Chapter 13

Can the Intelligence Community Keep
Pace with the Threat?
Jeffrey T. Richelson

On November 25, 1991, President George Bush signed National
Security Review Directive 29, "Intelligence Capabilities 19922005." The directive required over twenty government agencies
to specify their intelligence requirements and priorities for the
next thirteen years. Among the highest priorities specified were
intelligence on the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.!
Few, if any, would disagree with the proposition that monitoring nuclear proliferation activities should be a major task for the
U.s. intelligence community in the years ahead. 2 In addition to
monitoring those countries that have not acknowledged their nuclear weapons capability (e.g., Israel, Pakistan, India), there is
the need to monitor those who, at various times, seek to develop
or acquire such a capability (e.g., North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya).
At the same time, many would also point to the post-Gulf
War discoveries concerning the Iraqi nuclear program, as well as
internal intelligence community disputes over Iranian nuclear
intentions, as troubling signs that the U.S. intelligence community may not be able to adequately monitor such nuclear weapons
programs. 3 Among the gaps in U.s.-UN knowledge about the
Iraqi program was the identity of the program's director. In July
1991, five months after the end of the Persian Gulf War, the UN
officials responsible for destroying Iraq's nuclear weapons were

they had dismissed the possibility that he was in overall charge of the nuclear weapons program. 6 But possibly the biggest surprise concerning the Iraqi nuclear program was its reliance on calutrons. RICHELSON searching for an unidentified "mastermind" who they believed had overall charge of the Iraqi program. Despite their mandate to conduct intrusive inspections. was misunderstood. it is possible to examine the challenges faced . at least on an unclassified basis.s. which was not linked to the Iraqi program until a week before the end of the war. Likewise.s. the experience of the UN inspection team in Iraq could be taken as another indicator of the great diHiculty of monitoring a foreign nuclear weapons program. turned out to be the nerve center of the Iraqi nuclear program. the deputy head of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC). intelligence community might be able to monitor foreign nuclear weapons programs. inefficient devices went undetected by U.? In the face of such post-Gulf War discoveries. The Iraqi development of the huge. Although the inspectors had been aware of JaHar's existence and position in the IAEC since July. a complex of buildings about forty miles south of Baghdad. The complex. and other Western intelligence agencies for years. possibly a foreigner. intelligence. considered to be an outmoded technology. However. The significance of the Al Atheer scientific research installation. "The revelations about Iraq's clandestine nuclear activities also raise questions about the adequacy of nuclear intelligence gathering by the United States and other concerned states."8 Further.s. intelligence community. Although it is impossible. the UN inspectors often found themselves involved in a game of hide-and-seek with the Iraqis. to precisely assess how well the U. It wasn't until September that the UN inspectors discovered secret Iraqi documents that indicated that the program's director was JaHar Dhia JaHar. resulted from the perception that none of the Iraqi scientists who had been interro4 gated had a full grasp of the complex program. one nuclear proliferation expert observed. The belief in an unknown mastermind. the purpose of another installation (at Furat) that was secretly building centrifuges for enriching uranium to a weapons-grade level was apparently not discovered until after the war. there are reasons to believe that the situation is not as bleak as it might appear. 5 Nor was the identity of the program's director the only aspect of the Iraqi program that escaped U.292 JEFFREY 1'.S. and the aid of the U.

you'd want to go out and find out what they were doing. from their appearance or emissions. reprocessing facilities that extract pluto- . as noted above. communications and emissions. centrifuge production facilities.S. Collection Targets Any nation's nuclear weapons program consists of several distinct elements. and scientists were involved." l0 Monitoring the activities of such individuals can provide valuable clues to the course of a nuclear program. uranium mining sites and mills. Secret Iraqi documents seized by the UN inspection team in the summer of 1991 indicated that more than ten thousand nuclear workers. the United States did not discover the role of the Furat centrifuge production facility until after the war. laboratories. intelligence community in effectively monitoring such programs and to explore ways in which the probability of successful monitoring can be (or possibly is being) increased. observed. and nuclear test sites.Lan tfle intelligence Lommumty Keep Face with the Threat? 293 by the U. enrichment facilities. David Kay. Maurizio Zifferero. Thus. Reactors discharge heat. You can remove fissile material. It would be helpful to begin by examining the different collection targets associated with foreign nuclear weapons programs. The function of only some of the facilities is apparent."l! A second key element is. noted: "You can remove the equipment. it is also vital to monitor what leaves the facilities-specifically. Successful monitoring may help answer some of the questions as to what is inside a facility. Thus. of course. "If you identify 10 people and they end up all working at some place labeled a dairy research institute. who led the UN inspection teams in Iraq. One key element is the thousands of skilled scientists and technical workers employed in any program. but you cannot take out the know-how. and what are their capabilities? Just as it is important to investigate what is inside the facilities. the head of the inspection operation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 12 A crucial question concerning these facilities is exactly what is inside them-how sophisticated is the equipment. weapons assembly and storage sites. You can destroy instruments. technicians. the facilities-which may include research and power reactors. 9 Such individuals are the one element that are likely to survive a concerted attack on a nuclear weapons program and provide the basis for regenerating a damaged program.

