INTRODUCTORY CASES

LAWYERs LEAGUE v. AQUINO

Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the
legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the
judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in
effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de factogovernment but is in
fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized,
have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
De LEON v. ESGUERRA
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC
Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective
positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further
provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years x x x."
IN RE: LETTER OF JUSTICE PUNO
The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to
E.O. No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the 1987 Revolution. The
Court of Appeals that was established under E.O. No. 33 is considered as an entirely new
court.
The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the courts existing
before E.O. No. 33. It was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the
revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the aftermath of the people power in 1986.
Revolution is defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any
country or state by those who were previously subject to it." or "as sudden. radical and
fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at
least some acts of violence."
ESTRADA v. DESIERTO
Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I
EDSA II
exercise of people power of freedom of speech
exercise of the people power of
and freedom of assemblyto petition the
revolution which overthrew the whole
government for redress of grievances which
government.
only affected the office of the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the
intra constitutional and the resignation of the
new government that resulted from it cannot be
sitting President that it caused and the
the subject of judicial review
succession of the Vice President as President are
subject to judicial review.
presented a political question;
involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution
require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II,
and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The
issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also
involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were
present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing
material relevant issuesPresident Estrada is deemed to have resigned constructive
resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his
leaving Malacaan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he
was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President
(without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same
service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or omission before,
during and after January 20, 2001.
The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed
H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate
passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been
terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President.
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer
temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and
addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he
did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground
that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress
and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

MARBURY v. MADISON
The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they
are unconstitutional and therefore void.
It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply
the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws
conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard
the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the
Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 clearly gives the Supreme Court judicial review over writs of
mandamus. However, Article III of the Constitution does not give the Supreme Court
authority to review the writs. Therefore, the two laws are in conflict. As such, the Supreme
Court being charged with upholding the Constitution must adopt Article IIIs application.
Justice Marshall argued that there would be no point for the Supreme Court to exist were it not
to uphold the Constitution and strike down laws adopted by Congress that necessarily conflict
with the Constitution itself. In so doing, Marshall established the principle of judicial review.
GOVT v. SPRINGER
E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The
Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to
do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is
essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was
created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the
Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an
invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are
exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such
exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within
the legislative branch this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive
branch.
SPRINGER v. GOVT
JUSTICE HOLMES dissent: The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and
divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a
penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. Property must not be taken
without compensation, but with the help of a phrase (the police power), some property may be
taken or destroyed for public use without paying for it, if you do not take too much. When we
come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with a
certain latitude or our government could not go on.
To make a ruld of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would be free
from it is to legislate-yet it is what the judges do whenever they determine which of two
competing principles of policy shall prevail. At an early date it was held that Congress could
delegate to the courts the power to regulate process, which certainly is lawmaking so far as it
goes.
ANGARA v. ELECTORAL COMMISSION
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains
not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of

the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check
on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is
subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the
President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the
National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special
session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check
on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is
necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its
members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what
courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to
appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to
a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And
the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive
and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
FRANCISCO v. HREP
The courts power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is
subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.
The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in
the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to
examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.
The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the merits of the second
impeachment complaint. More importantly, any discussion of this would require this Court to
make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a
purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislation.
BIRAOGO v. PTC
PROCEDURAL
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated,
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be

raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case.
The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which
they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power
of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the
powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested
by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the
validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as
legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any
personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private
suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest
is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make
out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a
citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The
Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.
SUBSTANTIAL
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The
powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of
the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty
is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts
and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled
to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative
to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of
the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.
PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all,
the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The
function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the

courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited
to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.