Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
e of constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System under res judicata and stare de
cisis.
- Res judicata applies when the judgment of the merits in a previous case render
ed by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case, if between
the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, subject matt
er, and causes of action.
Here: The previous cases involved just the articles on pork barrel; here, it is
a blanket attack on the entire pork barrel system. The latter case, LAMP, dismis
sed the case on procedural technicality, which already makes RJ inapplicable as
to it.
- Stare decisis of course means that like cases are to be decided alike. Here, i
t is important to look at the doctrines created in the previous cases:
Philconsa: focused on the power of the legislature to propose and identity proje
cts to be funded with pork barrel. The Court there held that the power to approp
riate has an implied power to specify target projects, where such implied power
was held to be merely recommendatory. There: focus on a particular separation of
powers problem; here: holistic relation of the pork barrel system and the relea
se and realignment of funds vis-a-vis post-enactment measures. [Court also sees
constitutional problems with the Philconsa decision: if the power to identity is
an implied power coming with the power to appropriate, and that the power of ap
propration is lodged with Congress, then why is a single member making that deci
sion outside the general procedure of law making:: in reality, this is not mere
recommendation-- it is technically an opinion with the force of law; further, th
ere is the Abakada decision where separation of powers was given primacy].
LAMP: inapplicable because it was dismissed on procedural grounds.
-COURT DEFINITION OF PORK BARREL: "the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as th
e collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-su
m, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized thro
ugh the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of g
overnment, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds
of lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind
of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or coll
ectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspe
cts of the fund s utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or pract
ices."
PETITIONERS: "petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, a
s Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure th
at allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind
of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the mann
er of its utilization."
Pres. PB limited only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund (t
he only ones where issues were raised against)
-CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
SI: Whether or not PDAF violates the system of separation of powers. (YES)
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact
that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots
the parties submissions on the same. Nevertheless, since the amendatory provisio
n may be readily examined under the current parameters of discussion, the Court
proceeds to resolve its constitutionality. A similar problem exists in Sec. 12 P
D 1869, as amended, in the phrase 'to finance the priority infrastructure dev't
projects' as infrastructure is a very broad classification.
Effect: Said provisions are severed from the rest of the laws for being unconsti
tutional.
-AI: Whether or not the petitioners may be furnished lists and detailed reports o
n the use of funds of the legislators. (NO)
First, these are cases of prohibition and certiorari. In cases of access to reco
rds, Legaspi v CSC is instructive-- mandamus is the proper remedy to invoke the
right to information (Art. II Sec. 28 and Art. III Sec. 7). The right itself giv
es the particular right-- information on matters of public concern. However, in
the case of Valmonte v Belmonte, it only concerns mere access to information. Re
quiring custodians of records to prepare lists and abstracts is outside their du
ty. The same is the case here.
-n: Budgetary Matters:: political question
n: TRO:: Moot due to declaration of unconstitutionality.
-------PHILCONSA v ENRIQUEZ
F: The General Appropriations Act of 1994 contained provisions allowing authoriz
ed members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the pork barrels allo
ted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. President Ramos s
igned the bill into law, but also vetoed/conditionally vetoed several provisions
of the bill. Congress did not take steps to override these vetoes.
Several petitions were then filed, assailing provisions in the GPAA:
- Philconsa: prohibition - Art. XLI on CDF, Art. I provision on realignment of a
llocation for operational expenses, Art. XLVIII on appropriation for debt servic
e in excess of the DECS amount, and the veto of the President of the Special Pro
vison of Art. XLVIII
- Angara group: CPM - assail the veto of the President on the special provision
for debt service, and conditions imposed on the allocations for the SC, COA, Omb
udsman, CHR, CAFGU, and SUCs.
- Romulo group: PM - assail the veto of the special provision for debt service a
nd automatic appropriation of funds therefore.
- Tanada group: PM - assail the veto on four special provisions for the AFP and
DPWH, and the conditions in the implementation of certain appropriations for the
CAFGUs, DPWH, and NHA.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have standing.
Senators: Yes. Gonzales v Macaraig. Because of the veto. "Where the veto is clai
med to
ent by
e into
anding
have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the Presid
the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executiv
the domain of the Legislature arises." The Solgen did not question the st
of the other petitioners!
-SI: Whether or not Art. XLI, setting up the CDF, to be used for infrastructure,
purchase of ambulances/computers, and other priority projects..., is unconstitut
ional.
Petitioners: The power given to members of Congress to propose and identity thes
e projects is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, as this pow
er affects the implmentation of the law. This is outside the scope of their powe
r.
- The final say as to appropriations is under Congress. It carries with it the p
ower to specify the target to be funded under the law, which can be as detailed
and as broad as Congress wants it to be. Congress, in fact, made such a declarat
ion of purpose in the CDF.
- The authority given to members of Congress is only to propose and identify pro
jects to be implemented. Art. XLI gives the President the power to examine propo
sals, and make determinations for implementation. Congress' proposals are merely
recommendatory. "It makes equal the unequal."
-SI: Whether or not the special provision allowing members of Congress to realign
allocations for operational expenses is prohibited under Sec. 25(5) Art. VI of
the Constitution (no transfer of appropriations except by heads of certain areas
).
- Sec. 16 of the General Provisions allows members of Congress to realign operat
ing expenses, supposedly because the term says 'act of Congress.'
