The New War Frontier:

Understanding Modern Insurgency Wars and the Syrian Civil War through the
Iraq Insurgencies during 2006-2009.
By Jake Diliberto Ph D (ABD).
University of Birmingham UK

This paper is for 2014 APSA Annual Conference not for publication.

The New War Frontier:

Understanding Modern Insurgency Wars and the Syrian Civil War through the
Iraq Insurgencies during 2006-2009.
The Syria civil war has created a series of security concerns for the Syrian people,
the Assad Regime, and the international community more broadly. One of the
components that complicate the crisis in Syria is neighboring Iraq and its ongoing contest
with a potent insurgency called the Islamic State. The Islamic state crosses its borders
into Syria and exasperates the violence in the surrounding region (Byman 2012).
Furthermore, competing interests continue to emerge in the region from powerful states
including the US, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Iran. Notwithstanding these convoluted
issues, the region itself poses difficult challenges due to the USs history of occupation in
Iraq from 2003-2011. As a result, President Obama and many Washington policy makers
continue to tread softly with US foreign policy and actions, regarding how to proceed
with these insurgencies along with the broader troubled region in a post-US occupied
Iraq.
The problems in Syria are not unprecedented. During the US occupation of Iraq,
American policy makers and military commanders gained insight to the militias fighting
in the region. Then and today, many policy makers labeled the armed groups as Sunni,
Shiite, and Al-Qaeda (McCain 2012, Ollivant 2013). Subsequently, the common view
amongst scholars, policy makers, and soldiers alike is that these three major groups
constructed the insurgency in Iraq during the Counter Insurgency campaign from 20062009 (Kilcullen Natonski, Ricks 2012). However, this same set of classifications creates
an over simplification for the complexity of the problems in Iraq, Syria, and the
surrounding region.

During US occupation of Iraq, neighboring Syria acted as a safe haven for many
of the Iraq insurgents. After the US left Iraq, many of the insurgent groups in Iraq formed
independent groups in Syria. These civilians and Syrian army defectors broke ranks from
the Assad Government and formed a conglomeration known as the Free Syrian Army.
Because of these formed a loose political alignment; a few rebel leaders formed the
Supreme Military Counsel to coordinate the groups.

Meanwhile, in 2011 Iraq still

struggled against al-Qaeda in Iraq that acts as a group within the ghosts of an ongoing
conflict with the Maliki government from tensions existing from 2005. This paper argues
that these two cases demonstrate a new and emerging insurgency phenomenon argued in
this paper as the New War Frontier.
This paper will argue that the Civil war within Syria is a new kind of emerging
war model that is unique to modern changes in insurgency warfare. In previous
insurgency wars, models used to understand the conflict are binary (Kilcullen, 2012)
Meaning, the wars were primarily focusing on two entities focused on the state and nonstate groups. This paper makes the case that previous models are somewhat misleading to
the current conflict zones. This paper makes a new case that in analyzing future Civil
Wars and insurgency conflicts, scholars and policy makers will require new theory and
new levels of analysis in order to cogently, and coherently interpret current and future
conflicts while planning US foreign and defense policy. While the argument in this paper
does not exhaust every insurgency in existence, it makes significant headway in
expanding previously developed theories and levels of analysis for insurgency warfare.
The argument in this paper bases itself in the social science method of case study

research. It is the attempt of this paper to contribute to confusing and convoluted

discussions in and surrounding US foreign policy and the Iraq and Syrian insurgencies.
This paper relies on the Iraq Case Study from the period of 2006-2009. The data in this
study largely stems from field research conducted from 2012-2014 containing extensive
interviews with key individuals such as captured insurgents, senior military advisors, and
individuals with key access to insiders information including congressional staff, and
journalists. Secondary sources also provide this study for background information and
secondary accounts of the relevant material used in this article.
Theory: Reviewing and Expanding Concepts Surrounding Insurgency
In past military campaigns, insurgency is a common form of political revolt.
Historical accounts of the Jewish revolts against the Roman Empire, the French and
Spanish Guerrilla Campaigns, Mao Tse-tungs Peoples revolutions, and the French and
British Campaigns within the Middle East and African Maghreb demonstrate common
themes of insurgency and revolutionary warfare. The common theme within these broad
revolts is the desire of indigenous people groups to pursue their own political interests to
independently govern their society. These political revolts contain a modus operdai that
is not always universal, yet most of the insurgencies of the 20th century adapt what John
Mackinlay and David Kilcullen call a Maoist model (Kilcullen 2012, Mackinlay 2009).
In Mao Tse-tungs seminal work, On Guerrilla Warfare, he articulates the rural uprisings
through the concept of insurgency. Insurgency is a formal doctrine that guides a weaker
political force to accomplish its goals by political revolt and employing a strategy of
revolutionary guerrilla warfare (Tse-Tung and Griffith 2000). In modern cases, armed

groups conduct a sustained campaign in an organizational structure of a non-state group