an investigation by the Italian Service for Information and Military Security (SISMI) identified twenty-two companies that "might have benefited from the financial operations that were 'steered' by the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) in Atlanta ."]5 Additionally. In 1990. there are the foreign governments.294 h'''''''H'V T RICHELSO\I niurn emit krypton~R. West German investigators uncovered a Pakistani smuggling network that apparently assisted Pakistan's uranium-enrichment efforts by providing specialized containers for the transport and storage of uranium hexafluoride.-made military-grade capacitors. corporations. South America (uranium ore concentrate). Iraq received key nuclear-related equipment and material from Britain (plutonium). Japan (carbon fiber). Iraq. sometimes covertly or unknowingly. or groups that supply key technologies and material. Pakistan acquired the special steel electronics and processing vessels needed to produce nuclear weapons material from German firms such as NTG. Thus. Although the material so far seized by authorities would be of little . Thus. In addition to people and facilities located within the prolif~ erating nation. Thus. and Leybold-Heraeus. 13 Cerman corporations have provided key nuclear technology not only to Iraq but also to Pakistan. and Israel-have shown an inclination and ability to acquire crucial material and technologies by illicit means. France (research reactors).S. Switzerland (metal casings). and enrichment plants leak radiation into the surface.5 into the air. unacknowledged and emerging nuclear statesincluding Pakistan. 16 A recent concern is the smuggling of nuclear material stolen from former Soviet and East European nuclear facilities. and the United States (power supply units). 14 Various international banking institutions also playa significant role in the proliferation effort by funding and directing the financial activities of companies involved in proliferation activities. Africa (uranium ore concentrate). for nuclear programs. It also acquired a multimillion-dollar plant to convert natural uranium to gaseous form-······an essential step in enriching it to weapons grade. r. ltaly (plutonium separation utility). in 1989. Finland (copper coils). Iraqi agents attempted to illicitly acquire U.acilities also must communicate with some related facilities and the nuclear program's nerve center. Israel and Pakistan have sought to illegally acquire krytrons from sources in the United States. PTB. And. India.

and helicopters. aircraft. 1'7 Just as there are a variety of targets. ground stations. they can even be placed in an attache case. 19 Plutonium production reactors can be detected by satellite infrared sensors. Naturally. NUCINT sensors are of much lesser value when the questions involve a nation/s nuclear intentions. can be deployed on spacecraft. but with how many warheads they were producing and the characteristics of those warheads.Can the intellzgence Communzty Keep Pace wzth the Threat? 295 immediate value in developing atomic weapons. the activity does create a new concern. 20 But NUCINT certainly does not playas great a role in evaluating the nuclear weapons programs of emerging nuclear states as it did in monitoring the Soviet nuclear weapons program. Fuel reprocessing plants can be monitored by the releases of krypton-85 gases. and Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) arrays provided a valuable means of providing answers to such questions. its efforts to ac- . there are also a number of different collection methods and strategies. communications intelligence (COMINT). the outflows of hot water from the Savannah River production reactors are easily visible in thermal infrared photographs taken from an altitude of 1.2 kilometers and are so broad that they are also detectable from satellite altitudes.S. Thus. The constellation of nuclear intelligence aircraft. which detect radiation and other effects resulting from radioactive sources. small boats.18 The most direct technical means of collecting intelligence on other nations' nuclear weapons programs is through the variety of sensors that fall in the NUCINT category. which are sufficiently large to be detectable at long distances. ships. Collection Methods and Strategies Various means exist to gather intelligence on nuclear weapons programs-including nuclear intelligence (NUCINT). and human intelligence (HUMINT). Such sensors. In the early 1950s. the krypton-85 level was the key to U. The United States was concerned for over forty years not with how the Soviets would attempt to acquire an A-bomb or whether they had succeeded. imagery intelligence (IMINTL signals intelligence (SIGINT). estimates of the Soviet Union/s plutonium production and nuclear weapons production rate.

