Chapter 13

Can the Intelligence Community Keep
Pace with the Threat?
Jeffrey T. Richelson

On November 25, 1991, President George Bush signed National
Security Review Directive 29, "Intelligence Capabilities 19922005." The directive required over twenty government agencies
to specify their intelligence requirements and priorities for the
next thirteen years. Among the highest priorities specified were
intelligence on the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.!
Few, if any, would disagree with the proposition that monitoring nuclear proliferation activities should be a major task for the
U.s. intelligence community in the years ahead. 2 In addition to
monitoring those countries that have not acknowledged their nuclear weapons capability (e.g., Israel, Pakistan, India), there is
the need to monitor those who, at various times, seek to develop
or acquire such a capability (e.g., North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya).
At the same time, many would also point to the post-Gulf
War discoveries concerning the Iraqi nuclear program, as well as
internal intelligence community disputes over Iranian nuclear
intentions, as troubling signs that the U.S. intelligence community may not be able to adequately monitor such nuclear weapons
programs. 3 Among the gaps in U.s.-UN knowledge about the
Iraqi program was the identity of the program's director. In July
1991, five months after the end of the Persian Gulf War, the UN
officials responsible for destroying Iraq's nuclear weapons were

turned out to be the nerve center of the Iraqi nuclear program. considered to be an outmoded technology.s. which was not linked to the Iraqi program until a week before the end of the war. to precisely assess how well the U. Despite their mandate to conduct intrusive inspections. However. The belief in an unknown mastermind. Although it is impossible. resulted from the perception that none of the Iraqi scientists who had been interro4 gated had a full grasp of the complex program. The Iraqi development of the huge. a complex of buildings about forty miles south of Baghdad. Likewise. the UN inspectors often found themselves involved in a game of hide-and-seek with the Iraqis.s. possibly a foreigner.S. at least on an unclassified basis. inefficient devices went undetected by U. and the aid of the U. "The revelations about Iraq's clandestine nuclear activities also raise questions about the adequacy of nuclear intelligence gathering by the United States and other concerned states. 5 Nor was the identity of the program's director the only aspect of the Iraqi program that escaped U. The complex. intelligence community might be able to monitor foreign nuclear weapons programs. it is possible to examine the challenges faced .s.? In the face of such post-Gulf War discoveries. was misunderstood. 6 But possibly the biggest surprise concerning the Iraqi nuclear program was its reliance on calutrons. the experience of the UN inspection team in Iraq could be taken as another indicator of the great diHiculty of monitoring a foreign nuclear weapons program. the purpose of another installation (at Furat) that was secretly building centrifuges for enriching uranium to a weapons-grade level was apparently not discovered until after the war. The significance of the Al Atheer scientific research installation. there are reasons to believe that the situation is not as bleak as it might appear."8 Further.292 JEFFREY 1'. the deputy head of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC). and other Western intelligence agencies for years. one nuclear proliferation expert observed. intelligence. intelligence community. It wasn't until September that the UN inspectors discovered secret Iraqi documents that indicated that the program's director was JaHar Dhia JaHar. RICHELSON searching for an unidentified "mastermind" who they believed had overall charge of the Iraqi program. Although the inspectors had been aware of JaHar's existence and position in the IAEC since July. they had dismissed the possibility that he was in overall charge of the nuclear weapons program.

who led the UN inspection teams in Iraq. intelligence community in effectively monitoring such programs and to explore ways in which the probability of successful monitoring can be (or possibly is being) increased." l0 Monitoring the activities of such individuals can provide valuable clues to the course of a nuclear program. 12 A crucial question concerning these facilities is exactly what is inside them-how sophisticated is the equipment. You can remove fissile material. it is also vital to monitor what leaves the facilities-specifically. but you cannot take out the know-how. observed. noted: "You can remove the equipment. Thus. as noted above. communications and emissions. The function of only some of the facilities is apparent. the United States did not discover the role of the Furat centrifuge production facility until after the war. It would be helpful to begin by examining the different collection targets associated with foreign nuclear weapons programs. Reactors discharge heat. One key element is the thousands of skilled scientists and technical workers employed in any program. and scientists were involved. and what are their capabilities? Just as it is important to investigate what is inside the facilities.S.Lan tfle intelligence Lommumty Keep Face with the Threat? 293 by the U."l! A second key element is. Maurizio Zifferero. uranium mining sites and mills. enrichment facilities. Successful monitoring may help answer some of the questions as to what is inside a facility. You can destroy instruments. 9 Such individuals are the one element that are likely to survive a concerted attack on a nuclear weapons program and provide the basis for regenerating a damaged program. David Kay. and nuclear test sites. Secret Iraqi documents seized by the UN inspection team in the summer of 1991 indicated that more than ten thousand nuclear workers. you'd want to go out and find out what they were doing. Collection Targets Any nation's nuclear weapons program consists of several distinct elements. of course. laboratories. from their appearance or emissions. technicians. reprocessing facilities that extract pluto- . the head of the inspection operation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). weapons assembly and storage sites. centrifuge production facilities. "If you identify 10 people and they end up all working at some place labeled a dairy research institute. Thus. the facilities-which may include research and power reactors.

