G.R. No.

L-18463 October 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.GREGORIO PERFECTOR, defendantappellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any
person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is
still in force.
About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered that certain
documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had
disappeared from his office. Shortly thereafter, the Philippine Senate, having been called into special session by the
Governor-General, the Secretary for the Senate informed that body of the loss of the documents and of the steps taken
by him to discover the guilty party. The day following the convening of the Senate, September 7, 1920, the newspaper
La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article reading as follows:
Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the first time, of the scandalous robbery of records which were kept
and preserved in the iron safe of the Senate, yet up to this time there is not the slightest indication that the author or
authors of the crime will ever be discovered.
To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Sente itself, and the persons in charge of the
investigation of the case would not have to display great skill in order to succeed in their undertaking, unless they
should encounter the insuperable obstacle of offical concealment.
In that case, every investigation to be made would be but a mere comedy and nothing more.
After all, the perpetration of the robbery, especially under the circumstances that have surrounded it, does not surprise
us at all.
The execution of the crime was but the natural effect of the environment of the place in which it was committed.
How many of the present Senators can say without remorse in their conscience and with serenity of mind, that they do
not owe their victory to electoral robbery? How may?
The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed
the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery.
The Philippine Senate, in its session of September 9, 1920, adopted a resolution authorizing its committee on elections
and privileges to report as to the action which should be taken with reference to the article published in La Nacion. On
September 15, 1920, the Senate adopted a resolution authorizing the President of the Senate to indorse to the
Attorney-General, for his study and corresponding action, all the papers referring to the case of the newspaper La
Nacion and its editor, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto. As a result, an information was filed in the municipal court of the City of
Manila by an assistant city fiscal, in which the editorial in question was set out and in which it was alleged that the
same constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the
municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
During the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, after the prosecution had rested, the defense moved for the
dismissal of the case. On the subject of whether or not article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was
presented, is in force, the trial judge, the Honorable George R. Harvey, said:
This antiquated provision was doubtless incorporated into the Penal Code of Spain for the protection of the Ministers of
the Crown and other representatives of the King against free speech and action by Spanish subjects. A severe
punishment was prescribed because it was doubtless considered a much more serious offense to insult the King's
representative than to insult an ordinary individual. This provision, with almost all the other articles of that Code, was
extended to the Philippine Islands when under the dominion of Spain because the King's subject in the Philippines
might defame, abuse or insult the Ministers of the Crown or other representatives of His Majesty. We now have no
Ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority in the Philippines representing the King of Spain, and said
provision, with other articles of the Penal Code, had apparently passed into "innocuous desuetude," but the Supreme
Corut of the Philippine Islands has, by a majority decision, held that said article 256 is the law of the land to-day. . . .
The Helbig case is a precedent which, by the rule of stare decisis, is binding upon this court until otherwise determined
by proper authority.
In the decision rendered by the same judge, he concluded with the following language:
In the United States such publications are usually not punishable as criminal offense, and little importance is attached
to them, because they are generally the result of political controversy and are usually regarded as more or less colored
or exaggerated. Attacks of this character upon a legislative body are not punishable, under the Libel Law. Although
such publications are reprehensible, yet this court feels some aversion to the application of the provision of law under
which this case was filed. Our Penal Code has come to us from the Spanish regime. Article 256 of that Code

prescribes punishment for persons who use insulting language about Ministers of the Crown or other "authority." The
King of Spain doubtless left the need of such protection to his ministers and others in authority in the Philippines as
well as in Spain. Hence, the article referred to was made applicable here. Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty,
our Supreme Court, in a majority decision, has held that this provision is still in force, and that one who made an
insulting remark about the President of the United States was punishable under it. (U.S. vs. Helbig, supra.) If it
applicable in that case, it would appear to be applicable in this case. Hence, said article 256 must be enforced, without
fear or favor, until it shall be repealed or superseded by other legislation, or until the Supreme Court shall otherwise
determine.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the defendant guilty as charged in the information and under
article 256 of their Penal Code sentences him to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor and the accessory
penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of both instances.
The fifteen errors assigned by the defendant and appellant, reenforced by an extensive brief, and eloquent oral
argument made in his own behalf and by his learned counsel, all reduce themselves to the pertinent and decisive
question which was announced in the beginning of this decision.
It will be noted in the first place that the trial judge considered himself bound to follow the rule announced in the case of
United States vs. Helbig (R. G. No. 14705, 1 not published). In that case, the accused was charged with having said,
"To hell with the President and his proclamations, or words to that effect," in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code.
He was found guilty in a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila and again on appeal to the
Supreme Court, with the writer of the instant decision dissenting on two principal grounds: (1) That the accused was
deprived of the constitutional right of cross-examination, and (2) that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is no longer
in force. Subsequently, on a motion of reconsideration, the court, being of the opinion that the Court of First Instance
had committed a prejudicial error in depriving the accused of his right to cross-examine a principal witness, set aside
the judgment affirming the judgment appealed from and ordered the return of the record to the court of origin for the
celebration of a new trial. Whether such a trial was actually had, is not known, but at least, the record in the Helbig
case has never again been elevated to this court.
There may perchance exist some doubt as to the authority of the decision in the Helbig case, in view of the
circumstances above described. This much, however, is certain: The facts of the Helbig case and the case before us,
which we may term the Perfecto case, are different, for in the first case there was an oral defamation, while in the
second there is a written defamation. Not only this, but a new point which, under the facts, could not have been
considered in the Helbig case, is, in the Perfecto case, urged upon the court. And, finally, as is apparent to all, the
appellate court is not restrained, as was the trial court, by strict adherence to a former decision. We much prefer to
resolve the question before us unhindered by references to the Helbig decision.
This is one of those cases on which a variety of opinions all leading to the same result can be had. A majority of the
court are of the opinion that the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, has had the effect of repealing so much of article
256 of the Penal Code as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts,
the defendant is neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code, nor of the Libel Law. The view of the Chief
Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute
a violation of article 156 of the Penal Code. Three members of the court believe that article 256 was abrogated
completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and is inconsistent with
democratic principles of government.
Without prejudice to the right of any member of the court to explain his position, we will discuss the two main points just
mentioned.
1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. The Libel Law, Act No.
277, was enacted by the Philippine Commission shortly after organization of this legislative body. Section 1 defines
libel as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public
theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or
reputation, or publish the alleged or natural deffects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred,
contempt or ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts of laws now in force, so far as the same may be in
conflict herewith, are hereby repealed. . . ."
That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect, were in conflict therewith, and that the Libel Law
abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title X of Book II of the Penal Code,
covering the subjects of calumny and insults, must have been particularly affected by the Libel Law. Indeed, in the
early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez ([1902], 1. Phil., 468), the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as
"reforming the preexisting Spanish law on the subject of calumnia and injuria." Recently, specific attention was given to
the effect of the Libel Law on the provisions of the Penal Code, dealing with calumny and insults, and it was found that
those provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny and insults in which the elements of writing an publicity
entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law. (People vs. Castro [1922], p. 842, ante.)
The Libel Law must have had the same result on other provisions of the Penal Code, as for instance article 256.