and progress). 23 Potentially. At least one penetration of the Chinese government has involved someone with access to information concerning Chinese nuclear relations with Pakistan. facilities. or production work. an overview that could be extraordinarily difficult to piece together by relying on technical collection." In particular the report claimed that the CIA was working "at a frenzied pace" to establish human intelligence networks in hard-to-penetrate countries such as Iraq and North Korea. there seem to have been serious deficiencies in the general assessment of Iraq's nuclear program. including overhead reconnaissance and electronic intercepts. Further. particularly imagery and signals intelligence. a master list of foreign suppliers. Human sources not only can provide information on intentions but also can provide an integrated overview of a program (its people. In spite of the massive intelligence-gathering means at the disposition of several nations. 22 And it has recently been reported that "U.L':Jb JEFFREY L KICHELSON quire nuclear material and technology. research and development. certain smuggling networks may not rely on any form of interceptable communications in conducting their operations. In addition. That source reported on the following: 1. Human sources can also scoop up soil samples around a· suspected nuclear installation to be examined for traces of uranium hexafluoride. none of which give off signals detectable by such sensors.S. China's nuclear exports to Argentina and South Africa . human sources can report on what is inside facilities and can acquire and pass on documents and hardware of great value in helping to understand a foreign nuclear weapons program--for example. 21 It has been suggested that such deficiencies were due to an inadequate devotion to human intelligence collection and an overreliance on technical collection. 24 It is easy to provide examples in which HUMINT was or would have been of tremendous value in evaluating the status of a foreign nuclear weapons program. HUMINT can be applied to foreign nuclear weapons programs to provide a level of understanding that would probably be unavailable from technical collection. intelligence professionals who have been stymied in their attempts to monitor and curb proliferation through satellite intelligence gathering and export controls are turning anew to developing networks of agents and informants. suppliers.

Colonel Chang Hsien-Yi.S. 5. or thermonuclear. 3. Further. which includes a breakdown of the specific function of each unit inside the Tunnel. as stunning: "The scope of this is much more extensive than we thought. provided the American intelligence community with the first extensive evidence of Israeli capability to manufacture fusion. weapons. 4. 26 Aside from the significant new information provided by Iraqi defectors after the Persian Gulf War. In addition to attempts to penetrate the actual or po- .Can the Intelligence Community Keep Pace with the Threat? 2. One American official who has been analyzing Israel's nuclear capability since the late 1960s depicted Vanunu's information. According to The Samson Option: Vanunu's Times interview and his photographs of many of the production units in the Tunnel. 297 Chinese technicians who helped at a suspected Pakistani bomb-development site Chinese scientific delegations who were spending a substantial amount of time at a centrifuge plant in Kahuta where Pakistani scientists were attempting to produce enriched uranium Pakistani scientists from a secret facility at Wah who showed a nuclear weapons design to some Chinese physicists in late 1982 or early 1983 and who sought Chinese evaluation of whether the design would yield a nuclear blast The triggering mechanism for the Pakistani bomb design that appeared to be very similar to one used by China in its fourth nuclear tesf S Information about the Taiwanese nuclear program was also provided by an informant. U.. This information indicated that the Taiwanese were in the process of building a secret installation that could have been used to obtain plutonium. who worked in a Taiwanese research institute.. This is an enormous operation:'27 It is important to acknowledge the potential value of HUMINT and the value of improving HUMINT collection on proliferation activities.. Army human intelligence reports on the Pakistani presence at Chinese nuclear test sites and on Iraqi-Chinese discussions about construction of a nuclear reactor also indicate the value that can be played by human sources. the Mordechai Vanunu case certainly illustrates the potential value of HUMINT. or Machon 2.