14 Various international banking institutions also playa significant role in the proliferation effort by funding and directing the financial activities of companies involved in proliferation activities. And. It also acquired a multimillion-dollar plant to convert natural uranium to gaseous form-······an essential step in enriching it to weapons grade. Africa (uranium ore concentrate). in 1989."]5 Additionally. Switzerland (metal casings).294 h'''''''H'V T RICHELSO\I niurn emit krypton~R. Iraq. and enrichment plants leak radiation into the surface.5 into the air. India. Thus. West German investigators uncovered a Pakistani smuggling network that apparently assisted Pakistan's uranium-enrichment efforts by providing specialized containers for the transport and storage of uranium hexafluoride.-made military-grade capacitors.acilities also must communicate with some related facilities and the nuclear program's nerve center. PTB. Although the material so far seized by authorities would be of little . Thus. and the United States (power supply units). and Israel-have shown an inclination and ability to acquire crucial material and technologies by illicit means. for nuclear programs. Iraqi agents attempted to illicitly acquire U. corporations. 16 A recent concern is the smuggling of nuclear material stolen from former Soviet and East European nuclear facilities. Thus. In addition to people and facilities located within the prolif~ erating nation. In 1990. there are the foreign governments. or groups that supply key technologies and material. unacknowledged and emerging nuclear statesincluding Pakistan. an investigation by the Italian Service for Information and Military Security (SISMI) identified twenty-two companies that "might have benefited from the financial operations that were 'steered' by the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) in Atlanta . ltaly (plutonium separation utility). Japan (carbon fiber). France (research reactors). South America (uranium ore concentrate).S. Israel and Pakistan have sought to illegally acquire krytrons from sources in the United States. Iraq received key nuclear-related equipment and material from Britain (plutonium). and Leybold-Heraeus. Finland (copper coils). sometimes covertly or unknowingly. r. 13 Cerman corporations have provided key nuclear technology not only to Iraq but also to Pakistan. Pakistan acquired the special steel electronics and processing vessels needed to produce nuclear weapons material from German firms such as NTG.

Can the intellzgence Communzty Keep Pace wzth the Threat? 295 immediate value in developing atomic weapons. Collection Methods and Strategies Various means exist to gather intelligence on nuclear weapons programs-including nuclear intelligence (NUCINT). The United States was concerned for over forty years not with how the Soviets would attempt to acquire an A-bomb or whether they had succeeded. Thus. small boats. NUCINT sensors are of much lesser value when the questions involve a nation/s nuclear intentions. aircraft. which are sufficiently large to be detectable at long distances. there are also a number of different collection methods and strategies. they can even be placed in an attache case. which detect radiation and other effects resulting from radioactive sources. and helicopters. and Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) arrays provided a valuable means of providing answers to such questions. 1'7 Just as there are a variety of targets. estimates of the Soviet Union/s plutonium production and nuclear weapons production rate. but with how many warheads they were producing and the characteristics of those warheads. In the early 1950s. 20 But NUCINT certainly does not playas great a role in evaluating the nuclear weapons programs of emerging nuclear states as it did in monitoring the Soviet nuclear weapons program. the outflows of hot water from the Savannah River production reactors are easily visible in thermal infrared photographs taken from an altitude of 1. Such sensors. ground stations. and human intelligence (HUMINT). can be deployed on spacecraft.S. communications intelligence (COMINT).2 kilometers and are so broad that they are also detectable from satellite altitudes. its efforts to ac- . 19 Plutonium production reactors can be detected by satellite infrared sensors.18 The most direct technical means of collecting intelligence on other nations' nuclear weapons programs is through the variety of sensors that fall in the NUCINT category. ships. The constellation of nuclear intelligence aircraft. Naturally. the krypton-85 level was the key to U. imagery intelligence (IMINTL signals intelligence (SIGINT). Fuel reprocessing plants can be monitored by the releases of krypton-85 gases. the activity does create a new concern.