that uses the tactics of guerrilla war with a strategy for revolutionary political change.
The principle tool in Maos revolutionary warfare is subversion. Roger Trinquier defined
subversion as, interlocking systems of actions, political, economic, psychological and
military that aims at the overthrow of established authority in a country (Kitson 1971:5).
Subversion is not just the tactic applied as kidnapping or extortion (Department of
Defense 2010). Therefore, subversion is best understood as a system of resistance that the
political movements operate
Modern insurgency exists because of an attempt to subvert the legitimate
authority of the state. The US Department of Defense defines this action by the
insurgency, and it classifies the political orientation of each group stating the insurgency
is, "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through
use of subversion and armed conflict (Petraeus et al. 2007). As seen through DoDs
definition, though Maos theory of insurgency is foundational, it is not exhaustive.
David Kilcullen identifies one key difference in Mao and modern insurgencies by
stating modern insurgencies are more dynamic (Kilcullen 2012). Meaning they are
capable of responding more rapidly than previous insurgencies. Kilcullen says this is the
case because modern insurgencies are more connected and able to recruit from more
sources than anything of the Maoist era (Kilcullen 2012). Moreover, these modern
insurgencies are capable of more violence with less personal than previous insurgencies.
Insurgencies that predate the modern era have a variety of tools at their disposal such as
banditry, partisan uprising, and rudimentary guerilla warfare. These early insurgencies
were not able to conduct campaigns at the rate of speed as modern insurgencies that

contribute to modern insurgency and its capacity for increased violence. (Beckett 2001:123). Steve Metz contends that modern insurgencies posses a far more complex and
shifting participation than traditional insurgencies (Metz 2007, Metz and Millen 2004).
Meaning that in a conflict zones with insurgencies, economic AID, general court
systems, and other non combat tools are just as much of the battle field as beans, bullets,
and band aids (Kilcullen 2012). In summary, modern insurgencies and rebellions of
antiquity are not equals, and neither equal are Maoist models and contemporary models
of insurgency.
David Kilcullen contends that, our understanding of [modern] insurgency is
somewhat still being influenced by the Cold War (Kilcullen, 2012). Advancing his
critique, Kilcullen comments about General David Petraeus influential work, The US
Counter Insurgency Manual, FM 3-24, stating [FM 3-24] is binary, it is a really good
manual for colonial counter-insurgency, fit for fighting a war of yesteryear in Vietnam,
but not necessarily for the wars of this generation (Kilcullen 2012). That is not to say the
manual is irrelevant, or absent of deep theoretical grounding, quite the opposite.
However, according to Kilcullen, the main theory within the manual constructs itself, as
binary model analogous to a zero sum game of us vs. them. Former NSC/White House
advisor, Doug Ollivant explains that this model acts as a simplification for military
planning, or as David Ucko explains as a, rational process, in which simplicity assists
military commanders in decision-making. Ollivant states, It was easier for the US to
make decisions with this [binary] model, because it makes field planning, (levels of
analysis), and campaign assessments much more sailable (Ollivant 2013).

The main difficulty in understanding insurgency wars is that the contests emerge
over a range of issues involving territory, history, ideology, and leadership. However as
the typology of each insurgency varies, no single theory or interpretation is relevant to
every insurgency (Rid 2009:255-260, Petraeus et al. 2007:3-54, Mackinlay 2009:221).
When there are insurgencies that gain support and control a population group,
largely it occurs in areas where the state is weak at employing a standardized system of
control (Kalyvas 2006:247-329). Therefore, it is best understood that criminal/antigovernment groups use violence as one of its tools, not as the end goal (Gambetta
1996:2). The violence that insurgencies use, allow them to gain political control, as Mao
famously stated, political power grows out of the barrel of a gun (Tse-Tung 1966:61).
In summary, modern insurgencies are different from ancient insurgencies. Modern
insurgencies are more capable, diverse, and advanced than past insurgencies. In addition,
it is essential to understand modern insurgencies in their context; the mistake is to use
other historical cases to provide a theoretical framework to understand modern
insurgencies.
Towards an Expanded Theory and New Levels of Analysis for Insurgencies
Clearly, the previous theories of insurgency do not adequately characterize and
modern conflict zones. Emerging conflicts with insurgencies involve more actors than
former colonial insurgencies of the past (Trinquier and Cohen 2006). In addition, 21st
century insurgencies are in a constant state of change due to the complex global political
landscape (Mackinlay 2009:143-162). Globalization is one instrument that makes a
dramatic difference from current instances of insurgency to those of past decades
(Kilcullen 2012). The world is more connected than ever, and as a result, people are

more connected, even the most rural farmer of Nigeria has access being informed by the
events occurring in London (Kilcullen 2012). Kilcullen and Mets agree that the concept
dynamic insurgencies provides newer theoretical insights of faster evolving insurgencies
(Mackinlay 2009: 144). Dynamic insurgency posses diversity in actors/groups and the
rate of speed in which groups are changing, and there needs to be a new level of analysis
to understand insurgency wars. To get at this, a new classification needs assigning.
As Mao argues, insurgencies in the past, serve as political function against the
state. However, in 2010, Deputy Secretary of Defense Michael Vickers argues that states
sponsor insurgencies as a component of foreign policy as well. Vickers indicates states
outsource insurgency instead of sending their own armed forces (Byman 2001, Vickers
2010). This form of outsourced insurgency is where host governments or external states
create an insurgency, sponsor, or manipulate an existing domestic group to launch
insurgency to accomplish political ends in a conflict zone or contest territory for the
states own political goals. These can be ongoing indefinitely or used in short intervals as
well. Moreover, outsourced insurgencies can be shifting from dormant to highly
proactive or anywhere in-between. Vickers accounts the most famous example of an
active outsourced insurgency is when the US sponsored the mujahedeen insurgents in
Afghanistan during the 1980s. Retired CIA analyst and former White House advisor
Bruce Reidel accounts outsourced insurgency in Pakistan as well. Pakistan sponsors
several insurgent groups as a function of their state, as does India (Riedel 2012, Tankel
2012, Jones and Fair 2010). Moreover, the former Soviet Union sponsored insurgencies
in Africa and South America, during the cold war as well (Blaufarb, 1977). Outsourced
insurgency serves an additional nuance that reinterprets the concept of insurgency.

