Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Rd. 3
three quarters of our planet. It comes from the Greek Okeanos, a river believed to
circle the globe. The word sea can also mean the vast ocean covering most of the world. But it
more commonly refers to large landlocked or almost landlocked salty waters smaller than the
great oceans, such as the Mediterranean Sea or the Bering Sea. Sailors have long referred to all
the world's waters as the seven seas. Although the origin of this phrase is not known for certain,
many people believe it referred to the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, the
Black Sea, the Adriatic Sea, the Caspian Sea, and the Indian Ocean, which were the waters of
primary interest to Europeans before Columbus.
4. A stasis point is key to debate we offer the only one rooted in the
resolution.
Shively, Assistant Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, 2K [Ruth Lessl, Assistant
Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000 Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p.
182-3)
The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must
be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very
candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need
of the subversive for an order to subvert. But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as
usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that
order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell
us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some
ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless
rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly
some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further
contest. It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they
cannot admit to these implications, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons
as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of
rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic,
but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion. Yet
difficulties remain. For and then proceed to debate without attention to further
agreements. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities
premised on the building of progressive agreements. Imagine, for instance, that two
people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any
argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At
the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they
must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing
about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agreeand they do
so simply by entering into debatethat they will not use violence or threats in making
their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good
arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.
1NC Animals K
The Aff is simply a pause of violence papers over the ongoing war on the
non-human animal the end of the world they call for merely brings forth
the same plane where every human subject can kill or be killed within the
circuit of anthropocentrism. The Aff ignores the fundamental reversibility
of all violence.
Bell (PhD candidate in social philosophy at Binghamton) 11
(Aaron, The Dialectic of Anthropocentrism in Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, pg. 173-5)
displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and
crevices, as indigent and distorted 43 as it will appear one day in the
messianic light." It seems that our one conso- lation is that this perspective, at least in
relation to our treatment of other animals, obstinately returns and cannot be entirely
snuffed out for as long as we continue to exist as a species.
If we are finally to abandon the self-aggrandizing narrative of anthropocentrism
constructed in the West, we will have to begin by reconceptualizing the difference
between humans and animals in a way that does not operate under a destructive
exclusionary logic. Both for human beings and for animals, any
each of them can replace the murderer, in the same blind lust for
killing, as soon as he feels the power of representing the norm."
The Jew in Auschwitz, the Palestinian in the West Bank, the
Christian in Armenia, the enslaved African in the American South,
women everywhere they all have been reduced to the status of
animal and they all could do the same to others. We all can be reduced to
the "animal."
The Aff obscures the way the originary Human/Animal divide made civil
society, chattel slavery and coloniality possible
Pugliese (an Associate Professor of Cultural Studies at Macquarie University, Sydney) 13
(Joseph, State Violence and the Execution of Law, pg. 38-40)
In her The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery, Marjorie Spiegel asks the
provocative question: Comparing speciesism with racism? At first glance, many
only did the domestication of animals provide the model and inspiration
for human slavery and tyrannical government, Charles Patterson write s,
but it laid the groundwork for western hierarchical thinking and
European and American racial theories that called for conquest and
exploitation of lower races, while at the same time vilifying them as
animals so as to encourage and justify their subjugation.24 Jim
Mason amplifies Pattersons thesis, arguing, in his interlinking of the enslavement of
animals with larger colonial formations of power, that the establishment of agri-culture
operated as a license for conquest.25 The Latin etymology of the terms colony and
colonial colonia evidences the modalities of power over life that intertwine the
concept of a farm and a public settlement of Roman citizens in a hostile or newly
conquered country.26 In the prehistory of biopolitical power, the expropriated space of
a conquered country is inscribed with the genocidal extermination of the useless wild
animals and the enslavement of those that can be put to human use; in other words,
there is precisely what Foucault terms the biopolitical power to foster life or disallow it
to the point of death.27 This colonial move, then, is informed by a
biopolitics of speciesism that determines who will live and who will
die according to an anthro- pocentric hierarchy of life and its attendant
values of, amongst other things, economic productivity. The non-human animal is, in
this prehistorical moment, marked by an ineluctable fungibility that pre-dates the
transference of this same attribute to the human slave. In figuring forth her compelling
thesis that it is fungibility that characterizes the life and death of the black slave, Saidya
Hartman delineates its complex dimensions: The relation between pleasure and the
possession of slave property, in both figurative and literal senses, can be explained in
part by the fungibility of the slave that is, the joy made possible by virtue of the
replaceability in inter- changeability endemic to the commodity and by the extensive
capacities of property that is, the augmentation of the master subject through his
embod- iment in external objects and persons.28 In the colonial prehistory of biopolitics,
non-human animals are branded as either vermin to be exterminated so that, in
Foucaults titular phrase, society can be defended or, alternatively, as fungible objects
that are infinitely replaceable and exchangeable. The anthropocentrism of the master
subject augments the sense of embodied ownership over the enslaved animal while
legitimating their right over its life/death. The archaic development of colonial regimes of
governance over the life of animals pivots on a series of biopolitical technologies that
include capture, enclosure, harness, enforced labour, controlled breeding, castration,
branding and auctioning at markets. All of these animal technologies are invested, in
their ancient inception,29 with the biopolitical power of regularization, and it . . .
