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'Dying Hindus': Production of Hindu Communal Common Sense in Early 20th Century Bengal

Author(s): Pradip Kumar Datta


Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 28, No. 25 (Jun. 19, 1993), pp. 1305-1319
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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SPECIAL ARTICLES

'Dying
Hindus
Production of Hindu Communal Common Sense in
Early 20th Century Bengal
Pradip Kumar Datta
The discursive power of Hindu communalism does not spring exclusively from single texts or even a chain
of them at from the swift creation of a popular network of certain tropes, themes, structures of apprehension
and reform, at the heart of whichfunctions a single mobile trope to provide the necessary ideological orientation.
This produces a formation of immense potency and amazing flexibility. For,it constantly accretes new meanings,
whole traditions to itself producing from its formative moment a web of thought that ranges from stereotypes
to statistical and sociological analysis.
ONE of the first markers of difference
between 'Hindu' and 'Muslim' I learned
as a child, was the 'fact' that Muslims
marriedfour times. I did not question this
assertion; not even when, many decades
later during the Muslim Women's Bill
agitation, Hindu communalists cited it as
a privilegethat was sought to be protected
by the Muslim community as a whole.
Though now the venom with which it was
invoked made me a little uncomfortable.
A few years later,my credulitywas rewarded with a grim retribution. While investigating a riot-one of the many that the
Ram Janmabhoomi agitation has produced-a key characterisation of the
Muslims that was made to us, by all
shades of fighters for the Hindu 'cause',
was their alleged marital excesses. It was
claimed that this allowed them to proliferate in numbers; hence it would be a
matter of time before they overran the
country. The 'fact' that I had learned 'innocently', now revealed paranoia and
violence. Yet its projection seemed
unimaginably remote. Wherethen did the
intensityof this fear come from?Was this,
I wondered, something that was dormant,
that what we were hearing today was a
trace, which was being bloated to produce
yet another story of mangled bodies and
torn minds. But in that event, could the
trace be made to revealthe power of a past
deposit? Together with the nature of the
formation?
Inspecting the shelves of the library, I
was struck by the title of a publication of
the Hindu Mahasabha called, They Count
Their Gains- We Calculate Our Losses,
which had come out in 1979. The foreword said that the title was taken from a
statement of Bhai Parmanand; the book
itself tried to raise a scare of the rising
population of Muslims and Christians.'
Soon I discoveredevidence from an earlier
period. Writingto Malaviyaabout his impressions of a talk with a British statesEconomic and Political Weekly

man aboard a ship, sometime during the


communally charged period of the
mid-20s, Lajpat Rai reported the following: "The chief hope [of the British]seemed to have so far been on the chance of
thinning their [the Hindus'] numberswith
a view eventuallyto make them politically
impotent!2 Whether this was accurate
was not my interest; it was only a step in
confirming the preoccupation with Hindu
numbers in the mind of one who was
engaged in tryingto produce a Hindu constituency. A more decisive fact followed
in the tracks of the last: in 1925, Swami
Shraddhanand had declaredin the course
of a speech in Patna, that he had been
seized by the problem of the dying out of
the Hindu 'race' after reading a book by
one U N Mukherji entitled, Hindus-A
Dying Race.3 Later I learned that it was
as early as 1912that Mukherji had actually met Shraddhanand,to convince him of
his thesis;4 Mukherji's own book had
been published three yearsearlier,in 1909.
Another surprise awaited me: the quotation so authoritatively attributed to Parmanand, actually formed one of the concluding lines of Mukherji'stext. This was
not simply a case of the discourse outliving the author. What I was confronted
with was a textthat had become 'common
sense',repeating,as it circulatedacrossthis
century, an antagonistic notion of communal relations, while it accreted to itself
new contexts and meanings and established different tonalities of estrangement.
But it was more than simply the tenacity of this preoccupation that aroused my
interest. What was at stake was an understanding of one of the primarysources of
communal power:its ability to perpetually
renew itself through the reiteration of
stereotypes, without necessarily sounding
repetitive. What is more, although the
relationship between different, stereotypical 'observations'seemed random, as
say, the juxtaposition of Mtuslimfertility

with their alleged proclivites towards


violence, the fact of their mutual proximity ultimately defined them as part of a
network of meanings. They tended to
createa disposition, which complemented
an ideological 'line',without appearingto
be ideologicaly interested.Their authority
lay precisely in the assumption that they
were common truth, a product of social
'good sense.
Hindu communal thinking around the
census seemed a good entry point into this
perplexingand powerfulweb of banalities,
whose operations remained nonetheless
opaque. For one, this could be traced to
an author; more pertinently, Hindus-A
Dying Race (hereafter ADR)5 dealt with
a vast range of subjects and themes, including ideas of fertility, economics,
organisation, the body, space, drawing
at the same time on the disciplines of
Sociology, Philosophy and History
amongst others. Mukherji provided the
spaciousness of a world-view that could
lend itself to growth and consolidation.
Equally important for my purposes was
the way a vast constellation of significations created itself through processes of
association, displacement, observation
and analysis: this text offered the first
largewindow on the logic of the seemingly
random selection of stereotypes. Furthes
the way its theme was taken up by other
texts, which improvised their own meanings, often aligning it to changed preoccupations; the process by which its
origins irntexts produced by individuals
gave way to more organised mediations;
its conversion into oral cormunication;
the fact that the concern with declining
numbersof Hindus was providedwlth different positions of importance, frcomoccupying the place of the central problem
to being included as a rhetorical appendages, even as it was being coupled with
other anxieties which, by the end ot my
penod of study, displaced the focus of in-

June 19, 1993

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1305

terest onto themselves: all this pointed to


the emergenceof a 'common sense, which
could cut across disparate concerns and
institutional formations. In effect, it offered an opportunity to study a peculiarly
polysemic and polymorphic discourse,the
growth of which depended on both its inner logic and on a multiplicity of extradiscursive happenings.
Given its location amongst heterogenous voices, the common sense around
the census also raised the question as to
whether all varietiesof discourse that had
the 'Hindus' a; their referencepoint, were
communal. A recent study by Papia
Chakravarty6 has assumed that all
strands of Hindu 'self-strengthening
including the pronouncedly communal
assertions of U N Mukherji, went into the
making of a single Hindu identity. This
begs important questions: how was, for
instance, Vivekananda's ideas of Hindu
reform, which are not energised by communal imperatives, appropriatedby thinkers like Mukherji? This linked itself to
another question: the vitality of the process in which a range of concerns were
made to intersect at the 'census'. raised
questions about the responsibility of colonialism. Did the categories of the census
provide the formative discourse that buil
the communal prison which we continue
to inhabit?

11
In his remarkablyperceptiveessay, Kenneth Jones sums up the decisive effects of
the census, as: 'Religions became communities mapped, counted, and above all
compared with other religious communities"7 However Jones belies expectations
by go)ng on to simply describe how the
formation of Hindu identity is preoccupied throughout its careerwith the census; although the logical move would have
been to consider its momentous significance for communalism. The evidence
for such a reading, it may be added, is
overwhelming. H H Risley, home secretary, government of India, who proposed the partition of Bengal in 1903, for instance, is as frankly excited as a bookie
at a horse race, when he declares: "Can
the figures of the last censu.s be regarded
in any sense the forerunner of an Islamic
or Christianrevivalwhich will threatenthe
citadel of Hinduism or will Hinduism
hold its own in the future as it has done
through the long ages of the past."8
Risley's comments were overdetermined
by the 'calculations' made by O'Donnell,
the census commissioner for 1891,who on
the basis of slower growth ratesof Hindus
relativeto the Muslims, leapfroggedacross
simple statistical logic to deduce the
number of years it would takeefor the
Hindus to disappear altogether! Even as
late as the 1911 census, whenz it had
1306

become absolutely transparent that such


speculations could arouse tremendous
communal antagonism, observations to
the same effect were reiterated.9
A year before this, an even more blatant
act of colonial engineering was proposed.

E A Gait, the census commissioner, passed a circular proposing five 'tests' to


discover who was a Hindu, even if the
person/s concerned subscribed to this
nomenclature. This involved a questionnaire that would basically make a fourfold query: whether, the would-be respondents, worshipped the 'great Hindu
gods: wereallowed entry into temples and
offerings to the shrine; if the brahmins
who administeredto them were 'degraded'
or even recognised as brahmins by their
supposed caste members, and what was
the status of the respondents regarding
untouchability. Obviously there was a
tremendousanalytic acumen at work here,
since the questions were designed to confirm both brahmanical exdusiveness, as
well as low caste anger. Given the upper
caste character of the leaders of the
Swadeshi movement, this 'test' was
designed to encourage the detachment of
low castes from the 'Hindu' category,
reducingthe numberson whose behalf the
upper castes claimed to speak. Horrified,
Mukherji observes in Hinduism and the
Coming Census (hereafter HCC), written
as a response to this challenge: "It will
break into two communities those that
hitherto had been regarded as one."'
Such evidence, by itself, argues for a
Pavlovian relationship between communalism and the colonial dispensation.
It hammers in the 'truths' of Said. But it
also encourages a circularityof argumentation that confines all potential enquiries
within the limits of critiquing colonial
power-knowledge.Other questions remain
unasked. Could, for instance, colonial
classifications be regarded as origins or
as renewaland reaccentuation?Lucy Carroll has made a distinction between caste
associations that sprang up to claim
privileges before each census, rapidly
withering away thereafter and those
which, in their more pennanent and evolving history, testified both to more longstanding sources of collective aspirations,
as well as their shaping by colonial classifications." Without elaborating the obvious answers as to whether there existed
'Hindu'/'Muslim' identities prior to colonialism, it may be observed that the census explainsthe stabilisationof these identities around new ofientations (of the sort
mentioned by Jones), backed up by institutional 'facilities' such as reservededucational and employment quotas. But it
does not explain much of what the texts
discussed below, revealed: how, for instance, were relations of untouchability
tackled by upper caste representatives,

especially the communalists. Or, how the


'common sense around the census was coextensive with the development of a
world-viewgrounded in communal stereotypes. For it soon became clear that it was
not an anthropologised history of collective affiliations one was confronted with,
a stable, collective self that was inherited
either from an unchanging past or from
a power-knowledgeformation, but an unfamiliar ideological terrain that retained
its marks of apparently improvised and
dislocated growth.
All this cannot be explained in terms
of its colonial origins alone. The 'origins'
require location within a broader process
of identity formation. Recently, Gyanendra Pandey has made such an effort, but
his thesis remains moored to a notion of
discrete communities. being (rais)represented in the discourseso>fthose who control the powers of disseminating their
representations. Pandey's efforts are
directed towards uncoveringthe 'truth' of
these separate communities, an enterprise
that tends to assume that communalism
is the effect of (power-laden) prejudices
alone.'2This does not explain the process
by which an ideological unity of different
identities is sought to be erected through
communalism, nor the vulnerabilitiesthat
it reveals.An understandingfor which one
of the possibilities could be to look upon
it as a discursive area that is fraught with
inner tensions; in which the claims of
cther collectivities-which are themselves
wrestlingwith inner schisms-are sought
to be either reoriented, displaced or actively opposed; which are reshaped by the

logic of events and the relationships with


'others'. In short, to understand it in its
twin movement towards stabilisation and
dispersal.
III
The ADR gestured at its later importance by producing a fair amount of success and controversy on its appearance.It
was serialised in the Bengalee during the
month of June in 1909, a period that saw
this newspaper in a communal temper.'3
It was published twice as a book in 1910
sold at a priceof 4as, which for its English
language readershipwas very affordable.
The author followed this up by writing
HCC? a Bengali translation of which he
distributed 25,000 copies free of cost.
Another 25,000 copies of a modified
Bengali version of ADR called Hindu
Samaj was also distributed free. 14
Mukherji's *thesis was criticised, most
notably by Sakharam Ganesh Deuskar, a
major extremist leader, whose reply we
will consider later. But bigger fearsdispelled these attacks. On the one hand was
Ameer Ali's petition on behalf of the
London branch of the All India Muslim
leaguesmade in the context of the Morley-

