CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Gamboa vs. Cruz

Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including
petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the
absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court denied
said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and due process violated.
Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at
such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a
move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even
plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then
and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional
right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to
present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion
to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard.
Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Accused was the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational School,
which school is also located at del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. His duties included the collection of tuition
fees, preparation of vouchers for salaries of teachers and employees, and remittance
of collections exceeding P500.00 to the National Treasury. An information for malversation of public funds
was filed. A warrant of arrest was issued, but accused-petitioner could not be found. on 10 December
1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect creating the Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original
and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code. On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested. He was released on provisional liberty
upon the approval of his property bail bond. When arraigned by the RTC on 18 July 1985, he pleaded not
guilty. Upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the
Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quiones-Marcos opined that since Navallo had already been
arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking
cognizance of the case. The matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise.
The information was then docketed with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's arrest was issued by
the Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned with a certification by the RTC Clerk of Court that the
accused had posted a bail bond. Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending (1) that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over the offense and the person of the accused and (2) that since the accused had
already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would
constitute double jeopardy. However this was denied and trial ensued and he was found guilty.
Issue: Whether or Not the constitutional right against double jeopardy and in custodial investigations in
favor of the accused violated.
Held: No. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following requisites:
(1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction;
(2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case;
(3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and
(4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express consent.
The RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then had

already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with
conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed.
No. Appellant is not in custodial investigation. A person under a normal audit examination is not under
custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement
officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign
the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime (examined cash, as ordered by Espino, the provincial
auditor) appears to be belied by his own testimony.

People vs. Alicando

Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a minor, four
years of age, choking her with his right hand. The incident happened after appellant drank liquor. A
neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago found the victims body and the parents and police were informed. Appellant
was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length from Penecilla's house. Appellant was arrested and
interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the
basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and
recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a
stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution. He was
arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC
convicted him. Hence an automatic review for the imposition of death penalty.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners right to counsel and due process were violated.
Held: In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all important
confession of the appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing showing that appellant waived his
right to silence and to have competent and independent counsel. Despite the blatant violation of
appellant's constitutional right, the trial court allowed his uncounselled confession to flow into the records
and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death. It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned
as inadmissible, but also evidence derived therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged
bloodstains were evidence derived from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from
the appellant.
People vs. Bolanos
Facts: Oscar Pagdalian was murdered in Marble Supply, Balagtas Bulacan. According to Pat. Rolando
Alcantara and Francisco Dayao, deceased was with two companions on the previous night, one of whom
the accused who had a drinking spree with the deceased. When they apprehended the accused they found
the firearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly seated. They boarded accused
along with Magtibay, other accused on the police vehicle and brought them to the police station. While in
the vehicle Bolanos admitted that he killed the deceased. RTC convicted him hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not accused-appellant deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.
Held: Yes. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to
the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been
informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, more particularly
par. 1 and par. 3.
People vs. Judge Ayson

Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station.
It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management
notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with
PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with
the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by
Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given
to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling
said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa
was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos
written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the
accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was
not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration
filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and
statement of accused.
Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to
witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present in
case at bar).
This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of
subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a
witness against himself. It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a
prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character,
is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to
disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify
altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in Miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial,
no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
People vs. Macam
Facts: On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan Jr., Danilo Roque and Ernesto
Roque went to the house of Benito Macam (uncle of Eduardo Macam) located at 43 Ferma Road QC. Upon
the arrival of the accused, Benito invited the former to have lunch. Benito asked his maid Salvacion Enrera
to call the companions of Eduardo who were waiting in a tricycle outside the house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan
and D. Roque entered the house while E. Roque remained in the tricycle. After all the accused had taken
their lunch, Eduardo Macam grabbed the clutch bag of Benito Macam and pulled out his uncles gun then
declared a hold-up. They tied up the wife (Leticia Macam), children, maid (Salvacion) and Nilo Alcantara
and brought them to the room upstairs. After a while Leticia was brought to the bathroom and after she
screamed she was stabbed and killed by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo and Salvacion was also stabbed but
survived. The total value of the items taken was P536, 700.00.
Issue: Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. WON the arrest was valid. WON the
evidence from the line-up is admissible.
Held: It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before trial. A
police line-up is considered a critical stage of the proceedings. Any identification of an uncounseled

accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. HOWEVER, the prosecution did not present evidence
regarding appellants identification at the line-up. The witnesses identified the accused again in open
court. Also, accused did not object to the in-court identification as being tainted by illegal line-up.
The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. HOWEVER, they are estopped from questioning the
legality of such arrest because they have not moved to quash the said information and therefore
voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and
participating in trial. The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque, while remaining
outside the house served as a looked out.
Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque are guilty of the crime of
robbery with homicide as co-conspirators of the other accused to suffer reclusion perpetua.
People vs. Pinlac
Facts: The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for robbery and robbery with homicide.
He assailed his conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession
as evidence which was taken by force, violence, torture, and intimidation without having appraised of
his constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel.
Issue: Whether or not due process was observed during the custodial investigation of the accused.
Held: The court find it meritorious to declare that the constitutional rights of the accused was violated in
the failure of the authorities in making the accused understand the nature of the charges against him
without appraising him of his constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial investigation.
Moreover the prosecution merely presented the extrajudicial confession of the accused which is
inadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided therein are merely circumstantial and subject
for rebuttal. The court acquitted the accused.

RIGHT TO BAIL
People vs. Judge Donato
Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts
committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that:
(a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which
was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense
under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive
Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force
and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees.
Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he
shall report to the court once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner
filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to
present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not
comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention when
arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;

3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's
License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and
address was also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered and
paid for his arrest.
This however was denied. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.
Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital offense,
therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right
becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K
without hearing the prosecution.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the
crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.
Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were
made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in
the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of
a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of
the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose
waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law.
Comendador vs. De Villa
Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear in
person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for their alleged participation the failed coup on December
1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by
Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration, alleging denial
of due process.
In G.R. No. 95020, Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by the
General Court Martial (GCM) No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the
provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military
men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that
they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after
hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their
arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
Issues: (1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process; (2) Whether or not there was a violation of
the accused right to bail.
Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the
pre-trial investigation, instead they filed a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked
to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counteraffidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence."
Petitioners have a right to preemptory challenge.
It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the
Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with
the court-martial proceedings.

This is without merit. The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other
bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not
available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a
speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there was
substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP
Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year
because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup.
Manotoc vs. CA
Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a
motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to
the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said
motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and
26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the
issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation
Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which
granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty
could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Issue: Whether or not a person granted the right to bail has the absolute right to exercise his right to
travel.
Held: No. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to
make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction
on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason,
he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel
abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in
his behalf.
Government of Hong Kong vs. Olalia
Facts: Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3)counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud,
penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he
faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge. On September 13, 1999, the DOJ
received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private
respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same
day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was
opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail,
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a

high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off
to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge. Petitioner filed an urgent
motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
Held: No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the
arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is
based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the
prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and
should be granted bail.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed
that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but
higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition
court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS

Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report"
with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974,
containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary
of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of
the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then
Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the
Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of
a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on
April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was
accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential
Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was
submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt
practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all
affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the
Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the
Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12,
1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for
giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation
of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar,
President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the release
7

of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the
Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3)
counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years
1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the
prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy
disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were
violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a
falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures
prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits
and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the
Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding
investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the
prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination.
While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely
"directory," yet, on the other hand, it cannot be disregarded or ignored completely, with
absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or
justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had
just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the
back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the
man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later
as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in
turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who
joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that
"the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers
in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a
military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority
report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the
military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two
criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed
for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments
and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the
prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition
and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The

same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent
Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal
ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are
entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged,
declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with
the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter,
same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that
respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice
and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused; Whether or not there was a
violation of the double jeopardy clause.
Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases
which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due
process.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer
around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the
Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the AquinoGalman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to
the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President
ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided
that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference
was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro
were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the
meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the
President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag
moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to
the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from
Malacaang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman
murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided
the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist.
Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondentsaccused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television
that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore,
not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with
his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any
suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement
because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of
the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall
appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.

More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of
witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination, according to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these
persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran;
no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated
testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their confinement in a military
camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and
by Malacaang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos
had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the
Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the
accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and
disregarded.
The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his
authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder
cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer
who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business
coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and
treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only
after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and
voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as
mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at
bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system
is at stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued
without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no
judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing
out of it are void.
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan
from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the
respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew,
respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the
accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse
of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.

