public policy requires that it should be given in such form as to reach
the body of the electorate. Here there had been no nominations to fill the vacancy,
either by the holding of a special primary election, or by nomination by county political
conventions or party committees. The designation of the office to be filled was not upon
the official ballot. As before noted, except for the vacancy, it would have no place there,
as the term of office of the incumbent, if living, would not expire until January 1,
1947. 119 (emphases supplied)
As early as the 1897 case of People ex rel. Dix v. Kerwin, 120 the requirement of notice in an election has
been recognized, viz:
. . . We are not prepared to hold that this statute (requiring the giving of notice) is,
under all circumstances and at all times, so far mandatory that a failure to observe its
requirements will defeat an election otherwise regularly holden. There are many cases
which hold that elections regularly held and persons regularly voted for on nominations
made where there has been failure to observe some specific statutory requirement will
not thereby be necessarily defeated and the direction may, because of the excusing
circumstances, be held directory rather than mandatory. We do not believe the

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circumstances of the present case, as they are now exhibited, bring it all within this
rule. The theory of elections is that there shall be due notice given to the voters, and
that they must be advised either by a direct notice published by the clerk, as provided
by statute, or by proceedings taken by the voters and the people generally in such a
way as that it may be fairly inferred that it was generally and thoroughly well
understood that a particular office was to be filled at the election, so that the voters
should act understandingly and intelligently in casting their ballots.
xxx xxx xxx
Since there was no notice published according to the statutes, we may not assume that
the nomination was regularly made, or that the voters were duly notified that the office
was to be filled at that general election, nine days afterwards. It has been generally
held that some notice, regular in its form, and pursuant to the requirements of law, must
be given as a safeguard to popular elections, that the people may be informed for what
officers they are to vote. Of course, it might easily be true, as has already been
suggested, that, if nominations had been made for an office, certificates regularly filed,
and tickets regularly printed, even though the clerk had failed to publish his notice,
there would be no presumption that the body of the voters were uninformed as to their
rights and as to the positions which were to be filled. People v. Porter, 6 Cal.
26; Secord v. Foutch, 44 Mich 89, 6 N.W. 110; Adsit v. Osmun, 84 Mich. 420, 48 N.W.
31; Allen v. Glynn, 17 Colo. 338, 29 Pac. 670;Stephens v. People, 89 Ill.
337. 121 (emphases supplied)
Similarly, in Griffith v. Mercer County Court, et al., 122 it was held, viz:
There is a clear distinction between the case of a vacancy which is to be filled at a
special election to be held at a time and place to be appointed by some officer or
tribunal, authorized by statute to call it, and a case where the statute itself provides for
filling a vacancy at the next general election after it occurs. In such case nearly all the
authorities hold that if the body of electors do in fact know the vacancy exists, and
candidates are regularly nominated by the various political parties to fill it, and the
candidates receive most of the votes cast, such election is valid, even though no notice
thereof was published in a manner provided by the statute. It would be hypertechnical
and unreasonable to hold that a failure to comply literally with the statute in such case
would avoid the election. 123 (emphasis supplied)
In Duquette, Kerwin and Griffith, as in a great majority of cases on the state level, the mere fact that the
election to fill a vacancy occasioned by death, resignation, removal, or the like is held at the time of a
general election in accordance with a constitutional or statutory provision, is not regarded as sufficient in
itself to validate the election if no notice of the election was given; it has been held that in such a case, it
must be shown that a sufficient part of the electors have actual notice that the vacancy is to be filled. The
fact that a great percentage of voters cast their votes despite the failure of giving proper notice of the
elections appears to be the most decisive single factor to hold that sufficient actual notice was
given. 124 These doctrines were reiterated in Lisle, et al. vs. C.L. Schooler 125 where it was held that
mere allegation that "many" voters were informed that a special election to fill a vacancy was being held
was unsatisfactory proof of sufficient notice.
2. Philippine jurisdiction
In our jurisdiction, it is also the rule that the exercise of the right of suffrage should be an enlightened one,
hence, based on relevant facts, data and information. It is for this reason that the choice of
representatives in a democracy cannot be based on lottery or an y form of chance. The choice must be
based on enlightened judgment for democracy cannot endure the rule and reign of ignorance. This
principle was stressed by the Court in Tolentino v. Commission on Elections. 126 The issue before the
Court was whether the Constitutional Convention of 1971 had the power to call for a plebiscite for the
ratification by the people of a partial constitutional amendment. The amendment was the proposal to
lower the voting age to 18 but with the caveat that "(t)his partial amendment, which refers only to age
qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be
proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section or
in other portions of the entire Constitution." The Court ruled in the negative, emphasizing the necessity for
the voter to be afforded sufficient time and information to appraise the amendment, viz:

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. . . No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution the
Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means
of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can
say whether or not later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of
voters for each level of the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the
difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of
introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of
the existing social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a
voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the
voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention may establish and of
which presently he is not given any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an
amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only
sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the
amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with
which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the present state of things, where the
Convention has hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of
proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single
proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement. 127(emphasis supplied)
The need for the voter to be informed about matters which have a bearing on his vote was again
emphasized by the Court in UNIDO v. Commission on Elections. 128 This case involved the amendments
to the 1973 Constitution proposed by the Batasang Pambansa in 1981. The Court reiterated that the
more people are adequately informed about the proposed amendments, their exact meaning, implications
and nuances, the better. We held, viz:
To begin with, we cannot agree with the restrictive literal interpretation the Solicitor
General would want to give to the "free, orderly and honest elections" clause of Section
5, Article XII-C above-quoted. Government Counsel posits that the said clause refers
exclusively to the manner in which the elections are conducted, that is to say, with the
manner in which the voters are supposed to be allowed to vote. Perhaps, such a theory
may hold insofar as ordinary elections of officials are concerned. But the Court views
the provision as applicable also to plebiscites, particularly one relative to constitutional
amendments. Be it borne in mind that it has been one of the most steadfast rulings of
this Court in connection with such plebiscites that it is indispensable that they be
properly characterized to be fair submission by which is meant that the voters must
of necessity have had adequate opportunity, in the light of conventional wisdom, to cast
their votes with sufficient understanding of what they are voting on. We are of the firm
conviction that the charter's reference to honest elections connotes fair submission in a
plebiscite. (emphasis supplied).
Similarly, the Court ruled in Sanidad v. COMELEC 129 that plebiscite issues are matters of public
concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make
a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the
forum.
It cannot be overemphasized that an informed electorate is necessary for a truly free, fair and intelligent
election. The voting age was lowered from 21 years, to 18 years because the youth of 18 to 21 years did
not differ in political maturity, 130 implying that political maturity or the capacity to discern political
information is necessary for the exercise of suffrage. It is for this obvious reason that minors and the
insane are not allowed to vote. Likewise, the literacy test for the right to vote was abolished because as
explained by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
"the requirement to read and write was written into our constitution at a time when the only medium of
information was the printed word and even the public meetings were not as large and successful because
of the absence of amplifying equipment. It is a fact that today the vast majority of the population learn
about national matters much more from the audio-visual media, namely, radio and television, and public
meetings have become much more effective since the advent of amplifying equipment." Again, the
necessity of information relevant to an election is highlighted. Similarly, in the 1986 Constitutional

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Commission, Commissioner Bernas, in justifying enfranchisement of the illiterates, spoke of their access
to information relevant to elections, viz:
If we look at . . . the communication situation in the Philippines now, the means of
communication that has the farthest reach is AM radio. People get their information not
from reading newspapers but from AM radio farmers while plowing, and vendors
while selling things listen to the radio. Without knowing how to read and write, they are
adequately informed about many things happening in the country. 131
Several election cases, albeit not involving an issue similar to the case at bar, affirm the necessity of an
informed electorate in holding free, intelligent and clean elections. InBlo Umpar Adiong v. Commission on
Elections 132 where this Court nullified a portion of a COMELEC Resolution prohibiting the posting of
candidates' decals and stickers on "mobile" places and limiting their location to authorized posting areas,
we held, viz:
We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. (New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L.Ed. 686 [1964] . . .) Too many restrictions will deny to
people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of interest
essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest.
We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the
utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make
more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections,
36 SCRA 228 [1970]).
xxx xxx xxx
When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party
and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended
for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC
should lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen
and the State's power to regulate are not antagonistic. There can be no free and
honest elections if in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to
know are unduly curtailed.
xxx x xx xxx
. . . we have to consider the fact that in the posting of decals and stickers on cars and
other moving vehicles, the candidate needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. In
such a case, the prohibition would not only deprive the owner who consents to such
posting of the decals and stickers the use of his property but more important, in the
process, it would deprive the citizen of his right to free speech and information:
Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to
receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting
aside reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of
distribution, it must be fully preserved. (Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319
U.S. 141; 87 L. ed. 1313 [1943]). 133
To facilitate the people's right to information on election matters, this Court, in Telecommunications and
Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. COMELEC 134upheld the validity of COMELEC's
procurement of print space and airtime for allocation to candidates, viz:
With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC
Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can
advertise their qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving
candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide airtime
unless paid by the government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know.
Art. III, 7 of the Constitution provides that 'the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized . . . ' 135 (emphasis supplied)
The importance of the people's acquisition of information can be gleaned from several provisions of the
Constitution under Article IX (C), The Commission on Elections. Section 4 provides that the COMELEC is
given the power to "supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants,
special privileges or concession granted by the Government . . . Such supervision or regulation shall aim

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to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective
of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Section 6 provides that, "(a) free and
open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people". Section 2(5) of
the same article requires political parties, organizations and coalitions to present their platform or program
of government before these can be registered. In the robust and wide open debate of the electorate,
these programs of government are important matters for discussion.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on whether voting of Congressmen should be by
district or province also evince a clear concern for intelligent voting, viz:
SR. TAN. Mr. Presiding Officer, I think one of the drawbacks of our political system,
especially in the campaign, is that many of us vote by personality rather than by issue.
So I am inclined to believe that in the elections by district, that would be lessened
because we get to know the persons running more intimately. So we know their
motivation, their excesses, their weaknesses and there would be less chance for the
people to vote by personality. I was wondering whether the Commission shares the
same observation.
MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Presiding Officer, if it would be by province, the vote would no longer
be personalities but more on issues, because the relationship is not really very
personal. Whereas, if it would be by district, the vote on personality would be most
impressive and dominant.
SR. TAN. I cannot quite believe that. It would be like a superstar running around.
MR. DAVIDE. For instance; we have a district consisting of two municipalities. The vote
would be more on personalities. It is a question of attachment; you are the godson or
the sponsor of a baptism, like that. But if you will be voted by province, it's your merit
that will be counted by all others outside your own area. In short, the more capable you
are, the more chance you have of winning provincewide. 136
Several provisions of our election laws also manifest a clear intent to facilitate the voters' acquisition of
information pertaining to elections to the end that their vote would truly reflect their will. Section 52(j) of
Article VII of B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code gives the COMELEC the following power and
duty:
(j) Carry out a continuing and systematic campaign through newspapers of general
circulation, radios and other media forms to educate the public and fully inform the
electorate about election laws, procedures, decisions, and other matters relative to the
work and duties of the Commission and the necessity of clean, free, orderly and honest
electoral processes. (Sec. 185(k), 1978 EC)
(k) Enlist non-partisan groups or organizations of citizens from the civic, youth,
professional, educational, business or labor sectors known for their probity, impartiality
and integrity . . . Such groups or organizations . . . shall perform the following specific
functions and duties:
A. Before Election Day:
1. Undertake an information campaign on salient features of this Code and help in the
dissemination of the orders, decisions and resolutions of the Commission relative to the
forthcoming election. (emphasis supplied)
Section 87 of Article X of B.P. Blg. 881 also provides, viz:
Section 87. . . .
Public Forum. The Commission shall encourage non-political, non-partisan private
or civic organizations to initiate and hold in every city and municipality, public for at
which all registered candidates for the same office may simultaneously and personally
participate to present, explain, and/or debate on their campaign platforms and
programs and other like issues . . . (emphasis supplied)
Section 93 of the same Article provides, viz:
Section 93. Comelec information bulletin. The Commission shall cause the printing,
and supervise the dissemination of bulletins to be known as "Comelec Bulletin" which
shall be of such size as to adequately contain the picture, bio-data and program of

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government of every candidate. Said bulletin shall be disseminated to the voters or

displayed in such places as to give due prominence thereto. (emphasis supplied)
Of the same import is Section 25 of R.A. No. 8436, "An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to
Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 Elections and Subsequent Electoral Exercises"
which provides, viz:
Section 25. Voters' Education. The Commission together with and in support of
accredited citizens' arms shall carry out a continuing and systematic campaign though
newspapers of general circulation, radio and other media forms, as well as through
seminars, symposia, fora and other non-traditional means to educate the public and
fully inform the electorate about the automated election system and inculcate values on
honest, peaceful and orderly elections. (emphasis supplied)
Similarly, R.A. No. 9006, "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Election Practices," approved a few months before the May 2001 elections or on
February 12, 2001 provides in Section 6.4, viz:
Sec. 6.4. . . .
In all instances, the COMELEC shall supervise the use and employment of press, radio
and television facilities insofar as the placement of political advertisements is
concerned to ensure that candidates are given equal opportunities under equal
circumstances to make known their qualifications and their stand on public issueswithin
the limits set forth in the Omnibus Election Code and Republic Act No. 7166 on election
spending. (emphasis supplied)
The Omnibus Election Code also provides for procedures and requirements that make the election
process clear and orderly to avoid voter confusion. Article IX of the Code provides, viz:
Section 73. Certificate of candidacy. No person shall be eligible for any elective
public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed
herein.
xxx xxx xxx
No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election,
and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be
eligible for any of them . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Certificates of Candidacy, Certified List of Candidates. . . .
. . . the Commission shall cause to be printed certified lists of candidates containing the
names of all registered candidates for each office to be voted for in each province, city
or municipality immediately followed by the nickname or stage name of each candidate
duly registered in his certificate of candidacy and his political affiliation, if any. Said list
shall be posted inside each voting booth during the voting period.
xxx xxx xxx
The names of all registered candidates immediately followed by the nickname or stage
name shall also be printed in the election returns and tally sheets (R.A. No. 6646, Sec.
4)
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state
that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that
he is eligible for said office; . . .
Article XVI, Section 181 also provides, viz:
Section 181. Official ballots.
xxx xxx xxx
"(b) The official ballot shall also contain the names of all the officers to be voted for in
the election, allowing opposite the name of each office, sufficient space or spaces with
horizontal lines where the voter may write the name or names of individual candidates
voted for by him.
In the case of special elections, the need for notice and information is unmistakable under Section 7 of
the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, as amended by R.A. No. 7166, which provides, viz:
Sec. 7. Call for special election. In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the
Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the
term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier

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than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy.
However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the succeeding regular election. (R.A. No. 7166, Sec. 4).
The postponement, declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections
as provided in Sections 5, 6, and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by
the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members. The causes for the
declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on
the day of the election. (R.A. No. 7166, Sec. 4)
The Commission shall send sufficient copies of its resolution for the holding of the
election to its provincial election supervisors and election registrars for dissemination,
who shall post copies thereof in at least three conspicuous places preferably where
public meetings are held in each city or municipality affected. (1978 EC, Sec. 8)
(emphasis supplied)
In Hassan v. COMELEC, et al., 137 we ruled that constituents could not be charged with notice of a
second special elections held only two days after the failure of the special election. This case involved the
May 8, 1995 regular local elections in Madalum, Lanao del Sur. Due to the threats of violence and
terrorism in the area, there was a failure of election in six out of twenty-four precincts in Madalum. A
special elections was set on May 27, 1995 but the Board of Election Inspectors failed to report for duty
due to the threats of violence. The Monitoring Supervising Team of the COMELEC reset the special
elections to May 29, 1995 in a school 15 kilometers away from the designated polling places. In ruling
that the May 29 special elections was invalid, the Court ruled, viz:
We cannot agree with the COMELEC that petitioner, his followers or the constituents
must be charged with notice of the special elections to be held because of the failure of
the two (2) previous elections. To require the voters to come to the polls on such short
notice was highly impracticable. In a place marred by violence, it was necessary for the
voters to be given sufficient time to be notified of the changes and prepare themselves
for the eventuality.
It is essential to the validity of the election that the voters have notice in some form,
either actual or constructive of the time, place and purpose thereof . (Furste v. Gray,
240 Ky 604, 42 SW 2d 889; State ex. rel. Stipp v. Colliver (MO) 243 SW 2d 344.) The
time for holding it must be authoritatively designated in advance. The requirement of
notice even becomes stricter in cases of special elections where it was called by some
authority after the happening of a condition precedent, or at least there must be a
substantial compliance therewith so that it may fairly and reasonably be said that the
purpose of the statute has been carried into effect. (State ex. rel. Stipp v. Colliver,
supra). The sufficiency of notice is determined on whether the voters generally have
knowledge of the time, place and purpose of the elections so as to give them full
opportunity to attend the polls and express their will or on the other hand, whether the
omission resulted in depriving a sufficient number of the qualified electors of the
opportunity of exercising their franchise so as to change the result of the election.
(Housing Authority of County of Kings v. Peden, 212 Cal App 2d 276, 28 Cal Rptr,
other citations omitted)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . even in highly urbanized areas, the dissemination of notices poses to be a
problem. In the absence of proof that actual notice of the special elections has reached
a great number of voters, we are constrained to consider the May 29 elections as
invalid . . . (emphases supplied)
Although this case did not involve a special election held simultaneously with a general election by
mandate of law as in the case at bar, the doctrine that can be derived from this case is that the
electorate must be informed of the special election as proved by official or actual notice.
VII. Application of the Principles of Democracy, Republicanism,
Freedom of Information and Discourse to the Case at Bar
The 1987 Constitution, with its declaration that the Philippines is not only a republican but also a
democratic state, and its various provisions broadening the space for direct democracy unmistakably
show the framers' intent to give the Filipino people a greater say in government. The heart of democracy

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lies in the majoritarian rule but the majoritarian rule is not a mere game of dominant numbers. The
majority can rule and rule effectively only if its judgment is an informed one. With an informed electorate,
a healthy collision of ideas is assured that will generate sparks to fan the flames of democracy. Rule by
the ignorant majority is a sham democracy a mobocracy for in the words of Jefferson, a nation
cannot be both free and ignorant. If there is anything that democracy cannot survive, it is the virus of
ignorance.
Elections serve as a crevice in the democratic field where voters, for themselves and the public good,
plant the seeds of their ideals and freedoms. Yick Wo is emphatic that voting is a fundamental right that
preserves and cultivates all other rights. In a republic undergirded by a social contract, the threshold
consent of equal people to form a government that will rule them is renewed in every election where
people exercise their fundamental right to vote to the end that their chosen representatives will protect
their natural rights to life, liberty and property. It is this sacred contract which makes legitimate the
government's exercise of its powers and the chosen representatives' performance of their duties and
functions. The electoral exercise should be nothing less than a pure moment of informed judgment where
the electorate speaks its mind on the issues of the day and choose the men and women of the hour who
are seeking their mandate.
The importance of information and discourse cannot be overemphasized in a democratic and republican
setting. Our constitutional provisions and cases highlighting the people's right to information and the duty
of the State to provide information unmistakably recognize the indispensable need of properly informing
the citizenry so they can genuinely participate in and contribute to a functioning democracy. As elections
lie at the foundation of representative democracy, there should be no quarrel over the proposition that
electoral information should also be disseminated to the electorate as a predicate to an informed
judgment.
The ponencia concedes that a survey of COMELEC's resolutions relating to the conduct of the May 14,
2001 elections would reveal that they "contain nothing which would amount to a compliance, either strict
or substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended." Nowhere in its
resolutions or even its press releases did COMELEC state that it would hold a special election for a single
Senate seat with a three-year term simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Nor did
COMELEC give official notice of the manner by which the special election would be conducted, i.e., that
the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the election would be declared
winner in the special election. Still, the ponencia upheld the holding of the May 14, 2001 special election
despite "the lack of 'call' for such election and . . . lack of notice as to the office to be filled and the manner
by which the winner in the special election is to be determined."
With all due respect, I cannot subscribe to the ponencia's position for it leaves the purity of elections and
the ascertainment of the will of the electorate to chance, conjecture and speculation. Considering that
elections lie at the heart of the democratic process because it is through the act of voting that consent to
government is secured, I choose to take a position that would ensure, to the greatest extent possible, an
electorate that is informed, a vote that is not devalued by ignorance and an election where the consent of
the governed is clear and unequivocal.
The ponencia justifies its position on the lack of call or notice of the time and place of the special election
by holding that the law charges voters with knowledge of R.A. No. 7166 which provides that in case of a
vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding election, that is, the May 14, 2001 election. The ponencia's argument is that the provisions
of R.A. No. 7166 stating that the special election would be held simultaneously with the regular election
operated as a call for the election so that the absence of a call by the COMELEC did not taint the validity
of the special election. With due respect, this is not the intention of R.A. No. 7166 for despite its
paragraph 1, Section 7 that "in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the succeeding regular election", the law nevertheless required in paragraph 3 of the
same section that "(t)he Commission shall send sufficient copies of its resolution for the holding of the
election to its provincial election supervisors and election registrars for dissemination, who shall post
copies thereof in at least three conspicuous places preferably where public meetings are held in each city
or municipality affected."
The Duquette case cited by the ponencia does not lend support to its thesis that statutory notice suffices.
In Duquette, it was held that in the absence of an official notice of the special election mandated by law to
be held simultaneously with the general election, there should be actual notice of the electorate. Actual
notice may be proved by the voting of a significant percentage of the electorate for the position in the

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special election or by other acts which manifest awareness of the holding of a special election such as
nomination of candidates. In the case at bar, however, the number of votes cast for the special election
cannot be determined as the ballot did not indicate separately the votes for the special election. In fact,
whether or not the electorate had notice of the special election, a candidate would just the same fall as
the 13th placer because more than twelve candidates ran for the regular senatorial elections. Nobody
was nominated to vie specifically for the senatorial seat in the special election nor was there a certificate
of candidacy filed for that position. In the absence of official notice of the time, place and manner of
conduct of the special election, actual notice is a matter of proof. Respondents and the ponencia cannot
point to any proof of actual notice.
With respect to the lack of notice of the manner by which the special election would be conducted, i.e.,
that the 13th placer would be declared winner in the special election, there can be no debate that
statutory notice will not operate as notice to the electorate as there is no law providing that a special
election held simultaneously with a general election could be conducted in the manner adopted by the
Senate and the COMELEC. Instead, the ponencia buttresses its holding by stating that the petitioner has
not claimed nor proved that the failure of notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the
result of the special senatorial election. It relies on "actual notice from many sources, such as media
reports of the enactment of R.A. No. 6645 and election propaganda during the campaign" but without
even identifying these media reports and election propaganda. Suffice to state that before
the ponencia can require proof that a sufficient number of voters was misled during the May 14, 2001
elections, it must first be shown that in the absence of official notice of the procedure for the special
election, there was nevertheless actual notice of the electorate so that the special election could be
presumed to be valid. Only then will the duty arise to show proof that a sufficient number of voters was
misled to rebut the presumption of validity.
I respectfully submit that the electorate should have been informed of the time, place and manner of
conduct of the May 14, 2001 special election for the single senatorial seat for the unexpired term of
former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Tolentino, UNIDO, Blo Umpar Adiong and Hassan all deepened
the doctrine that a meaningful exercise of the right of suffrage in a genuinely free; orderly and honest
election is predicated upon an electorate informed on the issues of the day, the programs of government
laid out before them, the candidates running in the election and the time, place and manner of conduct of
the election. It is for this reason that the Omnibus Election Code is studded with processes; procedures
and requirements that ensure voter information.
Bince and Benito further teach us that free and intelligent vote is not enough; correct ascertainment of the
will of the people is equally necessary. The procedure adopted in the case at bar for holding the May 14,
2001 special senatorial election utterly failed to ascertain the people's choice in the special election.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7166 provides that the "special election shall be held simultaneously with such
general election." It does not contemplate, however, the integration of the special senatorial election into
the regular senatorial election whereby candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for the regular
elections also automatically stand as candidates in the special election. TheOmnibus Election Code is
crystal clear that a candidate can run for only one position in an election. Consequently; there were no
candidates in the special election to vote for. Separate sets of candidates for the special election and the
regular elections are decisive of the election results. Each independent-minded voter could have a variety
of reasons for choosing a candidate to serve for only the unexpired term of three years instead of the
regular term of six years or not choosing a candidate at all. A voter might choose a neophyte to serve the
three-year term as a shorter trial period. Another might be minded to choose an old-timer to compel him
to hasten the completion of his projects in a shorter period of three years. Still another might want to
afford a second termer who has not performed too satisfactorily a second chance to prove himself but not
for too long a period of six years. In not allowing the voter to separately indicate the candidate he voted
for the three-year senatorial term, the voter was deprived of his right to make an informed judgment
based on his own reasons and valuations. Consequently, his true will in the special election was not
ascertained. As a particle of sovereignty, it is the thinking voter who must determine who should win in
the special election and not the unthinking machine that will mechanically ascertain the 13th placer in the
general election by mathematical computations.
The models to follow in the conduct of special elections mandated by law to be held simultaneously with a
general elections are the special elections of November 13, 1951 and November 8, 1955 to fill the seats
vacated by then Senators Fernando Lopez and Carlos P. Garcia, respectively. In these special senatorial

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elections, election activitiesprior (i.e., filing of certificate of candidacies), during (i.e., the act of voting for a
special election candidate distinct from the candidates for the regular election) and after the election (i.e.,
tallying and canvassing of results) were conducted simultaneously with, but distinctly from the regular
senatorial elections. This procedure minimized voter confusion and allowed the voter to freely and
accurately speak his mind and have his will truly ascertained. Regrettably, this objective appears to have
been lost in the calling of the May 14, 2001 special election as can be gleaned from the Senate
deliberations on the resolution calling for that election, viz:
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD) Mr. President, in this resolution, we are leaving the mechanics to
the Commission on Elections. But personally, I would like to suggest that probably, the
candidate obtaining the 13th largest number of votes be declared as elected to fill up
the unexpired term of Senator Guingona.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA]. (J). Is there a law that would allow the Comelec to conduct
such an election? Is it not the case that the vacancy is for a specific office? I am really
at a loss. I am rising here because I think it is something that we should consider. I do
not know if we can . . . No, this is not a Concurrent Resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. May we solicit the legal wisdom of the Senate President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. May I share this information that under Republic Act No. 6645,
what is needed is a resolution of this Chamber calling attention to the need for the
holding of a special election to fill up the vacancy created, in this particular case, by the
appointment of our colleague, Senator Guingona, as Vice President.
It can be managed in the Commission on Elections so that a slot for the particular
candidate to fill up would be that reserved for Mr. Guingona's unexpired term. In other
words, it can be arranged in such a manner.
xxx xxx xxx
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco is recognized.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest, subject to a one-minute caucus, wordings to
the effect that in the simultaneous elections, the 13th placer be therefore deemed to be
the special election for this purpose. So we just nominate 13 and it is good for our
colleagues. It is better for the candidates. It is also less expensive because the ballot
will be printed and there will be less disenfranchisement.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. If we can just deem it therefore under this resolution to be such a
special election, maybe, we satisfy the requirement of the law.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. In other words, this shall be a guidance for the Comelec.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. to implement.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec will not have the flexibility.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already consider the 13th placer of the forthcoming
elections that will be held simultaneously as a special election under this law as we
understand it.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. That will be a good compromise, Senator Roco.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the sponsor can introduce that later, maybe it will be
better, Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the sponsor say?
S[ENATOR] [T]ATAD. Mr. President, that is a most satisfactory proposal because I do
not believe that there will be anyone running specifically
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Correct.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. to fill up this position for three years and campaigning
nationwide.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Actually, I think what is going to happen is the 13th candidate will
be running with specific groups.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever gets No. 13.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. I think we can specifically define that as the intent of this
resolution.