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June 19, 1993

Why is English society given such prominence in this argument?And what does
this imply for the conception of Muslims?
In England, Mukherji argues, the combined effects of the various institutions
produces a common relationship with the
self; thus, although a person may think
of himself as an individual, "as a matter
of fact he is a [sic] unit and generallya very
intelligent unit of a huge organisation
where everyone, irrespective of rank or
class, has a common idea and a common
object". The result is an awesome prospect, epitomised by English industry:
"Here Indians had to hold their ground
gress in 1911.18
against a set of men who after hundreds
Given the importanceof A DR, it would of years of work and experience had
be useful to start with a brief summary. reduced the art of making money into
something like an exact science, men in
Mukherji develops his argument by comparing a monolithic Hindu society with possession of everypossible information...
equally singular conceptions of Muslim carefully weighed, sifted and tabulated,
and English societies. Proceeding from with all the advantages that capital and
combination could secure..." The tone is
O'Donnells' warning, he asserts that the
lyrical; possessive. Figures of completion
fundamental cause for the decline of
Hindu numberswas because their peasan- abound: 'hundreds of years', 'exact',
The rhetoricis franklyground'every',
try was poor. Further,Hindu influence on
ed in the idea of Britishsuperiority,which
village life was also declining because of
the shrinking power of the mahajans. in the 19th century the moderates had
Conversely, the Muslim peasant was assuned would be beneficial for the
developmentof their own society. But here
becoming wealthier and buying up land.
it carries other resonances. The English
In Calcutta too, the labour market and
petty artisanal enterprises were being maybe a model, but the lyricism also confesses the impossibility of attaining it.
taken over by immigrants, since Hindus
Hindus cannot match the investment in
(implying Bengali ones) werepreventedby
caste rules from changing their inherited competitive time, nor command a comparable volume of knowledge. Desire is
occupations and competing with them.
Muslim immigrants were religious, hard- shrouded in disenchantment.
The disenchantment was unavoidable,
working, and ate well; Hindu low castes
drank liquor, were unkempt and lazy. for in the years preceding 1909, the proMukherji then contrasts England with
spect of rivalling British industry (in adHindu society. The latter was characteris- dition to elements of its administrative
ed by immense gradationsof caste; shared machinery, such as Swadeshi arbitration
occasions like the Durga puja served to -ourts providing an alternative to the
etiphasise caste divisions since the low judiciary) had enthused the Swadeshi
castes were kept at a distance. This state movement; but by 1908, it was becoming
of affairs remained unregenerate,because apparentthat all these initiatives werecoleither actively complicit lapsing.20 But nationalism had not lost
upper castes %wre
or simply disinterested. On the other its pride, nor the sense of outrage
hand, social classes in England were Mukherji'sconcluding lines in the passage
cited above runs: "If ever there was an
bonded by the same feelings on common
occasions such as those provided by unequal fight it was this" The Swadeshi
sports, defence requiremen-tsanid church movement had left anger in addition to
activities:an ability that accounted for the disenchantment-making it doubly imoverwhelming organisational power their possible to regardthe English as a model.
But the shutting out of one possibility
society possessed. Islam too had produced a sense of commonness throughmasjid
opens another: "There is nothing in the
congregations. As a matter of fact, their
laws that specially affects the Hindus
reform movements of the 19th centurv
unfavourably", Mukherji states, adding:
were responsible for both their wealth as
"The superiority of the...Mohammedans
well as their unity under British rule. is entirelydue to their religiousrevivaland
Hindus, however,faced disaster from three systematic moral training..." Of course
sources: Morley's equivocating reply to
Mukherji does not specify how the
Ameer Ali's petition; "` the pulverisation
Muslims had suffered under colonialism
to make their condition comparable (this
of Bengali industry by the British; and
could conceivably spoil the argument by
now, dispossession of land by Muslims.
The cause of their helplessness, MQukherji arousing sympathy for them); but also,
reiterates, iay in caste exclusiisn;s.
the
Mluslims need to remainsuperior,.sinc:e
Minto

reforms

of

1909,'

that called

upon the authorities to effectively detach


the lower castes as a bloc from the Hindu
category; on the other, increasing
demands were being made by influential
sections of the so-called backward castes
for autonomous and preferential consideration.16 Moreover,the debate on the
census was acquiring nationwide importance since it seized communally disposed
leaders of the Punjab as well.'7 It was
thereforea sign of the times that Mukherji's investment was rewardedby an invitation to guide, the specially constituted
Social Conference'of the ProvincialCon-

Economic and Political Wcckiy

argumentdemands they be a viable model


for emulation. The insistence on this
allows Mukherji to tap the resources of
another discourse. Muslim superiority
stems from religion, a sphere that was
'guaranteed' by Queen Victoria's Proclamation of 1858 (and referredto by all
parties as a kind of Directive Principle),
to be autonomous of the administration.
lkgore had'already drawn a distihction
between 'rashtra' (state) and 'samaj'
(society), finding in the latter a province
that allowed independent initiatives; recent work suggests that such a structure

of thinking was present even earlier.2'


The Islamic reform movements allow an
opportunity to recast this aspiration for
self-strengthening in a space independent
of the state via its reinscriptionin this image of a triumphant Muslim society. And
Mukherjispares no efforts in making this
image vivid. The locus of this renaissance
is the village masjid, cared for by the
'mollah, who, though learned, belongs to
the same background as his congregation
which has the power to elect him. Every
Friday,prayersare followed by a 'waz' or
sermon which consists of: "smple morality, simply told". All this-it is reiteratedis done independently, without any central organisation, state help, obligatory
payments or church laws. Above all, the
greatest contributionof the reform movement, it appears from this representation,
seems to lie in producing the drive to selforganisation.
Mukherji skirts the borders of stereotyping here: the notion of Islamic
'fanaticism' is as old as the Renaissance,
and it is no coincidence that this formulation about Islamic reform in Bengal is
derived from the famous passage in
Hunter's history, which our author approvingly cites.22 But it would be selfdefeating for Mukherji to identify his
argument with the stereotypical, for the
latterdenotes final ontological conditions.
His aim is change through emulation of
the other; and this involves self-reform.
Mukherji thus carries out a more subtle
exercise, throughout the course of his
argument:appropriatingthe weightof antagonism that stereotypes offer, while
orienting these to the object of reform.
Such negotiation is evident from the onset
of the self-critique.Mukheriiasserts from
his 'observations'that the cause of Muslim
proliferation lies in the desre of Hindu
widows for Muslim males. This is a radically new departurefrom late 19thcentury
discourseson the Hindu female which had
idealised the notion of inviolate chastity.23 Moreover Mukherji's 'fact' pulls a
constellation of discourses around it.
There is the centuries-long image of the
sexually powerful Muslim male; which in
colonial Beng,alis tied to the internalised

Juiec 19, 1993

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1307

British stereotype of the effete Bengali


Hindu

male 24 However,

the

very

unresolvability of the dialectic between


desire, resentment and anxiety that these
stereotypes produce, is sought to be
redeemed by shifting its burden on to the
supposed desire of the Hindu widow. A
special connection between the Muslim
and the Hindu widow had already been
established and publicised during the
Jamalpur riots of 1906.25 But the focus
then had been on the abduction of
widows: the fault lay solely in Muslim aggressiveness. On the other hand, by making the widows culpable for the connection, Mukherji taps the legacies of guilt,
fear and humanitarianconcern which the
19th century Hindu proponents of widow
remarriage had tried to arouse.26 Viewed
from this frame,to resolve the problem of
widowed desire would also settle a larger
assortment of more recognisably male
dilemmas.
"After Cers comes Venus": the epigrammatic style hurls the argument from
one point to the next, allowing it to armass
a wealth of discursive associations, but
not providing space to interrogate the
series of displacements. Resonances of
19thcentury reformistdiscourseare utilised to reorient the argument to the differentpossibilityof economic reform.The
fatal desireof widows is explained by Hindu peasant poverty. This is so, Mukherji
asserts, because Hindu males cannot afford to remarry,in turn producing larger
numbers of unsatisfied widows; conversely, Muslim wealth gives to them a 'superior
physique'. It may be noted that by
blending the sexual into the economic,
Mukherjiis enabled to harnessthe anxious
energy of stereotypes to a condition,
which, since the drain-of-wealth theory,
had been recognised as man-made.
The Muslim is saddled with a double
burden. By surrounding his figuirewith a
plethora of discourses, this text aspires to
make suspicion of the Muslim a key structuring principle of existence itself; by the
same token, to defeat their silent machinations promises to resolve far-reachingproblems. The encoding of hopeful expectation within fear provides a powerful
world-view. Not only can it hold the anxieties of established discourses, but it is
made to absorb more immediately political and social challenges.
Let me begin with one already touched
upon, namely, the utility of the Muslim
in providing a release from the cul-de-sac
scenario at the end of the Swadeshimovement. Concerns that were integral to it,
such as economic self-reliance,the cultivation of the body, organisation through
faith, can now be conjured up throughencounter with this new enemy. Though the
Muslim representsan attenuatedspace for
these initiatises, for that very reason, it
1308

becomes even more important to cling to.


Secondly, there is the problem of a shift
in the regional composition of Calcutta's
population, which Mukherji is among the
first to underline;it later becomes a major
preoccupation with Sir P C Ray. From
Mukherji's figures (which show that the

population profile of Calcutta has one


Bengali Hindu to 25 Bengal Muslims and
about 100 upcountrymen, without including the Chinese, Marwaris, etc), it is clear
that Muslims form only a part of the overall deluge.27 Yet precisely because the
particular section is left hanging here, the
chauvinistic anxiety produced by the prospect of the political and cultural capital

of Bengal becoming non-Bengali, is relocated in the Muslims who, needless to


add, are seen as the heart of a general
danger. This of course, involves the
removal of distinction between Bengalis
and non-B4ngalis. Finally, and most
significantly, the Hindus' condition is
signified overwhelmingly by the low
castes. This has much largerconsequences
than the relatively straightforward one
of displacement. It needs separate consideration.
IV
Mukherji's representation of the low
caste condition is one of unmitigated
degradation:it acts as the ever-presentinversionof the idealised Muslim. Consider
the following description of the low caste
bagdi, which is typical: "He is poor,
eternally poor... He is lazy, thriftless,
unreliable...Hope, ambition, self-respect,
self-reliancehaveno meaning for him, and
things have been like this ever since he has
been a bagdi". Further, "There is no object for which they can unite..".The subjectivity attributed to them by Mukherji
is not one that is conducive to unity.Quite
logically, they cannot resistthe hegemony
of the brahmins, from which flows the
strictures on untouchability. Low caste
movements for self-assertion-in which
Mukherji includes Vaishnavism, the
Charak festival, sects such as the Kartabhajas and caste association movements-are either absorbed by brahmins,
which results in the internaldecay of their
initial aims, or they assert superiorityover
others, increasing the centrifugal tendencLyamongst themselves.
Certain assertions stick out like sore
thumbs in this portrayal,most notably,the
one relating to the evaluation of caste
association movements.Since they cannot
be said to have been appropriated by
brahminism,Mukherjidismisses them for
militating against Hindu unity. He does
not consider their improvement ideology,
their growing prosperity and a commitment to combination, or anti-brahminism
fall of which characterise the powerful

Namasudra movement, for instance).28


From where does the driving necessity to
create this, negative, dependent image of
the low castes spring?
An obvious explanation is that it saves
Mukherji from having to contrast the
upper castes with the Muslims, a framework-given the visible social and economic privileges of the former-would have
made it impossible for Mukherji to substantiate the master metaphor of impending death. Even though, it may be
observed, this trope is crucial (its importance being expressedin becoming an accepted featureof Hindu communal rhetoric). The threat of diemographic deducchanges in the
tions involved far-i-eachix?g
oppurtunities that the colonial administration offered for the diffe w.astes, For
the first time since the birthof the Bengali
Hindu colonial middle cIaWs,there was a
decisive and immediate threat to their
hegemony. By absenting them as an index
to the Hindu condition, Mukherji allows
the threat to privilege to be presented as
the plight of the oppressed.29 But this
conceals another displacement. The
Swadeshi movement had failed to galvanise the low castes; in the case of powerful caste bodies such as the Namasudras,
there had even been proclamations of
loyalism.-' By drawing an absolute, inverserelationshipbetweenthe Muslim and
the lower castes, he can both shift the anxiety caused by the former,arndrecreatethe
lower orders as an object of paternal concern, at a time when this was under strain.
By doing this, Mukherji also alters the
discourse on reform of the low castes,
which had been establishedby Vivekananda. For the latter,upper caste paternalism
was necessitatedby a combination of fear
of low caste rebellionagainst the authority
of the upper, as well as an humanitarian
commitment. For Mukherji the problem
of low caste breakawaycould not be admnitted,precisely because the problem was
now manifest. But the overall situation
presentedspace for another possibility, to
which his discourse could be proiuctively
aligned. The relationship between the
Muslim and the low castes held complicated possibilities. Prospects for an
alliance were counterbalanWedby indications of antagonism that became pronounced in the years immediately following the publication of this pamphlet.3'
Obviously, Mukherji's framework of antagonistic comparison was designed to
encourage the growth of the second tendency. However, this by itself, is not sufficient: the antagonism with the Muslim
need not necessarilylead to the 'Hinduisation' of the low castes. It is to fill this
lacuna that the brahminentersapportion-

concern.
ed the burdenof humanitarian
In the fifth section of the book,
Mukherjiidentifiessix broadca,steclus-