However, another model exists that does not fit the non-state national model from Mao,
or in the outsourced model described by Vickers and Reidel.
In contrast to Mao or Vickers/Reidels observation of outsourced insurgency,
there are insurgent groups that also act partially as an insurgency and partially as a force
operating within a government. This is when an organization caries out governmental
duties that shares population support however acts in a semi competitive system of
control in the outlier. This hybrid model of insurgency is more cryptic and not as
obvious as a prime actor in government but the hybrid insurgent group may have existing
power share in parliament, or it may be put in charge of a certain geographic territory in
where the state does not have legal authority to govern.
Hybrid insurgencies are less overt than that of the Maoist era because they are
latent insurgencies serving in host government institutions with local or regional power
ambitions, while not holding complete control of the government. This hybrid model is
most evident in Lebanese Hezbollah. Hezbollahs legitimate political organization shares
political power with the Lebanese government and posses separate activities outside of
the state to attempt to continue to grow its influence. An example of where Hezbollah
acts separate from the interest of the state is there illicit money laundering schemes in
North Africa (Baer 2012, Biddle 2012, Byman 2012) With Hezbollah funneling illicit
cash into the Lebanese economy; it acts outside and separate from the interests of the
legitimate actions of the comprehensive government.
In very different case of Pakistan, segments of the constitutional setup allow
large parts of the state to exist as ungovernable by the government in Islamabad. As a
result, the Pakistani state has to work with these varied groups to ensure its stability, and

its national integrity. Moreover, at times Pakistan has funneled money into these armed
groups in ungoverned areas to act as a proxy against Afghanistan or Indias armed
movements. (Korb 2012, Biddle 2012) These kind of latent insurgencies act as non-state
and outsourced insurgencies alike, yet can exist either phlegmatically, highly active or
anywhere in-between depending on the events occurring at the time.
In this new paradigm, the third and most common insurgency is the non-state
insurgencies are the most common amongst traditional insurgencies in the Maoist era,
and similarly today, they are still the most common. These groups are typical non-state
organizations that are challenging the governing authority of the state as defined by Mao,
Petraeus and other traditionalist interpretations.
These differing levels of analysis understood by Mao, Vickers, and demonstrated
in practice by the Lebanese Hezbollah, indicate there are differing organizations of
insurgencies including state, hybrid, and non-state groups. Most insurgencies have robust
local political ambitions (e.g. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia, National Liberation Front, Tehrik-e-Nefaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad, Tehriki-Taliban Pakistan) while other insurgencies express have mixed ambitions due to their
domestic political affairs (Kilcullen 2012). In the case of Lebanon, local Hezbollah
operates in Lebanon, but also has political ambitions in the surrounding region. They act
locally and regionally in Syria, Israel and North Africa (Baer 2012) This is very similar to
groups such as Laskar-e-Taiba, and the TTP (Moghadam 2008, 55-60). Some other
groups are far more ambitious as observed Al-Qaeda who franchises itself across the
world by appointing leaders and regional commanders.

AQ expressed its global ambitions early on, and a vow to destroy the interstate
global system by first attacking the near enemy, and carrying out a global campaign
against the far enemy (Byman 2012). The following chart is a helpful paradigm to
configure the parameters for understanding what Metz calls the contemporary
insurgency, or what Mackinlay calls the post-Maoist insurgency. More importantly,
this assists in classifying the differences in what Kilcullen labels local and global
insurgencies.
Insurgency Organization
Non-State
Hybrid
State

Operational Capacity
Overt: dormant-active
Latent: dormant-active
Outsourced: dormant-active

Political Aspirations
local, regional, global
local, regional
local, regional

In summary, the conceptualizing of insurgency needs expanding from previous

paradigms. The model above makes theoretical headway in expanding the conceptual
framework to understanding modern insurgent organizations argued in this paper as The
New War Frontier.
New theory of insurgency in Iraq from 2006-2009
The micro level political concerns of the citizens and the actors involved in the
conflict can easily be overlooked in midst of violence and disintegration of the state.
Overlooking political grievances can occur in a broader concern to stop violence, quell
the insurgencies, or addresses issues such as the right to protect. Moreover, surrounding
states have their own security concerns that most often trump considerations over the
insurgencies in the surrounding area.
This grand masking and blurring of micro level analysis and macro level occurs
when military commanders address their own metrics for successes in operations. If a