The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper published an article, naturally in writing, which may have had the
tendency to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation of members of the Philippine Senate, thereby possibly exposing
them to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, which is exactly libel, as defined by the Libel Law. Sir J. F. Stephen is
authority for the statement that a libel is indictable when defaming a "body of persons definite and small enough for
individual members to be recognized as such, in or by means of anything capable of being a libel." (Digest of Criminal
Law, art. 267.) But in the United States, while it may be proper to prosecute criminally the author of a libel charging a
legislator with corruption, criticisms, no matter how severe, on a legislature, are within the range of the liberty of the
press, unless the intention and effect be seditious. (3 Wharton's Criminal Law, p. 2131.) With these facts and legal
principles in mind, recall that article 256 begins: Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any
Minister of the Crown or other person in authority," etc.
The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel. The well-known rule of statutory
construction is, that where the later statute clearly covers the old subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly
appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to give expression in it to the whole law on the subject, previous
laws are held to be repealed by necessary implication. (1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 465.) For
identical reasons, it is evident that Act No. 277 had the effect so much of this article as punishes defamation, abuse, or
insults by writing.
Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected article 256, but as to
this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement.
2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian sevoreignty over the Philippine son article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code. Appellant's main proposition in the lower court and again energetically pressed in the appellate court was that
article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not now in force because abrogated by the change from Spanish to American
sovereignty over the Philippines and because inconsistent with democratic principles of government. This view was
indirectly favored by the trial judge, and, as before stated, is the opinion of three members of this court.
Article 256 is found in Chapter V of title III of Book II of the Spanish Penal Code. Title I of Book II punishes the crimes
of treason, crimes that endanger the peace or independence of the state, crimes against international law, and the
crime of piracy. Title II of the same book punishes the crimes of lese majeste, crimes against the Cortes and its
members and against the council of ministers, crimes against the form of government, and crimes committed on the
occasion of the exercise of rights guaranteed by the fundamental laws of the state, including crime against religion and
worship. Title III of the same Book, in which article 256 is found, punishes the crimes of rebellion, sedition, assaults
upon persons in authority, and their agents, and contempts, insults, injurias, and threats against persons in authority,
and insults, injurias, and threats against their agents and other public officers, the last being the title to Chapter V. The
first two articles in Chapter V define and punish the offense of contempt committed by any one who shall be word or
deed defame, abuse, insult, or threathen a minister of the crown, or any person in authority. The with an article
condemning challenges to fight duels intervening, comes article 256, now being weighed in the balance. It reads as
follows: "Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other
person in authority, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or by reason of such performance, provided
that the offensive minister or person, or the offensive writing be not addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor," that is, the defamation, abuse, or insult of any Minister of the Crown of the Monarchy of Spain (for there
could not be a Minister of the Crown in the United States of America), or other person in authority in the Monarchy of
Spain.
It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason,
lese majeste, religion and worship, rebellion, sedition, and contempts of ministers of the crown, are not longer in force.
Our present task, therefore, is a determination of whether article 256 has met the same fate, or, more specifically
stated, whether it is in the nature of a municipal law or political law, and is consistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States and the characteristics and institutions of the American Government.
It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the
inhabitants to the sovereign. (American Insurance Co. vs. Canter [1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific
Railway Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542; Roa vs. Collector of Customs [1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of
the United States Supreme Court stated the obvious when in the course of his opinion in the case of Chicago, Rock
Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn, supra, he said: "As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances and regulations
in conflict with the political character, institutions and Constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus,
upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power and the latter is involved in the former to the United
States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing
cruel and unusual punishments, and he like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to
that effect." To quote again from the United States Supreme Court: "It cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could,
by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that
they have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must

hold it subject to the Constitution and laws of its own government, and not according to those of the government ceding
it." (Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3 Hos., 210.)
On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander dated May 28,
1898, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person
and property and providing for the punishment of crime were nominally continued in force in so far as they were
compatible with the new order of things. But President McKinley, in his instructions to General Merritt, was careful to
say: "The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of the former political relation of
the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power." From that day to this, the ordinarily it has been taken
for granted that the provisions under consideration were still effective. To paraphrase the language of the United States
Supreme Court in Weems vs. United States ([1910], 217 U. S., 349), there was not and could not be, except as precise
questions were presented, a careful consideration of the codal provisions and a determination of the extent to which
they accorded with or were repugnant to the "'great principles of liberty and law' which had been 'made the basis of our
governmental system.' " But when the question has been squarely raised, the appellate court has been forced on
occasion to hold certain portions of the Spanish codes repugnant t democratic institutions and American constitutional
principles. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 273; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil.,
533; Weems vs. U.S., supra.)
The nature of the government which has been set up in the Philippines under American sovereignty was outlined by
President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine liberty, his instructions to the Commission, of April 7, 1900. In
part, the President said:
In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to prescribe, the Commission
should bear in mind that he government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction or for the
expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands,
and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the
fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government. At
the same time the Commission should bear in mind, and the people of the Islands should be made plainly to
understand, that there are certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of our governmental
system, which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom, and of which they have,
unfortunately, been denied the experience possessed by us; that there are also certain practical rules of government
which we have found to be essential to the preservation of these great principles of liberty and law, and that these
principles and these rules of government must be established and maintained in their islands for the sake of their
liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are
familiar. It is evident that the most enligthened thought of the Philippine Islands fully appreciates the importance of
these principles and rules, and they will inevitably within a short time command universal assent.
The courts have naturally taken the same view. Mr. Justice Elliott, speaking for our Supreme Court, in the case of
United States vs. Bull ([1910], 15 Phil., 7), said: "The President and Congress framed the government on the model
with which American are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and
the protection of individual rights and privileges."
Therefore, it has come with somewhat of a shock to hear the statement made that the happiness, peace, and
prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands and their customs, habits, and prejudices, to follow the language of
President McKinley, demand obeisance to authority, and royal protection for that authority.
According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect
Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a
new theory of government, as set up in the Philippines. It was in no sense a continuation of the old, although merely for
convenience certain of the existing institutions and laws were continued. The demands which the new government
made, and makes, on the individual citizen are likewise different. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person
in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our
Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights with every other man. We
have no rank or station, except that of respectability and intelligence as opposed to indecency and ignorance, and the
door to this rank stands open to every man to freely enter and abide therein, if he is qualified, and whether he is
qualified or not depends upon the life and character and attainments and conduct of each person for himself. Every
man may lawfully do what he will, so long as it is not malum in se or malum prohibitum or does not infringe upon the
qually sacred rights of others." (State vs. Shepherd [1903], 177 Mo., 205; 99 A. S. R., 624.)
It is true that in England, from which so many of the laws and institutions of the United States are derived, there were
once statutes of scandalum magnatum, under which words which would not be actionable if spoken of an ordinary
subject were made actionable if spoken of a peer of the realm or of any of the great officers of the Crown, without proof
of any special damage. The Crown of England, unfortunately, took a view less tolerant that that of other sovereigns, as
for instance, the Emperors Augustus, Caesar, and Tiberius. These English statutes have, however, long since, become
obsolete, while in the United States, the offense of scandalum magnatum is not known. In the early days of the