With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court
with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against
them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government,
is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no
majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of
office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Dumlao vs. Comelec

10

Facts: The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who
has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January
30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such,
has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo
Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. Petitioner
questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to
the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or provincial city official that already received retirement
benefits and is 65 years of age shall not be qualified to run for the same local elective office from which he
has retired. It is also provided that "Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State,
including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be
qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan
political activity therein: provided, that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall
be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a
civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the right of presumption of
innocence.
Held: Yes it is unconstitutional. Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the
fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional
presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground
alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is
fully heard.
That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that ". . . the
filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being
violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
Marquez vs. Comelec
Facts: It is averred that at the time respondent Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal
charge against him for ten counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending
before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed,
has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged flight from that country. Before the
May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of respondents certificate of candidacy on the ground of the
candidates disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code [Section 40. Disqualification.
The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position... (e) Fugitive from justice
in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.] was filed by petitioner, but COMELEC dismissed the
petition. Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon. Petitioner instituted quo warranto
proceedings against private respondent before the COMELEC but the latter dismissed the petition.

Issue: Whether private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy is said to be
facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term
fugitive from justice.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 provides:

11

Article 73. Disqualifications The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
xxxx(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers
to a person who has been convicted by final judgment.
It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer only to persons who has been convicted by
final judgment. However, COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent
is a fugitive from justice when it out rightly denied the petition for quo warranto. The Court opted to
remand the case to COMELEC to resolve and proceed with the case.
The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible constitutional
infirmity of Section 40(e) of RA 7160 if the disqualification therein meant were to be so taken as to
embrace those who merely were facing criminal charges. A similar concern was expressed by Senator R. A.
V. Saguisag who, during the bicameral conference committee of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, made this reservation: de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the
scope of fugitive. Medyo bothered ako doon, a.
The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991. It provided:
Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local
position: (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice
refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. It includes those who after being charged
flee to avoid prosecution. The COMELEC is directed to proceed and settle the case in conformity of the
given clarification with the term fugitive from justice.
Corpus vs. People
Facts: Petitioner seeks reversal of the lower courts decision finding him guilty for malversation of public
funds. The accused was the acting supervising cashier at the Provincial Treasurers office. He denied
having misused the whole amount of P72,823.08 which was discovered to be a shortage from
the government funds contending that the P50,000.00 was the unliquidated withdrawal made by their
paymaster Pineda thru the 4 checks he issued while the petitioner was on leave and that he was forced by
their Provincial Treasurer Aluning to post said amount in his cash book despite not actually receiving the
amount.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in observing the presumption of innocence of the accused of the
charge against him
Held: It is held that presumption of innocence of the accused should yield to the positive findings that he
malversed the government funds considering all the evidences presented that point out to his guilt on the
charge imputed against him. Records shows that the checks issued for the paymaster were duly liquidated
to the accused and there were inconsistent entries on his cash books and that he was not really on leave
on the day the said checks were disbursed by the paymaster.
Right to be Heard by Himself and Counsel
People vs. Holgado
Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal
detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without
justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight
hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel)

12

and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the latter.

Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.

Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be
informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires
the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be
allowed for procuring attorney. This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused
"shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing
unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does not
show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the
commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on
this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed
instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court
became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the
same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a
mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all,
the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the
qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.
People vs. Agbayani
Facts: The appellant was charged for raping his 14-year old daughter and was found guilty of the crime of
rape. A motion for a new trial was filed before the court by the new counsel of the accused assailing the
irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused invoking the failure of the court to inform
the accused of his right to choose his own counsel and the violation of the appellants right for a 2 day
preparation for trial. In the instant case, the trial court appointed two de oficio counsel who assisted the
appellant at his arraignment, one of whom extensively cross-examined the first witness for the
prosecution, Dr. Florante Baltazar.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the
accused of the right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment of conviction and to send
the case back for a new trial.
Held: It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the
accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial
court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of
cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus
it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved that the trial
court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was
informed by the court of such right. Besides, it is only in this appeal that appellant raised the issue of the
failure of the trial court to inform him of the right to counsel. At no time did he previously raise it in the
trial court despite ample opportunity to do so. His consent to be assisted by counsel de oficio, coupled with
said counsel's extensive cross-examination of Dr. Baltazar, may even be considered a waiver of his right to
question the alleged failure of the trial court to inform him of his right to counsel.
Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of Accusation