military commander observes macro level threats and trends, any micro-makeup political
grievance becomes less important.
There are potential strengths in overlooking localized political issues in a broader
concern to establish international norms in conflict zones. However, in cases where
policy makers are considering action, state leaders and military commanders must
observe local political grievance as well as their own interests in deciding why they will
or will not take action. Moreover, these considerations are important likely to succeed. If
third party intervention is an option, success must pair with short-term ambitions and
long-term strategic goals.
In 2006, the US was involved in an all out civil war in Iraq, coupled with an antistate insurgency war. However, by 2009, a large pacification settled over the country, and
the violence largely ceased. Since this occurred, most of the debates surrounding this
phenomenon involve the concept of counter insurgency (COIN hereafter). While COIN is
an important debate, the expanded theory of insurgency argued above provides more data
points to consider than how the insurgency ended through a COIN campaign. The point
here is to understand the insurgencies through a new theory base and understand the
diverse political differences of the actors. This is foundational in order to understand Iraq
today and to plan for Syria as well as other future insurgencies. Iraq during 2006-2009
shows clear and distinct differences in political groups that blend, blur, and converge on
more than sectarian lines. This reality validates the improved theory above. Indeed, in
Iraq the data indicates the insurgencies operating were not simply four groups of Sunni,
Shiite, Kurds, and Al-Qaeda. Instead, Iraq demonstrates a complexity of local, regional,
and global actors that split at times along sectarian lines, but were not limited to them.

Indeed, these actors had varying political objectives that ranged from state originated
objectives, to localized political goals, and tribal allegiances. Lastly, the insurgencies in
Iraq act in all three forms of outsourced, hybrid, and non-state functionality.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI hereafter) pursued its subversive actions and shifted from
a criminal militia to an outright competition for political authority in 2006. In 2006, AQI
was trying to unite Sunni Iraqis across Iraqs western, Anbar Province with a radical and
new political vision for Iraq. As AQI took more control, they became more corrosive
than any other insurgent group.
Some members were forcing their way into marriages with Iraqi families, which
angered many locals. AQI also publicly beat and murdered people just to show
their authority. AQI cut the fingers off of people who smoked in public.
(Kilcullen 2012).
Further complicating the AQI efforts, many street thugs who murdered, stole, and
created trouble, did so while waving the AQ flag, using the AQ name but possessing no
affiliation whatsoever (Ollivant, 2013). There was no coherence amongst the groups
killing, and murdering, the only thing that made sense was that killings were occurring
and people were getting paid to do it (Hoh, 2014). An Iraqi named Ibrahim recounted,
In the early days of the war, the terrorists came to my door step with weapons
and knives wearing black masks, they were not just evil individuals, they were an
army of evil, they took my oldest son and told me to have 2,000 USD for him by
morning or he would be killed, I sold everything I owned, and took the last
amount of money I had, and waited till morning, my family was terrorized and in
tears all night. We did not sleep. They came back and I gave them the money,
and then they slit my sons throat in front of me and my family, they were Iraqis, I
could tell by their speech, but they did not think like Iraqis, they acted like evil
satans from another place. We left as soon as we could and came to Beirut
(Baghdadi, 2010).
Ibrahim Baghdadis story is one of thousands that describe the horror and confusion of
the average Iraqi. The division in political groups alienated many political leaders. Sheikh
Hareth al-Dhari, one of Anbar's prestigious tribes and head of the anti-government

Association of Muslim Scholars of Iraq, called on Osama bin Laden to stop some of the
tensions emerging between Al Qaeda in Iraq and the local Sunni insurgency.
I call on Sheikh Osama bin Laden in the name of the Islam for which he fights to
intervene and to instruct Al Qaeda to adhere to the rules of proper jihad and to
respect the people who had previously opened their arms to Al Qaeda," Dhari's
remarks indicated that the US and Iraqis still have much work ahead to fully
dislodge Al Qaeda from all the Anbar tribes." If he [bin Laden] has no influence
over Al Qaeda in Iraq, then he must say it so that we can decide how to deal with
those who have hurt our main cause, which is liberating Iraq," (Dagher 2007)
In the middle of AQI/ISI corrosive actions, some Anbaris attempted to resist. To
continue to take control AQI used intimidation and terror against the independent and
reluctant Anbaris (Kilcullen 2012).
Dynamic Changes in the Insurgency and localized Iraqi politics
The diverse set of insurgent groups created such great tension in Iraq. By 2005,
Marine intelligence analysis said Anbar Province was untenable (Ballard, 2012: 155).
AQI had manipulated much of Anbar, and the Sunni community. Sheikh Abdul Rahman
al-Janabi accounted while in the middle of negotiations with AQ chieftains to avert
conflict with them, AQ attacked with 800 men against al-Janabi killing 10 of his family,
and AQ destroyed homes and vehicles of al-Janabi (McWilliams and Awakening 2009:
67). Furthermore, al-Janabi accounted that while AQ was putting fear in his people, all
the other militias were as well, they issued fatwas against us and they sent out leaflets,
we tried uprisings against AQ in 2004, and 2005 (McWilliams and Awakening 2009:
71). As 2006 progressed Sunnis all over central Iraq suffered under more and more
attacks, until they realized they could defeat both their own Shiite countrymen, the
Coalition, [disaffected opposing Sunni groups], if they stayed aligned with AQ (Ballard
2012: 156). One rebelling tribal leader Sheik Abdul Sittar Eftikhan al-Rishawi ad-Dulami

