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BELGICA v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OCHOA

N: Pork barrel, in the Philippine setting, is the lump-sum discretionary funds o


f Members of the Legislature, and later, certain funds of the Executive.
The current PDAF article involved a provision of funds for legislators, with aut
omatic allocation for 'soft' and 'hard' projects, allowing for some leeway to re
align the funds (endorse by HC on Appropriations and Senate Comm on Finance). Le
gislators were allowed to identify target programs and projects even outside his
home legislative district provided there is concurrence with the intended benef
iciary, and endorsed by the Speaker.
The same term also applies to certain Presidential funds-- the Malampaya Funds a
nd the Presidential Social Fund. The former was a special fund for energy resour
ces, while the latter was a general fund allowing the President to provide direc
t assistance to priority targets outside the regular budget allocation.
F: Pork funds have increased tremendously, partly because of Presidents who use
the pork barrel in order to gain congressional support. As time passed, many con
troversies of widespread corruption erupted involving the use of pork funds. In
Philconsa v Enriquez (2004), an attempt was made to declare PDAF unconstitutiona
l, but the petition in that case was dismissed for lack of evidence showing that
'PDAF knickbacks were misused and has become common exercise of members of Cong
ress.'
This case revolves around the recent probe on projects revolving around ghost pr
ojects and NGOs, partly involving Janet Napoles. This led to the investigation a
nd eventual release of statistics showing the extent of the corruption (e.g. NGO
s not existing, NGOs not really using the funds, NGO funds transferred from publ
ic funds without a law or ordinance). In addition, as to the Presidential Pork B
arrel, the issues focus on the receipt of a ghost NGO of royalties in the operat
ion of the Malampaya gas project.
Because of the findings contained in reports concerning these controversies, sev
eral petitions were lodged before the Court seeking that the ENTIRE PORK BARREL
SYSTEM BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Petitioner Standing:
- SJS/Alcantara group: Rule 65 prohibition
- Belgica et al.: Rule 65 certio/prohibition; also seek release complete schedul
e/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from 2000-2013, al
ong with specific information on use [similar case with executive]
- Neopmuceno: Rule 65 prohibition; allow release of PDAF funds to fund priority
projects identified and approved by Local Deveopment Councils
I:
Procedural Issues:
- Whether or not the
- Whether or not the
icial review.
- Whether or not the
- Whether or not the
of constitutionality
sis.

issues involve an actual and justiciable controversy.


issues involve political questions outside the ambit of jud
petitioners have locus standi.
Philconsa and LAMP cases bar the relitigation of the issue
of the Pork Barrel System under res judicata and stare deci

Substantive Issues (Congressional):


- Whether or not the PDAF Article and ALL OTHER PORK BARREL LAWS are unconstitut
ional for violation of: (1) separation of powers, (2) non-delegability of legisl
ative power, (3) checks and balances, (4) accountability, (5) political dynastie

s, and (6) local autonomy.


