I Dont Know It But I Like You

The Influence of Nonconscious Affect

on Person Perception
JENNIFER L. MONAHAN
University of Georgia

A model of nonconscious affect is proposed and an experiment tests predictions about the

influence of nonconscious affect on evaluations made of conversational interactants. Participants engaged in a subliminal priming task to induce a positive nonconscious affective
response toward one of two target persons. Participants then watched two videotaped interactions (onefeatured the subliminally primed target person) and rated a target person from
each interaction. A 3 x 2 x 2 mixed experimental design crossed Target Primed (Target A, B,
or No Prime) and Order of Evaluation ( A U S . B first), whereas the third factor (Target
Evaluated) was within subjects. The primed target was rated as more likable and attractive
yet not more competent. The nonconscious affect was target spec@ (affecting judgments of
the primed target) and d i m e (affecting judgments of a nonprimed target).

ommunication theorists propose that to fully understand human interaction requires that both the deliberate and automatic
components of human behavior are understood. Although theoretical accounts consider both automatic and deliberate processes as
integral (Burgoon & Hale, 1987; Capella, 1991; Capella & Greene, 1982;
Greene, 1984; Kellermann, 1992), empirical evidence of automatic processes remains scarce.
One of the most fundamental automatic processes that people engage
in is that of ascertaining the goodness or badness of stimuli in their
environment. Automatic good-bad judgments occur without conscious
thought yet influence conscious experiences, including judgments, emotions, and behaviors. Previous research, for example, finds that nonverbal
affiliation-avoidance and dominance-submission gestures are encoded
and decoded by communicators at a nonconscious level of awareness
(Buck, 1988; Palmer & Simmons, 1995).There is little evidence, however,

Jennifer L. Monahan, Ph.D., is an assistantprofessorin the Department of Speech Communication at the University of Georgia. The author would like to thank E. L. Fink, S. T. Murphy,
D. Roskos-Ewoldson, M. Williams, C. Zuckerman, and the reviewers for their helpful
suggestions on earlier versions of this manuscript. A previous version was presented at the
annual meeting of the International CommunicationAssociation, Albuquerque, NM, 1995.
Preparation of this article was supported by a grant from the National Institute of Mental
Health (MH54578-01).
Human Communication Research, Vol. 24 No. 4, June1998 480-500
0 1998 InternationalCommunication Assodation
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suggesting how the nonconscious processing of nonverbal affective cues

affects subsequent behavior and judgments and which judgments are
likely to be influenced by such cues. Therefore, this article presents a
model of nonconscious affect and an experiment testing predictions from
the model.
All affective responses have an underlying approach-avoidance component. Initial approach-avoidanceaffective responses toward other people are instantaneous (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982), effortless, inescapable, and difficult to change (Zajonc, 1980).Feelings of warmth or aversion
toward another person can serve to direct subsequent interest in the
person as well as serve as a marker in memory of the encounter. Srull and
Wyer (1989), for example, find that people decide whether a person is
likable or dislikable;this judgment then serves as a foundation to organize
information about that person.
These simple like-dislike affective responses can be experienced consciously or nonconsciously. A lack of awareness is the defining characteristic of all automatic or nonconscious reactions (Bargh, 1989).A second
criterion of nonconscious processing is that the process must not be subject
to intention or voluntary control (Pratto, 1994).For the purposes of the
present research, affect is defined as nonconscious when a person is not
aware of the source of the feeling, of the target of the feeling, or of both
(Murphy Monahan, & Zajonc, 1995). Nonconscious affective responses
that occur when the individual is unaware of the source of the affect (that
is, its eliciting stimulus condition) are of particular interest to communication researchers because conversational interactants and observers
often do not consciously perceive information that elicits affective reactions in them (Kellermann, 1992). Niedenthal and Cantor (1986), for
example, found that individuals prefer people with dilated pupils and
make fewer positive attributions about people with constricted pupils,
without realizing the source of their feelings. Although one may not
consciously acknowledge the root of these feelings, an amazing amount
of information is communicated within the first few seconds of an interaction (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992).
A Model of Nonconscious Affect
Many current theories of perception incorporate an automatic evaluation mechanism to account for nonconscious effects (see, e.g., Bargh,
1989; Fazio, Roskos-Ewoldson, & Powell, 1994; Kentridge & Aggleton,
1990; Lazarus, 1991; LeDoux, 1989).Kitayama (1991),for example, argues
that once a stimulus is perceived, the stimulus activates perceptual information that in turn triggers two other processes-preattentive and attentive processes. The preattentive process is an affective response outside of