said, We began to see what they were actually doing in al-Anbar province. They were
not respecting us in any way. Their tactics are not acceptable (Ballard 2012: 345). Sheik
Abdul Sittar Eftikhan al-Rishawi ad-Dulami remarks indicate Iraqis experienced shifting
allegiances and political differences that were emerging across Iraq. Feeling political
pressure, the Sunni tribal sheiks around Iraq, but mainly in al-Anbar province,
independently of Americans help, began to push back against the ideology of the AQI
slaughter brigades. In late summer of 2006, Sittar began to enlist his fellow sheiks in a
movement of self-determination called the Sahwa or translated as Awakening
(Kilcullen 2012) The Awakening was an independent movement, which the Sunnis
began evicting AQ, the US came along side this movement, but did not originate it
(Natonski 2013). Over the fall and winter months, the awakening movements gained
support from neutral tribes, and began to take control back from AQI. Tom Ricks argues
that a key example came from the cooperation from the Albu Soda tribe (Ricks 2009:69).
The newly revitalized tribal cooperation and commitment made it much more difficult for
al Qaeda to penetrate al-Anbar society. David Kilcullen indicates, this was a turning point
for the war, and when Iraqis did not tolerate foreigners in their neighbourhoods, within
a matter of weeks, local tribes took control of their neighbourhoods that were previously
controlled by AQI (Kilcullen 2012). One speech by a tribal leader highlights the
rejection of foreigners, If it was not for the coyotes among us, no one would have been
killed, kidnapped, or bombed. You know who among you brought the Yemeni with the
suicide vest (McCary 2009: 52). The sheikh speech indicates without local support, AQI
could not manipulate Iraq any longer.
Complexities to the Shiite Infighting

The diversity in Sunni insurgent groups provides a clearer point of view in

understanding the newer theory of insurgency. In addition to understanding the Sunni
components, the other dominant and complex insurgency came from the Shiite side that
assists in understanding the micro level complexities. Even before the invasion and
occupation of Iraq, anti-American sentiments were vast amongst Iraqi Shiite. Large parts
of the Shiites did not trust the Coalition for several reasons, but most importantly, they
did not believe in the political objectives described in US policy and by the US military
(Natonski 2013). Some elements within the Shiite supported the overthrowing of
Saddam, but they also feared for their own survival. Ayatollah Hakim stated,
They [Shiite] did not believe that the US was overthrowing Saddam to bring
democracy. They remember how the Americans had betrayed them before when
they [Shiite] rose against the Baathist regime in 1991, and the US sat by and
watched. The Americans and their allies betrayed the Shiites of Iraq once before
and they might do it again. This time we know better than to trust the Americans
(Hashim 2005: 286).
This feeling of betrayal and alienation inspired political action and on April 8, 2003, as
the Coalition toppled Baghdad; an Iraqi cleric named Ayatollah Kazem al-issued a fatwa
urging the Iraqi Shiite to seize power or Iraq (Kagan 2007: 11). Understanding this
nuance, Linda Robinson accounts that, Shiite politics were the most complicated
amongst any Iraqi groups (Robinson 2008:145). The basic struggle split between three
differing political movements, the Islamic Supreme Council, Muqtada al Sadrs groups,
and the Islamic Dawa party. (Robinson 2008:145). These three main groups possessed a
variety of armed militias that at times followed a political vision, and at times looked
after their own well being (Baer 2012). Nonetheless, the single unifying element was a
general feeling of Anxiety (Hoh 2014). Differing Shiite political groups spun into

armed groups that spread as the US and AQI entered Iraq.

One of the more important movements stems from a radical Shiite cleric named
Moqtada al-Sadr. Sadr offers the confidence in survival of traditional Shiite communities
and their right to self govern, the Sadrists sought to establish their own power base
amongst the Shiites. The Shiite political power structures themselves inside the halls of
the large Kufa mosque near Najaf, Iraq. (Allawi 2008) Najaf is a key city in southern Iraq
and the Middle East more broadly because; Najaf gets more travellers than any other
besides Mecca and Medina. Najaf is central for Shiite political and religious
promulgation.
As far back as August of 2003, Sadr created a shadow government, one in which
he modelled after Lebanese Hezbollah, where he began to organize a political party and
a train his Mahdi Army (Kagan 2007: 13). Well into the early days of the Iraq war, Sadrs
brigades pushed into communities from Nassariya all the way to Sadr City-Baghdad.
Sadr possessed a large audience and easily recruited militants that later identified
themselves as the Mahdi Army (Cockburn 2008:18-30). In the absence of any central
political power in Baghdad, the Mahdi Army penetrated large parts of Shiite society and
manipulated a persuasive power base by taking over major institutions such as schools
and hospitals. Furthermore, the Mahdi army affected the daily life of Iraqis as well, they
patrolled the streets and made women change the veils they wore and issued death
sentences to unaligned insurgent groups.
The Mahdi Army firebombed stores, destroyed an entire village of gypsies, held
daily protests against the U.S., and generally created terror, intimidation, and fear in
anyone who did not support them (Stewart and Film-Club 2005). In addition, the Mahdi