Local conditions-including the isolation of the country as well as the thoroughness and brutality of the security service-and the nature of a country's relations with the United States may preclude sufficient successful recruitments.298 JEFFREY T RrCHELSON tential nuclear programs. including technical collection and analysis. and power lines. cooling towers. Whereas the United States has apparently learned "zip" about the North Korean program from human sources.s. probably by several orders of magnitude. Gaseous diffusion plants are reasonably conspicuous because of their large size (and heavy power demand)due to the fact that each passage of uranium hexafluoride through a diffusion barrier increases its enrichment by only a very small percentage. which may yield significant benefits. an excessive preoccupation with HUMINT may divert attention from enhancing other activities.. 28 However. particularly from nations such as Iraq. roads. In the 1970s. satellite imagery alerted the United States to the existence of a research installation.S. Thus. 30 Satellite imagery can show the presence of completed reactors.29 In addition. and Iran. railroad . it has been reported that the CIA networks in East Germany and Cuba were heavily penetrated by those nations' security services. as well as facilities under construction and their external characteristics. As desirable as it may be. Zip.. imagery and COMINT can provide significant hard information (and a valuable check on HUMINT) on many aspects of foreign nuclear weapons programs. the United States did have some human intelligence sources reporting on Iraq. according to one U. Imagery intelligence can and has provided information valuable in monitoring nuclear weapons programs. But he added: "With North Korea. it has learned a great deal from satellite imagery. It should not be forgotten that along with notable U. Thus. it may be impossible to attain sufficiently reliable human intelligence. we had nothing. as recruiting a source in the North Korean program. North Korea. there is a real danger in viewing HUMINT as the answer to monitoring proliferation activities. there have been some significant failures. Recruiting a source in the Pakistani nuclear program will not be as difficult. intelligence official. Certainly. HUMINT successes. there is also an obvious value to penetrating portions of the suppliers' network and smuggling operations.

The conclusion drawn by the CIA was that the North Koreans were planning on burying the pipes between the two facilities and thus concealing their connection from IAEA inspectors. housing. . U. 34 But clearly. U.S.S.S. additional satellite imagery revealed a second large building that seemed perfectly suited for reprocessing plutonium. 31 In the winter of 1991. have made or examined the feasibility of denial and deception efforts to hide aspects of their nuclear weapons programs from U. North Korea. 32 U. 33 Communications between the different elements of a nuclear program and between the different elements and higher authority are subject to interception by space and other COMINT systems. Similarly. reconnaissance activities. imaging satellites monitoring Iraq have detected uranium-enrichment machinery being moved around on trucks or buried to evade detection by UN inspectors. graphite-moderated. before taking the risky leap and building at Yongbyon. noted that the North Koreans may have built a "pilot plant" to process plutonium. And it is clear that several nations. and South Africa. possibly to haul away equipment. the director general of the IAEA. out of satellite view. imagery satellites detected North Korean workers digging trenches in frozen ground between Yongbyon's principal facility for reprocessing nuclear fuel and one of two facilities suspected of storing nuclear wastes. including Iraq. Hans Blix. a satellite returned imagery that indicated that a new reactor was going up at Yongbyon. in a report circulated to several governments.Can the Intelligence Community Keep Pace with the Threat? 299 trae](s. power grids. gas-cooled machine that burned natural uranium. During 1988-89. the U. Although there are virtually no specific examples in the open literature of the contribution of COMINT to nuclear proliferation intelligence-the only exception being a report of National Security Agency intercepts of South African-Israeli communications after the September 22. technical collection effort directed against Iraq left significant gaps. 35 Thus. Further photos showed a thirty-megawatt. and storage areas. 1979. In 1980. imagery satellites also detected trucks pulling up to the reprocessing plant before the arrival of lAEA inspectors in 1992. It has been noted that Pakistani officials regularly use the telephone to relay information about their nation's nuclear weapons program.s.s. U?la incident-it is safe to assume that there are a number of classified examples of the contribution of COMINT.

and activities taking place under cloud cover-have increased dramatically. in itself. 37 At the same time. the size of the U. Due to launch failures. The increased number of imagery spacecraft in orbit is. the U. In addition. As a result. a strict communications security program prohibits Iraqi officials from discussing the nuclear program over the telephone. it was discovered that Iraq had constructed underground facilities for nuclear weapons development and had buried related power lines.S. 36 In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. significant. Iraq pursued.S. imagery satellites detected the digging of deep tunnels around the nuclear site at Yongbyon in early February 1992. The tunnels are believed to be part of a program to harden the facility against a possible attack. with China. The United States reportedly first became aware of the facilities after a North Korean diplomat defected in May 1991. It has also been reported that North Korea was working on aspects of its nuclear weapons program in Bakchon County at a secret underground site designed to avoid satellite detection (and international inspection). and the LACROSSE is a radar imagery spacecraft. in addition to its visible-light imagery capability.S. But the new spacecraft have additional capabilities. with the launch of two VORTEX and two MAGNUM geosynchronous SIGINT spacecraft. Further. it should not be assumed that gaps are inevitable or that denial and deception measures cannot be defeated. the Advanced KH-ll is capable of producing infrared imagery. . space SIGINT constellation has increased since 1987-88.Likewise. possible plans to build a nuclear reactor that would be camouflaged to defeat satellite surveillance. the circumstances under which the United States can monitor certain activities or their effects-such as heat discharges. imagery satellite constellation in the 1987-88 period was quite limited compared with today's constellation---consisting of one KH-ll visible-light electro-optical spacecraft through October 1987 and two KH-lls through November 1988. In addition. nighttime construction. Since that time. the United States has launched approximately three Advanced KH-lls and two LACROSSE spacecraft. They may also be part of a program to hide nuclear weapons components from international inspectors. a new heavier SICINT spacecraft is scheduled for launch in late 1994. U.