S. or production work. a master list of foreign suppliers. That source reported on the following: 1. 22 And it has recently been reported that "U. Human sources not only can provide information on intentions but also can provide an integrated overview of a program (its people. particularly imagery and signals intelligence. HUMINT can be applied to foreign nuclear weapons programs to provide a level of understanding that would probably be unavailable from technical collection. Human sources can also scoop up soil samples around a· suspected nuclear installation to be examined for traces of uranium hexafluoride. human sources can report on what is inside facilities and can acquire and pass on documents and hardware of great value in helping to understand a foreign nuclear weapons program--for example. there seem to have been serious deficiencies in the general assessment of Iraq's nuclear program. In addition. including overhead reconnaissance and electronic intercepts. research and development. suppliers. intelligence professionals who have been stymied in their attempts to monitor and curb proliferation through satellite intelligence gathering and export controls are turning anew to developing networks of agents and informants. and progress)." In particular the report claimed that the CIA was working "at a frenzied pace" to establish human intelligence networks in hard-to-penetrate countries such as Iraq and North Korea. certain smuggling networks may not rely on any form of interceptable communications in conducting their operations. 21 It has been suggested that such deficiencies were due to an inadequate devotion to human intelligence collection and an overreliance on technical collection. In spite of the massive intelligence-gathering means at the disposition of several nations.L':Jb JEFFREY L KICHELSON quire nuclear material and technology. China's nuclear exports to Argentina and South Africa . At least one penetration of the Chinese government has involved someone with access to information concerning Chinese nuclear relations with Pakistan. 24 It is easy to provide examples in which HUMINT was or would have been of tremendous value in evaluating the status of a foreign nuclear weapons program. Further. none of which give off signals detectable by such sensors. facilities. 23 Potentially. an overview that could be extraordinarily difficult to piece together by relying on technical collection.

This information indicated that the Taiwanese were in the process of building a secret installation that could have been used to obtain plutonium. as stunning: "The scope of this is much more extensive than we thought. provided the American intelligence community with the first extensive evidence of Israeli capability to manufacture fusion. Colonel Chang Hsien-Yi. 297 Chinese technicians who helped at a suspected Pakistani bomb-development site Chinese scientific delegations who were spending a substantial amount of time at a centrifuge plant in Kahuta where Pakistani scientists were attempting to produce enriched uranium Pakistani scientists from a secret facility at Wah who showed a nuclear weapons design to some Chinese physicists in late 1982 or early 1983 and who sought Chinese evaluation of whether the design would yield a nuclear blast The triggering mechanism for the Pakistani bomb design that appeared to be very similar to one used by China in its fourth nuclear tesf S Information about the Taiwanese nuclear program was also provided by an informant... 26 Aside from the significant new information provided by Iraqi defectors after the Persian Gulf War. Army human intelligence reports on the Pakistani presence at Chinese nuclear test sites and on Iraqi-Chinese discussions about construction of a nuclear reactor also indicate the value that can be played by human sources. U. weapons. or Machon 2. who worked in a Taiwanese research institute. 5. which includes a breakdown of the specific function of each unit inside the Tunnel. One American official who has been analyzing Israel's nuclear capability since the late 1960s depicted Vanunu's information. the Mordechai Vanunu case certainly illustrates the potential value of HUMINT. According to The Samson Option: Vanunu's Times interview and his photographs of many of the production units in the Tunnel. 4..Can the Intelligence Community Keep Pace with the Threat? 2. Further. This is an enormous operation:'27 It is important to acknowledge the potential value of HUMINT and the value of improving HUMINT collection on proliferation activities. In addition to attempts to penetrate the actual or po- . 3. or thermonuclear.S.