Argument: The provision refers to the Senate Pres. and Speaker of the House, not
individual members.
- Court: Individual members only determine necessity of realignment as they are
in the best position to do so because they are the ones who have better access t
o the items considered. The SP and S-HR approve the realignment subject to two c
onsiderations: funds to be realigned are actually savings, transfer meant to aug
ment.
-SI: Whether or not the allocations on debt service and education are violative o
f Art. XIV Sec. 5(5) on the highest budgetary priority to education. (NO)
Guingona doctrine: merely directory. "While it is true that under Section 5(5),
Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to "assign the highest bud
getary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and
retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remune
ration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby
follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power t
o respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of
other state policies or objectives."
--
SI: Whether or not the veto of the provision on debt ceiling (Special Provision
on Appropriations for Debt Service) is an improper veto.
- The provision contained two parts: one on the use of the fund, and another on
the reporting requirement. The President vetoed the first Special Provision with
out vetoing the appropriation for debt service. [disagrees with how to handle th
e debt]
Argument: President cannot veto the Special Provision without vetoing the entire
allocation.
SolGen: Special Provision did not relate to the item of appropriation for debt s
ervice, and could be subject of an item veto.
Provision vetoed: 'excess amount'
Court: The issue was already put to rest in Gonzales v Macaraig, where they deal
t with the 1989 and 1990 Appropriations Bills. "The restrictive interpretation u
rged by petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing
the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and seve
rable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks th
e Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill s
hall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any s
uch provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it
relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the
true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its
operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not re
late to the entire bill. that even assuming arguendo that "provisions" are beyon
d the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) w
ere not "provisions" in the budgetary sense of the term, they are "inappropriate
provisions" that should be treated as "items" for the purpose of the President'
s veto power."
- The Special Provisions refer to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in
the bill; they are'inappropriate' provisions that may be vetoed.
- Further, the vetoed provision was an attempt to repeal Sec. 31 of PD 1177 and
EO 292, and reverse the debt payment policy. As held in Gonzales, the repeal sho
uld be done in a separate law, not an appropriations law (one bill-one subject)
Petitioners: The President must still comply with the conditions for automatic a
ppropriation under RA 4860 as amended by PD 81, and PD 1177 as amended by the RA
C and PD 1967.
Court: The President vetoed the entire paragraph one, including the provisions t
hat the appropriation authorized in said item "shall be used for payment of the
principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" and that "in no cas
e shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board o
f Liquidators." These provisions are germane to and have a direct connection wit
h the item on debt service. Inherent in the power of appropriation is the power
to specify how the money shall be spent (Henry v. Edwards, LA, 346 So., 2d., 153
). The said provisos, being appropriate provisions, cannot be vetoed separately.
Hence the item veto of said provisions is void.
-OTHER VETOS:
a. SUCs: Re: revolving funds: was no undue discrimination when the President vet
oed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other governmen
t agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income and mai
ntain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been
enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such pr
actices as exceptions to the "one-fund policy. Veto valid.
b. 70/30 for road maintenance: Cannot be item-vetoed. It laid down a policy on h
ow the appropriation would be expended. The 1987 Constitution allows the additio
n by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill,
which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long a
s they are "appropriate" in the budgetary sense. As an 'appropriate' position, i
t cannot be item-vetoed.
c. AFP MEDICINES: Assailed just the fact that the AFP would comply with the Nati
onal Drug Formulary. Court said that it was an appropriate provision-- the Gener
ics Act of 1988 is one of the basis of this provision. A belief of a need for a
transition period is not justification for a veto. Further, being directly relat
ed to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by t
he AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vet
oing the said item.
d. MILITARY EQUIPMENT: Prohibition alters the intent of the contract creating th
e AFP Modernization Fund by limiting the release of the fund through the Congres
s approval requirement. It is in effect a congressional veto. This is a serious
question of separation of powers, but this was not the provision they used to re
solve this issue. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementin
g a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated
in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being "inappropriate" provisions
, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed. Furthermore, Special Pro
vision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization Funds for payment of the
trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by
the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws
that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts
entered into by the Government itself. Veto valid.
e. SAVINGS TO AUGMENT AFP PENSION FUNDS: Should be a direct appropriation. Apply
Sec 29.1 and 25.5. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to us
e savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retir
ement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of
the Article VI of the Constitution. Under Section 25(5), no law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, and under Section 29(1), no money s
hall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law. While Section 25(5) allows as an exception the realignment of savings to a
ugment items in the general appropriations law for the executive branch, such ri
ght must and can be exercised only by the President pursuant to a specific law.
Veto valid.
f. DEACTIVATION OF CAFGUs: Conflict bet. Congress and President -- immediate dea
ctivation v timetable. We do not find anything in the language used in the chall
enged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the P
resident the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,0
00 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the app
ropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must b
e embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers
of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAF
GU's to be amended. Again we state: a provision in an appropriations act cannot
be used to repeal or amend other laws, in this case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No.
6758. Veto valid.
g. SC, etc.: SC: Conditions were actually placed by Congress based on their word
ing. Statements were merely reminders and are at best superluities. COA/DPWH/NHA
: Merely reminders. There is less basis to complain when the President said that
the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidel
ines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriat
e. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds authoriz
ed by Congress is simply an exercise by the President of his constitutional duty
to see that the laws are faithfully executed.
Of note: They used the wrong vehicle. Why GAD?