American Republic, a sedition law was enacted, making it an offense to libel the Government, the Congress, or the
President of the United States, but the law met with so much popular disapproval, that it was soon repealed. "In this
country no distinction as to persons is recognized, and in practice a person holding a high office is regarded as a target
at whom any person may let fly his poisonous words. High official position, instead of affording immunity from
slanderous and libelous charges, seems rather to be regarded as making his character free plunder for any one who
desires to create a senation by attacking it." (Newell, Slander and Libel, 3d ed., p. 245; Sillars vs. Collier [1890], 151
Mass., 50; 6 L.R.A., 680.)
Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and
system of government. The gulf which separates this article from the spirit which inspires all penal legislation of
American origin, is as wide as that which separates a monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the United
States. This article was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the
Philippine Islands. Penalties out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical
conception of the nature of political authority, as opposed to the American conception of the protection of the interests
of the public, have been obliterated by the present system of government in the Islands. 1awph!l.net
From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials,
although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers
has no place in a government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of
some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only
entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The
American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is
due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people
any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks.
The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the
Crown have no place under the American flag.
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that the
judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.
Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
People v. Perfecto
G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922

"The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing
"Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . .
.," is still in force."

public law: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of
the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations
sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.
FACTS:
This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in
the Senate investigation of oil companies. The newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an
article about it to the effect that "the author or authors of the robbery of the records from the iron safe of the Senate
have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery."
Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate, filed an information
alleging that the editorial constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code.
The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
ISSUEs:

Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with the change from Spanish to American
sovereignty

Whether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel

HELD:

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the
inhabitants to the sovereign.
On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander, and by
proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property
and providing for the punishment of crime (e.g. the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued in force in so far as
they were compatible with the new order of things.
Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the
King. But with the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the
Philippines. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen
must speak of him only with bated breath. Said article is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the
American character and system of
government. It was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine
Islands.
"From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive
officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial
officers has no place in a government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an
agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials
are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The
American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is
due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people
any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks."
DECISION:
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that the
judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant, vs.HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J:
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of
the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a judge."
The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia Muoz
Palma of the Court of Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case was referred on
October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus:
Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz
R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R.
Macariola, defendant, concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of the
plaintiff and defendant.
In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among other things that; a) plaintiff Sinforosa R.
Bales was not a daughter of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the deceased were defendant
Macariola, she being the only offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining
plaintiffs who were the children of the deceased by his second marriage with Irene Ondez; c) the properties left by the
deceased were all the conjugal properties of the latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties were
acquired by the deceased during his second marriage; d) if there was any partition to be made, those conjugal
properties should first be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated solely to defendant it being the
share of the latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other half which is the share of the deceased Francisco
Reyes was to be divided equally among his children by his two marriages.

On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a preponderance of evidence, finds and so
holds, and hereby renders judgment (1) Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes,
Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only children legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz
to Irene Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes
Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as belonging to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of
Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common partnership; (5)
Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being the only legal and forced heir of her mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive
owner of one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of
each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154
as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the exclusive owner of one-half
(1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304
and the remaining one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes
Diaz; (8) Directing the division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a manner as to give or grant to
Irene Ondez, as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditary share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole estate
of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and the remaining portion of the estate
to be divided among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela
Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the total share of
plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of
any or each of the other plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive equal
shares from the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33);
(9) Directing the parties, within thirty days after this judgment shall have become final to submit to this court, for
approval a project of partition of the hereditary estate in the proportion above indicated, and in such manner as the
parties may, by agreement, deemed convenient and equitable to them taking into consideration the location, kind,
quality, nature and value of the properties involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant
Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-third (1/3) by the first named and twothirds (2/3) by the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].
The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a project of partition was
submitted to Judge Asuncion which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project of partition was not
signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion
approved it in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is quoted hereunder in full:
The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court for approval the following project of partition:
COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case, to this Honorable Court respectfully submit
the following Project of Partition:
l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to Bernardita Reyes Macariola;
2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along the eastern part of the lot shall be awarded
likewise to Bernardita R. Macariola;
3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;
4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along the western part of the lot shall likewise be
awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;

5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes,
Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares;
6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking the portions awarded under item (2) and (4)
above shall be awarded to Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes
in equal shares, provided, however that the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively to Priscilla
Reyes.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition indicated above which is made in accordance with
the decision of the Honorable Court be approved.
Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City
(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City
While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have signed this Project of Partition, nevertheless, upon
assurance of both counsels of the respective parties to this Court that the Project of Partition, as above- quoted, had
been made after a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs and the defendant approving the above Project of
Partition, and that both lawyers had represented to the Court that they are given full authority to sign by themselves the
Project of Partition, the Court, therefore, finding the above-quoted Project of Partition to be in accordance with law,
hereby approves the same. The parties, therefore, are directed to execute such papers, documents or instrument
sufficient in form and substance for the vesting of the rights, interests and participations which were adjudicated to the
respective parties, as outlined in the Project of Partition and the delivery of the respective properties adjudicated to
each one in view of said Project of Partition, and to perform such other acts as are legal and necessary to effectuate
the said Project of Partition.
SO ORDERED.
Macariola v. Asuncion Case Digest
Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982
(En Banc), J. Makasiar
Facts: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias B. Asuncion of Court of
First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him
which he later approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was complainant Bernardita R.
Macariola.
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot according to the decision rendered by
Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated
as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.
On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge
Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion. Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their
respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein Judge
Asuncion was the president.
Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte
against Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge" alleging that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of
Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision dismissing the complaints
against Judge Asuncion.

After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals,
she recommended on her decision dated March 27, 1971 that Judge Asuncion be exonerated.