. it has learned a great deal from satellite imagery.S. particularly from nations such as Iraq. North Korea. cooling towers. Local conditions-including the isolation of the country as well as the thoroughness and brutality of the security service-and the nature of a country's relations with the United States may preclude sufficient successful recruitments. 28 However. it may be impossible to attain sufficiently reliable human intelligence. As desirable as it may be..s. Certainly. and power lines. there is also an obvious value to penetrating portions of the suppliers' network and smuggling operations. satellite imagery alerted the United States to the existence of a research installation. intelligence official. Thus. railroad . Whereas the United States has apparently learned "zip" about the North Korean program from human sources. It should not be forgotten that along with notable U.29 In addition. HUMINT successes. there is a real danger in viewing HUMINT as the answer to monitoring proliferation activities. the United States did have some human intelligence sources reporting on Iraq. probably by several orders of magnitude. roads. Gaseous diffusion plants are reasonably conspicuous because of their large size (and heavy power demand)due to the fact that each passage of uranium hexafluoride through a diffusion barrier increases its enrichment by only a very small percentage. imagery and COMINT can provide significant hard information (and a valuable check on HUMINT) on many aspects of foreign nuclear weapons programs. including technical collection and analysis. 30 Satellite imagery can show the presence of completed reactors. In the 1970s.298 JEFFREY T RrCHELSON tential nuclear programs. according to one U. Thus. Imagery intelligence can and has provided information valuable in monitoring nuclear weapons programs. as well as facilities under construction and their external characteristics. and Iran. there have been some significant failures. an excessive preoccupation with HUMINT may divert attention from enhancing other activities. Zip. But he added: "With North Korea. Recruiting a source in the Pakistani nuclear program will not be as difficult. which may yield significant benefits. we had nothing. as recruiting a source in the North Korean program. it has been reported that the CIA networks in East Germany and Cuba were heavily penetrated by those nations' security services.

graphite-moderated. housing. The conclusion drawn by the CIA was that the North Koreans were planning on burying the pipes between the two facilities and thus concealing their connection from IAEA inspectors. It has been noted that Pakistani officials regularly use the telephone to relay information about their nation's nuclear weapons program. power grids. During 1988-89. U. the U. 35 Thus. and South Africa. reconnaissance activities. Further photos showed a thirty-megawatt. Hans Blix. in a report circulated to several governments. 34 But clearly. additional satellite imagery revealed a second large building that seemed perfectly suited for reprocessing plutonium. U. U?la incident-it is safe to assume that there are a number of classified examples of the contribution of COMINT. Similarly. technical collection effort directed against Iraq left significant gaps. 32 U. including Iraq. imagery satellites also detected trucks pulling up to the reprocessing plant before the arrival of lAEA inspectors in 1992. before taking the risky leap and building at Yongbyon. a satellite returned imagery that indicated that a new reactor was going up at Yongbyon. 33 Communications between the different elements of a nuclear program and between the different elements and higher authority are subject to interception by space and other COMINT systems.s. the director general of the IAEA. and storage areas. imagery satellites detected North Korean workers digging trenches in frozen ground between Yongbyon's principal facility for reprocessing nuclear fuel and one of two facilities suspected of storing nuclear wastes. have made or examined the feasibility of denial and deception efforts to hide aspects of their nuclear weapons programs from U. . And it is clear that several nations. 1979. noted that the North Koreans may have built a "pilot plant" to process plutonium. North Korea.S. gas-cooled machine that burned natural uranium.Can the Intelligence Community Keep Pace with the Threat? 299 trae](s.s. Although there are virtually no specific examples in the open literature of the contribution of COMINT to nuclear proliferation intelligence-the only exception being a report of National Security Agency intercepts of South African-Israeli communications after the September 22.S. In 1980. 31 In the winter of 1991. imaging satellites monitoring Iraq have detected uranium-enrichment machinery being moved around on trucks or buried to evade detection by UN inspectors. out of satellite view. possibly to haul away equipment.S.

S. But the new spacecraft have additional capabilities. and activities taking place under cloud cover-have increased dramatically. a strict communications security program prohibits Iraqi officials from discussing the nuclear program over the telephone. In addition. As a result.S. The United States reportedly first became aware of the facilities after a North Korean diplomat defected in May 1991. They may also be part of a program to hide nuclear weapons components from international inspectors. Since that time. Due to launch failures.S. 36 In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. and the LACROSSE is a radar imagery spacecraft. it was discovered that Iraq had constructed underground facilities for nuclear weapons development and had buried related power lines.Likewise. It has also been reported that North Korea was working on aspects of its nuclear weapons program in Bakchon County at a secret underground site designed to avoid satellite detection (and international inspection). U. Iraq pursued. . the United States has launched approximately three Advanced KH-lls and two LACROSSE spacecraft. the U. possible plans to build a nuclear reactor that would be camouflaged to defeat satellite surveillance. the Advanced KH-ll is capable of producing infrared imagery. in addition to its visible-light imagery capability. the size of the U. the circumstances under which the United States can monitor certain activities or their effects-such as heat discharges. The increased number of imagery spacecraft in orbit is. Further. in itself. imagery satellite constellation in the 1987-88 period was quite limited compared with today's constellation---consisting of one KH-ll visible-light electro-optical spacecraft through October 1987 and two KH-lls through November 1988. space SIGINT constellation has increased since 1987-88. The tunnels are believed to be part of a program to harden the facility against a possible attack. 37 At the same time. In addition. significant. imagery satellites detected the digging of deep tunnels around the nuclear site at Yongbyon in early February 1992. nighttime construction. a new heavier SICINT spacecraft is scheduled for launch in late 1994. with China. it should not be assumed that gaps are inevitable or that denial and deception measures cannot be defeated. with the launch of two VORTEX and two MAGNUM geosynchronous SIGINT spacecraft.