13

Pecho vs. People

Facts: The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for the complex crime of
attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document was assailed with the contention of
the defense that the accused may not be convicted of the crime for double jeopardy. The charge against
the accused was on violation of RA 3019 of which he was acquitted because it only penalizes
consummated crime. In the absence of evidence that shows that the crime was consummated the accused
was acquitted but the court held judgment of prosecuting his conviction for attempted estafa thru
falsification of official and commercial document which is necessarily included in the crime charged.
Accused invokes the defense of double jeopardy since his acquittal from the charge involving RA 3019 is a
bar for prosecution on the crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial
document and that the accused was not informed of this charge against him in the filing of the
information.

Issue: Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the crime to which he is
convicted
Held: The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the crime he is charged with as follows:

To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make
his defense;
To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the
same cause;
To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had.
In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not conclusions of law. The complaint
must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. What
determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated
in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. It follows
then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which although not the one charged, is necessarily
included in the latter. It has been shown that the information filed in court is considered as charging for
two offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to object therefore he can be convicted for both or
either of the charges.
However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient evidence that would establish the guilt
of the accused as conspirator to the crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt, the prior decision of the SC
was deemed to be based merely on circumstantial evidence, thus the accused was acquitted.
Soriano vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an Asst. Fiscal, was assigned to
investigate. In the course of the investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 from Tan as price for
dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the NBI which set up an entrapment. Tan was given a Php.2000,
marked bill, and he had supplied the other half. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed
with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty as
a principal in violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.3019). A motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the crime

14

Held: The petitioner claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because
to do so would be violative of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which has been reproduced herein clearly
makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.
Borja vs. Mendoza
Facts: Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was not arraigned.
That notwithstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a
decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was appealed to the Court o First Instance
in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged that the failure to arraign him is a violation
of his constitutional rights. It was also alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without requiring
him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered The Solicitor
General commented that the decision should be annulled because there was no arraignment.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioners constitutional right was violated when he was not arraigned.
Held: Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as
to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his
guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. It is
also not just due process that requires an arraignment. It is required in the Rules that an accused, for the
first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he
is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state
is mobilized against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him.
Also, respondent Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment. With
the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is correct
that the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for
being null. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of due
process to ensure a fair and impartial trial.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining
dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and
set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976,
affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The case is remanded to
the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect and
observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner.
Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
People vs. Tee
Facts: The case involves an automatic review of judgment made against Tee who was convicted for illegal
possession of marijuana and sentenced to death. The defense assailed the decision of the court for taking
admissible as evidence the marijuana seized from the accused by virtue of allegedly general search
warrant. They further contend that the accused was deprived of his right to speedy trial by failure of the
prosecution to produce their witness who failed to appear during the 20 hearing dates thereby slowing
down the trial procedure.
Issue: Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial prejudiced during the hearing
of the case.
Held: The court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and speedy trial was not violated.
It held that the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides that the trial period for the criminal cases should be in
general 180 days. However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more
than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.

15

The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or (3)
when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried.
It was shown by the records that the prosecution exerted efforts in obtaining a warrant to compel the
witness to testify. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative where several factors are weighed
such as the length of time of delay, the reason of such delay, and conduct of prosecution and the accused
and the prejudice and damaged caused to the accused of such delay. The court did not find the 20 days of
delayed hearing unreasonable length of time as to constitute deprivation of the constitutional rights of the
accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact that court trial may be always subjected to postponement
for reasonable cause of delay. In the absence of showing that the reason for delay was capricious or
oppressive, the State must not be deprived of reasonable opportunity in prosecuting the accused.
Conde vs. Rivera
Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no
less the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and
counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice
been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more than one
year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her
troubles as she was when originally charged.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.
Held: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a
right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in
defiance of law. We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause,
secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time,
as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to
compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom.