Substantive Issues (Presidential):
- Whether or not the phrases "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter di
rected... "(Malampaya) and "to finance projects as may be directed and authorize
d by the President..." (Social Fund) are unconstitutional for being undue delega
tions of legislative power.
H/R:
- Again, requisites for judicial review: Actual case or controversy, Locus stand
i, Earliest opportunity, Lis mota
PI: Actual case or controversy. YES.
Actual case or controversy :: one that involves a conflict of legal rights, asse
rtion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution [not hypothet
ical/advisory]. Also consider ripeness [direct adverse effect on individual chal
lenging it].
- Contrariety of legal rights: Antagonistic positions of parties on the constitu
tionality of Pork Barrel
- Ripeness: PDAF already existing and operational-- there already exists an imme
diate/threatened injury as a result of unconstitutional use
- Not moot: Switching to a line-item budgeting scheme or 'abolishing the PDAF' w
ould render the issue moot as the aim of the reform is not the current PDAF, but
the system itself. Also, the government cannot annul its legal existence-- repe
al is only done by Congress, or by a declaration of unconstitutionality.
- Even if moot: there is allegation of grave violation of the Constitution (here
, through the issues on separation of powers, etc.), an exceptional situation in
volving paramount public interest (here, the entire system of PDAF), when the is
sue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench+bar
+public (here, the disallowance cases that will be issued by the COA, which will
most likely be reviewed by the Court later, and the matter on how disbursements
should be made), and the case is capable of repetition but evading review (the
nature of the budget and PDAF).
PI: Political question. NO.
Political questions are limitations on the power of judicial review: the courts
will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. It re
cognizes that political branches are sometimes in the best position to perform c
ertain actions-- here, the respondents argue in relation to the use of funds.
- Court: These are legal questions. What is questioned here is the constitutiona
lity of the Pork Barrel system. And even then, the Supreme Court may still revie
w under the GAD clause.
PI: Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
Taxpayers: disbursement of public funds -- 'taxpayers have been allowed to sue w
here there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public m
oney is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law'.
And also transcendental importance -- complete breakdown of controls because of
the wound inflicted on the Constitution by the enforcement of an invalid statute
.
PI: Whether or not the Philconsa and LAMP cases bar the relitigation of the issu

e of constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System under res judicata and stare de
cisis.
- Res judicata applies when the judgment of the merits in a previous case render
ed by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case, if between
the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, subject matt
er, and causes of action.
Here: The previous cases involved just the articles on pork barrel; here, it is
a blanket attack on the entire pork barrel system. The latter case, LAMP, dismis
sed the case on procedural technicality, which already makes RJ inapplicable as
to it.
- Stare decisis of course means that like cases are to be decided alike. Here, i
t is important to look at the doctrines created in the previous cases:
Philconsa: focused on the power of the legislature to propose and identity proje
cts to be funded with pork barrel. The Court there held that the power to approp
riate has an implied power to specify target projects, where such implied power
was held to be merely recommendatory. There: focus on a particular separation of
powers problem; here: holistic relation of the pork barrel system and the relea
se and realignment of funds vis-a-vis post-enactment measures. [Court also sees
constitutional problems with the Philconsa decision: if the power to identity is
an implied power coming with the power to appropriate, and that the power of ap
propration is lodged with Congress, then why is a single member making that deci
sion outside the general procedure of law making:: in reality, this is not mere
recommendation-- it is technically an opinion with the force of law; further, th
ere is the Abakada decision where separation of powers was given primacy].
LAMP: inapplicable because it was dismissed on procedural grounds.
-COURT DEFINITION OF PORK BARREL: "the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as th
e collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-su
m, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized thro
ugh the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of g
overnment, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds
of lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind
of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or coll
ectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspe
cts of the fund s utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or pract
ices."
PETITIONERS: "petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, a
s Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure th
at allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind
of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the mann
er of its utilization."
Pres. PB limited only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund (t
he only ones where issues were raised against)
-CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
SI: Whether or not PDAF violates the system of separation of powers. (YES)