the primary focus of U. North Korea and other potential proliferators were not ignored in imagery and COMINT collection plans. technical collection efforts was the former Soviet Union. the United States has recently stepped up satellite reconnaissance of Iran's nuclear-related facilities in response to evidence of a "suspicious procurement pattern" of nuclear-related technologies. as well as more frequent searches for new frequencies that might be associated with such programs. 40 Likewise. including more frequent imagery coverage at night and when cloud cover is present. some believed that it might be imperative to obtain photography of Soviet missile silos while thev were under construction because once construction was completed they would be camouflaged.S.S. 39 Imagery coverage can be increased in several ways-by scheduling images of targets already on the target list to be produced more frequently. they certainly did not receive as much attention as they might have and as they are receiving now. Increased nighttime coverage (employing Advanced KH:-ll and LACROSSE spacecraft) and increased coverage in the presence of cloud cover (relying on LACROSSE spacecraft). the attempts by Iraq and North Korea to construct underground facilities suggest that it may be necessary to detect some nuclear facilities in the construction stage. Defeating denial and deception measures may depend on a variety of strategies.S. reconnaissance satellites. increased coverage of supplier communications links may reveal valuable new information. Although that was not actually a problem.Also. by increasing the frequency and area of missions devoted to searching for new facilities. along . COMINT coverage can be increased by more frequent monitoring (andfor processing) of communications links known to be associated with nuclear weapons programs. Thus. technical collection systems is a function not only of their number and technical characteristics and capabilities but also of how they are employed-of human decisions concerning the areas and facilities to be covered and the frequency of coverage. In addition to increased attention to the communications links of a particular proliferator. Increasing imagery and COMINT coverage means increasing the probability of detecting new facilities and new developments. 38 Until recently. the "take" obtained from constructing and deploying U. and by devoting more attention to anomalous or suspicious facilities. In the days before the launch of the first U. Although Iraq.

there are distinct alternative paths to the production of nuclear weapons. the choice between plutonium and highly enriched uranium). It appears that the surprise that resulted from the discovery that Iraq was employing calutron technology to produce nuclear material stemmed from the dismissal of the method as being obsolete. But improvements in collection are only one means of enhancing the ability to monitor the activities of emerging nuclear powers. increase the chances of detecting construction of underground facilities before they have been completed. A fundamental condition for analytical success. before even the proper analytic strategy. which makes the intelligence problem of monitoring Soviet nuclear weapons developments simple by comparison. Furthermore. Improved analysis is another. they are not pursuing such a capability" may have little validity. Instead. This is particularly true when dealing with an intelligence problem such as proliferation. 41 Clearly. often including the desire to achieve the capability covertly. And for any particular path or paths chosen. paths that are the product of numerous choices (e. and most "rational" method may not be the one chosen. it is necessary to evaluate information against a variety of models of nuclear proliferation. Analysis Improving the ability to monitor attempts at nuclear proliferation requires more than enhanced collection operations--whether human or technical.g. least costly. is to focus analytic resources on the problem. The analytical component of the proliferation monitoring effort can improve the chances of successful monitoring.with coverage of more territory. more attention to the issue would have been justified. the logic that "if they were pursuing a nuclear capability. As a result.. given the constraints facing potential proliferators. there are a number of suppliers for the resources required. the most direct. analysts had concluded that Iraq was seeking . Aside from the multitude of potential proliferators. and since they are not doing X. The staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found only one finished intelligence community assessment of the Iraqi procurement network in the 1983-89 period. they would do X. Hence.