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S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Subject to style, we accept that amendment and if there will be
no other amendment, I move for the adoption of this resolution.
ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934
If there are not other proposed amendments, I move that we adopt this resolution.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. There is a motion to adopt this resolution. Is there any objection?
[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved. 138 (emphases supplied)
The Senate's observation that the procedure for the special election that it adopted would be less costly
for the government as the ballots need not be printed again to separately indicate the candidate voted for
the special election does not also lend justification for the manner of conduct of the May 14, 2001 special
election. We cannot bargain the electorate's fundamental right to vote intelligently with the coin of
convenience. Even with the Senate stance, the regular ballot had to be modified to include a thirteenth
space in the list of senatorial seats to be voted for. At any rate, reliance on R.A. No. 6645 is erroneous.
This law provides that when a vacancy arises in the Senate, the Senate, by resolution, certifies to the
existence of the vacancy and calls for a special election. Upon receipt of the resolution, the COMELEC
holds the special election. R.A. No. 6645 was amended in 1991 by R.A. No. 7166. The latter law provides
that when a permanent vacancy occurs in the Senate at least one year before the expiration of the term,
"the Commission (on Elections) shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy . . ." Since
under R.A. No. 7166, it is the power and duty of the COMELEC, and not the Senate, to call and hold the
election, the Senate cannot, by mere resolution, impose upon the COMELEC the procedure for the
special election that it intended such that "Comelec will not have the flexibility" to deviate therefrom. As a
constitutional body created to ensure "free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections", it was the
duty of the COMELEC to give to the electorate notice of the time, place and manner of conduct of the
special elections and to adopt only those mechanisms and procedures that would ascertain the true will of
the people.
In sum, I submit that the ruling of the ponencia would result not just to a step back in an age of
information, but would constitute a fall in the nation's rise to democracy begun as early as the Malolos
Constitution and begun anew in the 1987 Constitution after the 1986 People Power Revolution. Informing
the electorate on the issues and conduct of an election is a prerequisite to a "free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections." Free elections does not only mean that the voter is not physically
restrained from going to the polling booth, but also that the voter is unrestrained by the bondage of
ignorance. We should be resolute in affirming the right of the electorate to proper information. The Court
should not forfeit its role as gatekeeper of our democratic government run by an informed majority. Let us
not open the door to ignorance. HSDIaC
I vote to grant the petition.

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EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127116. April 8, 1997.]
ALEX L. DAVID, in his own behalf as Barangay Chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7,
Kalookan City and as President of the LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY SA
PILIPINAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY, Department of Interior and Local Government, and THE
HONORABLE
SECRETARY,
Department
of
Budget
and
Management, respondents.
[G.R. No. 128039. April 8, 1997.]
LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY QUEZON CITY CHAPTER, Represented by
BONIFACIO M. RILLON, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.
Marciano J . Cagatan for petitioner in G.R. No. 127116.
Florencio E. Dela Cruz for petitioner in G.R. No. 128039.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE (RA 7160); TERM OF OFFICE OF
BARANGAY OFFICIAL LIMITED TO THREE (3) YEARS. For some time, the laws governing barrio
governments were found in the Revised Administrative Code of 1916 and later in the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917. Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, "a Punong Barangay
(Barangay Captain) and six Kagawads ng Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Councilmen) had a term of
six years which begun on June 7, 1982. The Local Government Code of 1983 also fixed the term of office
of local elective officials at six years. B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, reiterated that Barangay
officials "shall hold office for six years." Under RA 6653, the term of office of the barangay officials was
cut to five years and the punong barangay was to be chosen from among themselves by seven
kagawads, who in turn were to be elected at large by the barangay electorate. But the election date set
by RA 6653 was again postponed and reset and their term was fixed to five years. Under the Local
Government Code of 1991, RA 7160, several provisions concerning barangay officials were introduced:
Theterm of office was reduced to three years. In light of the foregoing brief historical background, the
intent and design of the legislature to limit the term of barangay officials to only three (3) years as
provided under the Local Government Code emerges as bright as the sunlight. The cardinal rule in the
interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law.
2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; A LATER LAW REPEALS AN EARLIER ONE; RA 6679 REPEALED
BY RA 7160. RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that
in case of an irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later enactment
prevails. Legis posteriores priores contraries abrogant. The rationale is simple: a later law repeals an
earlier one because it is the later legislative will. It is to be presumed that the lawmakers knew the older
law and intended to change it. In enacting the older law, the legislators could not have known the newer
one and hence could not have intended to change what they did not know. Under the Civil Code, laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones and not the other way around. Under Sec. 43-c of RA 7160, the
term of office of barangay officials was fixed at "three (3) years which shall begin after the regular election
of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994." This provision is clearly inconsistent with and
repugnant to Sec. 1 of RA 6679 which states that such "term shall be for five years." Note that both laws
refer to the same officials who were elected "on the second Monday of May 1994." RA 7160 is a special
law insofar as it governs the term of office of barangay officials. In its repealing clause, RA 7160 states
that "all general and special laws . . . which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly." There being a clear repugnance and incompatibility between
the two specific provisions, they cannot stand together. The later law, RA 7160, should thus prevail in
accordance with its repealing clause. When a subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of
the former enactments, the latter is deemed repealed.
3. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWS; TO STRIKE DOWN A LAW AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL THERE MUST BE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL SHOWING THAT WHAT THE
CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS, THE STATUTE PERMITS. Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal (not just
implied) breach of the Constitution. To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and

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unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute permits. The petitioners have
miserably failed to discharge this burden and to show clearly the unconstitutionality they aver.
4. ID.; ID.; RA 7160; SECTION 43-C THERETO, CONSTITUTIONAL. There is absolutely no doubt in
our mind that Sec. 43-c of RA 7160 is constitutional. Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution limiting the
term of all elective local officials to three years, except that of barangay officials which "shall be
determined by law" was an amendment proposed by Constitutional Commissioner (now Supreme
Court Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr. According to Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., the amendment was
"readily accepted without much discussion and formally approved." To the question at issue here on how
long the term of barangay officials is, the answer of the Commission was simple, clear and quick: "As may
be determined by law"; more precisely, "(a)s provided for in the Local Autonomy Code." And the Local
Autonomy Code, in its Sec. 43-c, limits their term to three years.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL; BARANGAY OFFICIALS ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RA 7160 WHERE THEY RAN FOR AND WERE ELECTED
TO THEIR OFFICES UNDER SAID LAW; CASE AT BAR. As pointed out by Amicus Curiae Pimentel,
petitioners are barred by estoppel from pursuing their petitions. Respondent Commission on Elections
submitted as Annex "A" of its memorandum, a machine copy of the certificate of candidacy of Petitioner
Alex L. David in the May 9, 1994 barangay elections, the authenticity of which was not denied by said
petitioner. In said certificate of candidacy, be expressly stated under oath that he was announcing his
"candidacy for the office of punong barangay for barangay 77, Zone 7" of Kalookan City and that he was
"eligible for said office." If, as claimed by petitioners, the applicable law is RA 6679, then (1) Petitioner
David should not have run and could not have been elected chairman of his barangay because under RA
6679, there was to be no direct election for the punong barangay; the kagawad candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes was to be automatically elected barangay chairman; (2) thus, applying said
law, the punong barangay should have been Ruben Magalona, who obtained the highest number of votes
among the kagawads 150, which was much more than David's 112; (3) the electorate should have
elected only seven kagawads and not one punong barangay plus seven kagawads. In other words,
following petitioners' own theory, the election of Petitioner David as well as all the barangay chairmen of
the two Liga petitioners was illegal. The sum total of these absurdities in petitioners theory is that
barangay officials are estopped from asking for any term other than that which they ran for and were
elected to, under the law governing their very claim to such offices: namely, RA 7160 the Local
Government Code. Petitioners' belated claim of ignorance as to what law governed their election to office
in 1994 is unacceptable because under Art. 3 of the Civil Code, "(i)gnorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith."
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The two petitions before us raise a common question: How long is the term of office of barangay
chairmen and other barangay officials who were elected to their respective offices on the second Monday
of May 1994? Is it three years, as provided by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code) or five years, as
contained in RA 6679? Contending that their term is five years, petitioners ask this Court to order the
cancellation of the scheduled barangay election this coming May 12, 1997 and to reset it to the second
Monday of May, 1999. cda
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 127116
In his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as president of the Liga
ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, Petitioner Alex L. David filed on December 2, 1996 a petition for
prohibition docketed in this Court as G.R. No. 127116, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to prohibit the
holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997. On January 14, 1997,
the Court resolved to require the respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period
of fifteen days ending on January 29, 1997.
On January 29, 1997, the Solicitor General filed his four-page Comment siding with petitioner and praying
that "the election scheduled on May 12, 1997 be held in abeyance." Respondent Commission on
Elections filed a separate Comment, dated February 1, 1997 opposing the petition. On February 11,
1997, the Court issued a Resolution giving due course to the petition and requiring the parties to file
simultaneous memoranda within a non-extendible period of twenty days from notice. It also requested
former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. 1 to act as amicus curiae and to file a memorandum also within a
non-extendible period of twenty days. It noted but did not grant petitioner's Urgent Motion for Issuance of

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Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated January 31, 1997 (as well as his
Urgent Ex-Parte Second Motion to the same effect, dated March 6, 1997). Accordingly, the parties filed
their respective memoranda. The Petition for Leave to Intervene filed on March 17, 1997 by Punong
Barangay Rodson F. Mayor was denied as it would just unduly delay the resolution of the case, his
interest like those of all other barangay officials being already adequately represented by Petitioner David
who filed this petition as "president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas."
G.R. No. 128039
On February 20, 1997, Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter represented by its
president Bonifacio M. Rillon filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 128039, "to seek a judicial review by
certiorari to declare as unconstitutional:
"1. Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which reads as follows:
'(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan
shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular election of
barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.'
2. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of the
barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities related thereto;
3. The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in Republic Act No.
8250 otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1997 intended to
defray the costs and expenses, in holding the 1997 barangay elections;" 2
Comelec Resolution 2880, 3 promulgated on December 27, 1996 and referred to above, adopted a
"Calendar of Activities and List and Periods of Certain Prohibited Acts for the May 12, 1997 Barangay
Elections." On the other hand, Comelec Resolution 2887 promulgated on February 5, 1997 moved certain
dates fixed in Resolution 2880. 4
Acting on the petition, the Court on February 25, 1997 required respondents to submit their comment
thereon within a non-extendible period of ten days ending on March 7, 1997. The Court further resolved
to consolidate the two cases inasmuch as they raised basically the same issue. Respondent Commission
filed its Comment on March 6, 19975 and the Solicitor General, in representation of the other respondent,
filed his on March 6, 1997. Petitioner's Urgent Omnibus Motion for oral argument and temporary
restraining order was noted but not granted. The petition was deemed submitted for resolution by the
Court without need of memoranda.
The Issues
Both petitions though worded differently raise the same ultimate issue: How long is the term of office of
barangay officials?
Petitioners 6 contend that under Sec. 2 of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6653, approved on May 6, 1988, "(t)he
term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years . . ." This is reiterated in Republic Act No.
6679, approved on November 4, 1988, which reset the barangay elections from "the second Monday of
November 1988" to March 28, 1989 and provided in Sec. 1 thereof that such five-year term shall begin on
the "first day of May 1989 and ending on the thirty-first day of May 1994." Petitioners further aver 7 that
although Sec. 43 of RA 7160 reduced the term of office of all local elective officials to three years, such
reduction does not apply to barangay officials because (1) RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to
barangays while RA 7160 is a general law which applies to all other local government units; (2) RA
7160 does not expressly or impliedly repeal RA 6679 insofar as the term of barangay officials is
concerned; (3) while Sec. 8 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution fixes the term of elective local officials at
three years, the same provision states that the term of barangay officials "shall be determined by law";
and (4) thus, it follows that the constitutional intention is to grant barangay officials any term, except three
years; otherwise, "there would be no rhyme or reason for the framers of the Constitution to except
barangay officials from the three year term found in Sec. 8 (of) Article X of the Constitution." Petitioners
conclude (1) that the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion when it promulgated
Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 because it "substituted its own will for that of the legislative and usurped
the judicial function . . . by interpreting the conflicting provisions of Sec. 1 of RA 6679 and Sec. 43 (c)
of RA 7160; and (2) that the appropriation of P400 million in the General Appropriation Act of 1997 (RA
8250) to be used in the conduct of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997 is itself unconstitutional and a
waste of public funds. cdta

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The Solicitor General agrees with petitioners, arguing that RA 6679 was not repealed by RA 7160 and
thus "he believes that the holding of the barangay elections (o)n the second Monday of May 1997 is
without sufficient legal basis."
Respondent Commission on Elections, through Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo, defends its assailed
Resolutions and maintains that the repealing clause of RA 7160 includes "all laws, whether general or
special, inconsistent with the provisions of the Local Government Code," citing this Court's dictum
in Paras vs. Comelec 8 that "the next regular election involving the barangay office is barely seven (7)
months away, the same having been scheduled in May 1997." Furthermore, RA 8250 (the General
Appropriations Act for 1997) and RA 8189 (providing for a general registration of voters) both "indicate
that Congress considered that the barangay elections shall take place in May, 1997, as provided for in RA
7160, Sec. 43 (c)." 9 Besides, petitioners cannot claim a term of more than three years since they were
elected under the aegis of the Local Government Code of 1991 which prescribes a term of only three
years. Finally, Respondent Comelec denies the charge of grave abuse of discretion stating that the
"question presented . . . is a purely legal one involving no exercise of an act without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion." 10
As amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. urges the Court to deny the petitions because
(1) the Local Autonomy Code repealed both RA 6679 and 6653 "not only by implication but by design as
well"; (2) the legislative intent is to shorten the term of barangay officials to three years; (3) the barangay
officials should not have a term longer than that of their administrative superiors, the city and municipal
mayors; and (4) barangay officials are estopped from contesting the applicability of the three-year term
provided by the Local Government Code as they were elected under the provisions of said Code.
From the foregoing discussions of the parties, the Court believes that the issues can be condensed into
three, as follows:
1. Which law governs the term of office of barangay officials: RA 7160 or RA 6679?
2. Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years constitutional?
3. Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that provided under RA
7160?
The Court's Ruling
The petitions are devoid of merit.
Brief Historical Background of Barangay Elections
For a clear understanding of the issues, it is necessary to delve briefly into the history of barangay
elections.
As a unit of government, the barangay antedated the Spanish conquest of the Philippines. The word
"barangay" is derived from the Malay "balangay," a boat which transported them (the Malays) to these
shores. 11 Quoting from Juan de Plasencia, a Franciscan missionary in 1577, Historian Conrado
Benitez 12 wrote that the barangay was ruled by adato who exercised absolute powers of government.
While the Spaniards kept the barangay as the basic structure of government, they stripped
the dato or rajah of his powers. 13 Instead, power was centralized nationally in the governor general and
locally in the encomiendero and later, in the alcalde mayor and the gobernadorcillo. The datoor rajah was
much later renamed cabeza de barangay, who was elected by the local citizens possessing property. The
position degenerated from a title of honor to that of a "mere government employee. Only the poor who
needed a salary, no matter how low, accepted the post." 14
After the Americans colonized the Philippines, the barangays became known as "barrios." 15 For some
time, the laws governing barrio governments were found in the Revised Administrative Code of 1916 and
later in the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. 16 Barrios were granted autonomy by the original Barrio
Charter, RA 2370, and formally recognized as quasi-municipal corporations 17 by the Revised Barrio
Charter, RA 3590. During the martial law regime, barrios were "declared" or renamed "barangays" a
reversion really to their pre-Spanish names by PD. No. 86 and PD No. 557. Their basic organization
and functions under RA 3590, which was expressly "adopted as the Barangay Charter," were retained.
However, the titles of the officials were changed to "barangay captain," "barangay councilman,"
"barangay secretary" and "barangay treasurer."
Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, 18 "a Punong Barangay (Barangay Captain) and six
Kagawads ng Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Councilmen), who shall constitute the presiding officer
and members of the Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Council) respectively" were first elected on May
17, 1982. They had a term of six years which began on June 7, 1982. cdti

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The Local Government Code of 1983 19 also fixed the term of office of local elective officials at six
years. 20 Under this Code, the chief officials of the barangay were the punong barangay, six elective
sangguniang barangay members, the kabataang barangay chairman, a barangay secretary and a
barangay treasurer. 21
B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, 22 reiterated that barangay officials "shall hold office for six
years," and stated that their election was to be held "on the second Monday of May nineteen hundred and
eighty eight and on the same day every six years thereafter." 23
This election scheduled by B.P. Blg. 881 on the second Monday of May 1988 was reset to "the second
Monday of November 1988 and every five years thereafter" 24 by RA 6653. Under this law, the term of
office of the barangay officials was cut to five years 25 and the punong barangay was to be chosen from
among themselves by seven kagawads, who in turn were to be elected at large by the barangay
electorate. 26
But the election date set by RA 6653 on the second Monday of November 1988 was again "postponed
and reset to March 28, 1989" by RA 6679, 27 and the term of office of barangay officials was to begin on
May 1, 1989 and to end on May 31, 1994. RA 6679 further provided that "there shall be held a regular
election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994 and on the same day every five (5)
years thereafter. Their term shall be for five years . . ." 28 Significantly, the manner of election of the
punong barangay was changed. Sec. 5 of said law ordained that while the seven kagawads were to be
elected by the registered voters of the barangay, "(t)he candidate who obtains the highest number of
votes shall be the punong barangay and in the event of a tie, there shall be a drawing of lots under the
supervision of the Commission on Elections."
Under the Local Government Code of 1991, RA 7160, 29 several provisions concerning barangay officials
were introduced.
(1) The term of office was reduced to three years, as follows:
"SEC. 43. Term of Office.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan
shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay
officials on the second Monday of May, 1994" (Emphasis supplied.)
(2) The composition of the Sangguniang Barangay and the manner of electing its officials were altered,
inter alia, the barangay chairman was to be elected directly by the electorate, as follows:
SEC. 387. Chief Officials and Offices. (a) There shall be in each barangay a punong
barangay, seven (7) sangguniang barangay members, the sangguniang kabataan
chairman, a barangay secretary and a barangay treasurer.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 390. Composition. The Sangguniang barangay, the legislative body of the
barangay, shall be composed of the punong barangay as presiding officer, and the
seven (7) regular sangguniang barangay members elected at large and the
sangguniang kabataan chairman as members."
SEC. 41. Manner of Election. (a) The . . . punong barangay shall be elected at
large . . .by the qualified voters" in the barangay." (Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to the foregoing mandates of the Local Autonomy Code, the qualified barangay voters actually
voted for one punong barangay and seven (7) kagawads during the barangay elections held on May 9,
1994. In other words, the punong barangay was elected directly and separately by the electorate, and not
by the seven (7) kagawads from among themselves.
The First Issue: Clear Legislative Intent
and Design to Limit Term to Three Years
In light of the foregoing brief historical background, the intent and design of the legislature to limit the term
of barangay officials to only three (3) years as provided under the Local Government Code emerges as
bright as the sunlight. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the law. 30 And three years is the obvious intent.
First. RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that in case of
an irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails. 31 Legis
posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. The rationale is simple: a later law repeals an earlier one
because it is the later legislative will. It is to be presumed that the lawmakers knew the older law and

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intended to change it. In enacting the older law, the legislators could not have known the newer one and
hence could not have intended to change what they did not know. Under the Civil Code, laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones 32 and not the other way around.
Under Sec. 43-c of RA 7160, the term of office of barangay officials was fixed at "three (3) years which
shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994." This
provision is clearly inconsistent with and repugnant to Sec. 1 of RA 6679 which states that such "term
shall be for five years." Note that both laws refer to the same officials who were elected "on the second
Monday of May 1994". cdpr
Second. RA 6679 requires the barangay voters to elect seven kagawads and the candidate obtaining the
highest number of votes shall automatically be the punong barangay.RA 6653 empowers the seven
elected barangay kagawads to select the punong barangay from among themselves. On the other hand,
the Local Autonomy Code mandates a direct vote on the barangay chairman by the entire barangay
electorate, separately from the seven kagawads. Hence, under the Code, voters elect eight barangay
officials, namely, the punong barangay plus the seven kagawads. Under both RA 6679 and 6653, they
vote for only seven kagawads, and not for the barangay chairman.
Third. During the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994 (second Monday), the voters actually and
directly elected one punong barangay and seven kagawads. If we agree with the thesis of petitioners, it
follows that all the punong barangays were elected illegally and thus, Petitioner Alex David cannot claim
to be a validly elected barangay chairman, much less president of the national league of barangays which
he purports to represent in this petition. It then necessarily follows also that he is not the real party-ininterest and on that ground, his petition should be summarily dismissed.
Fourth. In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997, 33 Congress appropriated the amount of P400
million to cover expenses for the holding of barangay elections this year. Likewise, under Sec. 7 of RA
8189, Congress ordained that a general registration of voters shall be held" immediately after the
barangay elections in 1997." These are clear and express contemporaneous statements of Congress that
barangay officials shall be elected this May, in accordance with Sec. 43-c of RA 7160.
Fifth. In Paras vs. Comelec, 34 this Court said that "the next regular election involving the barangay office
concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled in May, 1997." This judicial
decision, per Article 8 of the Civil Code, is now a "part of the legal system of the Philippines."
Sixth. Petitioners pompously claim that RA 6679, being a special law, should prevail over RA 7160, an
alleged general law pursuant to the doctrine of generalia specialibus non derogant. Petitioners are
wrong. RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. It specifically
and definitively provides in its Sec. 43-c that "the term of office of barangay officials . . . shall be for three
years." It is a special provision that applies only to the term of barangay officials who were elected on the
second Monday of May 1994. With such particularity, the provision cannot be deemed a general law.
Petitioner may be correct in alleging that RA 6679 is a special law, but they are incorrect in stating
(without however giving the reasons therefor) that RA 7160 is necessarily a general law. 35 It is a special
law insofar as it governs the term of office of barangay officials. In its repealing clause, 36 RA 7160 states
that "all general and special laws . . . which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly." There being a clear repugnance and incompatibility between
the two specific provisions, they cannot stand together. The later law, RA 7160, should thus prevail in
accordance with its repealing clause. When a subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of
the former enactments, the latter is deemed repealed. 37
The Second Issue: Three-Year Term
Not Repugnant to Constitution
Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
"SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected."
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter posits that by excepting barangay officials whose
"term shall be determined by law" from the general provision fixing the term of "elective local officials" at
three years, the Constitution thereby impliedly prohibits Congress from legislating a three-year term for
such officers. We find this theory rather novel but nonetheless logically and legally flawed.