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ters. The common index by which their


hierarchyis mapped out, is the manner in
which differentgroups relateto brahmins:
the latter then are given the status of a
structunng principle. Obvicusly, this corresponds to their hegemonic position,
although Mukherji characterises it in
negative terms: "He [the brahminj claims
superiority over all, but admits of no
obligation or duty towards any.' Significantly, Mukherji does not contest the
proclamation of superiority, but the inability to support it. Though this is couched in terms of mutual obligations, the
issue is one of power: the brahmins need
self-reform to save Hindu society from
dismemberment-which includes their
superior social position in it.
Talking of the reasoniswhy Hindus do
not meet together, Mukherjiobserves that
when a low caste meets a brahmin, he
does a 'dandabat', that is, prostrates
himself "like a log of wood-not like a
human being..'; at sites of common
festivities,a straydog is treatedbetterthan
a Hari or Dom if they happen to enter.
Mukherji bemoans the resultant lack of
self-respect that the low castes imbibe,
which provides an explanation for their
allegedly immoral culture and lack of
subjective motivation. Underpinning this
pronouncement is the presumption that
brahmins determine their self-image.
Howeverthe brahminsare themselves victims of minute and rigid intra-caste
discriminations, being divided by region,
and by sub-classificationssuch as 'gotras',
'mel' and 'sanatan'.For the brahmins,unity is as imperativeas it is for other groups.
Brahmins had a special status in
Bengal, since there were no intermediate
varnacaste between them and the shudras
who occupied the lowest rung in this order
of ranking 3'-which is a possible explanation for the importance given to
them in many schemes for constructing
alternateJiindu societies. Mukherji'spositioning of the brahmin draws from two
discourses around them. On one hand was
the reformist project of Vivekananda,
which argued that since brahminhoodwas
an ideal, the ultimate goal of Hindu society ought to be the raising up of all castes
to the status of brahmins.3 On the other
hand were the tuirn-of-the-centuryrevivalists, including figures such as Satishchan-

dra Mukherji and RabindrariathThgore


(who briefly went through this phase) called for the maintenanceof the caste system
and appointment of brahminsas "disinterested intellectual leaders".'4 Mukherji
follows Vivekananda in privileging
brahmins as educators, but differs from
the latter by concentrating exclusively on
this aspect. Again, in the emphasis on
brahmanical self-refbrm as a prelude to
Hindu reformn,he draws upon Vivekananda's orientation. B3ut therr' ic v2
Economic and Political Weekly

negotiation involved. Brahminsare urged


to educate all castes in order to uphold
their inherited privileges:effectively,what
is offered to the brahmins as compensation for the loss in social prestige (by giving up discriminatory practices in social
relationships), is a much broader vista of
hegemonising Hindu low castes directly,
making brahminism itself a supra-caste
ideology, without entailing the loss of
caste identity. A reformulation of revivalism is delicately sxiggested.
The inherent conservatism of this project regulates the outlines of Mukherji's
overriding objectives, which is expressed
in rhetoric that tends to posture a little
For instance, a key requirement, which is
again inheritedfrom Vivekananda,is that
of egalitarianism. And with his mentor,
Mukherjisharesthe attenuateddefinition
of egalitarianismas basically denoting the
suspensionof untouchabilityIn the earlier
project, it arises from a sense of expediency (to avoid the prospect of low caste
revolution and possible breakaway), as
well as righteous anger against their treatment. However, Mukherji shrinks the
meaning of egalitarianism further, by
making it a purely functional precondition for brahminsto teach the low castes,
and by denuding it of the quality of

social opportunities. EgaLitarianismtnci


indicates the overriding necessity to constitute a samenessof subjectivity.Incidentally, for Mukherji, this does not signify
the obliteration of individuality: on the
contrary, strong self-respecting individuals, as Muslim and English societies indicate, are necessary as 'intdlegent units'
to power the social machine.The ultimate
lyrical prospect is however the German
'Volkschule',defined in a later pamphlet
entitled Hindu Samaj (hereafter HS),35
as an education system which compulsonly removes"differencebetween untouchable or respectable, rich or poor amongst
the boys and girls...[sin.e they possess] the
same book, the same education, the same
rules".
However,the idealisation of egalitarianistvas samentss, is modified in this pamphlet. There is a reinscription of the
England of ADR. The main feature of
English society represented here, is its
loose educational system, which allows for
the differences of denominational education, is held to be more relevant.This goes
together with the discovery of a distinctively brahmanicaleducationalinstitution.
The 'tol' (shorn of its brahmanical exclusiveness)is advocated,not only because
it has maintained traditional learning at
indignation.
the cost of great self-sacrifice on the part
It may be remarkedthat the proposal of brahmins, but more importantly, in
to educate the low castes by the brahmins view of its relevance for modern condioriginates from Vivekananda again. The tions, that had apparently been proved
word that Mukherji uses, however, is by its adoption in England as the bell
'training': implying a pedagogy that is system.* It can be argued that the alteramore applied, technical. More than any- tions in HS are necessitated by the limitathing else, it carries the implication that tions of ADR's prescriptions, in producthe object of attention is 'character':"A ing a Hindu society. But the haste with
trained man is superior to a man who is which these proposals are displayed
not trained",declares Mukherji. In other (HS was published in 1910, only a year
words,justifying the production of a comand a half after ADR) testifies to the
mon personality (since the training pro- urgency produced by a circular released
gramme is obviously deemed to be comby E A Gait, the census commissioner,
which dramatically and perilously posed
mon) on grounds of efficiency. But the
the question, who is a Hindu.
tropes of subjectivity also imply the conADR makes engrossing reading. The
version of a mechanical social organisation into an organism, seeking to create line of argumentation flows, one cause
leading seductivelyinto another, the whole
an inter-connectedness that is intimate
without surrendering the idea of instru-, being packaged by a ringing, epigrammatic style. One forgets that at important
mentality. Further, Mukherji uses the
points, Mukherjiavoids mentioning estafigure of the body to establish a compreblished explanations, such as, the deterhensiveellision betweenthe 'personal'and
'social'. Castes are chastised, for instance, mining role that upper caste customs play
since each is a 'self-containedbody'.Given in preventing widow remarriage. The
economic expla'nationof Hindu poverty
the framework of the weak Hindu conthat is offered in its place is, in turn, stripfronted by the unremittingantagonism of
the immediate and overwhelming power ped of questions such as redistributing
kandand tenancy reforms, and propped
of Muslim personality and more remoteup on simple personal observation alone
ly, the British, it follows that Hindus must
Economic conditions are regarded as a
develop a larger, unified personality.
matter of individual motivations (much
It will be recalled that we started with
in the style of conservative Victorian
egalitarianism: we can now see that it is
social thinkers,assuming as they do, that
premised on a necessary inequality with
opportunities are equal for everyone), the
others, accrued as a consequence of a
failureof subjectivity(in being brokenand energies for whlichare located in religious
,4: ,,^;.J
h- z' n f a d:"ferncein reformn.

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1309

This brief recapitulation suggests that


Mukherji could easily havejumped from
his initial diagnosis of a dying Hindu
community to his concluding position,
without going through the intermediate
steps: a religious community self-definitionally requires religious revival to
resuscitate it. But in that event, a worldview would not have been produced. As
I have shown, the flexibility of the argument allows it, like a magnet passing
through metal filings, to draw various
kinds of discourses, which had become
part of the cormmonsense of the Swadeshi
movement,into anothersemingly cohernt
stream of argumentation,so that another
world-view can be produced, fattening
itself on traces of older ones. An identity
then emerges,not as simple nomenclature
alone, but as a many faceted 'world'
where the networkof causality is comprehensive enough to linlk, for instance,
economic problems with those of relig,'ov.s
reform.
This is accomplished morover without
surrenderingthe major source of popular
energy for the production of such communities, that is of stereotypes. We have
seen how the model of inverted characteristics exacerbates the load of anxiety,
while the careful avoidance of ontological
fixity paves a credible path for the corresponding desire to fulfill itself. But this
does not move the vision away from the
parametersof stereotypes.In fact it makes
them sophisticated, enlargesthem so that
they can contain a world-view.Ultimately,
ADR leaves the reader with a pictorial
evocation: a dying (low caste) Hindu, selfdivided and physically weak, Surrounded
by an already overwhelming and progressively expanding presence of the
Muslim, who in their self-engineered
growth, suck out the life-blood of their
rivals. A contest between two bodies, two
personalities, two societies; each with a
history, together with a correspondingexplanation for their conditions.
All in all this is a neat edifice, that rests
on the assumption that therewas time for
a single Hindu society to be produced
through reforn. By 1910howeverthis luxury was over. Mukherji's response to the
Gait circular was one of desperation.
HCC disavows the imperative of a
mechanical Hindu organisation, that
presupposes a singular collective identity. Here Hinduism is defined as a system
that possesses 'belief without authority'.
The relationship with the Other (which is
represented here by Christianity, since
Mukherji's aim is to convince the authorities with instances familiar to them), is
now one of the differencesthat should not
be bridged. For, although Christianity is
divided intcosects and schools, they are
united by a commlon belief In the "idea

1310

of authority-dairningsupremacyimposing
restrictionsissuing licence.." On the other
hand, Hinduismis not only heterogeneous,
but also valorises its plurality.31 In other
words Mukherji here affirms the status
quo. Hinduism is in fact portrayed as an
utopia, where there are no problems of
power. It is rnotsurprising to find that
Mukherji jettisons all proposals for
reform. Even untouchabilityis justifiedas the comparison of a housewifecleaning
her rooms to prepare for puja, to an

operation theatre where precautions are


taken against infection--on the improbable grounds of hygiene.
TWo texts, the ADR and the HCC
separated by only a year, with a deep line
of contradicdon running through. However, the criticalityof the schism does not
put an end to the search for a definitive
Hindu community: as HS indicates, it
makes this desire more urgent. Too much
power is at stake and the fear of the
detachment of the low castes too perilous.
T;A*:
increasing prestige of the preoccupation with the census becomes evident in
the way Mukherji's assertions withstand
a scathing critique from within the Congress. It is this which I will now briefly
consider.
V

By 1910, the year he wrote his critique


of ADR, Sakharam Ganesh Deuskar was
already, unlike his antagonist, a highly
revered leader. In 1905, this domiciled
Maharashtrian introduced the Shivaji
Utsav (a festival started by Tilak in his
home province, which had mobilised Hindus against colonial rule at the cost of
alienating the Muslims) in Bengal, following this up with authorship of Desher
Katha, an indictment of British rule that
became a standard reference work for
Swadeshi activists. His book, Bangiya
Hindujati Ki Dhangshaner Mukhe?
(hereafter BHD) was written partly
because of Mukherji's silence on the
criticisms of .Kishori Lal Sarkar, a high
court 'vakil',in the pages of Amrita Bazar
Patrika.38 )espite Deuskar's credentials
as a Hindu nationalist, BHD did not
make a popular impression.
For the most part, BHD is a rigorous
statistical and political analysis, which
ruthlesslyshows up the nany inconsistencies

and

suppressions

that

underpin

Mukherji's deductions. Deuskar concludes that while the Hindu populatioIn

grew slowly during 1872-1881 (by 3.65


lakh, while Muslims increased by 5.18
lakh), between 1891-1901their numbers
accelerated(rising by 14.62 lakh above the
1891 figure, while the Muslim population
added 24.97 lakh to itself). These figure.s,
for Deulskar, make nonsense of Mukherji's

claims, since both caste structure and the


level of povertyremainedconstant during
the period of accelerated growth. Alternatively, he traces the fallowness of the
1872-81period to the ravagesof malaria,
which afflicted the western parts of
Bengal, extractinga much highertoll than
the floods and even outbreaks of malaria
in the eastern parts, which in contrast
to the 'west' was populated mainly by
Muslims.
Even more effective is the critique of
suppressions. For one, it is pointed out
that Mukherji does not take the figures
for certain areas (Srihattaand Kachar)into account. More crucial is the silent suggestion that Mukherji is deliberately
whipping up anxiety, which is implicit in
Deuskar's observations that Mukherji
does not specify O'Donnell's calculation,
which asserts that it would take a lengthy
650 years for the Hindus to disappear
altogether: a figure that would not harmonise with the immediate prospect of
disappearance that ADR paints. Liter
BHD goes on to assert that, in fact
O'Donnell had wilfully classified tribals
who had come under the influence of
fallen brahmins, as 'animists without extending the principle to converts of other
religions. Nor does ADR mention the
higher longevity rate amongst Hindus.
Besides, it manipulates figures for education. For instance, the figures of Muslim
'muchis' provided to dramatise the
superiority of Muslims' educational attainmentsare undoubtedlyimpressive;bt
the reader is not informed that these
figures are only for Darbhanga. On the
other hand, if only low caste Hindu male
muchis were to be included, the number
of educated amongst them would rise
from 8 per 1,000 (which is Mukherji's
figure) to 232 per 1000!