and by devoting more attention to anomalous or suspicious facilities. 38 Until recently. technical collection systems is a function not only of their number and technical characteristics and capabilities but also of how they are employed-of human decisions concerning the areas and facilities to be covered and the frequency of coverage. by increasing the frequency and area of missions devoted to searching for new facilities. Increased nighttime coverage (employing Advanced KH:-ll and LACROSSE spacecraft) and increased coverage in the presence of cloud cover (relying on LACROSSE spacecraft). Increasing imagery and COMINT coverage means increasing the probability of detecting new facilities and new developments. Although that was not actually a problem. including more frequent imagery coverage at night and when cloud cover is present. the primary focus of U. increased coverage of supplier communications links may reveal valuable new information.Also. In the days before the launch of the first U. some believed that it might be imperative to obtain photography of Soviet missile silos while thev were under construction because once construction was completed they would be camouflaged.S.S. Thus. the United States has recently stepped up satellite reconnaissance of Iran's nuclear-related facilities in response to evidence of a "suspicious procurement pattern" of nuclear-related technologies. North Korea and other potential proliferators were not ignored in imagery and COMINT collection plans. Defeating denial and deception measures may depend on a variety of strategies. along . 40 Likewise. the attempts by Iraq and North Korea to construct underground facilities suggest that it may be necessary to detect some nuclear facilities in the construction stage. Although Iraq. COMINT coverage can be increased by more frequent monitoring (andfor processing) of communications links known to be associated with nuclear weapons programs. technical collection efforts was the former Soviet Union. In addition to increased attention to the communications links of a particular proliferator. 39 Imagery coverage can be increased in several ways-by scheduling images of targets already on the target list to be produced more frequently. the "take" obtained from constructing and deploying U. they certainly did not receive as much attention as they might have and as they are receiving now. as well as more frequent searches for new frequencies that might be associated with such programs. reconnaissance satellites.S.

The analytical component of the proliferation monitoring effort can improve the chances of successful monitoring. often including the desire to achieve the capability covertly. given the constraints facing potential proliferators. As a result. Instead.. which makes the intelligence problem of monitoring Soviet nuclear weapons developments simple by comparison. The staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found only one finished intelligence community assessment of the Iraqi procurement network in the 1983-89 period. This is particularly true when dealing with an intelligence problem such as proliferation. there are distinct alternative paths to the production of nuclear weapons. Aside from the multitude of potential proliferators. And for any particular path or paths chosen. they are not pursuing such a capability" may have little validity. Furthermore. it is necessary to evaluate information against a variety of models of nuclear proliferation.g. and since they are not doing X. and most "rational" method may not be the one chosen. they would do X.with coverage of more territory. A fundamental condition for analytical success. Analysis Improving the ability to monitor attempts at nuclear proliferation requires more than enhanced collection operations--whether human or technical. the logic that "if they were pursuing a nuclear capability. increase the chances of detecting construction of underground facilities before they have been completed. Improved analysis is another. is to focus analytic resources on the problem. least costly. before even the proper analytic strategy. there are a number of suppliers for the resources required. the most direct. It appears that the surprise that resulted from the discovery that Iraq was employing calutron technology to produce nuclear material stemmed from the dismissal of the method as being obsolete. Hence. the choice between plutonium and highly enriched uranium). more attention to the issue would have been justified. analysts had concluded that Iraq was seeking . But improvements in collection are only one means of enhancing the ability to monitor the activities of emerging nuclear powers. 41 Clearly. paths that are the product of numerous choices (e.