Right of Confrontation
US vs. Javier
Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of October 22, 1915, fastened his carabao valued at P150 in his corral
situated in the barrio of Trapiche municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas. On the following morning
when he went to look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral open and that the carabao had
disappeared. He reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary under the
leadership of sergeant Presa, now deceased, on the 20th of November following, encountered the accused
Lazaro Javier, Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading the carabao. When the ladrones saw the
Constabulary, that scattered in all directions. On the following day, the Constabulary found this carabao
tied in front of the house of one Pedro Monterola in the barrio of Santa Clara, municipality of San Pablo. The
carabao was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been taken from his corral on the
night of October 22, 1915, and by the Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of the accused.
As corroborative of such evidence, we have the well-known legal principle, which as applied to cases of
this character is that, although the persons who unlawfully took a certain carabao are not recognized at

16

the time, and their identity remains entirely unknown, nevertheless, if the stolen animal is found in the
possession of the accused shortly after the commission of the crime and they make no satisfactory
explanation of such possession they may be properly convicted of the crime. (See U. S. vs. Divino [1911],
18 Phil., 425.) In the present instance, the attempt of the accused to insinuate that one of the
Constabulary soldiers testified against them falsely because of enmity is hardly believable.
The foregoing statement of the facts and the law disposes of all but one assignment of error, namely, that
the lower court erred in admitting Exhibit B of the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn
statement of sergeant Presa, now deceased, whose signature was identified, before the justice of the
peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas. Appellant's argument is predicated on the
provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says, "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, section 15 (5), which says that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: . .
. to be confronted at the trial by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him." With reference to the
clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day said in a case of the Philippine origin
(Dowdell vs. U. S. [1911], 221 U. S., 325) that it "intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so
far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the
trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of crossexamination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon deposition or ex parte
affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the
exercise of the right of cross-examination." In other words, confrontation is essential because crossexamination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the
department and appearance of the witness while testifying. (U. S. vs. Anastacio [1906], 6 Phil., 413.) The
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied this constitutional provisions on behalf of accused
persons in a number of cases. (See for example U. S. vs. Tamjuanco
[1902], 1 Phil., 374; U. S. vs. Bello [1908], 11 Phil., 526; U. S. vs. De la Cruz [1908], 12 Phil., 87.) It is for us
now to determine whether the present facts entitle the accused to the protection of the Bill of Rights or
whether the facts fall under some exception thereto.
The sworn statement of Presa was not made by question and answer under circumstances which gave the
defense an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to
confrontation is therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement again is not the testimony of a witness deceased,
given in a former action between the same parties relating to the same matter. Consequently, the
exception provided by section 298, No. 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the prosecution
in the lower court is also inapplicable. Nor is the statement of Presa a dying declaration or a deposition in a
former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary examination. Under these circumstances, not to
burden the opinion with an extensive citation of authorities, we can rely on the old and historic case of R.
vs. Paine (1 Salk., 281 [King's Bench Div.]) occurring in the year 1696. It appears that a deposition of B.,
examined by the Mayor of Bristol under oath, but not in P's presence, was offered. It was objected that B,
being dead, the defendant had lost all opportunity of cross-examining him. The King's Bench consulted
with the Common Pleas, and "it was the opinion of both courts that these deposition should not be given in
evidence, the defendant not being present when they were taken before the Mayor and so had lost the
benefit of a cross-examination." Although we are faced with the alternative of being unable to utilize the
statements of the witness now deceased, yet if there has been no opportunity for cross-examination and
the case is not one coming within one of the exceptions, the mere necessity alone accepting the statement
will not suffice. In fine, Exhibit B was improperly received in evidence in the lower court.
With such a resolution of this question, we could, as has been done in other cases, further find this to be
reversible error and remand the case for a new trial. We are convinced, however, that this would gain the
accused nothing except delay for the testimony of the owner of the carabao and of the two Constabulary