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conscious awareness. Higgins and Bargh (1992) refer to this affective

response as an auto-evaluation process: "a simple dichotomous response
to the person, object or event as positive or negative, it does not report on
the extent or degree of the goodness or badness" (p. 83; see also Greenwald, Klinger, & Liu, 1989). LeDoux's (1989) findings suggest that this
auto-evaluationprocess occurs when the perceptual information activates
affective circuits of the brain located in the limbic or subcortical regions.
Subsequent to the preattentive auto-evaluation process is an elicitation
of attentive processing. Attentive processing is selective. It must first be
directed to a target and once directed (even if it is incorrectly directed), it
furthers the processing of the information (Kitiyama, 1991).This second
process is necessary to produce a conscious experience of the information.
Attentive processing,however, also results in nonconscious effects. Attention can be drawn toward a person, object, or even a set of rules resulting
in a variety of responses, such as a change in attitude toward the person
or object (Roskos-Ewoldsen & Fazio, 1992),in the perception of a person's
behavioral intentions (Bargh,Chen, &Burrows, 1996),and in the learning
of grammatical rules (Gordon & Holyoak, 1983), all outside of conscious
awareness.
In summary, some nonconscious affect is produced by the preattentive
activation of the target code and, therefore, can be induced before attentive processing is engaged. In addition, some nonconscious affect associated with a particular stimulus is produced by attentive processing. This
model of nonconscious affective processing has two important implications for how nonconscious affect might guide subsequent evaluations
and behaviors. First, Pratto (1994)reviews research suggesting people can
control the influence that preattentive processing has on their subsequent
judgments only when they are aware of the provoking stimuli and its
potential influence; that is, when the source of affect enters conscious
awareness. If so, then the affect processed preattentively may serve to
influence the subsequent attentive processing that produces and guides
consciousevaluation of a stimulus (Bruner, 1994).In this case, the nonconscious affect serves to selectively direct information processing strategies.
The second implication stems from the hypothesis that affect deriving
from attentive processing is qualitatively different from that which is
derived from preattentive processing. Preattentive affect has been shown
to be diffuse, and its target at best is ambiguous (Murphy et al., 1995;
Murphy & Zajonc, 1993).As Clore (1994)notes,
If the source of an emotion remains unconscious, the emotion may be
experienced as part of one's reaction to almost anything, and hence may
color one's judgment about anything. If the source of an emotion is conscious, then its meaning will be constrained, and the range of judgments it
colors will be limited. (p. 287)

Monahan / NONCONSCIOUS AFFECT

483

Because preattentive affect is diffuse, it has the ability to attach itself to

unrelated stimuli (Murphy et al., 1995). Thus, preattentive affect should
result in a generalized mood-like effect. Affect deriving from attentive
processing has a specific source and target (Schwarz & Clore, 1983).Once
the affect becomes more complex, the affective response operates similarly to semantic priming: Affective stimuli are semantically encoded and
then prime associated ideas, thoughts, and images. Affect requiring cognitive elaboration is more likely to be target specific, influencing judgments made of the target stimuli with which the affect is associated.
Attentive affect therefore acts as an evaluation and is tied to a specific
target. In summary, it is proposed that when a response is preattentive,
the affect that derives from that response will be diffuse. Almost simultaneous with the preattentive response, the stimulus can trigger an attentive
response that should not be diffuse but instead should be target specific.
Nonconscious affect, thus, derives from two potential sources (preattentive and attentive processing) and results in two types of effects (general
and specific).
Judgments
In addition to explicating a theory of nonconscious affect, a second
focus of this research was to examine how nonconscious affective responses are used by people in social interactions. As mentioned before,
the specific actions and judgments that may be influenced by nonconscious affect lack empirical substantiation. Wyer and Carlston (1979),
however, suggest that affective responses may serve both informational
and directive functions. Feelings serve a directive function by shifting
attention to some aspect of another person's behaviors to the exclusion of
other aspects. Feelings serve an informational function when people use
their feelings as relevant information when making judgments. Schwarz
and Clore (1983), for example, found that participants reported more
satisfaction with their lives when they were in a good mood than when
in a bad mood. Subsequentresearch, however, found that people use their
feelings as a source of information only for judgments for which the
feeling state is relevant or provides useful information (Schwarz, 1990).
In the present study, participants were subliminally primed with a
picture of a target person who was portraying great happiness. This
subliminal priming technique was used to create a positive nonconscious
response. Participants then watched the target person in a conversation
and evaluated his behaviors afterward. When participants were asked to
evaluate the target interactant, the affective response that was nonconsciously induced was one piece of information they may have used in their
evaluations. Because the nonconscious affect was in the form of an initial