- There is violation of separation of powers when one branch of government undul


y encroaches on the domain of another. In the US, it may be by interfering with
a constitutionally assigned function, or by assuming a function more properly en
trusted to another.
- The enforcement of the budget is a function assigned and entrusted to the Exec
utive. In Guingona v Carague, budget execution involves the various operational
aspects of budgeting. Meanwhile, the Congress has the power to formulate the app
ropriation act. The lines are clearly drawn.
- In ABAKADA, the Court held that from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role
in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separa
tion of powers and is thus unconstitutional. The only thing that Congress can do
is mere oversight limited to (1) scrutiny based on appropriation and the budget
hearings involved and (2) monitoring of implementation of laws pursuant to legi
slative inquiries.
Petitioners: CPB wrecks the assignment of responsibilities as it is a post-enact
ment re-legislation. The COA report evidences the power of the legislators re: i
mplementation that is tantamount to a violation of separation of powers. It must
also be noted that Philconsa merely limited the legislators' role to recommenda
tion-- the evidence here shows they actually dictate.
Respondent: No violation. President maintains ultimate authority to control the
execution of the GAA, and may reject the proposals. Does recognize the recommend
atory nature of Congress vis-a-vis pork barrel. As such, the 2013 PDAF Article f
ollows Philconsa, and remains constitutional.
Court: Favors petitioners. Provisions still show that the post-enactment authori
ty still remains.
Special Provisions 1-3 and SP 4 para 2 show this with respect to identification:
1- program menu feature (allows legislators to identify PDAF projects as long as
it falls within a general program listed)
2- creation of a more detailed priority list to enhance the initial program menu
. Also authorizes the outside-area application (which must have been used for th
ose ghost NGOs).
3- provides allocation limit
4- modification and revision of project identification requires submitted to the
appropriate committees
Meanwhile, Special Provision 5 shows post-enactment authority with respect to re
lease and realignment: requests for release of funds shall be supported by the d
ocuments prescribed in the law, and endorsed by the related committees. The comm
ittees find their power in SP4 (realignment of funds to be submitted for favorab
le endorsement).; SP4 also provides that certain Secretaries of agencies (DEPED,
DOA, DILG, DOLE, DPWH, DSWD, DTI) may approve realignment of projects/scope pro
vided the request is with concurrence of the legislator concerned.
- These are not mere oversight measures. They allow intervention or execution, e
ven if they are supposedly recommendatory, pursuant to the ruling in ABAKADA whi
ch made a blanket prohibition on post-enactment measures.
- Even if the Philconsa ruling were retained, the respondents admitted that the
identification of a legislator is actually mandatory. (SolGen Jardaleza: Act of
identification is mandatory)
EFFECT: PDAF Article and all other similar provisions which allow legislators to
wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement
of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separa

tion of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal


practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper p
hases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion a
mounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconst
itutional treatment. Such informal practices are undisputed-- Sereno: Thanks for
including all those practices in the Special Provisions!
-SI: Whether or not PDAF violates the non-delegability of legislative power. (YES
)
- One of the adjuncts of sepearation of powers it the non-delegability of legisl
ative power. Sec. 1, Art. VI vests it on Congress as bicameral body and on the p
eople with respect to initiative and referendum. There are recognized exceptions
to this principle: LGUs with respect on purely local matters, and constitutiona
lity grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to exercise power
s re: national emergencies and some taxation power wrt tonnae and wharfage dues.
- It should not be confused with the grant of rule-making powers to administrati
ve agencies. What they do is make 'subordinate legislation' to implement the law
, but all they do is implement-- they may not add to, or subtract from the law.
Court: PDAF violates non-delegability because legislators are effectively allowe
d to individually exercise the power of appropriation, when such power is lodged
in Congress. (Sec. 29.1, Art. VI) Appropriation, as defined in Bengzon v SOJ, i
nvolves the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for a
specified purpose. Under the PDAF Article, individual legislators dictate the al
location of funds to different projects as they may so determine-- these are act
s of appropriation that cannot be done by legislators acting separately.
-SI: Whether or not PDAF violates the system of checks and balances, and the item
-veto power of the President. (YES)
- Separation of powers does not entail absolute separation. The Constitution has
also provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordina
tion in their workings.
- One of these is the President's item veto power in Sec. 27.2 Art VI (veto of i
tem[s] in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, where said veto does not af
fect the items he did not object to). It is the final step in the law-making pro
cess (as part of submission to the President for approval).
- The Executive, in this regard, is granted a negative power to prevent the defe
at of the Constitution by an invalid bill, so it follows that this power is cons
titutionally granted. The Court has held the validity of a veto to be similar to
the validity of any other law, hence there will be a presumption of constitutio
nality.
- Why? To prevent log-rolling legislation, impose fiscal restrictions on the leg
islature, and fortify the executive's role in the budgetary process.
- To be exercise: there must be a proper item (the particulars) that is a specif
ic appropriation of money (Bengzon). This does not just include single items, bu
t also line-items where there allocations of amounts for a specified singular pu
rpose and even allocations with several related purposes (maintenance and relate
d expenses). This also includes special appropriations funds for as long as they
follow the rule on singular correspondence.
- The issue is with lump-sum amounts for multiple purposes. As there has to be a
nother determination on the amount to be allocated and the purpose of the alloca
tion, it cannot be a specific appropriation of money that the President can veto
. This leads to practical and legal dilemmas such that it would lead the impleme
nting agency to legislate as well (because it's a lump sum amount with no provid