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Undoubtedly, the Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for
barangay officials. It merely left the determination of such term to the lawmaking body, without any
specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in
accordance with the exigencies of public service. It must be remembered that every law has in its favor
the presumption of constitutionality. 38 For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal (not just implied) breach of the Constitution. 39 To strike down a law as unconstitutional,
there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute
permits. 40 The petitioners have miserably failed to discharge this burden and to show clearly the
unconstitutionality they aver.
There is absolutely no doubt in our mind that Sec. 43-c of RA 7160 is constitutional. Sec. 8, Article X of
the Constitution limiting the term of all elective local officials to three years, except that of barangay
officials which "shall be determined by law" was an amendment proposed by Constitutional
Commissioner (now Supreme Court Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr. According to Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
S.J., the amendment was "readily accepted without much discussion and formally approved." Indeed, a
search into the Record of the Constitutional Commission yielded only a few pages 41 of actual
deliberations, the portions pertinent to the Constitutional Commission's intent being the following: prcd
"MR. NOLLEDO.
One clarificatory question, Madam President. What will be the term of the office
of barangay officials as provided for?
MR. DAVIDE.
As may be determined by law.
MR. NOLLEDO.
As provided for in the Local Government Code?
MR. DAVIDE.
Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT.
Is there any other comment? Is there any objection to this proposed new
section as submitted by Commissioner Davide and accepted by the
Committee?
MR. RODRIGO.
Madam President, does this prohibition to serve for more than three
consecutive terms apply to barangay officials?
MR. DAVIDE.
Madam President, the voting that we had on the terms of office did not include
the barangay officials because it was then the stand of the Chairman of the
Committee on Local Governments that the term of barangay officials must be
determined by law. So it is now for the law to determine whether the restriction
on the number of reelections will be included in the Local Government Code.
MR. RODRIGO.
So that is up to Congress to decide.
MR. DAVIDE.
Yes.
MR. RODRIGO.
I just wanted that clear in the record."
Although the discussions in the Constitutional Commission were very brief, they nonetheless provide the
exact answer to the main issue. To the question at issue here on how long the term of barangay officials
is, the answer of the Commission was simple, clear and quick: "As may be determined by law"; more
precisely, "(a)s provided for in the Local Autonomy Code." And the Local Autonomy Code, in its Sec. 43c, limits their term to three years.
The Third Issue: Petitioners Estopped From
Challenging Their Three-Year Terms
We have already shown that constitutionally, statutorily, logically, historically and commonsensically, the
petitions are completely devoid of merit. And we could have ended our Decision right here. But there is
one last point why petitioners have no moral ascendancy for their dubious claim to a longer term of office:

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the equities of their own petition militate against them. As pointed out by Amicus
Curiae Pimentel, 42 petitioners are barred by estoppel from pursuing their petitions.
Respondent Commission on Elections submitted as Annex "A" of its memorandum, 43 a machine copy of
the certificate of candidacy of Petitioner Alex L. David in the May 9, 1994 barangay elections, the
authenticity of which was not denied by said petitioner. In said certificate of candidacy, he expressly
stated under oath that he was announcing his "candidacy for the office of punong barangay for Barangay
77, Zone 7" of Kalookan City and that he was "eligible for said office." The Comelec also submitted as
Annex "B" 44 to its said memorandum, a certified statement of the votes obtained by the candidates in
said elections, thus:
"BARANGAY 77
CERTIFIED LIST OF CANDIDATES
VOTES OBTAINED
May 9, 1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS
PUNONG BARANGAY VOTES OBTAINED
1. DAVID, ALEX L. 112
KAGAWAD
1. Magalona, Ruben 150
2. Quinto, Nelson L. 130
3. Ramon, Dolores Z. 120
4. Dela Pea, Roberto T. 115
5. Castillo, Luciana 114
6. Lorico, Amy A. 107
7. Valencia, Arnold 102
8. Ang, Jose 97
9. Dequilla, Teresita D. 58
10. Primavera, Marcelina 52"
If, as claimed by petitioners, the applicable law is RA 6679, then (1) Petitioner David should not have run
and could not have been elected chairman of his barangay because under RA 6679, there was to be no
direct election for the punong barangay; the kagawad candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes was to be automatically elected barangay chairman; (2) thus, applying said law, the punong
barangay should have been Ruben Magalona, who obtained the highest number of votes among the
kagawads 150, which was much more than David's 112; (3) the electorate should have elected only
seven kagawads and not one punong barangay plus seven kagawads. cdta
In other words, following petitioners' own theory, the election of Petitioner David as well as all the
barangay chairmen of the two Liga petitioners was illegal.
The sum total of these absurdities in petitioners' theory is that barangay officials are estopped from asking
for any term other than that which they ran for and were elected to, under the law governing their very
claim to such offices: namely, RA 7160, the Local Government Code. Petitioners' belated claim of
ignorance as to what law governed their election to office in 1994 is unacceptable because under Art. 3 of
the Civil Code, "(i)gnorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith."
Epilogue
It is obvious that these two petitions must fail. The Constitution and the laws do not support them. Extant
jurisprudence militates against them. Reason and common sense reject them. Equity and morality abhor
them. They are subtle but nonetheless self-serving propositions to lengthen governance without a
mandate from the governed. In a democracy, elected leaders can legally and morally justify their reign
only by obtaining the voluntary consent of the electorate. In this case however, petitioners propose to
extend their terms not by seeking the people's vote but by faulty legal argumentation. This Court cannot
and will not grant its imprimatur to such untenable proposition. If they want to continue serving, they must
get a new mandate in the elections scheduled on May 12, 1997.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED for being completely devoid of merit
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Vitug, J ., reserves his vote on the matter of estoppel.
Hermosisima, Jr., J ., is on leave.
Footnotes

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1.Sen. Pimentel was the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991.
2.Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 4, G.R. No. 128039.
3.Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo and Comms. Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios S.
Fernando, Manolo B. Gorospe, Julio F. Desamito, Teresita D. L. Flores and Japal M. Guiani.
4.Resolution 2887 was signed also by the Chairman and six commissioners of the Comelec mentioned
in note 3.
5.Subsequently, on March 11, 1997, Comelec filed a Manifestation and a corrected version of its
Comment.
6.Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 5-6, G.R.. No. 127116.
7.Petition, pp. 4 et seq.; Rollo, pp. 6 et seq., G.R. No. 128039.
8.G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996.
9.Comelec Comment, pp. 10-11, G.R. No. 128039.
10.Comelec Comment, p. 7, G.R. No. 127116.
11.Agoncillo and Alfonso, A Short History of the Filipino People, 1961 ed. p. 38; Cushner, Spain in the
Philippines, 1971 ed. p. 5.
The Encyclopedia of the Philippines, Vol. XI, 1953 Ed. p. 12, authored by Zoilo M. Galang relates that
"(t)he word BARANGAY is originally BALANGAY from the Malay BALANG which means a boat
larger than the Chinese sampan. It is used in the diminutive sense, having the suffix ay . . . The
etymology of this word confirms what the historians say about the way the Malay people
emigrated for the first time to (our) Islands. They came in small boats (BALANGAY). These
groups by BALANGAY were found by the Spaniards and kept by them to the end of their
dominion."
12.Benitez, A History of the Philippines, 1940 ed., p. 119. See also Guerrero, Philippine Society and
Revolution, 1971 ed., p. 6.
13.Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898, Vol. XVI, pp. 155-157.
14.Arcilla, An Introduction to Philippine History, 1971 ed. p. 73.
15.See Hayden, The Philippines, A Study in National Development, 1950 ed. p. 261 et seq. However,
Casiano O. Flores and Jose P. Abletez (Barangay: Its Government and Management, 1989
Ed., p. 3), aver that "the barangays became barrios and components of Spanish pueblos" even
prior to the arrival of the Americans. See also, Ortiz, The Barangays of the Philippines, 1990
Ed., p. 1.
16.Aruego, Barrio Government Law, 1971 ed., p. 15.
17.Section 2, RA 3590.
18.Approved on March 25, 1982.
19.Approved on February 10, 1983 as B.P. Blg. 337.
20.Sec. 44, B.P. Blg. 337.
21.Sec. 86. B.P. Blg. 337.
22.Approved on December 3, 1985.
23.Sec. 37, B.P. Blg. 881.
24.Sec. 1, RA 6653.
25.Sec. 2, ibid.
26.Sec. 5, ibid.
27.Approved on October 21, 1988.
28.Sec. 1, 2nd paragraph, RA 6679.
29.Approved on October 10, 1991 and took effect on January 1, 1992.
30.Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Manila Lodge No. 761, 105 Phil. 983, cited in Agpalo, Statutory
Construction, 1990 Ed. p. 36; Francisco, Statutory Construction, Third Ed., pp. 5 and 106;
Martin, Statutory Construction, 1979 Ed. p. 40.
31.Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 Ed. p. 294.
32.Art. 7, Civil Code.
33.RA 8250.
34.G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996.
35.If the Local Government Code merely provided that all local officials, without specifying barangay
officials, "shall have a term of three years," then such provision could be deemed a general law.
But the Code provision in question (Sec. 43[c]) specifically and specially mentioned barangay

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officials. Hence, such provision ceased to be a general law. Rather, it assumes the nature of a
special law, or a special provision of a code of laws.
36.Sec. 534.
37.Iloilo Palay vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377, March 3, 1965; Joaquin vs. Navarro, 81 Phil. 373 (1948).
38.Abbas vs. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287, 301, November 10. 1989; Lim vs. Paquing, 240 SCRA 649,
January 27, 1995; People vs. Permakiel 173 SCRA 324, 675, May 12, 1989; La Union Electric
Cooperative vs. Yaranon, 179 SCRA 828, 836, December 4, 1989.
39.Basco vs. Pagcor, 197 SCRA 52, 68, May 14, 1991.
40.Garcia vs. Comelec, 227 SCRA 100, October 5, 1993.
41.Vol. III, pp. 406-408 and 451.
42."The petitioner is estopped from contesting the applicability of the three year term of elective
barangay officials as fixed by the Code.
The present set of barangay officials were elected in 1994 to a three-year term under the provisions of
the Code.
The rules issued by the Commission on Elections covering the barangay elections of 1994 state
among other things that the laws that govern the said elections include the Code. In fact, when
the petitioner and the candidates for punong barangay filed their certificates of candidacy for
purposes of the 1994 barangay elections, they had to state categorically that they were
standing for election as punong barangay, which the Code required but which was not so
required under Rep. Act No. 6653 and Rep. Act No. 6679, as the two acts then provided for two
different ways of electing the punong barangay which have been explained earlier.
One of the provisions of the Code that the Comelec implemented in connection with the barangay
elections of 1994 is Sec. 43, which categorically ordains that the barangay officials would only
have a three, not a five, year term.
The petitioner as well as other elective barangay officials who are now in office knowingly ran under
the provisions of the code. They have been elected under the strictures of the Code. The
petitioner and all the elective barangay officials are making use of the various provisions of
Code. They are holding sangguniang barangaymeetings and passing barangay ordinances
under the provisions of the Code. They are receiving the honoraria granted them by the Code.
They are getting in behalf of their barangay their shares of the taxes and the wealth of the
nation as directed by the Code.
For the petitioner (and the barangay officials associated with his cause) to avail of all the beneficial
provisions of the Code intended for the barangay exclusive, however, of the three-year term
limitation for barangay officials is plain opportunism, patently ludicrous and should, thus, be
laughed out of the court" (Comment, pp. 10-11; rollo, pp. 114-115, G.R. No. 127116.)
On the other hand, in a rather delayed and undated "Urgent Ex-parte . . . Rejoinder to the . . . Amicus
Curiae" filed with this Court on March 31, 1997, Petitioner David laments the alleged
"intemperate, ungentlemanly and uncalled for language . . . of (the) distinguished legal
practitioner and former senator." He argues that "(t)he barangay elections of 1994 were held
solely at the instance of the COMELEC and all the rules, orders and directives governing the
elections in 1994 were prepared, promulgated and implemented by COMELEC." He asserts
that the "blame" for the failure of the RA 7160 to expressly repeal RA 6653 and 6679 and the
confusion resulting therefrom should be laid on Sen. Pimentel, the principal author of RA 7610,
and not on the "lowly and innocent 420,000 elected barangay officials" who are seeking "for the
first time a judicial interpretation of the laws and issues involved . . ."
43.Rollo, pp. 75, 86; G.R. No. 127116.
44.Ibid, p. 87
||| (David v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127116, 128039, April 08, 1997)

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EN BANC
[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996.]
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R.
LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996.]
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN
G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Juanito G. Arcilla and Teodoro M. Jumamil for Juan G. Frivaldo.
Felix Carao, Jr., Ferdinand Laguna, Gavinoo Barlin and Bernardo P. Fernandez for Raul Lee.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; QUALIFICATION REQUIRED FOR ALL ELECTIVE LOCAL
OFFICIALS. The Local Government Code of 1991 [Republic Act No. 7160] expressly requires
Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor.
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the
purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing
allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an
official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law
mandates his term of office to begin. The law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from
being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the
voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the
need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY
he seeks to govern. i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province .
. . where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an
elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration not
the actual voting is the core of this "qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second
requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern
and not anywhere else.
2. ID.; ID.; MANNERS OF REACQUISITION UNDER PHILIPPINE LAWS. Under Philippine law,
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation.
3. ID.; ID.; IMMIGRATION LAW; P.D. 725 CREATED A RIGHT AND REMEDY TO REACQUIRE
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP NOT ONLY FOR THE BENEFIT OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO MARRIED
ALIENS BEFORE THE 1973 Constitution TOOK EFFECT BUT ALSO OF OTHER NATURAL BORN
FILIPINO WHO LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows
that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws.
Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost
their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63,
as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital
status" and who could neither be benefited by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino
woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such provision of the new
Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took
effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship
even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said
statute also provide a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost
their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship," because prior to the
promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome
process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
4. ID.; ID.; REPATRIATION; REQUIREMENTS THEREOF ARE LESS TEDIOUS AND CUMBERSOME
COMPARED TO NATURALIZATION. The requirements of repatriation underP.D. No. 725 are not
difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 725 itself requires very little of
an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement the said decree were left to the Special
Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a firsttimeentry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is
merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN MAY BE GIVEN A RETROACTIVE EFFECT; CASE AT BAR. While it is true
that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is

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not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted
under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroactive to the date of his
application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent
of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events i.e., situations and
transactions existing even before the law came into being in order to benefit the greatest number of
former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right
of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is
all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events
and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on
June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned,
there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the
legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or
injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation.
6. ID.; ID.; THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE DOES NOT SPECIFY WHEN SUCH QUALIFICATION
SHALL BE POSSESSED. Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, it will be noted that the law
does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for
residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election)
and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day). Even from a literal (as distinguished from
liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of
"Qualifications" of 'ELECTIVE OFFICIALS', not of candidates. Literally, such qualifications unless
otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence should thus be possessed when
the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his
term. Section 39, par. (a) (thereof) speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to
"candidates." The citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an
elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which
he has been elected.
7. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; REPEAL OF LAW; BY SUBSEQUENT ONES. Laws are repealed
only by subsequent ones [Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines] and a repeal may be express or implied. It
is obvious that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum
based on the copy furnished us by Lee did not categorically and/or impliedly state that PD 725 was
being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it
specifically by its number or text.
8. ID.; ID.; BY IMPLICATION IS NOT FAVORED; EXCEPTION. It is a basic rule of statutory
construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is
convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist". The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be
regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her lawmaking powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to
hall the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first
Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not
repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress once created to deal with the matter. If she had
intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to
Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the
intention of "the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the
matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum,
such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon
statutory construction but on common sense as well.
9. ID.; THE LAW PRESUMES THAT THE LAW MAKING-BODY INTENDED RIGHT AND JUSTICE TO
PREVAIL. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. [Art. 10, Civil Code of the Philippines)
10. CIVIL LAW; RETROSPECTIVE OPERATIONS OF STATUTES; WHEN EFFECTIVE. It is true that
under Art. 4 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is
CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS. According to TOLENTINO,
curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or

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administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would
not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with
some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive
in operation. Agpalo, [Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., pp. 270-271] on the other hand, says that
curative statutes are "healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations . . . (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb
certain evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events
to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be
otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended." On the other hand, remedial or procedural
laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take
away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily
do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the
retrospective operation of statutes.
11. POLITICAL LAW; Omnibus Election Code; PROVIDED REMEDY TO QUESTION INELIGIBILITY OF
A CANDIDATE. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code gives any voter, presumably including the
defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is
the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the COMELEC an
incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the
Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after
proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be
taken cognizance of by the Commission.
12. ID.; ID.; PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE OR TO CANCEL A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
UNDER SECTION 78 IS MERELY DIRECTORY. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code is merely
directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for
disqualifications even after the elections.
13. ID.; ELECTIONS; THE RULE IS THE INELIGIBILITY OF A CANDIDATE RECEIVING MAJORITY
VOTES DOES NOT ENTITLE THE ELIGIBLE CANDIDATE RECEIVING THE NEXT HIGHEST NUMBER
OF VOTES TO BE DECLARED ELECTED. "The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate
receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."
14. ID.; ID.; ELECTORAL LAWS SHOULD BE LIBERALLY AND EQUITABLY CONSTRUED TO GIVE
FULLEST EFFECT TO THE MANIFEST WILL OF OUR PEOPLE. This Court has time and again
liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will
of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular
mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot
stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held: ". . . (L)aws governing election contests
must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections." In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular
electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give
effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by
those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications,
the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and
legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people,
would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. The real essence of justice does not emanate
from quibbling over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the
dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled
against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in
order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation
approximating venerability in Philippine political life.
15. ID.; INTERNATIONAL LAW; A STATE DETERMINES ONLY THOSE WHO ARE ITS OWN CITIZENS
NOT WHO ARE THE CITIZENS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. Since our courts are charged only with
the duty of the determining who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are
or who are not Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its
own citizens not who are the citizens of other countries.

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PUNO, J., Concurring Opinion:

1. POLITICAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; SOVEREIGNTY OF THE
PEOPLE, CONSTRUED. The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987
Constitution. For this reason, it appears as the first in our declaration of principles and state policies.
Thus, Section 1 of Article II of our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and
republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."
The same principle served as the bedrock of our 1973 and 1935 Constitutions. [The 1987
Constitution added the word "democratic" in the statement of the principle.] It is one of the few principles
whose truth has been cherished by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of the U.S.
Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal government to guarantee to every state a "republican form of
government." With understandable fervor, the American authorities imposed republicanism as the
cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being crafted by its Filipino farmers. Borne out of the 1986
people power EDSA revolution, our 1987 Constitution is more people-oriented. Thus, Section 4 of Article
II provides as a state policy that the prime duty of the Government is "to serve and protect the people."
Section 1, Article XI also provides that ". . . public officers . . . must at all times be accountable to the
people . . . " Sections 15 and 16 of Article XIII define the role and rights of people's organizations. Section
5(2) of Article XVI mandates that "[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist
consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty." And
Section 2 of Article XVII provides that "amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed
by the people through initiative . . ." All these provisions and more are intended to breathe more life to the
sovereignty of our people. To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose
dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions.
They knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the just summi imperu,
the absolute right to govern. Former Dean Vicente Sinco states that an essential quality of sovereignty is
legal omnipotence, viz: "Legal theory establishes certain essential qualities inherent in the nature of
sovereignty. The first is legal omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and
absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has the power to determine exclusively its legal
competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It is the sole judge of what it should do at any given
time." Citing Barker, Principles of Social and Political Theory, p. 59 (1952 ed.), he adds that a more
amplified definition of sovereignty is that of "a final power of final legal adjustment of all legal issues." The
U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, where it held that ". . .sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source
of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government,
sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts."
2. ID.; ID.; REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY DISTINGUISHED FROM PURE DEMOCRACY. In our
Constitution, the people established a representative democracy as distinguished from a pure democracy.
Justice Isagani Cruz explains ". . . A republic is a representative government, a government run by and
for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The essence of
republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public
functionaries who derive their mandate for the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period
only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican
government is a responsible government whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public
trust and shall, according to the Constitution, 'at all times be accountable to the people' they are sworn to
serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost needless to state, is the promotion of the
common welfare according to the will of the people themselves."
3. ID.; ELECTION CASES; THE COURT SHOULD STRIVE TO ALIGN THE WILL OF THE
LEGISLATURE WITH THE WILL OF THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE. In election cases, we should strive
to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with the will of the sovereign people as
expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must respect the will of the people. For in the eloquent prose
of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate
source of established authority." (Moya v. del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199) The choice of the governed on who
shall be their governor merits the highest consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where
the sovereignty of the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We
cannot fail by making the people succeed.
DAVIDE, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion"

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1. POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991; ELECTION; WHEN THE PRESCRIBED
QUALIFICATION SHALL BE POSSESSED. Justice Davide departs from the view in the ponencia is
that Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991 does not specify the time when the citizenship
requirement must be met, and that being the case, then it suffices that citizenship be possessed upon
commencement of the term of the office involved. Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications
of elective local officials and not those of an elected local official. These adjectives are not synonymous,
as the ponencia seems to suggest, the first refers to the nature of the office, which requires the process of
voting by the electorate involved; while the second refers to a victorious candidate for an elective office.
The section unquestionably refers to elective not elected local officials. It falls under Title Two
entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph (a)
thereof begins with the phrases "An elective local official," while paragraphs (b) to (f) thereof speak of
candidates. It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications ofcandidates for
elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may the section be construed to mean that
possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the commencement of the term of office of the
elected candidate. It is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the time when the citizenship
requirement must be possessed. I submit that the requirement must be satisfied, or that Philippine
citizenship must be possessed, not merely at the commencement of the term, but at an earlier time, the
latest being election day itself. Section 39 is not at all ambiguous nor uncertain that it meant this to be, as
one basic qualification of an elective local official is that he be "A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE
BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . . WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE." This simply
means that he possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right of suffrage. The fundamental
qualification for the exercise of this sovereign right is the possession of Philippine citizenship. No less
than the Constitution makes it the first qualification.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; AVAILABLE REMEDIES ON QUESTIONS OF INELIGIBILITY FOR PUBLIC OFFICE.
Quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a candidate's ineligibility for public office.
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows the filing of a petition to deny due course to or cancel the
certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required by
Section 74, is false. Section 74, in turn, requires that the person filing the certificate of candidacy must
stateinter alia, that he is eligible for the office, which means that he has all the qualifications (including, of
course, fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none of the disqualifications as provided by law. The
petitioner under Section 78 may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate
of candidacy. Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC rules of procedure allows the filing of a petition for
disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided by the
Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not
later than the date of proclamation."
3. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; STEPS FOR THE REACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP BY REPATRIATION.
The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under P.D. No. 725are: (1) filing the
application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is
approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is deemed ipso
jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the
date of the filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.
4. ID.; INTERNATIONAL LAW; STATELESSNESS, CONSTRUED. Statelessness may be either de
jure, which is the status of individuals stripped of their nationality by their former government without
having all opportunity to acquired another; or de facto, which is the status of individuals possessed of a
nationality whose country does not give them protection outside their own country, and who are
commonly, albeit imprecisely, referred to as refugees (JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases,
Materials and Comments, 1995, ed., 290). Under Chapter I, Article 1 of the United Nations Convention
Regarding the Status of Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty Series, Compiled and Annotated by Haydee
B. Yorac, vol. III, 363), a stateless person is defined as "a person who is not considered as a national by
any State under the operation of its law.
5. ID.; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; DOCTRINE OF PEOPLE'S
SOVEREIGNTY, CONSTRUED. The doctrine of people's sovereignty is founded on the principles of
democracy and republicanism and refers exclusively to the sovereignty of the people of the Philippines.
Section 1 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution is quite clear on this. And the Preamble makes it clear
when it solemnly opens it with a clause "We, the sovereign Filipino people. . . " Thus, the sovereignty is

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an attribute of the Filipino people as one people, one body. That sovereign power of the Filipino people
cannot be fragmentized by looking at it as the supreme authority of the people of any of the political
subdivisions to determine their own destiny; neither can we convert and treat every fragment as the
whole. In such a case, this Court would provide the formula for the division and destruction of the State
and render the Government ineffective and inutile.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared
the rightful governor of Sorsogon
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three
successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office
due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship
thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes
cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have
intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the
position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post
inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office has
occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the
superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and
preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections
(Comelec), First Division, 1 promulgated on December 19, 1995 2 and another Resolution of
the Comelec en banc promulgated February 23, 1996 3 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul
R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition 4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying
that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet
being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1,
1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution 5 granting the petition with the
following disposition: 6
"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that
respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the
ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate
of candidacy is cancelled."
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8,
1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said
date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc 7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the
Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a
Certificate of Votes 8 dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by the
candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
Raul R. Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition 9 praying for his
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order 10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June
29, 1995," the Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to

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reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate
in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,
1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, 11 docketed as SPC No. 95317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he
filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As such,
when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received
by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to
the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two
cases of Labo vs. Comelec, 12 the Vice-Governor not Lee should occupy said position of
governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution 13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally
entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest
number of votes, and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of
Sorsogon"; thus:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore
RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul
R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he
not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis
of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected
Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of
Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),
the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the
Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof."
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the Comelec en banc in its Resolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996,
the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court issued
on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain the status
quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand briefly be capsulized in the following
propositions" 15 :
"First The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and
substance to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result
that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and
deciding said petition;
Second The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a
continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold
the Office of Governor;
Third The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the
effect thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of
Governor; and
Fourth Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the
validity of petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon."