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approach or avoidance cue, it was expected that the nonconscious affect

would have its strongest effect on related judgments, such as hot evaluations or gut reactions. Hot evaluations include judgments of physical
attractiveness, good-bad, and like-dislike; such evaluations form quickly
deriving primarily from nonverbal and visceral responses to a target
(Zajonc, 1980). Nonconscious affect should sigruficantlyaffect judgments,
such as physical attractiveness and liking, because the nonconscious
feeling is a salient cue, and individuals are accustomed to making such
judgments based on their feeling states.
A nonconscious affective response might also alter other judgments
made of communicators. Consider evaluations made of communication
competency or how effectively and appropriately a communicator acts
during an interaction (Canary & Spitzberg, 1987). Affect clearly plays an
important role in judgments of communicator competency; there is even
some evidence that judgments of competence and social skills are based
on implicit perceptions of attractiveness (Glasgow & Arkowitz, 1975). If
so, nonconscious affect may serve a directive function such that those
communication behaviors consistent with the valence of the affect may be
more likely to be noticed. Apositive nonconscious affective cue, then, may
influence a perceiver to evaluate a target person more positively on
measures of communicator competence because the perceiver is viewing
the behavior through rose-colored glasses (Niedenthal, 1992).
Although the rose-colored-glasses hypothesis is plausible, empirical
evidence concerning nonconscious affect offers little support. One of the
most robust findings in mere exposure research is that increased subliminal exposure to a stimulus increases ones liking for the stimulus but does
not change other types of evaluations (Bomstein, 1989; Fink, Monahan, &
Kaplowitz, 1989). Studies using subliminal affective primes (similar to
those in the present research) also find that affective primes influence
subsequent judgments of how much a stimulus is liked without changing
other forms of evaluation (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). Consistent with the
work in subliminal priming and exposure is LeDouxs (1989) research
with fear reactions, which suggests that under conditions of preattentive
processing, emotional learning based on the simplest features of stimuli
(e.g., intensity and affect) occurs but that other forms of learning do not
occur (Armony Cohen, Servan-Schreiber,& LeDoux, 1995). Finally Bargh
et al. (1996),found that nonconscious cues activate relevant behaviors and
stereotypes. These findings are consistent with Schwarz and Clores
(1983) model of affect as information where individuals use their feelings
only for those judgments for which the feelings provide relevant information. If so, then a nonconscious affective cue may be a more salient piece
of information to use when making liking and attraction judgments than
when making more objective competencyjudgments.

Monahan / NONCONSCIOUS AFFECT

485

Empirical Test
To test the proposed model of nonconscious affect, research participants engaged in a subliminal priming task such that they were primed
with photographs of one person (either Target A or Target B) who was
clearly portraying happiness. A subliminal priming task was used to
ensure that participants were unaware they viewed the photographs or
that a positive affective response had been induced. Both preattentive and
attentive processing were predicted to result in an increase in positive
feelings toward the person that was primed. For this effect to be germane
to communication scholars, it needs to be demonstrated that the nonconscious positive response will then influence perceptions of the target
person during a communication interaction. After the subliminalpriming
task, individuals watched two videotaped conversations and subsequently rated a partner from each conversation.These two taped interactions featured Target A and Target B from the priming manipulation. If
an individual was primed with Target A, he or she should like Target A
more than he or she likes Target B, whereas the reverse would be expected
for individuals who were primed with Target B.
Hl: Positive affect associated with a specific person that is induced outside
of conscious awareness will make that person appear more likable and
attractive.

Although both attentive and preattentive processing may result in a

target specificresponse (Hl),preattentive processing should also produce
a diffuse response. If the subliminal prime results in a preattentive affective response, then participants who were primed with Target A(B)should
have elevated liking ratings for Target B(A)when compared to individuals
who did not view a subliminal prime.
H2:Positivenonconsciousaffect derived from one person will make a different
person appear more likable and attractive.

Finally it was predicted that nonconscious affective cues would more

strongly affect subsequent affective judgments than judgments of communicator competency because the nonconscious affective feeling is a
more salient piece of information to use when making affect judgments.
H3: The effectsof nonconsciousaffectivecues on person perception evaluations
will be stronger for liking and attraction judgments than for judgments of
communicator competency

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HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / June 1998

METHOD
Design and Participants
A 3 x 2 x 2 mixed experimental design crossing Target Primed (Target
A, Target B, or No Prime) and Order of Evaluation (Target Afirst vs. Target
B) was used. The third factor, Target Evaluated (A vs. B) was a withinsubjects factor. Participants (N = 122) were recruited from a communication department subject pool. Approximately 20 participants were randomly assigned to each experimental condition.

