Torts Reviewer (Gianna - Ranx.tina - Gi.sam - Katz.alex - Emjo.didy)

TORTS AND DAMAGES|gianna.ranx.tina.gi.sam.katz.alex.emjo.
didy| FINALS REVIEWER| CASIS 1

TORTS
not defined in the NCC nor in any Philippine Law BUT many
scattered provisions on tortuous acts
usually defines as: (1) what it is not; (2) remedies granted; (3)
social/public policy protected
Why not use the concept of tort? It is too broad vis a vis culpa
aquiliana.
Why the need for tort?

to fill the vacuum between delicts and quasi- delicts
for expediency (proof beyond reasonable doubt vs
preponderance of evidence)
a way for the State to allocate risks and payment of
damages/restoration cost
Damages: much longer treatment in the NCC; more practical
importance on damages
Practical Legal Relevance: vehicular accidents
Intentional tort: not a delict (any act or omission punishable by law)
Why? Intentional act causing damage to another, not a crime
Act: intentional, voluntary
-damage
-may or may not violate a criminal law
Negligence: any act or omission causing damage to another but w/o
intent (only difference w/intentional tort)
Strict liability: it doesnt matter if youre negligent or if you intended
it as long as sets of circumstances make you liable
I. TORT
A. Definitions
1. Tort and Quasi-delict
a. Tort
NAGUIAT v NLRC
FACTS: Naguiat is the president and a stockholder of Clark Field Taxi,
Inc. (CFT). Due to the phase-out of the US bases in the country, Clark
Air Base was closed and the taxi drivers of CFTI were separated from
service. The drivers filed a complaint for the payment of sep. pay due
to the termination/phase-out. NLRC held Naguiat and the company
solidarily liable for the payment of sep. pay.
ISSUE: WON Naguait should be held solidarily liable with CFTI. YES.
HELD: Under the Corporation Code, Naguait is liable bec: (1) he
actively managed the business; (2) there was evidence that CFTI
obtained reasonably adequate insurance; and (3) there was a
corporate tort in this case.
Our jurisprudence is wanting of the definite scope of corporate tort.

Essentially, tort consists in the violation of a right given or
the omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply stated, it is a
breach of legal duty.
NOTES:
CORPORATE TORT: in regards to liability of President of CFTI: no
definition of corporate tort
2 definitions: long and short (legal basis)
Short definition: from a law dictionary
Whats wrong with the definition in Naguiat? TOO BROAD. Any breach
of legal duty becomes a tort so it would include criminal acts, QD,
breach of contract.
very sloppy definition but its the only case that defines Tort
Why SC gave definition of Tort? They had to determine the liability of
the officers (Naguiat) for the tortious act.
Is it part of the ratio of the case? NO. Obiter. They already found CFTI
liable under the Labor Code so SC did not need to establish liability
through tort
VINZON-CHATO v FORTUNE
FACTS: Vinzons-Chato, in her capacity as Commisioner of the Internal
Revenue, imposed a 55% ad valorem tax on Fortune. The latter sue for
damages based on Article 32 for alleged violation of its constitutional
right against deprivation of property without due process of law and
the right to equal proetection of law. SC found for Fortune.
The Court defined tort in this case as a wrong, a tortious act
which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by
one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or
indirectly, in person, property or reputation. Presence of good motive,
or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act
which is otherwise an invasion of another's legal right.; that is, liability
in tort is not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil
intent.
NOTES:
Definition is too broad. It may cover criminal acts, but not all
criminal acts give rise to damages.
Defense of good faith is irrelevant to tort according to this

case. No distinction between intentional and non-intentional
tort.
NOT binding. Obiter dictum. What was discussed about tort

was already decided by the Code Commission.
AQUINO (pp. 1-2)
Tort: taken directly from the French and is derivation of the Latin word
torquere meaning to twist
common law: An unlawful violation of private right, not created
TORTS AND DAMAGES|gianna.ranx.tina.gi.sam.katz.alex.emjo.didy| FINALS REVIEWER| CASIS 2
by contract, and which gives rise to an action for damages. An

act or omission producing an injury to another, without any
previous existing lawful relation of which the said act or
omission may be said to be a natural outgrowth or incident
(other definitions not discussed)
no universal formula for torts liability
includes intentional tort, negligence, and strict liability
Intentional tort: Includes conduct where the actor desires to cause

the consequences of his act or believes the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it.
includes assault, batter, false imprisonment, defamation,

invasion of privacy and interference of property
Negligence: involves voluntary acts or omissions which result in
injury to others, without intending to cause the same
actor fails to exercise due care in performing such acts or

omissions
Strict Liability: where the person is made liable independent of fault
or negligence upon submission of proof of certain facts
DE LEON (pp. 1-3)
Tort: common law expression
used in French to mean wrong, derived from Latin tortus

meaning twisted, as if to say tortuous conduct is twisted
conduct or conduct that departs from the existing norm
a legal wrong that causes harm for which the violator is subject
to civil liability
fundamental concept of tort: wrongful act or omission +

resulting in breach of a private legal duty (distinguished from a
mere breach of contractual duty) + damage from said breach
of duty (of such character as to afford a right of redress at law
in favor of the injured party against the wrongdoer)
Note (explained definition in Naguiat vs. NLRC): the term tort used
by SC has same meaning as tort in common law jurisdictions, as it was
used in cases involving QD and delicts
Tortious act: a wrongful act
commission or omission of duty of an act by one, without right,

whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in
person, property, or reputation (74 Am. Jur. 2D 620)
Art. 2176, NCC

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
Essence of tort: defendants potential for civil liability to the victim

for harmful wrongdoing and correspondingly the victims potential for
compensation or other relief
b. Quasi-delict
NOTES:
Article 2176 explanation: First sentence refers to ALL CIVIL
LIABILITIES. Second sentence qualifies it to QD.
BARREDO v GARCIA
FACTS: A Head-on collision between a taxi and carretela resulted in
the death of a 16-yr old boy who was a passenger of the carretela. The
taxi driver was convicted in a crim case but the right to file a sep civil
action was reserved. The parents of the boy sued Barredo, the drivers
employer for damages. Barredo contends that under the RPC, his
liability is only subsidiary, hence he cannot be held liable as no civil
action has been filed against the driver.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiffs, may bring this separate civil action against
Barredo, making him primarily liable as employer under the CC. YES.
HELD: Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa
aquiliana" is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, entirely
independent from a delict or crime.
A concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not
destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime
and the responsibility for cuasi- delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The
same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising
from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an
action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 19021910 of the Civil Code.
Thus, there were 2 liabilities of Barredo: a subsidiary one
arising from the drivers crim negligence nd a primary one as employer
under the CC. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take,
and they preferred the second remedy. They were acting within their
rights in doing so.
NOTES:
during that time, culpa aquiliana (QD) doesnt cover acts
against law? A1903, old CC expressly exclude acts not
punishable by law
SC needed to have very strong reason not to follow what the

old law says because if A1903 applied literally there would be
no culpa aquiliana, if read together with RPC (all acts would be
under criminal negligence and imprudence)
so in this case, emphasize scope of culpa aquiliana and
delict; why needed? Barredo was arguing that he was not
solidarily liable and should only be subsidiarily liable
if applied today, would the result be the same? YES through

stare decisis + QD definition changed, removed phrase not
punishable by law
According to this case, culpa aquiliana may include acts or
omissions punishable by law. The overlap does not destroy the
distinction between crimes and QD, it just gives the injured
party a choice of whether to sue based on culpa criminal
(where employers are only subsidiarily liable) or culpa
aquiliana (where employers are primarily liable).
ELCANO v HILL
FACTS: In criminal case where Reginald Hill was charged with the
killing of Agapito Elcano, the former was acquitted for lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake. The deceaseds parents thereafter sued
Reginald and his father for damages. CFI dismissed the civil cases on
the ground of res judicata.
ISSUE: WON the civil action for damages is barred by Hills acquittal in
the crim case. NO.
HELD: Hills acquittal in the crim case has not extinguished his liability
for QD, hence the acquittal is not a bar to the instant civil action.
Art. 2176 where it refers to fault or negligence, covers not only acts
not punishable by law but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent.
NOTES:
why make intentional acts covered by QD? To make father and

son liable
Article 2177 expressly points out that theres a separate civil
liability from criminal negligence BUT it seems to apply to QD
only so court dealt with this limitation by upholding the
construction that upholds the spirit that giveth life rather
than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the
lawmaker (A2176 is not just QD, so A2177 really has no
problem)
CINCO v CANONOY
FACTS: Cincos car and a jeepney collided. Cinco filed a civil action for
damage to property against the jeepneys driver and operators.
Thereafter, he also filed a criminal case against the jeepney driver. CFI
upheld the suspension of the civil case pending the determination of
the crim case.
ISSUE: WON there can be an independent civil action for damage to
property during the pendency of the criminal action. YES.
HELD: Liability being predicated on a QD, the civil case may proceed
as a separate and independent civil action as specifically provided for
in Art. 2177 of the CC.
Art. 2176 of the CC is so broad that it includes not only injuries to

persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction bet.
Damage to persons and damage to property.
NOTES:
Relevance: clarified that QD includes damage to property

Problem: A2191(2) gave example where QD and damage
to property [liability of proprietors of excessive smoke]; but
this is a Tort on STRICT LIABILITY, not QD!
BAKSH v CA
FACTS: Baksh was sued for damages for his breach of promise to
marry. CA affirmed TCs award of damages, relying on Art. 21 CC.
ISSUE: WON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to
marry based on Art. 21 of the CC. YES.
HELD: Art. 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where
the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Art. 21 is designed to
expand the concept of torts or QD in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold no. of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in
the statute books.
Art. 2176 which defined a QD is limited to negligent acts or omissions
and excludes the notion of willingness or intent. Torts is much broader
than culpa aquiliana bec. it includes not only negligence, but
intentional criminal acts as well.
NOTES:
Include or not to include intentional acts?
According to this case, Article 21 has wider scope than Article

2176. The latter is limited to negligent ats or omissions and
exludes the notion of wilfullness or intent.
BUT Aricle2176 discussion is not necessary (because

Article 21 applies anyway) for the disposition of the
case (OBITER). THEREFORE, QD still includes intentional
acts!
***Issue: WON QD covers intentional acts or not? If it covers intentional

acts..
Fr litigation pt of view: it doesnt matter
Fr academic pt of view: it matters!
COCA-COLA v CA
FACTS: Proprietress of school canteen had to close down as a
consequence of the big drop in its sales of soft drinks trigerred by the
discovery of foreign substances in certain beverages sold by it.
ISSUE: WON QD may still exist despite existence of contract?

HELD: YES. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract
between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the
law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from
quasi-delict,i.e., the act which breaks the contract may also be QD.
QD, as defined in Article 2176 is homologous but not identical
to tort under the common law, which includes not only negligence, but
also intentional criminal acts.
2. Damages
AQUINO (pp. 842-843)
Reason behind the NCC Title on Damages: to see to it that

whenever a right is transgressed, every manner of loss or
injury is compensated for in some way or another.
A2195, NCC: provisions on damages are applicable to all

obligations regardless of source (delict, QD, contract, or quasicontract).
A2196: rules under title of damages are w/o prejudice to

special provisions on damages provided elsewhere in the Code.
A2198: principles of general law on damages are adopted

insofar as they are not inconsistent with the NCC.
Indemnity has to be proportionate to the fault and to the loss

caused thereby.
In actions for damages, courts should award an amount

(money value) to the winning party and not its equivalent in
property.
SANGCO, (pp. 940-941)
Basis of Law: introduced in NCC mostly from American Law since
they were either not expressly recognized or rarely allowed under old
code, particularly on subject of moral damages
Scope of applicability of provisions on damages: applicable to all
obligations arising from sources enumerated in A1157, NCC, without
prejudice to special provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in
said code.
-dont apply to compensation of workmen and other employees in
cases of death, injury or illness
-in other special laws: same rules observed insofar as not in conflict
with Civil Code
Concept of damages:
Damages: the sum of money which the law awards or imposes as
pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury
done or a wrong sustained as a consequence of a breach of a
contractual obligation or a tortious act
-pecuniary consequences which law imposes for breach of some duty
or violation of some right.
Kinds: compensatory, punitive, liquidated damages (damages

recoverable upon breach of a contract, as stipulated by the parties),
nominal damages (given in vindication of a breach of duty which does
not result in any actual or pecuniary damages)
Damage, damages, injury: material distinctions
Injury: Illegal invasion of a legal right
Damage: loss, hurt, or harm which results from an injury; in a popular
sense, it is the depreciation in value, regardless if caused by a
wrongful or legal act; as defined by statutes providing for damages:
actionable loss, injury or harm which results from unlawful act,
omission or negligence of another
-not synonymous to example, fine, penalty, punishment, revenge,
discipline, chastisement
Damages: recompense or compensation awarded for damages
suffered.
Pecuniary loss: loss of money or something by which money or
something of money value may be acquired
PEOPLE v BALLESTEROS
FACTS: Ballesteros et al were convicted of murder. They were ordered
to pay actual, compensatory, and moral damages to the heirs of the
deceased.
ISSUE: WON damages were correctly awarded. YES
HELD: Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation,
recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise
expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the
breach of some duty or the violation of some right.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction
of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. The party claiming
such must present the best evidence available such as receipts.
Moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has
experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral
shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the
proximate result of the offenders wrongful act or omission.
CUSTODIO v CA
FACTS: Custodio et al built an adobe fence making the passageway to
Mabasas apartment narrower. Mabasa filed a civil action for the grant
of easement of right of way against them. CA, aside from granting right
of way, awarded damages to Mabasa.
ISSUE: WON award of damages was proper. NO
HELD: In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no
legal injury. Custodio et als act of constructing a fence within their lot
is a valid exercise of their right as owners.

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. Damage is the loss, hurt
or harm, which results from the injury.
Damages are the recompense or compensation awarded fro the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of
a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured
person alone.
Damnum absque injuria
AQUINO (pp. 843-845)
-There is no liability even if there is damage because there was no
injury. Mere damage without injury does not result in liability.
-A related maxim is qui jure suo utitir nullum damnum facit one who
exercises a right does no injury.
CUSTODIO v CA (supra)
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which
the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
B. History and Development
AQUINO (pp.1-5)
Tort provisions in our NCC were derived from Spanish, French and
Anglo-American Law. Therefore, RP SC borrows heavily from decisions
of the Court in other countries especially Spain and US and relies from
annotation of foreign author.
Roman Law served as main inspiration of NCC, as quite evident in the
field of QD: it added 4 new category of obligations that arise quasi ex
delicto (a. liability of a judge who misconducts a case or gives a wrong
decision; b. liability of an occupier of a building for double the damage
caused by anything thrown or forced out of the building, no matter by
whom, on to a public place[A2193]; c. liability of the occupier if he
keeps any object suspended from the building which would do damage
if it fell; and d. the liability of the shop keeper, innkeeper, or keeper of
a stable for any theft or damage caused by slaves or employees, or in
case of the innkeepers, of permanent residents [A2000].)
-Code Commission initially wanted to adopt the word tort in our NCC
but decided later against it because tort in Anglo-American law
is much broader (includes negligence, intentional criminal
acts, false imprisonment, deceit) than the Spanish-Philippine
concept
of
obligations
arising
from
non-contractual
negligence. Intentional acts would be governed by RPC. However,
some provisions used tort and therefore recognize it as a source
of liability [Sec22 & 100, Corporation Code; Art.68 Child and
Youth Welfare Code; Sec. 17(a)(6) of the Ship Mortgage
Decree]. Even SC used the term tort in deciding cases
involving negligent acts or omissions as well as involving

intentional acts. They defined it in Naguiat vs. NLRC.
-There is an evident intent to adopt the common law concept of tort
and to incorporate the different, intentional and unintentional common
law torts in the NCC. Tortious conduct for which civil remedies are
available are embodied in different provisions of the code. E.g. Arts.
32, 33, 34, 35, and 36; A2199 on contributory negligence and
proximate cause (however, a blending of American and SpanishPhilippine Law) NCC
SANGCO (pp. xxxi-xl)
Civil Code of the Philippines: based on Civil Code of 1889 (Spanish and
French in origin); but many provisions from codes of other countries
were adopted.
Rules from Anglo-American law were adopted because of element of
American culture that has been incorporated into Fil life during US
occupation; because economic relations that continue between US and
RP; and because US and English Courts have developed certain
equitable rules that are not recognized in the 1889 Civil Code
1889 Civil Code
1. Civil Liability Arising From Criminal Offenses
A1089: Civil obligations arise only from law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
acts or omissions punished by law and quasi-delicts.
-civil obligations from crime or misdemeanor was governed only by
Penal Code (A1092) so when criminal action was instituted, the civil
action arising from the crime is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or
reserves his right to institute it separately (A122, Law of CrimPro)
-right to recover damages arising from crime is completely dependent
on the result of the criminal case. If an earlier civil action is instituted,
upon start of criminal case, the civil action is suspended and would be
determined by the result of the criminal case. If criminal action is
dismissed, civil action is also deemed dismissed, regardless if
instituted with the criminal action or separately. Civil liability is treated
as purely incidental to the criminal liability of the offender. The cases
of Springer vs. Odin, Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., US vs. Guy
Sayco, US vs. Bernardo, and Wise & Co. vs. Larion were ruled using this
principle. As ruled in rakes, any civil action not predicated on offense
committed or charged (based on law, contract, quasi-contract, or QD)
cannot be instituted with the criminal action.
-When Penal Code revised, RPC retained what is now contained in
A100; Rules on CRimPro retained what is contained in Rule 107 (check
if still correct)
2. Civil Liability arising from QD
A1902: Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another by his fault or negligence shall be liable fro the damage done
In re: A1903: punish wrongful acts or omissions not punishable by law

-said articles are not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute
either punishable offenses(delicts) or breach of contract.
-thus, the liability of employers, et. al. under now A2180 are only
subsidiary (in accordance with penal laws)
-QD or culpa aquiliana or extra-contractual culpa: causative act or
omission not punished by law and is done ONLY negligently, where civil
liability could arise as governed by the Civil Code (not by penal laws),
and the party aggrieved could file an ordinary civil action for damages
using only preponderance of evidence. It gives rise only to civil liability.
Here, the employers liability for his employees NONCRIMINAL
NEGLIGENCE is direct and primary and not subsidiary, and he could be
directly imputed in an action for recovery of damages.
-an act or omission will give rise to civil liability only if it causes
damage or injury to another or others.
DE LEON (pp.4-8)
Tort law emerged out of criminal law; originally concerned principally
with violent breaches of the place.
(1) Common law tort judges usually define what counts as torts
and how compensation is to be measured. Still, a statute or
even Consti may make certain conduct legally wrongful and
may permit recovery of damages for such conduct.
(2) No clear distinction between tort and crime initially, this was
the case sine the development of anything like a clearly
formulated conception of a tort is comparatively recent.
(3) Notion of tort as a specific wrong there was an attempt in
1720 to consider several specific wrongs in a work
consolidating them under the general heading of torts. Torts of
a specific character have been increasing.
(4) Place of torts in the Philippine law even if RP was a civil law
country, some of the provisions in the 1889 CC dealth with
cases of the nature of torts + with US occupation, a number of
laws patterned after Anglo-American models have been passed
amplifying the field of torts in Philippine legal system.
Functions or goals of tort law
Medieval England: discourage violence and revenge
Today: compensation of injured persons and deterrence of undesirable
behavior:
System of thoughts (sorry, no parallelism in the enumeration
of de leon):
(1) Morality or corrective justice defendants should be liable fro
harms they wrongfully caused and no others; liability imposed when
and only when it is right to do so
(2) Social utility or policy a good-for-all-of-us view: provide a
system of rules that works toward the good of society
(3) Legal process litigation process is a good to be preserved rather
than abstract ideal of justice or social utility
(4) potential conflicts between justice and policy outlook and legal
process outlook
(5) distribution of loss the cost of loss suffered by plaintiff is not
simply transferred to the defendant but is distributed through the
defendant to a large number of individuals
(6) redress of social grievances tort law a popular mechanism
that permits ordinary people to put authority on trial
(7) a mixed system tort law a mixed set of functions
CLASSES OF TORTS: Property torts and Personal torts
II. CONCEPT OF QUASI-DELICT
A. Elements
Art. 2176, NCC
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
PNR v BRUNTY
FACTS: The car carrying Rhoda Brunty, her host Juan Garcia and driver
Rodolfo Mercelita collided with a PNR train. The collision killed Brunty.
The mother of the deceased and Garcia sued PNR for damages. RTC
and CA awarded damages.
ISSUE: WON the award was proper.
HELD: YES. In order to sustain a claim based on QD, the following
requisites must concur:
1. damage to the plaintiff
2. negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some
person for whose acts he must respond (vicarious liability) was guilty
3. connection of cause and effect between such negligence
and damage
BPI v LIFETIME
Facts: Alice Laurel, an agent of Lifetime Marketing was able to defraud
the company by depositing amounts to Lifetime's account with
different BPI branches and then requesting to reverse the deposits
after the deposit slips have been machine-validated. She would then
present these slips to Lifetime which granted her certain privileges or
prizes based on the deposits she supposedly made. The fraudulent
acts were done because of the alleged negligence of BPI tellers in not
retriving the deposit slips. Lifetime sued BPI for damages. RTC and CA
awarded damages to Lifetime.
SC: Elements of QD
1. fault or negligence of the defendant, or some person for
whose acts he must respond

2. damages suffered by the plaintiff
3. connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff
Lifetime incurred damages. BPI was negligent, and such negligence
was the proximate cause of the loss
GARCIA v SALVADOR
FACTS: Because of a wrong medical examination Ranida Salvador lost
opportunity to be employed and her father suffered a heart attack
upon finding out of the incorrect medical examination result.
SC: For health care providers, the test of the existence of negligence
is: did the health care provider either fail to do something which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he
or she did something that a reasonbly prudent health care provider
would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the
patient; if yes, then he is guilty of negligence.
The elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach,
3) injury, and 4) proximate causation. All are present in the case at
bar.
NOTES:
Sir: This is a poorly crafted decision. The SC did not even cite
the basis for the elements.
Does this pertain to QD? Maybe not. May be possible elements

for Article 20.
GREGORIO v CA
FACTS: A case for violation of BP22 was filed against Gregorio by
Datuin and Sansio. In the complaint the address of Gregorio was wrong
so she wasn't able to controvert the charges against her. A warrant of
arrest against her was issued. She was arrested and had to post bail
for her temporary liberty. The case against her was later dropped when
it was found out that the account where the bounced checks were
drawn were not hers. She filed a case for damages against Datuin and
Sansio.
SC: The complaint for damages filed by Gregorio is based on quasidelict under Art 2176 in relation to Art 26 of the Civil Code, rather than
malicious prosecution.
In every tort case filed under Art 2176, the plaintiff has to prove by
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by him; (2) the
fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person to whose act
he must respond; (3) the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence and the damages incurred; and (4) that there must
be no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
B. Distinguished
1. Quasi-delict v Delict
Art 2177, NCC
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is

entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Art 365, RPC. Imprudence and Negligence.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice,
doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by
reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstance regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in
those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate not he danger clearly manifest.
BARREDO v GARCIA (supra)
RULE: A QD or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the
CC, with a cause of action substantially all its own, and individuality
that is entirely apart and independent from crime.
Crime
public interest
RPC punishes and corrects the act
punishes only when there is a
penal law covering the act
subsidiary liability of employer
defense
is
that
employees
resources must first be exhausted
Quasi-delict
private concern
CC repairs the damage by
indemnification
include all acts in which "any kind
of fault or negligence intervenes."
solidary liability of employer
defense is that accused observed
due diligence of a good father of a
family
ANDAMO v CA
FACTS: The Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette caused the
construction of waterpaths and contrivances in its compound. This
allegedly caused flooding and damage to the adjacent lot, property of
the Andamo spouses. The Andamos filed a criminal case for
destruction by means of inundation, and later also filed a civil action
for damages against respondent corporation. The civil case was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as the crim case was field ahead of it.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the civil case was proper.
HELD: NO. The civil action was based on QD and may proceed
independently of the criminal case. All the elements of QD are present
in the complaint, to wit:
(1) damages suffered by the plaintiff;

(2) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
NOTES:
Important: Take note of 3 elements of QD: (1) damages

suffered by plaintiff; (2) fault or negligence of defendant; (3)
fault of defendant caused damages suffered by plaintiff
Sir: it must be injury not damages

OCCENA vs ICAMINA
FACTS: Occena, a barangay captain, filed a criminal complaint for
Grave Oral Defamation against Vegafria for allegedly openly, publicly
and maliciously uttering statements which caused great and
irreparable damage and injury to his person and honor. RTC convicted
Vegafria but did not award damages. Occena argues that the decision
is contrary to Art 100 of the RPC providing that every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable, and rt 2219 of the Civil Code
providing that moral damages may be recovered in libel, slander or
any other form of defamation.
SC: Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable
is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a
crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense against the state because
of the disturbance of the social order; and (2) as an offense against
against the private person injured by the crime unless it involves the
crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others wherein
no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there
are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person
injured by the crime.
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone
to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of
his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and
whether or not punishable by law.
Art 2219 (7) establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral
defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his
feelings and reputation.
LG FOODS CORP v PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR
Facts: Charles Vallejera, 7 years old, was hit by a Ford Fiera van
owned by LG Foods and driven by Vincent Yeneza. He died as a result
of the accident. His parents filed complaint against the driver for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide. The driver committed
suicide, hence, the complaint was dismissed. The spouses Vallejera
filed case against LG Food for damages for failure to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Petitioner contends that the complaint is a claim for subsidiary

liability against an employer under Art 103 of the RPC. There must first
be a judgment conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua
non. Since the driver is already deceased the condition was not
fulfilled, hence there is a lack of cause of action.
SC: Victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an
action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Art
100 of the RPC, and an action for quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and
2194 of the Civil Code. If, as in this case, the action chosen is for QD,
the plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its
employee, subject to the employer's defense of the diligence of a good
father of the family. On the other hand, if the action is for culpa
criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only
upon proof of prior convinction.
Here, the compliant sufficiently alleged that the death of the
couple's son was caused by the negligent act of the deceased driver;
and that LG Foods themselves were civilly liable for the negligence of
their driver for failing to exercise the necessary diligence required of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their
employee, which diligence, if exercised, would have prevented the
accident.
If the complaint was based on Art 103 of the RPC, they would
have alleged that the guilt of the driver had been proved beyond
reasonable doubt; that the accused driver is insolvent; that it is the
subsidiary liability of the employers to pay the damages done by their
employee based on the principle that every person criminally liable is
also civilly liable.
2. Quasi-Delict v. Breach of Contract
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty
of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene
the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
Art. 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all
obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void.
Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of
every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be
regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances.
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the
time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions
of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be

observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of
a family shall be required.
Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to
a quasi-delict.
NOTES: Negligence for BoC and QD are defined in the same way as
provided by Art 2178.Therefore, if you sue for negligence, you can
base the action on quasi-delict, delict, or contract.
CANGCO v MANILA RAILROAD

FACTS: Cangcos arm was amputated because he was drawn from
under a railroad car. His foot alighted upon a melon at the moment he
stepped upon the platform. He sues for negligence in the performance
of a contract. MR argues that [1] the breach was due to negligence of
servant and [2] it exercised due diligence in selection and supervision.
HELD: MR is liable. The contract to transport carries with it the duty to
provide safe means of entering and leaving the train. It is unnecessary
for plaintiff for BoC to prove the breach was due to negligence. When a
contractual relation exists, the obligor may break the contract by
means of an act which would have constituted a violation of an extracontractual obligation had no contract existed.
DOCTRINE: QD and BoC are concentric, and QDs are broader. Plaintiff
with a pre-existing contractual relation may still sue for QD so long as
had there been a no contract, there is still a quasi-delict.
NOTES: SC held there was a contract of carriage even if Cangco did
not pay for a ticket. Also, Sir took note of the 4 main differences of QD
and BoC in this case:
1.
liability
of
defendant employer
2.
defendant
employers defense
3.
vinculum
(legal tie)
juris
4. what a plaintiff
needs to prove
NOTES:
Under QD
Presumptive liability
Under BoC
Direct and immediate
Rebut
presumption
through proof of the
exercise of due care
in
selection
and
supervision
Created
by
the
wrongful or negligent
act/omission itself
Defendants fault or
negligence
Prove performance of
contract or contributory
negligence
Independent the breach
of the duty assumed by
the parties
The contract and its
nonperformance.
The
negligence need not be
proven
What is the breach of contract committed? Negligence, failure

to exercise due care
Art. 1903 not applicable in cases where there is preexisting
relationship
Cangco did not pay for his fare so why is a contract of carriage
at issue? It should be a contract of employment.
MERALCO was held liable for breach of contract. What was the
breach? Failure to exercise due diligence
This is a landmark case because there is a glaring statement in
Cangco that contradicts the other cases
True or False a breach of contract is not a basis for QD: FALSE
Court in Cangco said that the circle is CONCENTRIC: QD is
larger and that culpa contractual is the yolk
So Cangco doesnt say that the two are mutually exclusive and
therefore Cangco is consistent with Air France
Vinculum juris distinction doesnt matter because here the act
& the breach coincided
SIR: in culpa aquiliana negligence must be proved, in culpa

contractual you only need to prove existence of contrat and
the breach of such contract
Due diligence is NOT a defense in culpa contractual because it

will create an anomalous situation if the case involves juridical
entities. The defense will create unfair advantage to such
entities since they are only acting through agents so they can
forego with the diligence requirement.
FGU INSURANCE v GP SARMIENTO

FACTS: GP Sarmiento Trucking undertook to deliver refrigerators
abord one of its truck from the plan site of Concepcion Industries. The
truck collided with another truck resulting in damage to the cargoes.
FGU, an insurer of the cargoes, paid Concepcion Industries the value of
the covered cargoes. It then sought reimbursement from GP Sarmiento
which failed to heed the claim. FGU filed case for damages and breach
of contract of carriage.
SC: In culpa contractual, uppon which the action of FGU rests as being
the subrogee of Concepcion Industries, the mere proof of the existence
of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief. A breach of contract confers upon the
injured party a valis cause for recovering that which may have been
lost or suffered
Respondent trucking corporation recognizes the existence of a contract
of carriage between it and petitioner's assured, and admits that the
cargoes it has assumed to deliver have been lost or damaged while in
its custody. In such a situation, a default on, or failure of compliance
with, the obligation gives rise to a presumption of lack of care and
corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden
on him to establish otherwise.

As to liability of driver: a contract can only bind the parties who have
entered into it or their successors and can neither favor nor prejudice a
thrid person. The action against the driver can only be based on
culpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual, would require
the calimant for damages to prove negligence or fault on the
part of the defendant.
CALALAS v CA
FACTS: Eliza Sunga, a passenger of a jeepney owned by Calalas, was
injured when a truck hit the rear end of the jeepney. The jeepeney was
filled to the capacity. When the truck hit the jeepney Sunga was giving
way to passengers who were alighting the jeepney. Sunga filed
complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the
contract of carriage by the latter in failing to exercise the diligence
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas on the other hand filed
3rd-party complaint against the owner of the truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against the owner of the truck,
holding that it was the driver of said truck that was responsible for the
accident. It also absolved Calalas.
CA reversed the ruling on the ground that Sunga's cause of
action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that
the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the
Civil Code.
SC: Quasi-delict has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor.
Breach of contract is premised on the negligence in the performance of
a contractual obligation.
In QD, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it
is the basis of the action. In BoC, the action can be prosecuted merely
by proving the existence of the contract an the fact that the obligor, in
this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely
to his destination.
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions
for QD, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine
is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is
created by law itself. But where there is a pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create
the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the
relation thus created.
BATAL v SAN PEDRO
FACTS: Spouses Luz and Kenichiro contracted the services of Frank
Batal to survey the lot they purchased. Based on such survey, they
constructed concrete fence on said land. A case was filed against them
for alleged encroachment of a designated right of way. They found out

that Frank was not the licensed geodetic engineer but his wife, Erlinda.
SC: Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses:
either as culpa aquiliana, which is the wrongful or negligent act or
omission which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation
between two persons not formally bound by any other obligation, or as
culpa contractual, which is the fault or negligence incident in the
performance of an obligation which already existed, and which
increases the liability from such already existing obligation.
Culpa aquiliana is governed by Art 2176 of the Civil Code and the
immediately following articles; while culpa contractual is governed by
Articles 1170 to 1174 of the same Code.
In the present case, the petitioners, in carrying out their contractual
obligations, failed to exercise the requisite diligence in the placement
of the markings for the concrete perimeter fence that was later
constructed.
FORES v MIRANDA
FACTS: Miranda was a passenger of a jeep which hit a wall and
fractured his right humerus. He sues under contract of carriage. CA
awarded him with moral damages.
HELD: SC deleted moral damages. Moral damages are not recoverable
for actions based on BoC unless there is bad faith. There was no bad
faith because: [1] mere carelessness of the driver does not justify the
inference of bad faith; and [2] under Art 1756, the presumption is that
common carriers acted negligently (and not maliciously)
DOCTRINE: Differences between QD and BoC in this case:
1. moral damages
2. defendant carriers
defense
3.
what
plaintiff
needs to prove
Under QD
Anywhere there are
physical injuries (Art
2219[2])
Proof of due diligence
in
selection
and
supervision
Carriers
fault
or
negligence
Under BoC
Recoverable
only
if
passenger dies or there
is malice or bad faith
(proof of due diligence
not available)
Injury to passenger. No
need to prove it was
carriers
Fault
NOTES:
Does not say that when there is a contract, you cant sue for
QD.
A2176 expressly excludes cases where there is a pre-existing

contractual relationship. But even if there is a pre-existing
contractual relationship, there is still a cause of action for
quasi-delict since it is not expressly prohibited.

The ruling on the interpretation of A2176 is not ratio, just
obiter.
Case is not basis of mutual exclusivity
FAR EAST v CA
FACTS: Plaintiff Luna got a Far East credit card which was dishonored
at a despedida party due to a hotlist policy compelled by the loss of
the complementary card. He sues for damages. RTC awarded him
moral and exemplary damages.
HELD: Complaint is based on contract because without the contract,
the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be an actionable
tort. Moral damages were deleted because negligence in failing to give
personal notice to Luna is not gross as to amount to malice or bad
faith. Exemplary damages were deleted because
DOCTRINE: The test to determine whether QD can be deemed to
underlie the BoC s where, without a pre-existing contract between 2
parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable
tort by itself.
NOTES:
Qualifies Air France case: QD should be independent of BoC
Differences between QD and BoC in this case:

Unde QD
Under BoC
1. award for moral Injury
If there was bad faith
damages
or gross negligence
2.
award
for Gross negligence as to Act that is wanton,
exemplary damages
approximate
malice fraudulent,
reckless,
(Art 2231)
oppressive
or
malevolent (Art. 2232)
AIR FRANCE v. CARRASCOSO (1966)
white man
Carrascoso was issued a first class ticket from Manila to Rome. He
travelled first class from Manila to Hongkong. But the airline manager
in HK told him to vacate his seat because a white man has a better
right to it. Commotion ensued and Carrascoso transferred seats
against his will. Air France argues that since the action is planted on
breach of contract there must be fraud or bad faith to authorize award
of moral damages.
HELD: There is a contract and it was breached. There was also bad
faith when he was told to leave after he was already seated by reason
of which he suffered inconvenience and humiliation resulting in moral
damages. Passengers have a right to be treated by the carriers
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
Any discourteous misconduct on the part of employees toward a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages (A21).
DOCTRINE: The act that breaks a contract may be also a tort.

PSBA v. CA (1992)
Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physicswhen
bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air
A student of PSBA was stabbed by non-students within the schools
premises. The parents sued PSBA and its officers under A2180 and
A2176.
HELD: The school is not liable under A2180 because the assailants are
non-PSBA students. It is also not liable under A2176 because it applies
only if there is no contractual obligation. The negligence of the school
would not be relevant absent a contract. The negligence cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances in A21. The case was remanded to lower court to
determine if there was breach of contract by its negligence to provide
proper security measures.
DOCTRINE: Should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad
faith and be violative of A21, then there is a cause to view the act as
constituting a QD.
SYQUIA v. CA (1993)
(Manila Memorial park cemetery) has exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water inside
the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around
the grave filling the same with earth O.O
Juan Syquias remains were to be transferred to a newly purchased
family lot in the cemetery. In the course of the transfer they discovered
a hole in the wall of the concrete vault which caused water to sip in
and destroy the coffin. The Syquias said that such was either a breach
of contract to provide a sealed vault or a negligent act constituting a
QD. The trial court and CA dismissed the case.
HELD: There is no negligence. Sealed cannot be equated to
waterproof. Had there been negligence found, Manila Memorial would
be liable not for a QD but for a BoC under A1170. They exercised the
due diligence of a GFP in preventing the accumulation of water in the
vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth in the grave.
LRT v. NAVIDAD (2003)
Navidad (then drunk) entered the LRT after purchasing a token. An
altercation between him and Escartin (security guard) ensued which
resulted in a fist fight. Navidad fell in the tracks and was struck and
killed by the train. The trial court held Escartin and his agency liable
and absolved LRTA and the trains driver. CA absolved Escartin and his
agency and held LRTA and the driver liable.
HELD: LRTAs liability is founded on the contract of carriage and its
obligation arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its
failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier.