17

soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable evidence on behalf of the accused, is deemed sufficient to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The facts come under article 518, No. 3, in connection with article 520, as amended, of the Penal Code.
Accordingly the defendants and appellants are each sentenced to four years, two months, and one day of
presidio correccional, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay one-third part of costs of
both instances; the carabao shall be returned to Doroteo Natividad, if this has not already been done. So
ordered
Talino vs. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: Talino, along with several others, were charged in four separate informations with estafa through
falsification of public documents for having allegedly conspired to defraud the government in
the totalamount of P26,523.00, representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken, butactu
ally not needed and never made, on fourgovernment vehicles, through falsification of the supporting
papers to authorize the illegal payments. The cases were tried jointly for all the accused until
Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which were
allowed. At one of the proceedings, Pio Ulat gave damaging testimony against Talino. The Sandiganbayan
rendered its decision in all the four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang Ulat and Renato Valdez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged while absolving the other
defendantsfor insufficient evidence. This decision is now challenged by Talino on the ground that it
violateshis right of confrontation as guaranteed by theConstitution.- In its decision, the court made the ff
remarks: The peculiarity of the trial of these cases is the fact that We allowed, upon their petition, separate
trials for the accused Basilio and Talino and Macadangdang. This being the case, We can only consider, in
deciding these cases as against them, the evidence for the, prosecution as went as their
own evidence. Evidence offered by the other accused cannot be taken up. It would really have
been simpler had
there been no separate trialbecause the accused Pio Ulat said so manyincriminatory things against the oth
er accused when he took the stand in his own defense. But because Basilio,
Talino and Macadangdang were granted separate trials and they did not cross-examine Ulat because, as a
matter of fact, they were not even required to be present when the other accused were presenting their
defenses, the latters testimonies cannot now be considered against said three accused.- The grant of a
separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is not a matter of right to the accused,
especially where, as in this case, it is sought after the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution. The
rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost circumspection in granting a motion for
separate trial, allowing the same only after a thorough study of the claimed justification therefor, if only
to avoid the seriousdifficulties that may arise, such as the oneencountered and regretted by the
respondent court, in according the accused the right of confrontation.- The right of confrontation is one of
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution
who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given chance to cross-examine them on
their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his absence nor is
any derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons
who cannot stand by their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. In
United States v. Javier: confrontation is essential because cross-examination is essential. A second reason
for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the deportment and appearance of the witness
while testifying.
ISSUE: WON the decision of the court violates Talinos right of confrontation as guaranteed by
the Constitution

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HELD: NO- The court has carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the respondent court
did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting Talino. The part of that decision finding Talino
guilty made no mention of Ulat at all but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in approving
the questioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle the government. Talino
makes much of the statement in the Comment that the petitioner's guilt
could be deduced "from the evidence for the prosecution and from the testimony of Pio Ulat,"
But that was not the respondent court speaking. That was the Solicitor General's analysis. As far as the
Sandiganbayan was concerned, the said testimony was inadmissible against the petitioner because he
did not cross examine Ulat and was not even required to be present when the latter was testifying. In
fact, the respondent court even expressed the wish that Ulat had been presented as rebuttal witness in the
separate trial of the petitioner as there would then have been "no impediment to the use of his testimony
against the other accused. " As it was not done, the trial court could not and did not
consider Ulat's testimony in determining the petitioners part in the offenses.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
US vs. Tan Teng
Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the
house of the victim and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and
place his private parts over hers. Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called
gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about what had happened and reported it to the police.
Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. He was then stripped of his
clothing and was examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The
policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to
the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.
The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired came from the
defendant herein. Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The
defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his
right against self-incrimination.
Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendants rights
against self-incrimination.
Held: The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of the said right. He
was neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was taken from
his body without his objection and was examined by competent medical authority.
The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may
be material. It would be the same as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him
may be used as evidence against him.
Villaflor vs. Summers
Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to
subject herself into physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the determine
the crime of adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical examination
interposing the defense that such examination was a violation of her constitutional rights against self-

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incrimination.
Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioners constitutional rights
against self-incrimination.

Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no
person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition
against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular
inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.

Beltran vs. Samson

Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as
ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a
violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the
prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued
that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself.
Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing
the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified,
constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under
examination.
Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and
forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of
submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or
the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and
attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to
determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except
that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in
one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between
one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his
handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be
contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not
granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal
treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting.
But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means
complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It
might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are
accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for
the protection of innocent persons.
Chavez vs. CA
FACTS: this is a petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner invoking jurisdiction of the Supreme Court that he is
entitled to be freed from imprisonment upon ground that trial which resulted his conviction, HE WAS
DENIED OF HISCONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY AGAINSTHIMSELF.>judgment
of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle(thunderbird car together with accessories)>an
information was filed against the accused together with other accused, that they conspired, with intent to
gain and abuse of confidence without the consent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle.>all the accused
plead not guilty.>during the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be the first witness.