consists in making live and letting die.30 Moreover, all of these animal tech- nologies
will effectively be transposed to regimes of human slavery: the manage- ment of
livestock, Mason notes, operated as a model for the management of slaves.31
and the industrialized killing procedures of animal slaughterhouses) that they had
outlawed against animals. The Nazi state also exemplifies the manner in which the
regime of (animal) rights can be perfectly accommodated within the most genocidal
forms of state violence. This is so, precisely because the prior concept of human rights
is always-already founded on the human/animal biopolitical caesura and its asymmetry
of power otherwise the very categories of human and animal rights would fail to
achieve cultural intelligibility. The paternal distribution of rights to non-human animals
still pivots on this asymmetrical a priori. Even as it extends its seemingly benevolent
regime of rights and protections to animals, rights discourse, by disavowing this violent
a priori, merely reproduces the species war by other means. In order to short-circuit
this machine, a deconstructive move is needed, a move that refuses to
participate in the mere overturning of the binarized hierarchy, for example: animal >
human, and that effectively displaces the hierarchy by disclosing the conceptual aporias
that drive it. The challenge is to proceed to inhabit the hiatus, to run the risk
1NC Remembrance K
The AFFs remembrance is a paradox - The 1ACs call to endless representation of the Zongs events further entrenches the destructive
violence they isolate through a kind of psychic plagiarism that seeks
to assimilate the other into the narcissistic self
Kirkby, 06 (Joan, Department of Critical and Cultural Studies at Macquarie University,
Remembrance of the Future: Derrida on Mourning, Social Semiotics Vol. 16, No. 3,
September 2006, http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=df402c4770d2-4356-80fc-d0a1d8f6c5dd%40sessionmgr4002&vid=2&hid=4206, AW)
Derrida also recalls de Mans insistence on the performative structure of the text in
general as promise (1986, 93), and goes on to argue that the essence of speech is
the promise, that there is no speaking that does not promise, which at the same time
means a commitment toward the future through . . . a speech act and a commitment to
keep the memory of the said act, to keep the acts of this act (1986, 97). He also reflects
upon the significance of the word aporia in de Mans last texts, in which an absence of
path gives or promises the thinking of the path and provokes the thinking of
what still remains unthinkable or unthought (Derrida 1986, 132). The aporia
provokes a leap of memory and a displacement of thinking which leads toward a
new thinking. Aporicity promises an other thinking, an other text, the future of
another promise. All at once the impasse . . . becomes the most trustworthy, reliable
place or moment for reopening a question . . . which remains difficult to think.