Deuskar does not stop here. Being an


activist, he possibly felt the need to address the anxieties engendered by changing power relations.He offers threecauses
for the comparatively slower Hindu
growth rate. The first is the practice of
prohibiting widow-remarriage,which was
being taken over by sanskntising castes.
Secondly, there is casteism, suggesting
here the possibility of a future caste war,
that would obviously lead to a delinkage
from the low castes. And finally, Deuskar
advances a cultural cause, stating that

Bengalis havedeclined physically because


their heartshad been conqueredby western
customs.
The problem with these explanations is
that the discourses of rigorous statistical
explication and the more speculative one
of reform do not coalesce, except for the
question of widow remarriage.And that
is discussed with a measure of empirical
persuasivsenessby Mukherji.On the other

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June 19, 1993

hand, the east-west schema involves such


an abrupt switch from the physical to the
cultural (without the mediations that
Mukherji makes), that it seems more of
an excuse than an explanation. But more
than anythingelse, it is Deuskar'sinability
to grapplewith Mukherji'spersuasiveportrayal of the double Other, that explains
its limits. As we shall see, it is the latter's
explication of the caste problem that
popularisesthe anxiety of Hindu numbers.
But Deuskar seems to be caught onthe
wrong foot on this problem. He only
acknowledges the caste factor, without
elaborating upon it. Consequently, he can
neitherdecisivelyrepudiatethe connection
between caste structureand demography,
nor propose an alternate programme of
caste reform. On the other hand, while he
appears to understand that Mukherji's
text is part of a larger process of
ideological consolidation of a HinduMuslim divide, Deuskar's strategy is to
merely reassure the Hindus about their
ability to reproduce. Which, along with
his inadequate social prescriptions,
ultimately belie a sharing of anxiety. The
problem is that like most other Swadeshi
leaders, Deuskar is unable to realise that
the concept of Nationalism needed to
develop from its 19th century moorings
in an implicit Hindu identity, to attempt
an alternatetheory of Hindu-Muslimrelations. Without that urge, good intentions
remained merely good.
VI
Papia Chakravarty'sbook (cited above)
breezily admits that Mukherji may have
made committed some statisticalerrorsin
his 'enthusiasm while loftily conceding
that Deuskar had shown "ingenuity in
mathematical calculations". Nevertheless,
Chakravartyfeels free to incorporatemost
of Mukherji'sargumentsin her own. This
does not raise the biggest question however. She concludes that the upshot of
Deuskar's talents was that he "misunderstood its [ADR's] underlying purpoe',
which was the "rejuvenation of the entire
Hindu society.'"9 The cheer-leading by a
professional historian for the conlusions
of a text that is unsupported by its self
contessedly/evidently statistical assumptions, is not only affirmative of the influence of this communal common sense
I have talked of, but raises a problem
retrospectively.Is theresomething in ADR
itself which lends itself to such a cavalier
treatment of its assumptions?
At the very beginning, ADR raises the
question, as to whether Hindus were faced
with an absolute or relative decline
Mukherji's figures indicate that the
answer lay obviously with the latter. But
he neverdoes get around to discussing the
question. Instead his intensely negative

Economic and Political Weekly

picture reiteratesthe assertion made in his


title. The sheer weight of 'argumentation'
then, paradoxically detaches it from its
basic assumption: the statistics regarding
Hindu demographic decline is not only
divorced from the necessity of disciplined explication, but becomes a signifier of
an entirely different story. The statistical
becomes a trope of imminent death. And
Mukherji spares no effort in exhibiting it
as such. The first page of HS is adorned
by a simple census table containing the
numbers of Hindus and Muslims since
1872in Bengal, with a two line statement
below, stating the relative numerical extent of Hindu decrease. This little introduction expresses the author's confidence
that his analysis has become common
sense: he no longer has to explain
anything. On the other hand, the census
has become a visual clock, analogous to
the Disaster Clock of our times, that
measures how close our planet is to
destruction every day. iwo sets of
numbers, one of time, the other of the
numericalsize of the commun#ties:within
less than a lifetime, the Hindu population
is shrinkingeven as the Muslimsare growing. Each moment becomes crucial.
We have already seen that Mukherji's
structureof argumentationalloweda great
deal of swift movement across different
preoccupations, encouraging the use of
displacementas a consistent method. The
surreptitious conversion of the statistical
into the purely tropological, enormously
expands the range of concerns to which
traces of ADR can be attached. In fact,
the anxiety of Hindu numbers is made to
lend its weight to nearly all the important
problems that confront the construction
and activis.tion of a monolithic Hindu
society. In the second decade of this century, this meant its conscription by explorations of the caste problem that were
not engaged in whipping up a Muslim
antagonist.

The Gait Circular was withdrawn; but


the apprehensions it caused were enough
to make Mukherji an authority on casteism. As I have mentioned, Mukherji was
invited to address the United Bengal Pro-

vincial Congress held at Faridpurin 1911,


"to improvethe status of the Namasudras
and other 'depressedclasses' and to bring
them into the fold of organised Hinduism".4 Mukherji went on to build a
network of contacts wi th low caste
leaders, especially with Damodar Das, a
representative of the Mali caste.4'
However the most interesting man he was
tu influence was DigindranarayanBhattacharya, a dynamic brahmin reformer.
Mukherji'sattitude to the main objects
of his reform, the rural low castes, is
managerial;distanced. He claims authority on the basis of his knzowledgeof their

Lives,an understandingthat is held up for


generalinspection to his urbanuppercaste
brethren.Bhattacharya'stone, by contrast,
is always that of one who is in the thick
of battle. Maybe this has somnethingto do
with his life which was almost the inverse
of his mentors'.Mukherjibelonged to the
upper echelons of anglicised Calcutta
'bhadralok'society, being a son-in-law of
Sir Surendranath Bannerjea and a
member of the Indian Medical Service.
Bhattacharyahailed from Serajegunje, a
small town in Pabna district and came
from a Vaishnav family that traced its
genealogy to an associate of Chaitanya
himself. MoreoverBhattacharyaexpanded his influence, without disavowing his
role as an 'organic intellectual' His career
did not follow the accepted trajectory of
a Bengali rural intellectual which till as
late as Pather PanchaI442is one of abandoning the rural for city life. He travelled
extensively in the interiors, addressing
meetings, engaging in many acts of reforming habits of caste intolerance. He was
a prolific author. According to the
biography by his admirer, the low caste
PbundraKhattriya(originallycalled Pod)
leader Manindranath Mandal, Bhattacharya had already written 22 books in
Bengali (some being translated into
Assamese and Telegu) and widely read in
the villages.43

Mukherji appears to have been the


main source of encouragement from
amongst the Calcutta intellegentsia, having written a highly laudatory 'Preface'to
Bhattacharya-s major work on caste
reform, entitled Jatibhed.44 This book
receivedacclaim from urban reformerintellectuals, including agore, Sir Surendranath Bannerjea,Sir P C Ray,and even
Swami Shraddhanand. Significantly this
general commendation coincided with a
generallessening of upper caste apprehensions regardingMuslims. The withdrawal
of the Gait Circular was succeeded by the
reunification of Bengal in 1912. On the
other hand, communalised Muslim
leaders like Ameer Ati werebeing displaced by young, anti-Britishones epitomised
by Fazlul Haq who sought to come closer
to the Congress.This trend was to crystallise in the Lucknow Pact of 1916 and
culminate in the Non-Cooperation!
Khilafat movem3ent.Neverthelessthis pattern in communal relations was not accompanied by a corresponding move in
relationsbetween the upper and low castes
in Bengal. Namasudra demands for declassifying themselves from the Hinduis
remained while the announcement of the
Montagu Chelmsford Committeeto study
reforms triggered off, as we have seen,
demands for separate electorates.45
Since a msaorpart of Mukherji'spreoc-

cupationshad.tt do with caste, therewas

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1311

bound to be a great many common problems that Bhattacharya was likely to


share with him. The intellectual link was
further crystallised through the common
interest in Vivekananda. But within these
shared areas, Bhattacharya produced his
own resolutions. His major contribution
was to assimilate the undoubtedly
marginalposition that reformistdiscourse
occupied to the more deeply entrenched
and widespreadideas of Vaishnavismn:
an
act that complements his efforts at
widespread geographical and social
dissemination of caste reform.
Chaitanya wv,sheld to be a major transgressor of caste divisions since he
popularised the notion that low castes
could achieve salvation in the 'Kali
Yug'.4 through proper recitation of the
Divine Name alone. Bhattacharyaextends
the prospects of spiritual egalitarianism
that are offered thereby and does this
through the popular and attractive torriof a creation myth. His story also resolves
the schism, between the focusing on
singularityand the celebrationof pluraity
that separatedthe two texts of Mukherji's.
Startingfrom the Vaishnavtenet that creation was the product of 'lilakhela'(divine
play), he reinscribes its meaning to assert
that it was characterisedby two principles
egalitarianismand variety. Thus although
there were different castes, races, nationalities etc, the Lord looked on all equally.

This inheritance was however subverted


mainly by the brahmins,producing a state
of degenerationthat could not be endured
by the Lord, whose initiative is described
thus: "The pleading, soul-piercing wail of
the ignorant low classes shook the throne
of God's Heaven, and unable to remain
still any longer... He divided himself into
crores...of pieces and entered the hearts of
the oppressed...in the form of a new
Chaitanya" 'Chaitanya' here refers
simultaneously to both the saint, as well
as the generalconsciousness of rights,embodied in the minds of the low castes, the
double entendre rewriting and radicalising the notion of the Brahman, the one
and many.
This structureof comprehension allows
Bhattacharya to identify active reform
work as part of his inherited religious
responsibility. This is important because
Bhattacharya goes further than his mentors. Not only does he engage in active
reform in rural areas, but he writes texts
for the low castes. Both Vivekanandaand
Mukherji wrote their major works in
English, linguistically underlining their
perspective that it was primarily the upper caste elite who needed to reform their
attitudes. On the other hand, Bhattacharya pens origin myths for different
castes, a textual procedure that was an
essential ideological resource for castes

1312

seeking to improve their status. Furtber,


it explains why he was very encouraging
to Manindranath Mandal when the latter
broachedthe proposalto form the Bangiya
Jana Sangha in 1922,an organisationthat
sought to unite all low caste organisations.
It was only in the fitness of things that
Mukherji who was approached first proved to be discouraging:47after all, ADR
assuned that reforms would be carried
out under the tutelageof the upper castes.
But Bhattacharyatoo is committed to
a reassertion of Brahmanical leadership,
and his criticism of them, like that of his
mentors', is directed towards that end.
However he stirred much greater hostility,' not only on account of his sharpness, but more importantly, because his
observations were articulatedin low caste
gatherings. Points similar to Vivekananda's and Mukherji's, articulatedamongst
low castes, as happens in Bhattacharya's
case, has the very different impact of
ggalvanisingcritiquesof caste from below.
In fact, unlike both Vivekananda and
Mukherji, he seems to privilegi reformof
low castes over the necessity of organising the Hindus. Even though the latter is
a major preoccupation with him, as can
be evidenced in Jatibhed, which opens
with a panegyric to the sacred geography
of the nation and the need for Hindu
unity to fulfil itself.
There are two more substantial-and
consequential-traces of this drive. We
havealreadyseen the importanceMukherji
placed on the institutionalisation of certain privileged spots of space and time
(such as the Waz), in producing spatial
egalitarianism and organised endeavour.
Mukherji's assertion of its absence
amongst Hindus, implies a critique of the
unsuccessfulSwadeshi modes of mobilisation of low castes, which involved propaganda in fairs and religious festivals.
Bhattacharya's moorings in Gaudiya
Vaishnavism(of Chaitanya), an ideology
that was premised on the creation of a
common, inter-castedisposition through
music, enables him to offer a credible
alternative. Music had already played an
important mobilising role during the
Swadeshi movement. But what Bhatta-

combined in a simple, accessible tradition!