Issue: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in acquiring by purchase a
parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil Case No. 3010 and his engagement in business by joining
a private corporation during his incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act unbecoming of a judge"?

Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an "act unbecoming of a judge." But he
is reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.
SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to operate, the sale or assignment
of the property during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of
Lot 1184-E on March 6, 1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final
because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question was no
longer subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the
finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010.
SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later on from the US to the Republic of the
Philippines, Article 14 of Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change
of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign,
are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There
appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of
Commerce, consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the
respondent Judge Asuncion.
Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019 because the business of the corporation
in which respondent participated had obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office.
SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm
22 days after its incorporation realizing that their interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank
robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those
included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what
actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and
the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel
found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panels finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as
principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed
amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the
amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A.
7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the
principal accused are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief
Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their
motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from
the phrase principal accused in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law
shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners right to due process and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to
acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to
the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the
Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction.
RULING:
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is
too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a
declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law must
present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must
rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials and under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors argument,
the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover
cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court.
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A.
8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts
of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and
provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other
procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a
penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is
intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts
that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official
duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and
investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set
forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
committed in relation to his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with
the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain
murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
G.R. No. L-19272
January 25, 1967
JAIME HERNANDEZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN ALBANO, HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR., City Fiscal of Manila
and CARLOS C. GONZALES, Second Assistant City Fiscal of Mania, respondents-appellees.
San Juan, Africa & Benedicto for petitioner-appellant.
City Fiscal Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. and Assistant Fiscal E. S. Arguelles for and in their own behalf.
Valera Law Office for respondent-appellee Albano.
SANCHEZ, J.:

10

This case has its roots in a complaint lodged with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, by respondent Delfin Albano,
quondam Congressman for the lone district of Isabela, against petitioner Jaime Hernandez, then the Secretary of
Finance and Presiding Officer of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank for violation of Article 216 of the Revised
Penal Code, Commonwealth Act 6261 or Republic Act 265.2 The complaint revolves around petitioner's alleged
shareholdings in the University of the East, Bicol Electric Co., Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, DMG inc., and University
of Nueva Caceres and the claim that said corporations obtained dollar allocations from the Central Bank, through the
Monetary Board, during petitioner's incumbency as presiding officer thereof. The charges involved were docketed in
the City Fiscal's Office, as
I.S. No. 11379 re petitioner's holdings in Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres;
I.S. No. 11380 re petitioner's holdings in the University of Nueva Caceres;
I.S. No. 11381 re petitioner's holdings in the Bicol Electric Co.;
I.S. No. 11382 re petitioner's holdings in the University of the East; and
I.S. No. 11383 re petitioner's holdings in the DMG, Inc.
At the joint investigation of the foregoing charges before respondent Carlos C. Gonzales, the investigating Fiscal,
complainant moved to exclude therefrom the alleged violation of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code because the
applicability of this statute was in issue of Solidum, et al. vs. Hernandez, L-16570, at the time pending before this
Court, but which had since been resolved by us February 28, 1963 adversely to Hernandez. Fiscal Gonzales
granted the motion.
Then, petitioner sought the dismissal of the remaining charges upon the averment that (a) violation of Article VII,
Section 11, subsection (2) of the Constitution, punishable under Commonwealth Act 626, should be prosecuted at the
domicile of the private enterprises affected there by; and that (b) violation of Section 13 of Republic Act 265 is not
criminal in nature. Dismissal was denied; reconsideration thereof failed.
To restrain the respondent Fiscals from continuing the investigation, petitioner went to the Court of First Instance of
Manila on certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for preliminary injunction.3 The decision dated October 13, 1961,
reached upon a stipulation of facts, dismissed the petition, with costs.
Petitioner appealed.
1. Stripped of inconsequential issues, the forefront question thrust upon us is whether the prosecuting arm of the City
of Manila should be restrained from proceeding with the investigation of the charges levelled against petitioner.
By statute, the prosecuting officer of the City of Manila and his assistants are empowered to investigate crimes
committed within the city's territorial jurisdiction. Not a mere privilege, it is the sworn duty of a Fiscal to conduct an
investigation of a criminal charge filed with his office. The power to investigate postulates the other obligation on the
part of the Fiscal to investigate promptly and file the case of as speedily. Public interest the protection of society
so demands. Agreeably to the foregoing, a rule now of long standing and frequent application was formulated
that ordinarily criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition or injunction.4 Really, if at every turn
investigation of a crime will be halted by a court order, the administration of criminal justice will meet with an undue
setback.5 Indeed, the investigative power of the Fiscal may suffer such a tremendous shrinkage that it may end up in
hollow sound rather than as a part and parcel of the machinery of criminal justice.
We are not to be understood, however, as saying that the heavy hand of a prosecutor may not be shackled under all
circumstances. The rule is not an invariable one. Extreme cases may, and actually do, exist where relief in equity may
be availed of to stop a purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration
of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid

11

multiplicity of actions;6 (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; 7 and (e) in proper cases, because the
statute relied upon is unconstitutional, or was "held invalid."8
With the foregoing guidelines, we come to grips with the legal problems of
whether
a. Violation of Art. VII, Section 11, Subsection (2) of the Constitution punishable under C.A. 626, should be prosecuted
at the domicile of the private enterprise affected by the violation; and
b. Violation of Section 13 of Republic Act 265 is criminal in nature.
2. The constitutional prescription allegedly violated, Article VII, Section 11(2), reads:
(2) The heads of departments and chiefs of bureaus or offices and their assistants shall not, during their continuance
engage in the practice of any profession, or intervene, directly or indirectly, in the management or control of any private
which in any way may be affected by the function of their office; nor shall they directly or indirectly, be financially
interested in any contract with the Government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
Commonwealth Act 626 provides the penal sanction for a violation of this constitutional precept, i.e., a fine of not than
P5,000 or imprisonment of not more than 2 years, or both.
The legal mandate in Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of the Court is that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of
the essential ingredients thereof took place."9 This principle is fundamental. 10 Thus, where an offense is wholly
committed outside the territorial limits wherein the court operates, said court is powerless to try the case. For, "the rule
is that one cannot be held to answer for any crime committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it was committed."
11
Similarly, the City Fiscal of Manila and his assistants as such may not investigate a crime committed within the
exclusive confines of, say, Camarines Norte. This proposition offers no area for debate. Because, said prosecuting
officers would then be overreaching the territorial limits of their jurisdiction, and, in the process, step on the shoes of
those who, by statute, are empowered and obligated to perform that task. They cannot unlawfully encroach upon
powers and prerogatives of the Fiscals of the province aforesaid.
Petitioner seeks to bar respondent Fiscals from investigating the constitutional violation charged. His claim is that
except for his holdings in Manila's University of the East the Manila Fiscals are powerless to investigate him. His
reason is that the essence of the crime is his possession of prohibited interests in corporations domiciled in Naga City
(Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, University of Nueva Caceres and Bicol Electric Co.,) and in Mandaluyong, Rizal (DMG
Inc.); and that the place where the crime is to be prosecuted is "the situs of such shares."
In effect, petitioner asks us to carve out an exception to the rule that said Fiscals may not be enjoined from conducting
the inquiry aforesaid. We would not hesitate to state that, if it clearly appears that the crime or any essential ingredient
thereof was committed outside the boundaries of the City of Manila, petitioner's argument should merit serious
consideration. For, orderly administration of justice so demands; multiplicity of criminal actions is to be obviated; the
long arm of the law cannot be used in an oppressive or vindictive manner.
But let us take a look at the admitted facts of this case. Petitioner himself concedes that he stands "charged with
allegedly having shareholdings in the Bicol Electric Co., Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, University of Nueva Caceres,
DMG Inc., and the University of the East, and a that the said corporations purportedly obtained doll or allocations from
the Central Bank thru the Monetary Board during the incumbency of respondent as presiding officer thereof." 12
Petitioner relies on Black Eagle Mining Co. vs. Conroy et al., 221 Pac. 425, 426, thus