Army launched attacks all over southern Iraq targeting the US and its Coalition from
Baghdad, al-Kut, al-Amara, al-Najaf, and far south to Nassirya (Allawi, 2007). In effect,
the Mahdi army performed all the things Sadaams special police did to the Shiite when
he was in power (Today 2012). Sadr was supplied with money and weapons by Iranian
special Quds forces (Cockburn 2008). Sadrs militias desired their own path and their
own decisions on their destiny (Crain 2008). The American military was not going to
decide it, the Sunnis were not going to decide it, and the Iranian government was not
going to terminally decide the Iraqi Shiite faith, nor would Zarqawi.
The Shiite groups were a political force independent from the rest of Iraq. Inside
this society there were as many opinions and political directives as there were in Sunni
society (Ollivant, 2013). In some ways, the Mahdi army acted as an insurgency within
an insurgency. It also acted as a hybrid insurgency. The Shiite carried large parts of
Iraqi power, yet Sadr mobilized his people against their political allies. The most
prominent security concern was a unifying political interest amongst Shiite society, to
never turn to Saddam days, and avoid American manipulation (Ricks 2010, Ricks 2012).
Sadr acted as a unifying voice, yet a variety of local leaders, city managers, and clerics
wanted their say as well. There is a clear class and social basis to Moqtada al Sadrs
insurgency (Hashim 2005:252). Though Sadrs militia was influential, its actions forced
the Coalition to seclude the Sadrists from the early political processes in favour of other
Shiite political groups.
Hostile Neighbours, Safe Havens, and Outsourced Insurgents
In contrast to AQI, the former regime loyalists, or the nationalist/religious Iraqis
such as Sadr, several outside nationalist actors had contributions to the insurgency.

Nefarious actors came to Iraq because of the foreign policy of bordering Syria and Iran.
Syria and Iran outsourced insurgencies for a variety of reasons. Petraeus identified a more
expansive insurgency, identifying groups as Sunni, AQI, and Shiite. However, there
were smaller and lesser-known insurgent groups.
At the outset of the war, Syrian Intelligence and Iranian military units funded
operations in Iraq. In the case of Syria, agents were attempting to unite Baathists between
Syria and Iraq. In the testimony from First Lieutenant Ahmad Fadi Abdallah, of the
Syrian intelligence, he articulated how Syrian intelligence was ordered to fund terrorist
activities in order to reunify Syria and Iraq (TV 2005d). Abdallah claims pay and enters
into Iraq to unite with Baathists in Iraq and bridge Syrian and Iraqi Baathists in order to
unifying the two states.
Another illustration is Dania Saman Alin, a Christian who dresses as a Muslim
woman. Alin claims to acts on behalf of the Syrian Intelligence organization as a secret
operative. Formerly a political prisoner, sentenced in Damascus, serving in Adra Prison,
the Syrian government tortured her until she agrees to act within an outsourced
insurgency and subversive operations in Iraq. In her testimony before the Iraqi/Coalition
authorities she said,
I was paid 450 USD to come to Iraq, and gather intelligence. My daughter was
held captive by Brigadier General Alaa Al-Saleh, he is holding my daughter Nara,
until I give them information. I was trained in computers, and know how to
access the Syrian intelligence web site Al-Zahra AlBidhaa (TV 2005e).
Further evidence presented in US financial investigations. The US Dept of treasury
investigated and found the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security "supported
[militant] groups as well as its central role in perpetrating human rights abuses against the

citizens of Iran. Commentating on this matter, Admiral Mike Mullen said Iranians were
supporting insurgent groups with weapons and shaped explosives effective at penetrating
armor. "Iran is very directly supporting extremist Shiite groups which are killing our
troops," Furthermore, Mullen said, "there's no reason for me to believe that they're going
to stop. In addition the Quds Force, the special operations branch of Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps, has "gone to a more sophisticated program with a smaller
set of extremists" by narrowing down the number of Shiite [militant] groups it supports.
Field commander, General Odierno acknowledged the debate over whether Iranian
support for the three main Shiite terror groups in Iraq includes backing Iran's government
(Roggio 2010). "It's very difficult to say if the extremist groups are directly connected to
the Iranian government," Odierno said. "But we do know that many of them live in Iran,
many of them get trained in Iran, and many of them get weapons from Iran" (Roggio
2010). This kind of subversion occurred from 2004 and still exists to the present. These
groups report their attacks by uploading their recordings and post them on the Internet
boasting cooperation from Iran.
Muqtada al Sadr, the leader of the Mahdi Army and its militant Promise Day
Brigade, lived in Qom, Iran for a period of time. By Sadrs direction, the League of the
Righteous, the Promise Day Brigades, and the Hezbollah Brigades carried out attacks
against US and Iraqi forces as well as against Iraqi leaders who threaten Shiite authority
as well as challenge Iran's agenda in Iraq.
In opposition to the Baathist nationalists, and the Iranian Shiite influence in
southern Iraq, Kurdish political authority developed as their own power bases that sought
independent security. As previously identified, the 2005 elections proved to be