Materials and Apparatus

Priming apparatus. Two slide projectors, each outfitted with a Uniblitz

shutter and a red filter, were used to project 45 c m x 60 an images onto a
screen at participants eye level at a distance of approximately 1.5 m.
Luminance of the screen field was approximately 60 cd/m2. The shutters,
calibrated to be accurate to within 10% of the selected shutter speed, were
controlled by two Uniblitz Relay Control Boxes (Model T-132). MicroExperimental Lab Software (MEL) on a microcomputer was used to give
participants their directions, control the slide carousels and the sequencing
of the Uniblitz shutters, and to collect manipulation check data.
Afective primes. Slides of the faces of the two targets expressing happiness were used as affective primes. Among possible affective images, the
facial configuration associated with happiness has been found to be
universally recognized as an indicator of positive affect (Ekman, 1971),
thus reducing the possibility of idiosyncratic responses to the prime.

Interaction tapes. Subsequent to the subliminal priming manipulation,

all participants viewed two 3-minute videotaped interactions. In viewing
each interaction, participants could see only one interactant (Target A on
one tape, Target B on the other). The two male targets were acting students
selected for their acting abilities. Targets were instructed to project low
interest to provide a somewhat ambiguous affective display for research
participants to evaluate, because previous research indicates that nonconscious affect has its strongest impact in ambiguous situations. In addition,
when pilot testing the stimulus tapes, we found that those tapes in which
targets projected involvementwith their partner resulted in a ceiling effect
for involvement judgments. Coker and Burgoon (1987) suggest that an
uninvolved communication style includes low immediacy behaviors,
poor speech coordination skills, and restlessness. After some practice, the

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487

two male actors enacted these behavioral cues by (a)not always responding
in sync with their partner (e.g., letting a pause occur before answering a
question or starting a new topic), (b) answering queries for information
briefly without elaboration, (c) appearing restless by occasionally checking their watch and looking around the room, and (d) leaning slightly
away.

lndependent variable: subliminal afective prime. All participants rated a

series of twelve ambiguous Chinese ideographs prior to watching the
videotapes of the targets. Viewing and evaluating the Chinese ideographs
served three purposes. First, the ratings provided a manipulation check
of the affective prime paired with a particular ideograph. Second, the
ideographs served as a pattern mask to ensure that the affective prime
was not available to conscious awareness. Finally,viewing the ideographs
served as a cover story or reason for looking up at the screen for the
subliminal prime manipulation.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three priming conditions: not primed (control condition), primed with Target A, and primed
with Target B. The control group viewed the same ideographs as the
experimental conditionsexcept that the ideographs were not subliminally
primed. For the experimental groups, four of the ideographs were preceded by a subliminal affective prime (e.g., the photograph of a target
depicting happiness). Following the procedures outlined in Murphy et al.
(1995),each facial prime was presented to participants using a backward
pattern masking technique, where the prime (a face) was presented for 5
ms, followed immediately by the presentation of a pattern mask (a Chinese ideograph) for 1,000 ms. Participants were not informed that four of
the ideographs were preceded by subliminal primes. The placement of
the primes was held constant across participants: Ideographs in the third,
fifth, seventh, and ninth positions were always primed. To ensure that
there was no idiosyncratic interaction between ideographs and primes
that might affect the manipulation check, the 12ideographs were divided
into three sets of 4 ideographs each. One third of the participants saw the
primes paired with the first set of ideographs, the second third saw the
primes with the second set of ideographs, and the remaining participants
saw the ideographs primed with the third set of ideographs.
Dependent variables. The subliminal processing literature indicates that
there are at least two affective judgments that can be reliably made about
a stimulus after minimum exposure (e.g., less than 5 ms of exposure):
physical attractiveness (Goldiamond, 1958) and how much the person
liked the stimulus (Fink,Monahan, & Kaplowitz, 1989).Participants rated
a target on two 5-point semanticdifferentialscales: good looking-not good

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HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / June 1998

looking, and physically attractive-notphysically attractive.A5-point scale

asking How much do you like the conversational participant? (1= not
at all to 5 = quite a bit) was used to measure liking. Participants also
evaluated each target on the following 5-pOint semanticdifferentialscales:
nice-awful, friendly-unfriendly, kind-unkind, and pleasant-unpleasant,
because these judgments tend to share considerable variance with liking
judgments (Burgoon & Hale, 1987).
To measure person-perceptionjudgments that are more heavily influenced by how a communicator performs rather than by the evaluators
feelings, participants rated the target person for each videotaped interaction using Cupach and Spitzbergs (1983)Self-Rated Competence (SRC)
Scale. The SRC is a B i t e m questionnaire using 5-point Likert-type response scales, and the items load onto three competency dimensions:
other orientation, conversation skills, and self-centered behaviors. Previous reliabilities for these factors range from .87 to .92.
Procedure