The negligence of Escartin is not proven thus the agency is not liable.
The driver is also absolved.
The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death or
injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or willful acts of its
employees or (b) an account of willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees though
the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act
or omission.
a. the existence of a contract does not preclude the commission of a

QD.
b. Contractual responsibility and extracontractual liability exclude each
other and cannot be cumulated.
Tort liability arises from BoC when the is act or omission is in itself
wrongful independent of the contract, the breach of which being
merely incidental to the commission of the tort.
4. Culpa Aquiliana and Culpa Contractual Distinguished
CONSOLIDATED BANK v. CA (2003)

LC Diaz has an account with Solidbank. It entrusted the passbook to
their messenger to make a deposit. The messenger left the passbook
to the teller but when he came back the teller said that somebody else
took it. That same day there was an unauthorized withdrawal by a
certain Tamayo of 300k from the savings account. LC Diaz then filed a
criminal complaint against another messenger and a certain Verdazola
for estafa but the case was dismissed. LC Diaz filed this complaint for
damages against Solidbank.
HELD: Solidbank is liable for BoC due to negligence (A1980 deposits in
bank is governed by provisions concerning simple loan, RA 8791 sec.2.
the State recognizes the fiduciary nature of banking that requires high
standard of integrity and performance). Solidbank breached its
contractual obligation to return the passbook only to authorized
representative of LC Diaz. There is a presumption of negligence and
Solidbank must prove otherwise. (There is although contributory
negligence on the part LC Diaz for allowing a withdrawal slip to get into
the hands of an impostor.)
Note: In BoC ones last clear chance or contributory negligence will not
exonerate the defendants liability but will only reduce damage.
DE LEON (pp.157-160)
1. Requisites of QD:
a. An act or omission by defendant
b. Fault or negligence by defendant
c. Damage or injury to plaintiff
d. Direct relation of cause and effect between act or omission and the
damage
e. No pre-existing contractual relationship
2. Burden of Proof
a. Falls on the person claiming damages
b. To be established with satisfactory evidence
c. Negligence is not presumed. Only under Arts. 2180, 2183, and 2191
is presumed and burden of proof shifts to defendant
3. QD arising from BoC
Culpa Aquiliana (QD)
Culpa Contractual (BoC)
Wrongful or negligent act or

omission itself the source of the
obligation
The act or omission is merely an

incident in the performance of an
obligation
Plaintiff has burden to prove the

defendant was at fault or negligent
Plaintiff need not plead or prove it

was
defendants
fault
or
negligence
No presumption that defendant

was at fault or negligent (except
A2180, last par.)
Mere proof of existence of a

contract and its breach raises
presumption of fault or negligence
Governed by Art. 2176; and also Governed by Arts. 1170- 1174

governed by Art.1172-1174 under
Art. 2178
Based on voluntary act or omission which has caused damage to
another
Requires only preponderance of evidence
III. NEGLIGENCE
A. Concept of Negligence
1. Definition
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the
time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions
of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of
a family shall be required. (1104a)
PICART v. SMITH (1918)

being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of
the approach
Picart is riding his pony in the wrong side of a bridge when the car of
Smith approached it. Smith blew his horn. Picart didnt move to the
other side because he thought he didnt have enough time. The car
didnt reduce its speed. It turned to the right to avoid the horse but it
was too close to the horse that it got frightened and turned its body
towards the railing and across the bridge. It got hit on the hind leg and
Picart was thrown off. The horse died and Picart suffered injuries.
HELD: Given that Picart is on the wrong side and he cant escape
being run down by going to the place of safety the control of the
situation passed over to Smith, it was his duty to stop or take the other
side upon seeing that nobody else is on the bridge to avoid the danger.
The person who has the last fair chance to avoid impending harm and
fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences without reference to
the prior negligence of the other party. The negligence of Smith is the
immediate and determining cause of the accident.
PICART TEST: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man
would have used in the same situation?
Negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. As to what
would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation
must of course be always determined in the light of human experience
and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of
the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another
was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or
guarding against its consequences.
PNR v. BRUNTY (2006)
Mercilita overtook a car, not knowing that they were approaching a
railroad track, and hit the train, she died instantly. Brunty was among
the passengers brought to the hospital but she died after. Bruntys
parent sued PNR.
HELD: PNR is negligent (under A2176) in not providing adequate
warning signs. Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of
exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and
property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both in the
operation of trains and in the maintenance of the crossings.
NEGLIGENCE is the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent
and reasonable man would do.
NEGLIGENCE is want of the care required by the circumstances.

(Corliss vs. Manila Raildroad)
QD Requisites:
1. Damage to the plaintiff
2. Negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some
person for whose acts he must respond was guilty, and
3. Connection of cause and effect between such negligence and
damage.
SICAM vs. JORGE (2007)
Jorge pawned jewelries to Sicams pawnshop. It was robbed and Jorge
was informed of the incident. Jorge filed the complaint for recovery of
the jewelries. Sicam claims that robbery is force majeure and that it
exercised due care and diligence in safekeeping so it cannot be held
liable.
HELD: Robbery is foreseeable and anticipated. In order to exempt one
from liability because of FM, it is necessary that he has not committed
negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. When
the effect is found to be partly of the result of a persons participation
whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act the whole
occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to
acts of God. There was no showing that there is a security guard and
the vault is open at the time of robbery.
A2123- pawnshop and other establishments engaged in making loans
secured by pledges, the special laws and regulations concerning them
shall be observed, and subsidiarily, the provisions on pledge, mortgage
and antichresis.
A2099-the creditor shall take care of the thing pledged with the
diligence of a good father of family. This means that pawnshop must
take care of the pawns the way a prudent person would as to his own
property.
NGELIGENCE is the omission to do something which a reasonable, man
guided by the considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do; or the doing if something which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do. It is want of care requires by the
circumstances.
The diligence which the law requires the individual at all times to
govern his conduct varies with the nature if the situation in which he
us placed and the importance if the act which he is to perform. (Cruz
vs. Gangan)
2. Standard of Conduct : Ordinary
person
PNR vs. CA (Oct. 15, 2007)
prudent

Amores was driving his car. He slowed down and came to a full stop
when he reached the railroad tracks. When he was crossing, the train
hit the car was dragged 10 meters from the crossing. Amores died.
HELD: The failure of the PNR to put cross bar, signal light, flagman or
switchman, or semaphore is evidence of negligence and disregard of
the safety of the public. The train was fast for it dragged the car
meters away from the crossing even after the breaks was applied.
DOCTRINE: There is no hard and fast rule whereby such degree of
care and vigilance is calibrated; it is dependent upon the
circumstances in which a person finds himself. All that the law requires
is that that care and diligence expected of sensible men under
comparable situation.
CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOC. vs. TANJANGCO (2008)
Corinthian referred the Cuasos to Engr. De Dios (geodetic) for the
relocation survey of their lot. They constructed their house with C.B
Paraz as builder. Every now and then, Corinthian makes an ocular
inspection to make sure compliance with the approved plan. Their
perimeter fence encroached the adjoining lot owned by the
Tanjangcos.
HELD: Corinthian is responsible in insuring compliance with the
approved plans, inclusive of the construction of the perimeter walls. Its
failure to prevent encroachment of the other property despite the
inspection constitutes negligence.
The case is one for tort under A2176
1. Damage
2. Fault/Negligence
3. Connection of cause and effect between such negligence and
damage.
DOCTRINE: A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent
person in the actors position, in the same or similar circumstances,
would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause
him not to do it in a more careful manner.
The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent
in a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, and determines liability
according to that standard.(Fernando vs. CA)
SANGCO (PP. 7-8)
STANDARD OF CONDUCT
- it is impossible to fix in advance definite rules for all conceivable
human conduct because of the infinite variety of situations which may
arise
- standard of conduct must be:
i. external and objective
ii. the same for all persons
iii. must make allowance for the risk apparent to the act for his
capacity to meet it and for the circumstances under which he must act
3. Special Cases
a. Children
TAYLOR vs. MANILA RAILROAD (1910)
Taylor (15), son of mechanical engineer, mature than the average boy
his age and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics
went to the power plant in a small island in Pasig river. Together with a
boy (12) they walked around the plant to and gathered brass
fulminating caps where the plant dumps them together with cinders
and ashes from furnaces. The caps are used for exploding charges of
dynamite and they have explosive power on their own. They opened a
cap and lighted it with a match. The cap exploded and Taylor lost an
eye.
HELD: In Torpedo cases, records discloses that the plaintiffs (in whose
favor judgment have been affirmed) were of such tender years that
they were held not to have the capacity to understand the nature or
character of the explosive instruments which fell into their hands. In
this case, Taylor knew of the explosive character of the caps and yet
he willingly, recklessly and knowingly produced the explosion.
DOCTRINE: The care and caution required of a child is according to his
maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case
by the circumstances of the case.
JARCO MARKETING vs. CA (1999)
It has been in existence for 15 years. Its structure was safe and wellbalanced.
Zhieneth (6) was pinned by the bulk of the department stores giftwrapping counter/structure, brought to the hospital and died after 14
days. When she was rushed to the hospital the girl told the doctor that
she didnt even touch the counter. The department store contended
that it was the childs own act of climbing into the structure that was
the proximate cause of the fall of the counter.
HELD: Jarco was negligent because the unstable condition of the
counter is known to them (prior to the accident) but they didnt do
anything about it. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict
and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or
civil, a child under 9 years of age is, by analogy, conclusively
presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of
lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child
over 9 but under 15 years of age is rebuttable, under our law. The rule,
therefore, is that the child under 9 years of age must be conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
DOCTRINE: A child under 9 years of age must be conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
YLARDE vs. AQUINO (1988)

Edgardo Aquino ordered his students to dig beside a 1 ton concrete
block in order to make a hole to bury huge stones. He left four of them
to level the loose soil around the open hole but told them not to touch
the stone. They, however, playfully jumped into the pit and caused
the top of the concrete block to fall towards the opening. Ylarde wasnt
able to climb out and he died after 3 days because of the injuries
sustained.
HELD: Ylarde cannot be charged with reckless imprudence. The
degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of
the person engendered to care for himself. A minor should not be held
to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be
judged according to the average conduct of persons of his own age
and experience. Aquino is negligent for he should have foreseen that
bringing children to excavation site and leaving them there may result
in an accident.
DOCTRINE: The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for
his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by
children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and
experience under the same or similar circumstances.
SANGCO (pp. 70-74)
UNDER 9 YEARS conclusively presumed to have acted without
discernment and is exempt from criminal liability
OVER 9 BUT UNDER 15 may or may not be guilty of contributory
negligence, depending upon his mental development and other
circumstances (rebuttable presumption)
OVER 15 YEARS
presumed to have sufficient capacity and

understanding to be sensible of danger with the power to avoid it
(STANDARD is still that of a child his age and capacity, and not that of
an adult.)
STANDARD: ORDINARILY PRUDENT CHILD
The standard of conduct which a child must conform for his
own protection is that of a reasonable person of like age,
intelligence and experience under like or similar circumstances
or that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the
same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience
under the same or similar circumstances.
TEST as to whether an infant can be subjected to the same standard of
care as an adult:
1. type of activity involved is one that is usually engaged in by
children
2.
one involving the use of potentially dangerous, adultoriented instrument, like a car.
WHERE CHILD IS HELD TO THE STANDARD OF CARE OF AN
ADULT, his violation of a statute or other enactment entails the
same consequences as those of an adult.
b. Experts/ Professionals
CULION ICE vs. PHILIPPINE MOTORS (1930)
Culion wanted to get his motor schooner repaired, he went to
PMC. Quest, PMCs manager decided to oversee the repairs.
Apparently, the tube connecting the carburetor and the fuel tank
was not well-fitted, such that the fuel mixture leaked and
dripped down to the engine compartment. Quest attention was
called on this but he took it lightly. When the engine was started,
there was a backfire and burned the boat.
HELD: Ordinarily, a backfire from an engine would not be
followed by any disaster, but here the leak along the pipeline
and the flooding of the carburetor created a dangerous situation,
which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of boat engines,
would have taken precaution to avoid. When a person holds
himself out as being competent to do things requiring
professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails
to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the
particular work which he attempts to do. Quest is experienced in
fixing car and tractor engines, but not that of boats. A person
skilled in dealing with boats would have been sufficiently warned
by the circumstances to cause him to take precaution against the
danger. Quest did not use the skill that would have been
exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engine on
boats.
DOCTRINE: When a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be
held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill
of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts
to do.
US vs. PINEDA
If the victims had been human beings instead of horses, the damage
and loss would have been irreparable.
Santos bought medicine with prescription from Pineda (pharmacist) to
give to his sick horses. He was sold barium chlorate(poisonous)
instead of potassium chlorate which poisoned and killed 2 horses.
HELD: The profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and skill.
The responsibility to use care has been variously qualified as
ordinary care, care of a specially high degree, the highest
degree of care known to practical men, which is the highest
practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, vigilance, and the
most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable
conduct of business, in order that human life may not constantly
be exposed to danger flowing from the substitution of deadly
poison for harmless medicine. The care required must be
commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed
must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business
which the law demands. The question of negligence or ignorance is

irrelevant. The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor
of what he sells.
DOCTRINE: The profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and
skill. The responsibility to use care has been variously qualified
as ordinary care, care of a specially high degree,
the
highest degree of care known to practical men.
MERCURY DRUG vs. DE LEON (Oct. 17, 2008)
Sa isang parmasyutika, ang pagkakamali ay kapabayaan at ang
pagkalinga ay hindi angkop na depensa
(Judge) De Leon was given a prescription by his doctor friend for his
eye. He bought them from Mercury drug but he was given drops for the
ears. The sheriff assisted him in applying the drops in his eyes and he
felt searing pain. Only then he discovered that he was given the wrong
medicine. He returned the medicine. The pharmacist didnt apologize
and just told him that she wasnt able to read the prescription properly.
It was the supervisor who apologized and told him that they do not
have stock of the right one. Mercury says that De Leon was negligent
for not looking at the label.
HELD: As active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the
public, the highest degree of care and diligence is expected of them. In
the purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and seller do not stand at
arms length. There is an imperative duty on the seller or the druggist
to take the precaution to prevent death or injury to any person who
relies on ones absolute honesty and peculiar learning.
DOCTRINE: The profession of pharmacy demands care and skill, and
druggists must exercise care of a specially high degree, the highest
degree known to practical men. In other words, druggist must exercise
the highest practicable degree of prudence and vigilance, and the
most consistent with the reasonable conduct of business, so that
human life may constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the
substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines.
c. Medical Negligence
CRUZ vs. CA (Nov. 18, 1997)
Doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not
guarantors of care. They do not even warrant a good result. They are
not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences. Furthermore
they are not liable for honest mistakes of judgment
Lydia Umali was found to have myoma in the uterus and underwent
surgery under Dr. Ninevetch Cruz wherein the untidy clinic ran out of
medicine, blood and oxygen that she had to be transferred to another
hospital, where she died.
HELD: Whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite
degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the
generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference of
courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its
realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen
in most instances are capable of intelligently evaluating. Expert

testimony should have been offered to prove that the circumstances
cited are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care
employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the
same operation. No cogent proof that the circumstances caused
petitioners death.
Dispositive: acquitted from reckless imprudence but civilly liable
DOCTRINE: Whether or not a physician has committed an
"inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be
determined according to the standard of care observed by other
members of the profession in good standing under similar
circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at
the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. In the
recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pascasio, et al., this
Court stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents
that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training,
care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty
to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES vs. AGANA (Jan. 31, 2007)
Agana is diagnosed with cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Fuentes performed
the hysterectomy to remove certain parts of the ovary then Dr. Ampil
took over and completed the operation. The attending nurses
remarked in record that 2 sponges were missing. Agana complained of
pain but was told that it was just a normal consequence of the
operation. She went to the US for further treatment and was informed
that she is free of cancer. After her return to the Philippines they saw a
gauze protruding in her vagina. Dr. Ampil removed this by hand. She
went to see another doctor and they detected another gauze in her
vagina which infected it. She underwent another operation. Pending
the case, Agana died.
HELD: leaving sponge and other foreign substance in the wound after
the incision has been closed is prima facie negligence. If the surgeon is
compelled by necessity to leave a sponge it is his legal duty to inform
the patient of what he has been compelled to do so that the patient
may seek relief. Dr. Ampil misled Agana to thinking that the pain was
normal. What was initially an act of negligence in leaving sponges has
ripened to a deliberate wrong in concealing the missing gauzes.
DOCTRINE: to successfully pursue a medical negligence case, a
patient must prove that a health care provider either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would
have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent
provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury
to patient. (duty, breach, injury, proximate causation)

CANTRE vs. GO (2007)
Go gave birth and attended by Dr. Cantre. Cantre used a droplight to
warm Nora and her baby while she was massaging Gos uterus to stop
the bleeding. Go got a wound in her inner arm which the nurses say
was a burn. According to NBI test it was a burn caused by a droplight.
The hospital says its because of BP cuff. Go underwent skin grafting at
the hospitals expense.
HELD: Whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the blood
pressure cuff is of no moment. Both instruments are deemed within
the exclusive control of the physician in charge under the "captain of
the ship" doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an
operation liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time
when those assistants are under the surgeons control. However, the
fact that Cantre promptly took care of Gos wound before infection and
other complications set in is also indicative of her good intentions. Go
was also suffering from a critical condition when the injury happened,
such that saving her life became Cantres elemental concern.
Nonetheless, it should be stressed that all these could not justify
negligence.
DOCTRINE: In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a
presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the
instrument causing the injury.
The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial
consideration to the well-being of their patients. If a doctor fails to live
up to this precept, he is accountable for his acts. This notwithstanding,
courts face a unique restraint in adjudicating medical negligence cases
because physicians are not guarantors of care and, they never set out
to intentionally cause injury to their patients. However, intent is
immaterial in negligence cases because where negligence exists and is
proven, it automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for the
damage caused.
CAYAO-LASAM vs. RAMOLETE (2008)
Ramolete underwent raspa (D&C procedure ) under Caya0-Lasam and
was discharged the following day. She was brought to the hospital
again for severe abdominal pains and vomiting. She was informed that
there is a dead fetus in her womd. She underwent laparatomy and she
was found to have massive intraabdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured
uterus. She had to undergo hysterectormy and as a result she cant
bear a child anymore. Ramolete says that the hysterectomy is due to
the negligence of Cayao-Lasam in performing raspa (not knowing that
what she had was an ectopic pregnancy). Cayao-Lasam says that it
was because of Ramoletes insistence to be discharged immediately
and failing to go to her check up.
HELD: Ramolete did not present any expert testimony to support their
claim. Cayao-Lasam presented an expert on the subject who stated
D&C was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Edithas uterus
resulting in her hysterectomy. The D&C was conducted in accordance
with the standard practice, with the same level of care that any
reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the
same circumstances. Assuming that there was in fact a misdiagnosis,
the same would have been rectified if Ramolete followed the order to
return for a check-up. She omitted the diligence required by the
circumstances which could have avoided the injury. The omission in
not returning for a follow-up evaluation played a substantial part in
bringing about her injury. Had she returned, Cayao-Lasam could have
conducted the proper medical tests and procedure necessary to
determine her health condition and applied the corresponding
treatment which could have prevented the rupture of her uterus.
DOCTRINE: Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence
which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply use at
least the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor
would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. As to
this aspect of medical malpractice, the determination of the
reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is
essential. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in
malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific
knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually
necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
All told, doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not
guarantors of care. They are not insurers against mishaps or unusual
consequences specially so if the patient herself did not exercise the
proper diligence required to avoid the injury.
LUCAS vs. TUANO (2009)
Lucas had a sore eye and used maxitrol (steroid based) for it. He then
consulted Dr. Tuano (opthal) on October 1988. He was prescribed a
different medicine. The sore eyes was cured but the eye developed
EKC (a viral infection) and he was told to use maxitrol. EKC tapered
down and Lucas was told gradually reduce the dosage of maxitrol
otherwise EKC might recur. His EKC recurred and he was told to
resume the orig dosage of maxitrol. Blephamide (also steroid based)
was used when maxitrol is unavailable. Lucas discovered that
prolonged used of maxitrol is dangerous to the eyes (may develop
glaucoma). He told Tuano about it but the doctor just brushed it aside.
By December his right eye was blind and he was told to stop the use of
maxitrol and was prescribed different medicines. Tuano referred Lucas
to another Doctor for the treatment of glaucoma and Tuano treated
him according to the advice of that doctor. Lucas consulted Dr. Aquino
on his own initiative and was told that his condition needs lifetime med
and follow ups. Lucas underwent two operations (1990 and 1991) of
laser trabeculoplasty. He said that what he had is steroid-induced
glaucoma and sued Tuano. Tuano says that Lucas glaucoma is not
steroid induced for if it were, it would disappear with the discontinue of
the use of maxitrol.

HELD: No expert testimony was presented. Absent a definitive
standard of care or diligence required of the Dr. Tuano under the
circumstances, the Court cant determine whether he was able to
comply with the same in his diagnosis and treatment of Lucas. There is
no causation between use of maxitrol and glaucoma. Lucas failed to
prove by preponderance of evidence that Tuani failed to exercise that
degree of skill, care and learning possessed by other persons in the
same profession; and that as a proximate result if such failure, the
patient or his heirs suffered damages. The mere fact that the patient
does not get well or that a bad result is not determinative of the
performance of the physician and he is not required to be infallible.
When a patient engages the services of a physician, a physicianpatient relationship is generated. And in accepting a case, the
physician, for all intents and purposes, represents that he has the
needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons
practicing in the same field; and that he will employ such training,
care, and skill in the treatment of the patient. Thus, in treating his
patient, a physician is under a duty to [the former] to exercise that
degree of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same
general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice
ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases. Stated otherwise, the
physician has the duty to use at least the same level of care that any
other reasonably competent physician would use to treat the condition
under similar circumstances.
This standard level of care, skill and diligence is a matter best
addressed by expert medical testimony, because the standard of care
in a medical malpractice case is a matter peculiarly within the
knowledge of experts in the field.
d. Corporate Negligence
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES vs. AGANA (Jan. 31, 2007)
HELD: The failure of PSI, despite the attending nurses report, to
investigate and inform Natividad regarding the missing gauzes
amounts to callous negligence. Not only did PSI breach its duties to
oversee or supervise all persons who practice medicine within its walls,
it also failed to take an active step in fixing the negligence committed.
This renders PSI, not only vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr.
Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also directly liable for its
own negligence under Article 2176.
DOCTRINE: A patient who enters a hospital does so with the
reasonable expectation that it will attempt to cure him. The hospital
accordingly has the duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor and
oversee the treatment prescribed and administered by the physicians
practicing in its premises. It has the duty to exercise reasonable care
to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical
treatment.
With the passage of time, more duties were expected from hospitals,
among them: (1) the use of reasonable care in the maintenance of safe
and adequate facilities and equipment; (2) the selection and retention
of competent physicians; (3) the overseeing or supervision of all
persons who practice medicine within its walls; and (4) the formulation,
adoption and enforcement of adequate rules and policies that ensure
quality care for its patients.
e. intoxication
f. insanity
Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no
parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable
with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem
shall be appointed. (n)
B. Degrees of Negligence
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence.
AMEDO vs. RIO (1954)
Filomeno Manguit, a seaman, jumped overboard from his ship into the
water to retrieve a 2-peso bill that was blown by the breeze to the sea.
He drowned.
HELD: He failed to exercise even the slightest care and diligence,
that he displayed a reckless disregard of the safety of his person, that
he could not have been but conscious of the probable consequences
of his carelessness and that he was indifferent, or worse, to the
danger of his injury. There is more reason to hold that his death was
caused by his notorious negligence. If while he was working, his bill
merely fell from his pocket, and as he picked it up from the floor
something accidentally fell upon him and injured him, he would surely
be entitled to compensation, his act being obviously innocent. Jumping
into the sea, however, is entirely different, the danger which it entails
being clear, potent and obvious.
DOCTRINE: Notorious negligence has been held to be tantamount to
gross negligence, which is want of even slight care and
diligence. By gross negligence is meant 'such entire want of care as
to raise a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the
probable consequences of carelessness, and is indifferent, or worse, to
the danger of injury to person or property of others.' .The negligence
must amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of person or
property.
NOTE: What determines if an act if negligent is the danger of an act
(apparent and imminent). The nature of the act of jumping into the sea
involves danger per se.
MARINDUQUE IRON MINES v WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
(1954)

FACTS: Mamador hitched a ride together with other laborers on a
company-owned truck. When the truck tried to overtake another truck,
it collided with a coconut tree, which resulted in his death. There was a
company prohibition against laborers riding the haulage trucks.
Petitioner claims that such violation was the laborer's notorious
negligence which, under the law, precludes recovery.
HELD: Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not
negligence, ordinarily. Violation of a rule promulgated by a commission
or board is not negligence per se; but it may be evidence of
negligence. Under the circumstances, the laborer could not be
declared to have acted with negligence since the prohibition had
nothing to do with the personal safety of riders. Getting or accepting a
free ride on the company's haulage truck couldn't be gross negligence,
because no danger or risk was apparent.
RULE: Violation of a rule promulgated by a commission or
board is not negligence per se; but it may be evidence of
negligence.
NOTES:
SIR: the gradation of laws, rules, ordinances, etc. is NOT a

settled rule.
Theres only an alleged prohibition on part of employer
Even if there was indeed a prohibition, violation of policy is not

necessarily negligence per se but it may be an evidence of
negligence
ILAO-ORETA v SPOUSE RONQUILLO (1956)
FACTS: Rounquillo spouses decided to take on the services of Dr. IlaoOreta because Eva Ronquillo as having a difficult time while being
pregnant. They scheduled Eva for a laparoscopic procedure scheduled
om April 5 at 2pm. 7am on the said date, Eva underwent pre-surgery.
Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive on the scheduled day and time of the
operation. It turns out she was on her honeymoon and was still on a
flight from Hawaii and did not arrive until 10pm. She apologized,
argued that she did not intentionally mean to miss her operation, and
offered to reschedule the procedure. Spouses did not want to
reschedule and are now claiming damages from Dr. Ilao-Oreta.
ISSUE: WON Dr. was grossly negligent when she missed Evas
operation.
HELD: NO. She was negligent although not gross. The circumstances
of the case: she tried to contact the spouses as soon as she arrived;
she apologized and even tried to reschedule the procedure. The Court
was sympathetic over the fact that she was on her honeymoon, and
human experience dictates that the excitement over this matter would
normally cloud ones attention over minute details like time (Dr. IlaoOreta forgot to account for the International Date Line in between
Hawaii and the Philippines).
NOTES:
Might also have something to do with the nature of the
procedure the act or omission is not dangerous per se
SANGCO (10-12)
The amount of care demanded by the standard of reasonable conduct
must be proportionate to the apparent risk.
DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE:
SLIGHT NEGLIGENCE - an absence of that degree of vigilance which
persons of extraordinary prudence and foresight are accustomed to
use. (failure to exercise care)
GROSS NEGLIGENCE described as failure to exercise even that care
which a careless person would use. There is no generally accepted
meaning, but the probability is that it signifies more than ordinary
inadvertence or inattention, but less than conscious indifference to
consequences. (extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care)
WILFUL, WANTON, AND RECKLESS quasi-intent, lying between
intent to do harm and the mere reasonable risk of harm to another.
They apply to conduct which is still merely negligent but which is so far
from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many respects as if it
were intended (actor has intentionally done an act of unreasonable
character in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he
must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it
highly probably that harm would follow).
There is often NO CLEAR DISTINCTION between the above and
gross, and the two have tended to merge and take on the same
meaning as an AGGRAVATED form of negligence, differing in QUALITY
rather than in DEGREE from ordinary lack of care.
C. Proof of Negligence
1. Burden of Proof
RULE 131: BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
Sec. 1. Burden of proof in civil cases. - Each party must prove his own
affirmative allegations. Evidence need not be given in support of a
negative allegation except when such negative allegation is an
essential part of the statement of the right or title on which the cause
of action or defense is founded, nor even in such case when the
allegation is a denial of the existence of a document the custody of
which belongs to the opposite party. The burden of proof lies on the
party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either side.
Sec. 2. Burden of proof in criminal cases.

Sec. 3. Conclusive presumptions.
Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy. Sec. 5. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome
by other evidence;
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such , whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of his jurisdiction;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with
things of that nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
Sec. 6. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. - There is no
presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three
hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage or the
separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of such child must prove his allegation.
2. Presumption (Exemption to Burden of Proof
Rule 131)
Art. 2184
In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if
the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a
driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180
are applicable.
Art. 2185
Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap,
he was violating any traffic regulation.
Art. 2188
There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the
defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of
dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison,
except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his
occupation or business.
Art. 1734
Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or
calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act of omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
Art. 1735
In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the
preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as required in Article 1733.
NOTES:
Art 2184 CC (Driver)
disputable presumption:
o 2x w/in the next preceeding 2 mos: guilty of reckless
driving / violation of traffic rules
if the owner is not in the car, does the disputable presumption
apply?
o n/a when the owner is not in the car / common carrier
requires conviction SIR doesnt agree with this because

you cant get a conviction in 2 months, ticket is
acceptable. NOT CLEAR if prior violations need to be
connected to recent incidents.
Art 2185 CC
disputable presumption: violate traffic regulation

o no conviction required
o however, Sangco says this also requires conviction
** but when is one found guilty of traffic violation? when

issued a TICKET
Art 2188
prima facie presumption

o injury results from possession of defendant of
dangerous weapons/ substances, except when the
possession or use thereof is indispensable in his
occupation/business
Arts 1734 & 1735
common carriers
1734 EXCEPTION: subject to defense of EXTRAORDINARY
DILIGENCE; treated as exception to presumptions
loss, destroyed, deteriorate
presume negligence common carrier

o UNLESS prove extraordinary diligence
3. Res Ipsa Loquitor
NOTES:
No direct proof available
Control and management

o Access to thing: defendant can present evidence that
he was not negligent
o Plaintiff does not have such opportunity
The very evidence he is required to present to

prove the negligence is not with him.
Rebuttable
o Will not ordinarily have happened
o PROVE/SHOW (Burden of Proof)
Thing was under the control of the defendant
Thing caused the injury

LAYUGAN v IAC
FACTS: A truck bumped into the plaintiff while he and a companion
were repairing the tire of their parked truck along the right side of the
highway. He sustained injuries. Defendant contends that the proximate
cause was the failure of the driver of the parked truck to install an
early warning device. IAC concluded that under the doctrine, the
plaintiff was negligent. The question is whether the doctrine was
applicable.
HELD: Res ipsa loquitor (the thing speaks for itself) Where the thing
which causes the injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things
does not happen if those who have he management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. It is not rule of
substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural
convenience. It can be involved when and only when, under the
circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily
available. It cannot be availed of when the plaintiff has knowledge and
testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which
is the cause of injury complained of or where there is direct evidence
as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and
circumstances attendant to the occurrence appear. The absence of
want of care of the driver has been established by clear and convincing
evidence. The doctrine does not apply.
RULE: Res ipsa can be invoked when and only when, under the
circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily
available.
NOTES:
RIL made a special defense by Isidro to allege negligence of

the truck driver and Layugan.
IAC ruled RIL as the basis for holding Layugan negligent.
RIL N/A because theres direct (clear & convincing) evidence
Why? Because the mode of proof only, so when theres

evidence, use evidence / facts so that judgment will be based
on facts and not presumptions
RAMOS v CA
FACTS: Ramos, undergoing a gall bladder operation, went comatose
because she was incorrectly intubated.
HELD: Res ipsa (The thing or transaction speaks for itself) the fact of
the occurrence of the injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of
negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Requisites
are:
1. the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in
the absence of someones negligence

2.
3.
it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive

control of the defendant or defendants
the possibility of contributing conduct which would make
plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
The fundamental element is control of instrumentality which caused

the damage. Generally, expert testimony is relied upon in malpractice
suits to prove a physician has done a negligent act or that he has
deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine is
availed of by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is
dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of
negligence. In cases where the doctrine is applicable, the court is
permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to
patient, without aid of expert testimony, where the court from its
common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. The
doctrine is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where
a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and
observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as
such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised.
RULE: In cases where the doctrine is applicable, the court is permitted
to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient,
without aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of
common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.
NOTES:
CAN ARGUE: pre-op procedure; RTC did not know about it but
the SC said it was common knowledge
Case covered by RIL but still possible to apply Cruz v CA
Cf: Voss v Bridwell: Injury occurred prior to operation (like
Ramos). Maybe Cruz v CA will apply if injury was caused by
iperation.
RIL applicable:
No expert testimony
Court adjudicated based on common knowledge fund
The foundation of RIL is common knowledge
evidentiary rule: doesnt do away with presenting evidence
must prove these elements:
accident doesnt occur w/o persons negligence
defendant has exclusive control over the instrumentality
no contributory negligence on plaintiffs part
RIL & malpractice suits:

o Gen rule: expert testimony needed (Cruz v CA) to
establish the standard of care required
o Exception: If case can be gleaned from common
knowledge (Ramos v CA) directly to establish
negligence (Expert testimony dispensed with in

exception; why then allow testimony of Cruz?)
o TESTIMONIES (nature)
Cruz: demeanor, sound, etc.
JAMORA: not as to personal experience but if

drug had that effect in the system.
in Cruz, they didnt provide expert testimony therefore they
lost
in Ramos, can use common knowledge
medical malpractice
domain of medical science: expert needed
RIL
common knowledge: no need for expert
preparation for procedure
if theres failure / didnt get the results expected, RIL n/a
*question: when is a medical malpractice case common
knowledge or in the domain of medical science?*
RIL is NA in malpractice suits if the only showing is that the
desired result was not accomplished if the problem is based on
medical science (Cruz vs. CA). But if common knowledge can
be applied, RIL applies.
TAN v JAM TRANSIT

FACTS: Petitioner Tan owned a jitney being driven by Alexander
Ramirez. It was loaded with balut and salted eggs. Around 5 am, while
it was negotiationg a left turn, it collided with a JAM transit bus being
driven by Eddie Dimayuga. The jitney turned turtle along the shoulder
of the road and the cargo of eggs was destroyed. Ramirez and his
helper were injured and hospitalized.
ISSUE: WON JAM Transit is solidarily liable with driver Dimayuga
HELD: YES, Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or
injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum
that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its
employees. An employer must overcome the presumption, by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee
In this case, aside from the testimony of Dimayuga, JAM did not
present any other evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, in its
favor. Inevitably, the presumption of its negligence as Dimayugas
employer stands and it is, thus, solidarily liable for the damages
sustained by petitioner.
NOTES: RIL applies when there is no direct evidence when there is a
collision between a delivery jeep and bus.

CANTRE v GO
FACTS: Mrs. Go gave birth to her 4th child. There were some parts of
the placenta that were not completely expelled from her womb after
delivery. This caused Mrs. Go to suffer hypovolemic shock resulting in
the drop of her blood pressure. Dr. Cantre performed numerous
medical procedures to stop the bleeding. After the procedure, Mrs. Go
had a wound on her which looked like a burn mark from the droplight.
Dr. Cantre claims the wound was from the blood pressure cuff which
was used to monitor the heartbeat of Mrs. Go during the procedure.
ISSUE: WON Dr. Cantre is liable for the injuries suffered by Mrs. Go.
HELD: YES. The Hippocratic method mandates physicians to give
primordial concern to the well-being of their patients.
In cases involving MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a
presumption of negligence on the part of the person who
controls the instruments causing the injury.
Requisites:
a. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of someones negligence the
wound on Noras arm is not an ordinary occurrence in
the act of delivering a baby.
b. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant or defendants Both a
droplight and a blood pressure apparatus are deemed
to be within the exclusive control of the physician in
charge under the captain ship doctrine.
c. The possibility of contributing conduct which would
make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated the
wound on Noras arm could only be caused by
something external to her.
Even if petitioners contentions are true, that the wound was not
caused by a droplight but by the blood pressure cuff, petitioner is not
exempt from liability.
BATIGUIN v CA
Positive Testimony v Negative Testimony
FACTS: Dr. Batiquin performed a caesarian operation on a patient.
Afterwards, she was found to be feverish. When the patient submitted
herself to another surgery, she was found to have an ovarian cyst on
the left and right side of the ovaries and a piece of rubber material was
embedded on the right side of the uterus.
HELD: Res ipsa Where the thing which causes the injury is shown to
under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from ordinary want of care. All the requisites are present in this case.
(1) The entire proceedings of the caesarian were under the exclusive
control of Dr. Batiquin.
(2) The patient underwent no other operation which could habe caused
the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to
reason that it could habe only been a by-product of the caesarian
section.
RULE: Res ipsa Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be
under the management of the Defendant, and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from want of ordinary care.
NOTES:
RIL applies; all elements present:

o entire C-section under control & management of doctor
o no other operation after C-section
o would not have happened ordinarily
although there is no proof directly linking Dr. Batiquin to the

rubber, applying RIL, Dr. is liable
Theoretical basis for RIL: The proof should come from the
defendant (RIL is the bridge which allows the plaintiff to
reach the defendant).
PROBLEM: there was evidence (testimony, piece of rubber).