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G.R. No. 120295

This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which
are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution 16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995,
disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995
elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";
2. Resolution 17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
3. Resolution 18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995
suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755.
However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.
A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election." (Emphasis supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered "within the
period allowed by law", i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for
disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a
jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755
since they are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate question
raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them
thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be
given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing
bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317
considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the
assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon,
considering that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in
this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 1991 19 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a
qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
"Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the
case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at

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least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age
on election day.
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court 20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore
incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the
qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).
Under Philippine law, 21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 22 and during the oral
argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill
allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of
the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the
same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional,
substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by
the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and
20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino
and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a
third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the
Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through
the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less
than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost,
this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his
able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions
of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that he not Lee
should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of
Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the
highest number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we
shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then
President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the
same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise
of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under
the 1987 Constitution", adding that in her memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the
Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725,
President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within
your functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April
11, 1975, as amended." 23
This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 24 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be
construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725.Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was
made because then President Aquino in her memorandum based on the copy furnished us by Lee
did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being
rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text.
On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously
demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot coexist". 26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative
enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions
of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At

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best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the
acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first
Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not
repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress once created to deal with the matter. If she had
intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to
Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated
the intention of "the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave
the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential
Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence
not only upon statutory construction but on common sense as well.
Second. Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation
proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 . . . (and) was
approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented a judicious review and
evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for repatriation with the
Office of the President in Malacaang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor
General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably
the said Committee started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and resubmitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under these circumstances, it could not be said
that there was "indecent haste" in the processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on
Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent," 27 the Solicitor General
explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as
there were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was
submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation 28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have
not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by
itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the
requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious
and cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 725 29 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and
regulations to implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is
not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine
political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to
reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen
who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United
States a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a
dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace and who, after the fall of the
dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country of
birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted
repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently
posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have
been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant
to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it
could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification
prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when the
certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 104654 30 which held that "both the Local
Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to
Public office." Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was
whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the
Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office should
be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;

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* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends

to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-three
(23) years of age on election day."
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when
the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one
year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of
age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, 31
and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of
territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed
his citizenship on June 30, 1995 the very day 32 the term of office of governor (and other elective
officials) began he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to
discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was
already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit,
life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was
enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that
Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not
of candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of
the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications unless
otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence should thus be possessed
when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the
start of his term in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs.
Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our
people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another
nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship
qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument 34 to the
effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that
matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official
to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter".
And, under the law 35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not
have been a voter much less a validly registered one if he was not a citizen at the time of such
registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law
intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement
of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The
law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a
qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also
stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from
"citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a
voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in
the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected." It should be
emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It
does not require him to voteactually. Hence, registration not the actual voting is the core of this
"qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the
prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized and Lee has not disputed that
he "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as
valid by judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995." 36

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So too, during the oral argument, his counsel stead- fastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has
always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again
in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as
a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May
8, 1995. 37
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be
elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the
date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter, presumably including the
defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate.
This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before
the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated
under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of
"within ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the
issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very moment of
Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a
citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should
have been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in
the immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judiciallydeclared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation
of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions 40 to this general rule, such
as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino, 41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or
private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by
reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They operate
on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo, 42 on the other
hand, says that curative statutes are "healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of
enforcing existing obligations . . . (and ) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in
existing laws, and curb certain evils . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . .
(and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective
attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or
modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal
meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of
statutes. 43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a
new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly
recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage
to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation
until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and who could neither
be benefited by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an
alien to retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such provision of the new Constitution does not
apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D.
725 granted a new right to these women the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during
their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also
provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their
Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the
promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and

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cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725they could now re-acquire their
Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General 44 argues:
"By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA
342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws
(Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain
evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing
naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed
to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost
their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing
the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal
aberrations and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative."
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable
that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective
operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly
appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof." 45 It is obvious to the
Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not
otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that
citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode,
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of
Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the
fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it
effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past
transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not
in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional
guaranty." 46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit
or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D.
725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, whileFrivaldo lost his
Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August
17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an
American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive
effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed
to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is
simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply
to past events i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being in
order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and
exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be
given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a
retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage
of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to
take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would
bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no
showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving;
retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any
contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be
deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to
applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not
to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former
Filipinos who may be stateless, asFrivaldo having already renounced his American citizenship

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was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and
justice to prevail. 47
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant
applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were filed. 48 The fact
that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the
government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct
prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's repatriation has the effect of wiping out
a liability of his to the government arising in connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and
accruing only during the interregnum between application and approval, a situation that is not present
in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should
now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's
repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994.
This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality qualification whether at the date
of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of
candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would
also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated i.e., his Filipino
citizenship restored as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed
validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the
Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" 49 We
answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really
STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for
governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenship long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in
the interim when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to
his Filipino citizenship." 50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: 51
"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American
citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he
ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains
an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of
1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse. 52
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA
No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final
and executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having been issued by this
Honorable Court." 54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995,
there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's
two rulings (whichFrivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also
become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of his
political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for,
and holding any public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered
in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992
elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the
words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed Resolution: 55

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"The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided
that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988
and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of any 'final judgment' of the
disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the
Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995),
directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen
'having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a
citizen of the Philippines.' This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in
connection with the 1992 elections."
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's
future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter
lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 56 we held:
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial
or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it
has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands."
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC
No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by
the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case". Again, Lee
reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317
questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 "beyond the 5-day reglementary period."
Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo
warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution 57 has given the Comelec ample power to
"exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective. . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the various
petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say
that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions for
annulment of proclamations of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one. 58 Thus,
in Mentang vs. COMELEC, 59 we ruled:
"The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a preproclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding
that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by
the COMELEC after the winning candidate has been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs.
Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513;
Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an
assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed
candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make
such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883;
Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)"
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within
ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days
after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the
same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, 60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was
not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC, 61 Lee is "a second placer, . . .
just that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court
in the aforesaid Labo 62 case, as follows:
"The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in
law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such

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case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes
by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case,
the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected."
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
"But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been
shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an
ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the
contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its
resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city mayor as its
resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of
candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this case."
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case
because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both cases
a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus) resolution
declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995
election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of
Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the voters intentionally wasted their
ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all,
it is that the vice-governor and not Lee should be proclaimed, since in losing the election, Lee
was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the
emphatic teaching of Labo:
"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the
office."
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-acquired his citizenship
and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, he not Lee
should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be
corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295. Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second
Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying
him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered beyond the fifteen (15)
day period prescribed by Section 78 of theOmnibus Election Code which reads as follows:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.
A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and hearing,not later than
fifteen days before the election." (emphasis supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed
superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19,
1995, affirmed en banc 63 on February 23, 1996, which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is
obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 ofR.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission
to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
"SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast
for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with

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the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension
of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."
(emphasis supplied)
Refutation of
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that
President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a
repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely
academic distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an
existing law. The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case;
64 viz, "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship
maybe reacquired by . . . repatriation". He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to
remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two
previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery. The
retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may have
been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not
change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the
ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material representation
therein as required by Section 74. CitingLoong, he then states his disagreement with our holding that
Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his
claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11,
1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as
prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did
not commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try
and decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this
point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory", we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide
nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent,
teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period
prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during which
the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen
day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even
after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time.
There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual
circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such
retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second Frivaldo)
decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat,
there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his qualifications in
the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening repatriation has changed his
political status not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his
repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American
citizenship." Since our courts are charged only with the duty of the determining who are Philippine
nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It is basic in
international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens not who are the
citizens of other countries. 65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was
stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following
settled case law, such finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all
three previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an
American was publicly known." First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public"
knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two
previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his

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nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such "public"
knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the
qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the
citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not merely
at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently. Section 39,
par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates". If the
qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, the
legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs.
Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election
day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f)
for other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on
the ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of
allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not
question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be understood
thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have
retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in
reference to Section 39 of the Local Government Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's
thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather
extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold
the Rule of Law." We agree we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The
issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can
rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to
interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked
provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of
social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In applying election
laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon
would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this Court's
conscience.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be
possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimedand at the start of the
term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect
up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time,
and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and
effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right
to resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of
having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a
regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application
therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality.
Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start
of the term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since
his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon
is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely
consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or
disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous
rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment
of proclamations.

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This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our
country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, 66 for in case of doubt, political laws
must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will.
Consistently, we have held:
". . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end
that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections (citations omitted)." 67
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge,
in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving
effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving
the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to
resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound
public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To
successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate
that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic 68 to constitutional and legal principles that overriding
such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create
greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and
laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court
could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible
due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995
elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the
time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running
for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over
patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law
as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and
eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to
evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation
approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only
to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt
about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and
sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three
times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy
and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and
sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more
loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning
desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to
and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity.
Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and
plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly
insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore
deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final
analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve
to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the
respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any
event, it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Melo, Vitug, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Regalado, Romero and Bellosillo, JJ., pro hac vice.
Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions

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PUNO, J., concurring:

I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban which is pro-people and
pierces the myopia of legalism. Upholding the sovereign will of the people which is the be-all and the
end-all of republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure time and its tempest.
The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this
reason, it appears as the first in our declaration of principles and state policies. Thus, section 1 of
Article II of our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The same
principle served as the bedrock of our 1973 and 1935 Constitutions. 1 It is one of the few principles
whose truth has been cherished by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of the U.S.
Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal government to guarantee to every state a "republican form
of government." With understandable fervor, the American authorities imposed republicanism as the
cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being crafted by its Filipino framers. 2
Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987 Constitution is more peopleoriented. Thus, section 4 of Article II provides as a state policy that the prime duty of the Government
is "to serve and protect the people." Section 1, Article XI also provides that ". . . public officers . . .
must at all times be accountable to the people . . ." Sections 15 and 16 of Article XIII define the role
and rights of people's organizations. Section 5(2) of Article XVI mandates that "[t]he state shall
strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's
rights in the performance of their duty." And Section 2 of Article XVII provides that "amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative . . ." All these
provisions and more are intended to breathe more life to the sovereignty of our people.
To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are
buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They knew
that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute
right to govern. 3 Former Dean Vicente Sinco 4 states that an essential quality of sovereignty is legal
omnipotence, viz: "Legal theory establishes certain essential qualities inherent in the nature of
sovereignty. The first is legal omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and
absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has the power to determine exclusively its legal
competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It is the sole judge of what it should do at any
given time." 5 Citing Barker, 6 he adds that a more amplified definition of sovereignty is that of "a final
power of final legal adjustment of all legal issues." The U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same
thought in the landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 7 where it held that ". . . sovereignty itself is, of
course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign
powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by
whom and for whom all government exists and acts."
In our Constitution, the people established a representative democracy as distinguished from
a pure democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains: 8
"xxx xxx xxx
A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the
people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The
essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the
citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people
and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced
or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican government is a
responsible government whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public
trust and shall, according to the Constitution, 'at all times be accountable to the people'
they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost needless
to state, is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the people
themselves. "
I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that sovereignty
is indivisible but it need not always be exercised by the people together, all the time. 9 For this
reason, the Constitution and our laws provide when the entire electorate or only some of them can
elect those who make our laws and those who execute our laws. Thus, the entire electorate votes for
our senators but only our district electorates vote for our congressmen, only our provincial electorates
vote for the members of our provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for our city councilors,

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and only our municipal electorates vote for our councilors. Also, the entire electorate votes for our
President and Vice-President but only our provincial electorates vote for our governors, only our city
electorates vote for our mayors, and only our municipal electorates vote for our mayors. By defining
and delimiting the classes of voters who can exercise the sovereignty of the people in a given
election, it cannot be claimed that said sovereignty has been fragmented.
It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar is not whether the people of
Sorsogon should be given the right to defy the law by allowing Frivaldo to sit as their governor.
Rather, the issue is: whether the will of the voters of Sorsogon clearly choosing Frivaldo as governor
ought to be given a decisive value considering theuncertainty of the law on when a candidate ought to
satisfy the qualification of citizenship. The uncertainty of law and jurisprudence, both here and
abroad, on this legal issue cannot be denied. In the United States, 10 there are two (2) principal
schools of thought on the matter. One espouses the view that a candidate must possess the
qualifications for office at the time of his election. The other ventures the view that the candidate
should satisfy the qualifications at the time he assumes the powers of the office. I am unaware of any
Philippine decision that has squarely resolved this difficult question of law. The ponencia of Mr.
Justice Panganiban adhered to the second school of thought while Mr. Justice Davide dissents.
I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our law on the matter for this is
vital to dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my opinion can bring about ill effects to the State. Mr.
Justice Davide's fear is based on the assumption that Frivaldo continues to be disqualified and we
cannot allow him to sit as governor without transgressing the law. I do not concede this assumption
for as stressed above, courts have been sharply divided by this mind boggling issue. Given this
schism, I do not see how we can derogate on the sovereignty of the people by according more weight
to the votes of the people of Sorsogon.
Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a rebellion, we cannot
prosecute them "because of the doctrine of people's sovereignty." With due respect, the analogy is
not appropriate. In his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a crime, a violation of Article 134 of
the Revised Penal Code, an offense against the sovereignty of our people. In the case at bar, it
cannot be held with certitude that the people of Sorsogon violated the law by voting for Frivaldo as
governor. Frivaldo's name was in the list of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for governor. At
that time too, Frivaldo was taking all steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And even our
jurisprudence has not settled the issue when a candidate should possess the qualification of
citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable then and now, I cannot imagine how it will be
disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance in the case at bar in favor of the people of Sorsogon.
In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our people should be resolutory of the
case at bar which is one of its kind, unprecedented in our political history. For three (3)
times, Frivaldo ran of the province of Sorsogon. For two (2) times, he was disqualified on the ground
of citizenship. The people of Sorsogon voted for him as their governor despite his disqualification.
The people never waffled in their support for Frivaldo. In 1988, they gave him a winning margin of
27,000; in 1992, they gave him a winning spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted a margin of 20,000.
Clearly then, Frivaldo is the overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election cases, we
should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with the will of the sovereign
people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must respect the will of the people. For in the
eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty
and is the ultimate source of established authority.'' The choice of the governed on who shall be their
governor merits the highest consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the
sovereignty of the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We
cannot fail by making the people succeed.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the conclusions reached by my
distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I find myself unable to join him.
I
I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation was void, but not on the ground that
President Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March 1987 memorandum "effectively repealed" P.D. No. 725. In
my view, the said memorandum only suspended the implementation of the latter decree
by divesting the Special Committee on Naturalization of its authority to further act on grants of

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citizenship under LOI No. 270, as amended; P.D. No. 836, as amended; P.D. No. 1379; and "any
other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations." A reading of the last paragraph of
the memorandum can lead to no other conclusion, thus:
In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on
Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from undertaking any and all
proceedings within your functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of
Instruction No. 270 dated April 11, 1975 as amended, Presidential Decree No.
836 dated December 3, 1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated
May 17, 1978, relative to the grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other
related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations. (emphasis supplied)
It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only refer to those related to LOI No.
270, P.D. No. 836, and P.D. No. 1379. There is no doubt in my mind that P.D. No. 725 is one such
"related law" as it involves the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by repatriation
and designates the Special Committee on Naturalization created under LOI No. 270 to receive and
act on (i.e., approve or disapprove) applications under the said decree. The power of President
Aquino to suspend these issuances by virtue of the 27 March 1987 memorandum is beyond question
considering that under Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, she exercised legislative
power until the Congress established therein convened on the fourth Monday of July 1987.
I disagree with the view expressed in the ponencia that the memorandum of 27 March 1987
was merely a declaration of "executive policy," and not an exercise of legislative power. LOI No.
270, P.D. No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any other related laws," such as P.D. No. 725, were issued by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers not executive power.
These laws relate to the acquisition (by naturalization) and reacquisition (by repatriation) of Philippine
citizenship, and in light of Sections 1(4) and 3, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution (naturalization and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship shall be in accordance with law), it is indubitable that these
subjects are a matter of legislative prerogative. In the same vein, the creation of the Special
Committee on Naturalization by LOI No. 270 and the conferment of the power to accept and act on
applications under P.D. No. 725 are clearly legislative acts.
Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist order and the reactivationor revival of the
Committee can be done only by legislative fiat, i.e., by Congress, since the President had long lost his
authority to exercise "legislative power." Considering that Congress has not seen it fit to do so, the
President cannot, in the exercise of executive power, lift the cease and desist order nor
reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee. A multo fortiori, the Committee cannot validly
accept Frivaldo's application for repatriation and approve it.
II
Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation is valid, it did not cure his lack of
citizenship." I depart from the view in the ponencia that Section 39 of the Local Government Code of
1991 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be met, and that being the
case, then it suffices that citizenship be possessed upon commencement of the term of the office
involved; therefore, since Frivaldo "re-assumed" his Philippine citizenship at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June
1995 and the term of office of Governor commenced at 12:00 noon of that day, he had, therefore,
complied with the citizenship requirement.
In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of elective local officials and
not those of an elected local official. These adjectives are not synonymous, as the ponencia seems to
suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which requires the process of voting by the
electorate involved; while the second refers to a victorious candidate for an elective office. The
section unquestionably refers to elective not elected local officials. It falls under Title Two
entitledELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph
(a) thereof begins with the phrase "An elective local official," while paragraphs (b) to (f) thereof speak
of candidates. It reads as follows:
SEC. 39. Qualifications (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the
case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

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(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age
on election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component cities
component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on
election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang
barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age
but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day (emphasis supplied)
It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates for elective
local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may the section be construed to mean that
possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the commencement of the term of office of the
elected candidate.
For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the time when the citizenship
requirement must be possessed. I submit that the requirement must be satisfied, or that Philippine
citizenship must be possessed, not merely at the commencement of the term, but at an earlier time,
the latest being election day itself. Section 39 is not at all ambiguous nor uncertain that it meant this
to be, as one basic qualification of an elective local official is that he be "A REGISTERED VOTER IN
THE BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . . WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE." This
simply means that he possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right of suffrage. The
fundamental qualification for the exercise of this sovereign right is the possession of Philippine
citizenship. No less than the Constitution makes it the first qualification, as Section 1, Article V thereof
provides:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall
have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election . . .
(emphasis supplied)
And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) expressly provides
for the qualifications of a voter. Thus:
SEC. 117. Qualifications of a voter. Every citizen of the Philippines, not
otherwise disqualified by law, eighteen years of age or over, who shall have resided in
the Philippines for one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote
for at least six months immediately preceding the election, may be a registered voter.
(emphasis supplied)
It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's election as Governor in the 1988 and
1992 elections on the ground that for lack of Philippine citizenship he being a naturalized citizen of
the United States of America he was DISQUALIFIED to be elected as such and to serve the
position (Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 [1989], Republic of
the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]). This disqualification inexorably
nullified Frivaldo's registration as a voter and declared it void ab initio. Our judgments therein were
self-executory and no further act, e.g., a COMELEC order to cancel his registration as a voter or the
physical destruction of his voter's certificate, was necessary for the ineffectivity. Thus, he was never
considered a registered voter for the elections of May 1992, and May 1995, as there is no showing
that Frivaldo registered anew as a voter for the latter elections. Even if he did in obvious defiance
of his decreed disqualification this did not make him a Filipino citizen, hence it was equally void ab
initio. That he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections and was even allowed to vote
therein were of no moment. Neither act made him a Filipino citizen nor nullified the judgments of this
Court. On the contrary, said acts made a mockery of our judgments. For the Court now to
validate Frivaldo's registration as a voter despite the judgments of disqualification is to modify the said
judgments by making their effectivity and enforceability dependent on a COMELEC order cancelling

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his registration as a voter, or on the physical destruction of his certificate of registration as a voter
which, of course, was never our intention. Moreover, to sanction Frivaldo's registration as a voter
would be to sacrifice substance in favor of form (the piece of paper that is the book of voters or list of
voters or voter's ID), and abet the COMELEC's incompetence in failing to cancel Frivaldo's
registration and allowing him to vote.
The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship disqualification should be
reckoned not from the date of the election nor the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but from the
date of proclamation, is that the only available remedy to question the ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a
candidate is a petition for quo warranto which, under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, may
be filed only within ten days from proclamation and not earlier.
I beg to differ.
Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a candidate's ineligibility for
public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows the filing of a petition to deny due
course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation
contained therein, as required by Section 74, is false. Section 74, in turn, requires that the person
filing the certificate of candidacy must state, inter alia, that he is eligible for the office, which means
that he has all the qualifications (including, of course, fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none
of the disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under Section 78 may be filed at any time not
later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The section reads in full as follows:
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false The petition may be filed
at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen
days before the election.
This remedy was recognized in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA 760, 768 [1992]),
where this Court held:
Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails
to file the petition within the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for
whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has
another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo
warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as
provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section 1, Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure similarly provides that any voter contesting the election of any regional,
provincial or city official on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the Electoral Contest
Adjudication Department The petition may be filed within ten (10) days from the date
the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).
Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the filing of a petition
for disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided
by the Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy
but not later than the date of proclamation." Sections 1 and 3 thereof provide:
Rule 25 Disqualification of Candidates.
SECTION 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not
possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by
existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification
may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after
the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation.
While the validity of this rule insofar as it concerns petitions for disqualification on the ground of lack
of all qualifications may be doubtful, its invalidity is not in issue here.

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In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take up the last issue grappled within
the ponencia, viz., is Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code mandatory? The answer is provided
in Loong.
We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent Commission that in the light of the provisions of
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed even beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, as long as
it is filed within a reasonable time from the discovery of the ineligibility.
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:
SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification case. Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
SEC. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section
78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25-day period prescribed by Section
78 of the Code for filing the appropriate action to cancel a certificate of candidacy on account of any false
representation made therein. On the contrary, said Section 7 affirms and reiterates Section 78 of the
Code.
We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which may be based on
grounds other than that provided under Section 78 of the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 also
makes the effects referred to in Section 6 applicable to disqualification cases filed under Section 78 of the
Code. Nowhere in Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 is mention made of the period within which
these disqualification cases may be filed. This is because there are provisions in the Code which supply
the periods within which a petition relating to disqualification of candidates must be filed, such as Section
78, already discussed, and Section 253 on petitions for quo warranto.
I then disagree with the asseveration in the ponencia that Section 78 is merely directory
because Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the COMELEC to try and decide petitions for
disqualification even after elections. I submit that Section 6 refers to disqualifications under Sections
12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and consequently modifies Section 72 thereof. As such, the
proper court or the COMELEC are granted the authority to continue hearing the case after the
election, and during the pendency of the case, suspend the proclamation of the victorious candidate,
if the evidence against him is strong. Sections 12, 68, and 72 of the Code provide:
SEC. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment
for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed
removed upon declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of
sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in
which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found
by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election

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campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated
any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6,
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a
foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,
unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)
SEC. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and
the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act
to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the
election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for
any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption to office.
III
Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not persuaded by the arguments in support of
the thesis that Frivaldo's repatriation may be given retroactive effect, as such goes against the spirit
and letter of P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the principle that acquisition or re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship is not a right, but a mere privilege. Before the advent of P.D. No. 725, only the
following could apply for repatriation: (a) Army, Navy, or Air Corps deserters; and (b) a woman who
lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien after the death of her spouse (Section
2[2], C.A. No. 63). P.D. No. 725 expanded this to include Filipino women who lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the death of their alien husbands, or the termination of
their marital status and to natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship but
subsequently desired to reacquire the latter.
Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 expressly provides that repatriation takes
effect only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, thus:
. . . may reacquire Philippine citizenship . . . by applying with the Special
Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if
theirapplications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, AFTER WHICH THEY SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE
REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. (italicization and capitalization supplied for
emphasis)
Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation under the decree are: (1)
filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the
application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is
deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking
to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly provided
otherwise.
This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this Court's pronouncement in the
first Frivaldo case that what reacquisition of Filipino citizenship requires is an act "formally rejecting
[the] adopted state and reaffirming . . . allegiance to the Philippines." That act meant nothing less than
taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. If we now take this revision of
doctrine to its logical end, then it would also mean that if Frivaldo had chosen and reacquired
Philippine citizenship by naturalization or through Congressional action, such would retroact to the
filing of the petition for naturalization or the bill granting him Philippine citizenship. This is a
proposition which both the first and second Frivaldo cases soundly rejected.
The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support of the proposition that P.D. No. 725 can
be given retroactive effect is its alleged curative or remedial nature.
Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of legal hermeneutics may P.D. No. 725 be
characterized as a curative or remedial statute:

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Curative or remedial statutes are healing acts. They are remedial by curing
defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations. The rule in regard to
curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes
the defect sought to be removed or made harmless, is something the legislature might
have dispensed with by a previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one.
Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in
existing laws, and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable a person to carry into
effect that which they have designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal
consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action.
They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute, was invalid. (RUBEN
E. AGPALO, Statutory Construction, Second ed. [1990], 270-271, citations omitted).
P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship lost through the marriage
of a Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a foreign country of natural-born Filipino citizens.
It involves then the substantive, nay primordial, right of citizenship. To those for whom it is intended, it
means, in reality, the acquisition of "a new right," as the ponencia cannot but concede. Therefore, it
may not be said to merely remedy or cure a defect considering that one who has lost Philippine
citizenshipdoes not have the right to reacquire it. As earlier stated, the Constitution provides that
citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in the manner provided by law. Moreover, it has also
been observed that:
The idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial statutes are statutes
relating to procedure and not substantive rights. (Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
Vol. 3, Third ed. [1943], 5704 at 74, citations omitted).
If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that P.D. No. 725 is a curative or remedial
statute, it would be an inexcusable error to give it a retroactive effect since it explicitly provides the
date of its effectivity. Thus:
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy five.
Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship,
then nothing therein supports such theory, for as the decree itself unequivocally provides, it is only
after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines that the applicant is DEEMED TO
HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
IV
Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that taking the oath of allegiance retroacted to
the date of Frivaldo's application for repatriation, the same could not be said insofar as it concerned
the United States of America, of which he was a citizen. For under the laws of the United States of
America, Frivaldo remained an American national until he renounced his citizenship and allegiance
thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995, when he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. Section 401 of the Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of America provides that a
person who is a national of the United States of America, whether by birth or naturalization, loses his
nationality by, inter alia, "(b) Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of
allegiance to a foreign state (SIDNEY KANSAS, U.S. Immigration Exclusion and Deportation and
Citizenship of the United States of America. Third ed., [1948] 341-342). It follows then that on election
day and until the hour of the commencement of the term for which he was elected noon of 30 June
1995 as per Section 43 of the Local Government Code Frivaldo possessed dual citizenship, viz.,
(a) as an American citizen, and (b) as a Filipino citizen through the adoption of the theory that the
effects of his taking the oath of allegiance were retrospective. Hence, he was disqualified to run for
Governor for yet another reason: possession of dual citizenship, in accordance with Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code.
V
The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be considered STATELESS on the basis of
his claim that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship long
before May 8, 1985" is untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is based on Frivaldo's
unproven, self-serving allegation; second, informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to

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lose American citizenship; and third, simply put, never did the status of a STATELESS person attach
to Frivaldo.
Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the status of individuals stripped of their
nationality by their former government without having an opportunity to acquire another; or de facto,
which is the status of individuals possessed of a nationality whose country does not give them
protection outside their own country, and who are commonly, albeit imprecisely, referred to as
refugees (JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases, Materials and Comments. 1995 ed.,
290)
Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Regarding the
Status of Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty; Series, Compiled and Annotated by Haydee B. Yorac,
vol. III, 363), a stateless person is defined as "a person who is not considered as a national by any
State under the operation of its law." However, it has not been shown that the United States of
America ever ceased to consider Frivaldo its national at any time before he took his oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines on 30 June 1995.
VI
Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno. I am absolutely happy to join him in his statement that "[t]he sovereignty of our
people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution" and that the said Constitution is "more
people- oriented," "borne [as it is] out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution." I would even go
further by saying that this Constitution is pro-God (Preamble), pro-people (Article II, Sections 1, 3, 4,
5, 9, 15, 16; Article XI, Section I; Article XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11, 15, 16, 18;
Article XVI, Sections 5(2), 6), pro-Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14. Article XIV,
Sections 1, 4(2), 13; Article XVI, Section 11), pro-poor (Article II, Sections 9, 10, 18, 21; Article XII,
Sections 1, 2[3]; Article XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), pro-life (Article II, Section 12),
and pro-family (Article II, Section 12; Article XV).
Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the principle of sovereignty beyond what I
perceive to be the reasonable constitutional parameters. The doctrine of people's sovereignty is
founded on the principles of democracy and republicanism and refers exclusively to the sovereignty
of the people of the Philippines. Section 1 of Article II is quite clear on this, thus:
SECTION 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides
in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a clause "We, the sovereign Filipino
people . . ." Thus, this sovereignty is an attribute of the Filipino people as one people, one body.
That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be fragmentized by looking at it as the
supreme authority of the people of any of the political subdivisions to determine their own destiny;
neither can we convert and treat every fragment as the whole. In such a case, this Court would
provide the formula for the division and destruction of the State and render the Government
ineffective and inutile. To illustrate the evil, we may consider the enforcement of laws or the pursuit of
a national policy by the executive branch of the government, or the execution of a judgment by the
courts. If these are opposed by the overwhelming majority of the people of a certain province, or even
a municipality, it would necessarily follow that the law, national policy, or judgment must not be
enforced, implemented, or executed in the said province or municipality. More concretely, if, for
instance, the vast majority of the people of Batanes rise publicly and take up arms against the
Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the said Government or its laws, the
territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers or prerogatives, then those who did so and which are composed of the vast majority of the
people of Batanes a political subdivision cannot be prosecuted for or be held guilty of rebellion
in violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code because of the doctrine of peoples' sovereignty.
Indeed, the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty by investing upon the people of a mere political
subdivision that which the Constitution places in the entire Filipino people, may be disastrous to the
Nation.
So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the concurring opinion. Thus, simply
because Frivaldo had obtained a margin of 20,000 votes over his closest rival, Lee, i.e., a vast
majority of the voters of Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign will for the former, then this Court
must yield to that will and must, therefore, allow to be set aside, for Frivaldo, not just the laws on