Phase 1: Nonconscious afective priming. One participant was scheduled

at a time. Participants were told that they would participate in two
ministudies, each study taking approximately 5 to 10 minutes. The first
ministudy concerned the evaluations participants would make of novel
stimulus materials. They were informed that they would view a series of
Chinese drawings and that the researchers wanted their honest opinion
of each drawing to help select some stimulus materials to use in an
experiment the next quarter. Participants received all instructions by
computer and paced themselves through the study. Participants first
viewed a practice ideograph to learn how to use the computer and to
familiarize themselves with the judgments. They then viewed and rated
(on a 5-poht scale) 11 ideographs in terms of how much they liked each
ideograph, where 1= not atalZ and5 = quitea lot. Participants also indicated
how familiar they were with the ideograph by pushing an old key if
they felt they had never seen the ideograph before and a new key if they
felt they had seen the ideograph before.
Whereas all participants (control or experimental)viewed the same set
of Chinese ideographs, only participants in the two priming conditions
were exposed to the subliminal affective primes. Following the procedures outlined in the independent variables section, the prime (a face)was
presented for 5 ms followed immediately by the presentation of an
ideograph for 1,000 ms. After participants completed the judgments for
one ideograph, the computer emitted a brief beep sound, which was their
cue to focus on the screen to watch the next ideograph.

Monahan / NONCONSCIOUSAFFECT

489

Phase 2: Observing conversational interactions. After completion of Phase

1, participants completed another consent form, which informed them
that the researcher was interested in how people form impressions of
others based on the small talk people use to get acquainted. Participants
were randomly assigned as to which tape (the one featuring Target A
versus the one featuring Target B) they viewed first. After viewing each
tape, participants completed the dependent measures evaluating the
target they watched. Participants were debriefed and thanked for their
participation.
Forced choice test ofawureness. To ensure that the 5 ms exposures of the
affective primes were below conscious awareness, participants took a
forced-choice test of awareness (Eriksen, 1980) after participating in the
study Participants were informed that they would be given a series of
trials in which faces would be presented briefly immediately followed by
an ideograph. As in the priming study itself, the computer emitted a beep,
signaling a 5 ms exposure to a prime (a face) that was immediately
followed by a 1,000 ms exposure to a backward mask (an ideograph).
Participants were then presented with two test faces: an image of the
actual prime on one side of the screen and an alternative face, or foil, on
the other side of the screen. Participants were asked to guess which of the
two faces they thought had been used as the prime, receiving a score of 1
if they guessed correctly and a score of 0 if they were incorrect. Participants
completed 12 such forced-choice tests.
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks

Afect expressed in prime. Two different groups of pilot participants (n =

52) viewed a series of 20 slides of several individuals expressing various
emotions. Within this set of 20 slides were slides of the two target interactants expressing happiness. Pilot participants viewed each slide for approximately 2 seconds and then indicated which emotion the person on
the slide was expressingby circling one of the six basic emotions (Ekman,
1971).They then indicated how sure they were that they chose the correct
emotion using a 1(not at all sure) to 5 (extremely sure) scale. One slide for
each target interactant was selected for use as a subliminal prime in the
experimental study For these two slides, all pilot participants agreed that
the face was expressing happiness and that they were extremely sure of
their evaluation.

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HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / June 1998

Nonconscious prime. For the control (no prime) condition, the mean
liking rating of the three sets of ideographs were not significantly different. These results indicate that no sigruficant differences in liking scores
should be attributed to idiosyncratic effects of the ideographs. A 2 (target
primed: A vs. B) x 2 (ideograph rated primed vs. not primed) x 3
(ideograph set) analysis of variance, where the first factor was between
subjects and the second was within subjects, was used to examine the
liking evaluations for the Chinese ideographs. There were no effects for
ideograph set. The main effect for which target was primed (A vs. B) was
not significant, indicating that participants did not respond differently to
the two targets. The within-subjects factor of ideograph (primed vs. not
primed) was sigruficant,F(1,79) = 1 4 . 8 1 , <
~ .001, q2= .18, such that primed
ideographs were liked sigruficantly more than nonprimed ideographs
(means of 3.29 and 2.94, respectively). Thus, the manipulation worked as
planned. In addition, the success of the manipulation also indicates that
the nonconscious affective prime did trigger a diffuse affective response
in that the positive affect induced via exposure to the smiling prime
spilled over and led to more positive judgments of the ideographs paired
with the primes.