It was an extrenely influential suggestion,
for the identification of Hinduism with
music becamean imperativecondition for
the proclamation of Hindu rights in the
contentious music before mosque issue,
that fissured the 20s.
There is, in fact, something pernicious
in Jatibhed; an inheritance of Mukherji,
that could permit the conscription of
Bhattacharya's recommendations into a
communal cause. And this lies in the use
of Mukherji's census table, which is
presented at the beginning of Jatibhed.
Obviously Bhattacharyauses it as a figure
of anxiety alone, for his argument is not
elaborated on the basis of antagonistic
comparison with the Muslims (as a matter of fact, it is only Christianity that
arouses his ire), which does not improve
matters, since the table is allowed to remain like weeds in a boat propeller. On
the other hand, this trope is ingenious, for
in it the decline and impending doom of
Hindus, is indissolubly indentured to
comparison with a Muslim Other. The
power of the tabular trope lies in its
refusalto allowa comprehensivereinscription of itself. Its internal structure of antagonistic comparisonremainsstubbornly
encoded, even as a different chain of
significations is being attached to it. The
triumph of this sign is that it seduces by
the rhetorical potential it offers for reformist nmobilisation:but its very use confirms a communal habit of viewing as
common sense, silently imbricating it as
such into the new territories of thinking
in which it is made to move.

An even more vivid instance of its ability to introduce a surreptitious crack; in


fact, even go against the grain of a particular line of enquiry, without appearing
to create disharmony, can be found in
Tagore'sGora. It is a story about Gora,
an extremelygifted and idealisticbrahmin
youth, who believes in neo-brahminism
with missionary zeal. The discovery that
he is actually an English orphan brought
up by brahmin parents questions all his
assumptions,inthe process radicallydestabilising all notions of identity drawingon
a Self-Other polarity. But tucked into a
corner that one may have difficulty in
charya proposes is the 'kirtan' which involves a daily congregation built around remembering,but which occupies a fairly
strategic position in the plot, is a more
musiC.49
"Everyone should become part
of a single life, a common mind. Let the familiarstory. Pareshbabu,a person comsweet sounds of harikirtan enhance mitted to a liberal, universalistnotion of
villages each evening", exhorts Bhatta- identity, is confronted by Sucharita, his
charya: a recommendation that binds doting ward, who seeks his advice on her
egalitarianismand sameness on a regular, desire (produced largely under Gora's inevpryday basis (as recommended by fluence) to convert to Hinduism. As he
starts to remove the intellectual grounds
Mukherji), provides a simultaneous
from her impulse, she bursts out to say
rooting in popular, rustic culture, along
with mobilising a traditionai ideological that the superiorityof Hinduism lay in its
sanction for routinely ove:coming caste survival. Pareshbabu'sclinching objection
barriersfor a limited periodl,and all th)ese comes here: he patiently replies that Hin-

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J une 19, 1993

dus were actually disappearing, and that


if present conditions continued, it would
become impossible to call the country
Hindustan, since Muslims would becoine
the majority.-' Not only does Sucharita
retract, but this point marks the reversal
of Hindu influence in the novel. After
this, Gora also begins his journey of selfrealisation when he starts living in a
vilPageand encounters the problems of
casteism amongst the Hindus, and a corresponding unity among the Muslims: in
fact a picture that recalls Mukherji's!
Gora was published in the same year as
ADR and there is no way of knowing
whether this passage was inspired by the
latter.The point is that this piece of common sense, which actually involves a
structure of comprehension, plays a
decisive role in a text that seems to align
it to another path. Seems, because
although this trope is used as part of the
questioning of the narrowness of identities, its internal constitution remains
unaffected. In fact the contrast with the
Muslims is crucial to hammer in the pressure of impending doom. The power of
this trope is even more evident than in
Jatibhed, preciselybecause the rest of the
novel diverges so radically.
What we have here is something akin
to a free signifier, allowing itself to be
redirected:without however surrendering
its inherentand inflexiblecommunal codeF
The consequence is that it accommodates
itself to a large variety of understanding,
insinuating itself into non-identical, even
contrary discourses, splitting and problematising them, without casting ripples.
The net result is the production of the
Gramscian understanding of common
sense, which referred to the fragmented,
contradictory character of popular consciousness, that amalgamated traces of
disparate world-views into itself. But the
story of the 'census' reveals that these
traces did not remain as such. A different
matrixof political ,orces changed all that.
Vll
The new developmentin the 'life' of this
common sense in the 192Qsis that the
Hindu Mahasabha emerges as the authoritativeorganisationof Hindu communalism in the cotintry. It had been inactive
during the greater part of the Non-Cooperation/Khilafat (hereafterabbreviated
as NC/K), being revivedby Malaviya only in 1922. Its swift assumption of an allIndiacharacter,was not only becausecommunalism filled in the gap left by the
disappointment of the 'Bardoli retreat"
but equally, because their members were
simultaneously part of the Congress,
allowing them the opportunity to expand
their network alongside that of the Congress. But Bengal had additional reasons

Economic and Political Weekly

for its receptivity.The firstof these returns


us to the problemof numbers again. Hindiu intellectuals in Punjab (which was a
major centre of the Mahasabha) were
thinking of it at the same time as their
peers in Bengal, if not a little earlier. It
acquiredits definitive shape there, in Lala
Lal Chand's 'Self- Abnegation in Politics"
which was published in the same year as
ADR.S There was also a more grim
aspect to this relationship. Punjab and
Bengal provided two of the heaviest centres of rioting in the 1920s. The initial
wave of fnajor riots which followed the
NC/K, took place in Punjab, starting in
Multan and Amritsar; while the frenzy of
rioting gripped Bengal a little later,
Calcutta had the dubious distinction of
hosting in 1926, the biggest riots known
till then in the historyof the subcontinent.
The combined impact of all these accounts for the swift spread of the Bengal
Hindu Sabha. Though it was formed as
late as August 1923,52we can find its imprint almost immediately, not least in the
orientation towards organisation in the
pamphlets we will examine.
Twoot these, Saileshnath Sharma Bisi's
Hindu Samajer Barfaman Samasya (The
ContemporaryProblems of Hindu Society), and Sir P C Ray's pamphlet entitled
simply as Faridpur Pradeshik Hindu
Sabha, are reprintsof speeches, delivered
as chairman of the reception committee,
SerajegungeProvincialHindu Mahasammilani (The Great Hindu Conference at
Serajegunge) in 1923, and as president of
the Faridpur Provincial Hindu Sabha in
1925,respectively.The thirdpamphlet,entitled Bangla Hindu Jatir Khoy 0 Tahar
Pratikar (7he Decay of Bengali Hindus
and Its Remedy), is purely a mobilising
tract, brought out directly under the
authorship of the Tangail Hindu Samaj
Sangrakshini(Preserverof Hindu Society
in Tangail) in 1924.)3 Together they in-

dicate the presence of organised power


in promoting the concern with Hindu
numbers, propelling its articulation in
three different places in three successive
years.This development holds out methodological consequences. Being now faced with a network around the 'census, it
would be appropriate to treat them as a
composite, even if loosely affiliated, group
of meanings, instead of exploring individual accentuations.
The hardening and consolidation of
communal consciousness that we see in
the 1920s, is obviously built on the many
failures of other initiatives; but the one
most closely related to our particular enquiry is that of the aspirationsaroused by
and representedin Bhattacharya.In many
ways the man was a phenomenon. We
have already seen the adulation he received in upper caste reform circles. His

following amongst low castes was even


stronger-which makes him an unique
figure amongst upper caste reformers. In
his biography (cited above), Mandal, a
leader of the Poundra-Khattriya caste,
wrote that Bhattacharya was not only
greater than Rammohon Roy and Vivekananda, but actually superseded
Chaitanyain his commitment to removing
untouchability. A special song was composed for him when he presided over the
Kalna Nikhil Bangiya Vaishya Teli Sammilani (the 'telis' being a low caste oilpressers), which proclaim him to be an
'avatar' of Hari (the other name of
Vishnu, whose incarnations include
Krishna, the dominant figure of worship
in Gaudiya Vaishnavism). Obviously
Bhattacharya reaiised in his person the
desire for a consensus on reform. He
representeda 'historic bloc' of the upper
and lower castes, demonstrating to both
that brahminismcould be reinvented.The
problem was that this was a possibility
that was individual, at a time when influential caste groups from opposite sides,
such as the Brahman Sabha and Namasudras, remained unwilling to strive for
such a prospect. Bhattacharya was thus
fated to represent at best a (desire for)
temporary alignment.
Bhattacharyawas influentialenough to
leave traces of his ideas, though they were
now harnessed to a contest with the
Muslim Other. We have already seen his
contribution in the kirtan suggestion,
which provided an ideological imperative
to the revivalof the music before mosque
issue. Less d ramatic, though arguably
as important, was his propagation of
Vaishnavism. The Tangail Hindu Samaj
Sangrakshini pamphlet (hereafter THS),brings the heritage of both Mukherji and
Bhattacharya together, by first reciting
Hunter'sclaims about Islamic reform approvingly cited in ADR; at this point, it
suddenly breaks off to offer 'pranam'
(salutations) to Chaitanya. It then proceeds to repeatthe assertion that the saint
had introduced equality among castes
through 'sankirtans' and 'mahasabhas',
but edges in a revealingcomment. It says
that Vaishnavism provided a religion
where the upper castes could suspend
caste rules regarding the acceptability of
water, etc, without having to surrender
their 'respectable' status. The excessive
emphasis on egalitarianism present in
Bhattacharyais therebypruned away,and
Mukherji's imperative of hierarchical
organisation warranted by an Islamic
challenge is preserved-without departing
from Vaishnavism. An even more straightforwardharnessing of Vaishnavismto exclusivelyorganisational imperativesis present in an article written by Piyush Kanti
Gjhosh, the editor of Amriwa Bazar

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1313

Patrika and a leader of the Bengal Hindu Sabha, which is revealingly entitled,
'The Best Way to Organise the Hindus'.
Although it mouths warnings of a low
caste upheaval, the anger against upper
caste discrimination which accompanied
these warnings in both Vivekananda and
Bhattacharyais absent here. On the other
hand, the real emotional centre lies in its
proclamation that "it is on the grounds
of religion that the Hindus must meet",
for, "on no other basis will the unity last
long". And this unity, it can be guessed,
is compelled by Muslims; Ghosh advises
'brahmacharya' (celibacy) and 'suitable
physical exercise' for Hindu offsprings.
They could then die "defending his [the
Hindu's] religion and home and hearth",
a common newspaperphrase that invariably implied a Muslim threat.54
In a way, the shift to an overw!ielming
concern with Hindu organisation also
made Mukherji'sprivilegingof caste relations its victim. For, despite the efforts of
reformers, caste remained a signifier of
vertical cleavages that mere insoluble
within the framework of brahminism.
Tlhis did not mean that caste problems
would disappear from the rhetoric of
communal Hindu reform, since its manifest reality was far too forceful."5As a
matter of fact, caste remains a major
preoccupation in all three texts (with Ray
beginninghis speech by mentioning his indebtedness to Mukherji). But what it did
entail was the subordination of caste to
the more fearful question of gender.
VIIl
The new temper is enunciated in its
most extreme form by Bisi. The explanation he offers for decliningHindu numbers
has nothing to do with caste; on the contrary, it leads him to a consideration of
'unproductive marriage customs, that is
focused on the ban on widow-remarriage,
which he claims is responsible for many
social abuses. Bisi does discuss the problem of untouchability, but separatelysuggesting a certain move towards its
marginalisation. It is true that the others
bring in caste more directly in their
demographic considerations. But with a
"difference.For instance, THISasserts that
the decline in Hindus is due to the low
castes. But instead of discussing intercaste relations like the earlier generation,
it blames their marriage practices and
recommends widow-remarriage, which
would not only lead to the multiplication
of Hindu children, but would also
dispense with the dowry system. The importanceof widow-remarriageis underlined, by reiterating its necessity in the conclusion. Sir P C Ray begins his speech by
declaring the ban on widow-remarriageto