a U.>-- / . at the very least. ¥. The overall performance of u. 44 But as the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War showed.S. intelligence community to monitor nuclear proliferation activities. as well as to simply evaluate the meaning of data already collected.S. the United States began working with France.v •. and West Germany to develop a concerted response to a possibly impending test. ~ ~' •.. analysts apparently considered it unlikely that some Iraqi facilities detected by satellite reconnaissance were involved in the nuclear weapons program because of a lack of visible security around the facilities. this is not generally necessary to put a brake on proliferation.. Recognizing the variety of paths a nation may pursue to achieve a nuclear weapons capability can also improve the value and efficiency of the collection effort. there is considerable room (and need) for improvement. and measures to block such procurement attempts or actions.~ •. However. they are not cause for despair-for even though it may be desirable for the United States to know everything immediately. Hence.v""... the extensive nature of the program resulted in security fences being placed so far from those facilities that the fences went unnoticed..s.~v"""". That pressure.S. U. in 1992 the United States was able to persuade China and Argentina to cancel planned transfers of key technologies to Iran. . then or in the future. intelligence in the proliferation area can be improved by a number of means.7 ·•. following a tip from the Soviet Union. Great Britain..--. '>-110-.". . 43 In 1977. imagery satellite photographed a suspected nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert. Models of alternative proliferation paths can be (and presumably are) employed to direct collection activities. It was subsequently discovered that Iraq was pursuing both approaches.-.•. ..~ v (~. Knowledge of select procurement attempts or other actions. -. to enrich its uranium through the use of delicate fast-spinning centrifuges that separate the heavier and lighter isotopes of ura~ nium gas. may suffice.~ . 42 Similarly. ". On the basis of that imagery. may have discouraged a South African test in the Kalahari.. Conclusion Although the postwar discoveries concerning the Iraqi nuclear weapons program raise legitimate concerns about the ability of the U. 'L'-''''"'t" ".

For in addition to improving HUMINT collection. Finally. More frequent monitoring and processing of nuclear weapons programs. Boston. for such coIIection may provide information that would be of tremendous value and that is unobtainable from other sources. U. November 14. some improvement would come just from an increase in effort-in other words. and (3) reexamining known nuclear facilities. as well as analysis. it should not be seen as the answer. The development of an improved broad-area search capability would further enhance imagery capabilities. Technical collection has already improved due to the increased sensor capabilities of U. Notes 1. and financial communications links known to be associated with nuclear weapons programs would increase the probability of discovering relevant information. it is also necessary to improve imagery collection strategies-by devoting more time to (1) searching for new facilities. Gates to the Association of Former Intelligence Officers. A near exclusive focus on improving HUMINT may divert attention from other areas of possible improvement. (2) examining suspicious or anomalous facilities. . the hiring of more analysts or the devotion of more analytical time to proliferation problems. analysts also need to consider the numerous alternative paths that can be used to produce nuclear weapons. However. Remarks by Director of Central Intelligence Robert M. Increased searches for relevant communications could also produce valuable information.S. But beyond improvements in sensor capabilities and the number of spacecraft in orbit. Better integration of the analytical effort presently being conducted by several distinct intelligence organizations may produce better analysis. But it will also be necessary to make better use of the analytical resources already available. among the most important and necessary improvements are those that lie in the area of analysis. suppliers. In setting intelligence collection requirements and in analyzing data. p. 2. As with collection activities.JV<t JnHKEY L l'(ICHELSON Improving HUMINT collection is one of those means. COMINT collection can also be improved in similar ways. 1992. intelligence should be able to improve the effectiveness of technical collection.S. imagery satellites and the increased number of those satellites in operation. Massachusetts.