Forced choice test of uwureness. On the forced-choice test of awareness,

participants (n= 60) were not able to discriminatethe affective prime from
an incorrect alternative at a level greater than chance, averaging 5.35
correct responses (SD = -1.44) out of 12 trials, t(59) = .96, ns. Because
participants performed no better than chance at recognizing the facial
primes, these results suggest that the subliminal primes were unavailable
to conscious awareness.
Data Reduction
Prior to testing the hypotheses, the evaluations made of the target
interactants were analyzed using a principal components factor analysis
with varimax rotation to assess whether the items loaded on the three
social competency factors and an affect factor as expected. Items that
loaded greater than .60 on one factor and less than .30 on all other factors
were retained, leaving a total of 18 items. Four factors with eigenvalues
greater than 1.0 emerged, accounting for approximately 64%of the variance in the data. Two of the factors were similar to Cupach andspitzbergs
(1983) Conversational Skills (a= 30) and Other Orientation (a= .68)
factors; however, the reliabilities are lower than previously reported.
Items for the other SRC factor (Self-centeredBehaviors) loaded highly on
more than one factor and did not form a stable subscale. These items were
dropped from the data set. The third factor (Likableness, a = .68)consisted

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491

TABLE 1

Correlations Among the Dependent Measures

Likableness
Likable
Physical attraction
Conversationalskills
Other orientation

1.00

Physical
Attractiveness

.27"
1.00

Conversational
Other
Skills
Orientation
.19*
.09

1.00

.30*+
.07
.17*
1.00

*p < .05.**p < .01.

of three items: friendly, niceness, and liking. The final factor consisted of
the two physical attraction items (a = .78). Thus, the data formed four
factors, two measures of communicator competence, a measure of physical attractiveness, and a measure of liking/attraction. The resulting scales
were normally distributed with minimum skew. Correlations among
these four factors are presented in Table 1.
Hypothesis Testing

HZ.H1 stated that positive affect associated with a specific target that
is induced outside of conscious awareness will make that target appear
more likable and more attractive than a nonprimed target. To test this
hypothesis, an analysis of variance comparing the no prime and the
primed conditionsfor the liking and physical attractivenessmeasures was
examined for each target person. Prime did not interact with the order of
evaluation. As shown in Table 2, individuals primed with a specific target
found that target significantly more physically attractive than did the
individuals in the no prime condition for both Target A, F(2,73) = 9.67,
p = .003, qz = .11, and Target B, F(2, 73) = 10.68, p = .002, q2 = .12. Similar
results were obtained for the liking factor. Participants primed with a
specific target found that target significantly more likable than did participants in the no prime condition, F(2,76) = 20.14, p < .001, q2= .18, F(2,76) =
14.85, p < .001, q2= .09 for A and B, respectively.
A second way to assess for target-specific affect is by using a 2 (target
primed: Avs. B) x 2 (target evaluated: Avs. B) mixed design with priming
as a between-subjects factor and evaluation as a within-subjects factor.
There were no significant main effects for the physical attractiveness
evaluation. There was a significant Target Primed (A vs. B) x Target
Evaluated (Avs. B) interaction such that participants rated the target they
had been primed with significantly more attractive than the nonprimed
target, F(l, 79) = 6.11, p = .016, q2= .07; see Figure 1.For the liking evaluations, there was a main effect for which target was evaluated, F(l, 79) =

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HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / June1998

TABLE 2

Mean Responses on Person Perception Judgments

by Target Evaluated and Target Primed
Target Evaluated
Target Primed
Affect factors
Physical attractiveness
Likable
Social competence factors
Conversational skills
Other orientation

No Prime

Target A
Tnrget B Target A

Target B
No Prime Target A Target B

2.50a
(.79)
3.34ab
(.74)

2.85,
(.64)
3.84,
(72)

3.08,
(.82)
4.02b
(56)

2.56a
(.75)
3.03a
(.55)

2.79
(.67)
3.25b

3.17a
(82)
3.37
(.74)

3.30
(.74)
3.58
(.58)

3.52,
(77)
3.63
(.79)

3.19

3.18
(39)
3.37
(.82)

(.a)
3.36
(.67)

(M)

3.Ma
(.62)
3.67ab
(.67)
3.32

(.a)
3.17
(34)

NOTE:Standard deviations are in parentheses. Higher means indicate more positive evaluations. Comparisons are made within each dependent measure/priming condition. Within
dependent measure/priming condition, means with shared subscripts are significantly
different (SNK range t tests, p < .05).

19.90,p =.001, such that Target A was liked signtficantly more than Target
B. As shown in Figure 2, there was also an interaction effect such that
participants liked the target they had been primed with F(1,79) = 4.19, p
= .04, q2 = .05 more than the target they had not been previously exposed
to. Thus, similar to the comparisons made to the control condition, the
within-subjects analyses also found that individuals who received a positive prime rated the primed-target person sigruficantly more positively
than they rated the nonprimed-target person. H1 was supported.