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qualifications of candidates and elective officials and naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, but even the final and binding decisions of this Court affecting him.
This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. I vote then to DISMISS G.R. No.
120295 and GRANT G.R. No. 123755.
Footnotes
1.Composed of Pres. Comm. Regalado E. Maambong, ponente; Comm. Graduacion A.R. Claravall,
concurring, and Comm. Julio F. Desamito, dissenting.
2.In SPC No. 95-317, entitled Juan G. Frivaldo, petitioner, vs. Raul R. Lee, respondent; Rollo, pp.
110-129.
3.Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo, Comms. Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. SalazarFernando, Manolo B. Gorospe and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores. Chairman Pardo certified that
"Commissioner Julio F. Desamito was on official travel at the time of the deliberation and
resolution of this case. However, the Commission has reserved to Comm. Desamito the right
to submit a dissenting opinion." Rollo, pp. 159-171.
4.Rollo, pp. 46-49.
5.Rollo, pp. 50-55. The Second Division was composed of Pres. Comm. Remedios A. SalazarFernando, ponente; Comm. Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, concurring, and Comm. Manolo B.
Gorospe ("on official business").
6.Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citizen on January 20, 1983. In G.R. No.
87193, Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (June 23, 1989), the Supreme
Court, by reason of such naturalization, declared Frivaldo "not a citizen of the Philippines and
therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon." On
February 28, 1992, the Regional Trial Court of Manila granted the petition for naturalization
of Frivaldo. However, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 104654,Republic of the
Philippines vs. De la Rosa, et al., 232 SCRA 785 (June 6, 1994), overturned this grant,
and Frivaldo was "declared not a citizen of the Philippines" and ordered to vacate his office.
On the basis of this latter Supreme Court ruling, the Comelec disqualified Frivaldo in SPA No.
95-028.
7.Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo and the six incumbent commissioners, namely, Regalado
E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, Manolo B. Gorospe, Graduacion A. ReyesClaravall, Julio F. Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores; Rollo, pp. 56-57.
8.Rollo, p. 60.
9.Rollo, pp. 61-67.
10.Rollo, pp. 86-87. The Comelec considered the votes cast for Frivaldo as "stray votes", and thus
Lee was held as having garnered the "highest number of votes."
11.Rollo, pp. 88-97. This is the forerunner of the present case.
12.211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992) and 176 SCRA 1 (August 1, 1989).
13.Rollo, pp. 110-128.
14.Rollo, pp. 159-170.
15.Rollo, pp. 16-17; petition, pp. 14-15.
16.Rollo, pp. 10-15. This is the same resolution referred to in footnote no. 5.
17.Rollo, pp. 16-17. This is the same resolution referred to in footnote no. 7.
18.Rollo, pp. 18-21. This is signed also by the Chairman and the six other Comelec Commissioners.
19.Republic Act No. 7160.
20.See footnote no. 6, supra.
21.In debunking Frivaldo's claim of citizenship, this Court in G.R. No. 87193, supra, p. 254, observed
that "(i)f he (Frivaldo) really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire
Philippine citizenship, petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our
country. Under C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473 and P.D. 725, Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation."
22.Supra, p. 794.
23.Petition, p. 27; Rollo, p. 29.
24.The full text of said memorandum reads as follows:
"MEMORANDUM
"TO : The Solicitor General
The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs

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The Director-General
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
The previous administration's practice of granting citizenship by Presidential Decree or any other
executive issuance, and the derivative administrative authority thereof, poses a serious and
contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise of prudence and
sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the 1987
Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on Naturalization,
are hereby directed to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your
functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instructions No. 270 dated April 11,
1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3, 1975, as amended, and
Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative to the grant of citizenship under
the said laws, and any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations.
(Sgd.) Corazon C. Aquino
Manila, March 27, 1987."
25.Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines.
26.Cf. Ty, et al. vs. Trampe, et al., G.R. No. 117577 (December 1, 1995).
27.Petition, p. 28; Rollo, p. 30.
28.The aforesaid Manifestation reads as follows:
"M A N I F E S T A T I O N
The Solicitor General, as Chairman of the Special Committee on Naturalization, hereby manifests
that the following persons have been repatriated by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725,
since June 8, 1995:
1. Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo R-000900
2. Manuel Reyes Sanchez 901
3. Ma. Nelly Dessalla Ty 902
4. Terry Herrera and
Antonio Ching 903
5. Roberto Salas Benedicto 904
6. Winthrop Santos Liwag 905
7. Samuel M. Buyco 906
8. Joselito Holganza Ruiz 907
9. Samuel Villanueva 908
10. Juan Leonardo Collas, Jr. 909
11. Felicilda Otilla Sacnanas-Chua 910"
29.The text of P.D. 725 is reproduced below:
"PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 725
PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS.
WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to
aliens;
WHEREAS, while the new Constitution allows a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her
Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission, she is deemed under the law to have
renounced her Philippine citizenship, such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to
Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect;
WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) allows the repatriation of Filipino women
who lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to aliens only after the death of their
husbands or the termination of their marital status; and
WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire
to re-acquire Philippine citizenship;
Now, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order that: (1) Filipino women

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who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (2) natural born Filipinos who
have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation
by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instructions No.
270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their
certificate of registration.
The aforesaid Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and
prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the effective implementation of this
Decree.
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-five."
30.See footnote no. 6, supra.
31.Cf. Labo, Jr. vs. Comelec, 211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992).
32."The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be
three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for by
law, . . ." Sec. 43, Local Government Code.
33.96 Phil. 447, 453 (1955).
34.The following are excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the oral argument held on
March 19, 1996:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Mr. Counsel, it is your position then that the candidate
should be a citizen at the time of proclamation?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, it is required that he must be a citizen at the
time of proclamation and not only that, at the time that he assumes the office he must have
the continuing qualification as a citizen.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Should that not be reckoned from the time of filing of
certificate of candidacy or at least the day of the election?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, there are positions taken that it should be
reckoned from the date of certificate of candidacy as in the case of qualification for Batasang
Pambansa before under B.P. 53 it says that for purposes of residence it must be reckoned
. . . from the time of the filing of the certificate, for purposes of age, from the time of the date
of the election. But when we go over all the provisions of law under current laws, Your Honor,
there is no qualification requirement insofar as citizenship is concern(ed) as to when, as to
when you should be a citizen of the Philippines and we say that if there is no provision under
any existing law which requires that you have to be a citizen of the Philippines on the date of
the filing or on the date of election then it has to be equitably interpreted to mean that if you
are already qualified at the time that the office is supposed to be assumed then you should
be allowed to assume the office.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Is it not also true that under the Local Autonomy Code the
candidate should also be a registered voter and to be a registered voter one must be a
citizen?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, in fact, Mr. Frivaldo has always been a
registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995.
In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned but the Court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a
voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on
May 8, 1995.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: But the fact that he voted does not make him a citizen. The
fact is, he was declared not a citizen by this Court twice.
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, Your Honor, we admit that he has been twice
declared not citizen and we admit the ruling of the Supreme Court is correct but the fact is,
Your Honor, the matter of his eligibility to vote as being a registered voter was likewise
questioned before the judiciary. There was a ruling by the Municipal Court, there was a ruling
by the Regional Trial Court and he was sustained as a valid voter, so he voted.

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JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I raised this question in connection with your contention

that citizenship should be determined as of the time of proclamation and not as of the time of
the election or at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: And is it your contention that under the law, particularly the
Local Autonomy Code, the law does not specify when citizenship should be possessed by the
candidate, is that not correct?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, there is no express provision.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am also asking you that under the Local Autonomy Code
the candidate for governor or for other local positions should be a voter and to be a voter one
must be a citizen?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, but the fact of voting is not an issue
here because he was allowed to vote and he did in fact vote and in fact, he was a registered
voter." (TSN, March 19, 1996.)
35.Section 117, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as "The Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines", as amended, provides for the various qualifications of voters, one of which is
Filipino citizenship.
36.Comment, p. 11; Rollo, p. 259.
37.See footnote no. 33.
38.Section 253 reads as follows:
"Section 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any
member of the Congress, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with
the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of election. (Art. XIV,
Sec. 60, BP 697; Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978 EC).
Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the ground
of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition
for quo warranto with the regional trial court or metropolitan or municipal trial court,
respectively, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. (Art. XVIII,
Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978 EC)."
39.Art. 4, New Civil Code. See also Gallardo vs. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500 (May 25, 1988),
and Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519 (April 2, 1984).
40.Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed.,
p. 23 states:
"Exceptions to Rule. Statutes can be given retroactive effect in the following cases: (1)
when the law itself so expressly provides, (2) in case of remedial statutes, (3) in case of
curative statutes, (4) in case of laws interpreting others, and (5) in case of laws creating new
rights."
41.Id., p. 25.
42.Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., pp. 270-271.
43.73 Am Jur 2d, sec. 354, p. 489, cited in Castro vs. Sagales, 94 Phil. 208, 210 (1953).
44.Memorandum, p. 9.
45.73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 351, p. 488.
46.73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 354, p. 490; underscoring supplied.
47.Art. 10, Civil Code of the Philippines.
48.Based on the "Corrected Compliance" dated May 16, 1996 filed by Solicitor General, it appears
that, excluding the case of Frivaldo, the longest interval between date of filing of an
application for repatriation and its approval was three months and ten days; the swiftest
action was a same-day approval.
49."SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;"
50.P. 11; Rollo, p. 259.
51.Resolution, p. 12; Rollo, p. 121.

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52.Cf. Navarro vs. Commission on Elections, 228 SCRA 596 (December 17, 1993); Arao vs.
Commission on Elections, 210 SCRA 290 (June 23, 1992).
53.The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that
respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the office of Provincial Governor of Sorsogon on the
ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly respondent's certificate of
candidacy is cancelled."
54.Petition, p. 19; Rollo, p. 21.
55.Resolution promulgated on December 19, 1995, p. 7; Rollo, p. 116.
56.42 SCRA 561, 565 (December 20, 1971), citing Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L21289, October 4, 1971.
57.Art. IX, Sec. 2.
58.SPC No. 95-317 is entitled "Annulment of Proclamation" and contains the following prayer:
"WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission that after
due notice and hearing an Oder (sic) /Resolution/Decision be issued as follows:
a) Annulling/setting aside the 30 June 1995 proclamation of respondent as the duly
election (sic), Governor of Sorsogon for being contrary to law;
b) Ordering the proclamation of the petitioner as duly elected governor of Sorsogon;
xxx xxx xxx
59.229 SCRA 666, 674 (February 4, 1994).
60.211 SCRA 297, 309 (July 3, 1992).
61.G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995.
62.Supra, at p. 312.
63.See footnotes 2 and 3.
64.174 SCRA 245, 254 (June 23, 1959).
65.Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 1966 ed., p. 239.
66.In Espiosa vs. Aquino, (Electoral Case No. 9, Senate Electoral Tribunal [SET]), the election of the
late Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was upheld, despite his not being of the required age on
the day of the election, although he celebrated his thirty-fifth birthday before his proclamation.
Much later, in 1990, this Court held in Aznar vs.Comelec (185 SCRA 703, May 25, 1990) that
even if Emilio "Lito" Osmea held an Alien Certificate of Registration as an American citizen,
he was still not disqualified from occupying the local elective post of governor, since such
certificate did not preclude his being "still a Filipino." The holding in Aquino was subsequently
nullified by the adoption of the 1987 Constitution (Art. VI, Sec. 3), which specified that the age
qualification must be possessed on the day of the elections, and not on the day of the
proclamation of the winners by the board of canvassers. On the other hand, Sec. 40 of
Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991 ) which took effect on January 1,
1992 , provides that those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective
local position, and effectively overturns the ruling in Aznar. But the point is that to the extent
possible, and unless there exist provisions to the contrary, the laws have always been
interpreted to give fullest effect to the political will.
67.Benito vs. Commission on Elections, 235 SCRA 436, 442 (August 17, 1994).
68.This antagonism was clearly present in the two earlier cases involving Frivaldo. See footnote no.
6.
PUNO, J., concurring:
1.The 1987 Constitution added the word "democratic" in the statement of the principle.
2.Section 24(a) of the Tydings-McDuffie Law which authorized the Filipino people to draft a
Constitution in 1934 required that the "constitution formulated and drafted shall be republican
in form.''
This Court has observed that even before the Tydings-McDuffie Law, the Philippine Bill and the
Jones Law have ". . . extended the powers of a republican form of government modeled after
that of the United States to the Philippines." Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315, 340
[1912], Severino v. Gov. General, 16 Phil. 366, 383 [1910], US v. Bull, 15 Phil. 7, 27 [1910].
3.Words and Phrases, Vol. 39 A., p. 68 citing Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. R. Co., 33 F. 900,
906.

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4.Dean of the UP College of Law; later President of U.P., and Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention.
5.Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Principles and Concepts, 1954, ed., p. 22.
6.Barker, Principles of Social and Political Theory, p. 59 (1952 ed.).
7.118 US 356.
8.Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 49, [1991 ed.]
9.Sinco, op. cit., pp. 23-24.
10.3 AM JUR 2d 889-890; 63 AM JUR 2d 653; 67 CSJ 926.
11.Moya v. del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199.
||| (Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, 123755, June 28, 1996)

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EN BANC
[G.R. No. 86564. August 1, 1989.]
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS LARDIZABAL, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.
Rillera and Quintana for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; QUO WARRANTO; PETITION FILED TIMELY. The Court has considered
the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. We agree with
the respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended by the pendency of the
petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the
payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for
the payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record that Res.
No. 1450 was even published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on March 3, 1988, seven
days after its publication in the February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, or afterthe petition was filed.
2. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF FILING FEES NECESSARY FOR CONFERMENT OF JURISDICTION;
COURT MAY ALLOW PAYMENT WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME. It is true that in the Manchester
Case, we required the timely payment of the filing fee as a precondition for the timeliness of the filing of
the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, however, this Court, taking into account the
special circumstances of that case, reiterated the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case
only upon the payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, this court may allow the payment of the said
fee within a reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance therewith, the case shall be dismissed. The
same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure adopted on June
20, 1988.
3. CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTION; RESOLUTION ON THE MERITS INSTEAD OF REMANDING THE
CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS; AS DEMANDED BY THE DICTATES
OF JUSTICE. Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary
where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions,
the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the
merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of
justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest demands an early
disposition of the case or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties.
4. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA NOT APPLICABLE TO QUESTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP;
DEFENSE TO BE SEASONABLY INVOKED. There is also the claim that the decision can no longer
be reversed because of the doctrine of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does
not apply to questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. Moreover, it does not
appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been
invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply to the private respondent's comment. Besides, one of the
requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in this case.
5. POLITICAL LAW; NATURALIZATION; ACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALIZATION.
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest
him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a
Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such
through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian
citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the
Affirmation of Allegiance.
6. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; MODES OF LOSING PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. CA No. 63 enumerates the
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign
country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth
mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
7. ID.; ID.; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE TO A FOREIGNER NOT AN AUTOMATIC RESTORATION OF
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in
Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that

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circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian
citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we
must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and
knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been
subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically
reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
8. ID.; ID.; MEANS OF REACQUIRING PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. Under CA No. 63 as amended
by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or
by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by any of these methods.
9. ID.; ID.; LACK OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE DAY OF LOCAL ELECTIONS; GROUND FOR
DISQUALIFICATION AS A CANDIDATE FOR MAYOR. The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the
day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a
qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a
candidate for mayor of Baguio City under Section 42 of the Local Government Code.
10. ID.; ELECTION; QUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATE FOR PUBLIC OFFICE, CONTENDING
REQUIREMENTS. The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so
in the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot
nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing requirements;
once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar,
the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the
first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although
elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
11. ID.; ELECTION; CANDIDATE OBTAINING THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES; NOT
QUALIFIED TO REPLACE THE DISQUALIFIED CANDIDATE; SANTOS RULING REVERSED.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition,
can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second
highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City. Reexamining Santos v. Commission on Election, 137 SCRA 740 the Court finds, and so holds, that it should
be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, which represents the more logical and
democratic rule. There the Court held it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of
votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which
have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking into the
question of his citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation that
he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent has
jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition for quo
warranto against him was not filed on time. cdphil
It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged tardiness not of the petition itself
but of the payment of the filing fee, which the petitioner contends was an indispensable requirement.
The fee is, curiously enough, all of P300.00 only. This brings to mind the popular verse that for want
of a horse the kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown that the petition was indeed filed beyond the
reglementary' period, there is no question that this petition must be granted and the challenge abated.
The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City on January
20, 1988. The petition for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent on January 26,1988, but
no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days
after his proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be
deemed filed only when the fee was paid. This was done beyond the reglementary period provided
for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code reading as follows:
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of a Member
of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall files sworn petition

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for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the
result of the election.
The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under Rule 36, Section 5, of
the Procedural Rules of the COMELEC providing that
Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course without the payment of a
filing fee in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research fee
as required by law.
and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the payment of the filing fee is
essential to the timeliness of the filing of the petition itself. He cites many rulings of the Court to this
effect, specifically Manchester v. Court of Appeals. 1
For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of time. In fact, he
says, it was filed ahead of time. His point is that when he filed his "Petition for Quo Warranto with
Prayer for Immediate Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining Order or Injunction" on January 26,
1988, the COMELEC treated it as a pre-proclamation controversy and docketed it as SPC Case No.
88-288. No docket fee was collected although it was offered. It was only on February 8, 1988, that
theCOMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case
No. 88-19, serving him notice on February 10, 1988. He immediately paid the filing fee on that date.
The private respondent argues further that during the period when the COMELEC regarded
his petition as a pre-proclamation controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo
warranto proceeding was deemed suspended under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code. 2 At
any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of theCOMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the petitioner,
became effective only on November 15, 1988, seven days after publication of the said Rules in the
Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44 thereof. 3 These rules could not retroact to January
26,1988, when he filed his petition with the COMELEC.
In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election Code did not require it,
the payment of filing fees was still necessary under Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of
the respondent COMELEC, promulgated on January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980, respectively.
To this, the private respondent counters that the latter resolution was intended for the local elections
held on January 30, 1980, and did not apply to the 1988 local elections, which were supposed to be
governed by the first-mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect only on March 3,
1988, following the lapse of seven days alter its publication as required by RA No. 6646, otherwise
known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which became effective on January 5,1988. Its Section
30 provides in part:
Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission. The rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission shall take effect on the seventh day after
their publication in the Official Gazette or in at least (2) daily newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo
warranto was filed on time. We agree with the respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day
period as extended by the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a preproclamation proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this
conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the payment of the fees in quo
warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was even
published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on March 3, 1988, seven days after its
publication in the February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
or after the petition was filed. cdasia
The petitioner forgets Taada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues that the resolutions became
effective "immediately upon approval" simply because it was so provided therein. We held in that
case that publication was still necessary under the due process clause despite such effectivity clause.
In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay there may
have been is not imputable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. It is true that in the
Manchester Case, we required the timely payment of the filing fee as a precondition for the timeliness
of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 5 however, this Court, taking
into account the special circumstances of that case, declared:

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This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case only
upon the payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the court may allow the
payment of the said fee within a reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance
therewith, the case shall be dismissed.
The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
adopted on June 20, 1988, thus:
Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. If the fees above prescribed are not paid,
the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss
the action or the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition for quo
warranto should be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee on time, the petitioner would at the same
time minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as "a futile technicality." It is regrettable, to say the least,
that the requirement of citizenship as a qualification for public office can be so demeaned. what is
worse is that it is regarded as an even less important consideration than the reglementary period the
petitioner insists upon.
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the petitioner is
the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is the subject
of that proceeding, and considering the necessity for an early resolution of that more important
question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly address it now in this same
action.
The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:
From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant case, it would appear
that our sole function in this proceeding should be to resolve the single issue of
whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the motion for new trial of the
GSIS in question should indeed be deemed pro forma. But going over the extended
pleadings of both parties, the Court is immediately impressed that substantial justice
may not be timely achieved, if we should decide this case upon such a technical
ground alone. We have carefully read all the allegations and arguments of the parties,
very ably and comprehensively expounded by evidently knowledgeable and unusually
competent counsel, and we feel we can better serve the interests of justice by
broadening the scope of our inquiry, for as the record before us stands, we see that
there is enough basis for us to end the basic controversy between the parties here and
now, dispensing, however, with procedural steps which would not anyway affect
substantially the merits of their respective claims. 6
xxx xxx xxx
While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong court and thereby
allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the more correct procedure was for the
respondent court to forward the case to the proper court which was the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action. Considering, however, the length of time that this case
has been pending, we apply the rule in the case of Del Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112 SCRA
629) and follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (135
SCRA 37) which states:
". . . it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to
settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to
bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case
is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the
Intermediate Appellate Court and from there to this Court." (p. 43)
Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No.
50141, January 29,1988), we stated that:
". . . But all those relevant facts are now before this Court. And those
facts dictate the rendition of a verdict in the petitioner's favor. There is therefore
no point in referring the case back to the Court of Appeals. The facts and the
legal propositions involved will not change, nor should the ultimate judgment.
Considerable time has already elapsed and, to serve the ends of justice, it is
time that the controversy is finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA
733; Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber

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Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA 575; Francisco v.
City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil. 162). 'Sound
practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort
and expense, both to the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in
the disposal of the case (of: Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A marked
characteristic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so
demand . . . the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.' (Li Siu Liat v.
Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v.
Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74). In this case, the dictates of justice do demand that this
Court act, and act with finality." 7
xxx xxx xxx
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records
before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them
to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be
subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest demands an early
disposition of the case or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of
the parties. 8
This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case where, to repeat for
stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public office.
We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:
In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent COMELEC implicitly adopted as
"its own" private respondent's repeated assertion that petitioner is no longer a Filipino
citizen. In so doing, has not respondent COMELEC effectively disqualified itself, by
reason of prejudgment, from resolving the petition for quo warranto filed by private
respondent still pending before it? 9
This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule directly on the merits of this
case.
Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative decisions on the question of
the petitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982,
and found the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines. 10 The second was rendered by the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation on September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner was
not a citizen of the Philippines. 11
The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chairman Vicente Santiago, Jr., with
Commissioners Pabalate, Savellano and Opinion concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan
concurring in the dismissal of the petition "without prejudice to the issue of the respondent's
citizenship being raised a new in a proper case. "Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote, while
Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision until representations shall have been made with the
Australian Embassy for official verification of the petitioner's alleged naturalization as an Australian.
The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam Defensor-Santiago and
Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. prLL
It is important to observe that in the proceeding before the COMELEC, there was no direct
proof that the herein petitioner had been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This conjecture,
which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the fact that he had married an Australian
citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and registered as en alien with the CID upon his return to
this country in 1980.
On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official statement of the
Australian Government dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the
petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976. That
statement 12 is reproduced in full as follows:
I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by virtue of a
certificate of appointment signed and sealed by the Australian Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs on 19 October 1983, and recognized as such by Letter of Patent signed
and sealed by the Philippines Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23 November 1983,

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do hereby provide the following statement in response to the Subpoena Testificandum

dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the Petition for disqualification against RAMON LABO,
JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73). and do hereby certify that the statement is true and
correct.
STATEMENT
A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December 1934, was married in the
Philippines to an Australian citizen. As the spouse of an Australian citizen, he was not
required to meet normal requirements for the grant of citizenship and was granted
Australian citizenship by Sydney on 28 July 1976.
B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship must take
an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance. The wording of the oath of
affirmation is: "I. . . ., renouncing all other allegiance . . . .," etc. This need not
necessarily have any effect on his former nationality as this would depend on the
citizenship laws of his former country.
C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on 27
June 1980 on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous.
D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen.
E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in respect of Section 50
of Australian Citizenship Act 1948 which relates to the giving of false or misleading
information of a material nature in respect of an application for Australian citizenship. If
such a prosecution was successful, he could be deprived of Australian citizenship
under Section 21 of the Act.
F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest himself of Australian
citizenship:
(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian
citizenship under Section 18 of the Australian Citizenship Act, or
(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino) by a formal
end voluntary act other than marriage, then he would automatically lose his
Australian citizenship under Section 17 of the Act.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND AND SEAL OF THE
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12TH DAY OF APRIL 1984.
DONE AT MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES.
(Signed)
GRAHAM C. WEST
Consul
This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed to the private respondent
by the Department of Foreign Affairs reading as follows: 13
Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to inform you that inquiry
made with the Australian Government through the Embassy of the Philippines in
Canberra has elicited the following information:
1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian citizenship on 28
July 1976.
2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship had
to either swear an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance which
carries a renunciation of "all other allegiance."
Very truly yours,
For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs:
(SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR
Assistant Secretary
The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every naturalized Australian reading
as follows:
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear
true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors

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according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an
Australian citizen. 14
and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:
AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and sincerely promise and declare
that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second,
Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors according to law, and that I will faithfully
observe the Laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 15
The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above evidence. Neither does he
deny that he obtained Australian Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming back to the
Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the immigration authorities that he was an alien and
registered as such under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. 16 He later asked for the
change of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was granted
Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809. 17 He also categorically declared that he was a
citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and. even sought to
avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner. 18
The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as "mistakes" that
did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all the member joined in
this finding. We reject this ruling as totally baseless. The petitioner is not an unlettered person who
was not aware of the consequences of his acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted by counsel
when he performed these acts.
The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that time and
stresses Labo's political affiliation with the party in power then, but we need not go into that now.
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the doctrine
of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to questions of
citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. 19 Moreover, it does not appear that it was
properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been invoked only
when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to the private respondent's comment. Besides, one of the
requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in this case.
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not
automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he
automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia
because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case
because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally
took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above.
Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty
Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia. . . . , and to fulfill his duties as an Australian citizen." cdll
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual
national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand
against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in
this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was
annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that
circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of
Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted
country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship
and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may
have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been
automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does

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the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does
not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine
citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725, providing that:
. . . (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire
Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on
Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are
approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The
Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of
registration. (Emphasis supplied.)
That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his application for the
cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his
present claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a
citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself
because of his alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City under
Section 42 of the Local Government Code providing in material part as follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. (1) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter
registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes to
be elected, a resident therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English, Pilipino, or any other local
language or dialect.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should
not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous
majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his lead over the second-placer was only
about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that locality could not have, even unanimously,
changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution. The electorate had no
power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless
individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of
their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief
that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the
qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing requirements; once
any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar,
the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in
the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and,
although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such. LLpr
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of
the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, 22 decided
in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his
winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all
disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by
eight members of the Court then, 23 with three dissenting 24 and another two reserving their
vote.25 One was on official leave. 26
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor
of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, 27 which represents the more logical and democratic rule.
That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes, 28 was
supported by ten members of the Court, 29without any dissent, although one reserved his
vote, 30 another took no part, 31 and two others were an leave. 32 There the Court held:
". . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality
of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency,

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the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received
the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental
idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared
to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to
be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or
non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there.
However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as such
and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to
grant him. Having been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting it for
another land that may offer him material and other attractions that he may not find in his own country.
To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a
state with more allurements for him. 33 But having done so, he cannot expect to be welcomed back
with open arms once his taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as an
undesirable alien.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its
renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication
to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to public office.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is
ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City once this
decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is
LIFTED.
Fernan, C . J ., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J ., concurring:
As in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections (G. R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989) and
inspite of what would otherwise be insuperable procedural obstacles, I am constrained to concur in
the Court's decision so forcefully and felicitously written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. I do so
because I cannot see how the Court can countenance a citizen of a foreign country or one who has
renounced Filipino citizenship sitting as the mayor of one of the most important cities in the
Philippines. dctai
What was raised to the Court was only the issue of the COMELEC's jurisdiction to inquire into
the citizenship of the petitioner. Ordinarily, we would have limited ourselves to sustaining the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and remanding the case for further proceedings and the rendition of a
decision. Under Section 7, Article XI-A of the Constitution, a decision, order, or ruling of
the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof. No decision on the petitioner's citizenship has been rendered and
no decision can, as yet, be elevated to us for review. I, therefore, reiterate my statement
inFrivaldo that my concurrence is limited only to cases involving citizenship and disloyalty but not to
any of the many other grounds for disqualification cited in my concurring opinion.
Our decision to disqualify the petitioner is particularly distressing to me because I am
impressed by the singular achievements in the beautification of Baguio City, in the peace and order
situation, and in the resurgence of civic pride so visible to anyone who has gone up to Baguio since

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Mr. Labo assumed the mayorship. However, I see no other way this case can be resolved except by
adopting a pragmatic approach. It is beyond dispute that a non-citizen cannot be the mayor of Baguio
City. I join the rest of the Court.