12

Shares of stock are a peculiar kind of personal property, and are unlike other classes of personal property in that the
property right of shares of stock can only be exercised or enforced where the corporation is organized and has its place
of business and can exist only as an incident to and connected with the corporation, and this class of property is
inseparable from the domicile of the corporation itself.
By no stretch can the cited case be taken as germane to the controversial point here. It speaks of property right to
shares of stock which can only be enforced in the corporation's domicile. In the case at bar, the charges are not
directed against the corporations. Not mere ownership of or title to shares is involved. Possession of prohibited
interests is but one of the essential components of the offense. As necessary an ingredient thereof is the fact that
petitioner was head of a department Secretary of Finance. So also, the fact that while head of department and
chairman of the Monetary Board he allegedly was financially interested in the corporations aforesaid which so the
dollar allocations, and that he had to act officially, in his dual capacity, not in Camarines Sur, but in Manila where he
held his office.
Since criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the crime or an essential ingredient there of, took
place, it stands to reason to say that the Manila under the facts obtained here, have jurisdiction to investigate the
violation complained of.
3. The other argument pressed upon us that a violation of Section 13 of Republic Act 265 is not criminal in nature
furnishes no better foundation.
Section 13 of Republic Act 265, allegedly violated by petitioner, recites:
SEC. 13. Withdrawal of persons having a personal interest. Whenever any person attending a meeting of the
Monetary Board has a personal interest of any sort in the discussion or resolution of any given matter, or any of his
business associates or any of his relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or second degree of affinity has
such an interest, said person may not participate in the discussion or resolution of the matter and must retire from the
meeting during the deliberations thereon. The minutes of the meeting shall note the withdrawals of the member
concerned.
The gravamen of petitioner's argument is that for a violation of Section 13 of the law aforesaid, Section 15 of the same
statute provides "only for a civil sanction." "not a criminal sanction." Said Section 15 reads:
SEC. 15. Responsibility. Any member of the Monetary Board or officer or employee of the Central Bank who willfully
violates this Act or who is guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties shall be held liable for any loss or
injury suffered by the Bank as a result of such violation or negligence. ...
The nonsequitur is at once apparent. For, Section 34 of the same Republic Act 265, in terms clear and certain and free
from the taint of ambiguity, provides the penal sanction.13 thus
SEC. 34. Proceedings upon violation of laws and regulations. Whenever any person or entity willfully violates this
Act or any order, instruction, rule or regulation legally issued by the Monetary Board, the person or persons responsible
for such violation shall be punished by a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos and by imprisonment of not more
than five years. ...
But, petitioner draws attention to the fact that Sections 13 and 15 both fall under "Article II The Monetary Board," of
Chapter 1. "Establishment and Organization of the Central Bank of the Philippines," whereas Section 34 comes
under the heading "B. Department Supervision and Examination" of "Article IV. Departments of the Central
Bank." From this, petitioner puts forth the claim that the penal provisions in Section 34 are "to be restricted to the
matters encompassed in that topic, that is, the supervision of banking institutions."14 We are unable to join petitioner in
this ipse dixit pronouncement. And, for a number of reasons. First, because while Section 15 provides for the civil
liability "for any loss or injury suffered by the (Central) Bank as a result of such violation," Section 34 prescribes the
penalty for the willful violation of "this Act," irrespective of whether the bank suffered any loss or not. Second, the entire

13

statute is not in piecemeal style but as a whole. Effort be exerted "to make every part effective, harmonious
sensible." 15 And so construing we find that the one refers to the civil liability at the same time that the other specifies a
separate criminal liability. Indeed, it could well be said that the penal sanction in Section 34 is an "additional incentive
toward obedience of the mandates of the law." 16 One does not preclude the other. Third, We observe that the penal
provisions of Republic Act 265 were placed in three successive sections thereof, Sections 32, 33 and 34. Section 32
penalizes any owner, agent, manager or other officers in charge of any banking who willfully refuses to file the required
reports to have the bank's affairs examined. Section 33 penalizes the making of a false statement to the Monetary
Board. Section 34 provides for the penalty to be imposed upon any person who violates, among others, the provisions
of said Act. This grouping of penalties obviously was intended to present a clearer picture of the liabilities which the
Central Bank Act specifies, and thus avoid confusion. 17
All else failing, petitioner summons to his aid the Congressional Record on the deliberations on House Bill 1704 (which
later became Republic Act 265), to wit:
Mr. Topacio Nueno. On page 6, Section 13 - prohibiting relatives from transacting business. I should like to insert a
punishment, a penal clause. On line 11, add the following: "Violation of this section is punishable by dismissal and fine
of from five thousand to ten thousand pesos."
The Speaker. What does the Committee say?
Mr. Roy. We cannot accept the amendment.
The Speaker. When we come to the provision with regard to the penalties, the gentleman from Manila may propose
that amendment, in order that they may be included in the same section.
Mr. Topacio Nueno I reserve that amendment later on.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Mr. Laurel. May we be informed which of the three offenses mentioned in Sections 32, 33, and 34 is regarded to be the
most serious? I am asking this question because I notice that the penalties imposed are not the same. Which of the
three offenses covered by the three sections I have mentioned is the most serious?
Mr. Roy. Under Section 32, the offenses intended to be punishable are specified. It is in Section 34 where the law is
very broad. It provides: 'Whenever any person or entity willfully violates this Act or any order, instruction, rule or
regulation legally issued by the Monetary Board, ....' I think the court will determine the gravity of the offense. Mr.
Speaker, because there are many provisions of law; and the rules and regulations of the Monetary Board will vary in
their importance and in the seriousness of the consequences of the violation. So we will leave to the Court the
determination of the gravity of the offense. That is why the range of penalties provided under Section 34 is not more
than ten thousand pesos and by imprisonment of not more than five years. ...
Congressional Record, First Congress, Third Session, Vol. 3, pp. 1259, 1281.
Petitioner notes the failure of Congressman Topacio Nueno to reiterate his proposed amendment to Section 13 by
providing therein a penal clause. Paying full respect to the congressional intent as it may be reflected in the debates,
nonetheless it seems to us that nothing in the quoted transcript of the congressional record may be reasonably
deemed as foreclosing criminal action. That the announced amendment was not submitted, is perfectly
understandable. There was no need therefor. For, as Congressman Roy aptly puts it (in the aforesaid record), "Under
Section 32 the offenses intended to be punishable are specified. It is under section 34 where the law is very broad,
which simply means that any person and this includes the Chairman of the Monetary Board who "wilfully violates
this Act," shall be punished.