H2. H2 stated that nonconscious affect is diffuse and, when derived

from one target, should also make an unrelated target person appear more
likable and attractive. If the subliminal prime results in a preattentive
affective response, then participants who were primed with Target A
should have elevated liking ratings for Target B when compared to the
ratings of individuals who did not view a subliminal prime. Results
indicated that individuals who received a positive prime of Target B rated
the nonprimed target (Target A) significantly more positively on the
physical attraction, F(l ,79) = 3.75, p = .05, q2= .05, and liking judgments,
F(1, 79) = 5.14, p = .026, q2 = .06, than did individuals in the no prime
condition, supporting H2. As shown in Table 2, the comparisons for the
second target were in the direction predicted but the mean differences
were not significant.

Monahan / NONCONSCIOUS AFFECT

493

Tugct Primed

--b TargctA
-L?-

TagetB

Target B

Target Evaluated

Figure 1: Target Primed by Target Evaluated Interaction Effect for the Physical
Attractiveness Judgments

Target Primed

4.1

3.9

3.7

3.1
29

27

Target B

Tvget Evlluated

Figure 2: Target Primed by Target Evaluated Interaction Effect for the Liking Judgments

494

HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / June1998

H3. H3 stated that the effects of nonconscious affective cues on person

perception evaluations will be stronger for liking and attraction judgments than for judgments of communicator competency. As previously
noted, the results for the liking and attraction judgments supported H 3
Participants who received a nonconscious affective prime rated the
primed target significantly more likable and attractive than did participants who were not primed with that target. Similar analyses were
conducted for the competency judgments. Two prime (primed with that
specific target vs. no prime) by order of evaluation (Target A vs. Target B
first) analyses of variance for the conversational skills and the other
orientation factors was used for each target person. For Target A, there
were no interaction effects nor main effects for order. As shown in Table
2, there was a significant main effect for priming only for the conversational skills factor, F(2,73)= 3.84, p = .05, qz = .05, such that participants
who received a positive prime of Target A rated Target A significantly
more positively on the conversational skills items than participants who
were not primed. There were no sigruficant main or interaction effects
related to priming for Target B. The power of these analyses (a= .05) to
detect mean differences in the two competency measures was .26 and .21
for Target A and .25 and .21 for Target B. Finally the competency factors
were examined using a 2 (target primed: A vs. B) x 2 (target evaluated: A
vs. B) mixed design. There were no significant effects related to priming.
DISCUSSION
The results support the model of nonconscious affect explicated. The
positive subliminal prime resulted in both target specific and, to a lesser
degree, diffuse effects. First, the results for H1 demonstrate that positive
nonconscious affect associated with a specific target makes that target
appear more likable and more attractive. Although participants were
unaware of being primed with a target, their evaluations of that target
were more positive than the evaluations made by individuals who were
not primed or by participants who were primed with a different target.
Moreover, this result was fairly substantial in that the nonconsciousprime
accounted for 9% to 18% of the variance in the liking and physical
attractivenessmeasures. These results correspond to previous findings on
the relationship between affect and exposure in subliminal mere exposure
effects (SME). In a meta-analytic study Bornstein (1989) found the magnitude of SME effects is at least three to four times as great as the
magnitude of optimal exposure effects, suggesting that subliminal stimuli
produce greater affective responses in individuals than stimuli that are

Monahan / NONCONSCIOUSAFFECT

495

clearly recognized. Similar results have been obtained by Weinberger and

Hardaway (1991) in assessing psychodynamic activation.
That other research paradigms also find quite strong subliminal effects
does not address why participants in this study gave so much weight to
their nonconscious feelings when making evaluations of the two individuals they watched engage in a conversation. Perhaps the participants
did precisely as they were requested They reported their own genuine
reactions to the target person. Because the priming cue was presented
outside of conscious awareness, the affective response it provoked may
have seemed authentic to the individual (Martin & Achee, 1992). Participants had no reason to believe that the affective response was not genuine
(as opposed to an external manipulation); hence, their positive feelings
were an important and trustworthy piece of information to use in their
impression-formationtasks.
In addition, participants may have felt particularly comfortable or
confident about using their gut feelings because the nonconscious affective cue was in the form of a nonverbal cue, a target expressing the emotion of happiness. Nonverbal communication is the dominant channel for
the expression of emotion (Buck, 1984). When making first-impression
judgments, people place a great deal of trust in their readings of others
nonverbal responses to the extent that when verbal and nonverbal channels disagree, people are more likely to believe the nonverbal (Burgoon,
1994). Thus, affect cues that originate in nonverbal gestures may induce
strong responses in perceivers and such cues may be perceived as particularly valid and trustworthy

Nonconscious ufect us diffse. The model proposed that nonconscious

affect derives from both preattentive and attentive processing. In addition, it was speculated that preattentive processing would result in affect
that is diffuse with an ambiguous referent or target, whereas attentive
processing would result in affect that is target specific. Both a targetspecific effect (Hl) and a diffuse effect (H2) were obtained. Participants
who were subliminally primed with Target B rated the unrelated target
(Target A) significantly more positively on both physical attraction and
liking measures than did individuals who were not primed. These results
support the premise that nonconscious affect is diffuse and can attach
itself to even unrelated stimuli (Murphy et al., 1995);however, this effect
was not significant for participants who were primed with Target A. The
diffuse results obtained were clearly weaker than the target-specific results, although this outcome should not be surprising. The stronger targetspecific findings result from both the general mood effect produced by the
preattentive processing as well as the specific evaluation effect produced

496

HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / June1998

by the attentive processing, whereas the weaker diffuse effect resulted

from only the preattentive processing.