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EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000.]
CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND
YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
Ifurung & Marquinez for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions of the COMELEC, dismissing the petition for
disqualification filed by petitioner against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998
elections for governor of Davao Oriental. EHTCAa
Petitioner maintained that private respondent is an Australian citizen, not qualified to run for elective
office, because: she is a holder of an Australian passport; and she expressly renounced her Filipino
citizenship when she declared under oath in her application for alien certificate of registration and
immigrant certificate of residence that she was a citizen or subject of Australia.
In dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that private respondent was a holder
of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective
renunciation of Filipino citizenship. Renunciation must be express, to effectively result in the loss of
Filipino citizenship. At most, private respondent had dual citizenship she was an Australian and a
Filipino, as well. Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens with dual allegiance. Her filing of a
certificate of candidacy, where she declared that she is a Filipino citizen and that she will support and
defend the Philippine Constitution and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, sufficed to renounce
her foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; RENUNCIATION MUST BE EXPRESS; APPLYING FOR AN
ALIEN CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION AND HOLDING A FOREIGN PASSPORT, NOT A CASE OF;
CASE AT BAR. In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be
express. Petitioner's contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of
registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar
vs. COMELEC and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC. In the case of
Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that
he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien
certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. And, in Mercado
vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an
American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on
April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just
assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. Thus, the mere
fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an
alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not
militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express. EDATSI
2. ID.; ID.; DUAL CITIZENSHIP; AS A DISQUALIFICATION FROM RUNNING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
REFERS TO CITIZENS WITH DUAL ALLEGIANCE; CASE AT BAR. Petitioner maintains that even on
the assumption that the private respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for
governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, . . . In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual
citizenship" as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of
the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without
performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be
also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to
citizens with dual allegiance. . . Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not
automatically disqualify her from running for a public office.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RENUNCIATION OF FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP EFFECTIVELY REMOVES ANY
DISQUALIFICATION AS A DUAL CITIZEN; CASE AT BAR. It was ruled that for candidates with dual
citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of
candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of
candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual

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citizen. This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and
that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such
fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship. Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15,
1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly
registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a
result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to
by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the
COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; PRINCIPLE THEREOF GENERALLY DOES
NOT APPLY IN CASES OF CITIZENSHIP; EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. Petitioner is correct insofar
as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases
hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case ofBurca vs. Republic, an exception to this
general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res
judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present: 1) a person's citizenship be
raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his
authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3) the finding on citizenship is
affirmed by this Court. Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case
did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be
placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or
simpler. Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections
in SPA No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private
respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these
two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of
such prior resolutions. TCaEAD
DECISION
PURISIMA, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the herein
petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections
for governor of Davao Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church
in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as
a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao
Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by
her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as
ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent
had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition,
ratiocinating thus:
"A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows
that respondent was able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of
her late father . . . and consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of
the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to the contrary
notwithstanding. ETIDaH
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no other
evidence substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of petitioner that
respondent is an Australian citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of
citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63 is an
equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and consequence.

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The evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that
respondent contemplated renunciation of her Filipino citizenship". 1
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao
Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066
before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise
dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as
governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein
petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELEC's First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the petition, and
disposing as follows:
"Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the instant
case on the merits trying it de novo, the above table definitely shows that petitioner
herein has presented no new evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in
SPA No. 95-066. The present petition merely restates the same matters and incidents
already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995 Resolution but likewise in the
Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any new evidence and matter
substantial in nature, persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to compel
reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the present petition follows as a matter of
course.
xxx xxx xxx
"WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues
tendered, We find no convincing reason or impressive explanation to disturb and
reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA 95066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the present
petition.
SO ORDERED." 2
Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The same
was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning the citizenship of
private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen
and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino
citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January
15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport
was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there
are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino
citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing
reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an
Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695
dated September 19, 1988; SCEDaT
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence
(ICR); and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private respondent had
renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate of registration
and immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent expressly declared under oath that she was a
citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to
disqualify her to run for elective office.
As regards the COMELEC's finding that private respondent had renounced her Australian citizenship on
January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her

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Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy here in
Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not automatically restore the status of private respondent
as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship
she must comply with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the
election of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since
the private respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian
citizenship, private respondent has effectively become a stateless person and as such, is disqualified to
run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the principle of res
judicata to the case under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 3 that:
". . . Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. . . . "
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the
nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine
of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome,
Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines
Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the
principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of
July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands. The
Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4. . . . all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine,
and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto;
shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to
the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight. (italics supplied) HSIADc
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come within
the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein. (italics supplied)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899
and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent's
father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced
by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which
were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo's daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as
basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:

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(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 1973 4 and 1987 5 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent,
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being
born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle
of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her
possession of dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she
has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private
respondent's application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3,
1988.
Under COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a
foreign county upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; SEHTIc
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed
forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has
been granted; and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in
force in her husband's country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioner's
contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her
Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC 6 and
in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC. 7
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a
certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an
application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an
American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor
of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian
passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of
citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively
result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. 8 As held by this court in the aforecited case
of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation
or repudiation of one's citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate
of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were
mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at
the most, private respondent had dual citizenship she was an Australian and a Filipino, as
well. ISHCcT

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Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another
country has not been included as a ground for losing one's Philippine citizenship. Since private
respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner's claim that respondent must go
through the process of repatriation does not hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual citizenship,
still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citingSection 40 of Republic Act 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:
"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx xxx xxx
Again, petitioner's contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in the Local
Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual
allegiance. 9 Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as an
involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state,
the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance.
The Court succinctly pronounced:
". . . the phrase 'dual citizenship' in R.A. No. 7160, ... 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, . . .
20 must be understood as referring to 'dual allegiance'. Consequently, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification."
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from
running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough
that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship. 10 The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. 11 This is so because in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such
declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore,
when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated
her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15, 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of
private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy
of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle
the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective,
petitioner's claim that private respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation holds no
water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative
proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not consideredres judicata in any subsequent
proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration. 12 He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally
does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs.
Republic, 13 an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order
that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a person's citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said
person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof; and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the
weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these
antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler. 14 Indeed,

Page | 185

there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The
evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior cases.
Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior
resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannot
prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998
and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED. ATHCac
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao
Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is abroad, on official business.

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EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999.]
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Balase, Tamase, Alampay Law Office for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Mercado and private respondent Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati
in the May 11, 1998 elections. The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a
pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent
was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. The Second Division of the COMELEC
granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code,
persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. Private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending until after the election. The board of
canvassers tabulated the votes but suspended the proclamation of the winner. Petitioner sought to
intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC en banc reversed the decision and declared private
respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC en banc, the board of
canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the
resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office
of the vice mayor of Makati. cdasia
On the issue of whether the petitioner has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not the
original party in the disqualification case, the Supreme Court ruled that under Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered. As regards the issue
of citizenship, the Court ruled that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post,
private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTORAL REFORMS LAW OF 1987 (R.A. No. 6646); INTERVENTION,
ALLOWED IN PROCEEDINGS FOR DISQUALIFICATION EVEN AFTER ELECTION IF THERE HAS
BEEN NO FINAL JUDGMENT RENDERED; CASE AT BAR. Private respondent argues that petitioner
has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is "a defeated
candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of
Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment." The
flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings
before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice
mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private
respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner
had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to
intervene. The rule in Labo vs. COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only applies to cases in which the
election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the
disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a
"Motion for leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner,
and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an]
elective local position" under Section 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted
the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so
was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City. Nor is petitioner's
interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998,
after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the
candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or

Page | 187

any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in
proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
2. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; DUAL CITIZENSHIP; DISTINGUISHED FROM DUAL ALLEGIANCE. Dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national
by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of
a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus
soli. Such a person,ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino
fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the
Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers' country such children are
citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship. There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing
any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are possible given the constitutional
provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition. With respect to dual allegiance, Article
IV, Section 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. In including Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as
referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional
Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of
the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not
she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control." By electing
Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which
they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of
view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship.
4. ID.; ID.; FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY SUFFICED TO RENOUNCE AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP; CASE AT BAR. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post,
private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The
filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing
any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo vs. COMELEC it was held: It is not
disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his
repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code
would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" We answer this question in the
negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said
oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo
wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship long before May
8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim when he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship." On this point, we quote from the
assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: "By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost
his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran
for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance
to the Philippine Government." These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long

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before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such
findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or abuse. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, private
respondent had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of
his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar
vs. COMELEC applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar: . . . Considering the fact
that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate
stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . [T]he Certification that he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is
even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose
Philippine citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine
citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied." To recapitulate, by declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. acCITS
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza
III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 1
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, 2 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent
on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with
dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The COMELEC's Second
Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of
Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in
the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is
an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and
misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted
that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien
Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because
he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the
United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an
American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American
citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is
both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be
elected?

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Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo
Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. 3 The motion remained pending
even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the
board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the
proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. 4 Petitioner's motion was
opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its
resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of
its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in
the May 11, 1998 elections. 5 The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age
of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as
travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau
of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not
result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered
himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively
renounced his citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had
U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest
number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one
hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty-three (103,853) votes over his closest rival,
Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety-four
(100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty-nine (2,959) votes.
Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy-five
(54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the
popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving private international
law which may well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on
Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the
Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the
respondent's certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a
candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon
proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis
Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the
evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of
Makati. cdasia
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the
COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of
Makati City. Petitioner contends that
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:

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1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority

when he was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a
voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor
of the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second
Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not
be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold
the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano
whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original
party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's motion for leave to
intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring
this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:
SECTION 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any
person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an
action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in
such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as
to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion
for intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication
of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be
fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an
interest to protect because he is "a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City
[who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be
ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment."
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the
election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only
second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time.
Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the
time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, 6 reiterated in several cases, 7 only
applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one
who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at
the time petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no
proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent
disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position" under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto
Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City,
was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice
mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the
highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene
at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6
of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a

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candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he

is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even
after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As
the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not
only with the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention but also with the substantive issues
respecting private respondent's alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses
dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati
City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for any
elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the
Charter of the City of Makati. 8
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides
with him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has
"command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local
elective office."
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. 9 For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is
born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the
citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of
their fathers' country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing
any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." This provision was included
in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as
follows: 10
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual
citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to
which a dual allegiance and I reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more
threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and,
perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or
of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.

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What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional

cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens
in the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as
well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese community
is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until
recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the People's Republic of China,
they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of
Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries were represented, which
was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the
Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of
allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may
be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took
close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including
Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of
thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been
worried about minority claims on our natural resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan,
Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great
commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese
it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we
have to endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider
incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will
read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE
DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual
allegiance, thus: 11
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual
citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty
which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be
repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself
which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms
of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation
to rise to the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this,
Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of
those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations
since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China
was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to
Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of
allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion
when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have
detected a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk
of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I
appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a
future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the
security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of double
citizens professing double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed
amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double
citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to

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"dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process
with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if,
upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive
members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed
on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child
of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is something
completely beyond our control." 12
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to
the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It
may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not
effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on
40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: 13
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41,
page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local
position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a
citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the
Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the
age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging
to the country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines,
may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the
moment when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his
citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the
country of origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a
citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office
would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino
citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not
require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening
himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to
say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one
citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law,
Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested
upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that
will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under
this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce "all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty"14 of which at the time he
is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the
Philippines. In Parado v. Republic, 15 it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that
he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law
is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or

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fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and
is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted
by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere
with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality
were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our
legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government
has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all
means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and
power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on
September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis,
while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was
a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held
that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent "effectively
renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is
not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made
when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made
when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the
United States, which provided that "A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth
or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or
participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." To be sure
this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as
beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a
certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private respondent's certificate of
candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED")
NATURAL-BORN
xxx xxx xxx
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN
LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN
COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT
AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL
MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY
THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE
DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF
VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF
EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE
TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus,
in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held: 17
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American.
Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which
under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for
any elective local position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent
reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of
allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment,
Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American

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citizenship-long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim-when
he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his
Filipino citizenship."
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19,
1995:
"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American
citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government
when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of
candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before
the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic
that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any
showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained in
private respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his American
citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioner's contention that, to be effective, such renunciation
should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires
the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an
American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American
passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in
this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts
attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar
vs. COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship;
truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider
that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express," it stands
to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenshipwhen there is no
renunciation, either "express" or "implied."
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he
is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without
mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned,
effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced
his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under
oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 19 we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial
documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. cdasia
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

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EN BANC
[G.R. No. 180048. June 19, 2009.]
ROSELLER DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ANGELINA DG. DELA CRUZ, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This petition 1 for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order assails
the June 15, 2007 Resolution 2 of the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA
No. 07-211, disqualifying petitioner Roseller De Guzman from running as vice-mayor in the May 14, 2007
Synchronized National and Local Elections. Also assailed is the October 9, 2007 Resolution 3 of the
COMELEC En Banc denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were candidates for vice-mayor of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. On April 3, 2007, private respondent filed against
petitioner a petition 4 for disqualification docketed as SPA No. 07-211, alleging that petitioner is not a
citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the United States of America.
In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006, he
applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. 5 Upon approval of his application, he took his oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. He argued that, having re-acquired
Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, he is qualified to run
as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
During the May 14, 2007 elections, private respondent won as vice-mayor. Petitioner filed an election
protest on grounds of irregularities and massive cheating. The case was filed before Branch 31 of the
Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija and was docketed as Election Protest No. 07-01.
Meanwhile, in SPA No. 07-211, the COMELEC First Division rendered its June 15, 2007 Resolution
disqualifying petitioner, which reads as follows: ScaAET
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 states:
"Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: . . ."
Hence, under the provisions of the aforementioned law, respondent has validly
reacquired Filipino citizenship. By taking this Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on September 6, 2006 before Mary Jo Bernardo Aragon, Deputy Consul
General at the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California respondent was
deemed a dual citizen, possessing both Filipino and American citizenship.
However, subparagraph (2), Section 5 of the aforementioned Act also provides:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
As can be gleaned from the above cited provision, respondent [herein petitioner] should
have renounced his American citizenship before he can run for any public elective
position. This respondent did not do. The Oath of Allegiance taken by respondent was
for the purpose of re-acquiring Philippine citizenship. It did not, at the same time, mean
that respondent has renounced his American citizenship. Thus, at the time respondent
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice-Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija
he was, and still is, a dual citizen, possessing both Philippine and American citizenship.
For this reason alone, respondent is disqualified to run for the abovementioned elective
position.

Page | 197

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED, as

it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the instant petition finding it IMBUED WITH MERIT.
Hence, respondent (petitioner herein) Roseller T. De Guzman is disqualified to run as
Vice-Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and
Local Elections. 6
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was dismissed on October 9, 2007 by the
COMELEC En Banc for having been rendered moot in view of private respondent's victory.
Thereafter, the trial court in Election Protest No. 07-01 rendered a Decision, 7 dated November 26, 2007,
declaring petitioner as the winner for the Vice-Mayoralty position. It held: IDScTE
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring protestant ROSELLER T. DE
GUZMAN, as the winner for the Vice-Mayoralty position with a plurality of 776 votes
over the protestee, ANGELINA D.G. DELA CRUZ, in the May 14, 2007 Local Elections
in Guimba, Nueva Ecija. With costs against the protestee.
There being no evidence presented as to the damages by both parties, the same are
hereby denied.
SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, alleging that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying him from running as Vice-Mayor because of his failure to renounce his
American citizenship, and in dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being moot.
Petitioner invokes the rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections 9 and Mercado v. Manzano, 10 that
the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance,
constituted as a renunciation of his foreign citizenship. Moreover, he claims that the COMELEC En Banc
prematurely dismissed the motion for reconsideration because at that time, there was a pending election
protest which was later decided in his favor.
Meanwhile, private respondent claims that the passage of R.A. No. 9225 effectively abandoned the
Court's rulings in Frivaldo and Mercado; that the current law requires a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship; and that petitioner, having failed to renounce his American citizenship,
remains a dual citizen and is therefore disqualified from running for an elective public position under
Section 40 11 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
petitioner's motion for reconsideration for being moot; and 2) whether petitioner is disqualified from
running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to
renounce his American citizenship in accordance with R.A. No. 9225.
An issue becomes moot when it ceases to present a justifiable controversy so that a determination
thereof would be without practical use and value. 12 In this case, the pendency of petitioner's election
protest assailing the results of the election did not render moot the motion for reconsideration which he
filed assailing his disqualification. Stated otherwise, the issue of petitioner's citizenship did not become
moot; the resolution of the issue remained relevant because it could significantly affect the outcome of the
election protest. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. As
mandated by law: "An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines". 13 It bears stressing that
the Regional Trial Court later ruled in favor of petitioner in the election protest and declared him the
winner. In view thereof, a definitive ruling on the issue of petitioner's citizenship was clearly necessary.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's motion for
reconsideration solely on the ground that the same was rendered moot because he lost to private
respondent.
Anent the second issue, we find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his
failure to renounce his American citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) naturalborn citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become
citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. 14
Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship
upon his naturalization as an American citizen. In the instant case, there is no question that petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance on September 6, 2006. However, it

Page | 198

must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225imposes an additional requirement on those who wish to seek
elective public office, as follows: DcHSEa
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Contrary to petitioner's claims, the filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a
renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Our rulings in the cases
of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable to the instant case because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more
requirements.
Thus, in Japzon v. COMELEC, 15 the Court held that Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225 requires the twin
requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship, viz.:
Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or
retained his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office,
he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Further, in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC, 16 the Court ruled that a candidate's oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the
requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Thus:
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either
retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized
to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of
candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who
have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior
or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates
in Philippine elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing
themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than
that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of
the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No.
4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No.
9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur
Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance
is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship:
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay. So, No. 2. "Those seeking elective public office in
the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any

Page | 199

and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath." I think it's very good, ha? No problem? aTcIAS
REP. JAVIER. . . . I think it's already covered by the oath.
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Renouncing foreign citizenship.
REP. JAVIER. Ah but he has taken his oath already.
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Nono, renouncing foreign citizenship.
xxx xxx xxx
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I go back to No. 2. What's your problem,
Boy? Those seeking elective office in the Philippines.
REP. JAVIER. They are trying to make him renounce his citizenship thinking
that ano . . .
CHAIRMAN DRILON. His American citizenship.
REP. JAVIER. To discourage him from running?
CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.
REP. A.D. DEFENSOR. No. When he runs he will only have one
citizenship. When he runs for office, he will have only one. (Emphasis
ours.)
There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos
reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take
their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce
their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To
qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship,
namely, Philippine citizenship. ScCIaA
By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy,
which is substantially similar to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under Section
5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is
a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine
elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for
those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of
having more than one citizenship.
In the instant case, petitioner's Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Candidacy did not comply with
Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his
American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in
the May 14, 2007 elections.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioner is declared DISQUALIFIED from running for ViceMayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections because of his failure to renounce his
foreign citizenship pursuant to Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Carpio, Corona, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro,
Brion, Peralta and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Carpio Morales, J., is on leave.

Page | 200

JUAN DOMINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NARCISO Ra. GRAFILO, JR., EDDY
B. JAVA, JUAN P. BAYONITO, JR., ROSARIO SAMSON and DIONISIO P. LIM,
SR., respondents.
Challenged in this case for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the Resolution of 6
[1]
May 1998 of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (hereafter COMELEC), declaring
petitioner Juan Domino (hereafter DOMINO) disqualified as candidate for representative of the Lone
Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections, and the Decision of 29 May
[2]
1998 of the COMELEC en banc denying DOMINOs motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are not disputed.
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of
the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that
he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months
[3]
immediately preceding the election.
On 30 March 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan P. Bayonito, Jr.,
Rosario Samson and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-022 and assigned to the Second
Division of the COMELEC. Private respondents alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration in the
certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani
where he seeks election. To substantiate their allegations, private respondents presented the following
evidence:
1. Annex A the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman of
the Lone District of the Province of Sarangani filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Sarangani on March 25, 1998, where in item 4 thereof he wrote his date of
birth as December 5, 1953; in item 9, he claims he have resided in the constituency where
he seeks election for one (1) year and two (2) months; and, in item 10, that he is registered
voter of Precinct No. 14A-1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani;
2. Annex B Voters Registration Record with SN 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 indicating
respondents registration at Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City;
3. Annex C Respondents Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C dated January 15,
1997;
4. Annex D Certified true copy of the letter of Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial &
Municipal Treasurer of Alabel, Sarangani, dated February 26, 1998, addressed to Mr.
Conrado G. Butil, which reads:
In connection with your letter of even date, we are furnishing you herewith certified xerox copy of the
triplicate copy of COMMUNITY TAX CERTIFICATE NO. 11132214C in the name of Juan Domino.
Furthermore, Community Tax Certificate No. 11132212C of the same stub was issued to Carlito Engcong
on September 5, 1997, while Certificate No. 11132213C was also issued to Mr. Juan Domino but was
cancelled and serial no. 11132215C was issued in the name of Marianita Letigio on September 8, 1997.
5. Annex E The triplicate copy of the Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C in the
name of Juan Domino dated September 5, 1997;
6. Annex F Copy of the letter of Provincial Treasurer Lourdes P. Riego dated March 2, 1998
addressed to Mr. Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial Treasurer and Municipal Treasurer
of Alabel, Sarangani, which states:

Page | 201

For easy reference, kindly turn-over to the undersigned for safekeeping, the stub of Community Tax
Certificate containing Nos. 11132201C-11132250C issued to you on June 13, 1997 and paid under
Official Receipt No. 7854744.
Upon request of Congressman James L. Chiongbian.
7. Annex G Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman in the
rd
3 District of Quezon City for the 1995 elections filed with the Office of the Regional Election
Director, National Capital Region, on March 17, 1995, where, in item 4 thereof, he wrote his
birth date as December 22, 1953; in item 8 thereof his residence in the constituency where I
seek to be elected immediately preceding the election as 3 years and 5 months; and, in
item 9, that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 182, Barangay Balara, Quezon City;
8. Annex H a copy of the APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER OF REGISTRATION RECORDS
DUE TO CHANGE OF RESIDENCE of respondent dated August 30, 1997 addressed to and
received by Election Officer Mantil Alim, Alabel, Sarangani, on September 22, 1997, stating
among others, that [T]he undersigneds previous residence is at 24 Bonifacio Street, Ayala
Heights, Quezon City, III District, Quezon City; wherein he is a registered voter and that for
business and residence purposes, the undersigned has transferred and conducts his
business and reside at Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Province of Sarangani prior to this
application;
9. Annex I Copy of the SWORN APPLICATION FOR CANCELLATION OF VOTERS
[TRANSFER OF] PREVIOUS REGISTRATION of respondent subscribed and sworn to on
[4]
22 October 1997 before Election Officer Mantil Allim at Alabel, Sarangani.
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement
and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997. In support of the said contention,
DOMINO presented before the COMELEC the following exhibits, to wit:
1. Annex 1 - Copy of the Contract of Lease between Nora Dacaldacal as Lessor and
Administrator of the properties of deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal and
respondent as Lessee executed on January 15, 1997, subscribed and sworn to before
Notary Public Johnny P. Landero;
2. Annex 2 - Copy of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Deed of sale
executed by and between the heirs of deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios
Dacaldacal, namely: Maria Lourdes, Jupiter and Beberlie and the respondent on November
4, 1997, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Jose A. Alegario;
3. Annex 3 - True Carbon Xerox copy of the Decision dated January 19, 1998, of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, Branch 35, Quezon City, in Election Case NO. 725
captioned as In the Matter of the Petition for the Exclusion from the List of voters of Precinct
No. 4400-A Brgy. Old Balara, Quezon City, Spouses Juan and Zorayda Domino, Petitioners,
-versus- Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer, Quezon City, District III, and the Board of
Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City, Respondents. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
1.
Declaring the registration of petitioners as voters of Precinct No. 4400-A, Barangay Old Balara, in
District III Quezon City as completely erroneous as petitioners were no longer residents of Quezon City
but of Alabel, Sarangani where they have been residing since December 1996;
2.
Declaring this erroneous registration of petitioners in Quezon City as done in good faith due to an
honest mistake caused by circumstances beyond their control and without any fault of petitioners;
3.
Approving the transfer of registration of voters of petitioners from Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay
Old Balara, Quezon City to Precinct No. 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion of Alabel, Sarangani; and

Page | 202

4.
Ordering the respondents to immediately transfer and forward all the election/voters registration
records of the petitioners in Quezon City to the Election Officer, the Election Registration Board and other
Comelec Offices of Alabel, Sarangani where the petitioners are obviously qualified to exercise their
respective rights of suffrage.
4. Annex 4 - Copy of the Application for Transfer of Registration Records due to Change of
Residence addressed to Mantil Alim, COMELEC Registrar, Alabel, Sarangani, dated August
30, 1997.
5. Annex 5 - Certified True Copy of the Notice of Approval of Application, the roster of
applications for registration approved by the Election Registration Board on October 20,
1997, showing the spouses Juan and Zorayda Bailon Domino listed as numbers 111 and
112 both under Precinct No. 14A1, the last two names in the slate indicated as transferees
without VRR numbers and their application dated August 30, 1997 and September 30, 1997,
respectively.
6. Annex 6 - same as Annex 5
7. Annex 6-a - Copy of the Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voters Previous
Registration (Annex I, Petition);
8. Annex 7 - Copy of claim card in the name of respondent showing his VRR No. 31326504
dated October 20, 1997 as a registered voter of Precinct No. 14A1, Barangay Poblacion,
Alabel, Sarangani;
9. Annex 7-a - Certification dated April 16, 1998, issued by Atty. Elmer M. Kayanan, Election
Officer IV, District III, Quezon City, which reads:
This is to certify that the spouses JUAN and ZORAYDA DOMINO are no longer registered voters of
District III, Quezon City. Their registration records (VRR) were transferred and are now in the possession
of the Election Officer of Alabel, Sarangani.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. JUAN DOMINO.
10.

