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NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY,

BHOPAL

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
XIV Trimester
INTERNAL AIDS OF INTERPRETATION

SUBMITTED TO: Prof. Debashree Sarkar, Faculty In Charge


Interpretation of Statutes
SUBMITTED BY : Rohit Vijaya Chandra, 2010 BALLB 50

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction......................................................................................................................................2
Kinds of Interpretation.....................................................................................................................3
Literal interpretation............................................................................................................3
Exceptions to the rule of literal interpretation.................................................................................5
Logical interpretation................................................................................................................5
The mischief rule........................................................................................................................5
Rule of casus omissus.................................................................................................................5
Rule of Ejusdem Generis............................................................................................................6
INTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION.....................................................................................7
Long title.....................................................................................................................................7
Exemptions.................................................................................................................................7
Provisos.......................................................................................................................................7
Explanation................................................................................................................................8
Non-obstante clauses.................................................................................................................9
Marginal notes and headings.....................................................................................................9
Preamble.....................................................................................................................................9
Punctuation..............................................................................................................................10
Definition clause and undefined words.........................................................................................10
Judicially defined words..........................................................................................................10
Rule of Ejusdem generis..........................................................................................................11
Schedule....................................................................................................................................11
CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................13
BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................................................................................14

Introduction
The term interpretation means To give meaning to. Governmental power has been divided into
three wings namely the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Interpretation of statues to
render justice is the primary function of the judiciary. It is the duty of the Court to interpret the
Act and give meaning to each word of the Statute.
The most common rule of interpretation is that every part of the statute must be
understood in a harmonious manner by reading and construing every part of it together. The
maxim A Verbis legis non est recedendum means that you must not vary the words of the
statute while interpreting it.
The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature
conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used. In Santi swarup Sarkar v pradeep kumar
sarkar1, the Supreme Court held that if two interpretations are possible of the same statute, the
one which validates the statute must be preferred.

AIR 1997 Cal 197

KINDS OF INTERPRETATION.
There are generally two kind of interpretation; literal interpretation and logical interpretation.
Literal interpretation
Giving words their ordinary and natural meaning is known as literal interpretation or litera legis.
It is the duty of the court not to modify the language of the Act and if such meaning is clear and
unambiguous, effect should be given to the provisions of a statute whatever may be the
consequence. The idea behind such a principle is that the legislature, being the supreme law
making body must know what it intends in the words of the statute. Literal interpretation has
been called the safest rule because the legislatures intention can be deduced only from the
language through which it has expressed itself.
The bare words of the Act must be construed to get the meaning of the statute and one need not
probe into the intention of the legislature. The elementary rule of construction is that the
language must be construed in its grammatical and literal sense and hence it is termed as litera
legis or litera script.
The Golden Rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning.
This interpretation is supreme and is called the golden rule of interpretation.
In Ramanjaya Singh v Baijnath Singh2, the Election tribunal set aside the election of the
appellant under s 123(7) of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 on the grounds that the
appellant had employed more persons than prescribed for electioneering purpose. The appellant
contended that the excess employees were paid by his father and hence were not employed by
him. The Supreme Court followed the grammatical interpretation of S 123(7) and termed the
excess employees as volunteers.
In Maqbool Hussain v State of Bombay3, the appellant, a citizen of India, on arrival at an airport
did not declare that he brought gold with him. Gold, found in his possession during search in
violation of government notification, was confiscated under S 167 (8) Sea Customs Act, 1878.
2
3

(1955) 1 SCR 671 : AIR 1954 SC 749.


[1953] S.C.R. 730.

He was charged under sec. 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The appellant
pleaded that his trial under the Act was violative of Art 20(2) of the constitution relating to
double jeopardy as he was already punished for his act by was of confiscation of the gold. It was
held by the Supreme Court that the sea customs authority is not a court or a judicial tribunal and
the confiscation is not a penalty. Consequently his trial was valid under the Act of 1947.
In Madan Mohan v K.Chandrashekara, it was held that when a statute contains strict and
stringent provisions, it must be literally and strictly construed to promote the object of the act.
In Bhavnagar University v Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd 4, it was held that according to the
fundamental principles of construction the statute should be read as a whole, then chapter by
chapter, section by section and then word by word.
In Municipal Board v State Transport Authority, Rajasthan 5, an application against the change of
location of a bus stand could be made within 30 days of receipt of order of regional transport
authority according to s 64 A of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939. The application was moved after
30 days on the contention that statute must be read as 30 days from the knowledge of the order
The Supreme Court held that literal interpretation must be made and hence rejected the
application as invalid.

