Office of the Court Administrator v.

Pascual
A.M. No. MTJ-93-783. July 29, 1996
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Facts:
Sometime in February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter, addressed to Hon.
Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that
irregularities and corruption were being committed by the respondent Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan.
On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation in
order that an investigation on the alleged illegal and corrupt practices of the respondent may be
conducted. Ordered to conduct a discreet investigation by the then NBI Director Epimaco
Velasco were: SA Edward Villarta, team leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo, HA Teofilo Galang, SI
Florino Javier and SI Jose Icasiano. They proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for
Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer. Tigas, the NBI team realized was a fictitious character. In view
of their failure to find Tigas, they proceeded to the residence of Candido Cruz, an accused in
respondents sala.
In his affidavit executed on March 23, 1993 before SA Edward Villarta, Cruz declared
that he was the accused in Criminal Case No. 2154, charged with the crime of Frustrated Murder.
Respondent judge, after conducting the preliminary investigation of the case, decided that the
crime he committed was only physical injuries and so, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction
over the case. Cruz believed that he was made to understand by the respondent that, in view of
his favorable action, Cruz was to give to respondent the sum of P2,000.00. Respondent judge is
believed to be a drunkard and, in all probability, would need money to serve his vice.
In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused respondent judge to
be entrapped, for which reason, the judge was thought to have been caught in flagrante delicto.
NBI agents Villarta and Olazo filed the following report:
On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, CANDIDO CRUZ met with Judge
PASCUAL at the Colegio de Sta. Monica, near the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan, where
Subject is attending the graduation of his daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told Judge PASCUAL
that he already had the P2,000.00 which he (Judge PASCUAL) is asking him. However, Judge
PASCUAL did not receive the money because according to him there were plenty of people
around. He then instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see him (Judge PASCUAL) at his office the
following day.
At about 8:30 in the morning of the following day (26 March 1993), CANDIDO CRUZ
proceeded to the office of Judge PASCUAL at the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and
thereat handed to him four (4) pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white mailing envelope
previously marked and glazed with fluorescent powder.

Submitted by:

BAUTISTA, LUDIELYN C
Constitutional Law II

In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed outside the court room and after about 15
minutes, CANDIDO CRUZ came out of the room and signaled to the Undersigned that Judge
PASCUAL had already received the marked money. The Undersigned immediately entered the
room and informed Subject about the entrapment. Subject denied having received anything from
CANDIDO CRUZ, but after a thorough search, the marked money was found inserted between
the pages of a blue book on top of his table.
Subject was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein he was subjected to
ultra violet light examination. After finding Subjects right hand for the presence of fluorescent
powder, he was booked, photographed and fingerprinted in accordance with our Standard
Operating Procedure (S.O.P.).
On even date, the results of our investigation together with the person of Judge
FILOMENO PASCUAL was referred to the Inquest Prosecutor of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, Ombudsman, with the recommendation that he be charged and prosecuted for
Bribery as defined and penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidences presented against Judge Filomeno Pascual were strong
enough to convict him.
Held:
We find that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction.
We note that the only bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted by Executive
Judge Natividad G. Dizon consist of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the
respondent, and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case of
respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The respondent was, therefore, not afforded the right to
open trial wherein respondent can confront the witnesses against him and present evidence in his
defense.
This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an administrative cases,
demand that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver
offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct
knowledge.[6] The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its
members could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and after presentation of
competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character.[7] The above-quoted
Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen short of the requirements of
due process.
The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the testimonies of
principal witness, Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI Reynaldo Olazo on several material points.
It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by someone who must have had an
ax to grind against the respondent judge but who, by reason of cowardice or lack of evidence to
Submitted by:

BAUTISTA, LUDIELYN C
Constitutional Law II

put up a righteous case, did not come out in the open and instead wrote an anonymous letter.
The letter-writer, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not specify crimes committed or illegal
acts perpetrated but charged respondent with anomalies in general terms. Respondent judge
could not have been expected to make a valid answer or to otherwise defend himself from such
vague accusations.
While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of the Tigas letter,
ordered the NBI investigating team to make a discreet investigation of respondent, the NBI
team had instead caused an instigation or the entrapment of respondent judge. Not having found
letter-writer Tigas and concluding that no such person exists, they sought out an accused before
respondents court who could possibly be respondent judges virtual victim. Approached by the
NBI team was Candido Cruz, a person who had been brought before the Municipal Trial Court
of Angat, Bulacan, for preliminary investigation on the charge of Frustrated Murder.
Respondent judge gave judgment to the effect that the crime committed by Candido Cruz was
that of physical injuries merely. He declared then that he had original jurisdiction to try the case.
But, respondents action in this regard was perpetrated some time before Candido Cruz
was persuaded to participate in what they (the NBI agents) called entrapment operation. The
opportune time to bribe the respondent should have been before he acted in reducing Cruz
criminal liability from Frustrated Murder to Physical Injuries. No bribe was asked then. It was
unlikely that respondent would ask for it on the date of the entrapment on March 26, 1993, the
favorable verdict having been rendered already.
It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted[8] that, despite the fact that he
scoured the table of the respondent in search of the envelope, with marked money in it, no
envelope was found and so he had to call Candido Cruz who was already outside so that Cruz
can locate the envelope.
In view of these antecedents, we find reason to favorably consider the allegations of
respondent judge in his defense that, at around 9:30 oclock in the morning of March 26, 1993,
Candido Cruz, along with the NBI agents, went to the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan.
Candido Cruz, alone, went inside respondent judges chambers, located thereat, and placed
before respondent judge an envelope containing marked money. Respondent judge thought that
what was placed before him was a pleading for filing and so, he told Candido Cruz to file it with
the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is, in a room adjacent to his chambers. Candido Cruz
replied that it was the money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing this reply, respondent
judge suddenly erupted in anger. He grabbed the envelope on the desk and hurled it at Candido
Cruz. The envelope fell on the floor. Respondent judge then picked it up and inserted it inside
the pocket of Cruz polo shirt and drove him out of his chambers. NBI Agents Villarta and
Olazo immediately entered the door of the judges chambers, introduced themselves, and told
respondent judge that the money that Cruz gave him was marked. Respondent judge told them
that he did not receive or accept money from Candido Cruz. After respondent judge said this,
the NBI Agents nevertheless proceeded to search the room, examined tables, drawers, and every
nook and cranny of respondents chambers, and the pockets of the pants of respondent judge.

Submitted by:

BAUTISTA, LUDIELYN C
Constitutional Law II

Even after rigid search of the chambers of respondent, the NBI Agents failed to find the envelope
containing marked money allegedly given by Candido Cruz to respondent judge.

Valenzuela v Bellosillo
Adm. Matter No. MTJ-00-1241
January 20, 2000
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 97-445-MTJ)
PURISIMA, J.:
Facts:
Respondent Judge is being charged with gross violation of the constitutional right of
subject accused to assistance by counsel of her own choice, gross misconduct, oppression,
partiality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.
In a BP 22 case, Judge allegedly granted bail to the accused despite not being
accompanied and represented by her counsel at that time. It appears that Judge granted bail
without the assistance of the counsel of record, Atty. Valenzuela and he even suggested that the
latter should be replaced by another counsel. Aghast by such decision, Atty. V filed his Notice of
Withdrawal, in conformity with his clients decision, Meriam Colapo. Subsequently, he filed the
instant administrative complaint against respondent Judge. To support his position, he attached
an Affidavit allegedly executed by his client Colapo. However, during the hearing of the case, he
failed to present Colapo as Witness as she was allegedly out of the country although she was
willing to testify at that time.
Held:
NOT GUILTY. On the issue of granting bail without the assistance of counsel, the Court
held that it was valid and sufficiently based on the Manifestation filed by Atty. Valenzuela. With
regard to the alleged act of respondent Judge suggesting to the accused that she should change
her counsel (complainant Atty. V) and recommending a different lawyer, the Court found that
the evidence adduced by the complainant was insufficient to substantiate the charges against
him. The only evidence offered by complainant was the Affidavit of his client Meriam Colapo,
and it cannot be the basis of a finding of guilt even in an administrative case. The complainants
failure to present his principal witness, in the absence of other evidence to prove his charges was
fatal and said Affidavit cannot be given credence and is inadmissible without the said affiant
being placed on the witness stand.
The employment or profession of a person is a property right within the constitutional
guaranty of due process of law. This applies also to Judges. Respondent judge cannot therefore
be adjudged guilty of the charges against him without affording him a chance to confront the said
witness, Meriam Colapo. Otherwise, his right to due process would be infringed.