Annex 8 - Affidavit of Nora Dacaldacal and Maria Lourdes Dacaldacal stating the
circumstances and incidents detailing their alleged acquaintance with respondent.

11.

Annexes 8-a, 8-b, 8-c and 8-d - Copies of the uniform affidavits of witness
Myrna Dalaguit, Hilario Fuentes, Coraminda Lomibao and Elena V. Piodos subscribed and
sworn to before Notary Public Bonifacio F. Doria, Jr., on April 18, 1998, embodying their
alleged personal knowledge of respondents residency in Alabel, Sarangani;

12.

Annex 8-e - A certification dated April 20, 1998, subscribed and sworn to before
Notary Public Bonifacio, containing a listing of the names of fifty-five(55) residents of Alabel,
Sarangani, declaring and certifying under oath that they personally know the respondent as
a permanent resident of Alabel, Sarangani since January 1997 up to present;

13.

Annexes 9, 9-a and 9-b- Copies of Individual Income Tax Return for the year
1997, BIR form 2316 and W-2, respectively, of respondent; and,

14.

Annex 10 - The affidavit of respondent reciting the chronology of events and

circumstances leading to his relocation to the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani, appending
Annexes A, B, C, D, D-1, E, F, G with sub-markings G-1 and G-2 and H his
CTC No. 111`32214C dated September 5, 1997, which are the same as Annexes 1, 2,
[5]
4, 5, 6-a, 3, 7, 9 with sub-markings 9-a and 9-b except Annex H.
nd

On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2 Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified
as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year

Page | 203

residence requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, on the basis
of the following findings:
What militates against respondents claim that he has met the residency requirement for the position
sought is his own Voters Registration Record No. 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 [Annex B, Petition]
and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. This
evidence, standing alone, negates all his protestations that he established residence at Barangay
Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani, as early as January 1997. It is highly improbable, nay incredible, for
respondent who previously ran for the same position in the 3rd Legislative District of Quezon City during
the elections of 1995 to unwittingly forget the residency requirement for the office sought.
Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct No. 4400A, up to and until the day of the elections on May 11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks the one (1) year
residency requirement provided for candidates for Member of the House of Representatives under
Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
All told, petitioners evidence conspire to attest to respondents lack of residence in the constituency
where he seeks election and while it may be conceded that he is a registered voter as contemplated
under Section 12 of R.A. 8189, he lacks the qualification to run for the position of Congressman for the
[6]
Lone District of the Province of Sarangani.
On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution
No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the proclamation if
winning, considering that the Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and
[7]
executory.
The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of the Provincial Board of
[8]
Canvassers, shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his opponents for the
position of Congressman of the Province of Sarangani.
On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6 May 1998,
which was denied by the COMELEC en banc in its decision dated 29 May 1998. Hence, the present
Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main, that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled
that he did not meet the one-year residence requirement.
On 14 July 1998, acting on DOMINOs Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, the
Court directed the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the instant
[9]
petition.
On 15 September 1998, Lucille L. Chiongbian-Solon, (hereafter INTERVENOR), the candidate
[10]
receiving the second highest number of votes, was allowed by the Court to Intervene.
[11]

INTERVENOR in her Motion for Leave to Intervene and in her Comment in Intervention is asking
the Court to uphold the disqualification of petitioner Juan Domino and to proclaim her as the duly elected
representative of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections.
Before us DOMINO raised the following issues for resolution, to wit:
a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring
petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding
upon the whole world, including the Commission on Elections.
b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least
one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and
c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the
[12]
disqualification of petitioner.

Page | 204

The first issue.

The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the
exclusion proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is
final and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained.
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, over a
petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it
is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts
was made in the certificate of candidacy, that will include, among others, the residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings as to
the right of DOMINO to be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial
jurisdiction, does not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of DOMINOs qualification as a
candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement.
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in
character. Thus, the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion
proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not
conclusive upon the COMELEC. Although the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass upon
any question necessary to decide the issue raised including the questions of citizenship and residence of
the challenged voter, the authority to order the inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily
caries with it the power to inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of said
authority. However, except for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for
the particular election in relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion or
[13]
inclusion proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata. In this
sense, it does not operate as a bar to any future action that a party may take concerning the subject
[14]
passed upon in the proceeding. Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be
conclusive on the voters political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as
[15]
a voter in any other election.
Thus, in Tan Cohon v. Election Registrar

[16]

we ruled that:

xxx It is made clear that even as it is here held that the order of the City Court in question has become
final, the same does not constitute res adjudicata as to any of the matters therein contained. It is
ridiculous to suppose that such an important and intricate matter of citizenship may be passed upon and
determined with finality in such a summary and peremptory proceeding as that of inclusion and exclusion
of persons in the registry list of voters. Even if the City Court had granted appellants petition for inclusion
in the permanent list of voters on the allegation that she is a Filipino citizen qualified to vote, her alleged
Filipino citizenship would still have been left open to question.
Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its
jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani, approved and ordered the
transfer of his voters registration from Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to
precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is not within the competence of the trial court,
in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The
jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to
remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in
which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voters disqualification. The trial court has no power
to order the change or transfer of registration from one place of residence to another for it is the function
[17]
of the election Registration Board as provided under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189. The only effect of the
decision of the lower court excluding the challenged voter from the list of voters, is for the Election
Registration Board, upon receipt of the final decision, to remove the voters registration record from the
corresponding book of voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and thereafter place the record in the
[18]
inactive file.
Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing. Identity of parties, subject matter and
cause of action are indispensable requirements for the application of said doctrine. Neither herein Private

Page | 205

Respondents nor INTERVENOR, is a party in the exclusion proceedings. The Petition for Exclusion was
filed by DOMINO himself and his wife, praying that he and his wife be excluded from the Voters List on
the ground of erroneous registration while the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy was filed by private respondents against DOMINO for alleged false representation in his
certificate of candidacy. For the decision to be a basis for the dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is
essential that there must be between the first and the second action identity of parties, identity of subject
[19]
matter and identity of causes of action. In the present case, the aforesaid essential requisites are not
[20]
present. In the case of Nuval v. Guray, et al., the Supreme Court in resolving a similar issue ruled that:
The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or not the judgment rendered in
the case of the petition for the exclusion of Norberto Gurays name from the election list of Luna,
is resjudicata, so as to prevent the institution and prosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is now
before us.
The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, is of
a summary character and the judgment rendered therein is not appealable except when the petition is
tried before the justice of the peace of the capital or the circuit judge, in which case it may be appealed to
the judge of first instance, with whom said two lower judges have concurrent jurisdiction.
The petition for exclusion was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his dual capacity as qualified voter of the
municipality of Luna, and as a duly registered candidate for the office of president of said municipality,
against Norberto Guray as a registered voter in the election list of said municipality. The present
proceeding of quo warranto was interposed by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a registered candidate
voted for the office of municipal president of Luna, against Norberto Guray, as an elected candidate for
the same office. Therefore, there is no identity of parties in the two cases, since it is not enough that
there be an identity of persons, but there must be an identity of capacities in which said persons litigate. (
Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs. Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par.
1165)
In said case of the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter was the
exclusion of Norberto Guray as a voter from the election list of the municipality of Luna, while in the
present quo warranto proceeding, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter is his exclusion or
expulsion from the office to which he has been elected. Neither does there exist, then, any identity in the
object of the litigation, or the litigious matter.
In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray had not the six
months legal residence in the municipality of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof, while in the present
proceeding of quo warranto, the cause of action is that Norberto Guray has not the one years legal
residence required for eligibility to the office of municipal president of Luna. Neither does there exist
therefore, identity of causes of action.
In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of
things; and (c) identity of issues (Aquino vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850). And as in the case of the
petition for exclusion and in the present quo warranto proceeding, as there is no identity of parties, or of
things or litigious matter, or of issues or causes of action, there is no res judicata.

The Second Issue.

Was DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately preceding
the 11 May 1998 election as stated in his certificate of candidacy?
We hold in the negative.

Page | 206

It is doctrinally settled that the term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for
suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
[21]
intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business,
[22]
pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. Domicile is a question of intention and
circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that
a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new
[23]
one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
[24]

Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in
1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City,
rd
as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the 3 District of Quezon City
in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in
Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice at the Province of Sarangani.
A persons domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a
[25]
new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
[26]
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other
words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
[27]
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel, Sarangani since
December 1996 was sufficiently established by the lease of a house and lot located therein in January
1997 and by the affidavits and certifications under oath of the residents of that place that they have seen
petitioner and his family residing in their locality.
While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that from said date he had
transferred his residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the
place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. While residence simply requires bodily
presence in a given place, domicile requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a
[28]
declared and probable intent to make it ones fixed and permanent place of abode, ones home.
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and
intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of
domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual
residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence
[29]
without intention.
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change
of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINOs intention to reside in Sarangani but it
does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original
domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the
[30]
intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus the date of the contract of
lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in
the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.
Further, Dominos lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further strengthened
by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of
residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO
registered in his former barangay. Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public
assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided preponderance is a doubtful case upon the
[31]
place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his residence. The fact that a party continuously voted in
[32]
a particular locality is a strong factor in assisting to determine the status of his domicile.
His claim that his registration in Quezon City was erroneous and was caused by events over which
he had no control cannot be sustained. The general registration of voters for purposes of the May 1998
[33]
elections was scheduled for two (2) consecutive weekends, viz.: June 14, 15, 21, and 22.

Page | 207

While, Dominos intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that be
bought the house he was renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his previous
[34]
registration in Quezon City on 22 October 1997, and that he applied for transfer of registration from
[35]
Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of change of residence on 30 August 1997, DOMINO still falls
short of the one year residency requirement under the Constitution.
In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the district
[36]
one intends to represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. Dominos
[37]
failure to do so rendered him ineligible and his election to office null and void.

The Third Issue.

DOMINOs contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the present petition is bereft of merit.
As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has
jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction
continues even after election, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the
election, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of
[38]
votes and provided further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his oath of
[39]
office.
It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunals sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress as provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution
[40]
begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.
The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the
[41]
position in the winning candidate. A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of
office before he can be considered a member of the House of Representatives.
In the instant case, DOMINO was not proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the Lone Congressional
District of the Province of Sarangani by reason of a Supplemental Omnibus Resolution issued by the
COMELEC on the day of the election ordering the suspension of DOMINOs proclamation should he
obtain the winning number of votes. This resolution was issued by the COMELEC in view of the nonfinality of its 6 May 1998 resolution disqualifying DOMINO as candidate for the position.
Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House of
Representative. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the
[42]
issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.

Issue raised by INTERVENOR.

After finding that DOMINO is disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the
province of Sarangani, may INTERVENOR, as the candidate who received the next highest number of
votes, be proclaimed as the winning candidate?
It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not
[43]
be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.
In every election, the peoples choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must,
at all times, be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving the
[44]
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, no one can be declared elected in his place.

Page | 208

It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and
imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through
[45]
their ballots that they do not choose him. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have
received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could not be
considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate,
[46]
the conditions would have substantially changed.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
[47]
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails
[48]
entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated
loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who
[49]
haS obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number
of votes to be declared elected. In such case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election
[50]
is a nullity. To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the elective position despite his
rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to
undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the peoples right to elect officials of their
[51]
choice.
INTERVENORs plea that the votes cast in favor of DOMINO be considered stray votes cannot be
[52]
sustained. INTERVENORs reliance on the opinion made in the Labo, Jr. case to wit: if the electorate,
fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the
realm of notoriety, would nevertheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate, the electorate
may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their
franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher
number of votes may be deemed elected, is misplaced.
Contrary to the claim of INTERVENOR, petitioner was not notoriously known by the public as an
ineligible candidate. Although the resolution declaring him ineligible as candidate was rendered before
the election, however, the same is not yet final and executory. In fact, it was no less than the COMELEC
in its Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046 that allowed DOMINO to be voted for the office and
ordered that the votes cast for him be counted as the Resolution declaring him ineligible has not yet
attained finality. Thus the votes cast for DOMINO are presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief
that he was a qualified candidate, without any intention to misapply their franchise. Thus, said votes can
[53]
not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The resolution dated 6 May 1998 of the
COMELEC 2nd Division and the decision dated 29 May 1998 of the COMELEC En Banc, are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Page | 209

ROGELIO M. TORAYNO SR., GENEROSO ELIGAN and JACQUELINE M. SERIO, petitioners,

vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE Y. EMANO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding elective
public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties,
aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it
enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers' qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire
for. Inasmuch as Vicente Y. Emano has proven that he, together with his family, (1) had actually resided
in a house he bought in 1973 in Cagayan de Oro City; (2) had actually held office there during his three
terms as provincial governor of Misamis Oriental, the provincial capitol being located therein; and (3) has
registered as voter in the city during the period required by law, he could not be deemed "a stranger or
newcomer" when he ran for and was overwhelmingly voted as city mayor. Election laws must be liberally
construed to give effect to the popular mandate.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
[1]
January 18, 1999 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc in SPA No. 98-298,
[2]
which upheld the July 14, 1998 Resolution of the Comelec First Division. The assailed Resolutions
ruled that Private Respondent Vicente Y. Emano possessed the minimum period of residence to be
eligible to vote in Cagayan de Oro City, as well as be voted mayor thereof.

The Facts
The pertinent facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows.
During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y. Emano ran for, was elected, and proclaimed provincial
governor of Misamis Oriental. It was his third consecutive term as governor of the province. In his
Certificate of Candidacy dated March 12, 1995, his residence was declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis
Oriental.
On June 14, 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a Voter Registration
Record in Cagayan de Oro City (geographically located in the Province of Misamis Oriental), a highly
urbanized city, in which he claimed 20 years of residence. On March 25, 1998, he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for mayor of the city, stating therein that his residence for the preceding two years and five
months was at 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.
Among those who ran for the mayorship of the city in 1998, along with Emano, was Erasmo B.
Damasing, counsel of herein petitioners. On May 15, 1998, Petitioners Rogelio M. Torayno Sr.,
Generoso Q. Eligan and Jacqueline M. Serio, all residents of Cagayan de Oro City, filed a Petition
before the Comelec, docketed as SPA No. 98-298, in which they sought the disqualification of Emano as
mayoral candidate, on the ground that he had allegedly failed to meet the one-year residence
requirement. Prior to the resolution of their Petition, the Comelec proclaimed private respondent as the
duly elected city mayor. Thus, on May 29, 1998, petitioners filed another Petition before the Comelec,
[3]
this time for quo warranto, in which they sought (1) the annulment of the election of private respondent;
and (2) the proclamation of Erasmo B. Damasing, who had garnered the next highest number of votes, as
the duly elected mayor of the city.

Page | 210

In its Resolution dated July 14, 1998, the Comelec First Division denied the Petition for
Disqualification. Upon petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Consolidation, the two
[4]
cases were consolidated.

Ruling of the Comelec

As earlier stated, the Comelec en banc upheld the findings and conclusions of the First Division,
holding that "[t]he records clearly show that the respondent is an actual resident of Cagayan de Oro City
for such a period of time necessary to qualify him to run for mayor therein. This fact is clearly established
by the respondent having a house in the city which has been existing therein since 1973 and where his
family has been living since then."
Additionally, it ruled:
"There is nothing in the law which bars an elected provincial official from residing and/or registering as a
voter in a highly urbanized city whose residents are not given the right to vote for and be elected to a
position in the province embracing such highly urbanized city as long as he has complied with the
requirements prescribed by law in the case of a qualified voter.
"Neither can the list of voters submitted as evidence for the petitioners showing that the respondent was a
registered voter as of March 13, 1995 in Precinct No. 12, Barangay Poblacion, Tagoloan, Misamis
Oriental bolster the petitioner's argument that the respondent is not a resident [or a] registered voter in
Cagayan de Oro City since registration in said Precinct No. 12 does not preclude the respondent from
registering anew in another place."
Hence, this recourse

[5]

before this Court.

Issues
[6]

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit that the main issue is whether the "Comelec gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Resolutions." Allegedly,
[7]
the resolution of this issue would depend on the following:
"1. Whether or not private respondent Emano's
(a) remaining as governor of Misamis Oriental until he filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Cagayan de Oro City on March 25, 1998 in the May 11, 1998 election;
(b) asserting under oath [that he was] qualified to act as governor of said province until said date; and
(c) admitting, in sworn statements, [that he was] a resident of Misamis Oriental,
precluded him from acquiring a bona fide domicile of choice for at least one (1) year in Cagayan de Oro
City prior to the May 11, 1998 elections, as to disqualify him for being a candidate for city mayor of said
City.
2. Differently stated, whether or not Emano's securing a residence certificate in Cagayan de Oro City,
holding offices as governor of Misamis Oriental in the Capitol Building located in Cagayan de Oro City
and having a house therein where [he had] stay[ed] during his tenure as governor, and registering as a
voter in said City in June 1997, would be legally sufficient, as against the undisputed facts above
enumerated, to constitute a change of his domicile of birth in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental in favor of a new

Page | 211

domicile of choice in Cagayan de Oro City for at least one (1) year for purposes of qualifying him to run
for city mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections.
3. Whether or not Erasmo Damasing, the candidate for mayor of Cagayan de Oro City in the May 11,
1998 elections, who received the second highest number of votes, can be declared winner, considering
that respondent Emano was disqualified to run for and hold said office and considering that his
disqualification or ineligibility had been extensively brought to the attention and consciousness of the
voters prior to the May 11, 1998 election as to attain notoriety, notwithstanding which they still voted for
him."
Petitioners are seeking the resolution of essentially two questions: (1) whether private respondent
had duly established his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at least one year prior to the May 11, 1998
elections to qualify him to run for the mayorship thereof; and (2) if not, whether Erasmo Damasing, the
candidate who had received the second highest number of votes, should be proclaimed mayor of the city.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Preliminary Matter: Locus Standi of Petitioners
Although not raised by the parties, the legal standing of the petitioners was deliberated upon by the
Court. We note that petitioners pray, among others, for judgment "declaring Atty. Erasmo B. Damasing
as entitled to be proclaimed winner as mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections in Cagayan de Oro
[8]
City." And yet, Damasing is not a party to the instant "Petition forCertiorari pursuant to Rule[s] 64 and
65" brought before us.
Under the Rules of Court, a quo warranto may be brought only by (1) the solicitor general or (2) a
public prosecutor or (3) a person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
[9]
unlawfully held or exercised by another. A reading of the Rules shows that petitioners, none of whom
qualify under any of the above three categories, are without legal standing to bring this suit.
However, the present Petition finds its root in two separate cases filed before the Comelec: (1) SPC
98-298 for disqualification and (2) EPC 98-62 for quo warranto. Under our election laws and the Comelec
Rules of Procedure, any voter may file a petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds provided by
[10]
law, or to contest the election of a city officer on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the
[11]
Republic. The petitioners herein, being "duly-registered voters" of Cagayan de Oro City, therefore
[12]
satisfy the requirement of said laws and rules.

Main Issue: Residence Qualification for Candidacy

Petitioners argue that private respondent maintains his domicile in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental, not in
Cagayan de Oro City, as allegedly shown by the following facts: (1) he had run and won as governor of
the province of Misamis Oriental for three consecutive terms immediately preceding the 1998 elections;
(2) in the pleadings he filed in connection with an election protest against him relating to the 1995
election, he had stated that he was a resident of Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental; (3) he had fully exercised
the powers and prerogatives of governor until he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor on March 25,
1998.
Petitioners claim that in discharging his duties as provincial governor, private respondent remained a
resident of the province. They aver that residence is a continuing qualification that an elective official
must possess throughout his term. Thus, private respondent could not have changed his residence to
Cagayan de Oro City while he was still governor of Misamis Oriental.
Petitioners further contend that the following were not sufficient to constitute a change of
domicile: having a house in Cagayan de Oro City, residing therein while exercising one's office as
governor (the city being the seat of government of the province), securing a residence certificate and
registering as voter therein.

Page | 212

Private respondent, on the other hand, alleges that he actually and physically resided in Cagayan de
Oro City while serving as provincial governor for three consecutive terms, since the seat of the provincial
[13]
government was located at the heart of that city. He also avers that one's choice of domicile is a matter
of intention, and it is the person concerned who would be in the best position to make a choice. In this
case, Emano decided to adopt Cagayan de Oro City as his place of residence after the May 1995
elections. In fact, in January 1997, he secured his Community Tax Certificate at the City Treasurer's
Office, stating therein that he was a resident of 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. During the general registration of voters in June 1997, he registered in one of the
precincts of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. This meant that, at the time, Emano had been a voter of the city
for the minimum period required by law. No one has ever challenged this fact before any tribunal.
Private respondent contends further that his transfer of legal residence did not ipso facto divest him
of his position as provincial governor. First, there is no law that prevents an elected official from
transferring residence while in office. Second, an elective official's transfer of residence does not prevent
the performance of that official's duties, especially in private respondent's case in which the seat of
[14]
government became his adopted place of residence. Third, as ruled in Frivaldo v. Comelec, the loss of
any of the required qualifications for election merely renders the official's title or right to office open to
challenge. In Emano's case, no one challenged his right to the Office of Provincial Governor when he
transferred his residence to Cagayan de Oro City. Naturally, he continued to discharge his functions as
such, until he filed his candidacy for mayor in March 1998.
Lastly, Emano urges that the sanctity of the people's will, as expressed in the election result, must be
respected. He is not, after all, a stranger to the city, much less to its voters. During his three terms as
governor of Misamis Oriental, his life and actuations have been closely interwoven with the pulse and
beat of Cagayan de Oro City.
[15]

Public Respondent Comelec relies essentially on Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec in its

[16]
Memorandum which supports the assailed Resolutions, and which has been filed in view of the solicitor
[17]
general's Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment. Thus, the poll body argues that "x x x the fact
of residence x x x ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
Constitution's residency qualification requirement."
Law on Qualifications of Local Elective Officials

The pertinent provision sought to be enforced is Section 39 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of
[18]
1991, which provides for the qualifications of local elective officials, as follows:
"SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which they
seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a "stranger or
newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter
[19]
from [seeking] an elective office to serve that community." Such provision is aimed at excluding
outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral
[20]
gain." Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the
purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the
needs of the community. This purpose is "best met by individuals who have either had actual residence
in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by
[21]
choice."
Facts Showing Change of Residence

Page | 213

[22]

In the recent en banc case Mamba-Perez v. Comelec, this Court ruled that private respondent
therein, now Representative Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo of the Third District of Cagayan, had duly proven his
change of residence from Gattaran, Cagayan (part of the First District) to Tuguegarao, Cagayan (part of
the Third District in which he sought election as congressman). He proved it with the following facts: (1)
in July 1990, he leased and lived in a residential apartment in Magallanes Street, Tuguegarao, Cagayan;
(2) in July 1995, he leased another residential apartment in Kamias Street, Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan;
(3) the January 18, 1998 Certificate of Marriage between Aguinaldo and his second wife, Lerma
Dumaguit; (4) the Certificate of Live Birth of his second daughter; and (5) various letters addressed to him
and his family showed that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao for at least one year immediately
preceding the May 1998 elections. The Court also stated that it was not "of much importance that in his
[Aguinaldo's] certificates of candidacy for provincial governor in the elections of 1988, 1992, and 1995,
[23]
private respondent stated that he was a resident of Gattaran."
In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and his family had actually been
residing in Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in
1973. Furthermore, during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of Misamis Oriental, he
physically lived in that city, where the seat of the provincial government was located. In June 1997, he
also registered as voter of the same city. Based on our ruling in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably
prove that Vicente Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time sufficient to
qualify him to run for public office therein. Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of
Emano in his choice of residence.
Petitioners put much emphasis on the fact that Cagayan de Oro City is a highly urbanized city whose
voters cannot participate in the provincial elections. Such political subdivisions and voting restrictions,
however, are simply for the purpose of parity in representation. The classification of an area as a highly
urbanized or independent component city, for that matter, does not completely isolate its residents,
politics, commerce and other businesses from the entire province -- and vice versa -- especially when the
city is located at the very heart of the province itself, as in this case.
Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of Misamis Oriental and remains a
geographical part of the province. Not only is it at the center of the province; more important, it is itself
the seat of the provincial government. As a consequence, the provincial officials who carry out their
functions in the city cannot avoid residing therein; much less, getting acquainted with its concerns and
interests. Vicente Y. Emano, having been the governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms and
consequently residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that period, could not be said to be a stranger or
newcomer to the city in the last year of his third term, when he decided to adopt it as his permanent place
of residence.
Significantly, the Court also declared in Mamba-Perez that "although private respondent declared in
his certificates of candidacy prior to the May 11, 1998 elections that he was a resident of Gattaran,
Cagayan, the fact is that he was actually a resident of the Third District not just for one (1) year prior to
the May 11, 1998 elections but for more than seven (7) years since July 1990. His claim that he ha[s]
been a resident of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible considering that he was governor from 1988 to
1998 and, therefore, it would be convenient for him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao, which is the
capital of the province of Cagayan."
Similarly in the instant case, private respondent was actually and physically residing in Cagayan de
Oro City while discharging his duties as governor of Misamis Oriental. He owned a house in the city and
resided there together with his family. He even paid his 1998 community tax and registered as a voter
therein. To all intents and purposes of the Constitution and the law, he is a resident of Cagayan de Oro
City and eligible to run for mayor thereof.
To petitioners' argument that Emano could not have continued to qualify as provincial governor if he
was indeed a resident of Cagayan de Oro City, we respond that the issue before this Court is whether
Emano's residence in the city qualifies him to run for and be elected as mayor, not whether he could have
continued sitting as governor of the province. There was no challenge to his eligibility to continue running
the province; hence, this Court cannot make any pronouncement on such issue. Considerations of due
process prevent us from adjudging matters not properly brought to us. On the basis, however, of the

Page | 214

facts proven before the Comelec, we hold that he has satisfied the residence qualification required by law
for the mayorship of the city.
We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in the desire that officials of districts or localities
be acquainted not only with the metes and bounds of their constituencies but, more important, with the
constituents themselves -- their needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and development,
and all matters vital to their common welfare. The requisite period would give candidates the opportunity
to be familiar with their desired constituencies, and likewise for the electorate to evaluate the former's
qualifications and fitness for the offices they seek.
In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of herein private respondent in Cagayan
de Oro City is substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and for the voters to
evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioners' very legalistic, academic and technical
approach to the residence requirement does not satisfy this simple, practical and common-sense
rationale for the residence requirement.