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Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary
witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the
judge ruled in favor of the fiscal on the grounds that (1) the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act
as witness on the witness stand including the accused(2) If there should be any question that is
incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if
and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate him. (3) Counsel
has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which would
incriminate him
ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self incrimination had been violated?
Held: We have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full
breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did
not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the
contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner nevertheless answered the
questions in spite of his fear of being accused of perjury or being put under contempt, this circumstance
cannot be counted against him. His testimony is not of his own choice. To him it was a case of compelled
submission. He was a cowed participant in proceedings before a judge who possessed the power to put
him under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape testifying. The court made it
abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct examination would be taken right then and there on
the first day of the trial.

Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners

Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners.
It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel
for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon,
petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt
from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand,
the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the
witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a
question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right
against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first
witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for
malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.
Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the SelfIncrimination Clause.
Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination
clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. The Court
found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case
may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner
would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the
revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right
to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a

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presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he
chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief
that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives
should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect
accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded
an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the
dignity and integrity of its citizens.
Prohibited Punishment
People vs. Esparas
Facts: Esparas was charged with violation of DDA for importing 20kg of shabu. After arraignment and
pleading not guilty, she escaped from jail and was tried in absentia. She was found guilty and was
sentenced to death. She remains at large at present.
Issue: Whether the Court may proceed to automatically review Esparass death sentence despite her
absence.
Held: Yes. In US v. Laguna (1910), the Court held that its power to review a decision imposing the death
penalty cannot be waived either by the accused or by the courts. There, the Court said, mainly, that
the judgment of conviction (capital punishment of death) entered on trial is not final, cannot be executed,
and is wholly without force or effect until the cause has been passed upon byte Supreme Court. TC acts as
a commissioner who takes the testimony and reports the same to the Court with its recommendation. A
decision of TC does not become final unless and until it has been reviewed by the Court. An accused who
was sentenced with the highest penalty is entitled under the law to have the sentence and all the facts
and circumstances upon which it is founded placed before the Court, as the highest tribunal of the land,
to the end that its justice and legality may be clearly and conclusively determined. Such procedure is
merciful. It gives a second chance for life. Neither the courts nor the accused can waive it. It is a positive
provision of the law that brooks no interference and tolerates no evasions. (The Court here applied Sec. 50,
Gen. Orders No.58.)A little history on the matter: The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit the imposition of
the death penalty. Section 2(4) of Art. VIII provided for review by the Court of death penalty cases. Both
the Rules of Court of 1940 and 1964 require the transmission to the Court of the records of all cases in
which the death penalty was imposed by TC, whether the defendant has appealed or not, for review and
judgment. These rules were taken from the General Orders itself. The 1973 Constitutions did not also
prohibit death penalty. Sec. 9, Rule 122 provided the procedure for review of death penalty cases by
the Court. Sec. 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure even reenacted said procedure of
review and even expressly used the term "automatic review and judgment" by the Court. So in People v.
Villanueva (1953), the Court held that the withdrawal of appeal by a death convict does not deprive the
Court of jurisdiction to review his conviction. In People v. Cornelio (1971),which involved the escape of a
death convict, the Court held that said escape does not relieve the Court of its duty of reviewing his
conviction. In People v. Daban (1972), the Court said, speaking about convictions by TC of death
penalty on the defendant, that until after the Court has spoken enconsulta, no finality could be attached to
said decision. This automatic review cannot be waived bathe accused nor by the courts. The mere fact of
escape of the accused cannot be a bar at all. In People v. Saliling (1976), the Court said that it is not
precluded from reviewing the death sentence of an accused who is at large. In People v. Buynay (1984),
the Court reiterated the rule that escape of a death convict will not automatically result in the dismissal of
his appeal.
Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice

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Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO
arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on
the power of the executive to grant reprieve.
Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and executory, still
has jurisdiction over the case
Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality
of the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the
judgment has become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.
The power to control the execution of the SCs decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot
be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or
criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance
of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It
is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent
and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conform to law and justice.
The Court also rejected public respondents contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect
granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be
claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final
conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is
indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of
reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the execution of the death
convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law
by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of
commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be
considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The
powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude
each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the
Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of
co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government.
Double Jeopardy
People vs. Obsania
Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balangao,
Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege
vivid designs in the info. Said motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the prosecution appealed.
Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy.
Held: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained
in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge, d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to
dismiss. The doctrine of double jeopardy as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is
dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a
waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from
proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of the