(Derrida 1986, 132/133) The aporia engenders, stimulates, makes one write,
provokes thought . . .. There is in it the incalculable order of a wholly other: the
coming or the call of the other (Derrida 1986, 137). The aporia of de Mans death
has provoked Derridas re-reading of de Man and a re-casting of the process of
mourning. These ideas from de Man are then segued into the psychoanalytic model of
mourning to produce what I would argue is a new, intellectually and emotionally nuanced
model of mourning, a model wherein healthy psychic functioning depends neither
on a refusal to mourn or abandoning the dead. The Derridean model offers a respect
for the (dead) Other as Other; it allows agency to the mourner in the possibility of
an ongoing creative encounter with the Other in an externalising, productive,
future-oriented memory; it emphasises the importance of acting out the entrusted
responsibility, which is their legacy to us; it upholds the idea of community and
reminds us of our interconnectedness with our dead. And in a sort of irreligious
religiosity, it enables us to conceive of a bond greater than ourselves, the far
away within us. To summarise then. First, with regard to mourning, Derrida
privileges the process of incorporation, which classical psychoanalysis has been
seen as the pathological response to loss. He does this essentially because
incorporation acknowledges the other as other, while the so-called normal process
of mourning (introjection) merely assimilates the other into the self in a kind of
psychic plagiarism. Second, however, it is not an unreconstructed incorporation
that he recommends; he makes two important theoretical moves. In the distinction
between memory as interiorisation (erinnerung) and memory as a giving over to thinking
perspective of this knowledge that is older than ourselves; and this is why I say
that we being by recalling this to ourselves: we come to ourselves through this
memory of possible mourning. In other words this is precisely the allegory, this
memory of impossible mourning. Paul de man would perhaps say: of the
unreadability of mourning. The possibility of the impossible commands here the
whole rhetoric of mourning, and describes the essence of memory. Upon the
death of the other we are given to memory, and thus to interiorization, since the
other, outside us, is now nothing. And with the dark light of this nothing, we learn that
the other resists the closure of our interiorizing memory. With the noting of this
irrevocable memory. With the nothing of this irrevocable absence, the other appears as
other, and as other for us, upon his death or at least in the anticipated possibility of
a death, since death constitutes and makes manifest the limits of a me or an us who are
obliged to harbor something that is greater and other then them; something outside of
within them. Memory and interiorization: since Freud this is how the normal work of
mourning is often described. It entails a movement in which an interiorizing
idealization takes in itself or upon itself the body and voice of the other, the
others visage and person, ideally and quasi-literally devouring them. This
mimetic interiorization is not fictive; it is the origin of fiction, of apocryphal
figuration. It takes place in a body. Or rather, it makes a place for a body, a voice,
and a soul which, although ours, did not exist and had no meaning before this
possibility that one must always begin by remembering, and whose trace must be
followed. II faut, one must: it is the law, that law of the (necessary) relation of Being to
law. We can only live this experience in the form of an aporia: the aporia of
mourning and of prosopopeia, where the possible remains impossible. Where
success fails. And where faithful interiorization bears the other and constitutes
him in me (in us), at once living and dead. It makes the other no longer quite
seems to be the other, because we grieve for him and bear him in us, like an
unborn child, like a future. And inversely, the failure succeeds: an aborted
interiorization is at the same time a respect for the other as other, a sort of tender
rejection, a movement of renunciation which leaves the other alone, outside, over
there, in his death, outside of us.
Case
1. Past-oriented approaches towards whiteness neglect the way
future discourse affects the present futurity is key to full awareness
Baldwin, 11 (Andrew, Co-Director of the Institute of Hazard at the University of
Durhams Department of Geography, Whiteness and futurity: Towards a research
agenda, Progress in Human Geography 2012, originally published August 3, 2011,
http://phg.sagepub.com/content/36/2/172, AW)
My argument is that a past-oriented approach to accounting for geographies of
whiteness often neglects to consider how various forms of whiteness are shaped
by discourses of futurity. This is not to argue that a historicist approach to
conceptualizing white geographies is wrongheaded; the past continues to be a crucial
time-space through which to understand whiteness. It is, however, to argue that such a
past-focused orientation obscures the way the category of the future is invoked in
the articulation of whiteness. As such, any analysis that seeks to understand how
whitenesses of all kinds shape contemporary (and indeed past) racisms operates with
only a partial understanding of the time-spaces of whiteness. My argument is that we
can learn much about whitenesses and their corresponding forms of racism by
paying special attention to the ways in which such whitenesses are constituted by
futurity. I have offered some preliminary remarks on how we might conceptualize
geographies of whiteness qua futurity, but these should only be taken as starting points.