the United States began working with France.s.S.>-- / .~ . Great Britain. and West Germany to develop a concerted response to a possibly impending test. this is not generally necessary to put a brake on proliferation.".. ¥. U.v •. 'L'-''''"'t" ". The overall performance of u. then or in the future. intelligence in the proliferation area can be improved by a number of means. That pressure. . It was subsequently discovered that Iraq was pursuing both approaches.S. 44 But as the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War showed.~v"""". However. may have discouraged a South African test in the Kalahari.~ •.. the extensive nature of the program resulted in security fences being placed so far from those facilities that the fences went unnoticed. a U. Models of alternative proliferation paths can be (and presumably are) employed to direct collection activities. '>-110-. may suffice..7 ·•... On the basis of that imagery. 42 Similarly. .. Conclusion Although the postwar discoveries concerning the Iraqi nuclear weapons program raise legitimate concerns about the ability of the U... 43 In 1977. they are not cause for despair-for even though it may be desirable for the United States to know everything immediately. to enrich its uranium through the use of delicate fast-spinning centrifuges that separate the heavier and lighter isotopes of ura~ nium gas. following a tip from the Soviet Union. Knowledge of select procurement attempts or other actions.~ v (~. intelligence community to monitor nuclear proliferation activities. Recognizing the variety of paths a nation may pursue to achieve a nuclear weapons capability can also improve the value and efficiency of the collection effort. analysts apparently considered it unlikely that some Iraqi facilities detected by satellite reconnaissance were involved in the nuclear weapons program because of a lack of visible security around the facilities. ".v"". imagery satellite photographed a suspected nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert.•.--.S. there is considerable room (and need) for improvement.-. . -. Hence. ~ ~' •. and measures to block such procurement attempts or actions. in 1992 the United States was able to persuade China and Argentina to cancel planned transfers of key technologies to Iran. at the very least. as well as to simply evaluate the meaning of data already collected.

Increased searches for relevant communications could also produce valuable information. Remarks by Director of Central Intelligence Robert M. . the hiring of more analysts or the devotion of more analytical time to proliferation problems. some improvement would come just from an increase in effort-in other words. More frequent monitoring and processing of nuclear weapons programs. As with collection activities. In setting intelligence collection requirements and in analyzing data. among the most important and necessary improvements are those that lie in the area of analysis. November 14. COMINT collection can also be improved in similar ways. But it will also be necessary to make better use of the analytical resources already available. intelligence should be able to improve the effectiveness of technical collection.S. However. for such coIIection may provide information that would be of tremendous value and that is unobtainable from other sources. (2) examining suspicious or anomalous facilities. as well as analysis. and (3) reexamining known nuclear facilities. analysts also need to consider the numerous alternative paths that can be used to produce nuclear weapons. Boston. Massachusetts. it should not be seen as the answer. A near exclusive focus on improving HUMINT may divert attention from other areas of possible improvement. 1992. Notes 1. But beyond improvements in sensor capabilities and the number of spacecraft in orbit. suppliers.S. U. and financial communications links known to be associated with nuclear weapons programs would increase the probability of discovering relevant information. Better integration of the analytical effort presently being conducted by several distinct intelligence organizations may produce better analysis. For in addition to improving HUMINT collection. p. Finally.JV<t JnHKEY L l'(ICHELSON Improving HUMINT collection is one of those means. The development of an improved broad-area search capability would further enhance imagery capabilities. imagery satellites and the increased number of those satellites in operation. 2. it is also necessary to improve imagery collection strategies-by devoting more time to (1) searching for new facilities. Technical collection has already improved due to the increased sensor capabilities of U. Gates to the Association of Former Intelligence Officers.

p. Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. October 1." Orbis. Paul Lewis. and the Z (Special Projects) Division of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. such as businessmen and travelers. "Saddam's NUclear-Weapons Dream. Rowan Scarborough and Bill Gertz. 1991.N." New York Times. Spring 1992. Smith and Frankel. Intelligence. Cl.1992. Michael Wines. "Iraq's Nuclear Program Shows the Holes in U. pp. 3. 9. 16. Michael Wines. November 30. A8. Lewis. All. 17. Smith and Frankel. December 23. A6. October 20." New York Times.s. 3. May Destroy the Hardware. AI. Officials Seek Mastermind in Charge of Iraq's Nuclear Effort. the Defense Intelligence Agency. 1991. pp. p. AI. p. 10.N." Washington Post.s. pp. pp. Elaine Sciolino. November 16. Spector with Jacqueline R. "U. 1991. intelligence community involved in monitoring foreign nuclear programs are the DCI Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee. A3.N. Elaine Sciolino. October 8.S.Can the Intelligence Community Keep Pace with the Threat? 305 2. 3334. "U." 11. 1991. 14. "Iraq's Nuclear Quest: Tentacles in Four Continents.s. 29. July/August 1992." 13. who may have relevant information." New York Times. A36. Aides Discover Atom Arms Center". 1990." New York Times. "U. 15. 11-14." New York Times. the Department of Energy Office of Intelligence. but Iraqi Nuclear Workers Remain. 1990). Overt collection includes interviewing selected individuals. C2. 5. 6.S. pp. pp. 8. The most prominent organizations in the U. p. A9. Steve Call. 1993). pp. "U. 1990. Gary Milhollin. "Threats in the Middle East. Smith. A44-A4S. "U.181-98. pp. "U. the Central Intelligence Agency. "Iraq's Quest for the Nuclear Grail: What Can We Learn?" Arms Control Today. November 29. David Albright and Mark Hibbs. R." New York Times. SISMI. Eric Schmitt. September 22. 1992. "Saddam's Nuclear-Weapons Dream". p. Jeffrey Smith and Glenn Frankel.N. AI. 4. the Air Force Technical Applications Center. Stanford University." Washington Post. A30. 7. August 8. May Destroy the Hardware. October 11. . "CIA Says Iran Makes Progress on Atom Arms. ES. Says It Missed 2 A-Plants in Iraq. Leonard S. 1991. 1991. 1. A6." n. 1991. Anthony Fainberg. 18. "For Sale: Nuclear Contraband. "Nuclear-Related Plant Discovered in Iraq. 1989-1990 (Boulder: Westview. Leonard Spector. 10. p. "Asia's Nuclear Nightmare: The German Connection. Scarborough and Gertz." Washington Times. pp. Jeffrey Smith. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards: Lessons from Iraq (Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms Control." New York Times." 12. p. June 10. Schmitt. AI. R. October 13.d. Paul Lewis. Says It Missed 2 A-Plants. Is Building Up a Picture of Vast Iraqi Atom Program. 1991. It should be noted that HUMINT comes in two varieties-overt and clandestine. "U. "Saddam's Nuclear-Weapons Dream. Aides Discover Atom Arms Center Concealed by Iraq." Washington Post." Washington Post.N. "U. "Subject: BNL Affair-Atlanta Branch.

"As Intelligence Needs Change. 1991 (SanitizedlDeclassified). October 23. 28. Hafemeister. eds. "Advanced Arms Spread Defies Remote Detection. 1986 (SanitizedlDeclassified). 1992. seek to determine Iran's present nuclear intentions. David A." New York Times. National Archives and Record Administration. 1985. "A Few Spoken Words Sealed Atom Pact. 1985. Fulghum. DCS/O. 377. 18. So Do CIA Recruits' Resumes. A19. 25. Va. "Controlling Nuclear Weapons at the Source. Tyler. 377. "Taipei Halts Work on Secret Plant to Make Nuclear Bomb Ingredient. Dagger. "Nuclear Exports to China?" Washington Post. In addition. pp. although intelligence analysts may. Von Hippel and Levi." Washington Post. and Peter W.SON 19. Subject: (Unci. 1992. 1986)." May 12. 338-88. Griffin. 26. March 23. U. pp. February 9. SOOth MI Brigade. The unique ability of human sources to acquire documents. C7. Entry 214. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards. Thus. Seymour M. actions. 1992. p. 27.C. Military Reference Branch. AI. p.s. 1986. Gordon. Washington. Janeway. 1985. with communications intelligence being a very significant means. p. and should." Aviation Week and Space Technology. B2. 198. and particularly regarding proliferation. p. at p. Frank Von Hippel and Barbara Levi.) Determination of Proper Security Classification." Washington Post. RG 341. Army Operational Group. The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House. p.: Pergamon-Brassey's. A3. Under what circumstances the United . pp." p." in Kosta Tsipis. Stephen Engleberg and Michael R. pp. 1954. "Help Wanted: Bring Cloak. "Controlling Nuclear Weapons at the Source: Verification of a Cut-Off in Production of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium for Nuclear Weapons. December 28. Joanne Omang.306 JEFFREY T RICHEI. pp. Hersh. The standard argument for the benefits of HUMINT is that it can provide information on intentions. November 22. January 12. Fainberg. 1991).. At. A15. Patrick E. which technical collection systems cannot provide. it is not clear that their conclusions should influence U. AI. actions in attempting to limit Iran's acquisition of nuclear technologies--given the nature of that regime and the fact that intentions can change overnight. "China-Iran Nuclear Link Is Reported. This is a fairly poor argument for the value of HUMINT. "Memorandum for Director of Intelligence. 20. "Pakistani Use of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Test Facilities. D. "Nuclear Power Plant Development Plans. knowledge of intentions may have only a limited impact on U. Tyler and Joanne Omang. p. November 9. Arms Control Verification: The 1echnologies That Make It Possi/lle (McLean.S. hardware. James Adams. Files 4-4459 through 4-4592. "Nuclear Pact with China Wins Senate Approval. AS. Rodman D. 22. Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta. Patrick E." Washington Post.S. 23. November 3. A20-21. Overt HUMINT collection may prove fruitful for some segments of the international suppliers network. 21. David W. or soil samples seems to be a far better example of its potentially great value. Intentions are detectable by a variety of collection methods." November 26. 24. 20-22." Washington Post. 1985." Washington Times." June 19.