14

The respondent Fiscals, indeed justifiably relied or Section 34 in pursuing their investigation for a violation Section 13.
For Section 15 is not intended to write off from the said Section 34. To do so is to sanction pointless rigidity in statutory
construction.
In the light of the considerations, we vote to affirm the judgment under review. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, J.P., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
SHORT VERSION:
Hernandez sought to enjoin the fiscals investigation of charges filed against him. The courts only do so in extreme
cases; Hernandez did not prove that his belonged to those exceptions.
FACTS:

Isabela Rep. Delfin Albano (respondent-appellee) filed a complaint with the Manila city fiscal against Finance
Secretary & Central Bank Monetary Board Presiding Officer Jaime Hernandez (petitioner-appellant) for violating RPC
Art. 216 (possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Commonwealth Act 626 *which provides for the penalty
for violations of Article VII, Section 11, subsection (2) of the Constitution) or RA 265 (Central Bank Act).
o
The complaint involved Hernandezs alleged shareholdings in University of the East, Bicol Electric Co., Rural
Bank of Nueva Caceres, DMG inc., and University of Nueva Caceres and the claim that said corporations obtained
dollar allocations from the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, during Hernandezs incumbency as presiding
officer thereof.
o
In total, there were five charges docketed in the fiscals office.

After joint investigation of the charges before Second Assistant City Fiscal of Manila Carlos Gonzales
(respondent), Albano moved to exclude the alleged violation of RP Art 216 as the applicability of the statute was
pending before the SC in Solidum v Hernandez (it had since been resolved adversely against Hernandez). The fiscal
granted the motion.
o
Hernandez sought the dismissal of the remaining charges on the grounds that (a) violation of Article VII, Section
11, subsection (2) of the Constitution, punishable under Commonwealth Act 626, should be prosecuted at the domicile
of the private enterprises affected there by; and that (b) violation of Section 13 of Republic Act 265 is not criminal in
nature. Dismissal and reconsideration denied.

Hernandez went to the Court of First Instance Manila on certiorari and prohibition praying for preliminary
injunction to restrain the fiscals office from continuing the investigation.
o
The CFI dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:

could the Manila fiscal be restrained from proceeding with the investigation of the charges against Hernandez?
REASONING:

By statute, the prosecuting officer of the City of Manila and his assistants are empowered to investigate crimes
committed within the city's territorial jurisdiction. Not a mere privilege, it is the sworn duty of a Fiscal to conduct an
investigation of a criminal charge filed with his office. The power to investigate postulates the other obligation on the
part of the Fiscal to investigate promptly and file the case of as speedily.
o
A rule was formulated that ordinarily criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition or injunction.
o
However, in extreme cases, a relief in equity could be availed of to stop a purported enforcement of a criminal
law where it was necessary: (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the
law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional, or was "held invalid."

Commonwealth Act 626 provides the penal sanction for a violation of Constitution Art VII sec. 11(2): a fine of not
than P5000 or imprisonment of not more than 2 years, or both.
o
The legal mandate in Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of the Court is that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any
one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. Where an offense is wholly committed outside the territorial limits
wherein the court operates, said court is powerless to try the case.
o
Similarly, the Manila fiscal could not investigate a crime committed within the exclusive confines of another
province. Otherwise, they would be overreaching the territorial limits of their jurisdiction, and unlawfully encroach upon
powers and prerogatives of fiscals of the province.
o
Based on the facts of the case, Possession of prohibited interests is but one of the essential components of the
offense. As necessary an ingredient thereof is the fact that petitioner was head of a department: Secretary of Finance.
So also, the fact that while head of department and chairman of the Monetary Board he allegedly was financially

15

interested in the corporations aforesaid which so the dollar allocations, and that he had to act officially, in his dual
capacity, not in Camarines Sur, but in Manila where he held his office.
o
Since criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the crime or an essential ingredient thereof,
took place, it stands to reason to say that the Manila under the facts obtained here, have jurisdiction to investigate the
violation complained of.

Violation of RA 265 sec. 13 was criminal in nature, as the law clearly provided the penal sanction for violating its
provisions.
RULING: CFI judgment affirmed
G.R. No. L-9726 December 8, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.CARSON TAYLOR, defendant-appellant.
C. W. O'Brien for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Corpus for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This was an action for criminal libel.
The complaint alleged:
That on the 25th day of September, 1913, the said Carson Taylor, being then and there the acting editor and
proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, of a certain daily bilingual
newspaper, edited in the English and Spanish languages, and known as the 'Manila Daily Bulletin,' a paper of large
circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in the United States and other countries in all of which both
languages are spoken and written, and having as such the supervision and control of said newspaper, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, maliciously, and with intent to impeach the honesty, virtue, and reputation of one
Ramon Sotelo as a member of the bar of the Philippine Islands and as private individual, and to expose him to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule, compose, print, edit, publish, and circulate and procure to be composed, printed, edited,
published, and circulated in said newspaper's issue of the above mentioned date, September 25, 1913, a certain false
and malicious defamation and libel in the English language of and concerning the said Ramon Sotelo, which reads as
follows:
OWNERS FIRED BUILDING TO COLLECT INSURANCE. CRIMINAL CHARGES FOLLOWS CIVIL SUIT.
'Conspiracy divulged in three sworn statements made by members of the party after a family disagreement.
Sensational statement sworn to. Mystery of Calle O'Donnell fire solved and papers served.
'Conspiracy to defraud the insurance company.'
'The building was fired to collect the amount of insurance.'
'The movable furniture of value was removed before the fire.'
'The full amount of the insurance was collected, and the conspiracy was a success.'
'The above is the gist of the sworn statements of Vicente Sotelo and Eugenio Martin in connection with the fire that
destroyed house No. 2157 Calle O'Donnell on April 4.'
'The case in question is a sensational one to say the least, and the court is being petitioned to set aside the ruling and
cite the parties to show cause why they should not be cited to answer charges of conspiracy to defraud.'
'On April 4, 1913, the house located at 2157 Calle O'donnell was destroyed by fire.1awphil.net The house was insured
for P5,000, the contents for an additional P5,000, with the West of Scotland Insurance Association, of which Lutz & Co.
are the local agents, with an additional P1,500 with Smith, Bell & Co.'