ed purposes), violating non-delegability.


Petitioners: PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, where the identification of proje
cts occurs after the passage of the GAA-- the item-veto power cannot be applied
here.
Respondents: Lump-sum appropriations are necessary considering the changes in th
e economic landscape. Besides, some lump-sum appropriations are allowed and text
ually-grounded.
Court: The entire process fosters the creation of a budget within a budget, wher
e the 'sub-budget' cannot be the subject of an item veto as the President would
be forced to block the entire allocation to the detriment to legislators with le
gitimate agendas OR to accept the legislation without knowing who receives what.
Even then, the fact it is a lump-sum appropriation is problematic. The nature of
the lump-sum appropriation is such that it already evades the presidential veto
power. This is stressed by the COA as it notes that this system prevents a prop
er audit of the use of funds, and even recommends line by line budgets per targe
t program, etc. (which would mean legislation)
Effect: Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDA
F Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, t
o be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree
of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat
what the Constitution requires.
"Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional m
eans do not justify even commendable ends." (take that Ninoy)
-SI: Whether or not PDAF defies public accountability. (PARTLY)
Petitioners: The pork barrel defies public accountability because it renders Con
gress incapable of checking itself or its members. Further, through this system,
the legislators have financial interests in the budget and their own terms (sel
f-perpetuation and less interest towards impeachment).
- Sec. 1, Art. XI of the Constitution states that public office is a public trus
t. Every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions
only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution-- this means accounta
bility.
- With respect to expenditure of funds, one of the mechanisms that checks it is
the power of congressional oversight. In Abakada, this was held to be performed
through the appropriation and legislative inquiry powers.
- Some of the features in the CPB have effects on congressional oversight. The p
ost-enactment measures effectively make legislators financially interested in th
e appropriation law-- this would taint oversight as the legislators would have t
o check their own actions.
- Next, this runs afoul of Sec. 14, Art. VI of the Constitution as they would ef
fectively intervene in the phases of project implementation. This is effectively
taking undue advantage of their own office.
- However, this does not necessarily lead to perpetuation in office. It is merel
y speculative-- this is an election matter that must be analyzed on a case-to-ca
se basis.
- Also, as to impeachment, this is already a political matter that is outside ju
dicial review.

Effect: insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight an


d violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public
accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Bar
rel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.
-SI: Whether or not PDAF violates the prohibition of polibical dynasties.
- They cited an Art. II right that also explicitly states that whatever would be
considered political dynasties would be under a specific law. Not self-executin
g.
- Also, speculative. No argument demonstrating how this would be able to propaga
te political dynasties.
-SI: Whether or not PDAF violates the policy on local autonomy.
- The goal of our local government policy is to empower the LGUs to develop and
ultimately become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national eco
nomy. The goal here is: self-reliance, and lack of undue interference by the nat
ional government in purely local affairs which are best resolved by the official
s and inhabitants of such political units. (Philippine Gamefowl v IAC)
Petitioner Argument: CPB goes against local autonomy since it allows district re
presentatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utili
zing public funds for local development
Court: The first issue is that of allocation, where all LGUs would get the same
allocation from CPB, and even Senators, Party-List Reps, and the Vice Pres., all
obviously national leaders, received pork barrel. The way they were used, they
ultimately became personal funds under their effective control on sole account o
f their office. So much for making equal the unequal.
The second issue is on post-enactment authority. Through PDAF, a Congressman can
simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own, a
nd even take sole credit for its execution. This weakens government's coordinati
on efforts as a whole and undermines the local autonomy.
Effect: insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely
local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article
as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed uncons
titutional.
-PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
SI: Whether or not the Presidential Pork Barrel funds constitute an invalid appr
opriation, one without legal basis. (NO)
Petitioner's Arguments: The laws providing for the two funds are invalid appropr
iations laws since they do not have the primary and specific purpose of authoriz
ing the release of public funds from the Nat'l Treasury. Sec. 8 PD 910 is not an
appropriation since the fund is only incidental to the creation of an Energy De
velopment Board. The other one is merely incidental to the amendment of PAGCOR's
franchise and powers. These are violative of Sec. 29(1) Art. VI 1987c.
Court: No. Appropriations under that provision exist when a provision of law set