Much more pragmatically, what seems to be required is a fulsome investigation into the
way the future shapes white geographies. What might such a project entail? For one,
geographers would do well to identify whether and how the practice of governing
through the future inaugurates new and repeats old forms of whiteness. It would
also be worth comparing and contrasting how the future is made present in various
dialectical accounts of whiteness. For instance, what becomes of whiteness when
understood through the binary actual-possible as opposed to an actual-virtual
binary, which has been my main concern? Alternatively, what becomes of the
category of whiteness if it is shown to be constituted by a future that has no
ontology except as a virtual presence? And, perhaps more pressing, how might
whiteness be newly politicized? Futurity provides a productive vocabulary for
thinking about and challenging whiteness. It does not offer a means of overcoming
white supremacy, nor does it provide white people with a normative prescription for living
with their whiteness guilt- or worry-free. Futurity is, however, a lacuna in the study of
whiteness both in geography and outside the discipline, and this alone suggests
the need to take it seriously. But equally, and perhaps more urgently, there is the
need to study whiteness and futurity given how central the future is to
contemporary governance and politics. Indeed, at a moment when the future
features prominently in both political rhetoric in his inaugural speech, Obama
implores America to carry forth that great gift of freedom and [deliver] it safely to future
generations and everyday life, how people orient themselves towards the future
is indelibly political. The future impels action. For Mann (2007), it is central to
interest. For Thrift (2008), value increasingly arises not from what is but from what
is not yet but can potentially become, that is fromthe pull of the future. Attention to
whiteness and futurity may at minimum enable us to see more clearly the extent to
which the pull of whiteness into the future reconfigures what is to be valued in the
decades ahead.
We are encouraged to see ou rselves as Lhe vessels for the captive's return; we stand in the ancestor's shoes. We
imaginatively wi t- ness the crimes of the past and cry for those victimized -the enslaved, the ravaged, and the
slaughtered . And the obliterative assimilation of empathy enables us to cry for ou rselves, too. As we remember those
ancestors held in Lhe dungeons, we can't bul think of our own dishonored and devalued l ives and t he unrealized
aspirations and the broken promises of abolition, reconstruction, and the civil rights movemen t. The i n transigence of our
seemi ngly eternal secondclass status propels us Lo make recou rse to stories of origi n, unshakable explanatory
narratives, and sites of inju ry-the land where our blood has been spilt -asif some essen liaJ ingredien t of ourselves can
work to present by claimi ng that the tourist'sexcursion is theancestor'sreturn.Given this, what does the journey back bode
captivity and the incorporation of the dead? The most disturbing aspect of these reenactments is the suggestion that the
rupture of the Middle Passage is neither irreparable nor irrevocable but bridged by the tourist who acts as the vessel for
the ancestor. Inshort, the captive finds his redemption in the tourist.
that i n coming
to terms with trauma, there is the possibility of retrieving desirable aspects of the
past that might be used in rebuilding a new life.23 While LaCapra's argu men ts are persuasive,
I wonder to what degree the backward glance can provide us with the vision to
build a new life? To what extent need we rely on the past in transforming the
present or, as Marx warned , can we on ly draw ou r poetry from the fu ture and not the past? 2 Here I am not
advanci ng the impossi- bil ity of representa tion or declaring theend of history. but wondering aloud whether
the image of enslaved ancestors can transform the present. I ask this question in order to
discover again the political and ethical relevance of the past. If the goa l is something more than
assimilating the terror of the past into our storehouse of memory, the pressing question is, Why need we
remember? Does the emphasis on remembering and working through the past expose our insatiable
desires for curatives, healing, and anything else that proffers the restoration of
some prelapsarian intactness? Or is recollection an avenue for undoing history? Can remembering
potentially enable an escape from the regularity of terror and the routine of violence constitutive of black life in the United
Usually the
injunction to remember insists that memory can prevent atrocity, redeem the
dead, and cultivate an understanding of ourselves as both individuals and
collective subjects. Yet, too often, the injunction to remember assumes the ease of
grappling with terror, representing slavery's crime, and ably standing in the
other's shoes. I am not proscribing representations of the Middle Passage, particularly since it is the absence of a
States? Or is it that remembering has become the only conceivable or viable form of political agency?