16

'The full amount of the insurance on the property was paid by the paid by the agents of the insurance companies and
the matter apparently dropped from the records.'
'Then there was internal trouble and information began to leak out which resulted in sensational statements to the
effect that the destruction of the property had been an act of incendiarism in order to collect the insurance. The there
was an investigation started and it resulted in sworn statements of the three persons above mentioned.'
'Notarial returns were made yesterday by the sheriff, based on the sworn statements and the parties are cited to
appear in court and show cause.'
'The investigation also showed that the furniture, which was supposed to be in line the house at the time of the
conflagration and which was paid for by the insurance agents, sworn statements having been made that it was
destroyed in the fire, was in certain house in Montalban, where it was identified upon the sworn statements of the
above mentioned. Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the attorney for the plaintiff who
made affidavit as to the burning of the house and against whom criminal proceedings will be brought as well as against
the original owners.'
'Attorney Burke, who represents Lutz & Co. in the proceedings, was seen last night and asked for a statement as to the
case. Mr. Burke refused to talk on the case and stated that when it came to trial it would be time enough to obtain the
facts.'
'The present action came before the court on motion of Attorney Burke to set aside the judgment, which, in the original
case, given the owners of the property judgment for the amount of the insurance.'
'Attorney Burke filed the sworn statements with the court and the notarial returns to the same were made yesterday
afternoon, the sworn statements as to the burning of the house being in the hands of the sheriff.'
'It was stated yesterday that a criminal action would follow the civil proceedings instituted to recover the funds in the
case entitled on the court records, Maria Mortera de Eceiza and Manuel Eceiza versus the West o Sctoland
Association, Limited, No. 10191 on the court records.'1awphil.net
'It might be stated also that Eugenio Martin was one of the plaintiffs in the recent suit brought against Ex-Governor W.
Cameron Forbes for lumber supplied for his Boston home.'
That in this article is contained the following paragraph. To wit:
". . . Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the attorney for the plaintiff who made affidavit as
to the burning of the house and against whom criminal proceedings will be brought as well as against the original
owners," by which the said accused meant to refer and did refer to the said Ramon Sotelo, who then and there was the
attorney for the plaintiff in the case aforesaid, No. 10191 of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, and so was
understood by the public who read the same; that the statements and allegations made in said paragraph are wholly
false and untrue, thus impeaching the honesty, virtue, and reputation of the said offended party as a member of the bar
of the Philippine Islands and as private individual, and exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. Contrary to
law.
Upon said complaint the defendant was arrested, arraigned, plead not guilty, was tried, found guilty of the crime
charged, and sentenced by the Honorable George N. Hurd, judge, to pay a fine of P200. From the sentence the
defendant appealed to this court and made the following assignment of error:
First. The court erred in finding that the defendant was responsible for and guilty of the alleged libel.
Second. The court erred in finding that the defendant was the proprietor and publisher of the "Manila Daily Bulletin."
Third. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous articles was libelous per se.

17

Fourth. The court erred in holding that the article was libelous, while finding that there was no malice.
Fifth. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous article referred to attorney Ramon Sotelo.
Sixth. The court erred in finding that Ramon Sotelo was attorney for the plaintiffs in case No. 10191, when the alleged
libel was published.
After a careful examination of the record and the arguments presented by the appellant, we deem it necessary to
discuss only the first and second assignments of error.
In the Philippine Islands there exist no crimes such as are known in the United States and England as common law
crimes. No act constitutes a crime here unless it is made so by law. Libel is made a crime here by Act No. 277 of the
United States Philippine Commission. Said Act (No. 277) not only defines the crime of libel and prescribes the
particular conditions necessary to constitute it, but it also names the persons who may be guilty of such crime. In the
present case the complaint alleges that the defendant was, at the time of the publication of said alleged article "the
acting editor, proprietor, manager, printer, publisher, etc. etc. of a certain bilingual newspaper, etc., known as the
'Manila Daily Bulletin,' a paper of large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in the United States and
other countries."
It will be noted that the complaint charges the defendant as "the acting editor, proprietor, manager, printer, and
publisher." From an examination of said Act No. 277, we find that section 6 provides that: "Every author, editor, or
proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in
any part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same."
By an examination of said article, with reference to the persons who may be liable for the publication of a libel in a
newspaper, we find that it only provides for a punishment of "the author, editor, or proprietor." It would follow, therefore,
that unless the proof shows that the defendant in the present case is the "author, editor, or proprietor" of the
newspaper in which the libel was published, he can not be held liable.
In the present case the Solicitor-General in his brief said that "No person is represented to be either the 'author,
editor, or proprietor.'" That statement of the Solicitor-General is fully sustained by the record. There is not a word of
proof in the record showing that the defendant was either the "author, the editor, or the proprietor." The proof shows
that the defendant was the "manager." He must, therefore, be acquitted of the crime charged against him, unless it is
shown by the proof that he, as "manager" of the newspaper, was in some way directly responsible for the writing,
editing, or publishing of the matter contained in said alleged libelous article. The prosecution presented the newspaper,
the "Manila Daily Bulletin," for the purpose of showing the relation which the defendant had to it. That was the only
proof presented by the prosecution to show the relation which the defendant had to the publication of the libel in
question. From an examination of the editorial page of said exhibit, we find that it shows that the "Manila Daily Bulletin"
is owned by the "Bulletin Publishing Company," and that the defendant was its manager. There is not a word of proof in
the record which shows what relation the manager had to the publication of said newspaper. We might, by series of
presumptions and assumptions, conclude that the manager of a newspaper has some direct responsibility with its
publication. We believe, however, that such presumptions and assumptions, in the absence of a single letter of proof
relating thereto, would be unwarranted and unjustified. The prosecuting attorney had an opportunity to present proof or
because no such proof was obtainable, he presented none. It certainly is not difficult matter to ascertain who is the real
person responsible for the publication of a newspaper which is published daily and has a wide circulation in a particular
community. No question was asked the defendant concerning his particular relation to the publication of the newspaper
in question. We do not desire to be understood in our conclusions here as holding that the "manager" or the "printer"
may not, under certain conditions and proper proof, he held to be the "author, editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper. He
may nominate himself as "manager" or "printer" simply, and be at the same time the "author, editor, or proprietor" of the
newspaper. He can not avoid responsibility by using some other term or word, indicating his relation to the newspaper
or the publication, when, as a matter of fact, he is the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the same. His real relation
to the said publication is a matter of proof. The Solicitor-General, in his with the hope of evading legal responsibility, as