pp. December 23. Lewis. September 22. "U. October 11. 18. Intelligence.s. Smith." Washington Post. June 10. p. A44-A4S. "CIA Says Iran Makes Progress on Atom Arms. pp. Spector with Jacqueline R. C2. A36. A8. Leonard Spector. the Department of Energy Office of Intelligence. Scarborough and Gertz. 6. 1991. Smith and Frankel. A9. 10.N. Stanford University. p." Washington Post. pp. pp. p. p. "U. "Nuclear-Related Plant Discovered in Iraq. 4. 15. 29. AI. "Subject: BNL Affair-Atlanta Branch. . November 16.S. 1991. Leonard S. Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. Eric Schmitt." New York Times. A3.N. pp. Says It Missed 2 A-Plants in Iraq. 10.S." New York Times.s. ES. Officials Seek Mastermind in Charge of Iraq's Nuclear Effort. 1990. October 13. 17. pp. 5. 1991. SISMI. A30.d. 3. and the Z (Special Projects) Division of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. "Iraq's Nuclear Quest: Tentacles in Four Continents. "Iraq's Quest for the Nuclear Grail: What Can We Learn?" Arms Control Today. The most prominent organizations in the U." Washington Post. "Asia's Nuclear Nightmare: The German Connection. R. Michael Wines.181-98. 8. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards: Lessons from Iraq (Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms Control. Elaine Sciolino. R. Is Building Up a Picture of Vast Iraqi Atom Program. Aides Discover Atom Arms Center". "For Sale: Nuclear Contraband. "U. David Albright and Mark Hibbs. who may have relevant information.N. Elaine Sciolino." New York Times. Aides Discover Atom Arms Center Concealed by Iraq. 1991.N. AI. the Air Force Technical Applications Center. October 1. 1992. November 29. July/August 1992. October 20." New York Times. "U. intelligence community involved in monitoring foreign nuclear programs are the DCI Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee. 1993). "Saddam's Nuclear-Weapons Dream". Says It Missed 2 A-Plants. AI. Steve Call. "Iraq's Nuclear Program Shows the Holes in U." 13. 9. 1991. All. "U. AI. Smith and Frankel. p. 1990. 1989-1990 (Boulder: Westview. Jeffrey Smith and Glenn Frankel. "Saddam's NUclear-Weapons Dream." 11. the Defense Intelligence Agency. 11-14." Washington Times. Jeffrey Smith. "U. It should be noted that HUMINT comes in two varieties-overt and clandestine. May Destroy the Hardware. 3. 1." n." Washington Post.Can the Intelligence Community Keep Pace with the Threat? 305 2. May Destroy the Hardware.1992. "Saddam's Nuclear-Weapons Dream. Paul Lewis. pp.s. "U. November 30. August 8. 14. 1990). 3334. A6. Overt collection includes interviewing selected individuals. Anthony Fainberg. such as businessmen and travelers. October 8." New York Times. but Iraqi Nuclear Workers Remain. Rowan Scarborough and Bill Gertz. p. the Central Intelligence Agency. 16. p." New York Times." Orbis. "U. pp. Spring 1992." New York Times." 12. 7. A6. Michael Wines. pp. "Threats in the Middle East. 1991.N. 1991. Cl. Gary Milhollin. Paul Lewis. 1991. Schmitt.

26. Military Reference Branch. November 3. "Advanced Arms Spread Defies Remote Detection. The unique ability of human sources to acquire documents. At.) Determination of Proper Security Classification. pp. p. So Do CIA Recruits' Resumes. Patrick E. actions. seek to determine Iran's present nuclear intentions. Washington. 1985.: Pergamon-Brassey's.s. Entry 214. pp." Washington Post. Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta. "Controlling Nuclear Weapons at the Source. The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House. 1991).S. 1991 (SanitizedlDeclassified). 1986). "Help Wanted: Bring Cloak." June 19. pp. The standard argument for the benefits of HUMINT is that it can provide information on intentions. 338-88. "Nuclear Power Plant Development Plans. Army Operational Group. p. hardware. "Memorandum for Director of Intelligence." November 26. Griffin." p. Janeway. U. David W. March 23. Va. Von Hippel and Levi. 20." Washington Post." New York Times. although intelligence analysts may. 22." in Kosta Tsipis. A19. with communications intelligence being a very significant means.S. p. "Nuclear Exports to China?" Washington Post. Overt HUMINT collection may prove fruitful for some segments of the international suppliers network. pp. November 22. James Adams. December 28. D. C7. p." Aviation Week and Space Technology. B2. 1986 (SanitizedlDeclassified). p. pp. Hersh. Thus. October 23. which technical collection systems cannot provide. 20-22. January 12. Under what circumstances the United . 28. and Peter W. Dagger. 377. 18. Rodman D. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards. National Archives and Record Administration. Fulghum. Seymour M. Tyler. 1986. 1985. 24." Washington Post. Stephen Engleberg and Michael R. 23. Patrick E. A15. A3. "As Intelligence Needs Change. AI. Tyler and Joanne Omang. This is a fairly poor argument for the value of HUMINT. or soil samples seems to be a far better example of its potentially great value. Files 4-4459 through 4-4592. DCS/O.306 JEFFREY T RICHEI. February 9. 1985. 27. "Pakistani Use of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Test Facilities. David A. In addition. November 9." Washington Times.SON 19. RG 341. "Nuclear Pact with China Wins Senate Approval. "Controlling Nuclear Weapons at the Source: Verification of a Cut-Off in Production of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium for Nuclear Weapons. 198." May 12. "China-Iran Nuclear Link Is Reported. 1954. "A Few Spoken Words Sealed Atom Pact. Joanne Omang. AS.. SOOth MI Brigade. and should. AI. Intentions are detectable by a variety of collection methods. Subject: (Unci. 21. Fainberg. 377. 1992." Washington Post.C. eds. Frank Von Hippel and Barbara Levi. 25. "Taipei Halts Work on Secret Plant to Make Nuclear Bomb Ingredient. p. knowledge of intentions may have only a limited impact on U. and particularly regarding proliferation. 1985. Arms Control Verification: The 1echnologies That Make It Possi/lle (McLean. 1992. A20-21. actions in attempting to limit Iran's acquisition of nuclear technologies--given the nature of that regime and the fact that intentions can change overnight. Hafemeister. it is not clear that their conclusions should influence U. Gordon. at p. 1992.