1314

be the cause for the drop in Hindu numbers; he deviates thereafter into Mukherji's analysis of peasants (the Hindu lacking initiative, the Muslim possessing it),
but comes back to offer widow-remarriage
as the first item on the list of solutions.
He highlightsits importance by providing
another table showing how the numbers
of Hindu widows outstripped those of
Muslims, in the 15 to 30 years age group,
which complements his citation of
Mukherji's table.
What dpes the Widow signify?The selfevident motivation is that of resourceoptimisation, which relates to widows in the
same manneras newspaperarticlesof this
time did to cows: in both cases the major
problem is that of efficient breeding. In
the process, this consensus summons up
th!ezeal and dignity of past reformerslike
Vidyasagar.But his humanitarianaspects,
the deep though admittedly patriarchal
outrageat the treatmentof Hindu women,
all these are absent. On the other hand,
where Vidyasagar is recalled,56 is in the
apprehension of moral contamination of
Hindu society by sexually deprived and
'available' widows. There is actually a
basic similarity in the way that both
Muslims and widows are treated:both are
seen as figures of potential sexual excess
and hence of fear.
This penumbra of associations was
widened by their position in the social
relationships of rural areas. Apropos of
allegations of abduction of widows in the
Mymensingh riots of 1907, the district
magistrate in his report stated that on enquiry these allegations were found to be
"merely threats, the fact that Hindu
widows are not allowed to marry again being always rather a subject of comment
among Mohammadgn
neighbours". 57
a grim
Obviously
they represented
shadowy area in male society; being outside the protection that the domestic identity of female chastity provided, she was
both an invitation and a threat. Matters
were exacerbated by another likely phenomenon. Some Muslim newspapers claimed that many of the Hindu women who
were reportedly abducted were in fact
widows, who rescued themselves from the
burden of their lives by eloping with
Muslims.58 Besides making widows more
'attractive' as the explanation for Hindu
numbers, it also led to an associated and
in many ways, a more powerful concern
in the 1920s.
After offering widow-remarriage as a
remedy, Ray suddenly transits to a new
recommendation,
exclaiming: "All the
wives of our kin, who are being abducted,
and whom, because of our weakness and
cowardice, we cannot rescue from the

hands of the depraved-se should save


them and give them a place in the bosom

of society' Likewise, while talking of


widow remarriage, Bisi s!"ddenly elaborates on the heartlessness of Hindu males
and their disloyalty to the devi (goddess)
ideal, evidenced in their refusal to take
back their abducted wives. The point in
both cases is that the suddenness of the
transition to the abducted wife issue takes
place in the context of a discussion on
widows. The instance of Ray in particular
indicates that the jump is occasioned by
an irresistible power of association, the
logic of which is suppressed. Significantly, these passionate lines are not repeated:
it is as if they appear (or are made to), in
spite of Ray's intention.
To account for the pressure of this
rhetoric will take us to a point outside the
province, In the speech that he delivers as
President of the Hindu Mahasabha in
1923 at Benares, Malaviya provides one
of the first attempts to create a history of
abductions. He claims that the British incited the Muslims to attack Hindus, the
first instance of which occurredin Bengal
(referringpossibly to Jamalpur) and was
repeatedin the Frontierdistricts:the common featurein both was the abduction of
women. This was followedby the Moplahs
(who besides converting also abducted
Hindu females) and then by the sexual
outrages of Amritsar and Multan. He
then went on to deduce a moral from his
daims by contrasting Hindu apathy with
English belligerence when their women
uere insulted. "Behind English girls and
women there is a national strength which
protects them wherever they go. So also
with Mohammedan women" The main
reason for Hindu disunity, he continues,
lies in their inability to defend their
"religion and women".59
The abduction theme allows Bisi to
make a similar point, when he asserts
apropos of that discussion, that Muslims
should not confuse Hindu liberalism for
cowardice. 'Abductions' become yet
another method of defining collective
desireby first imputinga certain character
to the other (in this case that of organisation), and then setting it up as a quality
to be emujlated. It recalls Mukherji's
technique. Except that Malaviya's litany
of riots, the portrayalof an immense conspiracy by Muslims and the British
underlines the immediacy of this need.
The prospect of a long-term, peaceful
competition with Muslims that was offered in ADR, has completely
disappeared.
In the course of 1925, one of the few
anti-communal newspapers the Mohammadi, commented that cases of abductions had started to proliferate only after
the formation of the Sangathan movementY6(Undoubtedly the figure of the
threatenedwoman has its advantages.The

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June 19, 1993

election of woman as signifier and index


of Muslim 'oppression', makes the very
presenceof the formera source of anxiety,
which can only be constant and omnipresent. The figureof the woman as a potential site of outrage carries the fear of the
Muslim into every home, consequently
strengthening the drive for mobilisation.
This representational process is accelerated by the print media of that period.
Alreadyduring the Jamalpurriots, an important way of stimulating feelings of
outrage was by carrying grossly exaggerated stories of abductions of Hindu
females. The difference in the representations of the 1920s is that newspapers
publicised stories that showed Hindu
women abducted by Muslims in non-riot
circumstances. Secondly, these women
tended to be wives and not widows. These
reports were normally small, but regular
in frequency.Moreover they formed, as it
were,satellites to some major sensational
reports, such as the Barodasundari case,
that had occurred in Rangpurin 1923, but
which was kept alive as news through
detailed reporting on the state of this case
in the law courts even in 1925.61 It may
be observed that gender-related issues
were a major stimulus for early nationalism too, especially that of the Age of
Consent bill agitation of 1891, which involved a mas movement for protecting
the complete control of Hindu males over
the sexual life of their wives. A problem
with the earlier discourse was that it had
to reject all signs of marital affect in
favour of its assertions.62The advantage
here is that Hindu defence of their wives
against a lusting Muslim introduces space
for domestic affection to be reaffirmed.
The emotional physiognomy of this image indicates a more intimate threat from
the Muslim than in the widow issue.
Moreoverit suggests a violation of mutual
respectfor the others' codes of domesticity: it signifies betrayal.63We may recall
that the Musfimpresencein Mukherji did
not interpenetrate with the Hindus: its
threat was an external one, as if it were
a separate country, generating resources
internally, to take over the Hindus. The
difference between these two images corresponds also to the changed political
circumstancesof Hindu-Muslimrelations.
The NC/K was the first self-consciously
joint Hindu-Muslim mass movement in
the history of our sub-continent. Its symbol was (and still remains) the spectacle
of Swami Shraddhanand addressing a
congregation at Delhi's Jama Masjid in
1919. At the same time, the movement
popularised the notion of the country as
a federation to which even leaders like
Lajpat Rai subscribed.64 The effect of
this was to locate the Muslim as an 'insider' to Nationalism- in sharp contrast

Economic and Political Weekly

with the Swadeshi agitation, where the


Muslim was excluded by the Hinduoriented inheritance of nationalist
discourse. Additionally, this inheritance
was given a longer life in Bengal by Das'
Bengal Pact designed to establish a stable
alliance between Hindus and Muslims. Its
impact is palpable in Bisi, whose explicit
referencepoint, despite displaysof aggression, remains that of making the pact
workable.It was this discourse of mutuality that had to be broken, and the figure
of the threatened woman provided the
most potent instrument to do this.
ix
The trope of the census gains flexibility over time. Its qualities in this regardlie
not, only in allowing itself, firstly, to be
used in an additive capacity (Bhattacharya), and scondly, its order of explication to be altered (as in the 1920s); but
equally, in permittingthe new bits attached to it their own independent significance. In the 1920s, the 'Threatened
Woman'theme is felt to be so crucial, that
it spawns its own organisation, the
Women'sProtection League.The reach of
this new rhetoriccan te seen in the changing attitudesof ChittaranjanGuhathakurta, a Swadeshi hero who had been beaten
up by the police at the Barisal Conference
in 1906. He was one of the few who openly criticisedthe Suddhi movement as antiMuslim.65 Three years later, he blithely
delivered speeches calling foi setting up
self-defencecommittees at meetings of the
Women's Protection League.6
As I have implied, the Threatened
Woman theme is more suited to the
demands of mass communalism than the
Census. A self-evident problem with the
census concem is its baggage of statistics
and fairlyelaborateexplications.It possesses a certain heavy, 'acadenic' air, which
restricts its broadcast to pamphlets and
speeches in gatherings of the politically
literate. But in this period when mass
politics had entrenched itself (not confined to 'peak' moments like the Swadeshi),
political messages demanded an immediate receptivity. The surprising thing is
that the 'census' does not wither away in
these unfavourable circumstances. It
adapts itself.
Interestingly, it is Mukherji who provides direction again. This lies in the invention and use of the phrase, 'the dying
race'. The phrase 'packages' Mukherji's
argument, detaching it from the elaborateness of the explication, without surrenderingthe pressureof fear and anxiety.
This allows it to be used like a slogan,
which through sheer rhetorical brevity,insists on immediate attention. Not surprisingly, at two important points in his life

Shraddhanand writes books with titles


that proclaim the need of 'saving', 'the
dying race'.6'Further,the retention of the
emotional at the cost of the mathematical
(already partially accomplished in the
changeover from relative to absolute
decline), allows the numerical aspects of
the concern to be used freely. Thus for instance, Piyush Ghosh claimed it would
take 400 years for the Hindus to disappear,"' Ray in Faridpur identified it as
200-250, while JagatguruShankarcharya
in a Mahasabha meeting at Nasik warned
it would take merely a century!69 Undoubtedly the conversion of the 'census'
into a fully grown, popular communal
knowledge, increases its flexibility even
more drastically (without losing the
authorityof statistics), allowingmuch bigger effects to dramatise anxiety.
Further, the 'census' insinuates itself
much more easily into related interests.In
a public meeting held at a rice mill at
Ultadinghee, an industrial subuFb of
Calcutta, Pandit Devratan Sarma, secretary, Hindu Mahasabha asserted that
Hindus had physically and numerically,
degenerated.He then reportedlyproclaimed: "Now if so deplorable was the condition of individuals, what could be expected of the nation composed of such
weaklings? So when calamities like that
of Kohat,Saharanpur,Malabarand Ajmer
befell them, they were defenceless..".'0
The 'census'gathers new unstatedimplications: the Hindus could no longer resist
the Muslims physically and in turn they
were dying in greaternumbersbecause of
physicalliquidation by Muslims.We come
here, as close as we can possibly get, to
the use of the 'census' as a battle-cry.
It is the notion of the threatened male
body that permits this unmediated connection between Hindu numbers and
riots. This recallsthe sub-text of Mukherji's preoccupations, though it is necessary
to remind ourselves that when he talked
of the need for training, it was applied to
the structure of morals and motivations
on which rests his idea of Hindu subjectivity. The 20s see a preoccupation with
the trained male body. After witnessing
a display of physical exercises in a club,
Piyush Ghosh declared: "Bengalees as a
nation weredegeneratingand werea dying
race. Physicalculturewas the only remedy
to this race-degeneracy."7'His newspaper
regularly carried articles that preached the

virtues of physical fitness. A top level national leader like Lajpat Rai exhorted his
audience to be like Arjuna as he faced his
beloved enemy, Bhisma.12
The defencelessfemale body is counterpointed by the necessity for a trainedmale
body; both dramatise the necessity for
conflict. And withinlthis vortex of bodies
is located the anxiety of Hindu numbers,

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1315

which triggers off fears of low caste


breakaway.There are not only displacements involved here. As a matter of fact
nothing is ultimately repressed.The position and nature of each theme is qualified
by the addition of other ones, drawn from
different points of time and brought
together in the 1920s to produce a gigantic network that is as much an ideology
as a call to physically inflict one anxieties
on an enemy, that is needed for the self
to be created in the first place.
x

In concluding it is obvious that we need


to consider the implications of this network of common sense a little more. I
have alreadymentioned Gramsci'snotion.
The precise definition is as follows:
"When one's conception of the world is
not critical and coherent but disjointed
and episodic..'. He further elaborates this
as "a conception of the world mechanically imposed by the external environment".~73iwo implications follow. The
ace that Gramsci dwells upon is that it is
not actively and critically acquired but
remains a passive inheritance from more
elaborated, unitarysystems of thought (to
the extent that 'traces' of 'high' philosophy74 are absorbed: common sense
also consists of other inherited ideas,
possibly even 'Stone Age elements'.75)
The second that can be deduced and
which I will focus upon is that such a
structure of consciousness cannot interface with organised politics.76
Much of what we have seen so far of
communal common sense does not tally
with Gramsci's characterisation. The
crucial difference is its organised and active 'life. This not only refers to its propensity for orchestrated articulation. In
this connection, it will not be out of place
to mention that the footnotes I have provided to demonstratethe shift to the mass
appeal of the 'dying race' (in place of
statistical elaboration) trope are drawn
predominantlyfrom the historyof a single
month-which preceded the Calcutta session of the Mahasabha in 1925:obviously
common sense lends itself to be used for
organisedmobilisation. The less dramatic,
but more important instance of this facet
is that it possesses its own principles of
structuration.It may be remarkedthat the
discursivepowerof Hindu communalism,
as we have seen, does not spring exclusively from single texts or even a chain of
them, as from the swift creation of a
popularnetwork of certaintropes,themes,
structure of apprehension and reform, at
the heart of which functions a single,
mobile trope to provide the necessary
ideologicalorientation. And this produces
a formation of immense potency and
amazing flexibility. For it constantly ac1316

