Republic of the Philippines vs.

PLDT
ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object for
expropriation.
HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone company to
permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The
use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a
subject to an easement of right of way.
Quezon City vs Judge Ericta
The power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate.
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction
in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of
property (with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for
the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an
illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms).
Sorsogon vs. Villaroya
As a matter of fair procedure, it is the duty of the Government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their
will, to supply all required documentation and facilitate payment of just compensation. The imposition of unreasonable
requirements and vexatious delays before effecting payment is not only galling and arbitrary but a rich source of discontent
with government. There should be some kind of swift and effective recourse against unfeeling and uncaring acts of middle or
lower level bureaucrats.
Under ordinary circumstances, immediate return to the owners of the unpaid property is the obvious remedy. In cases where
land is taken for public use, public interest however, must, be considered. The children of Gubat, Sorsogon have been using the
disputed land as their high school athletic grounds for thirty years.
In the execution of this decision, the Provincial Government of Sorsogon is expected to immediately pay as directed. Should any
further delays be encountered, the trial court is directed to seize any of the patrimonial property or cash savings of the province
in the amount necessary to implement this decision.

Cam. Sur vs CA
Issues:
1) WON the resolution is null and void. Corollary to this issue is WON the expropriation is for a public use.
2) WON the exercise of the power of eminent domain in this case is restricted by the CAR Law?
3) WON the complaint for expropriation may be dismissed on the ground of inadequacy of the compensation offered?
Held/ratio:
1) The expropriation is for a public purpose, hence the resolution is authorized and valid.
SC explained that there had been a shift from the old to the new concept of public purpose:. Old concept is that the property
must actually be used by the general public. The new concept, on the other hand, means public advantage, convenience or
benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community.
In this case, the proposed pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the CamSur peeps.
(How?) invaluable info and tech on agriculture, fishery, and cottage industry, enhance livelihood of farmers and fishermen, etc.
2)

No, (citing Ardana vs Reyes, SC here said that the implication of the Ardana case is that) the power of expropriation is
superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform program.
Old LGC does not intimate in the least that LGUs must first secure approval of the Dept of Land Reform for conversion of agri to
non-agri use. Likewise, no provision in the CAR Law subjecting expropriation by LGUs to the control of DAR.
Moreover, Sec 65 of CAR Law is not in point because it is applicable only to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform
program. This is limited only to applications for reclassification submitted by land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication.
3) Fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation decalred in the tax declarations of
their property, are unfounded.

It is unconstitutional to fix just compensation in expropriation cases based on the value given either by the owners or the
assessor. Rules for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 ROC, evidence must be submitted to justify
what they consider is the just compensation.
Phil. Press Institute vs. Comelec
Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to donate
Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal property without payment of the just compensation required in
expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec,
considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is
authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a
valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to
take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs Central Luzon drug corp

Central Luzon Drug Corporation is a retailer of medicines and other pharmaceutical
products. For the period January 1995 to December 1995, pursuant to the mandate of Section 4(a) of
Republic Act No. 7432, otherwise known as the Senior Citizens Act, it granted a twenty percent
(20%) discount on the sale of medicines to qualified senior citizens amounting to P219,778.00. It
then deducted the same amount from its gross income for the taxable year 1995, pursuant to
Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 implementing the Senior Citizens Act, which states that the discount
given to senior citizens shall be deducted by the establishment from its gross sales for value-added
tax and other percentage tax purposes. For the said taxable period, Central Luzon Drug reported a
net loss of P20,963.00 in its corporate income tax return, thus, it did not pay income tax for 1995.
Subsequently, Central Luzon Drug filed a claim for refund in the amount of P150,193.00,
claiming that according to Sec. 4(a) of the Senior Citizens Act, the amount of P219,778.00 should be
applied as a tax credit. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) was not able to decide the claim
on time, hence, Central Luzon Drug filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals. The
latter dismissed the petition, declaring that even if the law treats the 20% discount granted to senior
citizens as a tax credit, the same cannot apply when there is no tax liability or the amount of the tax
credit is greater than the tax due. In the latter case, the tax credit will only be to the extent of the tax
liability. Also, no refund can be granted as no tax was erroneously, illegally and actually collected.
Furthermore, the law does not state that a refund can be claimed by the establishment concerned as
an alternative to the tax credit.
Central Luzon Drug filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court held that the 20% discount given to senior citizens which is treated as a tax credit is considered
just compensation and, as such, may be carried over to the next taxable period if there is no current
tax liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 20% discount granted by Central Luzon Drug to qualified senior citizens
pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of the Senior Citizens Act may be claimed as a tax credit or as a deduction from
gross sales in accordance with Sec. 2(1) of Revenue Regulations No. 2-94
HELD:
The Petition is DENIED.
Sec. 4(a) of the Senior Citizens Act provides:
Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. The senior citizens shall be
entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments
relative to utilization of transportations services, hotels and similar
lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase
of medicines anywhere in the country: Provided, That private
establishments may claim the cost as tax credit.
The above provision explicitly employed the term tax credit. Nothing in the provision
suggests for it to mean a deduction from gross sales. Thus, the 20% discount required by the law
to be given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not a deduction from the gross sales of the establishment