s apart a determinate/determinable amount of money, and allocates it for a parti


cular public purpose. As to form, there is no prescription per the rulings in Ph
ilconsa and Guingona. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative
intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Contin
uing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present.
This means that the appropriation need not be the primary and specific purpose o
f the law. As long as a legal provision designates that money and allocates it f
or a particular public purpose, then the intent to appropriate becomes apparent,
and would then be a valid appropriation made by law under the Constitution.
In both cases, we have determinable amounts for public purposes. These are legal
appropriations. (the CPB article is not an appropriation on the other hand beca
use no actual appropriation is made due to fact that the actual appropriation an
d determination of purpose is done post-enactment).
-SI: Whether or not the PPB constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
to the President.
Petitioner: Sec. 8 PD 910 (Malampaya) constitutes undue delegation of legislativ
e power as 'and for such other purposes...' gives the President unbridled discre
tion to determine the purpose of the funds.
Respondents: Apply ejusdem generis, read alongside energy provisions.
Court: Yes. While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a
particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the
appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law d
elegates rule-making authority to the Executive either for the purpose of (a) fi
lling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule
-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, refer
red to as contingent rule-making.
There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines fo
r delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the "compl
eteness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate.
On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jur
isprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides ade
quate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the dele
gate s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, t
he standard must specify the limits of the delegate s authority, announce the legi
slative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
The Malampaya one constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Ejusdem
generis cannot be applied because of three reasons: (1) the phrase "energy resou
rce development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" states
a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory refere
nce of specific things from which the general phrase "for such other purposes" m
ay be limited, (2) the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely
energy development programs of the government, and (3) the Executive department
has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under th
e subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents own position that it is limit
ed only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects o
f the government. The phrase should be struck down as it did not pass the standa
rd test.

As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact
that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots
the parties submissions on the same. Nevertheless, since the amendatory provisio
n may be readily examined under the current parameters of discussion, the Court
proceeds to resolve its constitutionality. A similar problem exists in Sec. 12 P
D 1869, as amended, in the phrase 'to finance the priority infrastructure dev't
projects' as infrastructure is a very broad classification.
Effect: Said provisions are severed from the rest of the laws for being unconsti
tutional.
-AI: Whether or not the petitioners may be furnished lists and detailed reports o
n the use of funds of the legislators. (NO)
First, these are cases of prohibition and certiorari. In cases of access to reco
rds, Legaspi v CSC is instructive-- mandamus is the proper remedy to invoke the
right to information (Art. II Sec. 28 and Art. III Sec. 7). The right itself giv
es the particular right-- information on matters of public concern. However, in
the case of Valmonte v Belmonte, it only concerns mere access to information. Re
quiring custodians of records to prepare lists and abstracts is outside their du
ty. The same is the case here.
-n: Budgetary Matters:: political question
n: TRO:: Moot due to declaration of unconstitutionality.
-------PHILCONSA v ENRIQUEZ
F: The General Appropriations Act of 1994 contained provisions allowing authoriz
ed members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the pork barrels allo
ted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. President Ramos s
igned the bill into law, but also vetoed/conditionally vetoed several provisions
of the bill. Congress did not take steps to override these vetoes.
Several petitions were then filed, assailing provisions in the GPAA:
- Philconsa: prohibition - Art. XLI on CDF, Art. I provision on realignment of a
llocation for operational expenses, Art. XLVIII on appropriation for debt servic
e in excess of the DECS amount, and the veto of the President of the Special Pro
vison of Art. XLVIII
- Angara group: CPM - assail the veto of the President on the special provision
for debt service, and conditions imposed on the allocations for the SC, COA, Omb
udsman, CHR, CAFGU, and SUCs.
- Romulo group: PM - assail the veto of the special provision for debt service a
nd automatic appropriation of funds therefore.
- Tanada group: PM - assail the veto on four special provisions for the AFP and
DPWH, and the conditions in the implementation of certain appropriations for the
CAFGUs, DPWH, and NHA.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have standing.
Senators: Yes. Gonzales v Macaraig. Because of the veto. "Where the veto is clai