problematic for the Sunni; however, the Iraqi state demonstrated corruption and the
Kurds of the north found it problematic as well.
In the north, confrontations between armed Sunni militia groups and the large
Kurdish Peshmerga forces (Allawi 2007:87-97, TV 2005a). The Kurdish militias saw the
fall of Baghdad, as an opportunity to expand their influence from Mosul into mixed areas
of Diyala, Nineva, and Wasit. Hashim accounts, The Kurds do not care about Iraq, the
Kurds care about Kurdistan (Hashim 2005:269). In addition to the Kurdish pressures in
the north, the Shiite militias in the south, and the Sunni communities also possessed
militant groups gaining a powerful presence in their own neighborhoods. The shifting
insurgency suffered from the contending nationalities of bordering non state foreign
insurgents found in AQI, but also the ethnic Kurds of the north, and religious majority in
the Shiite, and Sunni establishments. The insurgency also contained actors from the
competing states of Syria and Iran.
Summary to the Complexities of Violence in Iraq from 2006-2009
Explaining the Iraq insurgency is complex and difficult. Simplifying it to three or
four groups makes it easy to digest, but does not help in providing sophisticated
assessment of interests, objectives, and long term planning for policy makers. As the
previous sections have identified, the insurgency was dynamic, evolving, and in a state
of constant change (Kilcullen 2012). Moreover, Iraqis experiences with Zarqawi and
Sadrs insurgent groups shaped society even more. Zarqawi and Sadrs groups form out
of differing religious, theological, and ideological ties. However, in the Sunni sector, the
tribal/nationalist ideologue membership affected former regime loyalists. The religiously
motivated groups ideologically align themselves, seeking a purist Islamic state. This

support came from both the Wahabbi Saudi religious establishment, and the Iranian
Shiite theocratic support. However, Sunni and Shiite communities theology, culture, and
tradition trumps survival and a conceptual state of Iraq became less important.
Iraqis struggled between nationalist or religious identity from 2004-2006, both
Sunni groups and Shiite shifted in priority at times while balancing both religious and
national identify. Ahmed Hashim states, these organizations [range in perspective] from
those that believe that they have a right to resist occupation and do not feel it is necessary
to develop a more complex ideological formation for their resistance, to actors who have
articulated solid nationalist and Islamist principles to justify their resistance activities
(Hashim 2009:19). The lack of complex ideological formations or changing
perspectives explain why Sunni groups often changed their names, reassigned
themselves as insurgents or later as allies with each other depending on the year of the
campaign, and at times different groups went from a political group to criminal
enterprise (Ollivant 2013). Moreover, these militant groups demonstrated their priorities
or lack there of by showing times of activity or shifting from hyperactivity to a virtual
poltergeist.
However, identifying the insurgency as Sunni/Shiite/AQ served the interests of
the US in performing COIN in Iraq, despite its obvious inaccurate description of the
insurgency. Petraeus described the insurgency as Sunni/Shiite/AQ served the military
in conducting a COIN operation because it made it easy to divide Iraqi society (Ollivant
2013). Senator McCain argues the outcomes of Iraq occur in 2006-2009 because of US
troops and Petraeus defeating AQI. However, the evidence in this paper argues that due
to the changing dynamic complexities of the conflict environment many Iraqis made a

pledge of allegiance to more than one political group. This depends on a variety of social
variables that are germane to each individual, the time, the location, the tribal and
religious connection of said groups all played a part in the outcomes of Iraq.

Learning from Iraq and Planning for Syria and Future Insurgency Wars
There is an increasing likelihood for more civil wars and insurgency campaigns. The new
theory argued for above and demonstrated in the Iraq case indicates, overlooking local
political ambitions is useful in categorizing society and planning military operations,
however it does not help in planning for long term political processes that hold positive
lasting bonds of peace and regional stabilization.
In 2011, the problems beseeching Iraq bled over into Syria. Like radiation from a
Trinble meltdown, the toxicity in the regional political problems saturated Sunnis and
Shiite alike and alienated large sections of Iraqi and Syrian society from one another, thus
exacerbating localized political tensions amidst regional security problems, and century
old sectarian divisions.
The Iraq insurgency informs the political complexities and security problems in
Syria. Syria is not a mirror of Iraq, yet it further demonstrates that the expanded theory of
insurgency argued for above contains validity. The Syrian Insurgency demonstrates that
the complexities and diversity in political interests indicate an untenable situation for
third party intervention.
During the Iraq insurgency neighboring actors including Iranian, Saudi, Turkish,
and Qatari influences were strong in the early conflict and still are currently. When the
Supreme Military Counsel agreed to Geneva negotiations with the Assad Regime,

militants rose up across the countryside in protest against the rebel groups. One powerful
for emerging was Jabhat al Nusra but there were many other AQ linked groups.
Baghdadi mandated the Nusra join ISIS in its regional struggle, but Golani
rejected Baghdadi and Golani beseeched Ayamen Zawahiri to side with him. Zawahiri
mandated Baghdadi to leave Nusra as is, and yet Baghdadi chose to ignore Zawahiri. As
Baghdadi demonstrated his prowess, his activity on the scene of the battle field drew the
majority of foreign recruits (Byman 2014) This is not the first time that AQ group in Iraq
has done these kind of actions, this occurred during the US occupation of Iraq with
Baghdadis predecessor Zarqawi the leader of AQI/ISI. Zarqawi ignored Zawahiris plea
for camaraderie and partnerships thus originating the political differences in AQI/ISI and
Bin Ladens AQ. This revelation indicates that there are signs that some of the jihadist
movement has significantly detoured from the early global jihad actors that emerged
during the cold war. Mushreq Abbas, who writes on Iraq for the Al-Monitor website,
describes this divergence by describing the new AQI/ISI leader Baghdadi, who has
presented himself as an alternative to the Sunni political class tribal leaders and moderate
clerics who oppose central government (Tran 2014).
Baghdadi's real and very visible strength stands in sharp contrast to Zawahiri, in
hiding for more than a decade and trying to influence a global jihad most of which is
played out a long way from his refuge. Even Baghdadi's counterparts claim that the ISIS
leader is gaining influence well beyond Syria and Iraq. "He is becoming very popular
among Jihadists. They see him as someone who is fighting the war of Islam," said a
Nusra Front fighter from the Syrian city of Aleppo (Tran 2014).