concerned. As a corollary to this, the definition of tax credit found in Sect. 2(1) of Revenue
Regulations No. 2-94 is erroneous as it refers to tax credit as the amount representing the 20%
discount that shall be deducted by the said establishment from their gross sales for value added tax
and other percentage tax purposes. When the law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed
as a tax credit, it means that the amount, when claimed, shall be treated as a reduction from any tax
liability. The law cannot be amended by a mere regulation.
Finally, for purposes of clarity, Sec. 229 of the Tax Code does not apply to cases that fall under Sec. 4
of the Senior Citizens Act because the former provision governs exclusively all kinds of refund or
credit of internal revenue taxes that were erroneously or illegally imposed and collected pursuant to
the Tax Code while the latter extends the tax credit benefit to the private establishments concerned
even before tax payments have been made. The tax credit that is contemplated under the Senior
Citizens Act is a form of just compensation, not a remedy for taxes that were erroneously or illegally
assessed and collected. In the same vein, prior payment of any tax liability is not a precondition
before a taxable entity can benefit from the tax credit. The credit may be availed of upon payment of
the tax due, if any. Where there is no tax liability or where a private establishment reports a net loss
for the period, the tax credit can be availed of and carried over to the next taxable year.

Heirs of Mateo Pidacan and Romana Eigo, et al. v. ATO, et al.,

G.R. No. 162779, June 15, 2007
A property was converted into an airport by the Air Transport Office (ATO) depriving the owners of the beneficial use and
enjoyment of the same as early as 1948 without an expropriation proceeding. It was contended that there was taking hence,
just compensation should be reckoned from 1948. Is the contention correct? Why?
No. As a rule, the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is reckoned from the time of taking. (Gabatin v.
LBO, 444 SCRA 176 (2004)). In this case, however, application of the said rule would lead to grave injustice. Note that the ATO
had been using the property as airport since 1948 without having instituted the proper expropriation proceedings. To peg the
value of the property at the time of taking in 1948, despite the exponential increase in its value considering the lapse of over
half a century, would be iniquitous. ATO cannot conveniently invoke the right of eminent domain to take advantage of the
ridiculously low value of the property at the time of taking that it arbitrarily chooses to the prejudice of the owners.
Justice and fairness dictate that the appropriate reckoning point for the valuation of the property is when the trial court made
its order of expropriation in 2001. (Heirs of Mateo Pidacan & Romana Eigo, et al. v. ATO, et al., G.R. No. 162779, June 15, 2007).
Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC)
YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP.
*For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved
HLIs SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To
be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the
approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under
compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage *after PARCs
revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the
Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases
do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only
preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with
the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the
determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]

Vda. de Genuino vs Court of Agrarian Relation

The exercise of police power is alleged to be unreasonable because share tenancy does not involve health, morals and public
safety; that the constitutionality of Section 14 of Republic Act 1199 was upheld as a valid exercise of police power as against the

freedom to contract and not against deprivation of property without due process of law. The argument is unacceptable. Police
power is broad enough to be exercised on the basis of the economic need 7 for the public welfare. And, We do not see why
public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the state's exercise of
its police power.
Finally, it is alleged that rentals fixed by the court based on the stipulation of facts yield an unreasonable return of only 3.42%
to 4.56% to the estate, amounting to a confiscation of property without due process of law. It must be pointed out that just
compensation is not required in the exercise of police power. And besides, the constitutionality of a law may not be made to
depend on the effects of a conclusion based on a stipulation of facts entered into by the parties. Otherwise, the law would be
constitutional in certain cases and unconstitutional in others. And when questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of
a law, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail unless some factual foundation of record is proved. 8 Undoubtedly, this
factual foundation must be shown to exist independently of mere stipulation of facts.
Philippine Ports Authority vs Mendoza
Private monopolies are not necessarily prohibited. The use of the word "regulate" in the Constitution indicates that some
monopolies, properly regulated, are allowed. Regulate means includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but
regulate should not be construed as synonymous with suppress or prohibit (Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 108).
"Competition can best regulate a free economy. Like all basic beliefs, however, that principle must accommodate hard practical
experience. There are areas where for special reasons the force of competition, when left wholly free, might operate too
destructively to safeguard the public interest. Public utilities are an instance of that consideration." (Oleck, Modern Corporation
Law, Vol. IV, p. 197). By their very nature, certain public services or public utilities such as those which supply water, electricity,
transportation, telegraph, etc. must be given exclusive franchises if public interest is to be served. Such exclusive franchises are
not violative of the law against monopolies
Bautista vs Juinio
Police power is that inherent and plenary power of the state which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society. The exercise of police power may cut into the rights to liberty and property for the promotion of
the general welfare.
Social justice Society vs Atienza
he Court described Ordinance No. 8027 as a measure enacted pursuant to the delegated police power of local government
units to promote the order, safety, and health, morals, and general welfare of the society. It explained that based on the
hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is
obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not.
Lladoc vs Commissioner of internal revenue
The phrase exempt from taxation should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. The exemption is only
from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties as property taxes as contradistinguished from excise taxes. A donees
gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. It does not rest
upon general ownership, but an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the
properties. The imposition of such excise tax on property used for religious purpose do not constitute an impairment of the
Constitution.
The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise taxes.
Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas vs tan
Petitioners have failed to show that EO 273 was issued capriciously and whimsically or in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility. It appears that a comprehensive study of the VAT had been extensively discussed by this
framers and other government agencies involved in its implementation, even under the past administration. As the Solicitor
General correctly sated. "The signing of E.O. 273 was merely the last stage in the exercise of her legislative powers. The
legislative process started long before the signing when the data were gathered, proposals were weighed and the final
wordings of the measure were drafted, revised and finalized. Certainly, it cannot be said that the President made a jump, so to
speak, on the Congress, two days before it convened."