med to
ent by
e into
anding

have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the Presid
the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executiv
the domain of the Legislature arises." The Solgen did not question the st
of the other petitioners!

-SI: Whether or not Art. XLI, setting up the CDF, to be used for infrastructure,
purchase of ambulances/computers, and other priority projects..., is unconstitut
ional.
Petitioners: The power given to members of Congress to propose and identity thes
e projects is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, as this pow
er affects the implmentation of the law. This is outside the scope of their powe
r.
- The final say as to appropriations is under Congress. It carries with it the p
ower to specify the target to be funded under the law, which can be as detailed
and as broad as Congress wants it to be. Congress, in fact, made such a declarat
ion of purpose in the CDF.
- The authority given to members of Congress is only to propose and identify pro
jects to be implemented. Art. XLI gives the President the power to examine propo
sals, and make determinations for implementation. Congress' proposals are merely
recommendatory. "It makes equal the unequal."
-SI: Whether or not the special provision allowing members of Congress to realign
allocations for operational expenses is prohibited under Sec. 25(5) Art. VI of
the Constitution (no transfer of appropriations except by heads of certain areas
).
- Sec. 16 of the General Provisions allows members of Congress to realign operat
ing expenses, supposedly because the term says 'act of Congress.'
Argument: The provision refers to the Senate Pres. and Speaker of the House, not
individual members.
- Court: Individual members only determine necessity of realignment as they are
in the best position to do so because they are the ones who have better access t
o the items considered. The SP and S-HR approve the realignment subject to two c
onsiderations: funds to be realigned are actually savings, transfer meant to aug
ment.
-SI: Whether or not the allocations on debt service and education are violative o
f Art. XIV Sec. 5(5) on the highest budgetary priority to education. (NO)
Guingona doctrine: merely directory. "While it is true that under Section 5(5),
Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to "assign the highest bud
getary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and
retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remune
ration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby
follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power t
o respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of
other state policies or objectives."
--