Arguably, not direct evidence?
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES v AGANA
FACTS:
Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City Hospital (Owned by
PSI) because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal
discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her as having cancer of the sigmoid.
During surgery Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery and
found that the malignancy has spread to her left ovary necessitating a
hysterectomy. After which, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the
operation and closed the incision.
One of the nurses included in her notes that the sponge count was
lacking (missing 2 sponges) but still Dr. Ampil proceeded with closing
the incision. Mrs. Agana complained of pains but was reassured by the
doctors that it is normal after her procedure. The Aganas also
consulted an oncologist in the US affirming that she no longer has
cancer. 3 months after the operation, the daughter of Mrs. Agana
found gauze protruding from her vagina.
ISSUE: WON RIL applies to Dr. Fuentes.
HELD: NO

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to Dr. Fuentes .
Requisites: (1) occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the
injury was under the exclusive control and management of the
defendant; (3) in the ordinary course of things the injury wouldnt
have happened if the person in control used proper care; and (4)
absence of explanation by the person at fault. The 2nd requirement
is wanting because Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes was the lead
surgeon (Captain of the Ship rule).
DM CONSUNJI v CA
FACTS: A construction worker fell from the 14th floor when the
platform assembly he was standing on fell down.
HELD: The theoretical basis for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that
the necessary evidence is not available. The defendant in charge of
the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of
the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the
plaintiff has no such knowledge. It furnishes a bridge by which the
plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant
who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care
exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the
plaintiff complains. It is a rule of necessity.
RULE: The theoretical basis for the doctrine is its necessity.
NOTES:
RIL applies
theoretical basis:
o proof is in exclusive control of defendant
o bridge that connects plaintiff to the proof
Prof. Casiss problem: theres evidence (police report,

testimony & affidavit). It is like saying that even if there is
evidence, one could still argue RIL to win the case.
Prof. Casis thinks that it is the victims fault for falling off the
platform.
Due care defense comes into play only after the
circumstances for the application of the doctrine has
been established.
COLLEGE ASSURANCE v BELFRANLT
FACTS: Belfranlt leased several unit of a building to CAP and
comprehensive annuity Plans
and Pension Corporation (CAPP).
However, as fire occurred which destroyed portions of the building
including the units they leased. An investigation report found out that
the origin of the fire was from CAPs storeroom due to an overheated
coffee percolator.
ISSUE: WON RIL applies.
HELD: YES.
The requisites of RIL are present
a.
The accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless

someone is negligent fire that damaged the building was not
a spontaneous natural occurrence but the outcome of a human
act or omission
b. The cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person in charge originated in the storeroom which CAP had
possession and control of
c. The injury suffered must have been due to any voluntary
action of contribution on the part of the person injured =
Belfranlt had no hand in the incident
CAP alone, having knowledge of the cause of the fire or the best
opportunity to ascertain it; and Belfranlt having no means to find out
for itself, it is sufficient for the latter to merely allege that the
cause of the fire was negligence of the former and to rely on
the occurrence of the fire as proof of such negligence. It was all
up to CAP to dispel such inference of negligence, but their bare denial
only left the matter unanswered.
SANCO (27-32)
RES IPSA LOQUITOR the facts or circumstances attending an injury
may be such as to raise a presumption, or permit an inference, of
negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is
charged with negligence.
It relates to the MODE rather than the BURDEN of establishing
negligence.
It is NOT an exception to the rule of initial presumption of negligence,
but is DESCRIPTIVE of a class of cases wherein the initial presumption
is overcome by evidence inherently carrying with it implications of
negligence without the necessity of proof of specific facts or conduct.
WHEN DOES IT APPLY? Upon the satisfaction of 3 conditions:
1. The accident was of a kind which ordinarily does not occur
unless someone is negligent
2. The instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured
COURTS ADD A FURTHER CONDITION:
4. Plaintiff had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the
cause of the accident
D. Defenses
1. Plaintiffs Negligence
2) INJURY (legal question damnum absque injuria) or DAMAGE
3) NEGLIGENCE

a) Picart Test
b) Standard Care
4) PROXIMATE CAUSE
5) PLAINTIFFS NEGLIGENCE
a) PROXIMATE CAUSE Cannot recover
b) CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE can recover but mitigated
Art. 2179, NCC
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence
was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause being the
defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but
the court shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
NOTES:
Applies only when both parties are negligent.
Cf. Astudillo public place, should be stricter
Cf. Last Clear Chance
Does not apply if civil liability arises from crime

MANILA ELECTRIC v REMONQUILLO
FACTS:
Magno was repairing the media agua when he was
electrocuted to death. The galvanized iron sheet he was holding came
in contact with the electric wire.
HELD: Court said Meralco was not negligent. But assuming it was
Magnos heirs still cant recover because the proximate cause of the
electrocution was not the electric wire but the reckless and negligent
act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet
without precaution. It is assumed that due to his age and experience,
he was qualified to do the job.
SC: assumed he was a tinsmith higher standard of care
NOTES:
proximate cause: negligence of repairman in turning with GI

sheet
difference between this & Astudillo v. Manila Electric Co.:

o Meralco wouldve had to have been more careful if
public place
* The son could have sued stepbrother of his father for building
the house so close to the wire*
BERNARDO v LEGASPI
(If both negligent cannot recover from each other)
FACTS: CFI dismissed the complaint filed in an action to recover
damages for injuries sustained by plaintiffs automobile by reason of
defendants negligence in causing a collision. Court also dismissed a
cross-complaint filed by the defendant, praying for damages on the
ground that the injuries sustained by his automobile, and those to the
plaintiffs car were caused by plaintiffs own negligence.
HELD: Court found that both plaintiff and defendant were negligent in
handling their automobile so both cannot recover. Where plaintiff in a
negligence action by his own carelessness contributes to the principal
occurrence as one of the determining causes thereof, he cannot
recover.
RULE: When the negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant is
the proximate cause of the accident, they cannot recover from each
other.
NOTES:
Determining Cause of Principal Incident:

A. CASE:
Act/Omission of A as the Proximate Cause + Act/Omission of B
as the Proximate Cause = Principal Incident
B. SIR (proper way):
Act/Omission of A + Act/Omission of B = Proximate Cause
Principal Incident
BERNAL v HOUSE
(Before NCC)
FACTS: Mother and child were walking along a street, with the child a
few steps ahead. She got startled by an automobile and ran back to
her mother. She fell into a ditch with hot water and later died. CFI
denied damages to parents because they were negligent.
HELD: SC held they were not. Mother and child had a right to be on
that street. There was nothing abnormal in letting a child run along a
few paces ahead of the mother. Contributory negligence of the child
and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery but could
only result in reduction of damages.
NOTES:
No contributory negligence of mother & kid

Even if they did have contributory negligence, it is not a bar to
recovery; only mitigates
PLDT v CA
(Mound of Earth)
FACTS: Antonio and Gloria Estebans jeep ran over a mound of earth
and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by
PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system.
HELD: The accident was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio. His
jeep was running along the inside lane of the street but it swerved
abruptly, causing the jeep to hit the mound. Proximate cause was the

unexplained and abrupt swerving of the jeep. Court also found that the
jeep was running too fast. The negligence of Antonio was not only
contributory to his injuries and those of his wife, but goes to the very
cause of the occurrence of the accident and thereby precludes their
right to recover damages.
NOTES:
negligence imputed included knowledge of the place
The Estebans passed that mound several times.
Cause/Condition
2. Contributory Negligence
NPC v HEIRS OFCASIONAN
FACTS: Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor Jimenez, were at
Dalicno. They cut two bamboo poles for their pocket mining. One was
18 to 19 feet long and the other was 14 feet long. Each man carried
one pole horizontally on his shoulder. As Noble was going uphill and
turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying
touched one of the dangling high tension wires. Melchor, who was
walking behind him, narrated that he heard a buzzing sound when
the tip of Nobles pole touched the wire for only about one or two
seconds. Thereafter, he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor rushed
to Noble and shook him but the latter was already dead. Their coworkers heard Melchors shout for help and together they brought the
body of Noble to their camp.
ISSUE: WON there was contributory negligence on the part of the
victim?
HELD: Yes
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the
interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. On the other hand, contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause
to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he
is required to conform for his own protection.
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a

plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not
be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the
consequences of his own negligence. If indeed there was
contributory negligence on the part of the victim, then it is
proper to reduce the award for damages.
In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was
regularly used by members of the community. There were no
warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to
their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension
wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to
Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing
what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.
NOTES:
No contributory negligence
Proximate Cause = NOCs sagging lines
If PLDT was followed, he should have known about the wires;

both without warning signs
NPC v MERALCO
o SIR agrees more with NPC = contributory negligence
NPCs definition contradictory to Art. 2179

Art. 2214, NCC
In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce
the damages that he may recover.
NOTES:
Contributory negligence is a mitigating factor in awarding

damages.
GENOBIAGON v CA
FACTS: Rig (imagine Optimus Prime ) driven by appellant bumped an
81 y.o. lady who was crossing the street. His defense was that it was
the old lady who bumped his car. TC and CA found him guilty of
homicide through reckless imprudence.
HELD: Court said that the alleged contributory negligence of the
victim, if any, does not exonerate accused. The defense of contributory
negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through
reckless imprudence since one cannot allege the negligence of
another to evade the effects of his own negligence.
RAKES v ATLANTIC
FACTS: The truck plaintiff was riding fell because the track sagged.
The rails that they were transporting slid off the truck and caught his
lag. Later, his leg was amputated. Company said Rakes was negligent
because: (1) he continued his work despite having noticed the
depression in the track, and (2) he walked on the ends of the ties at
the side of the car instead of along the boards.
HELD: As to the first, Court held that Rakes had been working for less
than 2 days. He could not have known that one rail was lower than the
other or that the stringers and rails joined in the same place. As to the
second, Court found that there was a general prohibition against
walking by the side of the car. The disobedience of the plaintiff in
placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a
proximate, although not its primary cause. The Court made a
distinction between the accident and the injury. If the plaintiffs
negligence contributed to the accident, he cannot recover. But if his
negligence only contributed to his injury, he may recover the amount
that the defendant responsible for the accident should pay fpr the
injury, less a sum deemed an equitable equivalent for his own
imprudence.

NOTES:
1) not following orders; 2) should have known (only a bit

because hes new on the job; Foreman should have repaired)
Contributory negligence? YES! (50%

explanation look at previous cases)
damages;
50%
no
accident v. injury (RAKES TEST)

o accident: cant recover
contrib. to primary event

o injury: may recover
Defendants contrib. Plaintiffs contrib. =

Recovery
American Common Law:
Draconian Contributory: negligence

policy even if little = Barred from
recovery
PROPORTIONAL
DAMAGES
=
Relaxation of Draconian
o Comparative Negligence and
Contributory Negligence if
defendant contributed more,
plaintiff allowed to recover
PHILIPPINES: Comparative and Proportional
Problem, what if its equal? Apply

BERNARDO?
2 kinds of contribution: (1) contribution to the principal event;
(2) contribution to his own injury
3. Fortuitous Event
Art. 1174, NCC
Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable.
LAMBERT v HEIRS OF CASTILLON

FACTS: On Jan. 13, 1991, Ray Castilln visited the house of his brother
Joel in Iligan City and borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his
friend, Sergio Labang to roam around the city. Ray drove the
motorcycle with Sergio on the rear.
ISSUE: WON a greater reduction in the award of damages to the heirs
of Castilln is proper
HELD: : YES. While the Court agrees with the trial court that Ray was
contributorily negligent under Art. 2179 of the Civil Code, they also find
it equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of damages on
account of his negligence. Castilln was driving the motorcycle at a
high speed, drank one or two bottles of beer and was not wearing a
protective helmet. Although Gamot was also negligent in not checking
whether the road behind him was clear before making a sharp left turn,
it cannot be denied that Castillns actuations have also led to the
same effect. His heirs shall only recover damages of up to only 50% of
the award. The 50% will be borne by them while Lambert shall be only
liable to pay 50% of the damages.
HELD: SC said that there are specific acts of negligence on the part of
the respondents. Jeep was running at a very fast speed and was
overloaded. In this case, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence was not independent of human will. It was caused either
through the negligence of the driver or because of the mechanical
defects in the tire.
NOTES:
SIR: borrowed motorcycle, assumed not to have a license
Proximate cause = negligence of Tamaraw driver
NOTES:
** Is this really a defense? **
theres only one case cited because in Transpo course, Court

was not always consistent whether a tire blowout is a
fortuitous event or not
*how different is a tire blowout from a fire?*
*memorize elements of Fortuitous Event*

JUNTILLA v FUNTANAR
FACTS: Plaintiff was seated in the front passenger seat of a public
utility jeepney when the right tire blew up. He was thrown out of the
jeep and suffered injuries. He also lost his omega watch.
CHARACTERISTICS OF CASO FORTUITO:

1. Cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the
failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation must be independent
of human will.
2. It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the
caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it is impossible to avoid.
3. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner
4. Obligor must be free from participation in the aggravation of the
injury resulting to the creditor.
NOTES:
Many possibilities were proposed by the Court to justify that

the tire blowing up was not a fortuitous event.
Important: memorize characteristics of caso fortuito
Caso Fortuito is HUMANIZED even if only contributory Art.

2179 applies only to plaintiff
Mechanical defect: carrier still liable because its part of the
contract of carriage
Not enough that there was Fortuitous Event, there should be
NO negligence on person charged
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE v CA
FACTS: During a typhoon, schools roof was partly ripped off and
blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of
respondents house.
A team of engineers conducted an ocular
inspection and found that the causes may have been the U-shaped
formation of the building and the improper anchorage of the trusses to
the roof beams.
HELD: Court found that other than the report submitted by the
engineers, no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause
of the incident. Respondents did not even show that the plans, specs
and design of the school building were defective. On the other hand,
city building official testified that the school obtained both building
permit and certificate of occupancy; same official gave go signal for
repairs of damage of typhoon and subsequently authorized the use of
the entire 4th floor of the building; annual maintenance inspection and
repair of the school building was regularly undertaken; and that no
complaints have been lodged in the past. Therefore, petitioner has not
been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and
maintenance of the school building. Typhoon was the proximate cause.
CASO FORTUITO event which takes place by accident and
could not have been reasonably foreseen, it is an unexpected
event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor
resisted.
2 GENERAL CAUSES:
1. By nature- earthquakes, storms, floods, etc.
2. By the act of man- armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental
prohibition, etc.
NOTES:
typhoon is FE: only issue is whether there was negligence on

part of Southern
flying roof is FE
typhoon was proximate cause of damage to neighboring house
*take this case for definition of force majeur*
*credibility of ocular inspection discredited so this is strange

because this runs counter to Gotesco*
*they could have used RIL*: might have done better? But there
is evidence of diligence.
SICAM v JORGE
FACTS: Lulu Jorge pawned her jewelry with Agencia de R.C. Sicam, a
pawnshop in Paraaque, in October 1987 to secure a loan in the
amount of P59,500.00. On October 19, 1987, armed men entered the
pawnshop and took away whatever cash and jewelry were found in the
vault. On the same day, Sicam notified Jorge of the robbery incident
and that consequently all here jewelry is gone. Jorge did not believe
him.
ISSUE: WON the robbery is a fortuituous event which can absolve
Sicam from liabilty.
HELD: NO
- Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events
not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough
that the event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to
foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the
same. 22
- The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event
rests on him who invokes it. And, in order for a fortuitous event to
exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed
no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss.
Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous
event. It does not foreclose the possibility of negligence on
the part of herein petitioners
NOTES:
Austria Abad: social situation NOT prevalent: 1961 v 1987

Hernandez: public utility (no control) jeep v Pawnshop can
screen people
Cruz: rode train exerted enough effort
COLLEGE ASSURANCE v BELRANLT
FACTS:
Belfranlt leased several unit of a building to CAP and comprehensive
annuity Plans and Pension Corporation (CAPP). However, as fire
occurred which destroyed portions of the building including the units
they leased. An investigation report found out that the origin of the fire
was from CAPs storeroom due to an overheated coffee percolator.
ISSUE: W/N the fire was a fortuitous event.
HELD: NO.

-
Article 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as

that which could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, was inevitable.
- Whether an act of god or an act of man, to constitute a fortuitous
event, it must be shown that: a) the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the obligor to comply
with its obligations was independent of human will; b) it was
impossible to foresee the event or, if it could have been foreseen,
to avoid it; c) the occurrence rendered it impossible for the obligor
to fulfill its obligations in a normal manner; and d) said obligor was
free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss.
If the negligence or fault of the obligor coincided with the
occurrence of the fortuitous event, and caused the loss or damage
or the aggravation thereof, the fortuitous event cannot shield the
obligor from liability for his negligence.
In the present case, it was fire that caused the damage to the units
being occupied by petitioners. The legal presumption therefore is that
petitioners were responsible for the damage.
NOTES:
Fire is not always a fortuitous event; in this case, it was caused

by CAPs negligence when one of its employees left the
percolator on.
EVIDENCE: could not have been fortuitous event (Arson

investigators report, testimony, etc.)
Negligence was established first, RIL was secondary to

testimonial evidence
4. Assumption of Risk
AFIALDA v HISOLE
(Fun Fact: Hisoles referred to as spouses in the case even
though theyre both males)
FACTS: Caretaker of carabaos was gored by a carabao and he later
died as a consequence of his injuries. Action was predicated on Art
1905 CC.
HELD: Court said A1905 makes possessory user of animal liable for
any damages it may cause. In this case, the animal was under the
control of the caretaker. It was his business to try to prevent the
animal from causing injury to anyone, including himself. Being injured
by the animal under these circumstances was one of the risks of the
occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must
take the consequences.
NOTES:
inherent risks voluntarily & knowingly assumed by caretaker

when he agreed to be caretaker
SIR: part of the job applied to cases where a person has to
work with animals, like Congress.
ILOCOS NORTE v CA
FACTS: After a 2-day typhoon, Isabel went out of her house to check
on her grocery store. She waded in waist-deep flood and got
electrocuted. According to the NPC Engr, there were no INELCO
linemen who were going around.
HELD: Court said that contrary to petitioners claim, the maxim
violenti non fit injuria does not apply here. Isabel should not be
punished for exercising her right to protect her property from the
floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she
assumed the risk of personal in injury. A person is excused from the
force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger,
he must abide by the consequence, if an emergency is found to exist,
or if the life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to
rescue his endangered property.
NOTES:
Exemption to Violenti Non Fit Injuria: A person is excused from

the force of the assumption of risk rule, that when he
voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the
consequences:
o if an emergency is found to exist
o if the life or property of another is in peril
o when he seeks to rescue his endangered
property.
To which a person ascends to be injured, he cannot
recover damages
NIKKO HOTEL v ROBERTO REYES
FACTS: this is the case of Amay Bisaya who claimed that he was
invited to a birthday party at said hotel but who was then asked to
leave by the hotels executive Secretary, Ruby Lim, who on the other
hand claimed that Reyes was uninvited.
HELD: The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person
assents is not esteemed in law as injuryrefers to self-inflicted
injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery
of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed
himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.
As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find
application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes
assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party,
petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code,
were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to
expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
In the case at bar, Ruby was close enough to kiss him as testified by
Reyes when she asked him to leave, showing that she did not want to

cause him any embarrassment. There was also no evidence that she
was driven by animosity against Reyes. At most she may only be guilty
of bad judgment, done with good intentions, thus not amounting to bad
faith.
SANGCO (pp.81-84)
NOTES:
VIOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA: applies to non-contractual
relations;
3 requisites:
(1) plaintiff had actual knowledge of the damage;
(2) he understood an appreciated the risk from danger;
(3) he voluntarily exposed himself to such risk.
5. Prescription
KRAMER v CA
FACTS: 1976: 2 vessels collided
- 1981: Phil Coast Guard concluded that the collision was due to M/V
Asias negligence
-1982: Coast Guard suspended 2nd mate of M/V Asia.
-1985: Petitioners instituted complaint for damages against
respondent. Motion to dismiss was filed on the basis of prescription.
HELD: SC dismissed the case, saying that according to Art. 1146,
action based on quasi-delict must be instituted within 4 yrs.
Prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict was
committed.
IV CAUSATION
A. Proximate cause
NOTES:
Usually its the shorter definition thats being cited in the other cases.
So for our purpose-shorter version
The longer version can be shortened by removing sufficient
intervening cause
*memorize definition of proximate cause*
1. Definition
BATACLAN v MEDINA
FACTS: A bus speeding on its way to Pasay City at 2am when one of
its front tires burst, as a result of which the vehicle zigzagged, fell into
a canal or ditch, and turned turtle. 4 passengers were unable to get
out of the bus.
Calls and shouts for help were made in the
neighborhood. At 2:30am, 10 men came, one of them carrying a
lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick fueled with petroleum.
When they approached the bus, a fierce fire started, burning the bus
and the 4 passengers. It appears that as the bus overturned, the
gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank, spreading
over the bus and the ground under it, and that the lighted torch set it
on fire.
ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the accident?
HELD: The overturning of the bus, and not the fire that burned the
bus, is the proximate cause. The coming of the men with the torch
was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of
the bus, the trapping of the passengers and the call for outside help.
NOTES:
Definition #1 of proximate cause according to Bataclan v.
Medina:
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred.
Definition #2 of proximate cause according to Bataclan vs.

Medina:
More comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an in jury to some person might probably result
therefrom.
SIR: being burned is not part of the foreseeable consequences
of riding a bus
MERCURY DRUG v BAKING

FACTS: R got into a car accident because he fell asleep while driving.
It was found out that. Prior to the accident, R bought several
medications for his blood sugar and triglyceride at Mercury Drug,Alabang. However, the saleslady misread Diamicron and instead gave
him Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet. He took Dormicum for three
consecutive days.
HELD: Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in
a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred
otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case,
upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and
precedent.

In this case, the car accident could not have happened if the saleslady
carefullly and correctly read Dr. Sys prescription since it was unlikley
that Baking would fall asleep while driving.
NOTES:
SIR: the court attributed a high degree of diligence to pharmacists
PILIPINAS BANKING v CA
FACTS: Florencio Reyes issued two post-dated checks. To cover the
face value of the checks, he requested PCIB to effect a withdrawal from
his savings account there and have it deposited with his current
account with Pilipinas Bank. Santos, who made the deposit, wrote the
wrong account number on the deposit slip, but wrote the name of
Florencio Reyes as the depositors name. The Current Account
Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, seeing that the account number
coincided with the name Florencio, deposited the amount in the
account of Florencio Amador.
ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the injury to Reyes?
HELD: The proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of Pilipinas
Banks employee in erroneously positing the cash deposit of Reyes in
the name of another depositor who had a similar first name. The
employee should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption.
Proximate cause is any cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
result complained of and without which would not have occurred and
from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated
by a person of ordinary care that the injury complained of or some
similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable cause.
Note: Different definition of PC from Bataclan case. This case adds the
element of foreseeability.
Prof. Casiss opinion: Theres no basis for this additional element.
Under Art. 2202, foreseeability should not be a factor.Sir said that
there is a problem with foreseeability as an element. So as a solution,
if theres a case similar to Pilipinas Bank, apply Pilipinas Bank
definition*
Bank employees are required to exercise a high degree of

diligence because of the fiduciary nature of the job
2. Distinguished from other kinds

a. Remote
GABETO v ARANETA
FACTS: Gayetano (husband of plaintiff) and Ilano took a carromata to
go to a cockpit. When the carromata was about to move, Araneta held
the reins of the horse, saying he hailed the carromata first. Driver
Pagnaya pulled the reins to take it away from Aranetas control, as a

result of which, the bit came off the horses mouth. Pagnaya fixed the
bridle on the curb. The horse, free form the control of the bit, moved
away, causing the carromata to hit a telephone booth and caused it to
crash. This frightened the horse and caused it to run up the street with
Gayetano still inside the carromata. Gayetano jumped or fell from the
rig, causing injuries from which he soon died.
ISSUE: WON Araneta is liable for Gayetanos death. ---NO.
HELD: Aranetas act of stopping the rig was too remote from the
accident to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. After
Pagnaya alighted, the horse was conducted to the curb and an
appreciable interval of time elapsed before the horse started to career
up to the street. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the
head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for
the control of the animal, and Araneta cannot be charged with liability
for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter.
NOTES:
Classical description of remote cause with series of events.
It is not the counting of the time but the SERIES

b. Concurrent
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY v CA
FACTS: A ship owned by FESC rammed into the apron of the pier.
Kavankov was the master of the vessel. Gavino was the compulsory
pilot.
ISSUE: Who was negligent --- Gavino or Kvankov? ---BOTH.
HELD: Both Gavino (compulsory pilot) and Kavankov (master of the
vessel) were concurrently negligent. Gavino was negligent for failing to
react on time; Kavankov was negligent in leaving the entire docking
procedure up to Gavino instead of being vigilant.
Negligence, in order to render a person liable need not be the sole
cause of an injury. Where several causes combine to produce injuries,
a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only
one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person
charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would
not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not
attributable to the person injured.
Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as
though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. There is no
contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since
both of them are liable for the whole damage.
Reason: It is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the
whole injury.
Note: Liability of concurrent negligence = solidary.

NOTES:
If the concurrent act was the proximate cause, the degree of
participation does not matter.
What is the rule on liability? liability is impossible to

determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury
Those who are responsible for concurrent causes are jointly

and severally liable
o Creates the impression that concurrent causes are the
proximate cause
SIR:
Concurrent proximate cause
o Liability is not dependent on amount of physical
damage but on the nature of the act
o In a situation where 4 vehicles rammed into a traffic
enforcer in an intersection, each driver is liable as the
other, regardless of size and impact
Problem: can you have a situation where there is more than
one proximate cause?
2 things are the effect of concurrent causes:

o liability is not dependent on amount of physical
damage but on the nature of the act
o plaintiff can recover the entire amount from anybody
c. Cause and Condition
PHOENIX v CA
FACTS: A dump truck, owned by Phoenix, was parked askew on the
right hand side of the street, in such a manner as to stick out onto
General Lacuna Street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic.
There were no early warning devices placed near the truck. At 1:30
am, Dionisio was on his way home when his car headlights allegedly
suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on bright and saw the
truck looming 2 meters away from his car. His car smashed into the
dump truck.
HELD: The distinctions between cause and condition have already
been ALMOST ENTIRELY DISCREDITED.
Posser and Keeton: So far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the
sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part
in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between
active forces and passive situations, particularly since the latter are
the result of other active forces which have gone before. Even the
lapse of a considerable time during which the condition remains
static will not necessarily affect liability. It is not the distinction which
is important, but the nature of the risk and the character of the
intervening cause.
NOTES:
The cause is the active aspect whereas the condition is the

passive action that may produce the injury.
It is difficult to distinguish between a cause and a condition
because of the time element. A condition was a cause at
some point in time.
It cannot be cited in saying that cause and condition are no
longer applicable in our jurisdiction because it only said that
it is discredited.
DY TEBAN v JOSE CHING

FACTS: A three-way vehicular collision occurred along a national
highwa as a result of the improper parking of the prime mover on the
national highway and the absence of an early warning device on the
vehicle. A Nissan van operated by P was one of the vehicles involved in
the accident when it hit the front of the stationary mover while trying
to avoid a passenger bus which swerved to the vans lane upon trying
to avoid the mover. The said bus also collided with the rear portion of
the mover.
HELD: The parked mover is the proximate cause of the collision.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred.
Even granting that the passenger bus was at fault, its fault will not
necessarily absolve private respondents from liability. If at fault, the
passenger bus will be a joint tortfeasor along with private respondents.
The liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary.
It is said that where the concurrent or successive negligent
acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct
and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it
is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed
to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even
though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury.
NOTES:
Consistent with Phoenix

o Proximate cause would be the wrongly parked vehicle
RODRIGUEZA v MANILA RAILROAD
FACTS: The house of Rodrigueza and 3 others were burned when a
passing train emitted a great quantity of sparks from its smokestack.
Rodriguezas house was partly within the property of the Manila
Railroad.
ISSUE: WON Manila Railroads negligence was the proximate cause of
the fire
HELD: Yes. The fact that Rodriguezas house was partly on the
defendants property is an antecedent condition that may have made
the fire possible but cannot be imputed as contributory negligence

because: (1) that condition was not created by himself; (2) his house
remained on this ground by the tolerance, and thus consent of the
train company; (3) even supposing the house to be improperly there,
this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it.
Rodriguezas house was built on the same spot before the defendant
laid its tracks over the land.
Note: Condition = plaintiffs house was partly within the defendants
property. Cause = the sparks on the train which was the negligent act
of the defendant.
A case where rule on condition is applied
The house is the condition which made the injury possible but
not the cuase
SIR: as a question of policy, this is a good ruling
o People lost their homes
o If Meralco was nto liable, the owners would have ran
after Rodrigueza who also lost his house
FACTS: Efren Magno repaired the media agua below Pealozas 3storey house. In the course of the repair, the end of the iron sheet he
was holding came into contact with an uninsulated electric wire of
Manila Electric, causing his death by electrocution. The distance from
the electric wire to the media agua was only 2 feet, in violation of
the regulation of the City of Manila requiring 3 feet.
ISSUE: What was the cause and condition of the accident?
HELD: The cause was Magnos own negligence. The condition was the
too close proximity of the media agua, or rather, its edge, to the
electrical wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original
permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal
construction of media agua.
3. Efficient Intervening cause
NOTES:
The efficient intervening cause destroys the link between the

negligent act and injury. It should occur after the purported
proximate cause because it would then be a condition.
Negligence of the defendant if pre-empted by the negligence

of the plaintiff.
The efficient intervening cause is actually a proximate cause.
Although there is still lack of a definite ruling by the Court, any

violation of administrative ordinances and the like would either
be seen as 1) negligence per se or 2) prima facie evidence of
negligence.
It is not an efficient intervening cause when it is already in

existence during the happening of the proximate cause.
URBANO v IAC
FACTS: On October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier in his right palm.
Javier was brought to a doctor who issued a certificate stating the
incapacitation is from 7-9 days. On November 5, Javier was seen
catching fish in dirty shallow irrigation canals after a typhoon. ON
November 14, he died of tetanus.
ISSUE: WON there was efficient intervening cause YES.
HELD: The death must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence
of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. The medical findings,
in the case at bar, show that the infection of the wound by the tetanus
was an effacing intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of death.
NOTES: The court adopted the Bataclan definition of proximate cause.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause
and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause
of Javiers death with which Urbano had nothing to do.
Citing Manila Electric v. Remoquillo: A prior and remote cause
cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury
a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have happened
except but for such condition or occasion.
The remote cause was noted to be the wound of Urbano.

MCKEE v IAC
FACTS: A cargo truck and a Ford Escort were traveling in opposite
directions. When the car was 10 meters away from the bridge, 2 boys
suddenly darted into the cars lane. The car driver blew the horn,
swerved to the left and entered the trucks lane. He then switched on
the headlights, braked, and attempted to return to his lane. Before he
could do so, his car collided with the truck.
ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause YES.
HELD: Although it may be said that the act of the car driver, if at all
negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said
that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the
occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the
truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. It was the
truck drivers subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper
measure and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision, which
was the proximate cause of the tragedy.
FACTS: Efren Magno repaired the media agua below Penalozas 3story house. In the course of the repair, the end of the iron sheet he
was holding came into contact with an uninsulated electric wire of

Manila Electric, causing his death by electrocution. The distance from
the electric wire to the media agua was only 2 feet, in violation of
the regulation of the City of Manila requiring 3 feet.
ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause YES.
HELD: Efficient intervening cause: the negligent and reckless act of
MAgno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet
without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street
and at the wire to avoid its contacting the said iron sheet, considering
the latters length of 6 feet.
NOTES:
The IC here was the turning
What could have been the IC now becomes the remote cause
TEAGUE v FERNANDEZ
FACTS: A vocational school for hair and beauty culture had only one
stairway, in violation of an ordinance requiring 2 stairways. A fire broke
out in a nearby store and the students panicked and caused a
stampede. Four students died.
ISSUE: WON there was an independent intervening cause NO.
HELD: the violation of a stature or ordinance is not rendered remote
as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the
occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was
the very thing which the stature or ordinance was intended to prevent.
In the present case, the violation was a continuing violation in that the
ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent the specific
situation of undue crowding in case of evacuation.
NOTE: The PC of the deaths is the overcrowding brought about by the
violation. However, the court did not specifically identify the violation
itself as the PC.
Rule: if the injury was caused by an act which the statute

violated tended to prevent, the violation of the statute can be
considered negligence per se and is the proximate cause. But
this is only of limited application and is not yet settled.
Effects of violation of statute is not settled. It can be: a)

negligence per se, b) prima facie proof of negligence, c)
rebuttable proof of negligence, d) proof of negligence
*Limited application because its municipal ordinance. Can you

apply this if what is involved is a national statute?- You might
be able to use argument by analogy*
4. Tests
a. But for
b. Substantial Factor
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES v IAC
FACTS: A jeep was carrying passengers to Pangasinan when its right
rear wheel became detached, causing it to be unbalanced. The driver
stepped on the brake, which made the jeep turn around, encroaching
on the opposite lane. A Philippine Rabbit Bus from the opposite lane
bumped the rear portion of the jeep. Three passengers of the jeep died
as a result.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the bus driver was negligent. It applied
the substantial factor test: It is a rule under this test that if the
actors conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the
harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor
should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in
which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable.
ISSUE: Who is liable?-Jeep.
HELD: The Supreme Court was not convinced by the application of the
substantial factor test. Even though the bus was driving at 80-90 kph,
it was still within the speed limit allowed in highways. The bus driver
had little time to react and had no options available: it could not
swerve to the right (western shoulder was narrow and had tall grasses;
already near the canal) or to the left (it would have it the jeep headon).
NOTE: The substantial factor test contains no element of
foreseeability.
Prof. Casis thinks that this case should not be cited for the
substantial factor test because the SC did not apply the
test; only the CA did.
Substantial factor = Main cause, not the only cause
Important : memorize the test
*This is the only case that defines substantial factor test*
*Also see Pilipinas Bank*

5. Last Clear Chance
NOTES:
Elements:
o Both parties must be negligent
o Appreciable interval of time
o When it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence should be attributed to the incident
Important to allege that there is a prior and existing negligence
Cannot apply in:

o Common carrier against passenger
o Concurrent negligence
o Joint tortfeasors
o Emergency rule no LCC at all
o Proximate cause
Take note of the definition of last clear chance in all the

cases.
PICART v SMITH

*Provides for the classic definition of Last Clear Chance: the person
who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to
do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other party.
FACTS: Picart riding his pony was on the wrong side of the road.
Smith driving his car stayed on his right lane and so both Picart and
Smith were on the same lane. Smith stayed on his lane and swerved to
the other lane quickly, thereby almost hitting the pony. Pony became
frightened and lost control and Picart was thrown out of the pony and
got
injured.
Picart
then
filed
a
case
against
Smith
RATIO:
The
negligent
acts
of
both
parties
were
NOT
contemporaneous. Negligence of Smith succeeded the negligence of
Picart by an appreciable interval. th saw the pony when he was still far
and he had control of the situation. was his duty to avoid the
threatened harm by bringing the car to a stop or taking the other lane
to avoid the collision. t take into consideration the NATURE OF
HORSES and the ANIMAL NOT BEING ACQUAINTED TO CARS. ligence of
Smith: when it exposed Picart and pony to danger. This negligence of
Smith was the immediate and determining cause of the accident and
the antecedent negligence of Picart was a more remote factor
-Applied the LCCD and made the defendant liable
NOTES:
Important: there should be a sequence of events

BUSTAMANTE v CA
- Practical importance of LCCD
The negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff,

or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing
himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or should
have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care,
had in fact had an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to
avoid an accident
FACTS: Collision between a truck and a bus when the bus tried to
overtake a hand tractor. Bus saw that the trucks wheels were
wiggling and that truck was heading towards his lane. Still, bus driver
did not mind and instead applied more speed. Thus, many were killed
and injured. Victims heirs filed this case to claim damages from bus
and truck
RATIO: Last Clear Chance Doctrine: negligence of the plaintiff does
not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence. The practical import (stated
above) provides that negligent defendant shall be liable to negligent
plaintiff. Thus, the LCCD does not arise where the passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.
The doctrine also cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors
as a test whether one of them should be liable to the injured person.
So, the doctrine cannot apply in this case because this is NOT a suit
between owners and drivers but a suit brought by the heirs of the
deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding
vehicles
- did not apply LCCD
NOTES:
Last clear chance contemplates a series of negligent acts.