Submitted by:

BAUTISTA, LUDIELYN C
Constitutional Law II

Lumiqued v Exevea
G.R. No. 117565
November 18, 1997
ROMERO, J.:
Facts:
Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged with malversation
through falsification. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints
were conducted but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. He moved for its resetting, to enable
him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued
nor his counsel appeared. President Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.
Issue:
Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry?
Held:
The right to counsel which cannot be waived unless the wavier is in writing is a right
afforded to an accused during custodial investigation and may not be invoked in administrative
cases because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine the facts which merit the
dismissal measures against the erring officer/employee with the purpose of maintaining the
dignity of the government service.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to
explain ones side. Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee
was cured by Lumiqueds appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the
constitution or law.
Fabella v CA
G.R. No. 110379
November 28, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Secretary Carino of DECS charged the teachers of Mandaluyong High School who had
participated inwalkouts and strikes. DECS committee then rendered a decision declaring the
teachers guilty as chargedand ordered for their dismissal. Teachers argued that the composition
of the committee was illegal for failure to comply with the procedures prescribed in R.A. 4670,
otherwise known as Magna Carta for Teachers and that their dismissal was ordered without
any formal investigation therefore, they aredenied of due process. The secretary defended that
the said law was already repealed by P.D. 807.
ISSUE:
Whether the teachers were denied of due process?

Submitted by:

BAUTISTA, LUDIELYN C
Constitutional Law II

HELD:
Yes. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the
administrative chargesagainst private respondents did not include a representative of the local
or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers organization as required by
Section 9 of RA 4670.
It was also notrepealed by the PD for being a special law.Accordingly, these committees
were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedingsundertaken by them were
necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private
respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers organization in thesecommittees
was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would havegiven
substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of
procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to
be heard.Therefore, there is no formal investigation and they were denied of due process.
Contention: Waiver of Right of be Heard
Committee considered that the teachers waived their right to be heard because they
walked out during the proceedings.Ruling - not tenable because the walk out was staged in
protest against the procedures of the committeeand its refusal to give the teachers counsel a
copy of the guidelines. The committee concluded itsinvestigation and ordered the dismissal of
the teachers without giving the teachers the right to full accessof the evidence against them and
the opportunity to defend themselves.
RE: Hearing presupposes a competent and impartial tribunal
Due process of law requires notice and hearing. Hearing, on the other hand, presupposes
a competent andimpartial tribunal. The right to be heard and, ultimately, the right to due process
of law lose meaning inthe absence of an independent, competent and impartial tribunal.
Re: Administrative Due Process
In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondents legal rights;(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights;(3) a
tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and(4) a finding by
said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the
hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected
RE: Right to Strike
While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they
are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of
mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of
government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or associations,
without including the right to strike.

Submitted by:

BAUTISTA, LUDIELYN C
Constitutional Law II

Exceptions:
If not prejudicial to the public, or they did it during their break time, weekends, or
holidays.

Summary Dismissal Board v Torcita

G.R. No. 130442
April 6, 2000
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Facts:
On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with his aide,
PO2 Java, in the front seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a
Mazda pick-up owned by Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with
four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza
and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a
vehicular collision almost took place, it accelerated speed and proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a
sugarcane plantation owned by the congressman. The red Cortina Ford followed also at high
speed until it reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and the confrontation with
del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified himself but the same had no effect. PO2
Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them and that it is dangerous for them to
continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up. Torcita,upon the arrival of the back-up
force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del
Rosario were. On 6 July 1994, 12 verified administrative complaints were filed against Torcita
for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and
Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban. The 12
administrative complaints were consolidated into 1 major complaint for conduct unbecoming of
a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find sufficient evidence to
establish that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place
between the parties, nor that the urinating incident took place, and held that the charges of
violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. Still, while the Board found that Torcita
was "in the performance of his official duties" when the incident happened, he allegedly
committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty (for being in the influence of alcohol
while in performance of duty) and was suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for the same
period of time. Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the Philippine
National Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was
not charged (lack of procedural due process of law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which
was denied. The RTC granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of
the questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the
performance of duty. The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could not have
been guilty of irregularity considering that the 12 cases were eventually dismissed. The Board
filed the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Submitted by:

BAUTISTA, LUDIELYN C
Constitutional Law II

Issue:
Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach of internal discipline,
when the original charges against him were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal
Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and
Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.
Held:
Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent be informed of the specific
charges against him. The absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually
found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal
process. While the definition of the more serious offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a
finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and
tried cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process.
Herein, the 12 administrative cases filed against Torcita did not include charges or offenses
mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the performance of
official duty. There is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that
Torcita was also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic
drinks while in the performance of his duties. The omission is fatal to the validity of the
judgment finding him guilty of the offense for which he was not notified nor charged. Further,
the cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal
discipline by taking drinks while in the performance of same" should have been substantiated by
factual findings referring to this particular offense. Even if he was prosecuted for irregular
performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in
the performance of duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor; he
was on a private trip fetching his wife.
Office of the Ombudsman v Coronel
G.R. No. 164460
June 27, 2006
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
In administrative cases, a finding of guilt must be supported by substantial evidence. In
the present case, an unauthenticated photocopy of an alleged receipt does not constitute
substantial evidence to show that respondent is guilty of dishonesty. In fact, absent any
authentication, the photocopy is inadmissible in evidence; at the very least, it has no probative
value.
Facts:
Carmencita D. Coronel is a Senior Accounting Processor of the Linamon Water District,
Lanao del Norte. Board of Directors of Linamon Water District, by virtue of Resolution No. 056,
Series of 1997, designated [respondent] as Officer-in-Charge, effective October 1, 1997 until a
General Manager shall have been appointed. In the morning of October 14, 1998, [respondent]
called for a meeting the officers of the different Water Districts in Lanao del Norte and Lanao
del Sur. Since it was nearing lunchtime, the group opted to continue their meeting the luncheon
meeting, attended by more or less ten (10) persons. [respondent] paid for the lunch in the amount
of [P]esos (P1,213.00), as shown in cash Invoice No. 0736 dated October 14, 1998.[respondent]
claimed for reimbursement of her expenses covered by Voucher No. 98-11-23, chargeable
Submitted by:

BAUTISTA, LUDIELYN C
Constitutional Law II

against the representation and entertainment account of her office. That very same day, the
voucher was approved and [respondent] got her reimbursement in the amount of One Thousand
Two [H]undred Thirteen [P]esos (P1,213.00). Pedro C. Sausal, Jr. was appointed General
Manager of Linamon Water District filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a sworn
letter-complaint against herein Coronel for dishonesty. The complaint alleges that [respondent]
falsified the cash invoice she submitted for reimbursement by making it appear that the
(P1,213.00) when in fact, it was only (P213.00), as reflected in the photocopy of the original
duplicate of cash invoice No. 0736 dated October 14, 1998.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this office finds and so holds that respondent
CARMENCITA D. CORONEL is guilty of DISHONESTY and is hereby DISMISSED from the
service, with forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits, pursuant to Section 22 (a) in
relation to Sec. 9 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987. She is disqualified from re-employment in the national and local
governments, as well as in any agency, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not Coronel was deprived of due process
Whether or not the administrative proceedings of the Ombudsman erred in the decision
rendered.
Held:
The notation does not deny respondent of her right to due process. In administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process lies simply in the opportunity to explain ones side or to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What is proscribed is the absolute
lack of notice or hearing. In this case, respondent was given every opportunity to be heard.
Significantly, her intelligible pleadings before the CA and this Court indicate that she knew the
bases for the ombudsmans Decision. In fact, she very ably pinpointed its alleged errors that she
thought would merit our review. Not having been left in the dark as to how it was reached,
respondents insistence on a denial of due process has no legal leg to stand on.
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is
substantial evidence;that is, such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. In the instant case, the complainant did not present evidence to
support his theory that the photocopy of the original duplicate reflected the true amount, or that
OR No. 0736 had indeed been falsified. That oversight was fatal to the discharge of his burden of
proof. A reasonable mind will not carelessly jump to the conclusion that respondent is the guilty
party.
The complainants evidence to prove falsification consisted of an unauthenticated45
photocopy of the original duplicate. He could have obtained an affidavit from the restaurant
proprietor or employee who had issued the receipt, in order to attest to its due execution and
authenticity. Absent any proof of due execution and authenticity, the alleged photocopy of the
original duplicate of OR No. 0736 does not convince us that it is an accurate reflection of the
actual bill incurred.

Submitted by:

BAUTISTA, LUDIELYN C
Constitutional Law II

While this Court adheres to a liberal view of the conduct of proceedings before
administrative agencies, it also consistently requires some proof of authenticity or reliability as a
condition for the admission of documents.
Absent any such proof of authenticity, the photocopy of the original duplicate should be
considered inadmissible and, hence, without probative value.
Given the flimsy charge and the paucity of the evidence against respondent, there is no
need for her to present additional evidence to vindicate herself. The Office of the Ombudsman
should have dismissed the Administrative Complaint against her in the first place. Clearly, her
guilt was not proven by substantial evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Respondent Carmencita D. Coronel is hereby
EXONERATED of the charge against her for lack of substantial evidence. No pronouncement as
to costs. SO ORDERED.

Submitted by:

BAUTISTA, LUDIELYN C
Constitutional Law II