AI." Washington Post. Bill Gertz. pp. "N. A9. 128-29. Bill Gertz. AID. AI. February 21. B15. "South Africa's Sixteen-Year Secret: The Nuclear Bomb. Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta. William E.Can the Intelligence Community Keep Pace with the Threat? 307 States would attempt (or has attempted) to recruit clandestine sources in German. 1989. "North Koreans Pursue Nuclear Weapons.s. "Saddam's Nuclear Secrets. 32. 1992. "Nu_ clear Power Plant Development Plans. "Iraq's Nuclear Program Shows the Holes in U. or other West European corporations makes for interesting speculation.S. "Satellite Spots Iraq Burying Atomic Gear." Washington Post. Intelligence"." Blix meant in a location not likely to be the subject of coverage. R. To be literally "out of satellite view/' the plant would have to be in the Arctic 37. "Journey to Isolation"." New York Times. Sciolino. pp. 36." p. 39. pp. John J." Washington Post. AI. (source of quotation). July 29. October 7. Jeffrey Smith. 29. by "out of satellite view. 31. R. July 19. 30. Critical Mass (New York: Simon and Schuster. All. pp. VI. the United States sharply stepped up its technical collection operations directed at Iraq. 1991.S. 1991. pp. North Korea is located well within 30 to 50 degrees north latitude. Sanger. Sanger. June 27. Jeffrey Smith. Sanger. "Iraq's Nuclear Program Shows the Holes in U. . 38. "Journey to Isolation. Bill Gertz. 1988). Von Hippel and Levi. p. Korea Goes Underground with Nuclear Plants. 1989." Newsweek." Washington Times. Shows Photos to Argue Iraq Hides Nuclear Material. A16. U. One measure of the value of more intense coverage might be how much additional information the United States acquired about Iraqi nuclear programs due to increased technical collection in the period between the Iraqi invasion and the beginning of the air campaign. 34. May 12. "North Korea May Be Developing Ability to Build Nuclear Weapons. pp." 35.S. p. "North Korea Digs Tunnels for Nuclear Arms. 1991. making it easily accessible to all U." Washington Times. 1991." Washington Post. 33. 28ff. "Stasi Files Reveal CIA Two-Timers. 1992. p.: Amana Books. p. p." Washington Times. All. "N. Korea and the Bomb: High-Tech Hide-andSeek. Paul Lewis." Presumably. "Cuban Defector Impeaches CIA Spies. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. "Journey to Isolation". A9. p. Army Operational Group. "U. Stephen Green. 1993. Michael Breen. July 10. Decisions concerning the targeting of space imagery and space signals intelligence systems are made by the Dcr Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) and the SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee (SORS) of the DCI SIGINT Committee. Fialka. "Controlling Nuclear Weapons at the Source. Italian. 1994). March 21. Living by the Sword (Brattleboro. 28-35. 1988. All.375. October 25. Sanger. September 12. pp. David E. Burrows and Robert Windrem. November 15. April 27." Washington Times. A12." New York Times Magazine." Wall Street Journal. Intelligence. AI. Sciolino. A26.s. Don Oberdorfer. imagery satellites. 1991. 1993. "Journey to Isolation".

Coil.S.S. Some U.: Ballinger. Halted Nuclear Bid by Iran. U. Is Building Up a Picture of Vast Iraqi Atom Program. government and private analysts are skeptical that South Africa had enough fissionable material for a bomb in 1977. "U. November 17. 1991. in 1993. it is possible that such a test was planned in 1977 with Israeli help. Leonard S.C.S.S. September 27. 1984 (Cambridge. Mass. Steve Coil. p. that two shafts had been dug at the site for a potential nuclear blast. 1992.S.: Government Printing Office. AI. "U. pp." 44. p. Michael Wines.30H JEFFREY L KICHELSON 40. Spector. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. See Smith. 43. 1984). "South Africa's Sixteen-Year Secret. given reports of close Israeli-South African links. The Intelligence Community's Involvement in the Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro (BNL) Affair (Washington. Congress. And the South Africans confirmed. 42." . 41. 292." New York Times. 9. A8. 1993). Nuclear Proliferation Today: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons." Washington Post. D. A30. p. Halted Nuclear Bid by Iran. "U. Of course.