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accused but even upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113,
if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal.
Paulin vs. Gimenez
Facts: Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were smothered with dust when they were
overtaken by the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, Mabuyo followed the vehicle until the
latter entered the gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby security guard for the identity of the
owner of the vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his duties, petitioners allegedly pointed their guns
at him. Thus, he immediately ordered his subordinate to call the police and block road to prevent the
petitioners escape. Upon the arrival of the police, petitioners put their guns down and were immediately
apprehended.
A complaint grave threats was filed against the petitioners (Criminal Case No. 5204). It was dismissed by
the court acting on the motion of the petitioners. Mabuyo filed a MOR thus the dismissal was reversed.
Thereafter, petitioners filed for certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief of preliminary injunction and
the issuance of a TRO (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed for lack of merit and for being a prohibited
pleading and ordered to proceed with the trial of the case. Hence, this instant petition.
Issues: (1) Whether or Not the dismissal of 5204 was a judgment of acquittal; (2) Whether or Not the
judge ignored petitioners right against double jeopardy by dismissing CEB-9207.
Held: For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the
accused. Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused, he has
deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was
granted upon motion of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach.
Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The latter is always based on merit that
shows that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not guilty. While the former, in the case at bar,
terminated the proceedings because no finding was made as to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners.
The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the order of dismissal for the reception of further
evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and
dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right to complete the presentation of its evidence.
The rule on summary procedure was correctly applied.
People vs. Balicasan
Facts: Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being arraigned, he
entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted y counsel. At his counsel de officio, he was
allowed to present evidence and consequently testified that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense. In
addition, he stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On the basis of the
testimony of the accused, he was acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed.

Issue: Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.

Held: The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is an essential requisite
to double jeopardy. The accused had first entered a plea of guilty but however testified that he acted in
complete self-defense. Said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo
should have required him to plead a new charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered

24

for him. This was not done. Therefore, there has been no standing of plea during the judgment of acquittal,
so there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.

Esmena vs. Pogoy

Facts: Petitioners Esmea and Alba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of Cebu City for
allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to be given
to them because the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded Not Guilty.
No trial came in after the arraignment due to the priests request to move it on another date. Sometime
later Judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug.16, 1979 but the fiscal informed the court that it
received a telegram stating that the complainant was sick. The accused invoked their right to speedy trial.
Respondent judge dismissed the case because the trial was already dragging the accused and that the
priests telegram did not have a medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to recognize the
complainants reason to be valid in order to reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed
a motion to revive the case and attached the medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that the
priest was indeed sick of influenza. On Oct.24, 1979, accused Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss
the case on the ground of double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due to
complainants failure to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy
Held: Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has
been dismissed already without the consent of the accused which would have an effect of an acquittal on
the case filed. The dismissal was due to complainants incapability to present its evidence due to non
appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar further prosecution of the
defendant for the same offense. For double jeopardy to exist these three requisites should be present, that
one, there is a valid complaint or information filed second, that it is done before a court of competent
jurisdiction and third, that the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or
information. In the case at bar, all three conditions were present, as the case filed was grave coercion, filed
in a court of competent jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last the accused were
arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or the information. When these three conditions are present
then the acquittal, conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case without his
express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. In the
case, it was evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and asked for the trial of
the case and not its termination which would mean that respondents had no expressed consent to the
dismissal of the case which would make the case filed res judicata and has been dismissed by the
competent court in order to protect the respondents as well for their right to speedy trial which will be
equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further prosecution.
People vs. Relova
FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders
of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the
ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975,
Batangas police together with personnel of Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search
warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena
Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric wiring devices have been installed
without authority from the city government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building.
Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in
the plants electric meter. The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was filed

25

nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act being a light
felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was filed against Mr.
Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding
unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount
of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy.
The Assistant fiscals claim is that it is not double jeopardy because the first offense charged against the
accused was unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the approval and necessary authority
from the City Government which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as
opposed to the second offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code
making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint against Mr.Opulencia.
Issue: Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the second
offense charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of electricity
punishable by a statute against the Revised Penal Code.
Held: Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense because as
tediously explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of double
jeopardy. The first would be that No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense and the second sentence states that If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the
conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act. In the case at bar, it was very
evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double
jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. It further explains that
even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an
ordinance and the second charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two
charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance
shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that
Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the
same identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.

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