Exceptions to the rule of literal interpretation


4
5

2002 AIR SCW 4939.


[1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 373.

Generally a statute must be interpreted in its grammatical sense but under the following
circumstances it is not possible:Logical defects
A) ambiguity
B) inconsistency
C) incompleteness or lacunae
D) unreasonableness

Logical interpretation
If the words of a statute give rise to two or more construction, then the construction which
validates the object of the Act must be given effect while interpreting. It is better to validate a
thing than to invalidate it or it is better the Act prevails than perish. The purpose of construction
is to ascertain the intention of the parliament.
The mischief rule
The mischief rule of interpretation originated in Heydons case. If there are two interpretations
possible for the material words of a statute, then for sure and true interpretation there are certain
considerations in the form of questions. The following questions must b considered:
1. What was the common law before making the Act?
2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide a remedy?
3. What is the remedy resolved by the parliament to cure the disease of the common wealth?
4. The true reason of the remedy.
The judge should always try to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. The mischief rule
says that the intent of the legislature behind the enactment should be followed.
Rule of casus omissus
Generally, the court is bound to harmonize the various provisions of an Act passed by the
legislature during interpretation so that repugnancy is avoided. Sometimes certain matters might
have been omitted in a statute. In such cases, they cannot be added by construction as it amounts
to making of laws or amending which is a function of legislature. A new provision cannot be
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added in a statute giving it meaning not otherwise found therein. A word omitted from the
language of the statute, but within the general scope of the statute, and omitted due to
inadvertence is known as Casus Omissus.
In Padma Sundara Rao v State of Tamil Nadu6 it was held that the cassus omissus cannot
be supplied by the court except in the case of a clear necessity and when reason for it is found
within the four corners of the statute itself.
Rule of Ejusdem Generis
Ejusdem generis means of the same kind. Generally particular words are given their natural
meaning provided the context does not require otherwise. If general words follow particular
words pertaining to a class, category or genus then it is construed that general words are limited
to mean the person or thing of the same general class, category or genus as those particularly
exposed.
Eg: if the husband asks the wife to buy bread, milk and cake and if the wife buys jam
along with them, it is not invalidated merely because of not specifying it but is valid because it is
of the same kind.
The basic rule is that if the legislature intended general words to be used in unrestricted
sense, then it need not have used particular words at all. This rule is not of universal application.
In Devendra Surti v State of Gujarat7, under s2 (4) of the Bombay shops and Establishments Act,
1948 the term commercial establishment means an establishments which carries any trade,
business or profession. Here the word profession is associated to business or trade and hence a
private doctors clinic cannot be included in the above definitions as under the rule of Ejusdem
Generis. In Grasim Industries Ltd v Collector of Customs, Bombay 8, the rule of Ejusdem Generis
is applicable when particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus are followed by
general words.
In such a case the general words are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those
specified.
Every clause of a statute must be construed with reference to other clauses of the Act.

INTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION


6

(2002) 3 SCC 533.


[1969] 1 SCR 235.
8
AIR 2002 SC 1706.
7

Long title
A long title of a Legislation may not control, circumscribe or widen the scope of the

legislation, if the provisions thereof are otherwise clear and unambiguous, but if the terms of the
legislation are capable of both a wider and a narrower construction, that construction which
would be in tune with the avowed object manifested in the preamble or declared in the long title,
ought to be accepted9.

Exemptions

An exemption clause in a taxing statute must be, as far as possible, liberally construed
and in favour of the assessee, provided no violence is done to the language used10.
It is true that an exemption provision should be liberally construed, but this does not
mean that such liberal construction should be made even by doing violence to the plain meaning
of such exemption provision. Liberal construction will be made wherever it is possible to be
made without impairing the legislative requirement and the spirit of the provision.11
Provisos
The normal function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would
otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is confined to
that case.
The main function of a proviso is to carve out an exception to the main enactment. It
cannot, normally, be so interpreted as to set at naught the real object of the main enactment.12.
A proviso cannot be held to control the main enactment or to withdraw, by mere
implication, any part of what the main provision has given. But it cannot enable something to be
done which is not to be found in the enacting clause itself, on the ground that otherwise the
proviso would be meaningless and senseless.
9