p. R. "Saddam's Nuclear Secrets. Michael Breen. One measure of the value of more intense coverage might be how much additional information the United States acquired about Iraqi nuclear programs due to increased technical collection in the period between the Iraqi invasion and the beginning of the air campaign. "Journey to Isolation". "N. All. Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta. pp. 1988). 1989. AI. John J. A16. U. Sciolino. p. 1991. "South Africa's Sixteen-Year Secret: The Nuclear Bomb. "U. AI. "North Korea May Be Developing Ability to Build Nuclear Weapons. 39. 34. AID. "Stasi Files Reveal CIA Two-Timers. A26." Washington Post." New York Times. 1993. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 1992. . "Journey to Isolation". Von Hippel and Levi." 35." New York Times Magazine. pp. 1992. AI. 33. pp. "North Korea Digs Tunnels for Nuclear Arms.S. Jeffrey Smith. Critical Mass (New York: Simon and Schuster. Sanger. 29. "Satellite Spots Iraq Burying Atomic Gear. September 12. pp.375. Bill Gertz. "Journey to Isolation. R.s. A12. Korea and the Bomb: High-Tech Hide-andSeek." Washington Post. 1991. or other West European corporations makes for interesting speculation. imagery satellites. p. p. November 15. Shows Photos to Argue Iraq Hides Nuclear Material. B15. October 7. Army Operational Group. To be literally "out of satellite view/' the plant would have to be in the Arctic 37. 1988. Living by the Sword (Brattleboro. April 27." Washington Times. 31. "Controlling Nuclear Weapons at the Source. "Journey to Isolation". Stephen Green." Washington Post. Burrows and Robert Windrem. Sanger. June 27. Bill Gertz. July 10.: Amana Books. David E. All. 38. 32. 1989. 1991. Jeffrey Smith. A9. "N. "Iraq's Nuclear Program Shows the Holes in U." Presumably." p. Intelligence. Bill Gertz. pp." Blix meant in a location not likely to be the subject of coverage. 128-29. p. William E. March 21. 28-35. 1991. Paul Lewis. "Cuban Defector Impeaches CIA Spies.Can the Intelligence Community Keep Pace with the Threat? 307 States would attempt (or has attempted) to recruit clandestine sources in German." Washington Post. 36. 1991. by "out of satellite view. A9. VI. (source of quotation). p. May 12.S. October 25. Sciolino. 1994). February 21." Newsweek. the United States sharply stepped up its technical collection operations directed at Iraq. 30." Washington Times. Intelligence". 28ff. Sanger. 1993.s. North Korea is located well within 30 to 50 degrees north latitude. "North Koreans Pursue Nuclear Weapons." Wall Street Journal. Sanger. Italian. July 19." Washington Times. Korea Goes Underground with Nuclear Plants. All. pp. "Iraq's Nuclear Program Shows the Holes in U.S. pp." Washington Times. Fialka. "Nu_ clear Power Plant Development Plans. making it easily accessible to all U. Don Oberdorfer. Decisions concerning the targeting of space imagery and space signals intelligence systems are made by the Dcr Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) and the SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee (SORS) of the DCI SIGINT Committee. July 29. AI.

1984 (Cambridge.: Government Printing Office.: Ballinger. p.C. 9. 43. p. "U.S. 42. 1992. "U. A8. Steve Coil. 41. government and private analysts are skeptical that South Africa had enough fissionable material for a bomb in 1977. "South Africa's Sixteen-Year Secret. Nuclear Proliferation Today: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. A30. Halted Nuclear Bid by Iran. 1993)." New York Times. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. AI. Leonard S.S. it is possible that such a test was planned in 1977 with Israeli help.S. Is Building Up a Picture of Vast Iraqi Atom Program. D. Congress. And the South Africans confirmed. U. November 17. Of course. Michael Wines.S. See Smith. The Intelligence Community's Involvement in the Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro (BNL) Affair (Washington." 44. September 27. in 1993." Washington Post.S. "U. Halted Nuclear Bid by Iran. Mass. 1984). that two shafts had been dug at the site for a potential nuclear blast. given reports of close Israeli-South African links. Some U. p. 292. pp.30H JEFFREY L KICHELSON 40. 1991." . Spector. Coil.

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