Benedicto vs.

Dela Rama
Facts:
1.ON July 5, 1902, the CFI entered a final judgment decreeing a divorce to theplaintiff (Agueda
Benedicta dela Rama) on the ground of husbands adulteryand ordered Esteban Dela Rama to pay her
P81,042.76 due her as her unpaidshare of the property belonging to the conujugal partnership, as well
as thesum of P3,200 as an allowance for their support.
Issue: Whether the CFI has jurisdiction to hear divorce cases?Ruling:
The partidas recognized adultery as a ground for divorce. Therefore, according tothe civil as well as the
canonical law in force here on August 13, 1898, thecommission of that offense gave the injured party
the right to a divorce. Thatprovision of the substantive civil law was not repealed by the change of
sovereignty. The complete separation under the American Government of churchand state, while it
changed the tribunal in which this right should be enforced, couldnot affect the right itself. The fact that
the ecclesiastical courts no longer exercisesuch power is not important. The jurisdiction formerly
possessed by them is nowvested in Courts of First Instance, by virtue of Act No. 136. Section 56, first and
fifthparagraphs of that act, provides that "Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction, first, in
all civil actions in which the subject of litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation; fifth, . . . and in
all such special cases and proceedings as arenot otherwise provided for." The result is (1) that Courts of
First instance have jurisdiction to entertain a suit fordivorce; (2) that the only ground therefor is
adultery; (3) that an action on thatground can be maintained by the husband against the wife, or by the
wife againstthe husband; and (4) that the decree does not dissolve the marriage bond. TheCourt of First
Instance of Iloilo, therefore, committed no error in assuming jurisdiction of this case.(2) A motion for a
new trial having been made in the court below on the ground thatthe findings of fact contained in the
decision were not justified by the evidence, itbecomes necessary to examine that evidence. The adultery
of the defendant was duly proved. The finding that the plaintiff had not committed adultery is, however,
plainly andmanifestly against the weight of the evidence.For the sin of each one of them is of itself a bar
to an accusation against the other.Our conclusion is that neither one of the parties is entitled to a
divorce. The result makes it unnecessary to consider that part of the judgment which relatesto the
settlement of the conjugal partnership.

Albano vs Gapusan
Albano vs. Gapusan
AM No. 1022-MJ, May 7, 1976

FACTS:

Redentor Albano filed a complaint against Judge Gapusan seeking disciplinary action involving latters
malpractice in his notarization of a separation agreement between Valentina Andres and Guillermo
Maligta and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. Likewise, a complaint was filed
alleging that said Judge influenced Judge Crispin of CFI-Ilocos in deciding two criminal cases. In the
abovementioned separation agreement, it was stipulated that the spouse guilty of adultery or
concubinage shall be barred to file an action against the other. Respondent judge denied that he drafted
the said agreement and explained that the spouses had been separated for a long time when they
signed it and the wife had begotten children with her paramour. He further added that there was a
stipulation in the said agreement that the spouse would live together in case of reconciliation.
ISSUE: WON Judge Gapusan should be reprimanded because of notarizing the void agreement between
the spouses.
HELD:
A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the
separation of the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership.
There is no question that the stipulation contained in the said separation agreement is contrary to law,
morals and good customs. The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
protects. To preserve the institution of marriage, the law considers void any contract for personal
separation between husband and wife and every extra-judicial agreement for the dissolution of the
partnership. SC held the action of respondent judge Gapusan as contrary to law.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. 139 SCRA 139 October 8, 1985 Fact of the Case: Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is
citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States, were
married on 1972 at Hongkong. On 1982, they got divorced in Nevada, United States; and the petitioner
remarried to Theodore Van Dorn. On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking
that the petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgement in the divorce proceeding before
Nevada Court where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property. The lower court
denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines, that
the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. Respondent avers that Divorce Decree abroad cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines. Issue: (1)Whether or not the divorce obtained the
spouse valid to each of them. (2)Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal
properties. Held: As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen.As he is
bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Only Philippine Nationals are covered by the policy

against absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. Alicia Reyes under our National law is still considered married to private respondent. However,
petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support
to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.

Goitia vs Campos-Rueda
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on
January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a
month before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent
for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and
demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing,
respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body
parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her
husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting
her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.
HELD:
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage.
The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation
either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However,
this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate
his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his
wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the
lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband
for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.