Urmila Bala Dasi vs. Probodh Chandra Ghosh (1990) 184 ITR 604 (Cal)
CIT vs. Dungarmal Tainwala (1991) 191 ITR 445 ( Patna)
11
Petron Engineering Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. CBDT (1989) 175 ITR 523 (SC)
12
CIT vs. Pyarilal Kasam Manji & Co. 198 ITR 110 (Ori.)
10

There may be cases in which the language of the statute may be so clear that a proviso
may be construed as a substantive clause. But whether a proviso is construed as restricting the
main provision or as a substantive clause, it cannot be divorced from the provision to which it
stands as a proviso. It must be construed harmoniously with the main enactment.13

Explanation
Sometimes an Explanation is added to a section to elaborate upon and explain the

meaning of the words appearing in the section. Such an Explanation becomes an integral part of
the main enactment.
An Explanation to a statutory provision has to be read with the main provision to which
it is added as an Explanation. An Explanation appended to a section or a sub-section becomes an
integral part of it and has no independent existence apart from it. There is, in the eye of law, only
one enactment, of which both the section or sub-section and the Explanation are two inseparable
parts. In the absence of anything repugnant in the subject or context, the words and expressions
used in the Explanation are to be given the same meaning as given to them in the main provision
itself.14
The purpose of an Explanation is not to limit the scope of the main section. An
Explanation is quite different in nature from a proviso; the latter excludes, excepts and restricts
while the former explains, clarifies or subtracts or includes something by introducing a legal
fiction.
An Explanation may be appended to a section to explain the meaning of the words used
in the section. There is no presumption that an Explanation which is inserted subsequently
introduces something new which was not present in the section before. Ordinarily, an
Explanation is inserted to clear up any ambiguity in the section and it should be so read as to
harmonise it with the section and to clear up any ambiguity in the main section.15.
The normal principle in construing an Explanation is to understand it as explaining the
meaning of the provision to which it is added; the Explanation does not enlarge or limit the
provision, unless the Explanation purports to be a definition or a deeming clause; if the intention
13

CIT vs. Ajax Products Ltd. (1964) 55 ITR 741 (SC)]


CIT vs. Reunion Engineering Co. (P) Ltd. (1993) 203 ITR 274 (Bom.)
15
CIT vs. Voltas Ltd. (1994) 205 ITR 569 (Bom)
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of the Legislature is not fully conveyed earlier or there has been a misconception about the scope
of a provision, the Legislature steps in to explain the purport of the provision; such an
Explanation has to be given effect to, as pointing out the real meaning of the provision all
along.16.

Non-obstante clauses

A non-obstante clause is usually used in a provision to indicate that the provision should prevail
despite anything to the contrary in the provision mentioned in such non-obstante clause. In case
there is any inconsistency or a departure between the non-obstante clause and another provision,
one of the objects of such a clause is to indicate that it is the non-obstante clause which would
prevail over the other clause.17

Marginal notes and headings

The marginal note to a section cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the section
but it can certainly be relied upon as indicating the drift of the section or to show what the
section is dealing with. It cannot control the interpretation of the words of a section, particularly
when the language of the section is clear and unambiguous but, being part of the statute, it prima
facie furnishes some clue as to the meaning and purpose of the section.18.
Marginal notes are not decisive in interpreting a substantive provision of law, but, in
case of doubt, they can be relied upon as one of the aids for construction. 19
Preamble
The Act Starts with a preamble and is generally small. The main objective and purpose of the Act
are found in the Preamble of the Statute. Preamble is the Act in a nutshell. It is a preparatory
statement. It contains the recitals showing the reason for enactment of the Act. If the language of
the Act is clear the preamble must be ignored. The preamble is an intrinsic aid in the
interpretation of an ambiguous act.
16

CIT vs. Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works 193 ITR 77 (Kar)


Parasuramaiah vs. Lakshamma AIR 1965 AP 220.
18
K.P. Varghese vs. ITO 131 ITR 597 (SC)
19
R.B. Shreeram Religious & Charitable Trust vs. CIT (1988) 172 ITR 373 (Bom)
17

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In Kashi Prasad v State20, the court held that even though the preamble cannot be used to defeat
the enacting clauses of a statute, it can be treated as a key for the interpretation of the statute.