The definition of last clear chance in the case of Bustamante is
deemed to be the common definition (from the point of view of
recovery of plaintiff) and is defined as an exception to a rule.
The doctrine of last clear chance would apply even if the

plaintiff is grossly negligent. Exceptions, however, include joint
tortfeasors (according to Americn Jurisprudence).
Last clear chance cannot apply when there are: 1) contractual

relations, 2) joint tortfeasors, 3) concurrent negligence
CASIS: cant use LCC to avoid liability by pointing to another
person since suit was between heirs of the passenger and bus
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION v IAC
- basis for saying that there is doubt in the application of the Last Clear
Chance Doctrine because of Art. 2179. However, the statements made
on the Last Clear Chance Doctrine were merely obiter
FACTS: Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails and dinnermeeting when he collided with the dumptruck of Phoenix which was
parked askew at the side of the road. Thus, Dionisio filed an action for
damages against Phoenix. Phoenix invoked the Last Clear Chance
Doctrine: Dionisio had the Last Clear Chance of avoiding the accident
and so Dionisio, having failed to take the last clear chance, must bear
his own injuries alone
RATIO: The Last Clear Chance doctrine of the Common Law was
imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is still a matter
of debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The doctrine was applied by Common Law
because they had a rule that contributory negligence prevented any
recovery at all by a negligent plaintiff. BUT in the Philippines we have
Article 2179 of the Civil Code which rejects the Common Law doctrine
of contributory negligence. Thus, the court in this case stated that it
does not believe so that the general concept of Last Clear Chance has
been utilized in our jurisdiction.
Article 2179 on contributory
negligence is not an exercise in chronology or physics but what is
important is the negligent act or omission of each party and the
character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for
the rest of the community. To say that Phoenix should be absolved
from liability would come close to wiping out the fundamental law that

a man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own
negligent act or omission.
-LCCD was not applied because the court thinks that it is not
applicable in our jurisdiction
NOTES:
The issue on the element of foreseeability: There is no general

concept of last clear chance. Rather, what is more important is
the nature, not the order of events. In last clear chance, timing
is of the essence.
In the case at hand, the truck drivers parking askew led to an
increased diligence for the driver of the car. court should
allocate risks (policy of consideration)
Historical function of last clear chance: mitigate harshness of

doctrine of contributory negligence
Nature of negligent act should determine liability, not

sequence of events
Does the last clear chance doctrine still stand? Yes, because it
was still used in later cases
o HOWEVER, Phoenix says that purpose behind
contributory negligence no longer exists therefore
A2179 which is irreconcilable with LCC
o But in subsequent cases, the SC stil used LCC
Phoenix-1987, PBC-1997: appreciably later in time

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE v CA
- apply the last Clear Chance Doctrine when fault or negligence is
difficult to attribute
FACTS: RMC had an account in PBC and Secretary of RMC was tasked
to deposit its money. However, it turns out that the Secretary would
leave blank the duplicate copy of the deposit slip where the banks
teller would validate it. Instead of writing the account number of the
company in the original copy retained by the bank, Secretary would
write the account number of husband. Thus, RMCs funds were now in
Secretarys husbands account. RMC discovered this after 7 yers and
then filed a case against PBC to return its money
RATIO: PBC was negligent when its employee, teller, validated a
blank duplicate copy of the deposit slip. PBC was also lackadaisical in
its selection and supervision on the teller since it never knew that
blank deposit slips were validated until this incident . Court also
applied Last Clear Chance Doctrine in saying that PBC was really
negligent.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
Aka supervening negligence or discovered peril
Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of

one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it
is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be

attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is
chargeable with the consequence thereof
The bank had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by
its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation
procedure.
Still, court said that RMC was also negligent in not
checking its monthly statements of account. Applied 2179 of CC on
contributory negligence. 60-40 ratio! 40% of the damages shall be
borne by RMC; 60% by PBC
-applied LCCD in knowing whether PBC was negligent
NOTES:
Elements: 1) 2 parties negligent, 2) appreciable time bet. 2

negligent acts and it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence caused injury
Problem: overlaps with doctrine of concurrent negligence

CASIS: this is a queer case
o SC first established the existence of a Proximate Cuase
the went on to establish LCC
o The court then went on into contributory negligence
(inconsistent)
A. GLAN PEOPLES LUMBER & HARDWARE V IAC
- may be used as basis against the ruling made on Last Clear Chance
Doctrine in the case of Phoenix
FACTS
jeep and cargo truck collided
jeepney driver came from a beach party
jeep was zigzagging
cargo truck was staying on his lane because the line in the road
was wrongly painted
case filed by heirs of the driver of the jeep who died as a result of
the collision
RATIO:
- The truck driver was not negligent and so cannot be held liable.
Furthermore, the doctrine of Last Clear Chance also cannot apply
because there is no negligence of the other party
- Even assuming that the truck driver was negligent, the doctrine of
Last Clear Chance would still absolve him from any actionable
responsibility for the accident because both drivers had full view of
each others vehicle.
The truck stopped 30 m away from the jeep and so by this time, the
jeep should have stopped or swerved
Jeep driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident

It was the jeeps driver who had the duty to seize the opportunity of
avoidance and not merely rely on a supposed right to expect that the
truck would swerve and leave him a clear path
- The doctrine of Last Clear Chance provides a valid and complete
defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied
in the 1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, which involved a similar state of
facts
- Thus, this ruling would clearly apply to exonerate truck driver
- did not apply the doctrine of last clear chance because the other
party was not negligent
NOTES:
How did the case of Glan Peoples Lumber affect the

case of Phoeix? In the case of Glan, last clear chance
was deemed to be a valid defense.
B. PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS INC v BAESA

- awareness and opportunity
FACTS:
Passenger jeepney and Pantranco bus collided when Pantranco bus

encroached on the jeepneys lane
Heirs of passengers in jeepney who died filed this case against

Pantranco
Pantranco wants the court to apply the doctrine of Last Clear

Chance against the jeepney driver saying that the jeepney driver had
the last clear chance in avoiding the collision.
RATIO:
- Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose
of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense
to defeat claim for damages
- Thus, Pantranco raises the doctrine in order to escape liability
- However, the court said that the doctrine of last clear chance cannot
be applied in this case!
- For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the
person who allegedlty had the last opportunity to avert the accident
was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of
due care, have been aware of it
In this case, jeepney driver did not know of the impending

danger because he must have assumed that the bus driver will
return to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from
the opposite direction
- Court said that the doctrine can never apply where the party charged
is required to act instantaneously and if the injury cannot be avoided
by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should
have been discovered
In this case, Pantranco bus was speeding and at the speed

of the approaching bus prevented jeepney driver from swerving to
avoid collision
Jeepney driver had NO opportunity to avoid it

- Sole and proximate cause of the accident: Pantrancos driver in
encroaching into the lane of the incoming jeepney and in failing to
return the bus to its own lane immediately upon seeing the jeepney
coming from the opposite direction
- did not apply LCC because there was no opportunity to avoid
the accident and the jeepney driver was not aware of the
peril.
NOTES:
Do not apply last clear chance under the emergency rule
Important: memorize emergency rule

CASIS: SC declared that the jeepney had a right to assume
that the bus will veer away
o this is contrary to other rulings
o SC ruled on equity (family was traveling to celebrate
an anniversary)
-Last Clear
transactions
Chance
CANLAS v CA
Doctrine can [was]
apply
in
commercial
FACTS:
2 parcels of land owned by Canlas were sold to Manosca
Manosca issued 2 check that bounced
Manosca was then granted a loan by Asian Savings Bank with the 2
parcels of land as security
2 impostors used who introduced themselves as the spouses Canlas
mortgage was foreclosed
Canlas wrote to Asian Savings Bank regarding the mortgage of
Manosca of the 2 properties without their consent
Canlas filed this case for annulment of the deed of real estate
mortgage against ASB
RATIO:
ASB was negligent in not exerting more effort to verify the identity of
the sps Canlas
The Bank should have required additional proof of the true identity of
the impostor aside from their residence certificate
Applied the doctrine of Last Clear Chance which states that:
Where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one
is appreciable later in a point of time that that of the other, or
where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the

last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do
so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom
In this case, ASB had the last clear chance to prevent fraud, by
simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements of
banks to ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them
For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking
institutions, ASB has to bear the loss sued upon
-applied the LCCD
NOTES:
The Canlas sps. were negligent in giving their title to the

property to Maosca.
With regard to the special power of attorney: the SPA given to

Maosca was to mortgage so the presence of the Canlas sps.
was actually not a requirement.
Was there really negligence on the part of the bank even if

Manosca had an SPA and the land title?
In Canlas, the Court talked about 2 definitions-short and long:

take note of these
CONSOLIDATED BANK & TRUST CORPORATION v CA
- Last Clear Chance Doctrine is NOT applicable in culpa contractual
FACTS:
LC Diaz had a savings account with Solidbank.
After messenger of LC Diaz deposited amount, it took so long so he
had to leave the passbook
Turns out that the passbook was given to somebody else (not the
messenger or any employee of LC Diaz) and was able to withdraw
P300,000.00 from its account.
Thus, LC Diaz filed this case for the recovery of sum of money
against Solidbank
CA: found that Solidbank was negligent and it had the last clear
chance to avoid the injury if it had only called up LC Diaz to verify
the withdrawal
RATIO:
In this case, Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to
negligence or culpa contractual
The bank is under the obligation to treat the accounts of its
depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary
nature of their relationship. However, in this case, they failed to do
this.
Solidbank was supposed to return the passbook only to the depositor
or his authorized representative, but here, Solidbank through teller
gave it to someone else
Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook
only to the authorized representative of LC Diaz
Thus, Solidbank was negligent in not returning the passbook to
messenger of LC Diaz proximate cause

CA wrongly applied the doctrine of last clear chance
Last Clear Chance Doctrine is not applied in this case because
Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the
performance of contractual obligation to LC Diaz
This case of culpa contractual, where neither the contributory
negligence of plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss,
would exonerate the defendant from liability
Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff
merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but
does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract
LC Diaz guilty of contributory negligence in allowing withdrawal slip
signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an
impostor and so liability of Solidbank should be reduced.40-60
- LCCD not applied
NOTES:
Last clear chance is applied in order to establish proximate

cause. However in culpa contractual, what needs to be
established is the breach in contract not the presence of
proximate cause thus the last clear chance doctrine is not
applicable to culpa contractual.
Compared with PBC v CA last clear chance doctrine was

applied since they based their cause on culpa aquilana.
ENGADA v CA
FACTS
Iran driving a tamaraw jeepney
In the other lane was an isuzu pick-up that was speeding.
Right signal light was flashing but swerved to the left and
encroached on the lane of tamaraw jeepney
Tamaraw jeepney tried to avoid the Isuzu pick-up but Isuzu pick-ip
swerved to where tamaraw jeepney was going and so they collided
Information was then filed against the driver of the Isuzu pick-up
charging him with serious physical injuries and damage to property
through reckless imprudence
RATIO:
It was the Isuzu pick-up trucks negligence that was the proximate
cause of the collision
- Isuzu abandoned his lane and did not first see to it that the
opposite lane was free from on-coming traffic and was available for
safe passage.
- After seeing the tamaraw, Isuzu did not slow down
Iran, tamaraw driver, could not be faulted when he swerved to the
lane of Isuzu to the lane of Isuzu to avoid collision

Isuzu drivers acts had put tamaraw driver in an emergency situation
which forced him to act quickly
EMERGENCY RULE: an individual who suddenly finds himself in a
situation of danger and is required to act without much time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, it not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better
solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence
Defense of Isuzu: invoked Last Clear Chance Doctrine
SC: The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has
the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding the accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in
law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident
- However, no convincing evidence was adduced to support this
defense
- Furthermore, the doctrine cannot be applied because there was no
time or opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was no
clear chance to speak of
Thus, driver of Isuzu guilty!
did not apply LCCD because no clear chance
NOTES:
-
- Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied; instead

applied the emergency rule. Last Clear Chance
Doctrine was not applied because there was no clear
chance emergency situation.
- RULE: dont apply the emergency rule if your own
negligence brought about the emergency. In this case,
the Tamaraw driver could invoke the emergency rule
since he didnt create the emergency.
PNR v BRUNTY
FACTS:
Rhonda Brunty together with host, Juan Garcia was riding a

Mercedes Benz driven by Rodolfo L. Mercelita on the way to
Baguio. At a rate of 70 km/hr they collided with a train.
Mercelita died instantly, while Brunty was declared dead ten
minutes after arriving in the hospital. Garcia sustained serious
injuries. Ethel Brunty, Rhondas mother, thus instituted a case
against PNR, the railroad company
RATIO:
The last clear chance doctrine may only be applied when the
negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other,
or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable
with the loss.
In this case, the last clear chance doctrine is inapplicable

because PNR is the proximate cause of the accident. Railroad
companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable
degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at
railroad crossings. PNR was negligent when it failed to provide
the necessary safety device to ensure the safety of motorists
in crossing the railroad track
NOTES:
TEST to determine application of last clear chance: If proximate

cause is already established there is NO NEED to apply the LCC
doctrine.
LAPANDAY v ANGALA
FACTS:
A Datsun crewcab drien by Apolinio Deocampo and owned by

Lapanday Corporation (petitioner) collided with a Chevy pickup owned by Michael Raymond Angala (respondent) and driven
by Bernulfo Borres.
Angala instituted an action for damages alleging that his pickup was slowing down to about five to ten kph and was making
a left turn preparatory to turning south when it was bumped
from behind by the crewcab which was running at around 60 to
70 kph.
Deocampo on the other hand said they were both running at

40 kph when the pick-up was about 10 meters away when it
made a U-turn towards the left. He did not see any signal from
the pick-up. He tried to avoid the pick-up but he was unable to
avoid the collision and did not apply the brakes until after the
collision.
RATIO:
Both parties were found by the SC to be negligent thus last

clear chance doctrine was applied.
It was declared that
Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the collision since
he was driving the rear vehicle and had full control of the
situation as he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front
of him. He could have avoided the pick-up if he wasnt driving
very fast and if he applied the brakes at the right time
NOTES:
The facts are ambivalent enough that Angala could have been
declared as the party at fault. Proximate cause is where the
court exercises the greatest latitude. So if facts are similar to a
case that was already decided, cite the case!
SANGCO, (pp. 74-81)
The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
Also known as the doctrine of discovered peril, doctrine of

supervening negligence, humanitarian doctrine, doctrine of gross
negligence
The negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for
the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the
defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might
have
avoided
injurious
consequences
to
the
plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence.
A negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff or
even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing
himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or according to
some authorities, should have been aware of it in the reasonable
exercise of due care, had in fact an opportunity later than that of
the plaintiff to avoid an accident.
1. As a phase of proximate cause principle
The doctrine of last clear chance negatives an essential

element of the defense of contributory negligence by rendering
plaintiffs negligence a mere condition or remote cause of the
accident.
The failure to avoid injuring a person occupying a position of

peril may be a supervening cause.
2. Elements and conditions of doctrine
Facts required:
o
That the plaintiff was in a position of danger and by his
own negligence became unable to escape from such position
by the use of ordinary care, either because it became
physically impossible for him to do so or because he was
totally unaware of the danger.
o
The defendant knew that the plaintiff was in a position
of danger and further knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care
should have known that the plaintiff was unable to escape
therefrom
o
That thereafter the defendant had the last clear chance
to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary care but failed
to exercise such last clear chance and the accident occurred as
a proximate result of such failure
To state a cause of action, the pleader must disclose:

o
The exposed condition brought about by the
negligence of plaintiff or the injured party
o
The actual discovery by the defendant of the perilous
situation of the person or property injured in time to avert
injury
o
Defendants failure thereafter to exercise ordinary care
to avert the injury
3. Parties who invoke doctrine
Many courts take the view that the doctrine of last clear
chance is not available to defendant. LCC can only be invoked in
favor of the person injured, since it implies contributory negligence
on his part, and is, generally speaking, only operative in those
cases where, notwithstanding the injured persons want of care,
another person wantonly, or with knowledge of the perilous
situation of the person injured carelessly or recklessly injured him.
The doctrine embraces successive acts of negligence: primary
negligence on the part of the defendant then contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff which creates a situation of
inextricable peril to him and then becomes passive or static
followed by the subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing
to avoid injury to the plaintiff.
Although the defendant may not invoke the doctrine, it does
not preclude him from proving that the plaintiff had the last clear
opportunity to avert the injury complained of and thus establish
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which
proximately caused the accident and consequently bars plaintiffs
recovery.
Between the defendants, the doctrine cannot be extended into
the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them
should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his
discovery of the latters peril and it cannot be invoked as between
defendants concurrently negligent.
LCC applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.
Summary on Last Clear Chance

The Last Clear Chance Doctrine renders plaintiffs contributory
negligence as a mere condition
Invoked by the plaintiff
Cannot be invoked by joint tortfeasors
Case
Plaintiff
WON
applied the
LCCD
YES
Picart vs. Smith
Picart (one of the

parties
who
caused
the
collision)
Bustamante
Picart v Smith
Passengers
Picart (one of the
parties
who
caused
the
collision)
NO
Yes
Bustamante v CA
Passengers of the
No
Why?
Smith had a
clear
opportunity
to avoid the
accident
No
Smith
had
clear
opportunity
to avoid the
accident
No negligent

bus
Phoenix v IAC
Philippine Bank of
Commerce v CA
Glan v IAC
Pantranco v Baesa
Phoenix (one of
the parties who
caused
the
collision)
RMC (one of the
parties
who
caused
the
accident)
No
Heirs of the driver

of the jeep (one of
the parties who
caused
the
collision)
Heirs
of
the
passengers
of
jeepney
(no
contract)
No
Yes
No
Ong v Metropolitan
Parents of
deceased
the
No
Anuran v Buno
Heirs
of
the
passengers
of
jeep
(with
contract)
Canals (one of the
parties
who
caused
the
incident) for the
annulment of the
deed
No
Canlas v CA
Yes
plaintiff
because the
plaintiff in the
case are the
passengers of
the bus who
are asking for
damages
Doctrine was
not
carried
over to the
CC
Just to know
if PBC was
negligent but
damages
were divided
40-60
Truck driver
(other party
in
the
collision) was
not negligent
There was no
opportunity
to avoid the
accident and
driver
was
not aware of
the peril
Defendant
was
not
negligent
There
was
contractual
relation
Defendant
bank had the
last
clear
chance
to
prevent
the
fraud
Note:
there
was
no
contractual
relation
between
Canlas
and
Consolidated Bank
v CA
LC Diaz for the

recovery of the
sum of money
No
Engada v CA
Inured
party
(owner
of
the
Tamaraw)
No
PNR v BRUNTY
Brunty (mother of
passenger
who
died)
No
Lapanday (driver
of one of the cars
involved in the
accident)
Yes
LAPANDAY
ANGALA
the bank
Liability
of
bank
arose
from
culpa
contractual
and
so
doctrine
cannot
be
applied
There was no
clear chance
in
avoiding
the accident
because
it
was
an
emergency
situation
Last
clear
chance
was
inapplicable
because
PNRs
negligence
was already
established
as
the
proximate
cause
Last
clear
chance
was
applied
because both
parties were
found to be
negligent.
Decision was
based
on
circumstance
s of incident
NOTES:
According to Sangco, the last clear chance doctrine is a phase

of contributory negligence. It is considered in determining
proximate cause and should only apply when there is a time
sequence.
Other names: doctrine of discovered peril, doctrine of

supervening negligence, doctrine of gross negligence,
humanitarian doctrine.
Last clear chance doctrine considered to determine the

proximate cause.
Last clear chance doctrine should not apply when there is a
time sequence.
The elements of the doctrine of last clear chance:
a) the plaintiff is in danger
b) the defendant knew of plaintiffs state
c) the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident
Who may invoke? Solely for plaintiffs benefit
VI. PERSONS LIABLE

A. The Tortfeasor
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or
employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in
satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for
quasi-delict is solidary. (n)
NOTES:
There can be more than one tortfeasor and they are called
JOINT TORTFEASORS
Are you suppose to sue all of them? NO because you can get
relief from one of them.
Do they have to act in concert? NO, as long as they all
contributed to the act.
WORCESTER v OCAMPO
February 27, 1912
FACTS: Dean Worcester filed an action to recover damages resulting
from an alleged libelous publication against Martin Ocampo, Teodoro
M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, et al, as the
owners, directors, writers, editors and administrators of the daily
newspaper El Renacimiento (Spanish version) and Muling
Pagsilang (tagalong version). Worcester alleged that the defendants
have been maliciously persecuting and attacking him in the
newspapers for a long time and they published an editorial entitled
Birds of Prey with the malicious intent of injuring Worcester, both as
a private person and as a government official as the editorial obviously

referred to him.
Worcester alleged that he was likened to birds of prey in the
following manner: Such are the characteristics of the man who is at
the same time an eagle who surprises and devours, a vulture who
gorges himself on the dead and putrid meats, an owl who affects a
petulant omniscience and a vampire who silently sucks the blood of
the victim until he leaves it bloodless.
TC: In favor of Worcester; Defendants jointly and severally liable for
the P60k total damages.
ISSUE: WON the defendants individual properties can be made jointly
and severally liable for the damages under the civil and commercial
codes,
HELD: Yes. TC modified. Damages reduced, Santos absolved.
The present action is a tort.
Universal doctrine: each joint tortfeasor is not only individually
liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with
his tortfeasors.
If several persons commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has his
election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them
separately, because the TORT IS IN ITS NATURE A SEPARATE ACT OF EACH
INDIVIDUAL.
It is not necessary that cooperation should be a direct, corporal acte.g. assault and battery committed by various persons, under the
common law, they are all principals.
Under common law, he who aided or counseled, in any way, the
commission of a crime, was as much a principal as he who inflicted or
committed the actual tort.
General Rule: Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid
or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if
done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same
extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful
act themselves.
Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they
commit.
Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be
apportioned among them, except among themselves. They cannot

insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an
aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the full
amount.
A payment in full of the damage done by one tortfeasor satisfies any
claim which might exist against the others. The release of one of the
joint tortfeasors by agreement generally operates to discharge all.
This rule applies even if the owner of the vehicle was present
at the time of the accident, unless THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF THE DRIVER ARE
CONTINUED
FOR SUCH A LENGTH
OF TIME AS TO GIVE THE
OWNER
A REASONABLE
OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE AND TO DIRECT HIS DRIVER TO DESIST THEREFROM .
The court however may make findings as to which of the alleged joint
tortfeasors are liable and which are not, even if they are charged
jointly and severally.
When will the owner be liable?- An owner who sits in his vehicle,
and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the
performance of his negligent acts, after he had A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO
OBSERVE THEM AND TO DIRECT THAT THE DRIVER CEASE THEREFROM, BECOMES HIMSELF
RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH ACTS.
Art. 2184*. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable

with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by
the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the
next preceding two months.
When will the owner be NOT liable?-if the driver by a sudden act of
negligence, and without the owner having reasonable opportunity to
prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the
criminal law, the owner of the vehicle, present therein at the time the
act was committed, is not responsible, etiher civilly or criminally,
therefor.
*this was drafted with Chapman v. Underwood in mind.
The act complained of must be continued in the presence of

the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his drivers act his own.
NOTES:
Sir highlighted that Tort is in its nature a separate act of each

individual so no need to sue all of the tortfeasors!
The Case defines a joint totfeasor which is taken from the point
of view of the actor.
CHAPMAN v UNDERWOOD
March 28, 1914
FACTS: J.H. Chapman was trying to board a San Marcelino car
trough the rear platform when he was struck by Mr. James
Underwoords automobile, which was at that time driven by his
chauffer.
Underwoods driver was guilty of negligence because he was
passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side when he ran over
Chapman. Chapman, was not obliged for his own protection to observe
whether a car was coming upon him from where he was because
according to the law, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his
left should pass upon his side of the car.
TC: In favor of Underwood
ISSUE: WON Underwood is responsible for the negligence of his driver.
HELD: No. TC affirmed. The interval between unlawful act and the
accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge Underwood with
the negligence of the driver.
The driver does not fall within the list of persons in Art. 1903 (now
2180) for whose acts Underwood would be responsible.
RULE: Underwood is not liable for his drivers act even if he was inside
the car at the time of the accident (unless he let the negligence
continue for a long time without correcting it) because the driver is not
listed in 1903 (now 2180) as one of the persons whose acts Underwood
would be responsible for.
NOTES:
An owner is liable for a drivers negligence if he is able to see

the danger and was capable of preventing the driver so that
the accident could have been averted
Sir gave questions to ponder: what if you were riding a taxi?
What if the passenger was a minor? What if owner was
disabled? What if he was deaf, or mute, or blind? (HMM)
CAEDO v YU KHE THAI
December 18, 1968
FACTS: Marcial Caedo, with his family, was driving his Mercury car on
EDSA. On the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, driven
by Rafael Bernardo. They were both traveling at moderate speeds and
the headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the
Cadillac was a carretela. Bernardo testified that he saw the carretela
only when it was already only 8 meters away from him (This is the 1st
sign of negligence because the carretela was lighted-hence shouldve
given him sufficient warning). But Bernardo, instead of slowing down or
stopping, tried to overtake the carretela by veering to the left. The

cars right rear bumper caught the wheel of the carretela and collided
with the Mercury.
Caedo in the meantime, slowed down, and thought that the
Cadillac would wait behind the carretela. He tried to avoid the collision
at the last moment by going farther to the right but was unsuccessful.
TC: Bernardo and Thai jointly and severally liable for damages
ISSUE: WON Yu Khe Thai, as the owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily
liable with his driver.
HELD: No. TC modified. Thai not solidarily liable with Bernardo.
Art. 2184 applies: In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune.
It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been
found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least
twice within the next preceding two months.
Under Art. 2184, if the causative factor was the drivers
negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held
liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due
diligence. This rule is not new, although formulated as a law for the
first time in the new Civil Code. It was expressed in Chapman v.
Underwood.
Basis of masters liability in civil law: NOT respondeat superior
but paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately, the negligence of the
servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by
him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to
prevent injury or damage.
Bernardo was a pretty good driver and had no record. No negligence
for having employed him may be imputed to Thai. The only negligence
that can be imputed to Bernardo was when he tried to overtake the
carretela instead of stopping or waiting-and this cannot be imputed to
Thai because there were no signs for him to be in any special state of
alert. He could not have anticipated his drivers sudden decision to
pass the carretela. The time element was such that there was no
reasonable opportunity for Thai to assess the risks involved
and warn the driver accordingly.
Test of imputed negligence under 2184: -to a great degree,
necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and
inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers.
The law does not require that a person must possess a certain
measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanic of driving or in
the observance of traffic rules before they can own a motor vehicle.
Test of negligence within the meaning of 2184: -his omission to

do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in
order to avoid the accident.
RULE: negligence must be sought in the immediate setting and
circumstance of the accident, i.e. in his failure to detain the driver form
pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger
but also sufficient time to act upon it.
NOTES:
Art. 2184 is based on Chapman. Unless the owner

couldve prevented the negligence, or he was negligent
in selection and supervision, he cannot be held liable.
Art. 2184: owner can be held solidarily liable with the

driver only if the owner is IN the car.
Courts test: 1. senses of owner
2. circumstances
The standard set in this case is still REASONABLE
OPPORTUNITY.
Art. 2184 is based on Chapman. Unless the owner couldve
prevented the negligence, or he was negligent in selection and
supervision, he cannot be held liable.
Pater familias is the basis for the quasi-delict and NOT
respondeat superior (command responsibility). Difference
between respondeat superior vs. paterfamilias:
o Respondeat superior: acts under orders (1 negligent
the one who gave the orders)
o Paterfamilias: acts under guidance (2 negligent both
the owner and the driver)
Differentiated 2180 and 2184. IN 2180, an employer is guilty

for lack of supervision PRIOR to the occurrence of the incident.
In 2184, the employer is guilty at the time of the incident
There is no one standard of care for owners who are riding with
their drivers since there are different reasons why hired the
driver in the first place
VICARIOUS LIABILITY: found in Article 2180 (but use the term
tortfeasors instead of one
-a tortfeasor would be liable not only for his own acts or omissions but
also for those of persons for whom he is responsible
Take note of difference between NCC and FC:
under the NCC: the father, and in cases of his death or incapacity,
the mother, will be responsible for the damages caused by their
minor children who live in their company
under the FC: parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused

by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in
their company and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law.
Portions of 2180modified by FC
Does RA9344 affect the liability of parents and guardians? NO
Basis of liability of parents and minor children: PARENTAL
AUTHORITY
How does the FC affect 2180? Is the person below 21 still liable?
For those above 15 but below 18 who acted with discernment
basis to use is 2180
B. Vicarious Liability aka Imputed Negligence
NOTES:
In this section, a person is held liable for acts not his

own but because of the existence of a relationship.
A person Is not only liable for quasi-delicts he

committed but also when he has a relationship of
responsibility with the person who caused the quasidelict
There is no direct link between the injury and the

person vicariously liable
2180 is the primary law on vicarious liability. However,
the relationship enumerated in 2180 does not limit the
application of 2180. 2176 is what limits vicarious
liability. The question therefore arises as to what is
actually covered. Can a tort give a ground for vicarious
liability? (NO ANSWER )
Family Code
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special
parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under
their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution. (349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The
parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding

paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper
diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall
be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or
omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and
under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses
provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )
Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental
authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be
qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. (412a)
Revised Penal Code
Title Five-Civil Liability
Chapter One-Person Civilly Liable for Felonies
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The
exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5
and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced
subject to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability
for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person
under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of
age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those
having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it
appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under
his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be
insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own
property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance
with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons
for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in
proportion to the benefit which they may have received.

The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate
amount for which each one shall be liable.
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be

subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Sec. 20 of this Act.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even

approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government,
or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events,
whenever the damages have been caused with the consent of the
authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the
manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
A child above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case such child will be subjected to the appropriate proceedings
in accordance with this Act.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the

persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and
secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall
be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt
from execution.
Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers
and proprietors of establishments. In default of the persons
criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or
corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances
or some general or special police regulation shall have been
committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken
by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or
for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall
have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his
representative may have given them with respect to the care and
vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery
with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by
the innkeeper's employees.
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also
apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in
any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
RA 9344
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006
April 23, 2006
Sec. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal responsibility- A child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
The Exemption from criminal liability herein established does not

include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.
Civil Code
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided
in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered
in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
NOTES:
Basis: parental authority
Laws applicable
o Civil Code,2180
father or in case of death, mother of children

who live in their company
guardians, of children under their authority

o Family Code, 221
Parents and other persons of unemacipated

children who are living in their company and
under their parental authority
Age of emancipation: 18
No more emancipation by marriage
Are the parents still liable for if above 18 but below 21? Yes.
Legal basis: PD 603
1. Parents (see table after cases)
EXCONDE v CAPUNO
June 29, 1957
FACTS: Dante Capuno, 15 years old, a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School, was instructed by the city schools supervisor to
attend a parade in honor of Rizal in San Pablo City. From the school,
the students boarded a jeep, and when it started to run, Dante took
hold of the wheel, while the driver sat on his left side (remember that
the steering wheel is at the LEFT side). The jeep turned turtle and 2
passengers died.
Delfin Capuno, the father, was not with Dante at the time of the
accident, nor did he know that Dante was going to attend a parade. He
only found out after the accident when Dante told him about it.
Criminal case:
TC: Dante was convicted for Double homicide through reckless
imprudence.
CA: affirmed
Civil case: against Delfin and Dante Capuno (reserved by Sabina
Exconde, mother of one of the deceased):
TC: Convicted ONLY Dante to pay the damages.
CA: certified to SC
ISSUE: WON Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and
severally with his son for damages.
HELD: Yes. TC Modified. Delfin and Dante are jointly and severally
liable for the damages.
Art. 19031 applies: The obligation imposed by the next preceding
articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions, but
also for those persons for whom another is responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with
them.
Xxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
their custody.
1. School is NOT liable
Art. 1903 (now 2180) about teachers applies only to institutions of
arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution.
Balintawak Elementary School
is an academic institution, hence
neither the teacher nor the head can be held liable.
Even if Dante was on the jeep pursuant to the city school
supervisors instruction, neither the head of the school nor the city
schools supervisor could be held liable because Dante was not a
student of an institution of arts and trades.
2. Delfin, as the father IS liable. He failed to prove that he
exercised all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent the
damage.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, or the
mother as the case may be is a necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them. This parental authority imposes
12180 now: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
Xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

upon the parents the duty to support and instruct them in proportion to
their means and gives them the right to correct and punish them in
moderation.
How to avoid liability: prove that they exercised all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent the damage,
DISSENT: Reyes
He wants TC affirmed (relieving Delfin of liability): There is no sound
reason for limiting Art. 1903 to teachers of arts and trades and not to
academic institutions.
The phrase teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
does not qualify teachers but only heads of establishments.
If the basis of presumption of negligence in Art. 1903 is some culpa in
vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have
incurred in the exercise of their authority, hence, when the parent
places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the
teacher, and not the parent should be the one answerable for the torts
committed while under his custody.
Why? for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to
interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and
supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. If there
is no authority, there can be no responsibility.
Hence, Delfin should not be made liable for a tort that he was in no
way able to prevent, and which he had every right to assume the
school authorities would.
He rebutted the presumption of negligence under 1903 when
he proved that he entrusted custody of Dante to the school authorities.
RULES:
Majority:
Liability of teachers or directors are limited to institutions of arts and
trades.
Dissent:
1. Art. 1903 interpretation too limited. Teacher, master, or in the
absence of, school authorities should be liable for the negligence.
2. Once the parent entrusts custody to the school
authorities,
presumption is rebutted and burden of proof is shifted to claimant to
show actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him
liable.
NOTES: This case is cited as basis of liability arising from parental
authority.
SALEN AND SALBANERA v BALCE
April 27, 1960.
FACTS: Carlos Salen (single) died due to wounds caused by

Gumersindo Balce, 18, single and living with Jose Balce, his father.
Gumersindo was convicted of homicide and was sentenced to
imprisonment and to pay Carlos heirs indemnity. But Gumersindo was
insolvent, hence Severino Salen and Elena Salbanera (Salens), the
parents (and heirs) of Carlos, demanded from Jose to pay but he
refused. Hence the suit.
TC: dismissed. Sustained Joses theory that the civil liability of
Gumersindo arises from his criminal liability and therefore must be
determined under the RPC, and not under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code,
which only applies to obligations arising form QDs.
There is no law which holds the father either primarily or
subsidiarily liable for the civil liability incurred by the son who is a
minor of 18 years.
ISSUE: WON Jose Balce can be held SUBSIDIARILY liable to pay the
indemnity his son was sentenced to pay in the criminal case against
him (the son).
HELD: Yes. Jose Balce is ordered to pay the indemnity. TC reversed.
As a rule, the civil liability arising form a crime shall be
governed by the RPC. But since the RPC is silent as to the subsidiary
liability of parents for a minor over 15, who acts with discernment,
resort should be made to the general law which is the Civil Code. And
Art. 2180 is the law that applies.
To hold that Art. 2180 applies only to QDs will result in an absurdity
that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes, the father or
mother may be held subsidiarily liable, no liability would attach if the
damage is caused with criminal intent. The void that apparently exists
in the RPC is subserved by 2180 of the Civil Code as may be gleaned
from some recent SC decisions:
Exconde v. Capuno-where the father was held solidarily liable for
the crime his son committed.
Araneta v. Arreglado-(where Arreglado fired at Araneta because
he resented the remarks Araneta made about his leaving Ateneo and
enrolling in La Salle. The court convicted Arreglado but suspended his
sentence because he was only 14.) The court held the father, the
mother and the son to pay the Aranetas damages.
NOTES:
In this case, the liability of father was deemed to be

subsidiary. The subsidiary liability of the parent is
based on the New Civil Code, than on the Revised Pneal
Code due to the vacuum that the parent cant be
subsidiary liable in the RPC.

o
Under Art 101 of the RPC

HELD: Yes. Libis are primarily liable CA affirmed.
ELCANO v HILL
FACTS: Reginald Hill was a married minor living and getting
subsistence from his father, co-defendant Marvin. He killed Agapito
Elcano, son of petitioners, for which he was criminally prosecuted.
However, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Subsequently,
petitioners filed a civil action for recovery of damages against
defendants, which the latter countered by a motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: W/N there is a cause of action against Reginalds father, Marvin
HELD: Marvin Hill is vicariously liable. However, since Reginald has
come of age, as a matter of equity, the formers liability is now merely
subsidiary.
Under Art. 2180, the father and in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company. Applied in this case, Reginald, although
married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at
the time of the killing. The joint and solidary liability of parents with
their offending children is in view of the parental obligation to
supervise minor children in order to prevent damage to third persons
NOTES:
-
Ruling that father has become only subsidiary liable

since he has come of age was wrong since they based
his age at time of the decision and not at the time of
the offense.
LIBI v IAC
September 18, 1992
FACTS: Julie and Wendell were sweethearts for 2 years when Julie
broke it off due to Wendells sadistic and irresponsible nature. A month
after their break-up, Julie and Wendell died each from a single gunshot
wound traced to the gun licensed in the name of Cresencio Libi, the
father of Wendell. There were 2 versions of the story:
Libis: another man shot the 2
Gotiong: Wendell shot Julie and then committed suicide.
The Gotiongs (julies parents) fiuled for damages against the Livis
under Art. 2180.
TC: dismissed for insufficiency of evidence
IAC: Set aside TC and found the Libis subsidiarily liable.
ISSUE: WON Art. 2180 was correctly applied to hold the Libis liable.
The Libis were grossly negligent from preventing Wendell from having
access to the key to the safety deposit box where the gun was stored.
Diligence required is that of instruction and supervision of the kid.
BUT, liability is not subsidiary, it is PRIMARY
Rule on parents liability is correct but characterization of their nature
must be given a second look (coz SC held in some cases that the
liability of parents is subsidiary).
If the liability of the parents for crimes or QDs of their minor
children is subsidiary, then they can neither invoke nor be absolved of
civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damages.
But if the liability is direct and primary, the diligence would
constitute a valid and substantial defense.
Hence, the liability of parents for QDs of their minor kids as
contemplated in 2180 is PRIMARY and not subsidiary.
In fact, applying 2194 (solidary liability of join tortfeasors) the parent is
also solidarily liable with the child.
The liability of parents for felonies is likewise PRIMARY & not
subsidiary. Art. 101, RPC says so.
For both QDs and crimes, the parents primarily respond for such
damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both the
RPC and CC that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall
respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of the
insolvency of the parents. Arts. 21822, CC and 1013, RPC support this.
RULES:
2 Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with
his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)
3 Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.
xxx
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such
person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in
accordance with the civil law.

1. For civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the
legal authority or control or who live in the company of the
parents: PRIMARY
-Premised on Art. 101, RPC with respect to damages ex delicto
by kids 9 or under, or 9-15 but without discernment
-Premised on Art. 2180, CC for kids 9-15 with discernment, or
15-21 (now 18)
2. Liability effected against father or mother? BOTH PARENTS
AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER THE
MINOR.
Under 2180, the liability shall be effected against the father,
and in case of his death or incapacity the mother-which rule was
amplified by the Youth and Welfare Code.
BUT, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without
such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and
those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender.
3. For civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors:
same rules in accordance with 2180 and 2182, as so modified.
NOTES: This case cleared up the issue on whether the parents
liability is primary or subsidiary.
What is the basis of the doctrine that liability of parents is

primary and not solidary? Why?
o 2 legal bases: 101 RPC and 2182 CC
Why?-provisions provide for such defenseliability of parents

is primary
Why primary liability? 1. law provides a defense; 2. property of

minor only liable when parents are insolvent
Subsidiary liability is automatic and without any defense.
In parental liability arising from crime, when a minor acted with
discernment the parents are subsidiary liable, if the child acted
without discernment, the parents are primarily liable.
TAMARGO v CA
June 3, 1992
FACTS: Adelberto Bundoc, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an
air rifle, causing injuries which resulted in her death. Adelbertos
natural parents for damages. Adelberto was living with his natural
parents at the time of the accident but a petition for his adoption has
already been filed by the Rapisura spouses. This petition was granted
after the shooting of Jennifer.
The Tamargos filed:
criminal complaint for homicide through reckless imprudence

but Adelberto was acquitted and exempted from criminal
liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment.
civil complaint against the Bundocs, the natural parents of
Adelberto.
The Bundocs claimed that the Rapisuras should be held liable instead,
that they are indispensable parties because parental authority had
already shifter to them the moment the successful petition for
adoption was filed.
TC: dismissed the complaint. The Bundocs are not indispensable
parties to the action.
CA: dismissed petition. Tamargos lost their right to appeal.
ISSUE: Who are the indispensable parties? The Bundocs or the
Rapisuras?
HELD: The natural parents, the Bundocs, are the indispensable
parties. CA reversed and set aside, complaint reinstated and case
remanded.
When Adelberto shot Jennifer, parental authority was still lodged in the
Bundocs, his natural parents. Hence, they who had actual custody of
Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
Ratio:
The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on QD, under 2176
against him. On the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them.
The principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently
designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of imputed
negligence, where a person is not only liable for the torts committed
by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a
certain relationship and for whom he is responsible.
Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the
duties and responsibilities of parentstheir parental authoritywhich
includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.
The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained in
Cangco v. Manila Raildroad:
With respect to extra contractual obligations arising from
negligence, whether of act or omission, the legislature has elected to
limit such liability to cases in which the person upon whom such an
obligation is imposed is morally culpable, or on the contrary, for

reasons of public policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the
lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the
negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by
legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or
limited control over them.
The legislature which adopted our civil code elected to limit
extra contractual liabilitywith certain well-defined exceptionsto
cases in which moral culpabilityu can be directly imputed to the
persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having
failed to exercise due care in ones own acts, or in having failed to
exercise due care in the selection and control of ones own agents or
servants, or in the control of persons who, by reasons of their
status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the
person liable for their conduct.
Basis of civil liability imposed on parents for torts of their
minor kids living with them: PARENTAL AUTHORITY vested by the
civil code.
In other words, parental liability is anchored upon parental
authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the
discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. Parental
dereliction is only a PRESUMPTION which can be overturned under
2180 by proof of all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage.
The basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the
relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living
with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise
supervision and control.
Art 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code: responsibility for
child under parental authority
Art. 221, FC: child (tortfeasor) must be in the actual custody of
the parents sought to be held liable
Anent the retroactivity of parental authority to the time of
filing of the petition for adoption:
Retroactive effect may perhaps be given where such is essential to
permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the child.
Here, no presumption of parental dereliction on the Rapisuras could
have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at
the time the tort was committed.
RULE: Parents must have actual or physical custody over the minor to
be held liable.
NOTES: Only benefits retroact to the time of filing of the petition for
adoption, not parental authority
Parental Authority: Control and supervision over children.