cretes new meanings, whole traditions to


itself, producing from its formative moment a web of thought that ranges from
stereotypes to statistical and sociological
analysis.
But our reading also indicates how
communal common sense hides its ideological orientation, making an existential
statement of its ideological position;
allowing itself thereby to permeate contrarymodes of thought. Most of all, what
it possesses is credibility.
Gramsci's definition of the disjointed,
internally contradictory nature of common sense will be of help here to understand this phenomenon. Communal consciousness not only enters into contradictory relationships, as in Gora. If one were
to also look at the different themes that
make up the communal consciousness we
haveexamined(e g, dying Hindu/powerful
Muslim, caste division, abducted widow/
wife, threatened male body), without taking into account the history of interconnections, then one is bound to be struck
by an impression of random and disjointed impulses. And in the articulation
of these there need not be a necessaryselfconsciousness of the linkages. In this lies
its authenticity. After all the freedom to
articulate random views is also tantamount to experiencing oneself as removed from all unidirectional, and for that
reason, partisan discourses. Th^ disjointedness of common sense naturalises
ideolQgy by providing a form of thought
that does not encouragea testing of orientations, precisely because questions of interestedness are made redundant. The
credibilitythat accrues from this location,
I suggest, is responsible for the ease with
which comm unal elements percolate,
reorientor appropriate.The apparentlack
of any distinct ideological or political affiliation permits its imperatives to even
seem as universallypraiseworthyas something like altruism.
It is doubly important for communal
ideology to.take its credibility for granted,
in other words, in preventing critical examination of its assumptions, for its
signifiers are condemned to constant
change. Contrary to the assertions of
some contemporary commentators who
argue for the purely discursive nature of
identity formation,'7 it may be recalled
that Hindu communal discourses in this
paper are greatly shaped by the imperatives of displacement and reinscriptionof
social tension spots, its choices in this
matter being determined by alterations
outside its control. Its dependence on
changing correlations of political and
social forces, as well as the discourses of
others, necessitate constant change both
in the selection and combination of signifiers, as well as in the significancethey

occupy in varied approaches at different


points of time.
But this also means that despite the
camouflage of common sense, communalism is accountable to those' who have no
direct stakes in this world-view. It is no
coincidence that Manindranath Mandal
not only includes Muhammad in his pantheon of great reformers, but does not
also refer at all to the need to contest
Muslims, even though he imbibes many
of the key concerns of Hindu reform that
pertain to altering caste relations. It may
be remembered that Mandal represents
one of the possible points of entente between the high and low castes. By 1932
however,thereis open belligerencetowards
the Mahasabha. The Pabna Depressed
Classes Association, in demanding separateelectorates, stigmatised the Provincial
Hindu Sabha as an upper caste organisation, disavowing any effort to co-operate
with them.78
This does not imply that one can presume on social boundaries to determine
those of the discursive: elements or even
constellationsof communal concerns may
spill over into other groups, even if they
do not yield organisational results at
all points of time. The fundamentalpoint
here is that the case of communalised
common sense indicates that popular con-

sciousness is not only differentiated, but


that there exist contestations within it.
Studies of popular consciousness are normally carried out by those who do not
belong to the 'popular' social sections,
and unfortunately they are either (patronisingly) celebratory or dismissive: in
either case they retainthe marks of distancing which their society invests them.
Popular consciousness is thereby erected
as a monolith, evacuated of the changes
of history, of the wealth of forms and
structures of perception they possess.79
It is possibly Gramsci who makes the
decisive break here. He observes, "...there
is not just one commoni sense, fot that too
is a product of history and a part of the
historical process", and says elsewhere:
"Every social stratum has its own 'common sense'..".80 The possibilities of
mutual conflict between di f ferent formations of common sense, that we can read
into Gramsci's definition is even more
crucialin the presentcase. Common sense,
as Gramsci states, is a site for multiple
identities8"-which makes it more urgent
for identity-based ideologies to attempt a
formal appropriation of common sense,
in orderto stabilise the singlenessof a particular identity. That identity formation
under the aegis of Hindu communalism
has not been able to overcome the inherently unstable coalition of other identities suabsumed by it, is a comfort,
although it is not one we can take for

Economic and Plolitical Weekly

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June 19, 1993

granted.Morethan anythingelse, it still


leavesus with the problemof accenting
the necessary82
pluralismof identitiesby
an ideologicalframework,that does not
seekself-empowerment
byprovokingfear
of the Other.
Notes
[h par would have been impossible without
the help of Sumit and Tanika Sarkar. My debt
to them would be impossibleto recountby footnotes. I am also very grateful to Tapan Basu
for a major insight, which I am sure he will spot
hem]
I Indra Prakash, They Count Their GainsCW Calculate Our Losses~ Akhil Bharat
Hindu Mahasabha, New Delhi, 1979.
2 Cited in Indra Prkash, Hindu Mahasabha
Its Contribution to Indian Politics; Bankim
Chandra Chatterjee, New Delhi, 1966.
3 In his speech, Shraddhanand said that the
encounter with U N Mukherji had motivated him to start the Sangathan. Amrita
Bazar Patrika,June 17, 1925.
4 J F T Jordens, Swami Shraddhanand, Oxford University Press, Delh i, 1981 p 134.
5 All citations are drawn from U N Mukherji,
Hindus-A Dying Race, M Bannerjee
(f ed), Calcutta, 1909, rpt 1910.
6 Papia Chakravarty,Hindu Response to Nationalist Ferment, Subarnareklha,Calcutta,
1992.
7 Kenneth Jones, 'Religious Identity and the
Indian CensuW,7he Census in BritishIndia:
New Perspective, N G Barrier (ed),
Manohar, New Delhi, 1981, p 81.
8 Cited in Lajpat Rai, 'The Depressed
Classes' Laid Lajpat Rai Writings and
SpeecAhe Vol 1, 1888-1919,Vijay Chandra
Johi (ed), UniversityPublishers, Delhi and
Jullundhur, 1966, pp 160-74.
9 In this census it appears as incidental
remarks, such as the observation (made
while discussing the impact of immigration
on increasingnumbers)that: 'The main factor, however, is natural growth, and in different parts of the province this largely
depends on strength of Mussalmans, who,
as is well known, are more prolific than
Hindus' L S S O'Malley, Census of India
1911: Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Sikkim,
Vol V, Part 1, Bengal Secretariat Book
Depot, Calcutta, p 63.
10 All citations to the Gait Circular are drawn
from the appendix to U N Mukherji, Hinduism and the Coming Census Christianity
and Hinduism, Srikali Ghosh, Calcutta,
1911. Citations from this text are drawn
from the same edition.
11 Lucy Carroll, 'Colonial Perceptions of
Indian Society and the Emergence of
Caste(s) Associations, Journal of Asian
Studies, VolXXXVII, No 2, February1978.
12 Gyanendra Pandey, The Constructiont of
Communalism in Colonial India, Oxfdrd
University Press, Delhi.
13 A few morths before the serialisation of
ADR, it carried daily reports (at times extending to a full page) of the Titagarh riots

Economic and Political Weekly

(which had occurred in January 1909). Further it had played a leading role in criticising Ameer Ali's petition (see below). All this
was in addition to large serialised articles
on Hinduism.
14 Deuskar (publication details given below)
and Chakravarty(op cit) provide contradictory figures. The latter claims that 50,000
copies of HS were distributed free. I have
opted for Deuskar'sfigures, since they seem
more in keeping with the practical disposition of Mukherji.
15 Cited in Chakravarty,op cit, p 44.
16 The precedence of the Morley Minto reforms encouraged the demand for separate
representation. A Namasudra resolution
gave the following reason: ...though our
religious riies and their observances and
social customs are similar to those of high
castes Brahmins, we have not the slightest
connection with aniy of the Hindu communities'! Sekhar Bandopadhyaya, Social
Mobility in Bengal in the Late Nineteenth
and in the Early TwentiethCenturies.(Ph D
Thesis, Calcutta University, 1985), p 401.
17 Lajpat Rai's'The DepressedClasses' (op cit)
appeared only a month after the publication of ADR in The ModeirnReview in July 1909, and provided similar recommendations.
18 Bandopadhyaya, op cit, p 424.
19 ADR quotes Lord Morley's reply to Ameer
Ali's petition, which typically encourages
initiativefrom the latter by a non-comniittal
attitude: "I submit it is not very easy [to
carry out the exercise of separating out the
low castesi and I have gone into the question very carefully to divide these lower
castes and to classify them'
20 Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in
Bengal 1903- 190, Peoples Publishing
House, New Delhi 1973, pp 135-36. The
Boycott mosemeri was practically over in
Calcutta by 1907, ibid, p 145. Highlighting
the general failure was the parting of ways
between the Moderates and Extremists in
1908.
21 A recent article by Tanika Sarkar has explored how in the 19th century, conjugality
representedthe only source for male Hindu
control (and therefore 'autonomy') in a
society that was increasingly being experienced as under the stifling control of a
foreign power. 'The Age of Consent Rhetoric: Resisting Colonial Reason and the
Death of a Child Wife', forthcoming.
22 Mukherji's citation of Hunter states how
Muslimsare no better than 'a mongrelbreed
of circumcised low caste Hindus'. After
returiningto their fundamental doctrines
through their Reform movements, they had
become dangerous, since, "a return to
Mahommedan first principles means a
return to a religion of intolerance and aggression" guided by the aim of "forcibly
converting the world".
23 Tanika Sarkar.op cit. Although it may be
added that there is a reaccentuation in
Mukherjiof an older strain of thtought.For
Chandra Deb, one of the first of
AMahesh
those who argued for a reform of the condition of Hindu women, an important im-

perative was: "...the most trying evil which


they are obliged to undergois the perpetual
celibacy to which they are subjected. Many
of them are young and beautiful and unable
to subdue nature give way to those temptations which beset them on every side.'
However the consequent sin is that of killing illegitimate infants; it is not related to
Muslims. 'A Sketch of the Condition of
Hindoo Women, Awakening in Bengal in
Early Nineteenth Century (Selected Documents), Vol 1, Goutam Chattopadhyaya
(ed), ProgressivePublishers,Calcutta, 1%5,
p 104.
24 Maculay, for instance, proclaimed: "The
physicalorganisation of the Bengalee is feeble even to effeminacy...-His pursuits are
sedentary,his limbs delicate, his movement
languid"' 'Cited in Leonard A Gordon,
Bengal: The Nationalist Movement
1876-1940, Manohar Book Service, Delhi,
1974, p 6.Vivekananda was to exclaim that
the basic problem with Indians was
'physical weakness', which was responsible
for one-third of their problems. 'Vedanta
in Its Application to Indian Life', TheComplete Worksof Swami Vivekananda,Vol 111,
MayavatiMemorial (ed), Advaita Ashram,
Calcutta 1964.
25 The Jamalpur, riots were associated with
abductions from the very beginning; disturbances were apprehended during the
'ashtamisrnan'festival which involved ritual
bathing by Hinduewomen. A mrita Bazar
Patrikais specially mentionedas leading the
province-widecampaign to highlightcharges
of mass violations of Hindu women, which
were found to be untrue on investigation.
What is interestingis the district magistrates
report which lists complaints filed by
'chaukidars' (watchmen), all of which
featureallegations of abductions of Hindu
widows. These wereagain found to be falsec
West Bengal State Archives, Pol Confidential, No 514 of 1907.
26 Thus Deb, for instance, in the passage cited
above talks first about the 'utter misery' of
the widows, op cit.
27 It is significant that the census states that
out of a total of 949,144 persons in Calcutta
and its suburbs, 615,419 were Hindus and
286,576 Muslims. The majority of the
population (about 68.1 per cent) were
immigrants-but 52.2 per cent of the 68.1
per cent came from Bengalitself, led by the
24 parganas. J R Blackwood, Census of
India, 1901, Cakcutta, Townand Suburbs,
Part IV Obviously neither set of figures
could service Mukherji'sarguments, which
accounts for his revertingto impressionist
calculations. The interesting thing here is
of course the subtle opportunism of the
argument that feels free to insinuate its
inventions into authoritative citations.
28 Bandopadhyaya shows how the Namasudras started to take to settled agriculture
and profitable occupations in the 19thcentury; in the latter half of that century
Guruchand who became their ideologue
and leader, produced an anti-brahmanical
ideilogy that included elements of
Vaishnavism, Chri!stianity and a strong