Types ofjudgments. Positive affect induced outside of awareness influenced individuals to view a target as more likable and better lookingboth affectivejudgments. Additionally,for three of the four communicator
competency judgments, participants who received the subliminal positive prime viewed the target conversationalistas slightlymore competent
than did participants who did not receive the subliminal prime. However,
only one of the four analyses of the communicator competency measures
yielded a significant effect, and the variance accounted for by this analysis
was slight (less than 5%).These results suggest that the nonconscious
affect had a significantly weaker impact on these more behavioral- or
skill-orientedjudgments than it did on the affectivejudgments. Although
ones gut affective response to another person is a salient piece of information to use when describing how much one likes the other person, it
may not be as important when assessing anothers communication competence or at least not as important as on-line assessments made during
the interaction. The present findings provide little support for Niedenthals (1992)argument that nonconscious affect acts as a perceptual cue,
magnifying the likelihood that behaviors consistent with the cue will
more likely be noticed and used in forming judgments. Instead, it seems
that the results are best accounted for by salience: The nonconscious
feeling was relevant for affective judgments, whereas it was not as relevant for the conversation skills and other orientation judgments.
Future research might extend this study to examine behaviors within
communication interactions. I would speculate that social interactants
would be more susceptible to nonconscious effects than are observers of
interaction. Communicatorsusually have many goals in interactions that
influence the allocation of attention and reduce cognitive capacity. The
reduced cognitive capacity and focused attention of participants means
that they may not consciously perceive information that evokes affective
reactions in them and, moreover, have less cognitive energy than do
observers to expend in thinking about the veracity of such reactions.
Subliminal effects. As other researchers have noted (see Pittman, 1992),
subliminaleffects rarely happen in the real world and, thus, by themselves
are perhaps of little importance to communicationresearchers. People do,
however, communicatetheir biases and expectancies through very subtle
fleeting cues that are decoded by perceivers only at a nonconscious level
of awareness (Ambady& Rosenthal, 1992).In addition, previous research
using subliminal primes demonstrates that decoders often make misattributions and jump to conclusions based on brief (6 ms) exposures to

Monahan / NONCONSCIOUSAFFECT

497

cues, such as gender (Murphy & Coover, 1994), ethnicity (Devine, 1989),
rudeness (Bargh et al., 1996) and physical attractiveness (Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995, experiment 2). Interviewers report knowing
within 1to 2 minutes whether a potential job applicant is a winner and
people report knowing within the first 30 seconds the likelihood that a
blind date will be a success (Berg & Piner, 1990).There is a growing body
of research indicatingthat people often make important judgments within
seconds of meeting a person, sometimesremaining quite unaware of both
the obvious and subtle cues that may be influencing their judgments.
Subliminal priming is one way of evoking such cues so that researchers
might systematically assess how nonconscious processing biases perceptions, judgments, and communication behaviors. Subliminal priming is
an important tool to use in studying such biases because research participants are completely unaware that a response has been evoked in them
and, thus, have a difficult if not impossible time controlling their responses. This study demonstrates the potent influence of such nonconscious responses on the decision-making processes of individuals as they
observe others in social interaction.
NOTES
1. Several tapes were piloted. In a final pilot study, participants (n = 42) were asked to
view one stimulus tape and indicate how they felt about the target person. Pilot participants
completed four 5-point semantic differential scales. Tapes were selected where the average
evaluations of interactants would be about 3. Target A's evaluations were 3.25 (liking), 3.75
(nice), 3.28 (supportive), and 3.36 (interest in partner). Target Bs evaluations were 3.01
(liking), 3.49 (nice), 3.16 (supportive), and 3.40 (interest in partner). Although Target A was
rated more positively on most measures than Target B, these differenceswere not significant.
2. These ideographs have been used in prior research in our lab. In this earlier research,
pilot test participants (n = 20) were given a set of 48 ideographs to sort into three piles based
on how much they liked each ideograph (like a lot, like somewhat, like a little). Only
ideographs selected from the middle rating pile (like somewhat) were selected for use in this
study.

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