Hence, no PA, no parental liability.
Case
Exconde vs.
Capuno
(BSP asked
by school
head to go to
the parade)
Salen and
Salbanera
vs. Balce
(son above
15 but below
18 killed 18
yr old)
Fuellas vs.
Cadano
(stole pencil
and had the
nerve to be
mad by
breaking
classmates
arm!)
Guitierrez
vs.
Guitierrez
(bus
collision,
family except
pa in the car
driven by
minor)
RodriguezLuna vs.
IAC
(go-cart vs.
Toyota)
Action
for
Civil
action for
damages
(father
and son
impleaded
)
Criminal
case with
civil
liability
arising
from it
Criminal
action vs.
Rico for
Serious
Physical
Injuries
Civil
action vs
Agapito
(the
father)
only
Civil
action vs.
Manuel
Guitierrez
(the
father)
only (+
bus driver
and
owner)
Civil
action vs.
pa and
son
Who held
liable
TC: only son
liable
SC: Pa and son
jointly and
severally liable
-not the school
because not a
school of arts
and trades
SC: Father
liable
subsidiarily
-child above 15,
below 18
Basis for liability
SC: Pa liable
A2176 an A2180 (not

based on RPC)
-even if son caused
injuries with deliberate
intent (and not merely
negligence)
-note: not subsidiary
liable as mentioned
under Libi vs. IAC
SC: The father,

bus driver and
owner jointly
and severally
liable
A2180, common law,

master and servant
(not paterfamilias)
ma not liable even if
present during time of
incident
SC: Pa made
primarily liable
for the injury
caused by son
(son already of
A2180, strict law

-dont apply Elcano v. Hill
where court allowed only
subsidiary liability
because it will not serve
A1903 (now 2180):

FATHER liable for acts of
MINOR SON
-civil liability is a
necessary consequence
of parental authority
they exercise over their
MINOR children
A101 RPC incomplete
so resort to A2180 of
NCC (apply Exclusio
Unus, Exclucio Ulterus)
MINOR son LIVING in
their company
Libi vs. IAC

(Suicide or
homicide?)
Tamargo
vs. CA
(adopted
child still
with parents
at time of
incident)
Civil
action vs.
parents
Criminal
complaint
Civil
complaint
vs. Natural
parents of
child
age, said to be
insolvent but in
Madrid!)
SC: Libis are
primarily and
directly liable
SC: Bundocs
(natural
parents) are
indispensable
parties
-the adopting
parents had no
actual custody
yet
ends of justice
Art 221, FC; Art 2180,
NCC; Art 101, RPC
Why primarily liable:
1. If liability of the
parents for crimes or
QDs of their minor
children is subsidiary,
then they can neither
invoke nor be absolved
of civil liability on the
defense that they acted
with the diligence of a
good father of a family to
prevent damages.
2. The liability of parents
for felonies is likewise
Primary and not
subsidiary under A101 of
RPC: minor only liable if
parents are insolvent
(A101 par3)
Art. 2176, parental
authority coupled with
presumed parental
dereliction in the
discharge of duties
accompanying such
authority, doctrine of
vicarious liability as
explained in CANGCO VS.
MANILA RAILROAD
*IMPORTANT: PARENTS
MUST HAVE ACTUAL OR
PHYSICAL CUSTODY OVER THE
MINOR TO BE HELD LIABLE
Elcano v
Hill
(married
child who
still lives
with
parents at
time of
incident
Civil
action for
damages
against
the father
SC: the father is

liable but only
subsidiarily
(wrong decision
though should
have been
vicariously
liable)
Art 2180 since the

child was stlll in his
company.
2. Guardians
Family Code
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the
following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the
child in the order indicated:
(1)The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 2144;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless
unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless
unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of
the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be
observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)
Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused

children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall
be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's
homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the
proper government agency. (314a)
NOTES:
What is a foundling? A baby deserted by unknown parents. (e.g. those
left at the doorstep)
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
their company.
4 Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the
preceding article, shall exercise the authority. (355a)

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody.
employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered
in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
3. Teachers and Heads of Institutions
Family Code
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special
parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under
their supervision, instruction or custody.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities

whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution. (349a)

Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The
parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
MERCADO v CA, et al
May 30, 1960
FACTS: Augusto, 9 years old, lent his pitogo to Benedicto who lent it
to Renato. When Augusto tried to retrieve his pitogo, Manuel Jr,
thinking it was Benedictos, interfered and told Augusto not to get it
from Renato as Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of
the pitogo. Augusto resented this remark and aggressively poushed
him. A fight ensued and Augusto wounded Manuel Jr. on the right
cheek with a piece of razor.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding

paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper
diligence required under the particular circumstances.

The doctor who testified did not declare the amount he collected as
fees and Manuel Jr. was not hospitalized.
TC: dismissed the complaint filed by Manuel Jr. and his father
CA: Ordered Ciriaco Mercado (the father) to pay for the medical
expenses and MD, but no MD for the parents.
2. even if this is a QD within the meaning of Art. - Art. 2219, par

26, the facts show that Augustos act was occasioned by the fact that
Manuel Jr. tired to intervene or interfere with Augustos attempt to
recover his pitogo. Hence, the proximate cause of Manuel Jrs injury
is his own fault or negligence for having interfered.
Hence, no MD coz the cases in Art. 2219 were not shown to exist.
ISSUE: WON the teacher or head of the school should be held

responsible (instead of the father) since the fight happened during
recess time in school (Lourdes Catholic School).
HELD: No. The pupils were not in the custody of the school.
Reversed as to MD but affirmed the award of medical expenses.
CA
This was answered in Exconde v. Capuno through Justice Bautista: we

find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law, teachers or
directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their
pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. But this
provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and
not to any academic educational institution.
Custody (memorize!): SO
LONG
AS
THEY
REMAIN
IN
THEIR
CUSTODY-
CONTEMPLATES A SITUATION WHERE THE PUPIL LIVES AND BOARDS WITH THE TEACHER,
SUCH THAT THE CONTROL DIRECTION AND INFLUENCE ON THE PUPIL SUPERSEDES THOSE OF
THE PARENTS.
In these circumstances the control or the influence over the

conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and
mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of
the pupil.
Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar. The pupils
go to school during school hours and go back home to their parents
after.
The situated contemplated in the last par. of art. 2180 (I think
he meant 2nd to the last par) does not apply, nor does par 25 which
makes the father or mother responsible for the damages
caused by their minor children.
Hence, the claim of Mercado that responsibility should pass to
the school, must be held to be without merit.
Anent the MD:
Only possible circumstance in which MD may be granted is if a felony
or QD has been committed.
1.
no criminal action for physical injuries has been presented
RULE:
1. exconde v. capuno doctrine7: academic institutions not included in
Art. 2180
2. exconde v. capuno doctrine: responsibility passes from parents to
teachers or heads of ONLY institutions of arts and trades
3. Lourdes is not liable because they dont retain custody
(custody=living with the teachers or heads) of their pupils.
4. Ciriaco Mercado is not responsible even under Art. 2180 par. 2probably because Manuel Jr. did not die nor was he incapacitated.
5. No moral damages because cases in Art. 2219 were not shown to
exist.
6. Augusto was only 9 and was not shown to act with discernment
7. Even if there was a QD on Augustos part, the proximate cause of
the injury was Manuel Jrs own act of interference.
DOCTRINE: what Art. 2180 means by custody
PALISOC v BRILLANTES
October 4, 1971
FACTS: Dominador Palisoc, 16 years old and Virgilio Daffon, of age,
were classmates at the Manila Technical Institute. During recess, while
working on a machine, Daffon made a remark that Palisoc was like a
foreman because he was merely watching them. Irked, Palisoc bitchslapped Daffon. In retaliation, Daffon gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on
the face, followed by fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc tried to retreat,
but Daffon followed him. They exchanged fist blows until Palsioc
stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward.
He fainted and never regained consciousness. The autopsy report said
he died of broken ribs and hemorrhage on the brain caused probably
by strong fist blows.
TC: Daffon liable for QD under 2176.
Absolved the following because 2180 is not applicable: It applied
Mercado v. CAs definition of custody
1. Brillantes-member of the board of directors of MTI
2. Valenton, president of MTI
6Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
5 The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
their company.
7 Although later cases say this is a mere obiter because the issue was won the father had civil liability

3. Quibulue, instructor of the class.
ISSUE: WON the other defendants (board member, president and
instructor) should be held solidarily liable with Daffon
HELD: Yes. TC Modified. Daffon, Valenton and Quibulue are solidarily
liable for damages.
Under 2180, the president and instructor are liable solidarily for
damages.
Brillantes is not liable because he is a mere member of the
board (he could have been liable if not for the incorporation of the
school, making a corporation the owner of the school and not him
anymore).
The school cannot be held liable as it was not impleaded as a
party defendant.
The TC based its decision on Mercado v. CA, which in turn was based
on a dictum in Exconde v. Capuno. The case here was instituted
directly against the defendants (as against the cited cases where the
father was the defendant). The parents here are not involved since
Daffon was already of age at the time of the incident. MTI is
unquestionably a non-academic school.
1. custody
The TC erred in absolving the defendants on the ground that they can
only be held liable if they lived and boarded with his teacher or the
other defendants-school officials.
The phrase so long as (the students) remain in their
custody means THE PROTECTIVE AND SUPERVISORY CUSTODY THAT THE SCHOOL AND ITS
HEADS AND TEACHERS EXERCISE OVER THE PUPILS AND STUDENTS FOR AS LONG AS THEY ARE AT
ATTENDANCE IN THE SCHOOL, INCLUDING RECESS TIME.
NOTHING
precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and

hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that
some students themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence
on their fellow students.
4. Mercado overturned. Reyes dissent rules!
Adheres to Reyes dissent in Exconde: If the basis of presumption of
negligence in Art. 1903 is some culpa in vigilando that the parents,
teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their
authority, hence, when the parent places the child under the effective
authority of the teacher, the teacher, and not the parent should be the
one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody.
Why? for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to
interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and
supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. If
there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.
Hence, the president and instructor must be held solidarily liable
unless they prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage-which they failed to do.
Dissent: Makalintal
Wants Mercado sustained. Its unfair to hold teachers and/or
administrative heads responsible for tortuous acts of their students
considering the high number of enrollment. It would demand
responsibility without the commensurate authority.
Moreover, since the responsibility stems from loco parentis, then it
follows that
1. custody= live in company (like for parents and guardians)
and
2. responsibility limited to minors only (like for parents and
guardians)
(MEMORIZE)
IN THE LAW REQUIRES THAT FOR SUCH LIABILITY TO ATTACH, THE PUPIL-
TORTFEASOR MUST LIVE AND BOARD IN THE SCHOOL.
2. Rationale of the liability

The rationale of the liability of school heads and teachers is that they
stand to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco
parentis, and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision
over the conduct of the child.
3. Governing Principle in law of torts
In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective
custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted
for that of the parents, and hence it becomes their obligation as well
as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the
students activities during the whole time that they are at attendance
in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary
Concurring: Reyes
Concurs with majority but dissents with the dissent. Makalintals
interpretation not in accord with the law.
1.
Only the guardians and parents are exempt once the child
reaches majority
2.
The authority and custodial supervision (of the teachers and
heads) over the pupil exists regardless of the pupils age.
RULE:
1. Mercado doctrine abandoned/overturned
2. Wants to overturn Exconde (to include academic institutions
in the scope of 2180) but has no chance because MTI is anonacademic institution.
3. Definition of custody= the protective and supervisory custody
that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils

and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time. (MEMORIZE)
AMADORA v CA
April 15, 1988
FACTS: Alfredo Amadora, 17 yrs old, was shot by his classmate
Pablito Daffon, 3 days before his high school graduation, while he was
at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recolectos either to finish
a Physics experiment or to submit a Physics report. Daffon was
convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. The Amadoras sued
for damages against the School (Colegio), the dean of boys and, the
physics teacher and Daffon.
TC: defendants are liable for damages
CA: All the defendants were absolved. Colegio is not a school of arts
and trades and Daffon was not in custody since the semester already
ended.
Reddendo Singula Singulis8

(5) if academic- teacher is liable for the pupils and students
(General Rule)
(6) if non-academic- head is liable for the apprentices
(Exception)
*But same vigilance is required!
Reason for disparity: historically the heads of arts and
trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of an
academic school.9
There is no substantial distinction between an academic and a nonacademic school insofar as torts committed by their students are
concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the
students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the
school he is teaching.
ISSUE: Interpretation of Art. 2180
2. Art. 2180 applies so long as the student is under the control

and custody and within the school premises, regardless of
whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended
(Duration of Responsibility)
HELD: Petition denied. None are liable.
(MEMORIZE
LONG
The SC summarized 3 cases which have been decided in connection

with 2180:
Exconde-school not liable because it is not a school of arts
and trades
-Reyes dissent-rule was imposed on teachers in
general and heads OF establishments of arts and trades.
Mercado-reiterated Exconde. School not liable because it is
not an establishment of arts and trades
-Defined custody as living and boarding with the
teacher
Palisoc- Set aside/abandoned the doctrines in Exconde and
Mercado.
-Defined custody to mean that the protective and
supervisory custody of the school and its heads and teachers over the
students are in force so long as they remain in school including recess
time.
-in a footnote, Tehankee (the ponente) said that he agreed
with Reyes in his Exconde dissent to include academic schools but had
no chance because the school involed is a non-academic one.
Amadora is the case!
1. Art. 2180 applies to both academic and non-academic
schools
AS
STANDARD):
IT
CAN
BE
CUSTODY
SHOWN
THAT
IS NOT CO-TERMINOUS WITH THE SEMESTER.

THE
STUDENT
IS
IN
THE
SCHOOL
PREMISES
AS
IN
PURSUANCE OF A LEGITIMATE STUDENT OBJECTIVE, IN THE EXERCISE OF A LEGITIMATE

STUDENT RIGHT, AND EVEN IN THE ENJOYMENT OF A LEGITIMATE STUDENT PRIVILEGE, THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SCHOOL AUTHORITIES OVER THE STUDENT CONTINUES.
Even if the student should be doing nothing more than

relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and
friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere in the
school, he is still within the custody and subject to the
discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Art.
2180.
Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control
but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline
instilled in him as a result of such influence.
3. Liability imposed not on the school itself
It should be noted that the liability imposed is supposed to fall
directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and
not on the school itself.
If at all, the school, whatever its nature may be held to answer for
the acts of its teachers and heads under the general principle of
respondeat superior, it may exculpate itself by proof of exercise of
8 Referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object or let each be put in its proper place, i.e. the words
should be taken distributively
9 This disparity no longer exist in view of the increase in enrollment. But thats a task for the legislature.

diligence of bonus paterfamilias.defense which is also available to
the teacher or the head.
4. Pupil not required to be a minor to hold teacher liable
Unlike the parent who will be liable only for his minor child, the
teacher is answerable for torts of his students regardless of the
students age.
Hence:
1. Alfredo Amadora was still in the schools custody when the
incident happened
2. rector, high school principal and dean of boys NOT liable because
none of them were the teacher-in charge (they only exercised a
general authority and not the direct control and influence exerted by
the teacher-in-charge)
Dean of boys not liable although he earlier confiscated a gun
because it was not shown that the gun he confiscated and the gun that
was used in the shooting were the same.
3. Physics teacher not liable because there was no showing that he
was negligent in his duties. His absence cannot be taken against him
as he was not required to report to school that day.
4. Colegio not liable because 2180 does not apply to school but only to
its teachers and heads.
CONCURRING & DISSENTING: Melencio-Herrera
-teacher in 2180 should not be limited to the teacher-in-charge
-the school may be held responsible under 2180 as the employer of
the teachers and heads
CONCURRING: Gutierrez, Jr.
-reiterates the need for an amendment due to the non-existent
disparity between teachers of academic schools and heads of arts and
trades
RULE: 1. Custody definition
2. application of 2180 to both academic and non-academic
schools
3. teachers is to pupils and students as heads is to apprentices
4. school not directly liable under 2180 par 7.
NOTES: dangerous definition of custody because it is so broad
(even if just walking around school enjoying its ambience and
atmosphere)
CLASS NOTE
facts: in Academic school, by student of the school, after sem

ends
A2180 applies to both ACADEMIC and NONACADEMIC schools
Academic: teacher-in-charge:: Institute of Arts and Trades:

Heads
Custody does not connote INFLUENCE exerted on the child and
the DISCIPLINE instilled in him as a result of such influence
pupil is not required to be a minor for the teacher to be liable!
(A2180 doesnt require minority)
Applicability to academic institutions WAS an issue prior to this
casesee Exconde
Despite the broadness of the definition of custody, NO ONE
was held liable in Amadora!
SALVOSA v. IAC
October 5, 1988
FACTS: Jimmy Abon, was a student of the BCF and an employee of
AFP (as an armorer for the BCF-ROTC unit) with work premises inside
the BCF. Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a commerce student of BCF with
an unlicensed gun from the ROTC armory, at the BCF parking lot at
around 8pm. He was convicted of Homicide. Napoleons heirs (Castros)
sued for damages impleading Abon, The ROTC Commandant, B.
Salvosa-president and chairman of BCF board, J. Salvosa-the EVP of
BCF, the dean and BCF.
TC: Solidary liability of Abon, B. Salvosa and BCF
Absolved other defendants
IAC: Affirmed but modified award
ISSUE: WON Salvosa and BCF can be held solidarily liable with Abon
for damages under 2180.
HELD: No. Abon was not in the custody of BCF at the time of the
incident. IAC Reversed in so far as it holds Salvosa and BCF solidarily
liable with Abon.
1. Rationale for liability
Reiterated Palisoc: The rationale of the liability of school heads and
teachers is that they stand to a certain extent, as to their pupils and
students, in loco parentis, and are called upon to exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.
2. Abon was not in the custody of BCF when he shot
Napoleon
DEFINITION
OF
CUSTODY (MEMORIZE!)-- THE
PROTECTIVE AND SUPERVISORY
CUSTODY THAT THE SCHOOL AND ITS HEADS AND TEACHERS EXERCISE OVER THE PUPILS
AND STUDENTS FOR AS LONG AS THEY ARE AT ATTENDANCE IN THE SCHOOL, INCLUDING
RECESS TIME.
Qualifying custody

OF
In line with Palisoc, RECESS IS A TEMPORARY ADJOURNMENT EMBRACED IN THE

AT ATTENDANCE IN THE SCHOOL. IT IS A SITUATION WHERE THE STUDENT STILL
CONCEPT
REMAINS
3. James was absolved due to his minority.

4. Villanueva was likewise absolved.
WITHIN THE CALL OF HIS MENTOR AND IS NOT PERMITTED TO LEAVE THE SCHOOL PREMISES OR THE
AREA WITHIN WHICH THE SCHOOL ACTIVITY IS CONDUCTED.
RECESS BY ITS NATURE DOES NOT

Plus, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
premises of a school without more does not constitute attending
school or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the
school, as contemplated in the law.
CA: Affirmed but reduced AD.
INCLUDE DISMISSAL.
Abon cannot be considered to have been in attendance in the

school, or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon. Plus, he was
supposed to be working when the incident happened.
RULE: Defines recess
Qualified Custody
NOTE: Salvosa mitigates the effects of Amadora-but this was not cited
in Salvosa.
School: ACAD + Institute of Arts and Trade
time: dismissal, where: in parking lot of school, against who:

student of University of Baguio
Memorize: recess and custody
Amadora: legitimate student objectiveVictim is own student
Salvosa: applied Palisoc, definition of custodyVictim is

student of another school
Ponente forgot Amadoradecided 6 months earlier. So to

reconcile both cases: If victim is a student of schoolAmadora;
If victim is NOT a student of school-Salvosa
ST. MARYS ACADEMY v CARPITANOS
February 6, 2002
FACTS: St. Marys Academy conducted an enrollment drive for the
incoming school year. This involved visitation of schools. Sherwin
Carpitanos, who was part of the campaigning group rode the jeep,
along with other HS students. The jeep was owned by Villanueva and
was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student. They were on
their way to an elementary school when the jeep turned turtle due to
James reckless driving. Sherwin sustained injuries which caused his
death. The Carpitanos sued St. Marys, James, the Daniels (parents of
James) and Villanueva.
ISSUE: WON St Marys is liable

HELD: No. CA reversed and set aside. Case remanded
determination of liability of defendants excluding St. Marys.
for
1. St. Marys is not liable

The special parental authority under 218, FC applies to:
the school, its administrators and teachers
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care
This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all
authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution.
Such authority and responsibility applies to field trips,
excursions, and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the
school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under 219, FC, if the person under custody is a minor, those
exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable
for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor under their supervision, instruction or custody.
But, for St. Marys to be held liable, there must be a finding that the
act or omission considered a s negligent was the proximate cause of
the injury caused because the negligence, must have a causal
connection to the accident.
a. The proximate cause of the accident
was not the
negligence nor the reckless driving of James, but the mechanical
defect of the jeep. The steering wheel guide was detached while the
jeep was running.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity
or institution. (349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
TC: 1. St. Marys is liable for damages under 218 & 21910, FC
2. The Daniels were held subsidiarily liable in the event of St. Marys
insolvency.
10 Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasidelicts. (n)

b. Theres no evidence that St. Marys allowed the minor James
to drive the jeep. It was the grandson of Villanueva, who had control
and possession of the jeep who allowed James to drive.
2. Parents are Primarily liable
Whether the accident was due to James negligence or the
mechanical failure, the parents must be held primarily liable.
St. Marys negligence was only a remote cause, and either the
Daniels negligence or the mechanical failure was the intervening
cause.
3. Villanueva, as the registered owner of the jeep is liable for
damages
Overwhelming evidence that the accident was due to the
detachment of the steering wheel guide.
NOTES: applied FC-this seems to imply strict liability but SC here
allowed defense of diligence.
school liable if Proximate Cause of the injury is their
negligence
special parental authority applies as long as the activity was

approved by an office of the school
Who liable
For damages
caused by
Liability
FC
A218: school, its
administrators and
teachers, or the individual,
entity or institution
engaged in child
have special parental
authority and responsibility
to all authorized activities
whether inside or
outside the premises of
the school, entity or
institution
Minor child while under
their supervision,
instruction or custody
A219: unemancipated
minor
Principally and solidarily
liable schools
Subsidiarily liable parents,
judicial guardians, persons
exercising substitute
parental authority
Important to note that:
NCC
A2180, par7: teachers or
heads of establishments
of arts and trades
*In St. Francis Case,
activity should be inside
school premises
Under the FC, no distinction is made WON

School is ACADEMIC or NONACADEMIC
Incident happened WITHIN OR OUTSIDE school premises.
2180 not limited to minors and liability of teacher is only when

academic and not arts and trades
Summary of cases:
1. Exconde: Primary liability of parent
2180 applies only to arts and trades
2. Salen: subsidiary liability of parent
3. Libi: Primary liability of parent-CLEARED UP ISSUE ON PRIMARY OR
SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY
4. Mercado: Custody=living and boarding with teacher or head
5. Palisoc: custody-protective and supervisory custody. Does not have
to live or board with teacher or head
Overturned Mercado. No chance to Overturn Exconde.
6. Amadora: 2180 applies to all schools. Overturned Exconde
-Academic school-teacher-pupil
-Arts & trades-head-apprentice
Broad definition of custody
7. Salvosa: defines recess; qualifies custody (mitigates amadoras
effects)
8. St. Marys; Who may be liable under special parental authority.
Their pupils and students

or apprentices, so long
as they remain in their
custody
Primarily and directly
4. Owners and Managers of Establishments

*Rationale of employers being liable: policy considerationallocating
risks
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. v PHIL-AMERICAN
FORWARDERS, INC
March 25, 1975
FACTS: Fernando Pineda, driver of a Philippine American Forwarders
freight truck hit a Philippine Rabbit Bus along a national highway. The
bus driver suffered injuries and the bus was unusable for 79 days
resulting in loss of income.
Balingit, as the manager of PAF and Pineda were sued based
on a QD. (Balingits defense was that he was not the employer of
Pineda)

TC: Dismissed complaint against Balingit as he is not the manger
contemplated under 2180.
ISSUE:
WON
Balingit
is
liable
under
2180.
(WON
employers/owners/managers of an establishment/enterprise
includes managers of corporations)
HELD: YES. The action is an action for damages for QD under Art 2176
and 2180. The Court has considered the liability of a registered owner
of a public service vehicle for damages arising from tortuous acts of
the driver as primary, direct and joint and several or solidary with the
driver (Art 2194)11. The employers only recourse is to recover what it
has paid from the employee who committed the fault or negligence
(Art 2181)12.
HELD: No.
1. Balingit is not the manager contemplated in 2180
The terms employers and
establishment or enterprise DOES
NOT INCLUDE THE MANAGER OF A CORPORATION .
THE
VERSION ) IS USED IN THE SENSE OF EMPLOYER
TERM MANAGER
WHICH
IS
NOT
(DEPENDIENTE)
(DIRECTOR
EQUAL
TO
IN
SPANISH
MANAGER
owners
OF
and
CORPORATION
WHO
managers
IS
ALSO
AN
of
an
EMPLOYEE
OF THE CORPORATION .
2. PAF is a corporation with a personality separate and distinct

from that of Balingit (this was not alleged in the complaint).
The argument that PAF is a mere business conduit of the Balingit
spouses implies the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction. Since this
was not raised in the lower court, it cannot be countenanced in this
appeal.
5. Employers
NOTES: JURIS TANTUM (REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION) WHY?-coz hard for victim to
prove that employer was not negligent (similar to res ipsa), hence
employer should prove diligences as a defense
WHY OWNER?-deeper prockets
PHILTRANCO v CA
June 1997
FACTS: A Philtranco bus, driven by Manhilig was being pushed and
jumpstarted along a perpendicular street. It started suddenly and ran
over Acuesta, a biker. The driver didnt stop, but was forced to by a
cop who saw the accident and boarded the bus.
Acuestas heirs sued Manhilig and Philtranco for QD. Philtranco argues
it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees, saying Manhilig had an excellent record and exercised the
diligence of a very cautious person.
ISSUE: WON Philtranco may be held liable for the act of Manhilig
NOTES:
Employers liable because of paterfamilias
Manager = employer (director) as found in intent of framers

in Spanish text.
5. Employers
LAMPESA v DE VERA
Feb 2008
FACTS: De Vera was a passenger in a jeep which halted in order to let
a truck pass by. However the truck suddenly started to slide back and
hit the jeepney. Upon the collision, De Vera lost his middle finger.
Lampesa, the employer of the truck driver, denied liability since before
hiring the driver he asked if he had a drivers license.
ISSUE: WON Lampesa as the employer is liable with his driver
HELD: YES. Once negligence on the part of the employee is
established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was
negligent in the selection and/or supervision of the said employee. To
rebut this presumption, the employer must allege and show that he
has practiced the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. In this case there
was no showing that Lampesa did his duties as a good father of a
family in employing Copsiyat. There was no showing that Lampesa
exercised supervision over Copsiyat after his selection. As an
employer, Lampesa was duty-bound to do more than just ascertain if
Copsiyat had a professional drivers license.
SPOUSES JAYME v APOSTOL
Nov 2009
FACTS: Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the
Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the
Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the
name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto
Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring
11 Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)
12 Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or
delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)

Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his Manila
flight.
The truck hit a minor, Marvin C Jayme, who was crossing the highway
who died. Complaint for damages was filed. Apostol and Simbulan (the
registered owner and possessor) claimed that Lozano took pick up
truck without consent. Mayor Miguel, Lozano ( passenger and driver),
and the Municipality of Korondal said that Marvins sudden sprint was
impossible to avoid. Miguel also said he wasnt in the car at the time.
ISSUES:
WON Miguel as an employer should be solidarily liable with the driver
Lozano?
WON Municipality of Korondal as employer is liable?
HELD/RULES:
To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees
under Art 2180, the following requisites must be established:
(1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or
through another; (2) That the service to be rendered in accordance
with orders which the employer has the authority to give at all times;
(3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by
reason of the functions entrusted to him
(4) injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee
was performing his functions
AN EM-ER relationship must first be established by plaintiff through the
ff: (1) the employer's power of selection; (2) payment of wages or
other remuneration; (3) the employer's right to control the method of
doing the work; and (4) the employer's right of suspension or dismissal
APPLICATION:
(1) NO, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano's employer nor the
vehicle's registered owner. There existed no causal
relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that
will make him accountable for Marvin's death. Mayor Miguel
was a mere passenger at the time of the accident. Drivers
duty is not one that may be delegated to others.
(2) YES, municipality is the employer but it cannot be sued.
Municipality of Korondal is the employer since an employeremployee relationship still exists even if the employee was
loaned by the employer to another person or entity because
control over the employee subsists
However, the municipality cannot be sued because it is an
agency of the State engaged in governmental functions and,
hence, immune from suit. A municipality may only be liable if it
can be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity.
NOTES:
the case may have been ruled differently if the mayor

was the owner and not just the passenger applying
Caedo v Yu Khe Thai
Also Sir raised the issue if the mayor can actually be
considered as the employer of the municipality.
TAN v JAM TRANSIT

Nov 2009
FACTS: Petitioner Tan owned a jitney being driven by Alexander
Ramirez. It was loaded with balut and salted eggs. Around 5 am, while
it was negotiationg a left turn, it collided with a JAM transit bus being
driven by Eddie Dimayuga. The jitney turned turtle along the shoulder
of the road and the cargo of eggs was destroyed. Ramirez and his
helper were injured and hospitalized.
ISSUE: WON JAM Transit is solidarily liable with driver Dimayuga
HELD: YES, Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or
injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum
that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its
employees. An employer must overcome the presumption, by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee
In this case, aside from the testimony of Dimayuga, JAM did not
present any other evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, in its
favor. Inevitably, the presumption of its negligence as Dimayugas
employer stands and it is, thus, solidarily liable for the damages
sustained by petitioner.
NOTES:
-
Unclear on whether it based liability under par 4 or 5 of

2180
EM-ER relationship must be proven by employee
SALUDAGA v FEU
April 2008
FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of
respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) when he was shot by
Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of the security guards on duty at the
school premises.
Saludaga filed a complaint for damages against FEU on the ground
that they breached their obligation to provide students with a safe and
secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning. FEU, in
turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy Development and
Management Corporation, the agency contracted by respondent FEU

to provide security services within its premises and Mariano D.
Imperial, Galaxy's President, to indemnify them for whatever would be
adjudged in favor of Saludaga
ISSUES:
(1) WON FEU is Liable under contractual obligation?
(2) WON FEU is liable as the employer of the guards?
(3) WON FEUs president is solidarily liable with FEU?
HELD:
(1) YES, liable under Art 1170. As held in PSBA v CA, there is a
contract between the school and student for the school to provide an
environment conducive to studying and for the student to abide by the
school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Applied in this case, it was proven that a contractual obligation existed
between Saludaga and FEU, Saludaga being a 2nd year law student.
He was shot by the security guard hired to maintain peace and secure
the premises, a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply
with its obligation to provide a safe and secure environment to its
students. FEU failed to show it exercised the required diligence of
ascertaining whether the security guards are actually capable of
providing the services they required and merely relied on the agency.
(2) NO, the security guard was employed by Galaxy. The instructions
issued by respondents' Security Consultant to Galaxy and its
security guards are requests commonly envisaged in the contract
for services entered into by a principal and a security agency. They
cannot be construed as the element of control as to treat
respondents as the employers of the security guard.
(3) NO, A corporate director may only be liable if: (1) he assents to a
patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when he is guilty of bad
faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is a
conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation, its
stockholders or other persons; (2) he consents to the issuance of
watered down stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, does not
forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection
thereto; (3) he agrees to hold himself personally and solidarily
liable with the corporation; or (4) he is made by a specific provision
of law personally answerable for his corporate action.
NOTES:
-
Galaxy cannot be liable under 2180 since lack of

diligence in supervision should be prior to the incident.
In this case, the evidence presented was after the
accident occurred
CASTILEX vVASQUEZ
FACTS: Abad, a production manager of Castilex, was driving his

company-issued vehicle after office hours. He took a short cut in the
rotunda and went against the flow of traffic. As a result, he hit
Vasquez, who had a students permit, and on a motorcycle. Abad
brought him to the hospital, but he died anyway. The criminal case did
not prosper for failure to prosecute. The civil case for damages was
filed by Vasquezs parents. TC and Ca ruled for Vasquezs.CA held the
liability of Castilex was vicarious not solidary contrary to TCs ruling.
ISSUE 1: WON CA erred in applying par 5 and not par 4 of Art 2180
HELD: NO. SC ruled that the 5th par merely says being engaged in a
business is not necessary for the
paragraph to apply. The Court made distinctions between the 2
paragraphs.
4th paragraph
Owners and managers
Covers negligent acts or employees
committed
either in the service of the
branches or on occasion of their
functions
5th paragraph
Employers, in general, WON
engaged in a business or industry
Encompasses negligent acts of
employees as long
as they were acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks
*par 5 is an expansion of par 4

ISSUE 2: WON Castilex has the burden of proving that Abad was not
working within the scope of his assigned tasks
HELD: NO. The plaintiffs have the burden. He who alleges must prove.
ISSUE 3: WON Abad was working within the scope of his assigned
tasks, making Castilex liable
HELD: NO. The fact that Abad was a manager and driving a companyissued vehicle is not sufficient to
charge Castilex with liability. He was working beyond office hours and
was coming from a place where he had snacks. He was carrying out
personal affairs. The Court cited principles in American Jurisprudence
even if the relationship is respondeat superior, not pater familias.
Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to and From
Meals
The employer is liable if the vehicle is used to reduce his time-off and
devote more time to the performance of his duties.
Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to and From Work
The employer is liable if he derives some special benefit such as more
time for the performance of duties or that such duties require the
employee to circulate in a general area for work. The latter is called
the special errand or roving commission rule.
Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

The employer is liable if he derives some incidental benefit. The
employer is not liable when the vehicle is used for a personal benefit
and returned to where it is normally kept.
Notes:
This seems to contradict with Valenzuela v CA. Sir says there is

no contradiction. The place where the employee is coming
from is material. Castilex is the more conservative application
while Valenzuela is more liberal but is beyond the scope of the
Code. These cases are decided based on the prevailing
practices on that time.
Whats the rule if we combine 2180 (4) and (5) as regards the
liability of employer for the acts or omissions of employees?
Requisites to hold the employer liable for torts under 2180:
1. ER-EE relationship
2. Employee must be acting within the scope of his
assigned task
FILAMER v IAC
FACTS: Funtecha is a part-time janitor and scholar of Filamer. Having
a drivers license, he requested Masa, driver and son of school
president, to let him drive them home where Funtecha also lives. Masa
yielded and on the way they hit a pedestrian, Kapunan, because
Funtecha swerved right to avoid a fast-moving truck. It appears that
Agustin Masa, school president, knew of the license.
ISSUE: WON Filamer is liable
HELD: YES. The clause within the scope of their by assigned
tasks for the purpose of raising the presumption of liability of an
employer includes any act done by the employee, in furtherance of the
interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the
time of the infliction of the injury. It is applicable even if the employee
derives some benefit from the act. In this case, Funtecha drove the
jeep not for his enjoyment but for the service of Filamer. The fact that
he was not the school driver is insignificant. Besides, Filamer did not
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family.
Presumptive liability of employer (when employee is driving a
company vehicle) is determined by answering
The question Does the servant at the time of the accident performing
any act in furtherance of his masters business?
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code,
provides guidelines on the exclusion of working scholars from the
employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor
provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is
concerned. It is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive
law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the distinction and so holds that
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil
suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular
accident against a working student of a school and against the school
itself. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to
disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code is misplaced.
Supervision includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations
for the guidance of its employees and the issuance of proper
instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with
whom the employer has relations through his employees.
NOTES:
To make the employer liable, you have to establish:

1. employee is negligence
2. ER-EE relationship exists
3. employee is carrying out an act within the scope of
his functions
Sir thinks this is a dangerous doctrine because even if the

activity is far removed from the business/institution, the
employer may be held liable if it is in furtherance of the latters
interests.
NPC v CA
FACTS: A dump truck driven by Ilumba and owned by NPC collided
with a Toyota Tamaraw, resulting in the death of 3 persons in the
Tamaraw and injuries to 17 passengers. PHESCO supplied Ilumba as a
driver to NPC. NPC and PHESCO are pointing fingers, each claiming
Ilumba is the employee of the other.
ISSUE: Who is the employer of Ilumba, and therefore, liable with him
HELD: NPC. PHESCO is a labor-only contractor because it does not
carry on an independent business and does not have substantial
capital. It is merely an agent of NPC. The Civil Code and NOT the Labor
Code applies to determine NPCs liability because the action here is
based on the recovery of damages as a result of a quasi-delict. The
Labor Code applies only to liability caused by non-compliance with
substantive labor standards on working conditions, etc. In this case,
the Labor Code is only applied to determine if an ER-EE relationship
exists.
NOTES:
In Filamer, Labor Code provisions do not apply even n the

determination of an employer-employee relationship. Sir says
there is a policy considerations. The Court tries to utilize
doctrine to support their cause.
VALENZUELA v CA
FACTS: Valenzuela had a flat tire and had to park her midnight blue
Mitsubishi lancer on the side of the road. While standing on the left

rear side of the car, watching someone changed her tire, she was
bumped by Li (allegedly drunk). The car of the latter was registered to
Alexander Commercial. She had lost her left leg (only some skin and
muscle connected to the rest of her body) and had to be fitted with a
prosthetic leg.
ISSUE: WON Alexander was liable
HELD: YES. The relationship between Li and Alexander is Pater
familias not Respondeat superior, in which the ultimate liability falls
upon the employer. In this case, the Court averred the privilege of
using a company car serves 2 purposes: 1) Image of success; and 2)
Practical and utilitarian reasons (to reach clients conveniently). Thus,
the use of the car principally serves the business, the private purposes
and the goodwill of the company and only incidentally the private
purposes of the employee who uses the car. Li, an Asst. Manager of the
company, uses the car to facilitate meetings with clients. At the time of
the accident, he came from a co-employees place. The presumption is
they came from a company function or discussed work-related
matters.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES v AGANA II

FACTS: PSI filed an MFR alleging that Ramos v CA was already
overturned; hence, the ruling in Agana I shall also be reversed.
ISSUE: WON the ruling shall be reversed
HELD: NO. Although the ruling in Ramos v CA was reversed, the
doctrine stayed. It was only found that the hospital in that case had no
control over the physician, amounting to the absence of an ER-EE
relationship. PSI argues that Dr. Ampils negligence is the proximate
cause and their corporate negligence was merely a remote cause.
However, the Court still held that PSI failed to supervise Dr. Ampil and
further failed to investigate.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES v AGANA III
FACTS: Other hospitals intervened due to the rulings adverse effect
to the financial viability of private hospitals. PSI also contends that
there is no ER-EE relationship as Dr. Ampil was merely a consultant
and an independent contractor.
NOTES:
not liable simply because of company car but because of bonus
pater familias standard in 2180 did not prove diligence and
under 2nd instance discussed in Castilex
juris tantum presumption (rebuttable) vs. juris et jure
(conclusive)
cf with Castilex: compare the place where Abad and Li came

from along with the nature of Lis job which required him to
have a car.
This case is more of a roving commission
ISSUE: WON PSI is liable
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES v AGANA I

FACTS: Two pieces of gauze were found inside Natividads body and
this badly infected her vaginal vault (made her secrete stool through
her vagina). Nurse announced to the surgeon that sponge count was
lacking 2 but Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad of the missing gauzes
and even told her that the pain was normal.
MERCURY DRUG v HUANG

FACTS: Stephen Huang was paralyzed due to the collision of his car
and Mercury Drugs 6 wheeler truck driven by del Rosario. Mercury
Drug presented testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure. The
Recruitment and Training Manager testified that applicants are
required to take a theoretical, actual and psychological exam.
ISSUE: WON Mercury Drug is liable under 2180
ISSUE: WON PSI is liable

HELD: YES. In Ramos v CA, it was held that hospitals exercise
significant control in hiring and firing and exercise real control over a
physicians conduct. Hence, an ER-EE relationship exists. Furthermore,
the court held that the hospital is liable for corporate negligence.
Corporate negligence happens because corporate entities are only
capable of acting thru individuals. PSIs failure to conduct an
investigation of the matter reported in the nota bene of the count
nurse makes them directly liable.
HELD: YES. The Court held that it was already declared at no ER-EE
relationship exists at the RTC and CA level and to this, Agana did not
appeal. Hence, said ruling is final. However, PSI is held liable for
corporate negligence and not under 2180. Yet, the Court also said that
this case is pro hac vice or on a case to case basis. Consequently,
the ruling in this case cannot be applied to other cases. Still in the end,
the Court (making things worse), declared that PSI is solidarily liable
with Dr. Ampil. This declaration of liability has an unknown basis
because 2180, which provides for solidary liability, not longer applies.
HELD: YES. The Court found that del Rosario took an exam for delivery
man, not as truck driver. Furthermore, he used a Galant for the test
and not a truck. There were also no tests on motor skills, etc, and no
NBI and police clearances asked for. Mercury Drug also did not provide
for a backup driver for long trips. Also, at the time of the collision, del
Rosario had no license but Mercury Drug neither did suspended nor
reprimanded him for this.
NOTES:
General Rule in Hiring
1. Look for license

2. Look at experiences and qualifications
3. Look into the aptness
General Rule in Supervision
1. Come up with rules, guidelines and policies
2. Enforce said rules, guidelines and policies
6. State
-not liable for acts of its officers, agents and employees (unless special
agent; and except when state acts as a juridical person capable of
acquiring rights and contracting obligations)
MERRIT v GOVERNMENT
FACTS: Plaintiff Merritt suffered severe injuries as his motorcycle
collided with a PGH ambulance due to the
negligence of the latters vehicles driver. The Government passed an
Act authorizing Merritt to sue
the Government.
ISSUE: WON the State is liable for damages
HELD: NO. Though the State waived its immunity from suit, it did not
concede liability to Merritt. The State is not liable for torts, except
when it acts through a special agent. In this case, the driver is not a
special agent within the contemplation of the law. Although the
accident was caused by a government employee, the State did not
undertake to guarantee to third persons the acts of all its employees
for that would subject the State to countless suits, which is subversive
to public interest. The State is not responsible for the damages
suffered by private individuals in consequence of the acts performed
by its employees pertaining to their office because neither fault nor
negligence can be presumed on the part of the State in the
organization of branches of public service and appointment of its
agents.
MEMORIZE:
Short version: A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if
he is a special official.
Long version: A special agent is one duly empowered by a definite
order or commission to perform some act or charged with some
definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim
is based o n acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged
with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the
proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility.
NOTES:
In this case the chauffeur still was acting within his duty as a
driver when he hit Merritt
There must be another law to hold the state liable and in this
case, it is 1903 (2180)
ROSETE v AUDITOR GENERAL

FACTS: Employees of the Emergency Control Administration had
gasoline stored in their warehouse. Such storage was contrary to a
Manila ordinance. Frayno negligently lit a cigarette 5 meters from a
gas drum. Rosetes building were damaged.
ISSUE: WON the Government should pay damages
HELD: NO. There is no showing that whatever negligence may be
imputed to the ECA or its officers was not done by any special agent,
because the officers of the said institution did not act as special agents
within the contemplation of Art 1903 in storing gasoline in the
warehouse. In a case for damages, the responsibility of the State is
limited to that which it contracts through a special agent is one duly
empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or
charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and
not where the claim is based o n acts or omissions imputable to a
public official charged with some administrative or technical office who
can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the
law of civil responsibility.
RULE:
OFFICIALS: comprises all officials and employees of the government
who exercise duties of their respective public officers
SPECIAL AGENTS: all others who are acting by commission of the
government, whether individual or juridical bodies.
NOTES:
Perfecto dissent: all persons and entities acting by commission
of the Government, such as government enterprises and other
organs of government created for activities ordinarily of
ungovernmental nature, are special agents.
The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by

private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its
employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their
office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be
presumed on the part of the state in the organization of
branches of the public service and in the appointment of its
agents. A regular official is liable under Art 2176 for the
damage he causes.
MENDOZA v DE LEON
FACTS: This is an action for damages against the individual members
of the municipal council of Villasis, Pangasinan. The council revoked a
lease for an exclusive ferry privilege, which was awarded to Mendoza
and gave it to someone else.

ISSUE: WON the individual members of the council are liable
HELD: YES. There is no justifiable reason for revoking the lease
awarded to Mendoza. The municipality has 2 functions: governmental
and proprietary/corporate. The award of the lease was a proprietary
function. In such a case, the tortfeasors may be sued in capacities such
as those in private corporations. Respondeat superior applies.
FONTANILLA v MALIAMAN
FACTS: National Irrigation Administration was created for the purpose
of constructing, improving, rehabilitating
and administering all national irrigation systems of the Philippines.
NIAs driver caused the death of Fontanilla due to the fault and/or
negligence. His parents fled a suit for damages.
ISSUE: WON NIA is liable
HELD: YES. NIAs functions are basically proprietary and incidentally
governmental. RA 3601 and PD 552 provide that NIA is a body
corporate invested with a corporate personality and distinct from the
government. So, it may be sued. At the time, the driver was an agent.
Where a private individual is commissioned to do a special task, he
may be considered a special agent within the contemplation of the
provision.
NOTES:
The state agencies or subdivisions, in the pursuance of

proprietary functions, are akin to any other private corporation.
They may be sued for:
- torts committed by them (art 2176) or
- torts committed by their employees (art 2180).
As long as it is performing proprietary functions, it can be held

liable for the acts of its employees, both regular and special.
Feliciano: State refers to judicial persons meaning the

government of the Philippines; hence it excludes GOCCs with
original functions.
The dichotomy makes the law unstable!

VII. TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION
A. Violation of Civil and Political Rights
Art 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
1.Freedom of religion
2.Freedom of speech
3.Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication
4.Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention
5.Freedom of suffrage
6.The right against deprivation of property without due process of law
7.The right to just compensation when property is taken for public use
8.The right to equal protection of the laws
9.The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
10. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
11. The right to privacy of communication and correspondence
12. The right to become a member of associations and societies for
purposes not contrary to law
13. The right to take part in a peaceable assembly and petition the
government for redress of grievances
14. The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form
15. The right of the accused against excessive bail
16. The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses on is behalf;
17. Freedom form being compelled to be a witness against ones self,
or from being forced to confess his guilt, or from being induced by
a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except
when the person confessing becomes a State witness.
18. Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment,
unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a
statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional;
19. Freedom of access to the courts
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendants act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved
party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted) and
may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may
also be adjudicated. The responsibility herein set forth is not
demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a
violation of the Penal code or any other penal statute.
MHP GARMENTS v CA
FACTS: MHP was awarded the exclusive franchise to sell and
distribute official uniforms and supplies of the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines. They were informed that Cruz, Lugatiman and Gonzales
were selling BSP uniforms without authority. They sought the aid of the
Philippine Constabulary. Constabulary men and De Guzman,
representative of MHP, went to the stalls, seized the goods and caused
a commotion, all without warrant.
ISSUE: WON MHP and De Guzman may be held liable

HELD: YES. The Constitution protects people against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The evidence presented did not justify the
treatment of the respondents. MHP was indirectly involved. They
instigated the raid which was conducted with the active participation of
De Guzman. The proper method would have been to report the matter
and secure a warrant.
NOTES:
Innocence of persons being searched does not matter
Art 32 applies to direct and indirect participants

SILAHIS v SOLUTA
FACTS: Hotel employers of Silahis Intenational Hotel barged in the
unions office and allegedly found drugs. The hote employers pose the
defense that the constitutional protection against illegal searches and
seizures cannot be invoked against private individuals.
ISSUE: WON Silahis may be held liable
HELD: YES. The basis of the action is Article 32 of the Civil Code. It
may be invoked against a private individual who violated a
constitutional right of another. It is not even necessary that the
defendant under this article should have acted with malice or bad
faith, otherwise, it would defeat it main purpose, which is the effective
protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the
constitutional right of the plaintiff.
VINZONS-CHATO v FORTUNE I
FACTS: Vinzons-Chato as Commissioner of BIR declared Fortune
Tobacco brands as foreign brands subject to a higher tax rate. The
Courts found that her order falls short of the requirements for a valid
administrative issuance.
Fortune filed a complaint for damages
against Vinzons-Chato in her private capacity. She argues that what is
applicable to her is Art 38 of the Admin Code, where bad faith must be
proven.
ISSUE: WON Art 32 may be applied
HELD: YES. The rule is that a public officer may be validly sued in her
private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the
functions of the office where the said public officer: 1) acted with
malice, bad faith, or negligence (Art 38); or 2) where the public officer
violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff (Art 32). Fortune has a
valid cause of action under Art 32 for violation of right to property and
equal protection of the law. It is not necessary that the defendant
under Art 32 should have acted with malice or bad faith.
VINZONS-CHATO v FORTUNE II
FACTS: Vinzons-Chato filed for a motion to refer to the court en banc.
She alleged that her duty was directed to the public hence, she cannot
be liable under Art 32.
ISSUE: WON Vinzons-Chato shall be liable
HELD: NO. The Court distinguished the two duties of a public official:
1) its duty to the public; and 2) its duty to a private individual. The
Court held that public officers that are liable under Art 32 are only
those whose duty is directed to a private individual (in essence, only
notary publics). The Court was in effect saying that there must first be
a determination of the constitutionality of the issuance to determine if
there was a violation of the constitutional rights of Fortune.
NOTES:
Sir said this was a stupid ruling
Sir would take the case to not overturn the doctrine on bad
faith
SANGCO 228-233
Code Commission: The creation of an absolutely separate and

independent civil action for the violation of civil liberties is
essential to the effective maintenance of democracy, for these
reasons:
(1) In most case, the threat to freedom originates from
abuse of power by government officials and peace
officers
(2) The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt
often prevented the appropriate punishment
(3) Direct and open violations of the Penal code trampling
upon the freedoms named are not so frequent as those
subtle, clever and indirect ways which do not come
within the pale of penal law.
A violation of any of the individual rights and liberties

enumerated in Art. 32 may or may not constitute a criminal
offense
If act constitutes a criminal offense, the victim may opt

between a civil action under Art. 100 of the RPC and an
independent civil action under Art. 32.
If act is not a criminal offense, the civil action to enforce

liability for damages is governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code according to Art. 1162 thereof, and the Rules on Civil
Procedure.
The right to institute an independent civil action under Arts. 32,

33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is a substantive right
intended as an exception to and held as an amendment of the
general rule in Sec. 1 of Rule 107 of the 1940 Rules of Court
( Sec. 1 Rule 111 of the 1964 Revised rules of Court)
These independent actions should not be deemed instituted

with the criminal action and the right to institute them should
not be made subject to their prior reservation.
B. Defamation, Fraud and Physical Injuries
Art 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action

for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
MADEJA v CARO
FACTS: A criminal action was filed against Dr. Japzon for the death of
Madeja after an appendectomy. Pending the criminal case, his widow
filed a civil action for damages, alleging gross negligence, but this was
dismissed.
ISSUE: WON Judge Caro erred in dismissing the civil action
HELD: YES. Under the Rules of Court and Art 33, a separate civil action
may be instituted. The civil action is ex-delicto and aimed to allow the
offended party to enforce his rights in a private action. Physical injuries
is used in the generic sense, meaning bodily injury not the crime in the
RPC. To be liable under Art 33, the damage should arise from a crime.
This case also says that Corpus v Paje, saying reckess imprudence is
not included in Art 33, is not authoritative.
NOTES:
Madeja v Caro is a division case. It cannot overturn an en banc
decision.
Criminal negligence is covered by Art 33

ARAFILES v PHIL. JOURNALISTS
FACTS: Despuig filed a complaint against Arafiles for forcible
abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape. She
executed a sworn statement to that effect witnessed by Morales. The
latter interviewed the former and wrote an article about the incident.
Arafiles filed a complaint for damages against Morales, his editor and
the president of the publisher, saying his reputation was ruined by the
story.
ISSUE: WON the accused were liable for damages
HELD: NO. In actions for libel, the published work must be examined
and viewed as a whole. It depends on the scope, spirit and motive of
the piece. It must be read in the sense readers to whom it is addressed
would ordinarily understand it. Morales could have used better words,
but he did state that his story was based on the account of Despuig at
the station.
Notes:
According to Sir, the point of this case is that one may file a
criminal complaint and a civil one in one court and both could
proceed independently of each other.
Criminal case and civil case (for the same act) may proceed
independently of each other
1. Defamation
MVRS v ISLAMIC
FACTS: This is a class suit instituted by the respondent on behalf of all
Muslims who were allegedly defamed by an article of the petitioner
which said that Muslims in Mindanao do not eat pigs and all other
animals because these are sacred to them and are worshiped like
Gods.
ISSUE: WON MVRS may be held liable
HELD: NO.
1) THE BASIC CONCEPT OF DEFAMATION AND ITS ELEMENTS-Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of
injuring a persons character, fame or reputation through false and
malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to
diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or
to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff.
Words which are merely insulting or offensive are not actionable. There
must be a presence of allegations as to special damages suffered by
the plaintiff.
(2) SIZE OF THE GROUP SUBJECT OF THE DEFAMATIONWhere the
defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is
essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as
to apply to every individual in that group o class. Each reputation is
personal in character to every person. Together, the Muslims do not
have a single common reputation that will give them a common or
general interest in the subject matter of he controversy.
Puno, J.If the defamatory statements were directed at a small,
restricted group of persons, they applied to any member of the group,
and an individual member could maintain an action for defamation.
When the defamatory language was used toward a small group or
class, including every member, it has been held that the defamatory
language referred to each member so that each could maintain an
action. If the defamatory words are used broadly in respect of a large
class or group of persons, and there is nothing that points, or by proper
colloquium or innuendo can be made to apply, to a particular member
of the class or group, no member has a right of action for libel or
slander.
NOTES:
In defamation, the important criterion is the view of the public,

not the feelings of the offended party
cf Worcester - in that case, the defamatory statements are
directed to one person alone
2. Fraud

3. Physical Injuries
CAPUNO v PEPSI
FACTS: A Pepsi delivery truck driven by Elordi collided with a private
car driven by Capuno. Capuno and his passengers, Buan spouses, died.
Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence.
While the case was pending, the estate and heirs of the Buan spouses
filed a separate complaint for damages against Pepsi and Elordi. The
parties in the latter case compromised so the case was dismissed.
Later, Capuno heirs filed a similar complaint.
ISSUE: WON the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations
HELD: YES. The case for recovery under a quasi-delict must be
instituted within 4 years from the accrual of the right of action.
Contrary to the Capunos assertion, the prescriptive period was not
interrupted by the filing of the criminal action inasmuch as they never
waived nor reserved to file the civil action separately. Anent Art. 33,
The Court said that it included bodily injury resulting in death.
NOTES:
This case demonstrates a literal reading of A33
The action filed was based on A31 and A33
On A33: civil action for damages could have been commenced

by Capunos immediately upon death of Cipriano Capuno
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS v ARGOS
FACTS: Costa, the Spaniard managing director of International
Flavors, issued a personnel announcement which described
respondents as persona non grata and urged employees not to have
further dealings with them. The respondents sued Costa for libel and
impleaded International Flavors based on subsidiary liability under Art
33.
ISSUE: WON International Flavors may be sued under Art 33
HELD: NO. Art 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his
primary civil liability. It does not apply to an action against the
employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such liability
arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case.
HELD: YES. The acquittal was based on the ground that the reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence charged did not exist and the
collision was pure accident. Criminal negligence is no one of the crimes
mentioned in article 33, hence no separate civil action may be brought
on the basis of the same article.
NOTES:
Law punishes the negligent act
Action has also already prescribed
According to Sangco, reckless imprudence is included in A365
Rule: RI is not included in Art. 33 hence there is NO

independent civil action. Art. 100 will apply with respect to civil
liability
In Criminal negligence, act punished is the negligent/careless

act, not the result
BONITE v ZOSA
FACTS: Bonite, a caminero of the Bureau of Public Highways was hit
by a truck driven by Abamonga. Heirs filed a criminal complaint for
Homicide thru Recless Imprudence where Abamonga was subsequently
acquitted. The heirs then filed an action for recovery of damages but it
was dismissed because they did not reserve the right to file an
independent civil action.
ISSUE: WON the heirs may file a separate civil action
HELD: YES. The action was based on a quasi-delict. Art 29 does not
include any requirement that there must be an express reservation to
file a separate civil action.
CORPUS v PAJE
FACTS: Victory Liner bus driven by Paje collided with a jeep driven by
Marcia. Marcia died and 2 other were seriously injured. An information
for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence was filed against Paje. Heirs of Maria reserved the right to
file a civil action separately and later did.
ISSUE: WON the acquittal of Paje in the criminal case bars the civil
action
Case Title
(Year)
Facts
Issue(s)/Hel
d
Ratio
Doctrine

Jervoso v. People
(1990)
(1) Pamaus saw Marcelo Jervoso, in the

presence of his spouse and co-appellant
Norma Closa, stab victim Rogelio Jervoso,
with a pisao while the latter's back was
turned on the assailant.
Was the
award of
damages
against
Marcelo was
proper? NO
(2) Marcelo and Norma pleaded selfdefense which was not given credence
Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of

Court ordain that the offended
party may reserve his right to
institute a civil action separately
from the criminal action, provided
that no double recovery of
damages from the same act or
omission of the accused may not
be had.
"Physical injuries" as
contemplated in CC33
includes homicide committed
in the consummated,
attempted or frustrated
degrees.
In this case, Maria Dulay invokes

her right to recover damages from
Superguard via vicarious liability
(CC2180) for Torzuela's act of
shooting. Superguard's contention
that CC33 only applies to
intentionally committed injuries
cant prosper since Torzuela is not
charged with reckless imprudence
but homicide which falls under
physical injuries under CC33.
CC33 only applies to intentional

acts. The act complained of here
being ex-delicto, a separate action
based on CC33 lies.
Also: Thou shalt not recover

damages more than once for the
same act or omission complained
of.
(3) The courts found Marcelo guilty and

ordered him to pay P30,000 civil
indemnity to the heirs of Rogelio.
Dulay v. Court of
Appeals (1995)
(4) Marcelo avers that the award against

him was not proper since Rogelio's heirs
reserved their right to file a separate
action against him.
(1) Atty. Napoleon Dulay and Benigno
Torzuela went into a fight, until Torzuela
shot Dulay to death.
Will the
independent
civil action
against
Superguard
prosper? YES
(2) Maria Dulay, widow of Napoleon, filed

a case against Torzuela and his security
agency, Superguard.
VIII. HUMAN RELATIONS TORTS

Case Title
(Year)
Velayo v. Shell
(1956)
Facts
(1) Commercial Air Lines (CALI)
purchased supplies from the Shell Co. of
the P.I. ever since the former began
operations.
Issue(s)/Hel
d
(1) Did Shell
Philippines
betray the
trust of CALI?
YES
Ratio
Shell's transfer of its
aforementioned credit would have
been justified only if Mr. Fitzgerald
(of Shell) had declined to take
part in the Working Committee
Doctrine
CC19's provision, while it may
only be a mere declaration of
principle, such is implemeted by
CC21. A moral wrong or injury,
even if it does not constitute a

(2) Shell Philippines believed CALI was
insolvent and will be unable to pay what
the latter has bought from the former.
Globe Mackay v.
Court of Appeals
(1989)
(3) Creditors of CALI convened about the

financial status of CALI and how to settle
debts with said creditors with the
agreement that they will not go to court
to sue for collection.
(4) At the date of said meeting Shell
Philippines effected a telegraphic
transfer of its credit to its U.S.
counterpart, the Shell Union Co., which
sued for attachment of CALI's properties
in California.
(1) Tobias was accused of his boss, Globe
Mackay General Manager and EVP
Herbert Hendry of being privy to various
fictitious purchases and fraudulent
transactions in the company.
(2) Tobias was forced to take a leave,
and when he returned Hendry called him
a 'crook' and a 'swindler.'
(3) The police investigators cleared
Tobias of liability. Despite this, Globe
Mackay lodged 6 criminal complaints
against Tobias.
(4) Unemployed, Tobias sought
employment at RETELCO; Hendry, at his
own behest, wrote RETELCO a letter
stating that Tobias was dismissed by
Globe Mackay for dishonesty.
(2) By reason
of this
betrayal, is
Shell
Philippines
liable to
answer for
damages?
YES
and frankly and honestly informed

the other creditors present that he
had no authority to bind his
principal and that the latter was
to be left free to collect its credit
from CALI by whatever means his
principal deemed wise and were
available to it. Shell is liable for
damages under CC21 in relation
to CC19.
violation of a statute law, should

be compensated by damages.
Moral damages (CC2217) may be
recovered (CC2219). In CC20, the
liability for damages arises from a
willful or negligent act contrary to
law. In this article, the act is
contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy.
Was there an
abuse of
rights by
Hendry? YES
Globe Mackay claims that it did

not violate any provision of law
since it was merely exercising its
legal right to dismiss Tobias. This
does not, however, leave Tobias
with no relief. CC21 provides:
'Any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for
the damage.' This article, adopted
to remedy the "countless gaps
in the statutes, which leave so
many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they
have actually suffered
material and moral injury"
should "vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of
moral wrongs which it is
impossible for human foresight to
provide for specifically in the
statutes."
CC19 sets certain standards

which must be observed not
only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the
performance of one's duties:
(1) to act with justice, (2) to
give everyone his due and (3)
to observe honesty and good
faith. The law recognizes a
primordial limitation to all rights.

Albenson
Enterprises v.
Court of Appeals
(1993)
Albenson sued the wrong Eugenio Baltao

for violation of B.P. 22.
Was there an
abuse of
rights or
malicious
prosecution?
NEITHER
This was a case of mistaken

identity, for the records of the
case reveal that Albenson took
the effort to check with the SEC
and the DTI who the person they
were dealing with. Thus, no bad
faith can be imputed against
Albenson that will warrant a cause
of action under CC19-21. There is
also no malicious prosecution
here because Albenson has acted
with probable cause.
There is a common element

under CC19 and 21 and that
is, the act must be
intentional. However, CC20
does not distinguish: the act
may be done either "willfully",
or "negligently".
Amonoy v.
Gutierrez (2001)
(1) Amonoy was counsel in a case where

parcels of land were adjudicated to his
clients and eventually, to Angela
Gutierrez. On these lots was the
residence of Gutierrez. As security for the
payment of Amonoy's attorney's fees, a
chattel mortgage was executed over the
property. Upon foreclosure, Amonoy
began demolition of the house.
Is Amonoy
liable for
damages to
the
Gutierrezes?
YES
Amonoy did not heed the TRO

issued by the court against the
writ of demolition. He proceeded
nonetheless. The principle of
damnum absque injuria finds no
application in this case, there
being abuse of right by Amonoy.
Albeson v. Court of Appeals:

Concept of Abuse of Rights: CC19
is known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which may be
observed not only in the exercise
of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties.
These standards are the following:
to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; recognizes the
primordial limitation on all rights:
that in their exercise, the norms
of human conduct set forth in
CC19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held
responsible.
(2) Amonoy proceeded with demolition

even with a TRO from the lower court.
Eventually, the TRO was made
permanent by the Supreme Court.

University of the
East v. Jader
(2000)
Jader was enrolled at the U.E. College of

Law, took a Practice Court class and did
not know that he incurred a grade of 5.0
until after he was allowed to graduate
from law school.
Barons Marketing
v. Court of
Appeals (1998)
Barons dealt with Phelps Dodge for its

wire and cable needs. Barons had an
unpaid account with Phelps. Barons
requested to settle the amount through
payment by installments, but instead
Phelps filed a collection suit against
Barons. Now Barons contends that Phelps
abused its right to collect payment when
it ignored Barons' request to settle the
amounnt via installment payments.
Can an
educational
institution
may be held
liable for
damages for
misleading a
student into
believing that
the latter had
satisfied all
the
requirements
for
graduation
when such is
not the case?
YES
(1) Was there
an abuse of
rights here
by Phelps?
NO
U.E. is under a contractual

obligation to inform the student of
his status in the school. U.E.'s not
informing Jader of his status is
indicative of bad faith in the part
of U.E.
Absence of good faith must be

sufficiently established for a
successful prosecution by the
aggrieved party in a suit for
abuse of right under CC19.
Good faith connotes an honest
intention to abstain from taking
undue advantage of another, even
though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together
with the absence of all
information or belief of facts,
would render the transaction
unconscientious.
There was no abuse of rights

where there is no bad faith.
(2) Is Barons
liable to pay
interest and
attorney's
fees? YES
This being a breach of contract

and the contract containing a
penal clause in case of breach,
Barons is liable to pay interest
and attorney's fees on the finding
of breach.
To constitute abuse of rights,

there must be bad faith or intent
to prejudice the plaintiff. Citing
Tolentino: There is undoubtedly
an abuse of right when it is
exercised for the only purpose of
prejudicing or injuring another.
When the objective of the actor is
illegitimate, the illicit act cannot
be concealed under the guise of
exercising a right. xxx The
exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for
which it was established, and
must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no
intention to injure another.

Diaz v. Davao
Light & Power
Corp. (2007)
Diaz unilaterally installed a meter to

replace another one. There was a notice
of disconnection and eventually, the
connection was cut. There was a notice
of disconnection and eventually, the
connection was cut. There was a petition
for mandatory injunction to restore
connection. It was however settled by
way of a compromise agreement where
the parties agreed to reduce the DLPCs
claim and to waive the counterclaim and
to install the electric service. There was
no agreement to bar the institution of
other action.
Is Diaz
entitled to
damages
under CC19,
20, 21 and
2217? NO
There was no malice or bad faith.

Petitioner himself alleged in his
complaint that he unilaterally
installed a meter after it was
removed by DLPC. No less than
the Court, admonished petitioner
and reminded him that
connections of electrical service
and installations of electric meters
should always be upon mutual
contract of the parties, and that
payments for electrical
consumption should also be made
promptly whenever due. Based on
these established facts, petitioner
has not shown that the acts of
respondent were done with the
sole intent of prejudicing and
injuring him.
Wassmer v. Velez
(1964)
Velez and Wassmer decided to get

married. Many preparations were already
made. Two days before the wedding,
Velez went away, leaving a note that said
his mother disapproved of the wedding.
He promised to return soon, but he did
not.
Is Velez liable
for the cost
of wedding
preparations
by Wassmer?
YES
This is not a case of mere breach

of promise to marry. To formally
set a wedding and go through all
the above-described preparation
and publicity, only to walk out of it
when the matrimony is about to
be solemnized, is quite different.
This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in
accordance with CC21.
Tanjanco v.
Santos (1966)
(1) Tanjanco paid court to Santos. Both

were adults.
(2) Regularly until December 1959,
through his profession of love and
promises of marriage, Tanjanco
succeeded in having sex with Santos, as
a result of which Santos bore a child.
(3) Pregnant and embarrassed, Santos
resigned from her job. She sued Tanjanco
for damages, claiming that she had been
seduced.
Does CC21
apply here?
NO
There can be no seduction in this

case because there was
voluntariness and passion from
Santos. For a whole year from
1958 to 1959, Santos maintained
sexual relations with Tanjanco.
Such a fact negates seduction.
Good faith refers to the state of

the mind which is manifested by
the acts of the individual
concerned. In consists of the
intention to abstain from taking
an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of
another. Good faith is
presumed and he who alleges
bad faith has the duty to
prove the same. Bad faith, on
the other hand, does not simply
connote bad judgment to simple
negligence, dishonest purpose or
some moral obloquy and
conscious doing of a wrong, a
breach of known duty due to
some motives or interest or ill-will
that partakes of the nature of
fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or
spite and speaks not in response
to duty. It implies an intention to
do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
Malice is bad faith or bad motive.
While mere breach of contract
is not an actionable wrong,
CC21 provides that when the
person willfully causes loss or
injury contrary to good
custom, he shall compensate
the latter for damages. It is
the abuse of right which can
be a cause for moral and
material damages.
If a girl above 18 years old is

seduced, she can file an action
based on CC21, but since there is
no seduction here, there can be
no cause of action under the said
provision.

Baksh v. Court of
Appeals (1993)
Marilou Gonzales sues Gashem Shookat

Baksh, an Iranian medical student in
Pangasinan for various abuses
committed by the latter against her: She
was maltreated, injured and forced to
cohabit with him. All this happened after
he promised to marry her.
Does CC21
apply here?
YES
Baksh's "fraudulent and deceptive

protestations of love for and
promise to marry plaintiff that
made her surrender her virtue
and womanhood to him and to
live with him on the honest and
sincere belief that he would keep
said promise, and it was likewise
these fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed
marriage."
Pe v. Pe (1962)
Pe, a married man, visited Lolita Pe on

the pretext that he wanted her to teach
him to pray the rosary. They fell in love
and conducted clandestine trysts. When
the parents learned about this, they
prohibited defendant from going to their
house. The affair continued just the
same.
Can the
defendant be
held liable
under CC21?
YES
Que v.
Intermediate
Appellate Court
(1989)
(1) Nicolas ordered from Que canvas

strollers for P7,600.
Was Que
guilty of
malicious
prosecution?
NO
The defendant employed an

ingenious scheme to make Lolita
fall in love with him. The frequent
visits on the pretext of learning
the rosary was proof of this. From
this chain of events than that the
defendant not only deliberately,
but through a clever strategy,
succeeded in winning the
affection and love of Lolita to the
extent of having illicit relations
with her.
Que had probable cause to
institute the estafa case against
Nicolas: the dishonor of the
checks despite Que's protests,
Que filed the case because of his
own anxiety to protect his rights
(2) Nicolas gave Que 5 checks in

payment therefor.
Where a man's promise to marry

is in fact the proximate cause of
the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to
fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of
the giving of herself unto him in a
sexual congress, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise
was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual
act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to CC21 not
because of such promise to marry
but because of the fraud and
deceit behind it and the willful
injury to her honor and reputation
which followed thereafter.
It is essential, however, that
such injury should have been
committed in a manner
contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
The wrong he had caused her and
her family is indeed immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a
married man. Verily, he has
committed an injury to Lolitas
family in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs and public
policy as contemplated in CC21.
(But, why was the family even
allowed locus standi here when
they were not really the aggrieved
party?)
One cannot be held liable in
damages for maliciously
instituting a prosecution where
he acted with probable cause.
A suit will lie only in cases where
a legal prosecution has been

(3) Unable to encash said checks, Que
filed an estafa complaint against Nicolas.
Nicolas ordered to stop payment on the
checks because the articles delivered to
him were defective. Nicolas in return filed
an action for malicious prosecution
against Que.
due to Nicolas actions of simply

cutting short a mutually profitable
association.
Drilon v. Court of
Appeals (2001)
Adaza was suing petitioners for malicious

experimentation by filing against him a
charge of rebellion complexed with
murder and frustrated murder when
petitioners, according to Adaza, were
fully aware of the non-existence of such
crime in the statute books.
Did the RTC

judge err in
ruling that a
sufficient
cause of
action for
malicious
prosecution
exists? YES
The three elements of malicious

prosecution were absent in this
case.
Magbanua v.
Junsay (2007)
(1) Magbanua and Junsay were charged

with robbery.
Was the filing

of the
criminal
complaint
against
Magbanua
malicious
prosecution?
NO
There was probable cause present

in her case based from her own
confession. o Probable cause:
such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted. It is
merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Thus, a finding
of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether
there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction.
(2) RTC acquitted Magbanua for

insufficiency of evidence.
(3) Magbanua filed action for malicious

prosecution against Junsay, her
employer, Ibarra Lopez and members of
the police force
carried on without probable

cause. If the charge, although
false, was made with an honest
belief in its truth and justice, and
there were reasonable grounds on
Elements of malicious
prosecution:
(1) the fact of the prosecution and
the further fact that the defendant
was himself the prosecutor and
that the action finally terminated
with an acquittal;
(2) that in bringing the action, the
prosecutor acted without probable
cause;
(3) that the prosecutor was
actuated or impelled by legal
malice, that is by improper or
sinister motive.
The gravamen of malicious
prosecution is not the filing of a
complaint based on the wrong
provision of law, but the
deliberate initiation of an
action with the knowledge
that the charges were false
and groundless.

Grand Union
Supermarket v.
Espino (1979)
Jose L. Espino, civil engineer and

executive at Procter & Gamble went to
Grand Union's grocery where he was
accused of shoplifting when he
inadvertently carried on his way out a rat
file without paying for it first. In the
process he was humiliated in front of
other grocers and in the presence of his
family.
Are damages
properly
awarded
against
Grand Union?
YES
Carpio v.
Valmonte (2004)
Leonora Valmonte is a wedding

coordinator. At the wedding day of one of
her clients, she was accused by Soledad
Carpio of stealing her jewelry. Valmonte
was bodily searched, and had a security
detail following her around for the rest of
the night, causing Valmonte social
humiliation.
Are Carpio's
imputations
against
Valmonte
damna
absque
injuriaethat
would bar
Valmonte's
recovery for
damages?
NO
Quisaba v. Sta.
Ines-Melale
Veneer and
Plywood (1974)
(1) Quisaba filed a complaint against Sta.

Ines-Melale for illegal termination. The
complaint does not pray for
reinstatement or payment of backwages.
Is Quisaba's
complaint
based on an
employeremployee
relationship
which brings
his case
under the
coverage of
the
jurisdiction of
the NLRC?
(2) Quisaba was temporarily relieved as

internal auditor so that he could carry
out immediately the instructions thus
given, and he was warned that his failure
to comply would be considered a ground
for his dismissal.
The evidence sustains the court's

finding that the plaintiff had
absolutely no intention to steal
the file." The totality of the facts
and circumstances as found by
the Court of Appeals unerringly
points to the conclusion that
private respondent did not intend
to steal the file and that is act of
picking up the file from the open
shelf was not criminal nor done
with malice or criminal intent for
on the contrary, he took the item
with the intention of buying and
paying for it.
There was sufficient evidence on
record to show that Carpios act
was done with malice and in bad
faith. In the sphere of our law on
human relations, the victim of a
wrongful act or omission, whether
done willfully or negligently, is not
left without any remedy or
recourse to obtain relief for the
damage or injury he sustained.
Incorporated into our civil law are
not only principles of equity but
also universal moral precepts
which are designed to indicate
certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience and
which are meant to serve as
guides for human conduct.
It is against morals, good customs

and public policy to humiliate,
embarrass and degrade the
dignity of a person. Everyone
must respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other
persons (CC26). And one must act
with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good
faith (CC19). Also: Note here
the importance of social standing
in the award of damages.
Quisaba's complaint was

grounded not on his dismissal
per se as in fact he does not
ask for reinstatement or
backwages, but on the
manner of his dismissal and
the consequent effects of
such dismissal.
The "right" of the respondents to

dismiss Quisaba should not be
confused with the manner in
which the right was exercised and
the effects flowing therefrom. If
the dismissal was done antisocially or oppressively, as the
complaint alleges, then the
respondents violated
CC1701which prohibits acts of
oppression by either capital or
labor against the other, and
CC21, which makes a person
When a right is exercised in a

manner which discards these
norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is
committed for which the actor can
be held accountable. In other
words, a finding of bad faith
in one's actions negates the
defense of damnum absque
injuria.