18

the Libel Law places the responsibility for publishing a libel, on "every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, etc."
Had the prosecuting attorney in the trial of the cause believed that the defendant, even though he called himself the
"manager" was, in fact, the "author, editor, or proprietor" of said publication, he should have presented some proof
supporting that contention. Neither do we desire to be understood as holding that simply because a person connected
with the publication of a newspaper who calls himself the "manager" or "printer" may not, in fact and at the same time,
be the "author, editor, or proprietor." The "author, editor, or proprietor" can not avoid responsibility for the writing and
publication of a libelous article, by simply calling himself the "manager" or the "printer" of a newspaper. That, however,
is a question of proof. The burden is upon the prosecution to show that the defendant is, by whatever name he may call
himself, in truth and in fact, the "author, editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper. The courts cannot assume, in the
absence of proof, that one who called himself "manager" was in fact the "author, editor, or proprietor." We might
assume, perhaps, that the "manager" of a newspaper plays an important part in the publication of the same by virtue of
the general signification of the word "manager." Men can not, however, be sentenced upon the basis of a mere
assumption. There must be some proof. The word "manage" has been defined by Webster to mean "to have under
control and direction; to conduct; to guide; to administer; to treat; to handle." Webster defines "manager" to be "one
who manages; a conductor or director; as, the manager of a theater." A manager, as that word is generally understood,
we do not believe includes the idea of ownership. Generally speaking it means one who is representing another as an
agent. That being true, his power and duties and obligations are generally defined by contract. He may have expressed
as well as implied powers, but whatever his powers and duties are they must be defendant upon the nature of the
business and the terms of his contract. There is no fixed rule which indicates particularly and definitely his duties,
powers and obligations. An examination into the character of the business and the contract of his employment must be
made for the purpose of ascertaining definitely what his duties and obligations are. His exact relation is always a matter
of proof. It is incumbent upon the prosecution is a case like the present, to show that whatever title, name or
designation the defendant may bear, he was, in fact, the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the newspaper. If he
was in fact the "author, editor, or proprietor," he can not escape responsibility by calling the "manager" or "printer." It is
the relation which he bears to the publication and not the name or title he has assumed, which is important in an
investigation. He can not wear the toga of author of editor and hide his responsibility by giving himself some other
name. While the terms "author, editor, and proprietor" of a newspaper are terms well defined, the particular words
"author, editor, or proprietor" are not material or important, further than that they are words which are intended to show
the relation of the responsible party to the publication. That relation may as well exist under some other name or
denomination.
For the foregoing reasons, therefore, there being no proof whatever in the record showing that the defendant was the
"author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the newspaper in question, the sentence of the lower court must be reversed,
the complaint dismissed and the defendant discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de officio. So ordered.
MARIVELES SHIPYARD CORP. VS. CA et al.
G.R. No. 144134
November 11, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner engaged the services of Longest Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. to render security
services at its premises. Longest Force then deployed its security guards, herein private respondents, at the
petitioners shipyard. However, petitioner found the services rendered by private respondents unsatisfactory and
inadequate causing it to terminate its contract with Longest Force and in turn, the latter terminated the employment of
said respondents. Consequently, private respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages
pursuant to the PNPSOSIA-PADPAO rates, non-payment of overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day,
service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and attorneys fees, against both Longest Force and petitioner, before
NLRC, who in turn sought the guards reinstatement with full backwages and without loss of seniority rights. Petitioner
appealed to the NLRC, contending that it should not be held jointly and severally liable with Longest Force for
underpayment of wages and overtime pays because it had been religiously and promptly paying the bills for the
security services sent by Longest Force and that these are in accordance with the statutory minimum wage. Also,
petitioner contends that it should not be held liable for overtime pay as private respondents failed to present proof that
overtime work was actually performed. However, the labor tribunal affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
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Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the NLRC. The petitioner then filed a special civil action
for certiorari assailing the NLRC judgment for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion with the Court of
Appeals, which was also outright dismissed by the respondent court due to a defective certificate of non-forum
shopping and non-submission of the required documents to accompany said petition. The petitioner then moved for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal but was also denied by the appellate court, hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is jointly and severally liable with Longest Force
Held: Yes, Petitioners liability is joint and several with that of Longest Force, pursuant to Articles 106, 107 and 109 of
the Labor Code. When the petitioner contracted with Longest Force, petitioner became an indirect employer of private
respondents pursuant to Article 107. Following Article 106, when the agency as contractor failed to pay the guards, the
corporation as principal becomes jointly and severally liable for the guards wages. This is mandated by the Labor
Code to ensure compliance with its provisions, including payment of statutory minimum wage. The security agency is
held liable by virtue of its status as direct employer, while the corporation is deemed the indirect employer of the guards
for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of failure of the agency to pay them. This statutory scheme gives the
workers the ample protection consonant with labor and social justice provisions of the Constitution. Petitioner cannot
evade its liability by claiming that it had religiously paid the compensation of guards as stipulated under the contract
with the security agency. Labor standards are enacted by the legislature to alleviate the plight of workers whose
wages barely meet the spiraling costs of their basic needs. Labor laws are considered written in every contract.
Stipulations in violation thereof are considered null. Similarly, legislated wage increases are deemed amendments to
the contract. Thus, employers cannot hide behind their contracts in order to evade their (or their contractors or
subcontractors) liability for noncompliance with the statutory minimum wage.
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga,
Respondent.
E. M. Banzali for petitioner.
Acting Provincial Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marcelo L. Mallari for respondent
TUASON, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga after
he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the
peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her
witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused.
The motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of First Instance in support of his
motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of
the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea
of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could
be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor
objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel
announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to
the court of first instance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to present evidence, and by reason of that
waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of the opinion that the respondent
judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return
the record for the purpose set out therein. In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently
promulgated, in which case the respondent justice of the peace had allowed the accused, over the complaint's

20

objection, to recall the complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary investigation so that they might be crossexamined, we sustained the justice of the peace's order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound
discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of
the defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority,
inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth."chanrobles
virtual law library
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat
in his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest." We called
attention to the fact that "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not
apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to
confront witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the majority and denied even
any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation to compel the
complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.

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