Somera vs PilapilUnder Article 344 of the Revised PenalCode,

17

the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecutedexcept upon a
sworn written complaint filed bythe
offended spouse
.Now, the law specifically provides that inprosecutions for adultery and concubinage theperson who
can legally file the complaint should bethe offended spouse, and nobody else When said respondent
initiated the divorceproceeding, he obviously knew that there would nolonger be a family nor marriage
vows to protectonce a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.Neither would there be a danger of
introducingspurious heirs into the family, which is said to beone of the reasons for the particular
formulation of our law on adultery, Facts:Erich Geiling and Imelda Manalaysaywere married in
Germany. It turned sour not longafter and respondent filed a divorce decree inGermany. After just five
months, Erich comes toPhilippine courts to file for adultery against former wife.Issue:Does former
husband still has cause of action?Held: No, here can be no marital right to beclaimed from a marital
bond that has
beensevered.**********************************************************Campos vs
CamposThe admission of homosexuality does notautomatically mean immoralIn this case, Judge
Campos filed for annulmentsince he is a homosexual and his children knowthis and shy away from him.
He said he is alreadyliving in their basement. Wife says that husband isnot psycholigcally incapacitated
and files for a legalseparation. Wife also alleges that husbandddeclared a title lost for personal
sake.Issue: WON homosexuality per se is a ground for art 36 or legal separationHeld: No it is not
automatically so.
Dismissed.**********************************************************When may petition be
filed?Lapuz vs EufemioCarmen Lopez filed legal separation againsteufemio as the latter abandoned their
homehaving no child and cohabited with a Chinese.Eufemio counterclaimed with a petition for
absolutenullity on the ground of his subsisting marriageunder Chinese laws. While this was
proceeding,Carmen died and was substituted by MacarioLapuz.Issue:When an action for legal
separation is converted bythe counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullityof a marriage, does the
death of a party abate theproceedings?Held:Yes, the death of the spouse extinguishes the rightto file a
claim for divorce.Notes:A further reason why an action for legal separationis abated by the death of the
plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights aremere effects of decree of separation,
their sourcebeing the decree itself; without the decree suchrights do not come into existence, so that
beforethe finality of a decree, these claims are merelyrights in expectation An action for legal
separation which involvesnothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being
no absolute divorce inthis jurisdiction) is purely personal.Being personal in character, it follows that
thedeath of one party to the action causes the deathof the action itself
actio personalis moritur cum persona.*******************
Matubis vs PraxedisSocorro and Zoila after getting married could notagree on living together so they
separated anddeposed an agreement part of which says thateach is free to cohabit and no filing of
adultery or concubinage can be filed.Issue: WON wife can file for legal separationHeld: No. Due to
prescrtiption and due to theaffidavit signed by both. Condonation and consentextinguishes the right to

file for legal

separatiom.***************************************************************************
*****************************************
Court Procedure in Legal Separation Araneta vs
Concepcion********************************************************Somosa vs
VamonteThe loss affection on the part of one or both maybe discernible. Nonetheless, it will not serve
publicinterest, much less the welfare of the husband or the wife, to allow them to go their respective
ways.Where there are offspring, the reason for maintaining the conjugal union is even
moreimperative.It is conceded that the period of six months fixedtherein Article 103 (Civil Code) is
evidentlyintended as a cooling off period to make possible areconciliation between the spouses. The
recital of their grievances against each other in court mayonly fan their already inflamed passions
againstone another, and the lawmaker has imposed theperiod to give them opportunity for
dispassionatereflection. But this practical expedient, necessaryto carry out legislative policy, does not
have theeffect of overriding other provisions such as thedetermination of the custody of the children
andalimony and support pendente lite according to thecircumstance ... The law expressly enjoins
thatthese should be determined by the court accordingto the circumstances. If these are ignored or
thecourts close their eyes to actual facts, rankinjustice may be caused."
4

At any rate, from thetime of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4, 1971, more than six
months certainlyhad elapsed. Thus there can be no moreimpediment for the lower court acting on the
motionof petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminarymandatory injunction.Issue: WON a motion
for writ of preliminaryinjunction can prosper while the legal separationcase is still pending for 6 months
or during thecooling off period Held:Yes, because there is n doubt that the husbandfrom which
petitioner is shunning away from andthreatened her life should not be denied theprotection of the law
sought out even during thecooling off period.There would appear to be then a recognition thatthe
question of management of their respectiveproperty need not be left unresolved even duringsuch sixmonth period. An administrator may evenbe appointed for the management of the propertyof the
conjugal partnership. The absolute limitationfrom which the court suffers under the precedingarticle is
thereby eased. The parties may in themeanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's
insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction should not beignored by the lower
court. There is all the morereason for this response from respondent Judge,considering that the
husband whom she accusedof concubinage and an attempt against her lifewould in the meanwhile
continue in themanagement of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was
notspecifically denied by
him.**********************************************************Pacete vs Cariaga