SI: Whether or not the veto of the provision on debt ceiling (Special Provision
on Appropriations for Debt Service) is an improper veto.
- The provision contained two parts: one on the use of the fund, and another on
the reporting requirement. The President vetoed the first Special Provision with
out vetoing the appropriation for debt service. [disagrees with how to handle th
e debt]
Argument: President cannot veto the Special Provision without vetoing the entire
allocation.
SolGen: Special Provision did not relate to the item of appropriation for debt s
ervice, and could be subject of an item veto.
Provision vetoed: 'excess amount'
Court: The issue was already put to rest in Gonzales v Macaraig, where they deal
t with the 1989 and 1990 Appropriations Bills. "The restrictive interpretation u
rged by petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing
the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and seve
rable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks th
e Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill s
hall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any s
uch provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it
relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the
true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its
operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not re
late to the entire bill. that even assuming arguendo that "provisions" are beyon
d the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) w
ere not "provisions" in the budgetary sense of the term, they are "inappropriate
provisions" that should be treated as "items" for the purpose of the President'
s veto power."
- The Special Provisions refer to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in
the bill; they are'inappropriate' provisions that may be vetoed.
- Further, the vetoed provision was an attempt to repeal Sec. 31 of PD 1177 and
EO 292, and reverse the debt payment policy. As held in Gonzales, the repeal sho
uld be done in a separate law, not an appropriations law (one bill-one subject)
Petitioners: The President must still comply with the conditions for automatic a
ppropriation under RA 4860 as amended by PD 81, and PD 1177 as amended by the RA
C and PD 1967.
Court: The President vetoed the entire paragraph one, including the provisions t
hat the appropriation authorized in said item "shall be used for payment of the
principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" and that "in no cas
e shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board o
f Liquidators." These provisions are germane to and have a direct connection wit
h the item on debt service. Inherent in the power of appropriation is the power
to specify how the money shall be spent (Henry v. Edwards, LA, 346 So., 2d., 153
). The said provisos, being appropriate provisions, cannot be vetoed separately.
Hence the item veto of said provisions is void.
-OTHER VETOS:
a. SUCs: Re: revolving funds: was no undue discrimination when the President vet
oed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other governmen
t agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income and mai
ntain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been

enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such pr
actices as exceptions to the "one-fund policy. Veto valid.
b. 70/30 for road maintenance: Cannot be item-vetoed. It laid down a policy on h
ow the appropriation would be expended. The 1987 Constitution allows the additio
n by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill,
which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long a
s they are "appropriate" in the budgetary sense. As an 'appropriate' position, i
t cannot be item-vetoed.
c. AFP MEDICINES: Assailed just the fact that the AFP would comply with the Nati
onal Drug Formulary. Court said that it was an appropriate provision-- the Gener
ics Act of 1988 is one of the basis of this provision. A belief of a need for a
transition period is not justification for a veto. Further, being directly relat
ed to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by t
he AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vet
oing the said item.
d. MILITARY EQUIPMENT: Prohibition alters the intent of the contract creating th
e AFP Modernization Fund by limiting the release of the fund through the Congres
s approval requirement. It is in effect a congressional veto. This is a serious
question of separation of powers, but this was not the provision they used to re
solve this issue. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementin
g a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated
in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being "inappropriate" provisions
, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed. Furthermore, Special Pro
vision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization Funds for payment of the
trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by
the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws
that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts
entered into by the Government itself. Veto valid.
e. SAVINGS TO AUGMENT AFP PENSION FUNDS: Should be a direct appropriation. Apply
Sec 29.1 and 25.5. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to us
e savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retir
ement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of
the Article VI of the Constitution. Under Section 25(5), no law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, and under Section 29(1), no money s
hall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law. While Section 25(5) allows as an exception the realignment of savings to a
ugment items in the general appropriations law for the executive branch, such ri
ght must and can be exercised only by the President pursuant to a specific law.
Veto valid.
f. DEACTIVATION OF CAFGUs: Conflict bet. Congress and President -- immediate dea
ctivation v timetable. We do not find anything in the language used in the chall
enged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the P
resident the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,0
00 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the app
ropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must b
e embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers
of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAF
GU's to be amended. Again we state: a provision in an appropriations act cannot
be used to repeal or amend other laws, in this case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No.
6758. Veto valid.
g. SC, etc.: SC: Conditions were actually placed by Congress based on their word
ing. Statements were merely reminders and are at best superluities. COA/DPWH/NHA
: Merely reminders. There is less basis to complain when the President said that
the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidel

ines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriat
e. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds authoriz
ed by Congress is simply an exercise by the President of his constitutional duty
to see that the laws are faithfully executed.
Of note: They used the wrong vehicle. Why GAD?