June 19, S993

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1317

moral impfrative to self-improvement,


op cit.
29 Mukherji is thus provided t he opportunity
to confidently muakeoutrageous assertions,
like the Muslims were more advanced in
education than the Hindus.
30 One such resolution read: "...lit is] simply
owing to the dislike and hatred of the
Brahmins, the Vaidyas and the Kayasthas
that this vast Namasudra community has
remained backward; this community has
therefore not the least sympathy with them
and with their agitation". Bandopadhyaya,
Social Mobility..., op cit, pp 356-57.
31 Namasudras and Muslims were engaged in
riots in Khulna in 1889. Bigger riots broke
out betweenthem in 1911,1923-25and 1938.
In 1908howeverthey made a common cause
against the upper castes, being politically
aligned in their opposition to the Swadeshi,
ibid, pp 345-48. Further,while referring to
the riots of 1906, Mukherji mentions the
attack on the Rajbansis(and Hindu women,
another ideal figure of Muslim 'oppression',
as we shall see), but suppresses the ant
tagonism articulatedagainst the upper caste
Swadeshi volunteers by low castes.
32 Hiteshranjan Sanyal, Social Mobility in
Bengat, Papyrus,Calcutta 1981, p 36. There
were of course powerful jati caste groups,
such as the Kayasthas, who from the 19th
century began to claim they-were Kshattriyas.
33 Thus Vivekanandaproclaimed:"he ideal at
one end is the Brahminand the ideal at the
other end is the Chandala, and the whole
work is to raise the Chandala up to the
Brahmin" However Vivekananda recommended that this process should be a
gradual one since he did not want it to
introduce antagonisms within Hindus. Further, he did subscribe to the relative
superiority of brahmins, stating that they
had produced more people imbibed with
brahminhoodthan other castes. 'The Future
of India, op cit, p 295.
34 Sarkar, Swadeshi..., op cit, p 107.
35 U N Mukherji, Hindu Samaj, Srikali
Ghosh, Calcutta 1910.
36 There is a slight inaccuracyhere, since it was
'pathshalas' (institutions of primaryeducation) which provided the model for the Bell
system, rather than tols, which were centres
of advance study.
37 Mukherji derives this notion from 'adhikar
bheda: which permits the use of a multiplicity of paths to attain absolute realisation. It was normally used as a justification
for caste (the rationale being that the duties
of each caste was its 'Dath'). Ramkrishna,
the reformer-divineof the latter half of 19th
century Bengal, democratised the implications through individual example. The
famous one, often cited by Vivekananda,
was that of doing the 'untouchable' work
of cleaning latrines. What we have in HCC,
however, is another form of individuation
of adhikar bheda, which transforms it into a pluralism that implies a freedom to
choose one's beliefs, irrespective of social
hierarchy, or the compulsion of ultimate
realisation.

1318

38 Sakharam Ganesh Deuskar, Bangiya Hindujati Ki Dhangshanmukhe?,1910,Calcutta.


Other details are given in Chakravarty,
op cit, p 35.
39 Op cit, pp 36-42.
40 Bandopadhyaya, op cit, p 424.
41 Manindranath Mandal in his pamphlet
quotes a letter from Das to the effect that
Mukherji and he had been struggling unsuccessfully for 10 years in the caste reform
movement. Bangiya Jana Sanghaa:Bengal's
Peoples Association ('Sanghashakti:Kallai
Jugey'), Satadalkanti Mandal, Khajuri
village, Midnapore and Calcutta, 1923.
42 Satyajit Ray's film by the same name, where
the plot brings Apu, the child of a slow paced ruralsociety and a poor brahmin father,
to the sense of possibility that characterises
Calcutta.
43 Manindranath Mandal, Banger Digindranarayan, SannyasicharanPramanik, Burdwan, 1926.
44 Digindranarayan Bhattacharya Vidyabhushan, Jaiibhed, Serajegunje: The
author, f pub 1912, rpt 1924. All citations
are drawn from this edition.

45 A Namasudra meeting was held in 1917(attended by 30 representatives,elected by two


million Namasudras) which drew attention
to zamindari oppression, declaring that any
additional powers for a few leaders would
"make the future progressof the backward
classes impossible'.'It approved of the setting up of the committee, and declared its
loyalty. Bandopadhyaya, op cit, p 460.
Another conference in 1918 demanded
'communal representation' (following the
Lucknow Pact model), ibid, p 234.
46 For extended discussions of the social impact of this belief, see Kumkum Sangari,
'Mirabai and the Spiritual Economy of
'Bhakti' Economic and Political Weekly,
July 7, 14, 1990 and Sumit Sarkar, "Kali
Yuga','Chakri' and 'Bhakti': Ramkrishna
and his Times, Economic and Political
Weekly,July 18, 1992.
47 Mandal informs us that he took the initiative to mobilise for a meeting of representatives of namasudra, rajbansi, poundra
khattriya, jhalla malla (khattriya), saha,
mali among other low castes, at Calcutta
in Februaryof 1922. It was decided to start

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June 19, 1993

an umbrella organisation of the low castes.


Mandal spells out details of his encounter
with Mukherji and Bhattacharyaand dedicates his pamphlet to the latter. Bangiya...,
op cit.
48 Mandal, Banger.. op cit, reports that Bhattacharya was attacked by the orthodox
brahman sabha, spearheaded by his own
pupil clearly indicating the extent of
animosity, that could even make an orthodox brahmin publicly challenge his
teacher!
49 A comprehensive analysis of the underlying tenets of the 'kirtan' is available in
Hiteshranjan Sanyal, Bangla Kirtaner
Itihas, K P Bagchi and Company, Calcutta
1981.
Rabindra
50 Rabindranath
Tagore,
Rachanabali Vol 9, West Bengal Government, Calcutta, 1961, p 310.
51 The preoccupation with the census has a
long history in Punjab, starting from the
Arya Samaj's objection to naming themselvesas Hindus in 1883, followed by discussion of the alleged problem of declining
Hindu numbers in Jammu and Kashmir in
the 1890s. Jdnes, op cit, pp 86-88. Chand's
laterarticle, 'Self-Abnegation..,dwelt on the
decline of Hindu numbers as an index of
Hindu weakness and Muslim strength, and
advocated the setting up of party devoted
exclusively to Hindu interests, ibid, p 90.
52 Richard Gordon, 'The Hindu Mahasabha
and the Indian National Congress, 1915to
1926', Modern Asian Studies, 9, 2, 1975.
53 Citations from these three texts are drawn
from Saileshnath Sharma Bisi, HinduSamajer Bartaman Samashya, Address of
the Reception Committee at Serajegunje
Provincial Hindu Mahasammilani, Sir P C
Ray, Faridpur Pradeshik Hindu Sabha, 2
May 1925, Bengal Chemical Press, 1925and
Bangla Hindu Jatir Khoy o TaharPratikar,
Tangail Hindu Samaj Sanghrakshini, 1924.
54 This two-part article appeared in Amrita
Bazar Pairika on April 10-11, 1925.
55 For instance, even as the Provincial
Mahasabha at Faridpur(which Sir P C Ray
addressed) was deliberating, a meeting of
2,000 Namasudras was being held nearby,
to decide on conversion to Christianity.
Piyush Ghosh, who tried to stave off this
embarrassment was not allowed entry into
the meeting! Amrita Bazar Patrika, May 3,
1925. On the other hand, the refusal of the
Mahasabha leadershipto extend caste questions beyond a point where they would
anger the orthodox, led a radical Arya
Samaji like Swami Shraddhanandto resign
from the organisation. Jordens, Shraddhanand.., op cit, pp 154-57.
56 An excellent discussion of Vidyasagar's
reforms is available in Asok Sen, Ishwar
Chandra Vidyasagar and His Elusive
Milestones, Riddhi-India, Calcutta, 1977.
57 Op cit.
58 The Satyagrahi claimed, "As a matter of
fact some of these incidents are due to Hindu social usages, Hindu widows often
entering into illegal relations with MusLim
males. When such an incident gets exposed

Economic and Political Weekly

Hindu social leaders fasten the blame on


the untouchable despised Muslims and try
to get him into trouble". February 28,
Report on Native Newspapersand Periodicals, National Archives of India. I am
grateful to Indrani Chatterjee for drawing
attention to this preoccupation in an unpublished paper, where she demonstrates it
as a form of rejection of social bondage by
Hindu widows.
59 Cited in the The Indian Annual Register,
1923Vol 11,H N Mitra(ed), The Indian Annual Register Office, Calcutta 1925,
pp 130-31.
60 Mohammadi, March 13, Report on
Native..., op cit. Its deduction gained
substancefrom the resultsof an enquiryappointed by the authorities, which stated that
between 1926 and 1928 incidents of abduction of Hindu women had been rising, but
that number of Muslim offenders in cases
where victims were Hindus was not 'unduly higher' than those of Hindu offenders.
No 535/29, Govermentof Bengal:Political,
West Bengal State Archives.
61 Significantly, the first of this wave of such
cases occurred in a village called Charmanair in the Faridpur district, and those
responsible were policemen; the women
who wereviolated included Muslim widows,
Amrita Bazar Patrika, June 17, 1923.
62 Tanika Sarkar, op cit.
63 A typical story was one of Sheikh Issaq,
who rented a house at Tollygunge. His
subsequent actions are represented in the
following lurid plot: "The accused having
an eye on the handsome girl made himself
very thick and thin [sic] as a worthy
neighbour with the father" Amrita Bazar
Patrika, April 2, 1925.
64 Thus even in 1925, Rai declaredin Calcutta
that they did not want a 'Hindu Raj' and
stated that, "The correct thing for us to do
is to strive for a democratic raj in which the
Hindus, Muslims and the other communities of India may participateas Indians and
not as followers of any particular religion",
although his speech was all abo,ut strengthening the Hindus, Amrita Bazar Patrika,
April 12, 1925.
65 Amrita Bazar Patrika, August 9, 1922.
66 He reportedly claimed that unless they
defended their women, Bengalis would be
condemned to destruction, A mrita Bazar
Patrika, April 25, 1925. A similar life-story
can be seen in the case of Krishna Kumar
Mitra,who was a patronof the Anti Circular
Society, which had openly kept away from
the Shivaji Utsav (see above) because they
felt it would be hurtful to their Muslim
members. In the 1920s,he emerged a major
leader of the Women's Protection League.
67 Ten days after he established the Bharatiya
Hindu Suddhi Sabha in 1923, Shraddhanand issued an appeal entitled, 'Save the
Dying Race'.The second occasion was when
he wrote Hindu Sangathan, Saviour of the
Dying Race in 1924, after his retirement
from Mahasabhaactivities. It was published
in 1926: Jordens, Shraddhanand... op cit,
p 131 and pp 151-57.
68 'The Best Way..~op cit.

69 Amrita Bazar Patrika, December 1, 1925.

70 Ibid, April7, 1925.


71 Ibid, April 28, 1925.
72 Ibid, April 8, 1925.
73 'TheStudyof Philosophy'Selectionsfrom
the Prison Notebooks, eds, and translated

by Quintin Hoare and GeoffreyNowell


Smith,International
Publishers,NewYork
f pub 1971,rpt 1983,pp 323-24.
74 Ibid, see footnoteon p 326.
75 Ibid, p 324.
76 Mostof all, commonsenseis characteristic
of subalternconsciousness(althoughindicationsexistthatGramscivisualisesa more
complexinterrelationship
with 'high'traditions than the simple one of qualitative
distinction).
77 In a recentessay,ChantalMouffeargues,
"Thesocialagentis constructedbya diversity of discoursesamongwhichthereis no
necessary relation..". 'Citizenship and
Political Identity',October 61, Summer
1992,Massachusetts
Instituteof Technology
Press. Obviously,without evaluatingthe
socialreferentsof suchdiscourses,neither
the consent given to the latter, nor the
ideologicalunderpinnings
of diffeent kinds
of identitycan be explored.
78 Bandopadhyaya,
op cit, p 537.
79 The Introductionto a recentcollectionof
essays on common sense states, "An appeal
to common sense is essentially an act of

faith,thebeliefin the fundamental


similarity of reasonablenessof human beings".
Besideputtingall of commonsenseunder
a singlerubric,whatthis enquiryignores,
is that while the notionof commonsense
is always appealed to as a consensual
authority, the actual configuration of
elementsthatmakeupa particular
common
sense formation may militateagainst a consensus even in the act of producing a collectivity. Although Siegwart Lindenberg's
article, 'Common Sense and Social Structure: A Sociological View' does concede
that it is not possible to achieve 'communality' in a society governed by power,
this obviously rules out his belief that common sense is conceived as rooted in the
'uniformity' of human experience:the bias
for the consensus approach however does
not permit him to dwell on the implications
of this irony. Common Sense: The Foundations For Social Science, Frits van
Holthoon and David R Olson (eds), University Press of America, Lanham, London
1987.
80 Op cit, pp 325-26.
81 Common sense makes "one belong
simultaneously to a multiplicity of mass
human groups", op cit, p 324.
82 There is obviously a disagreementhere with
some suggestions in Gramsci that common
sense, that is the plurality of identities, can
be replaced by the unitary orientation of
'philosophy' What seems a preferableexercise is to study how freedom to range
across multiple identities can be assured,
without losing the urge to pull their hetero-

geneitytogetherforenactingchangenecesdifferentformsof
sary for redistributing
power.

June 19, 1993

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1319

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