Interpretation to Favor Popular Mandate

There is no question that private respondent was the overwhelming choice of the people of Cagayan
[24]
de Oro City. He won by a margin of about 30,000 votes. Thus, we find it apt to reiterate the principle
that the manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot must be given fullest effect. In case of
[25]
doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate. Verily, in Frivaldo
[26]
v. Comelec, the Court held:
"x x x [T]his Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to
ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular
electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give
effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by
those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications,
the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and
legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people
would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote."
[27]

In the same vein, we stated in Alberto v. Comelec that "election cases involve public interest; thus,
laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections."
Indeed, "it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but
[28]
little understood legalisms."
In sum, we hold that Respondent Comelec cannot be faulted with abuse, much less grave abuse, of
discretion in upholding private respondent's election.

Corollary Issue: Effect of Disqualification of Winner on Second Placer

With the resolution of the first issue in the positive, it is obvious that the second one posited by
petitioners has become academic and need not be ruled upon.
WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is DISMISSED and the
Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

assailed

Comelec

SO ORDERED.

Page | 215

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001
[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and
other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On
November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings
were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada
were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President,
succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was
thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned
after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and
local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC
declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. At
noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada
and his family later left Malacaang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for
WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases
filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming Estrada to
be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge
the duties of his office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I
EDSA II
exercise of people power of freedom of
speech and freedom of assemblyto petition
exercise
of the
people
power
of the government for redress of grievances
revolution which overthrew the whole which only affected the office of the
government.
President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of intra constitutional and the resignation of
the new government that resulted from it the sitting President that it caused and the
cannot be the subject of judicial review
succession of the Vice President as President
are subject to judicial review.
presented a political question;
involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the
proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII,
and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on
the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of
petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

Page | 216

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present
when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing material relevant
issuesPresident Estrada is deemed to have resigned constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving
Malacaan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to
reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt
referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the
country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or omission before, during and after
January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria MacapagalArroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the
nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the
Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of
Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to
Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any
decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our
justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened
individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not
present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render
the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing
preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge
and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN, respondents.
The Case
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001
(Resolution No. 01-005) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (Resolution No. 01-006)
of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13

Page | 217

candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared
official and final the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.
The Facts
Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator Guingona) as Vice-President. Congress
confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution No.
84 (Resolution No. 84) certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called
on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular
elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that
[1]
th
election. Resolution No. 84 further provided that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13 highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.,
[2]
which ends on 30 June 2004.
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the provinces but one
(Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as
the elected Senators. Resolution No. 01-005 also provided that the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve
th
for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13 ) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3)
[3]
years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President. Respondents Ralph
th
th
Recto (Recto) and Gregorio Honasan (Honasan) ranked 12 and 13 , respectively, in Resolution No.
01-005.
On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica (petitioners), as voters and
taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as respondent. Petitioners
sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the
th
13 highest number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single three-year term seat.
Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005 in so far as it makes a
proclamation to such effect.
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it
failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2
[4]
of Republic Act No. 6645 (R.A. No. 6645); (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in
their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as
[5]
allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to
specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular
senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 (R.A.
[6]
No. 6646). Petitioners add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast
for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two
separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of
[7]
term.
Stated otherwise, petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must
be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. To support their claim,
petitioners cite the special elections simultaneously held with the regular elections of 13 November 1951
and 8 November 1955 to fill the seats vacated by Senators Fernando Lopez and Carlos P. Garcia,
[8]
respectively, who became Vice-Presidents during their tenures in the Senate. Petitioners point out that
in those elections, COMELEC separately canvassed the votes cast for the senatorial candidates running
under the regular elections from the votes cast for the candidates running under the special
[9]
elections. COMELEC also separately proclaimed the winners in each of those elections.
Petitioners sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition.
Without issuing any restraining order, we required COMELEC to Comment on the petition.

Page | 218

On 20 July 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the results from all the provinces, it issued
Resolution No. 01-006 declaring official and final the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in
Resolution No. 01-005. The 13 Senators took their oaths of office on 23 July 2001.
In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required petitioners to file an amended
petition impleading Recto and Honasan as additional respondents. Petitioners accordingly filed an
amended petition in which they reiterated the contentions raised in their original petition and, in addition,
sought the nullification of Resolution No. 01-006.
In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all claim that a special election to fill the seat
vacated by Senator Guingona was validly held on 14 May 2001. COMELEC and Honasan further raise
preliminary issues on the mootness of the petition and on petitioners standing to litigate. Honasan also
claims that the petition, which seeks the nullity of his proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo
warranto petition and the Court should dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. For his part, Recto, as the
th
12 ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper party to this case because the petition only involves the
th
validity of the proclamation of the 13 placer in the 14 May 2001 senatorial elections.
The Issues
The following are the issues presented for resolution:
(1) Procedurally
(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the Senate Electoral Tribunal is
the sole judge;
(b) whether the petition is moot; and
(c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate.
(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly
held on 14 May 2001.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Nature of the Petition and the Courts Jurisdiction
A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right of a public officer in the
[10]
exercise of his office and to oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded. Under Section
17, Article VI of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to
the qualifications of the members of the Senate.
A perusal of the allegations contained in the instant petition shows, however, that what petitioners
are questioning is the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was
elected. Petitioners various prayers are, namely: (1) a declaration that no special election was held
simultaneously with the general elections on 14 May 2001; (2) to enjoin COMELEC from declaring
anyone as having won in the special election; and (3) to annul Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 in so
far as these Resolutions proclaim Honasan as the winner in the special election. Petitioners anchor their
prayers on COMELECs alleged failure to comply with certain requirements pertaining to the conduct of
that special election. Clearly then, the petition does not seek to determine Honasans right in the exercise
of his office as Senator. Petitioners prayer for the annulment of Honasans proclamation and, ultimately,

Page | 219

election is merely incidental to petitioners cause of action. Consequently, the Court can properly exercise
jurisdiction over the instant petition.
On the Mootness of the Petition
COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001 of the 13 Senators and its subsequent
confirmation on 20 July 2001 of the ranking of the 13 Senators render the instant petition to set aside
Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 moot and academic.
Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or board to desist from
committing an act threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
[11]
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already
[12]
done. However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot
[13]
[14]
if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. Thus, in Alunan III v. Mirasol, we took cognizance of a
petition to set aside an order canceling the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) on 4
December 1992 despite that at the time the petition was filed, the SK election had already taken place.
We noted in Alunanthat since the question of the validity of the order sought to be annulled is likely to
arise in every SK elections and yet the question may not be decided before the date of such elections,
the mootness of the petition is no bar to its resolution. This observation squarely applies to the instant
case. The question of the validity of a special election to fill a vacancy in the Senate in relation to
COMELECs failure to comply with requirements on the conduct of such special election is likely to arise
in every such election. Such question, however, may not be decided before the date of the election.
On Petitioners Standing
Honasan questions petitioners standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters
because petitioners do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds. Neither do petitioners
claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006.
Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
[15]
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act. The
[16]
requirement of standing, which necessarily sharpens the presentation of issues, relates to the
[17]
constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies. Thus, generally, a party
will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
[18]
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the instant petition. In questioning,
in their capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm
classified as a generalized grievance. This generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal
[19]
measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted in that election. Neither have
petitioners alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to the petition
because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 tax money [was] x x x extracted and spent in
violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power or that there [was]
misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to any improper
[20]
purpose.
On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give
[21]
due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage. Also, in the recent case of Integrated Bar of
[22]
the Philippines v. Zamora, we gave the same liberal treatment to a petition filed by the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP questioned the validity of a Presidential directive deploying elements
of the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Marines in Metro Manila to conduct patrols even
though the IBP presented too general an interest. We held:
[T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus

Page | 220

standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest
which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry x x x.
Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not
satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the
court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft
an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of
the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and
order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated
by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not
go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing
[23]
and to resolve the issue now, rather than later. (Emphasis supplied)
We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacity as voters since they
raise important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is
likely to arise again.

Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term

Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in
the Senate and the House of Representatives in the manner prescribed by law, thus:
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to
fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. (Emphasis supplied)
To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, which provides in
pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the
Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a
special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official communication on the existence
of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be
earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or
communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if
within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with such general election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as follows:
Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. x x x In case a permanent vacancy shall occur
in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the

Page | 221

Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor
longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in
the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term,
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the
date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after
the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of, among
other things, the office or offices to be voted for.
Did COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial election simultaneously with the 14 May 2001
regular elections, comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645?
A survey of COMELECs resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections reveals
that they contain nothing which would amount to a compliance, either strict or substantial, with the
[24]
requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions or even in its
[25]
press releases did COMELEC state that it would hold a special election for a single three-year term
Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give formal
th
notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13 highest number of votes
in the special election.
The controversy thus turns on whether COMELECs failure, assuming it did fail, to comply with the
requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, invalidated the conduct of the special
senatorial election on 14 May 2001 and accordingly rendered Honasans proclamation as the winner in
that special election void. More precisely, the question is whether the special election is invalid for lack of
a call for such election and for lack of notice as to the office to be filled and the manner by which the
winner in the special election is to be determined. For reasons stated below, the Court answers in the
negative.

COMELECs Failure to Give Notice

of the Time of the Special Election Did Not
Negate the Calling of such Election
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence, whether
made by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the
[26]
elections validity. In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid
[27]
without any call by the body charged to administer the election.
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election
to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to
be held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus
prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election
[28]
failed to do so. This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not
[29]
from any call for the election by some authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the
[30]
time and place of the election.
Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but
empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the
statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the
[31]
election a nullity.
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate,
the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular

Page | 222

election. Accordingly, the special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator
Guingonas appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be held at any other time but must
be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law charges the
voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs failure to give the additional notice did not
negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.
Our conclusion might be different had the present case involved a special election to fill a vacancy in
the House of Representatives. In such a case, the holding of the special election is subject to a condition
precedent, that is, the vacancy should take place at least one year before the expiration of the term. The
time of the election is left to the discretion of COMELEC subject only to the limitation that it holds the
special election within the range of time provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes
mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, for COMELEC to call x x x a
special election x x x not earlier than 60 days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of the
vacancy and give notice of the office to be filled. The COMELECs failure to so call and give notice will
nullify any attempt to hold a special election to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it will be well-nigh impossible for
the voters in the congressional district involved to know the time and place of the special election and the
office to be filled unless the COMELEC so notifies them.

No Proof that COMELECs

Failure to Give Notice of the Office
to be Filled and the Manner of
Determining the Winner in the Special
Election Misled Voters
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the
special election is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as
would change the result of the special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of
voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill a vacancy, a choice by a small
[32]
percentage of voters would be void.
The required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001 special senatorial election covers two
matters. First, that COMELEC will hold a special election to fill a vacant single three-year term Senate
seat simultaneously with the regular elections scheduled on the same date. Second, that COMELEC will
th
proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13 highest number of votes in the special
election. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that COMELECs failure to give this required notice
misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the special senatorial election or led
them to believe that there was no such special election.
Instead, what petitioners did is conclude that since COMELEC failed to give such notice, no special
election took place. This bare assertion carries no value. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended,
charged those who voted in the elections of 14 May 2001 with the knowledge that the vacancy in the
Senate arising from Senator Guingonas appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 was to be filled
in the next succeeding regular election of 14 May 2001. Similarly, the absence of formal notice from
COMELEC does not preclude the possibility that the voters had actual notice of the special election, the
office to be voted in that election, and the manner by which COMELEC would determine the
winner. Such actual notice could come from many sources, such as media reports of the enactment of
[33]
R.A. No. 6645 and election propaganda during the campaign.
More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party who stands most
prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan, in the
absence of proof that COMELECs omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of suffrage so
as to negate the holding of the special election. Indeed, this Court is loathe to annul elections and will
only do so when it is impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at
any certain result whatever, or that the great body of the voters have been prevented by violence,
[34]
intimidation, and threats from exercising their franchise.

Page | 223

Otherwise, the consistent rule has been to respect the electorates will and let the results of the
[35]
election stand, despite irregularities that may have attended the conduct of the elections. This is but to
acknowledge the purpose and role of elections in a democratic society such as ours, which is:
to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their government, either in determining who shall
be their public officials or in deciding some question of public interest; and for that purpose all of the legal
voters should be permitted, unhampered and unmolested, to cast their ballot. When that is done and no
frauds have been committed, the ballots should be counted and the election should not be declared
null. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in the affairs of their government for
mere irregularities on the part of the election officers, for which they are in no way responsible. A
different rule would make the manner and method of performing a public duty of greater importance than
[36]
the duty itself. (Emphasis in the original)

Separate Documentation and Canvassing

not Required under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645,
Neither is there basis in petitioners claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the
special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document separately
the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirements
exist in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC fix the
date of the election, if necessary, and state, among others, the office or offices to be voted for.
Similarly, petitioners reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and
on Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim
is misplaced. These provisions govern elections in general and in no way require separate documentation
of candidates or separate canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and special elections.
Significantly, the method adopted by COMELEC in conducting the special election on 14 May 2001
merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft
of Resolution No. 84 as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad (Senator Tatad) made no mention of the
manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the
suggestion of Senator Raul Roco (Senator Roco), the Senate agreed to amend Resolution No. 84 by
th
providing, as it now appears, that the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13 ) highest number
of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. Senator Roco
introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC and the candidates needless expenditures and the
voters further inconvenience, thus:
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move that we now consider Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934
[later converted to Resolution No. 84].
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
Consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 is now in order. With the permission of the Body,
the Secretary will read only the title and text of the resolution.
T[HE] S[ECRETARY]. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 entitled
RESOLUTION CERTIFYING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A VACANCY IN THE SENATE AND CALLING
ON THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) TO FILL UP SUCH VACANCY THROUGH
ELECTION TO BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE REGULAR ELECTION ON MAY 14, 2001
AND THE SENATOR THUS ELECTED TO SERVE ONLY FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM

Page | 224

WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator of the Philippines in 1998 for a
term which will expire on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo nominated Senator
Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been confirmed by a majority vote of all the
members of both House of Congress, voting separately;
WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as Vice-President of the Philippines on
February 9, 2001;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for twelve (12) Senators, all elective
Members of the House of Representatives, and all elective provincial city and municipal officials shall be
held on the second Monday and every three years thereafter; Now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved, to certify, as it hereby certifies, the existence of a
vacancy in the Senate and calling the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy
through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senator
thus elected to serve only for the unexpired term.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. TATAD
Senator
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move for the adoption of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. John H. Osmea is recognized.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Thank you, Mr. President. Will the distinguished Majority Leader, Chairman
of the Committee on Rules, author of this resolution, yield for a few questions?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. With trepidation, Mr. President. [Laughter]
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). What a way of flattery. [Laughter]
Mr. President, I think I recall that sometime in 1951 or 1953, there was a special election for a vacant seat
in the Senate. As a matter of fact, the one who was elected in that special election was then
Congressman, later Senator Feli[s]berto Verano.
In that election, Mr. President, the candidates contested the seat. In other words, the electorate had to
cast a vote for a ninth senator because at that time there were only eight to elect a member or rather,
a candidate to that particular seat.
Then I remember, Mr. President, that when we ran after the EDSA revolution, twice there were 24
candidates and the first 12 were elected to a six-year term and the next 12 were elected to a three-year
term.

Page | 225

My question therefore is, how is this going to be done in this election? Is the candidate with the
th
13 largest number of votes going to be the one to take a three-year term? Or is there going to be an
election for a position of senator for the unexpired term of Sen. Teofisto Guingona?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, in this resolution, we are leaving the mechanics to the Commission
th
on Elections. But personally, I would like to suggest that probably, the candidate obtaining the 13 largest
number of votes be declared as elected to fill up the unexpired term of Senator Guingona.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Is there a law that would allow the Comelec to conduct such an election? Is
it not the case that the vacancy is for a specific office? I am really at a loss. I am rising here because I
think it is something that we should consider. I do not know if we can No, this is not a Concurrent
Resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. May we solicit the legal wisdom of the Senate President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. May I share this information that under Republic Act No. 6645, what is needed is a
resolution of this Chamber calling attention to the need for the holding of a special election to fill up the
vacancy created, in this particular case, by the appointment of our colleague, Senator Guingona, as Vice
President.
It can be managed in the Commission on Elections so that a slot for the particular candidate to fill up
would be that reserved for Mr. Guingonas unexpired term. In other words, it can be arranged in such a
manner.
xxxx
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco is recognized.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest, subject to a one-minute caucus, wordings to the effect that in the
th
simultaneous elections, the 13 placer be therefore deemed to be the special election for this
purpose. So we just nominate 13 and it is good for our colleagues. It is better for the candidates. It is
also less expensive because the ballot will be printed and there will be less disfranchisement.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. If we can just deem it therefore under this resolution to be such a special election,
maybe, we satisfy the requirement of the law.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. In other words, this shall be a guidance for the Comelec.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. to implement.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec will not have the flexibility.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
th

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already consider the 13 placer of the forthcoming elections that will be
held simultaneously as a special election under this law as we understand it.

Page | 226

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. That will be a good compromise, Senator Roco.

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the sponsor can introduce that later, maybe it will be better, Mr.
President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the sponsor say?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, that is a most satisfactory proposal because I do not believe that
there will be anyone running specifically
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Correct.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. to fill up this position for three years and campaigning nationwide.
th

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Actually, I think what is going to happen is the 13 candidate will be running with
specific groups.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever gets No. 13.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. I think we can specifically define that as the intent of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Subject to style, we accept that amendment and if there will be no other
amendment, I move for the adoption of this resolution.
xxxx
ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934
If there are no other proposed amendments, I move that we adopt this resolution.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. There is a motion to adopt this resolution. Is there any objection? [Silence] There
[37]
being none, the motion is approved.
Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means and methods to conduct the
special election within the confines of R.A. No. 6645, merely chose to adopt the Senates proposal, as
embodied in Resolution No. 84. This Court has consistently acknowledged and affirmed COMELECs
wide latitude of discretion in adopting means to carry out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest
elections subject only to the limitation that the means so adopted are not illegal or do not constitute grave
[38]
abuse of discretion. COMELECs decision to abandon the means it employed in the 13 November 1951
and 8 November 1955 special elections and adopt the method embodied in Resolution No. 84 is but a
legitimate exercise of its discretion. Conversely, this Court will not interfere should COMELEC, in
subsequent special senatorial elections, choose to revert to the means it followed in the 13 November
1951 and 8 November 1955 elections. That COMELEC adopts means that are novel or even
disagreeable is no reason to adjudge it liable for grave abuse of discretion. As we have earlier noted:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part
in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with
restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission
may err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and
methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free, orderly
and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal
[39]
or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere.

Page | 227

A Word to COMELEC
The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the electorate of necessary
information regarding a special election, are central to an informed exercise of the right of suffrage. While
the circumstances attendant to the present case have led us to conclude that COMELECs failure to so
call and give notice did not invalidate the special senatorial election held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC
should not take chances in future elections. We remind COMELEC to comply strictly with all the
requirements under applicable laws relative to the conduct of regular elections in general and special
elections in particular.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157870
November 3, 2008
SOCIAL
JUSTICE
SOCIETY
(SJS), petitioner
vs.
DANGEROUS
DRUGS
BOARD
and
PHILIPPINE
DRUG
ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY
(PDEA),respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 158633
November 3, 2008
ATTY.
MANUEL
J.
LASERNA,
JR., petitioner
vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 161658
November 3, 2008
AQUILINO
Q.
PIMENTEL,
JR., petitioner
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing
of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses,
among other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government
forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the
DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among
others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well
as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x
x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and
with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and
private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test
as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk
in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt

Page | 228

with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory
drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs
use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in
connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the
said resolution read as follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the
quality of candidates they are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the
Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election
laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations on
the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May
10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in
government forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the
Department of Health.
SEC. 3. x x x

Page | 229

On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the
Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate
lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply x
x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before the start of the campaign
period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist
of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist
of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate. - No person
elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test
certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in the May
1
10, 2004 elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to
nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No.
6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the Philippines,
and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to read and write, a
registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be
a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.
G.R.
No.
157870 (Social
Justice
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

Society

v.

Dangerous

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political
party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they
give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another,
the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or
an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable
searches is also breached by said provisions.
G.R.
No.
158633 (Atty.
Manuel
J.
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

Laserna,

Jr.

v.

Dangerous

Page | 230

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional
for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and
the right against self - incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection
guarantees.
The Issue on Locus Standi
First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of
petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to
allege any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate
2
petitions.
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona
3
fidecontroversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed. But even with the presence of an
actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional
4
question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it. To have standing,
one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the
5
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non - traditional
plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount
6
public interest. There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May
10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject
matter of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is
wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount
public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the
equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?
Pimentel
(Constitutionality
of
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)

Sec.

36[g]

of

RA

9165

Petition
and

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally
impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions
on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The
Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
7
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Page | 231

Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby
declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all
8
laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
9
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as
1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in
the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the
boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as
governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are
limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department
can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The
Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment
10
may dash, but over which it cannot leap.
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of
11
12
legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights and other
provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for
senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates
for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions
13
of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched,
said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously
as a pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper
context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification
layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or
not the drug - free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is
really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non compliance with the drug - testing requirement.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not
expressly state that non - compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work
to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test
requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made drug - testing on
those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse
consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with candidates
for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and
revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal
would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and
effect whatsoever.

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While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer
enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and
the candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it
appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is
rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility
requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
SJS
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

Petition

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level
students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless
arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of
[the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose,
per the policy - declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an intensive
and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated
system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti - drug abuse policies, programs and
14
projects." The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal
drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be
exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and
55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and
Rehabilitation. - A drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by
himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for
treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring
forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant be examined for drug
dependency. If the examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug
dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a
Center designated by the Board x x x.
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program. - A drug
dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement,
shall be exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following
conditions:
xxxx
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and
addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically impaired by
15
intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by
16
17
the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. But
while the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity
of a state - decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among
students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these
proceedings is veritably one of first impression.

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US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug
testing among school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton
(Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al.
18
v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education), both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court - decided cases involving
the constitutionality of governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their
respective institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation
with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug testing for the school's athletes. James Acton, a
high school student, was denied participation in the football program after he refused to undertake the
urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the school's drug testing policy violated, inter
19
alia, the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the
following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding
their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights
than non - athletes since the former observe communal undress before and after sports events; (4) by
joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school
supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student's privacy since a
student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because
of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy
20
constituted reasonable search under the Fourth and 14th Amendments and declared the random drug testing policy constitutional.
In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test
for high school students desiring to join extra - curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show
choir, marching band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug testing policy made to apply to non - athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued,
unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in locker
rooms, non - athletes are entitled to more privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among non athletes on the basis of the school's custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no
distinction between a non - athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of
the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that
the school could implement its random drug - testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a kind
of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are:
(1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor
students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of
their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the
health and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary
to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission
that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of
RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional.
Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not
absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the
21
well - being of the people, particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims.

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Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing
of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the
safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be
promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is
as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the
necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug - infested school are visited
22
not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty. Needless to stress, the random
testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate
unsuspecting individual students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test
prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable,
albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than
saying that "subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an
23
unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy," has failed to show how the mandatory, random,
and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and
constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the
24
Constitution. Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not
merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the
constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have
been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a citizen's constitutional right
to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively
25
hereinbelow.
26

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right to be
free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a
27
way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. And while there has been general
agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the
abstract prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the
28
decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court. Authorities
are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to
29
the state's exercise of police power.
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
30
"reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. And whether a
search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state
31
interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally
determined by a judge. Given that the drug - testing policy for employees--and students for that matter-under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to inVernonia as "swift
and informal disciplinary procedures," the probable - cause standard is not required or even practicable.
Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search
in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which
the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes.
In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of
the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an
office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining
agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the
employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated
office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

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Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law.
Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated
32
in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation
that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every
officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may
be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to
discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be
observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing
that the employees concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained in the company's
work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place."
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much
as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the
procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless
to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration
lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an
33
accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug
34
results shall be on the "need to know" basis; that the "drug test result and the records shall be [kept]
confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test
35
results." Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting
agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the
employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against
embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect
the well - being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The
law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a
36
national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test. To the Court, the need
for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's
privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across
gender, age group, and social - economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale,
manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it
not for the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated
since the martial law public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid
back stance with respect to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory
random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private
offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the
chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set
forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public
37
officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes
the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil

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servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and
38
to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue delegation
of power hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not
so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of
drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools
and officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who
shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school
rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees,
the testing shall take into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall
be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an
unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the
test results are established.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH,
Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor
and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the
participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA
9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers have unchecked discretion to determine
how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.
39

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional landscape. In the
face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power,
or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as
here.

Laserna
Petition
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)

(Constitutionality

of

Sec.

36[c],

[d],

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability
of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver
by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily
submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office
with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative
concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons
charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office
and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to
40
the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused
is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.

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WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and toPARTIALLY
GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) ofRA 9165
CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are,
accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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