Nusra's political organization carries a much-localized agenda, yet sympathizes

with AQs more broad global agenda, and yet has not metastasized outside of Iraq.
Meanwhile ISIS is an entirely different political orientation. An ISIS fighter claimed,
"The group al Qaeda does not exist any more. It is now an Qaeda (base) for the Islamic
State and now we have it, Zawahiri should pledge allegiance to Sheikh Baghdadi.
Another Jihadi who described himself as close to Baghdadi said Zawahiri was watching,
powerless, to see whether the ISIL leader makes a false move. "He is waiting to see if
Baghdadi will win or fall, but in either case he is no longer leader..The world should
fear him". Baghdadi supporters claim "When you have his army, his determination and
his belief then the world should fear you, and if the world does not fear Baghdadi then
they are fools, they do not know what will hit them in the future (Karouny 2014).
ISIS and Nusras dispute indicates the differences amongst the Islamic extremist groups.
One ISIS fighter indicated this difference in answering whether ISIS wanted to redraw a
new Middle East Map, the fighter indicated, "There is no map. Where you see borders,
we see only your interests." Al monitor reports that this embodying of the ISIS ideology,
rallies against the aspirations for democracy in the Arab world (Borri 2014). The disputes
and differences in political aspirations and organizations are the chart in the data set
below.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

Iraq Case
Name of Insurgency
Al-Qaeda Iraq

Typology
Local/Regional/Global

Mujahidin Shura Council

Islamic State of Iraq
Al Rashideen Army
The Front for Jihad and
Change
Unorganized Nationalist
Sunni

Local/Regional/Global
Local/Regional/Global
Local
Local

Jaish al-Muslimeen

Local

Local

Syria Case
Name of Insurgency
Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant
Supreme Military Counsil
Al-Nusra Front
Martyrs of Syria Brigades
Jaysh al-Muhajirin wa alAnsar
Harakat Ahrar al-Sham alIslamiyya
Jaysh al-Islam

Typology
Local/Regional/Global
Local/Regional
Local/Regional/Global
Local
Local/Regional
Local/Regional

Local/Regional

7.1) Islamic Armed Group of alQaida, Fallujah branch

8. Sons of Islam

Local/Regional/Global

Liwa al-Haqq

Local/Regional

Local

Kataib Ansar al-Sham

Local/Regional

9.

Kurdish Islamic Front

Local/Regional
Local/Regional

11. Hamas Iraq

Local

Syrian Islamic Liberation

Front
Ahfad al-Rasoul Brigades

12. Kataib Hezbollah

Local/Regional

Asala waal-Tanmiya Front

Local/Regional

13. The Promised Day Brigades

Local/Regional

Durou al-Thawra
Commission

Local/Regional

The Mujahadeen Advisory

Local
Counsel
10. 1920 Revolutionary Brigade Local/State

Local/Regional

14. The Mahdi Army

Local/Regional
Tajammu Ansar al-Islam
Local/Regional
15. Supreme Council for
Local
Yarmouk Martyrs' Brigade
Local/Regional
Islamic Revolution in Iraq
16. Syrian Unification Baathists Local/Regional
National Unity Brigades
Local/Regional
17. Kurdish Peshmerga
Local/Regional
Popular Protection Units
Local/Regional
Data Set 1: Is an original data set comprised of the organizations that participate in either case study with
evidence of political orientations described by their own leaders and demonstrated in practice in either case
study.

Conclusion
This paper argues that through a more advanced theory of insurgency, the cases of
Iraq and Syria demonstrate a far more complex environment than has appeared in
previous discussions surrounding US foreign policy and military planning in the region.
By adopting a more advanced theory, the two cases demonstrate that current insurgencies
in Iraq and Syria carry similar trends and this has vast implications in planning future US
policy. Indeed, Iraq and Syria demonstrate a complicated array of local armed
insurgencies, regional, and a conglomeration of global actors as well. Simultaneously,
both cases demonstrate elements of competing hybrid insurgencies, and outsourced
insurgencies that further complicate the conflict zone and make planning increasingly
difficult.
While engaging the Middle East, and in planning future US foreign policy, the US
will need to include a diverse understanding of insurgencies to understand the
particularities in each case. Moreover, the US will need to expand micro level of analysis

to understand local political factors, and simultaneously expand the lens it views the
security problems. While the US experiences in Iraq from 2006-2009 demonstrated the
ability, to control parts of Iraq, the current state of affairs in the Middle East demonstrate
an increasingly changing and complicated environment that makes future military
campaigns increasingly difficult to produce similar results.

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