public history of slavery rather than the saturation of representa tion that engenders these com pulsive performances, but
instead poin ting lo the
and unfinishable in our relation to the present and past and, by extension, a sense of generosity and hospitality
towards ghosts? Or do they, as Sarah Ahmed55 has argued in relation to white guilt in postcolonial Australia,
constitute yet another self-referential engagement with the colonial past, in which
the experiences and desires of the settler occlude consideration of other desires
and possibilities? This is the reason for my wariness in the face of haunting tropes,
for I fear that postcolonial ghost stories risk perpetuating a kind of endless dancing
around a wound56 that Daniel David Moses identifies among liberal, left-leaning Canadians, anxiously
replaying their complicity in an ugly colonial past while neglecting to mobilize
effectively for change in the present. The ghosts of the Stein do not seem to me to
represent the Nlakapamux with very much dignity or agency, and surely any postcolonial trope we
might mobilize ought at the very least to figure Indigenous peoples with dignity. In
Haraways terms, it seems to me that haunting has the potential to function as a particularly
deadly trope, one that requires the death and immateriality of Indigenous peoples to make
an e/affective claim on non-Indigenous British Columbians. It is a trope within which todays living descendents of the
generalized spirits haunting the Stein, people like Chiefs Leonard Andrew and Ruby Dunstan, seem to have no place: As
the direct descendents of those aboriginal peoples who have inhabited, shared, sustained, and been sustained by the
Stein Valley for tens of thousands of years down to the present, our authority in this watershed is inescapable Under the
cooperative authority of our two bands we will maintain the Stein Valley as a wilderness in perpetuity for the enjoyment
and enlightenment of all peoples.57 And so, at a time when (primarily non-Aboriginal) geographers, among others, seem
to have taken an interest in ghostly matters,
work- ing through available to us? By suffering the past are we better able to grasp
hold of an elusive freedom and make it substantial? Is pain the guarantee of
compensation? Beyond con templating injury or apportioning blam e, how can this
encounter with the past fuel emancipatory efforts? Is it enough that these acts of
commemoration rescue the u n named and unaccounted for from obscurity and obl ivion
, counter the disavowals constitutive or the U.S. nalionaJ community, and unveil the
complicitou s discretion of the scholar- shi p of the trade?
6. Starting points based in the past create the linearity they critique
and preclude change a future-oriented approach is key
Baldwin, 11 (Andrew, Co-Director of the Institute of Hazard at the University of
Durhams Department of Geography, Whiteness and futurity: Towards a research
agenda, Progress in Human Geography 2012, originally published August 3, 2011,
http://phg.sagepub.com/content/36/2/172, AW)
geographies of whiteness? For my purposes here, they refer to geographies
spaces, places, landscapes, natures, mobilities, bodies, etc. that are assumed to be
white or are in some way structured, though often implicitly, by some notion of whiteness (Bonnett,
What, then, are
1997; McCarthy and Hague, 2004; Vanderbeck, 2006). The argument put forward in this paper is that research on
geographies of whiteness is almost invariably past-oriented (Bonnett, 1997, 2000; Hoelscher, 2003; Pulido, 2000). By
past-oriented I mean that whiteness, whether understood as a past or present phenomenon, tends
to be
explained, accounted for and examined as an expression of social relations that took shape
in the past (Satzewich, 2007). In the paper, I aim to show how this work is dominated by an orientation that looks to
the past as the temporal horizon through which research and learning about past or present white racial identity occurs.
By and large, this work assumes that in order to challenge or reconfigure whitenesses and their corresponding racisms
2009a; Dwyer and Jones, 2000; Jackson, 1998; McCarthy and Hague, 2004) suggest is a main point of reference for
debate about whiteness in geography, Alastair Bonnett (1997) argues that whiteness ought to be understood as a function
Linda Peake (2000) make a similar claim that whiteness is a historically constructed position: to understand whiteness
requires understanding its multiple genealogies.
of various kinds have been and continue to be critical for understanding whitenesses and the various racisms to which
how specific geographic expressions of whiteness are contingent on the future. For instance, the task might be to
understand how discourses of futurity shape various forms of white supremacy from right-wing xenophobias to leftnationalisms to practices of liberal humanitarianism, and how these shape, for instance, geographies of place, nature,
space, mobility, bodies and so on. A
that affect can also be understood as a generalized attitude towards presencings of the past. Think, for example, affects
of nostalgia and loss.) Thus, we might ask: what futures infuse the affective logics of whiteness? How does this future
presencing occur? And how, if at all, are these futures constitutive of specific white spatio-temporalities? These reasons
together provide a rationale for a research agenda concerned with understanding how the future works as a resource in
the geographic expression of whitenesses.