(3) Sta. Ines moved to dismiss the
complaint on ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the Davao CFI, asserting
that the proper forum is the National
Labor Relations Commission. The NLRC
representative in Davao said, however,
that actions for damages arising from an
employer-employee relationship are
beyond the jurisdiction of the NLRC.
Garcia v.
Salvador (2007)
St. Louis Realty

Corp. v. Court of
Appeals (1984)
(1) Ranida D. Salvador started working as

a trainee in the Accounting Department
of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal, Inc.
(the Company). As a prerequisite for
regular employment, she underwent a
medical examination at the Community
Diagnostic Center (CDC).
(2) When Ranida submitted the test
result to Dr. Sto. Domingo, the Company
physician, the latter apprised her that the
findings indicated that she is suffering
from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. She was
consequently terminated from her job.
When Ranida informed her father,
Ramon, about her ailment, the latter
suffered a heart attack and was
hospitalized.
(3) Ranida underwent other tests and
indicated that she tested negative for
Hepatitis B.
(4) Ranida and her father now claim
damages against Garcia for the
erroneous test results.
(1) St. Louis Realty caused to be
published with the permission of Arcadio
(but without the permission of Dr. Aramil)
in an issue of the Sunday Times an
advertisement which misrepresented
that the house of Dr. Conrado Aramil
belonged to Arcadio.
(2) The advertisement showed the house
of Dr. Aramil and the Arcadio family.
NO
Is Garcia
liable for
damages?
YES
Ranida suffered injury as a direct

consequence of Garcias failure to
comply with the mandate of the
laws and rules aforequoted. She
was terminated from the service
for failing the physical
examination; suffered anxiety
because of the diagnosis; and was
compelled to undergo several
more tests. All these could have
been avoided had the proper
safeguards been scrupulously
followed in conducting the clinical
examination and releasing the
clinical report. The basis for the
award of damages is CC20.
liable for damages if he wilfully

causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public
policy, the sanction for which, by
way ofprovides:
moral damages,
is
CC20
Every person
who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same.
The foregoing provision
provides the legal basis for
the award of damages to a
party who suffers damage
whenever one commits an act
in violation of some legal
provision. This was incorporated
by the Code Commission to
provide relief to a person who
suffers damage because another
has violated some legal provision.
Is St. Louis
Realty liable
for damages?
YES
St. Louis Realty's employee was

grossly negligent in mixing up the
Aramil and Arcadio residences in a
widely circulated publication like
the Sunday Times. To suit its
purpose, it never made any
written apology and explanation
of the mix-up. It just contented
itself with a cavalier "rectification
"Prying into the privacy of

another's residence" and
"meddling with or disturbing the
private life or family relations of
another" and "similar acts",
"though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief" under
Gregorio v. Court
of Appeals (2009)
(3) When Dr. Aramil noticed the mistake

he wrote St. Louis telling them that the
advertisement was done without any
permission or authority from him. He also
said in the letter that the unauthorized
use of his house and the distortions
therein are not only transgressions of his
private property but also damaging to his
prestige in the medical profession. He
mentioned that people are making
remarks that he is merely renting or
leasing the house form the Arcadios.
Gregorio filed a complaint for damages
against Sansio and Datuin for filing a
criminal complaint for B.P. 22 against
her. Sansio and Datuin even desisted
from said complaint, realizing that
Gregorio was not even a signatory to the
dishonored checks subject of this case.
Gregorio now claims that incalculable
damage has been inflicted on the plaintiff
on account of the defendants wanton,
callous and reckless disregard of the
fundamental legal precept that "every
person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of
his neighbors and other persons" (CC26).
Is Gregorio's
complaint
based on
quasi-delict
or malicious
prosecution?
Quasi-delict
IX. STRICT LIABILITY

BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY DEFINITION:
Liability does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, but
that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make something
safe. It most often applies either to ultra hazardous activities or in
product liability cases. It is also known as absolute liability or
liability without fault.
NOTES:
Test: when the conditions provided in the law exist, you are
already liable
".
CC26.
Sansio and Datuin did not

exercise diligent efforts to
ascertain the true identity of
the person who delivered to
them insufficiently funded checks
as payment for the various
appliances purchased.
Sansio and Datuin never gave
Gregorio the opportunity to
controvert the charges against
her, because they stated an
incorrect address in the criminal
complaint. Gregorio claimed
damages for the embarrassment
and humiliation she suffered when
she was suddenly arrested at her
city residence in Quezon City
while visiting her family.
CC26 grants a cause of action for

damages, prevention, and other
relief in cases of breach, though
not necessarily constituting a
criminal offense, of the following
rights: (1) right to personal
dignity; (2) right to personal
security; (3) right to family
relations; (4) right to social
intercourse; (5) right to privacy;
and (6) right to peace of mind.
Gregorios rights to personal
dignity, personal security, privacy,
and peace of mind were infringed
by Sansio and Datuin when they
failed to exercise the requisite
diligence in determining the
identity of the person they should
rightfully accuse of tendering
insufficiently funded checks. This
fault was compounded when they
failed to ascertain the correct
address of petitioner, thus
depriving her of the opportunity to
controvert the charges, because
she was not given proper notice.
A. Possessor of animals
Art. 2183, NCC
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the
damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the
person who has suffered damage.
VESTIL v IAC

FACTS: Theness Uy was bitten by Andoy, the dog of Vestils father,
when the victim was playing with Vestils child in their compound.
Theness, who was only 3 yrs old, was brought to the hospital and was
later discharged, but after 9 days she was readmitted for exhibiting
signs of hydrophobia and vomiting of saliva. The next day she died of
broncho-pneumonia.
-Uys sued Vestil for being the possessor of Andoy. Vestils claimed that
they dont own the dog, that it was a tame animal, and that Theness
provoked the dog so it bit her.
FACTS:
-The Dingcongs rented a house and established Central Hotel. Kanaan,
et.al. rented the ground floor of house where they established the
American Bazaar. Echeverria rented room in the hotel.
-One night, Echevarria, carelessly left the faucet open when retiring to
bed, causing the water to run off and spill to the ground, wetting the
articles and merchandise of the Kanaan's "American Bazaar" in the
ground floor. Kanaans filed complaint for damages against Echevarria
and Dingcongs.
HELD: The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not
based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the
possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on
natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who
possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for
the damage which such animal may cause.
- While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which
was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she
and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in
question.
- It does not matter that the dog was tame and was merely provoked
by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious
animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for
the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only
three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted
for whatever she might have done to the animal.
HELD:
-Echevarria is liable for being the one who directly, by his negligence in
leaving open the faucet, caused the water to spill to the ground and
wet the articles and merchandise of the plaintiffs.
-Dingcong, being a co-tenant and manager of the hotel, with complete
possession of the house, must also be responsible for the damages
caused. He failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the
family to prevent these damages, despite his power and authority to
cause the repair of the pipes.
NOTES:
Ownership is immaterial. Remote control argument does not

lie. This is a strict liability case.
Does it matter if the dog is tamed or provoked? No. Law covers

even tamed or provoked animals as long as they produce
injury
Dog follows the house: accessory follows the principal (so

would a rat living in the house make the house owners liable if
the rat bites a guest and causes the latters death?)
Reaffirms the rule that children are incapable of negligence

B. Things thrown or falling from a building
Art. 2193 The head of a family that lives in a building or a part
thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling
from the same.
NOTES:
This provision applies regardless of how things fell from the

house.
DINGCONG v KANAAN
NOTES:
Is A2193,CC applicable in this case? Prof. Casis seems to

believe otherwise since A2193 speaks of the liability of a head
of family when a structure or similar object falls off the balcony
or second storey of his building. Dingcong is not the head of a
family but a lessee.
Can water be considered as a thing thrown or falling? In this

case, yes.
C. Death/Injuries in the course of employment
Art. 1711 Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to
pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers,
workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may
have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the
death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the
employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the
employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment
or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was
due to the employee's own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or
drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When
the employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the
compensation shall be equitably reduced.
NOTES:
Who is liable? Employers, owners of establishment
Who are they liable to? Laborers, employees

Under what conditions? Death or illness arising out of the
course of employment
Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his

employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him.
Art. 1712 If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow

worker, the latter and the employer shall be solidarily liable for
compensation. If a fellow worker's intentional malicious act is the only
cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable,
unless it should be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence
in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff's fellow worker.
NOTES:
Defenses available to an employer: a) notorious negligence, b)

voluntary act of the employee and c) drunkenness.
Case distinguishes arising out of and in the course of. The

first refers to the origin or cause of the accident. The latter
refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the
accident takes place.
It is not inconsistent with Castilex because Castilex is actually

not applicable for it refers to a different matter: Liability of the
employer to a third person, and not to the employee himself.
AFABLE v SINGER SEWING MACHINE

FACTS:
-One Sunday afternoon, Leopoldo Madlangbayan, a collector for the
Singer Sewing Machine Company, while riding his bicycle was run over
and killed by a truck. At the time of his death he was returning home
after making some collections.
-The widow and children of Madlangbayan brought an action to recover
from the defendant corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by
Act. No. 3812. The complaint was subsequently amended, and they
sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428.
RATIO:
-The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 of Act
No. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812 to "arising out of and in the
course of".
-The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident,
and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of"
refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident
takes place. By the use of these words it was not the intention of the
legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental
injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the
employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of
the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the
workman's employment of incidental to such employment, and
accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or
hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason
of such employment. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are
equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the
particular employment are excluded.
-As a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal
injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or
returning from his place of employment, because such an accident
does no arise out of and in the course of his employment.
-If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del
Monte to Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and forth, he
did so at his own risk, as the defendant company did not furnish him a
bicycle or require him to use one; and if he made collections on
ALARCON v. ALARCON
Facts:
School teacher hired two people to dig a well on his land. One died
while being lowered into the dug hole because of an obnoxious odor
and hot air that caused asphyxia.
Held:
Teacher is not liable because 1711 applies only to owners of
enterprises and other employers operating businesses or engaged in a
particular industry or trade which requires the contracting of laborers
services. 1711 excludes purely casual employees and for acts
performed not for the purposes of occupation or business of the
employer.
NOTES:
Why differentiate between 1711 and 2180 where latter

requires only the control test but the former requires control
and industry and business? Because purpose of 1711 is to limit
the application to those kinds of employer and contemplates
injuries particular to the business
D. Product liability
Art. 2187 Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet
articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by
any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual
relation exists between them and the consumers.
NOTES:
Who is liable? Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs,

drinks, toilet articles
Under what circumstances? Death or injuries caused by

noxious or harmful substances
Who are they liable to? Anyone who consumed goods (even if
goods were stolen)

(b) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault.
Consumer Act
Art. 97. Liability for the Defective Products. - Any Filipino or
foreign manufacturer, producer, and any importer, shall be liable for
redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by
defects resulting from design, manufacture, construction, assembly
and erection, formulas and handling and making up, presentation or
packing of their products, as well as for the insufficient or inadequate
information on the use and hazards thereof.
A product is defective when it does not offer the safety rightfully
expected of it, taking relevant circumstances into consideration,
including but not limited to:
(a) presentation of product;
(b) use and hazards reasonably expected of it;
(c) the time it was put into circulation.
A product is not considered defective because another better quality
product has been placed in the market.
The manufacturer, builder, producer or importer shall not be held liable
when it evidences:
(a) that it did not place the product on the market;
(b) that although it did place the product on the
such product has no defect;
(c) that the consumer or a third party is solely at
fault.
market
Art. 99. Liability for Defective Services. - The service supplier is

liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to
consumers by defects relating to the rendering of the services, as well
as for insufficient or inadequate information on the fruition and hazards
thereof.
The service is defective when it does not provide the safety the
consumer may rightfully expect of it, taking the relevant circumstances
into consideration, including but not limited to:
(a) the manner in which it is provided;
(b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be expected of it;
(c) the time when it was provided.
A service is not considered defective because of the use or introduction
of new techniques.
The supplier of the services shall not be held liable when it is proven:
(a) that there is no defect in the service rendered;
Art. 106. Prohibition in Contractual Stipulation.

The stipulation in a contract of a clause preventing, exonerating or
reducing the obligation to indemnify for damages effected, as provided
for in this and in the preceding Articles, is hereby prohibited, if there is
more than one person responsible for the cause of the damage, they
shall be jointly liable for the redress established in the pertinent
provisions of this Act. However, if the damage is caused by a
component or part incorporated in the product or service, its
manufacturer, builder or importer and the person who incorporated the
component or part are jointly liable.
Art. 107. Penalties.
Any person who shall violate any provision of this Chapter or its
implementing rules and regulations with respect to any consumer
product which is not food, cosmetic, or hazardous substance shall upon
conviction, be subject to a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) and by imprisonment of not more that one (1) year or both
upon the discretion of the court.
In case of judicial persons, the penalty shall be imposed upon its
president, manager or head. If the offender is an alien, he shall, after
payment of fine and service of sentence, be deported without further
deportation proceedings.
CHAPTER VI. Prohibited Acts and Penalties (RA3720 Food,

Drug, and Cosmetic Act)
Sec. 11.
The following acts and the causing thereof are hereby
prohibited:
(a) The manufacture, sale, offering for sale or transfer of any food,
drug, device or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.
(b) The adulteration or misbranding of any food, drug, device, or
cosmetic.
(c) The refusal to permit entry or inspection as authorized by Section
twenty-seven hereof or to allow samples to be collected.
(d)
The giving of a guaranty or undertaking referred to in Section
twelve (b) hereof which guaranty or undertaking is false, except by a
person who relied upon a guaranty or undertaking to the same effect
signed by, and containing the name and address of, the person
residing in the Philippines from whom he received in good faith the
food, drug, device, or cosmetic or the giving of a guaranty or
undertaking referred to in Section twelve (b) which guaranty or
undertaking is false.
(e)
Forging, counterfeiting, simulating, or falsely representing or
without proper authority using any mark, stamp, tag label, or other

identification device authorized or required by regulations promulgated
under the provisions of this Act.
( f )
The using by any person to his own advantage, or revealing,
other than to the Secretary or officers or employees of the Department
or to the courts when relevant in any judicial proceeding under this
Act, any information acquired under authority of Section nine, or
concerning any method or process which as a trade secret is entitled
to protection.
(g) The alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of
the whole or any part of the labeling of, or the doing of any other act
with respect to, a food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is done
while such article is held for sale (whether or not the first sale) and
results in such article being adulterated or misbranded.
(h) The use, on the labeling of any drug or in any advertising relating
to such drug, of any representation or suggestion that an application
with respect to such drug is effective under Section twenty-one hereof,
or that such drug complies with the provisions of such section.
(i) The use, in labeling, advertising or other sales promotion of any
reference to any report or analysis furnished in compliance with
Section twenty-six hereof.
NOTES:
Is a restaurant owner a seller or a processor?
Could the company stipulate limited liability? No. A106 of the

Consumer Act. If basis is not Consumer Act, you can use 2187
on strict liability which is a powerful provision except against
sellers (law on SALES will be the basis in this case)
Elements of 2187: 1) causal link 2) manufacturers, processors
What do you mean by similar goods?-Sangco-consumed by

humans. Question: What about those consumed by animals?
Do you apply strict liability even if defendant exercised due

diligence? Yes. Precisely why it is called strict liability
Can RES IPSA LOQUITUR apply? Only if the defect in the items
is of such nature and character that do not change.
COCA-COLA v CA
FACTS: Geronimo sold food and softdrinks in a school canteen. A
group of parents complained that fibrous materials were found in the
softdrink bottles bought by their children. Upon inspection by the
DOH, the bottles were found to be adulterated. The sales of Geronimo
drastically dropped and she was forced to close shop. She brought an
action for damages against Coca-cola and the trial court ruled that the
complaint was based on a contract, not quasi-delict and should have
been filed within 6 months from the delivery of the softdrinks.
Geronimo argues that her case is based on quasi-delict and should
prescribe in 4 years.
HELD: The Court sided with Geronimo. The vendees remedies against
a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects or
encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed
in A1567. The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract
upon proof of error or fraud in which case the ordinary rule on
obligations shall be applicable.
NOTES:
Requisites of 2187: 1) death or injury caused by noxious

substance and 2) by manufacturer or processor
What is similar goods? Anything intended to be consumed

by humans.
What if the person who consumed the goods did not buy them
but stole them? The manufacturer/processor may still be held
liable.
II SANGCO (p. 714-734)
Product Liability
1.
Governing law: Art. 2187, NCC
The elimination in this article of both fault or negligence and

contract as the basis of liability thereunder are the essence of
strict liability. The consumers cause of action does not depend
upon the validity of his contract with the person from whom he
acquires the product, and it is not affected by any disclaimer or
other agreement.
However, Art. 2187 does not preclude an action based on

negligence for the same act of using noxious or harmful substance
in the manufacture or processing of the foodstuff, drinks, toilet
articles, or similar goods which caused the death or injury
complained of, if the injured party opts to recover on that theory.
Neither does this article preclude an action for breach of contract
and warranty.
2. Requisites of liability under Art. 2187, Civil Code
(1)
Defendant is a manufacturer or processor of foodstuff, drinks,
toilet articles and similar goods;
(2)
He use noxious or harmful substances in the manufacture or
processing of the foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles consumed or used
by the plaintiff;
(3)
Plaintiffs death or injury was caused by the product so
consumed or used; and
(4)
The damages sustained and claimed by the plaintiff and the
amount thereof.
The burden of proof that the product was in a defective

condition at the time it left the hands of the manufacturer and
particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff.

3. Persons who may be held liable, and for what products
Manufacturers and processors who used noxious or

harmful substances may be held liable.
-sellers of the enumerated goods which turn out to be injuriously
defective CANNOT be held liable for the obvious reason that they have
nothing to do either with the defect or with the manufacture of such
product
Products: limited to foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and

similar goods
4. Proof that food product was defective or unwholesome
The one seeking to recover is under the duty of proving with

reasonable certainty that the food eaten was in fact deleterious.
Proof of a defect in the product may not be supplied by the

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, unless the product is one whose
character and content must necessarily have remained unchanged
since it left the manufacturers possession.
Expert testimony is generally necessary to prove the defect in

the product.
It must appear that the unwholesome or unsound quality of the

food product in question existed at the time the defendant sold it,
and did not come into existence thereafter.
5. Proof of causation
One seeking recovery has the burden of proof that the

resulting illness was caused by the deleterious food.
A manufacturers strict liability in tort should be defined in

terms of the safety of the product in normal and proper use. The
plaintiff must allege and prove that he was using the product in the
way it was intended to be used.
6. Who may recover
A purchasing and non-purchasing consumer or user of a

defective food product or toilet article is entitled to recover
damages for physical injuries caused thereby.
7. Compensable Damages
Expressly limited to death or injuries caused by any noxious

or harmful substance used by manufacturers and processors of
foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods.
Applicable only to personal injuries, which includes death, and

only damages arising therefrom. This precludes claims for purely
pecuniary or commercial losses in absence of personal injuries.
8. Unavoidably unsafe product
The seller of unavoidably unsafe products, with qualification

that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning
is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict
liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely
because he has undertaken to supply the public with apparently
reasonable risk.
Liability for negligence in food products.
To constitute negligence an act must be one from which a

reasonably careful person would foresee such an appreciable
risk of harm to others as to cause him to forego the act or to
do it in a more careful manner.
Whether recovery is sought under strict liability or on fault or

negligence, it would seem contributory negligence would
diminish recovery.
a. Duty of care of manufacturer or processor of food.
The duty owed to the consumer by the manufacturer of food products
intended for human consumption is commensurate with the danger
and the possible and probable result of a lack of care.
A high degree of care is required of the producer of foods (in the
production of such product, advertising, inspecting the ingredients and
warning the consumers of possible injury from consumption of a food).
b. Duty of care of restaurant operator
A restaurateur has no duty to serve perfect products. But the law of
negligence requires him to exercise a care proportionate to the serious
consequences that may follow from a want of care.
c. Duty of seller other than restaurant operator.
A vendor of provisions selected, sold, and delivered to the purchaser
for his immediate use is bound to know the peril that the provisions are
sound and wholesome and fit for immediate use, and if they turn out to
be unsound and not wholesome, and the purchaser is injured thereby,
the vendor is liable to him.
d. Duty of warning; inspecting; testing.
A manufacturer or seller of a product which, to his actual or
constructive knowledge, involves danger to users has a duty to give
warning of such danger. As a matter of elementary logic, no duty to
warn arises with respect to a product which is not in fact dangerous.
The vendor of food should indemnify his vendee against latent defects
contained in the product which the vendee, by inspection or taste,
could not have discovered himself.
The test of commodities required is no more than that commonly or
usually practised by careful dealers under the same conditions and
circumstances, which is at least as high a duty of care as the consumer
expects or has the right to expect of his groceryman or food dealer.

NOTE:
The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condition
and subsequent mishandling or other causes makes it harmful by the
time it is consumed.
Important: Requisites of 2187 in Sangco
If it falls under A2187, can you still sue for breach of contract?
Sangco says, yes.
E. Interference with contractual relations
Art. 1314 Any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.
GILCHRIST v CUDDY
FACTS: Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar. Gilchrist was the
owner of a theatre in Iloilo. They entered into a contract whereby
Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the Zigomar for exhibition in his theatre for
a week for P125.
-Days before the delivery date, Cuddy returned the money already
paid by Gilchrist so that he can lease the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga
instead and receive P350 for the film for the same period.
-Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against Cuddy, Espejo
and Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for damages against Espejo and
Zaldarriaga for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and
Cuddy.
ISSUE: WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga are liable for interfering with the
contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the time
the identity of the parties
HELD: YES, Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the
contract and causing its breach. This liability arises from unlawful acts
and not from contractual obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his
contract with Gilchrist.
-ART 1902 CC provides that a person who, by act or omission causes
damage to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged
to pay for the damage done. There is nothing in this article which
requires as a condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that
he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damage. No
such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover
for the damages suffered.
NOTES:
Had legal liability but not under A1314. There is tortuous

interference because business interest is interference.
Is malice required to apply A1314?
No damages were due from Espejo because no malice was

proven (the motive was only to make profit).
Is malice an element of tortuous interference? Court does not
say that it is.
Justifications for Interference: Competition and Equal/Superior
right.
SO PING BUN v CA
FACTS: Tek Hua Trading originally entered into a lease agreement
with DC Chuan covering stalls in Binondo. The contracts were initially
for 1 year but were continued on month to month basis upon
expiration of the 1 yr. Tek Hua was dissolved, original members of Tek
Hua formed Tek Hua Enterprises (THE) with Manuel Tiong as one of the
incorporators. However, the stalls were occupied by the grandson (So
Ping Bun) of one of the original incorporators of Tek Hua under
business name Trendsetter Marketing.
-new lease contracts with increase in rent were sent to THE, although
not signed.
-THE through Tiong asked So Ping Bun to vacate the stalls so THE
would be able to go back to business BUT instead, SO PING BUN
SECURED A NEW LEASE AGEEMENT WITH DC CHUAN.
ISSUE: WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of
contract
HELD: Yes. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect
for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be
predicated upon an unlawful interference by one party of the
enjoyment of the other of his private property. In the case at bar,
petitioner, Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts in
its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent of the latters
property right.
- Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered.
- One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory
invasion of anothers interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset
if: a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the
use or enjoyment interfered with; b) the invasion is substantial; c) the
defendants conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; d) the invasion is
either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable
under the general negligence rules.
- elements of tort interference:
a) existence of a valid contract
b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its existence
c) interference of the third party is without legal justification or
excuse
- Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek Hua and DC
Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had property rights over the leased stalls. The

action of Trendsetter in asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in
their favor was unlawful interference.
- The SC handled the question of whether the interference may be
justified considering that So acted solely for the purpose of
furthering his own financial or economic interest. It stated that it
is sufficient that the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business
interest rather than in wrongful motives to conclude that So was not a
malicious interferer.
Nothing on the record imputes deliberate
wrongful motives or malice on the part of So. Hence the lack of
malice precludes the award of damages.
- The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous interference is
Article 1314.
NOTES:
Did not include malice as one of the elements under

A1314. Then discussed Gilchrist in saying that to award
damages, there should be malice but it was never
mentioned in Gilchrist in the first place.
Implied malice as an element.
De Leon included malice as an element.
Sir said as guidance: If we apply Gilchrist and So Ping Bun,
we need malice in 1314. But if question is just on the
elements, just answer the three elements given by So Ping
Bun.
So Ping Bun was okay had it not cited Gilchrist
Sir said that it seems this is the case right now: You can
compete in Business Contracts as long as intention is
financial interest and there is no malice. If this is the case,
then one cannot recover from 1314 as against the third
party.
LAGON v. CA
FACTS: there was a contract of lease between Sepi and Lapuz where
latter is to construct commercial buildings, sublease it and pay the
lease via his collection. However, while said lease was in force, Sepi
sold the land to Lagon. Lapuz sued Lagon for interfering with his
leasehold rights.
HELD: Lagon is not liable. Elements of tortuous interference are
absent. Lagon had no knowledge of the renewed lease because the
owners did not tell him and the title had no indication of lease. There
was no inducement on the part of Lagon because the heirs sold in on
their own volition. There was also no malice because it was merely for
the advancement of Lagons financial interests, thus precluding
recovery of damages.
AQUINO, (pp. 795-801)
Interference with contracts:
A. Statutory provision and rationale: Under Article 1314 of the

Civil Code, a third party may sue a third party not for breach of
contract but for inducing another to commit such breach. This tort is
known as interference with contractual relations. Such interference is
considered tortious because it violates the rights of the contacting
parties to fulfill the contract and to have it fulfilled, to reap the profits
resulting therefrom, and to compel the performance by the other
party. The theory is that a right derived from a contract is a property
right that entitles each party to protection against all the world and
any damage to said property should be compensated.
B. History: This particular tort started in the UK in Lumley vs, Gye in
1853 and was first adopted in the Philippines in 1915 in Gilchrist vs
Cuddy.
C. Elements:
1. Existence of a valid contract: This existence is necessary and
the breach must occur because of the alleged act of interference. No
tort is committed if the party had already broken the contract. Neither
can action be maintained if the contract is void. However, there is
authority for the view that an action for interference can be maintained
even if the contract is unenforceable. The view is that inducement, if
reprehensible in an enforceable contracts, is equally reprehensible in
an unenforceable one.
2. Knowledge on the part of the third party of the existence of
the contract: The elements do not include malice as a necessary act
in interference. However, the Supreme Court in its various rulings have
held that the aggrieved party will only be entitled to damages if malice
was present in the commission of the tortious act. It was held that
mere competition is not sufficient unless it is considered unfair
competition or the dominant purpose is to inflict harm or injury.
3. Interference of the third party without legal justification or
excuse: In general, social policy permits a privilege or justification to
intentionally invade the legally protected interests of others only if the
defendant acts to promote the interests of others or himself if the
interest which he seeks to advance is superior to the interest invaded
in social importance. Competition in business also affords a privilege to
interfere provided that the defendants purpose is a justifiable one and
the defendant does not employ fraud or deception which are regarded
as unfair.
D. Extent of liability: The rule is that the defendant found guilty of
interference with contractual relations cannot be held liable for more
than the amount for which the party who was induced to break the
contract can be held liable. This is consistent with Article 2202 if the
contracting party who was induced to break the contract was in bad
faith. However, when there is good faith, the party who breached the
contract is only liable for consequence that can be foreseen. In fact, it
is possible for the contracting party to be not liable at all, as in the

case where the defendant prevented him from performing his
obligation through force or fraud.
F. Liability of local government units
Art. 2189 Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason
of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or supervision.
GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN

FACTS: Guilatco, a court interpreter, fell into a manhole at Perez Blvd.
which is owned by the national Government. She fractured her right
leg, thus was hospitalized, operated on, and confined. City Engineer
testified that he supervises the maintenance of said manholes and
sees to it that they are properly covered. City Charter of Dagupan also
says that the city supervises and manages National roads and national
sidewalks.
HELD: City liable
- The liability of private corporations for damages arising from injuries
suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is
expressed in the Civil Code as follows:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable
for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision.
- It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to
the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article
only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the
defective road or street.
- In this case, control or supervision is provided for in the charter of
Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer.
The charter only lays down general rules regulating that liability of the
city. On the other hand, article 2189 applies in particular to the liability
arising from defective streets, public buildings and other public
works.
NOTES:
Can last clear chance apply? Wasnt it Guilatcos fault that she
was negligent in alighting a tricycle? No because it is under
strict liability.
Sir said it is wise to apply this to the case of PLDT and the
accident mound case (DACARA)
G. Liability of proprietors of buildings and engineers

and architects of collapsed building
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for
the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be
due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of
with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances
which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not
caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious
matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place. (1908)
Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should
be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in Article
1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against
the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article,
within the period therein fixed. (1909)
Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and
specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years
from the completion of the structure, the same should collapse by
reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the
defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the
damages if the edifice falls, within the same period, on account of
defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality
furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If
the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be
solidarily liable with the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of
any of the cause of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the
preceding paragraph.
The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of
the building. (n)
X. DAMAGES

NOTES:
Damages is not limited to quasi-delicts (also includes

contracts, quasi-contracts and delicts).
I. Definition and Concept
Art. 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be respectively applicable
to all obligations mentioned in Article 1157.
Art. 2197. Damages may be:
(1) Actual or compensatory;
(2) Moral;
(3) Nominal;
(4) Temperate or moderate;
(5) Liquidated; or
(6) Exemplary or corrective.
*DAMAGES may be defined as
SATISFACTION FOR AN INJURY SUSTAINED,
Art. 2205. Damages may be recovered:

(1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or
permanent personal injury;
(2) For injury to the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.
NOTES:
It is expressly provided for in Art. 2199 that there should be

proof of pecuniary damages for AD or CD
Take note of what indemnity is included in Art. 2200
Art. 2205 provides for the kinds of AD which the plaintiff may
recover
THE PECUNIARY COMPENSATION, RECOMPENSE , OR

OR
Art. 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the
value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee
failed to obtain.
AS
OTHERWISE
EXPRESSED,
THE
PECUNIARY
CONSEQUENCES WHICH THE LAW IMPOSES FOR THE BREACH OF SOME DUTY OR THE VIOLATION OF
SOME RIGHT.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in

satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained, whereas
moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has
experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral
shock, and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the
proximate result of the offenders wrongful act or omission.
NOTES:
Important for the definition of damages
For actual damages, the party making claim must present best
evidence (original documents).
II. Kinds of Damages
A. Actual or compensatory
Art. 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral,
nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages, may be
adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones,
is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of
each case.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled
to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by
him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual
or compensatory damages.
1. Kinds
PNOC v. CA
FACTS: The M/V Ma. Efigenia XV, owned by respondent Ma. Efigenia
Fishing Corp. collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time
was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Co. The Board of Marine Inquiry
rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault and thus the
respondent filed an action for damages against Luzon Stevedoring and
the Petroparcels captain. During the pendency of the case, petitioner
PNOC acquired the Petroparcel and was substituted in place of Luzon
Stevedoring in the complaint.
HELD: ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY
OF, OR IN RECOMPENSE FOR LOSS OR
DAMAGES ARE THOSE AWARDED IN SATISFACTION

INJURY SUSTAINED.
THEY
PROCEED FROM A SENSE
OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND ARE DESIGNED TO REPAIR THE WRONG THAT HAS BEEN DONE,
TO COMPENSATE FOR THE INJURY INFLICTED AND NOT TO IMPOSE A PENALTY.
In actions based on QD-AD include all the natural and probable

consequences of the act or omission complained of.
2 kinds of AD or CD:
1. The loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente)
2. the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have
pertained to him (lucro cesante)
On Nominal Damages:
When awarded: in the absence of competent proof on the AD
suffered-entitled to ND, which the law says is adjudicated in order that
a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose
of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.

-awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasicontracts, acts or omissions punished by law and QDs, or in every case
where property right has been invaded.
ND are damages in NAME only and NOT IN FACT. Where these are
allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but
simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.
The amount to be awarded as ND shall be equal or at least
commensurate to the injury sustained considering the concept and
purpose of such damages.
NOTES:
The basic rule in recovering AD: it is sufficient that damages

are capable of proof in order to recover (AD)
There should be a record to serve as proof presented before

the Court
There are cases which say that providing a list of expenses is

not enoughthere has to be receipts, etc.PROOF SHOULD BE
VERY FACTUAL
Proof required: reasonable certainty upon competent proof
Two (2) kinds of AD or CD:

1. Dano emergente-actual
2. Lucro cesante-loss of profit
2. Extent
Art. 2201, CC - In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for
which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that
are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall
be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to
the non-performance of the obligation.
Art. 2202, CC - In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be
liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary
that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been
foreseen by the defendant.
NOTES:
Art. 2201 lays down the distinction between good faith and bad
faith (in bad faithwhatever damage happens)
Last sentence of Art. 2202 problematicsome cases use

forseeability as an element of QD
Forseeability:
In elements: may be required

In damages: not required
Reasonable certainty required: allege specific facts, Present
best evidence
Quantum of evidence required: preponderance of evidence
3. Certainty
-possible that the exact value (peso) is not known.
PNOC v. CA
FACTS: Collision of 2 vessels
Certainty: to enable an injured party to recover AD or CD, he is
required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree
of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence available.
Burden of Proof: on the party who would be defeated if no evidence
would be presented on either side.
Evidence Required: He must establish his evidence by
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE, which means that the evidence, as
a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.
Damages are not presumed: damages cannot be presumed and
courts, in making an award must point out specific facts that could
afford a basis for measuring whatever CD or AD are borne.
NOTES:
Problem here with preponderance of evidence is that it became

COMPARATIVEall things being equal, the person who has
more pieces of evidence wins
What should be the basis: admissibility issue aside: number

and quality of evidence presented and this is what makes it
preponderant
you should also prove your allegations though not necessarily

beyond reasonable doubt
4. Damage to property
PNOC v. CA
Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant the
plaintiff is entitled to their value at the time of destruction, that is,
normally, the sum of money which he would have to pay in the market
for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case
damages for the loss of use during the period before replacement.
In other words, in the case of profit-earning chattel s, what has to be
assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner as a going concern at

the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in the case of
ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending engagements.
In the instant case, the pieces of documentary evidence proffered by
private respondent with respect to the items and equipment lost show
similar items and equipment with corresponding prices approximately
ten years after the collision.
NOTES: Rule: amount at the time of the loss. cf Gatchalian v. Delim
(where the girl was given 15k for plastic surgery)
NOTES:
o PNOC gives guidance as to how actual damages are computed:
1. Price (fair market value) at the time of loss, not what
the price is at the time of the ruling
2. In PNOC, inflation was taken into account.
3. If fair market value already includes the possible
contracts, then that is the value to be used.
YU v. NGO YET TE
Held: Actual damages may be recovered from wrongful attachment of
property but not automatically. There must be proof of the nature and
extent of the loss or injury concerned, of the fact of loss suffered.
There need not be malice proved.
5. Personal Injury and Death
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or
quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there
may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of
the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter;
such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the
court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability
not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of
his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the
provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the
decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession,
may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period
not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
NOTES:
Art. 2206 provides for earning capacity which is NOT equal to

actual income
GATCHALIAN v. DELIM
October 21, 1991
FACTS: Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, a
minibus owned by the Delim spouses, respondents in this case. She
was allegedly on her way to confer with the district supervisor of public
schools for a substitute teachers job.
Later, while the bus was running along the highway, a snapping sound
was suddenly heard and shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a
cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned
turtle and fell into a ditch.
Several passengers, including Gatchalian, were injured and were
promptly taken to a hospital for medical treatment.
The aforementioned events led Gatchalian to file an action extra
contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages. She alleged in
her complaint that her injuries had left her with a conspicuous white
scar on her forehead, generating mental suffering and feeling of
inferiority on her part.
She also alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and
deprived her of opportunities for employment.
ISSUE: WON the Delims are liable for the cost of plastic surgery to
remove the scar on Gatchalians forehead.
HELD: Yes. A
PERSON IS ENTITLED TO THE PHYSICAL INTEGRITY OF HIS OR HER BODY;
IF THAT INTEGRITY IS VIOLATED OR DIMINISHED, ACTUAL INJURY IS SUFFERED FOR WHICH

AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ARE DUE AND ASSESSABLE. Petitioner
Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the
condition that she was in before the mishap.
ACTUAL
SCAR, ESPECIALLY ONE ON THE FACE OF A WOMAN, RESULTING FROM THE INFLICTION OF INJURY
UPON HER, IS A VIOLATION OF BODILY INTEGRITY, GIVING RISE TO A LEGITIMATE CLAIM FOR
RESTORATION TO HER CONDITION ANTE.
NOTES:
This case is always cited to support that plastic surgery can
be the subject of AD.
Nature of action here: breach of contract of common carrier
Sir: is there a health risk if you have a scar? So purely

aesthetic?
What was the proof offered for the scar?
Expert testimony: alleged cost of 5-10k
Yet SC granted 15k based on a presumption that plastic

surgery would cost more after several years (SO AD became
speculative AND NOT PROVEN).
Sir: technology makes things cheaper but SC here gave a
presumption
Most intriguing is the language of the Courtthe longer the
scar has been, the more difficult it is to remove
Gatchalian ruling is OK but the reasoning is funny
This is still law so women can take advantage of this
The case also cited Araneta vs. Areglado where a young boy
sued for costs of surgery for removal of his scar on his face
which caused a degenerative process and inferiority complex
to the boy. Therefore since in this case it was just a boy, it was
easier to remove the scar. In Reynaldas case, she was older so
SC ASSUMED that removing scar would be harder
Skewed in favor of the beautiful
Relevance nung snapping sound accdg to sir: baka naman
may turtle kaya nag-turn turtle ung bus!
CANDANAO SHIPPING LINES v. SUGATA-ON

Held: Compensation under the workmens compensation act serves to
mitigate the harshness of industrial life for the workingman and his
family. On the other hand, damages under the NCC serves as a
vindication of wrongful invasion of rights. The latter is in the concept of
an award. The formula for computing for net earning capacity: Net
Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy [2/3 (80 Age of Deceased at
time of death)] x [Gross Annual Income Reasonable and Necessary
Living Expenses which is pegged at 50% absent proof to the contrary]
PEOPLE v. BUBAN
HELD: Civil indemnity due to a crime (murder) is in the nature of
actual damages and is mandatorily granted to the heirs upon proving
of the fact of the crime. It is granted without any need of proof other
than the commission of the crime.
NOTES:
Civil Indemnity for Death is normally P75k and for Rape, P50k
PEOPLE v. ASTROLOGO
HELD: Civil indemnity due to a crime (rape) is in the nature of actual
damages and is mandatorily granted to upon proving of the fact of the
crime. It is granted without any need of proof other than the
commission of the crime.
NOTES:
Civil Indemnity for Simple Rape is P50k, while P75k for

Qualified Rape.
6. Attorneys Fees
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses

of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding
against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable
claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers,
laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and
employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a
crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable
that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable.
NOTES:
Attorneys fees are in the form of damages (nasa title on

damages)
Also in the form of AD
MEMORIZE THIS ARTICLE!
You cant recover outside the listing of 2008 unless there is a

stipulation
AS regards the gen rule and exception, sir said it can be BOTH
Why may one recover attorneys fees under those listed?
person is forced to protect his interest and for at least double
judicial costs, the person must have done something really
bad AND be liable for a greater degree
Why ED only? Why not for other damages as well?
What is the rationale for the enumeration? A person is free to
litigate. (Except 2208)
QUIRANTE v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

January 31, 1989
FACTS: Dr. Indalecio Casasola had a contract with a building
contractor named Norman Guerrero. The Philippine American General
Assurance Co. Inc. (PHILAMGEN) acted as bondsman for Guerrero.
In view of Guerreros failure to perform his part of the contract within
the period specified, Dr. Casasola, through his counsel, Atty. John
Quirante, sued both Guerrero and PHILAMGEN.
The trial court found for Dr. Casasola and aside from awards of actual,
moral, and exemplary damages, ordered PHILAMGEN to pay the
plaintiff the amount of the surety bond equivalent to P120, 000.
Here, the petitioners claims are based on an alleged contract for

professional services, with them as the creditors and the private
respondents as the debtors.
NOTES:
Attorneys fees referred to by Quirante not the same as

attorneys fees in 2208
What the difference?Attys fees in 2208 are a form of AD and

hence need to be proven. This is not something that goes to
the attorney but to the litigant
GOMEZ v. GOMEZ-SAMSON
FACTS: No attorneys fees because the suit filed was not an
unfounded civil action.
FRIAS v. SAN DIEGO-SISON
FACTS: Attorneys Fees cannot be granted without basis, where it is
mentioned only in the dispositive portion.
7. Interest
PHILAMGEN filed a notice of appeal but the same was not given due
course because it was supposedly filed out of time. The trial court
thereafter issued a writ of execution.
Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of

money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages,
there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the
interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal
interest, which is six per cent per annum.
A petition was filed before the IAC to compel the trial court to give due
course to the appeal. However, the petition was dismissed and so the
case was elevated to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, Dr.
Casasola died leaving his widow and several children.
Art. 2210. Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed

upon damages awarded for breach of contract.
After Casasolas death, Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the
confirmation of his attorneys fees alleging that there was an oral
agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to the
said fees and allegedly confirmed by his widow in writing.
The trial court granted the motion despite opposition thereto hence the
instant petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the attorneys fees being claimed are the same
attorneys fees contemplated in article 2208 of the Civil Code.
HELD: No. What is being claimed here as attorneys fees is different
from attorneys fees as an item of damages provided under Article
2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the
litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the
judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorneys fees
by execution.
Art. 2211. In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the

damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the
court.
Art. 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon this
point.
Art. 2213. Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or
damages, except when the demand can be established with
reasonably certainty.
8. Mitigation of Liability
Doctrine of Avoidable Consequences:
-if the plaintiff does not try to reduce damages, he might not be
able to recover
-plaintiff must try to avoid further damage

Art. 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages
resulting from the act or omission in question.
Art. 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be
respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances.
Art. 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.
Art. 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the
court may equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances other
than the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the following
instances:
(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the
contract;
(2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result of the
contract;
(3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that
the defendant acted upon the advice of counsel;
(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;
(5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his
best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or injury.
NOTES:
2203 is known as the Doctrine of Avoidable Consequences

which is different from the Doctrine of Contributory Negligence
DOCTRINE OF AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES, the party has to minimize the
damages; in CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, the damages to be paid
would be diminished if you contributed to the damage
incurred!
There is an obligation on the part of the party suffering to

mitigate the loss.
B. Moral
1. Concept
Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are

the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.
NOTES:
If the professor allowed you to stand for three (3) hours, you cant
claim moral damages because there was an intervening causeyour
inability to answer the questions
KIERULF v. CA
March 13, 1997
FACTS: One of Pantrancos buses was traveling along EDSA when the
driver lost control of the bus, causing it to swerve to the left, and then
to fly over the center island, ending up on the wrong side of the road.
The front of the bus bumped the front portion of an Isuzu pickup driven
Porfirio Legaspi, causing damage to both vehicles and injuries to both
Legaspi and his passenger Lucila Kierulf, wife of Victor Kierulf, owner of
the pickup and employer of Legaspi.
As a consequence of the incident, Lucila suffered injuries which
required major surgery and prolonged treatment by specialists.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found for Legaspi and the
Kierulfs.
The spouses Kierulf, however, averred that the disfigurement of
Lucilas physical appearance due to the accident could not but affect
their marital right of consortium and asked that the moral damages
awarded be increased from P100, 000 to one million pesos, not only for
Lucila, but also for her husband.
They also averred that the social and financial standing of Lucila
should also be considered in fixing the award of moral damages.
ISSUE: WON an increase in the amount awarded as moral damages is
warranted given the circumstances.
HELD: The Court increased the moral damages awarded but ruled
against awarding moral damages based on loss of consortium or
considerations of social and financial standing.
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading
and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While
no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages
may be awarded, it is nevertheless essential that THE CLAIMANT SHOW THE
EXISTENCE OF THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR DAMAGES AND ITS CAUSAL CONNECTION TO THE
DEFENDANTS ACTS.

In Francisco vs. GSIS, the Court held that there must be clear
testimony on the anguish and other forms of mental suffering. Thus, if
the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and testify as to his/her
social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral damages
cannot be awarded.
In Cocoland Development Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, the Court held that "additional facts must be pleaded and
proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code,
these being, x x x social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety,
etc., that resulted therefrom."
*MORAL
DAMAGES ARE AWARDED TO ENABLE THE INJURED PARTY TO OBTAIN MEANS, DIVERSIONS
OR AMUSEMENTS THAT WILL SERVE TO ALLEVIATE THE MORAL SUFFERING HE/SHE HAS UNDERGONE,
BY REASON OF THE DEFENDANT'S CULPABLE ACTION .
ITS
AWARD IS AIMED AT RESTORATION, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, OF THE SPIRITUAL STATUS QUO
ANTE; THUS, IT MUST BE PROPORTIONATE TO THE SUFFERING INFLICTED.

GOVERNED
BY ITS OWN PECULIAR
SINCE
EACH CASE MUST BE
CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS NO HARD AND FAST RULE IN
DETERMINING THE PROPER AMOUNT.
The yardstick should be that the amount awarded should not be so

palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the
result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial judge.
Neither should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury
already inflicted on plaintiffs.
In the instant petition, a California case, Rodriguez v. Bethlehem was
cited as authority for the claim of damages based on loss of marital
consortium.
The Court noted that the Rodriguez case clearly reversed the original
common law view first enunciated in the case of Deshotel vs. Atchison,
that a wife could not recover for the loss of her husband's services by
the act of a third party.
Rodriguez ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that he/she
is no longer capable of giving love, affection, comfort and sexual
relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and
real personal loss.
The loss is immediate and consequential rather than remote and
unforeseeable; it is personal to the spouse and separate and distinct
from that of the injured person.
However, Victor's claim for deprivation of his right to consortium,
although argued before Respondent Court, was not supported by the
evidence on record.
His wife might have been badly disfigured, but he had not testified
that, in consequence thereof, his right to marital consortium was
affected. Clearly, Victor (and for that matter, Lucila) had failed to
make out a case for loss of consortium, unlike the Rodriguez spouse.
The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in
awarding moral damages. The factual circumstances prior to the
accident show that no "rude and rough" reception, no "menacing
attitude," no "supercilious manner," no "abusive language and highly
scornful reference" was given her.
The social and financial standing of a claimant of moral damages may
be considered in awarding moral damages only if he or she was
subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender's knowledge
of his or her social and financial standing.
Be that as it may, it is still proper to award moral damages to
Petitioner Lucila for her physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety and wounded feelings. She sustained multiple injuries
on the scalp, limbs and ribs. She lost all her teeth. She had to
undergo several corrective operations and treatments. Despite
treatment and surgery, her chin was still numb and thick. She felt that
she has not fully recovered from her injuries. She even had to undergo
a second operation on her gums for her dentures to fit. She suffered
sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicular accident.
RULES:
When social & financial standing may be considered in
awarding MD: only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous
conduct despite the offenders knowledge of his or her social and
financial standing.
On Exemplary Damages:
-designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially
deleterious consequences, and its imposition is required by public
policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender. However, it cannot
be recovered as a matter of rightit is based entirely on the discretion
of the court.
Requirements before ED may be awarded:
1. by way of example or correction in addition to CD
2. claimant must 1st establish his right to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages; &
3. the wrongful act must be accompanied by BF, and the
award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.
On Moral Damages:

-MD, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category
of an award designed to compensate the claimant at the expense of
the defendant.
-awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversity or
amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has
undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action. Its award is
aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status
quo ante; thus it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
There is no hard and fast rule in determining the proper amount
since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.
NOTES:
Rodriguez case-different from what happened to Lucila (there

was nothing wrong with possible performance. Equipment was
not damaged.)
Sir: what kind of evidence will you present without

embarrassing yourself to prove loss of consortium?
This case can be used in the futureeven if reason is only lack

of visual stimulation
Another factor to determine amount of moral damages: social

and financial standing (but wouldnt it be discriminating since
you only award damages to those who are rich?)
Epilogue by ponente: there should be:
Factual basis of mental anguish, etc.
Causal connection between factual basis and

defendants wrongful act or omission
2. Cases where allowed
(MEMORIZE!)
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused,
referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may

bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
Art. 2220, CC - Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.
SULPICIO LINES v. CURSO
HELD: NCC 2206.3 excludes siblings in recovery for death due to
breach of carriage contract. Though siblings succeed the estate of a
deceased without issue, 2219 does not include succession in the
collateral line as source of a right. It not an analogous case under 2219
because it refers to situations held similar to those expressly
enumerated. Article 1003 in stipulating that collateral relatives
succeed to the estate is not concerned with recovery of moral
damages.
NOTES:
Analogous cases refers to similar cases, not similar relatives.

HELD:
1.
2.
3.
4.
B.F. METAL v. LOMOTAN

Conditions for the Award of Moral Damages:
Evidence of physical/mental/psychological suffering
Culpable act/omission factually established
Proof that wrongful act/omission is PC of damages sustained
Predicated on any of the instances expressed by 2219 and
2220
NOTES:
Sir: Only refers to QD and it does not apply to delict and culpacontractual
EXPERTRAVEL AND TOURS, INC. v. CA
June 25, 1999
FACTS: Expertravel issued to respondent Ricardo Lo (Ricky Lo!
Showbiz!) four round-trip plane tickets to Hong Kong, together with
hotel accommodations and transfers for a total cost of P39, 677.20.
Alleging that Lo had failed to pay the amount due, Expertravel caused
several demands to be made. Since the demands were ignored by Lo,
Expertravel filed a complaint for recovery of the amount.
Respondent Lo answered that his account with Expertravel had already
been fully paid. The account had been remitted to Expertravel through
its then Chairperson Ma. Rocio de Vega who was theretofore
authorized to deal with the respondents clients.

special rule:
e. in Art. 1746 in relation to Art. 2206: when death results
from a breach of carriage
The trial court found for the respondent and held that the amount
claimed by Expertravel had already been paid.
ISSUE: WON damages can be recovered by reason of a clearly
unfounded suit.
2. in Culpa Aquiliana or QD:
HELD: Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can

at times be a legal justification for an award of attorney's fees
(Enervida vs. Dela Torre), such filing, however, has almost invariably
been held not to be a ground for an award of moral damages.
*Rationale for the rule: THE LAW COULD NOT HAVE MEANT TO IMPOSE A PENALTY ON
THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE. THE ANGUISH SUFFERED BY A PERSON FOR HAVING BEEN MADE A
3.
a.
b.
DEFENDANT IN A CIVIL SUIT WOULD BE NO DIFFERENT FROM THE USUAL WORRY AND ANXIETY
SUFFERED BY ANYONE WHO IS HALED TO COURT, A SITUATION THAT CANNOT BY ITSELF BE A COGENT
REASON FOR THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES.
If the rule were otherwise, then moral damages must every time be
awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful
plaintiff.
Nature of MD: not punitive, but are designed to compensate and
alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a
person.
Amount of MD: though incapable of pecuniary estimation, must be
PROPORTIONAL TO AND IN APPROXIMATION OF THE SUFFERING INFLICTED.
*REQUISITES
1.
2.
3.
4.
OF
MD:
THERE MUST BE AN INJURY, WHETHER PHYSICAL, MENTAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL

THERE MUST BE A CULPABLE ACT OR OMISSION FACTUALLY ESTABLISHED
THE WRONGFUL ACT OR OMISSION IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES IS PREDICATED ON ANY OF THE CASES STATED IN
2219 (CASIS:
ART.
PENDING ISSUE)
When MD allowed: must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or

omission, the factual basis for which is satisfactorily established by the
aggrieved party.
1. Under Culpa contractual or breach of contract: when the
defendant acted in:
a. BF; or
b. was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to BF); or
c. in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation; &
exceptionally:
d. when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive
of torts resulting in physical injuries (PI).
4.
5.
when an act or omission causes P

where the defendant is guilty of an intentional tort
(casis: Arts. 19, 20, 21, 26-huma relations torts)
-also applies to contracts when breached by tort
In Culpa Criminal: when accused is found guilty of
a. PI
b. Lascivious acts
c. Adultery or concubinage
d. Illegal detention
e. Illegal arrest
f. Illegal search; or
g. Defamation
Malicious Prosecution
The term analogous causes in Art. 2219, following the
ejusdem generis rule must be held similar to those expressly
enumerated by the law.
MIJARES v. CA 271 SCRA 558

- Metro Drug went after Mijares demanding full redemption of the
dishonored check and full payment even if they do not own the
drugstore anymore.
- Mijares spouses failed to show that private respondent was motivated
by bad faith when it instituted the action for collection.
-In China Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals it was held
that Malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases,
requires the presence of two elements, to wit: a) malice; and
b) absence of probable cause. Moreover, there must be proof
that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex
and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately
knowing that the charge was false and baseless (Manila Gas
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]).
-Mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious
prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for the law could not have
meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate (Ponce v. Legaspi,
208 SCRA 377 [1992]; Saba v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 50 [1990]);
Rubio v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]).
-WHEN IT CANNOT BE RECOVERED: Moral damages cannot be
recovered from a person who has filed a complaint against another in
good faith, or without malice or bad faith (Philippine National Bank v.
Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 433 [1988]; R & B Surety and Insurance v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 129 SCRA 736 [1984]).
If damage results from the filing of the complaint, it is damnum absque
injuria (Ilocos Norte Electrical Company v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA
5 [1989]).

In unfounded civil suits, can you award moral damages? YES, but bad
faith is required
INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE V. BONDAD GR NO 136722 (2000)
-insurance co sued Bondads even if they claimed that at the time of
the accident, their jeepney was on full stop on the right shoulder of the
road because of the flat tire. And that there was therefore no fault or
negligence on their part.
- WHEN CAN MORAL DAMAGES BE CLAIMED: it must be shown that
(1) the claimant suffered injury, and
(2) such injury sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and
2220 of the Civil Code.
(3) bad faith or ill motive
It is not enough that the claimant alleges mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like as a result of
the acts of the other party. It is necessary that such acts be shown to
have been tainted with bad faith or ill motive.
Unfounded civil suit; awarded moral damages
TRIPLE EIGHT V. NLRC 299 SCRA 608
-illegal dismissal
-moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the
employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an
act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs, or public policy. Likewise, exemplary
damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner.
PEOPLE V. PIRAME 327 SCRA (2000)
- The award of P50,000.00 from each accused as moral and exemplary
damages, however, is unsupported. The widow of the victim did not
testify on any mental anguish or emotional distress, which she suffered
as a result of her husbands death.
CARLOS ARCONA Y MOBAN V. CA GR NO 134784 (2002)
- As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death
invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on
the part of the victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow,
torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a
violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only
steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them
forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with
the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them.
-For this reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the absence
of any allegation and proof of the heirs emotional suffering.
VALENZUELA V. CA, SUPRA
-moral damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense
of the defendant, the award should nonetheless be commensurate to
the suffering inflicted
-court took into consideration the traumatic amputation, physical and
occupational rehabilitation, anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury
etc.
-increased moral damages to 1M
LOPEZ V. PAN AMERICAN 16 SCRA 431
-moral damages are recoverable in breach of contracts where
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith
-his prestige does not leave his office
- SEN. LOPEZ awarded 100k
o Was the Senate President, former VP of Philippines,
and was expected by well-wishers to be first to
disembark from the plane as a first class passenger
Suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious

anxiety, and mental anguish
Was compelled to travel as a tourist passenger
MARIA LOPEZ, Senators wife awarded 50k

o As wife, shared in his prestige and thus his humilitation
o Was sick when she boarded the flight and had to
undergo the physical suffering of a 13-hour flight in
narrows seats with little space since she was deprived
of a more suitable space in first class
MR AND MRS MONTELIBANO, traveling companions 25k
each
o As part of Senators party, also shared in his prestige
and humiliation
o While they asked for tourist class seats first which were
already booked, they afterwards expected and were
deprived of their first-class accomodations.
o Different to CHOOSE to be a tourist passenger, than to
be COMPELLED to be one.
PEOPLE V. LIZANO G.R. NO. 174470 APRIL 27 2007

-moral damages are automatically granted in rape cases without the
need of further proof other than the commission of the crime because
it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries
entitling her to such award
STREBEL V. FIGUEROS 96 PHIL 321
-General rule: the right of recovery for mental suffering resulting from
bodily injuries is restricted to the person who has suffered the bodily

hurt, and there can be no recovery for distress caused by sympathy for
another's suffering, or for fright due to a wrong against a third person.
So the anguish of mind arising as to the safety of others who may be in
personal peril from the same cause cannot be taken into consideration
. . . damages are not recoverable for fright or shock even when
sustained as a result of wilful act, unless such act was directed
toward person or property or person seeking recovery; hence
plaintiff is not entitled to recover against administratrix of
sister's murderer for fright or shock caused by viewing
mutilated body of murdered sister. (Koontz v. Keller, 3 N.E., 2d
694, 52 Ohio App., 265) (25 C.J.S. s 67 and footnote p. 554.)
American Jurisprudence:
Injury or Wrong to Another. In law mental anguish is
restricted as a rule, to such mental pain or suffering as arises
from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as distinguished
from that form of mental suffering which is the accompaniment
of sympathy or sorrow for another's suffering or which arises
from a contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of
another. Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or wife cannot
recover for mental suffering caused by his or her sympathy for
the other's suffering. (15 Am. Jur., pp. 597-598) (emphasis
supplied.)
-By specific mandate of Article 2219 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, however, moral damages may not be recovered in
cases of crime or tort, unless either results or causes "physical
injuries," which are lacking in the case at bar.
ABSCBN v. CA G.R. No. 128690
-As to moral damages the law is Section 1, Chapter 3, Title XVIII, Book
IV of the Civil Code. Article 2217 thereof defines what are included in
moral damages, while Article 2219 enumerates the cases where they
may be recovered, Article 2220 provides that moral damages
may be recovered in breaches of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith. RBS's claim for moral damages
could possibly fall only under item (10) of Article 2219, thereof which
reads:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
-Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered, and not to impose
a penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is not meant to enrich the
complainant at the expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured
party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to
obviate then moral suffering he has undergone. It is aimed at the
restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Trial courts
must then guard against the award of exorbitant damages; they should
exercise balanced restrained and measured objectivity to avoid
suspicion that it was due to passion, prejudice, or corruption on the
part of the trial court.
-The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a
corporation because, being an artificial person and having existence
only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses,
It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish,
which call be experienced only by one having a nervous system. The
statement in People v. Manero and Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB that
a corporation may recover moral damages if it "has a good reputation
that is debased, resulting in social humiliation" is an obiter dictum. On
this score alone the award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is
a corporation.
-It may be reiterated that the claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not
based on contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict, Hence, the
claims for moral and exemplary damages can only be based on Articles
19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
REPUBLIC V. TUVERA G.R. NO. 148246. FEBRUARY 16, 2007
-The claimant in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, a juridical
person. We explained in Filipinas Broadcasting v. Ago Medical &
Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC-BCCM):
-GENERAL RULE: A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral
damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience
physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious
anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock.
-the Court's statement in Mambulao that "a corporation may have a
good reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the
award of moral damages" is an obiter dictum.
-EXCEPTION: Nevertheless, AMEC's claim for moral damages falls
under item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code. This provision expressly
authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or
any other form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether
the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical
person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or
any other form of defamation and claim for moral damages.
- GENERAL RULE: A juridical person is not entitled to moral damages
under Article 2217 of the Civil Code.
-EXCEPTION: It may avail of moral damages under the analogous cases
listed in Article 2219, such as for libel, slander or any other form of
defamation. Suffice it to say that the action at bar does not involve any
of the analogous cases under Article 2219, and indeed upon an
intelligent reading of Article 2219, it is difficult to see how the Republic
could sustain any of the injuries contemplated therein.
SPS VALENZUELA VS SPS MANO JULY 9, 2010
-person claiming moral damages must prove bad faith
-willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive
-allege and prove 2217+ bad faith

C. Nominal Damages
-like a fine; vindicates a right; symbolic
Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a
right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
him.
Article 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every
obligation arising from any source enumerated in article 1157,
or in every case where any property right has been invaded.
Article 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall
preclude further contest upon the right involved and all
accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or
their respective heirs and assigns.
ROBESFRANCISCO V. CFI 86 SCRA 59
-Corporation failed to cause issuance of TCT because title was included
among properties of corp mortgaged to GSIS to secure an obligation.
Hence, a complaint for specific performance and damages.
-Nominal damages are not intended for indemnification of loss suffered
but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded.
They are recoverable where some injury has been done the amount of
which the evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages being
left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the
case.
Under American jurisprudence nominal damages by their very nature
are small sums fixed by the court without regard to the extent of the
harm done to the injured party:
It is generally held that a nominal damage is a substantial claim, if
based upon the violation of a legal right; in such case, the law
presumes a damage, although actual or compensatory damages are
not proven; in truth nominal damages are damages in name only and
not in fact, and are allowed, not as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted,
but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.
(Fouraker v. Kidd Springs Boating and Fishing Club, 65 S. W. 2d 796797, citing 17 C.J. 720, and a number of authorities).
-nominal damages cannot coexist with compensatory damages
compensatory damages means that a right has been violated; it would
be sufficient.
-In case of breach of contract, exemplary damages may be awarded if
the guilty party acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner. Furthermore, exemplary or corrective damages
are to be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good,
only if the injured party has shown that he is entitled to recover moral,
temperate or compensatory damages."
-4% is not a penal clause because under 2209 he is still entitled to a
legal interest which is 6% per annum
FRANCISCO V. FERRER GR. NO. 142029
- wedding cake ordered was not delivered; delivered a two layered
cake instead.
-To warrant the award of exemplary damages, "[t]he wrongful act must
be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be
allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless
or malevolent manner."
-REQUIREMENTS OF THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES: (1) they
may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory
damages, and only after the claimant's right to them has been
established; (2) that they can not be recovered as a matter of right,
their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory
damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be
accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive
or malevolent manner."
- "Nominal damages are 'recoverable where a legal right is technically
violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced
no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a
breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages
whatsoever have been or can be shown.'"27
-Nominal damages may be awarded "to a plaintiff whose right has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of
vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered."28
GONZALES V. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 159950. FEBRUARY 12, 2007
-Gonzales set fire on a building. He was charged with arson
-no proof of actual damages by each witness; however, nominal and
temperate damages were awarded
-The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the
trial court according to the circumstances of the case.
-Generally, nominal damages by their nature are small sums fixed by
the court without regard to the extent of the harm done to the injured
party. However, it is generally held that a nominal damage is a
substantial claim, if based upon the violation of a legal right; in such a
case, the law presumes damage although actual or compensatory
damages are not proven. In truth, nominal damages are damages in
name only and not in fact, and are allowed, not as an equivalent of
wrong inflicted, but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical
injury.14
-Temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot from the
nature of the case be proved with certainty
-only temperate damages were awarded

D. Temperate or Moderate Damages
Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more
than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the
case, be provided with certainty.
Article 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under
the circumstances.
PLENO V. CA G.R. NO. 56505 (1988)
-delivery truck hit delivery van and ran away. Passengers suffered
injuries
-both actual and temperate damages were awarded
-actual: medical expenses
- Temperate damages are included within the context of compensatory
damages (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) v. Court
of Appeals, supra.). In arriving at a reasonable level of temperate
damages to be awarded, trial courts are guided by our ruling that:
... There are cases where from the nature of the case,
defenite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered,
although the court is convinced that there has been
such loss. For instance, injury to one's commercial
credit or to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard
to show certainty in terms of money. Should damages
be denied for that reason? The judge should be
empowered to calculate moderate damages in such
cases, rather than that the plaintiff should suffer,
without redress from the defendant's wrongful act.
(Araneta v. Bank of America, 40 SCRA 144,145)
-His actual income was not sufficiently established but an award of
temperate or moderate damages may be made on loss or impairment
of earning capacity
- Pleno is also entitled to exemplary damages since it appears that
gross negligence was committed in the hiring of driver de Luna. In
spite of his past record, he was still hired by the corporation. As
regards de Luna, the very fact that he left the scene of the incident
without assisting the victims and without reporting to the authorities
entitles an award of exemplary damages, so as to serve as an example
that in cases of accidents of this kind, the drivers involved should not
leave their victims behind but should stop to assist the victims or if this
is not possible, to report the matter immediately to the authorities.
That the corporation did not also report the matter to the authorities
and that their lawyer would attempt to bribe the police officers in order
that the incident would be kept a secret shows that the corporation
ratified the act of their employees and such act also shows bad faith.
Hence, Id corporation is able to pay exemplary damages.
RAMOS V. CA, SUPRA
-wrong intubation, commatose
-temperate damages were awarded on top of actual damages
- the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are to
adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one
which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the
time of trial (ACTUAL DAMAGES); and one which would meet pecuniary
loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the nature of the
case, be made with certainty (TEMPERATE).
In other words, temperate damages can and should be
awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in
instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And
because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility
arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided
for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct
phases.
-As it would not be equitable and certainly not in the best interests
of the administration of justice for the victim in such cases to
constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking
adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded
temperate damages are appropriate. The amount given as temperate
damages, though to a certain extent speculative, should take into
account the cost of proper care.
-Value awarded for temperate damages should allow petitioners to
provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility which generally
specializes in such care. -They should not be compelled by dire
circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of
professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate.
-Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of
the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at
P100,000.00 are likewise proper.
PNR V. ETHEL BRUNTY, SUPRA
-car was hit by a train, Brunty died
- Respondents, however, failed to present evidence for such damages;
hence, the award of actual damages cannot be sustained. However,
as the heirs of Rhonda Brunty undeniably incurred expenses
for the wake and burial of the latter, we deem it proper to
award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. This is in lieu of actual
damages as it would be unfair for the victims heirs to get
nothing, despite the death of their kin, for the reason alone
that they cannot produce receipts.
REPUBLIC V. TUVERA, SUPRA

- Temperate or moderate damages avail when "the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot from the
nature of the case, be proved with certainty."
-The textual language might betray an intent that temperate damages
do not avail when the case, by its nature, is susceptible to proof of
pecuniary loss; and certainly the Republic could have proved pecuniary
loss herein. Still, jurisprudence applying Article 2224 is clear that
temperate damages may be awarded even in instances where
pecuniary loss could theoretically have been proved with
certainty.
-SC cannot discount the heavy influence of common law and its
reliance on judicial precedents in our law on tort and damages.
-if the doctrine can be justified to answer for the unlawful damage to a
cargo truck, it is a compounded wrath if it cannot answer for the
unlawful exploitation for our forests, to the injury of the Filipino people.
- The allowance of temperate damages also paves the way for
the award of exemplary damages. Under Article 2234 of the Civil
Code, a showing that the Republic is entitled to temperate
damages allows for the award of exemplary damages. Even as
exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right,
the courts are empowered to decide whether or not they
should be adjudicated. Ill-gotten wealth cases are hornbook
demonstrations where damages by way of example or correction for
the public good should be awarded. Fewer causes of action deserve
the stigma left by exemplary damages, which "serve as a deterrent
against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions."
E. Liquidated Damages
Article 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by
the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof.
Article 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an
indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are
iniquitous or unconscionable.
Article 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by
the defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in
agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall determine
the measure of damages, and not the stipulation.
TITAN V. UNIFIELD G.R. NO. 153874. MARCH 1, 2007
-complaint for collection of sum of money with damages
- The law also allows parties to a contract to stipulate on liquidated
damages to be paid in case of breach. A stipulation on liquidated
damages is a penalty clause where the obligor assumes a greater
liability in case of breach of an obligation. The obligor is bound to pay
the stipulated amount without need for proof on the existence and on
the measure of damages caused by the breach.
-in this case, the nature of attys fees were liquidated damages.
F. Exemplary or Corrective Damages

Article 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by
way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Article 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a
part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid
to the offended party.
Article 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
Article 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may
award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
Article 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a
matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they
should be adjudicated.
Article 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages
need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled
to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the
court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have
been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in
order that such liquidated damages may be recovered,
nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of
granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the
plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the
stipulation for liquidated damages.
Article 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are
renounced in advance shall be null and void.
PEOPLE V. DALISAY G.R. NO. 188106. NOVEMBER 25, 2009
-rape case
-People vs Catubig: exemplary damages can still be awarded even if
aggravating circumstances was not alleged but proved. The retroactive
application of the revised rules should not adversely affect the vested
rights of the private offended party
-Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or
corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of

outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used
interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of
exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings
and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a
result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the
theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by
the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendantassociated with
such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross
negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud
that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages
are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In
either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the
wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future
-Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be
awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but
also where the circumstances of the case show the highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the
same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary
damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down
the very basis of the award.
PNB V. CA 256 SCRA 44
- Tan wanted to claim the payment for the expropriation of his
land. PNB released the check for P32,480 to one Sonia
Gonzaga without Tans knowledge and consent. Gonzaga
deposited the said amount to her own personal account.
- Under CC2232, exemplary damages are to be awarded if a
party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner. Exemplary damages cannot be
recovered as a matter of right because the courts will
decide if the award of said damages is proper.
Requisites for the award of exemplary damages:
a.
It must be imposed by way of example in addition to

compensatory damages and only after the
claimants right to them has been established;
b.
Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter

of right and is to be determined depending on the
amount of compensatory damages;
c.
The act complained of should be done in bad faith or

in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
Here, while there was breach, there was no wanton, fraudulent,

reckless, oppressive or malevolent conduct to be imputed
against PNB.
There is no award of compensatory damages which is a
prerequisite to the award of exemplary damages.
Thus, the RTC award of exemplary damages of
P5,000 is baseless.
PEOPLE V. DIUNSAYJALANDONI G.R. NO. 174277. FEBRUARY 8,
2007.
-rape case
- People vs Catubig: the presence of an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to an award
of exemplary damages. Further, we noted in that case that the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000,
now requires that aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the
information in order to be validly appreciated by the court. However,
the retroactive application of these procedural rules cannot adversely
affect the rights of a private offended party that have become vested
where the offense was committed prior to the effectivity of said
rules24 as is the case here.
-Consequently, aggravating circumstances which were not alleged in
the information but proved during the trial may be appreciated for the
limited purpose of determining appellants liability for exemplary
damages.
- In the instant case, the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
knowledge by the offender of the offended partys mental disability,
although not alleged in the information, was proved during trial, which
justifies the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00
in consonance with current rulings
NOTES:
Serrano vs People GR 175023
-actual less than 25K, temperate damages worth 25K was given in lieu
of actual.
GR 182460
-same as above
Penta capital
-attys fees are considered as liquidated damages
-contracts usually dont state that they are liquidated damages

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TORTS AND DAMAGES|gianna.ranx.tina.gi.sam.katz.alex.emjo.

didy| FINALS REVIEWER| CASIS 1

Why the need for tort?

Our jurisprudence is wanting of the definite scope of corporate tort.

Defense of good faith is irrelevant to tort according to this

NOT binding. Obiter dictum. What was discussed about tort

TORTS AND DAMAGES|gianna.ranx.tina.gi.sam.katz.alex.emjo.didy| FINALS REVIEWER| CASIS 2

by contract, and which gives rise to an action for damages. An

Intentional tort: Includes conduct where the actor desires to cause

includes assault, batter, false imprisonment, defamation,

actor fails to exercise due care in performing such acts or

used in French to mean wrong, derived from Latin tortus

fundamental concept of tort: wrongful act or omission +

commission or omission of duty of an act by one, without right,

Art. 2176, NCC

Essence of tort: defendants potential for civil liability to the victim

SC needed to have very strong reason not to follow what the

if applied today, would the result be the same? YES through

TORTS AND DAMAGES|gianna.ranx.tina.gi.sam.katz.alex.emjo.didy| FINALS REVIEWER| CASIS 3

why make intentional acts covered by QD? To make father and

Art. 2176 of the CC is so broad that it includes not only injuries to

Relevance: clarified that QD includes damage to property

Include or not to include intentional acts?

According to this case, Article 21 has wider scope than Article

BUT Aricle2176 discussion is not necessary (because

***Issue: WON QD covers intentional acts or not? If it covers intentional

TORTS AND DAMAGES|gianna.ranx.tina.gi.sam.katz.alex.emjo.didy| FINALS REVIEWER| CASIS 4

Reason behind the NCC Title on Damages: to see to it that

A2195, NCC: provisions on damages are applicable to all

A2196: rules under title of damages are w/o prejudice to

A2198: principles of general law on damages are adopted

Indemnity has to be proportionate to the fault and to the loss

In actions for damages, courts should award an amount

Kinds: compensatory, punitive, liquidated damages (damages

TORTS AND DAMAGES|gianna.ranx.tina.gi.sam.katz.alex.emjo.didy| FINALS REVIEWER| CASIS 5

involving negligent acts or omissions as well as involving

TORTS AND DAMAGES|gianna.ranx.tina.gi.sam.katz.alex.emjo.didy| FINALS REVIEWER| CASIS 6

TORTS AND DAMAGES|gianna.ranx.tina.gi.sam.katz.alex.emjo.didy| FINALS REVIEWER| CASIS 7

Does this pertain to QD? Maybe not. May be possible elements

Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is

TORTS AND DAMAGES|gianna.ranx.tina.gi.sam.katz.alex.emjo.didy| FINALS REVIEWER| CASIS 8

Important: Take note of 3 elements of QD: (1) damages

Sir: it must be injury not damages

Petitioner contends that the complaint is a claim for subsidiary

TORTS AND DAMAGES|gianna.ranx.tina.gi.sam.katz.alex.emjo.didy| FINALS REVIEWER| CASIS 9

CANGCO v MANILA RAILROAD

What is the breach of contract committed? Negligence, failure

SIR: in culpa aquiliana negligence must be proved, in culpa

Due diligence is NOT a defense in culpa contractual because it

FGU INSURANCE v GP SARMIENTO

TORTS AND DAMAGES|gianna.ranx.tina.gi.sam.katz.alex.emjo.didy| FINALS REVIEWER| CASIS 10

for alleged encroachment of a designated right of way. They found out

A2176 expressly excludes cases where there is a pre-existing

TORTS AND DAMAGES|gianna.ranx.tina.gi.sam.katz.alex.emjo.didy| FINALS REVIEWER| CASIS 11

quasi-delict since it is not expressly prohibited.

Qualifies Air France case: QD should be independent of BoC

Differences between QD and BoC in this case:

DOCTRINE: The act that breaks a contract may be also a tort.

TORTS AND DAMAGES|gianna.ranx.tina.gi.sam.katz.alex.emjo.didy| FINALS REVIEWER| CASIS 12

a. the existence of a contract does not preclude the commission of a

CONSOLIDATED BANK v. CA (2003)

Culpa Aquiliana (QD)

Culpa Contractual (BoC)