Punctuation

There are three activities serially set out in that sub-clause, namely, construction, manufacture
or production. A comma is, therefore, legitimately and as per the rules of grammar, required after
the first activity to separate it from the second activity of manufacture. Since the second activity
is followed by the word or, no comma is required after the second activity to separate it from
the third activity. Therefore, punctuation is put as grammatically required. It does not disclose
any intention of providing for a separate kind of business altogether. Punctuation, in any case, is
a minor element in the construction of a statute. Only when a statute is carefully punctuated and
there is no doubt about its meaning can weight be given to punctuation. It cannot, however, be
regarded as a controlling element for determining the meaning of a statute.21

Definition clause and undefined words

Judicially defined words


It has long been a well-established principle to be applied in the construction of an Act

of Parliament that where a word of doubtful meaning has received a clear judicial interpretation,
the subsequent statute which incorporates the same word or the same phrase in a similar context,
must be construed so that the word or phrase is interpreted according to the meaning that has
previously been assigned to it.22
Interpretation of a provision in a taxing statute rendered years back and accepted and
acted upon by the department should not be easily departed from.23

20

1980 BB CJ 612
Hindustan Construction vs. CIT (1994) 208 ITR 291 (Bom)
22
Barras vs. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co. Ltd. (1933) AC 402 (HL)
23
CIT vs. Balkrishna Malhotra (1971) 81 ITR 759 (SC)
21

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Rule of Ejusdem generis

The maxim ejusdem generis serves to restrict the meaning of a general word to things or matters
of the same genus as the preceding particular words. It is well recognised rule of construction
that when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together
noscitur a sociis, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take their colour
from each other that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to the less general.
In order to attract the principle of ejusdem generis, it is essential that a distinct genus or category
must be discernible in the words under examination. Where the statute imposes restriction on
advertisement, publicity and sales promotion, the expression sales promotion cannot include
selling expenses incurred in the ordinary course of business 24. Similarly, the words other
stationary plant must be construed ejusdem generis with switchgears and transformers.25
The rule of ejusdem generis is to be applied with caution and not pushed too far. It may not
be interpreted too narrowly and unnecessarily if broad based genus could be found so as to avoid
cutting down words to dwarf size.26
Schedule
The Schedules appended to a statute form part of it. They are generally added to avoid
encumbering the statute with matters of excessive details, guidelines to work out the policy of
the statute, transitory provisions, rules and forms which need frequent amendment and the like.
Much importance is not given to the forms unless they contain requirements of a mandatory
nature.

CONCLUSION
Statute generally means the law or the Act of the legislature authority. The general rule of the
interpretation is that statutes must prima facie be given this ordinary meaning. If the words are
24

CIT vs. Statesman Ltd. (1992) 198 ITR 582 ( Cal .)


[CIT vs. Anglo India Jute Mills Co. Ltd. (1993) 202 ITR 104 (Cal.)
26
U.P. State Electricity Board vs. Hari Shanker Jain AIR 1979 (SC) 65
25

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clear, free from ambiguity there is no need to refer to other means of interpretation. But if the
words are vague and ambiguous then internal aid may be sought for interpretation.
The chief source of law is legislation, though there are other sources of law such as precedents
and customs. Every source of law finds its expression in a language. Often the language has a
puzzling effect, i.e., it masks and distorts. Often it is found that the language of a statute is not
clear. The words used in the statute too at times seem to be ambiguous. Sometimes it is not
possible to assign the dictionary meaning to certain words used in legislation. Meaning which is
to be assigned to certain words in legislation. Even the dictionary does not give the clear-cut
meaning of a word. This is so because the dictionary gives many alternative meanings applicable
in different contexts and for different purposes so that no clear field for the application of a word
is easily identified. So long as expansion of meaning takes place uniformly, the law will develop
along healthy lines. But if one judge takes the narrow view and the other the broad view, the law
will mean different things for different persons and soon there will be confusion. Hence, it is
necessary that there should be some rules of interpretation to ensure just and uniform decisions.
Such rules are called rules of interpretation.
There are various aids to the rule of interpretation and in case the ambiguity is not removed even
after applying the internal aids, then the external aids can come in handy. They provide various
methods by the help of which a statute can be interpreted and used by the judiciary in deciding
cases.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Mathur, D. N., Interpretation of Statutes, 1st Edn., 2006, Central Law Publications,
Allahabad.

Singh, Avtar, Introduction to Interpretation of Statutes, 2nd Edition Reprint 2007,


Wadhwa and Company, Nagpur.

URLs.

http://www.itatonline.org/interpretation/interpretation9.php

http://www.scribd.com/doc/7118910/Interpretation-of-Statutes

http://sixthformlaw.info/01_modules/mod2/2_2_3_stat_interp/05_internal_aids_.htm

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