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INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
SUBMITTED TO
PROF.DEBASHREE BANERJEE
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW
NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE
UNIVERSITY,
BHOPAL.
SUBMITTED BY:
AAKASH NARANG
2010-BALLB-34
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INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................
........................ 3
UNDERSTANDING PARLIAMENTARY AND LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY ...................................................... 4
Parliamentary history
................................................................................................................. 4
Legislative history
.......................................................................................................................
4
IS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BINDING
.................................................................................................. 4
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND LEGISLATIVE INTENTION
...................................................................... 5
REASONS FOR THE COURT'S USAGE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
....................................................... 6
IS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY USAGE MOTIVATED BY DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE
JUSTICES.............. 7
THE USE
INDIAN
INTERPRETATION
OF
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The essence of law lies in the spirit, not its letter, for the letter is
significant only as being the
external manifestation of the intention that underlies
it Salmond
INTRODUCTIO
N
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PARLIAMENTARY
AND
LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
Legislative
history
means (i)
The legislative antecedents of the statutory provision under
consideration ,i.e. corresponding provisions in previous enactment
3
since repealed and re-enacted with or without modification
(ii)
Pre parliamentary materials relating to the provision or the
statue in which it is contained ,e.g. reports of committees and
commission
(iii) Parliamentary materials
IS
LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
BINDING
This notion is completely rejected. On contrary, there seems to be broad
consent that legislative history is just a tool with acts as a "guiding function"
for the courts. Variation of opinion arises regarding the relative weight to be
provided to the historical interpretative method in relation to other methods.
Advocates of legal discourse theory suggest a ranking that usually places
arguments based on legislative intent higher than others." furthermore,
increasing number of scholars are of the view that while a categorical duty
of the courts to stick to legislative history
might not exist, an obligation to refer the
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materials does .
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HISTORY
AND
LEGISLATIVE
INTENTION
to
Black's
Law
Dictionary
legislative
intent
means
"the
design or plan that the legislature had at the time of enacting a statute."
It does not essentially reveal the meaning of each word; however it does
offer courts with a ways of selecting between competing interpretations.
Few schools of legislative interpretation offer that the court's obligation is to
determine and uphold the intention of the legislature; while some should the
existence of a collective intention and the necessity to determine such, even
if it does exist. For those in the former school, it is one mode to discern
legislative intent.
According to Black's Law Dictionary legislative
history means
"The back ground and events leading to the enactment of a statute,
including hearings committee reports, and floor debates."
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FOR THE
COURT'S USAGE
OF
LEGISLATIVE
Many scholars have tried to understand the motive of judges for citing
legislative history.The usage
of
legislative
history
is
motivated
by
The age of the statute is also relevant, but its outcome is neither linear nor
monotonic: extremely new and old statutes are less likely to extract
legislative history usage than statutes of intermediate age. The facts also
recommend that the usage of legislative history by one justice induces other
justices to respond in the similar kind.
With regard to the effect of ideological factors, liberal justices are usually
more likely than conservative
justices
to
use
legislative
history.
James J. Brudney &Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices' reliance on Legislative history: Principle, Strategy,
and
The Scalia effect, 29 Berkeley J. Emp. &lab. L. 117 (2008)
9
David s. Law & David Zaring, law versus ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of legislative
history51 Wm. & Mary l. Rev. 1653 2009-2010
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HISTORY
USAGE
MOTIVATED
BY
DISAGREEMENT
There is one question that has to be delving into, to what limit, if any, do the
Justices refer to legislative history in order to retort to the arguments and
positions of other Justices?
Difference over the meaning of a statute enhances the usage of legislative
history. When Justices differ on the merits, it is expected from them to resort
to legislative history as a way of strengthening their own arguments, and
weakening those of the opponents.
It appears that Court's legislative history opinions yields little aid for this
hypothesis. Indeed, the opposite view can be:
Opinions for a unanimous Court are considerably more likely to refer to
legislative history than other kinds of opinions. However, this finding is
deceptive. It is an error to suppose that unanimity enhances legislative
history usage. Most of the majority opinions are unanimous opinions and
majority opinions-unanimous or else-are more likely to refer to legislative
history
than
are
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opinions.
minority
10
David s. Law & David Zaring, Law versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative
history 51 Wm. & Mary l. Rev. 1653 2009-2010
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THE
IN
USE
THE
OF
INTERPRETATION
PARLIAMENTARY
OF INDIAN
STATUTES:
AND
LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
LAWS
The parliamentary history may be referred for ascertaining the intention, but
not for construction, is pedantic. In fact all such material out freely to be
referred to and it is only by resort to such material that the object of the
legislation and how the legislature intended to achieve that object by the
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LAWS
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to find out what was the mischief which the legislation aimed at .
And
Kapur,
J.
observed:
In construing an enactment and determining its true scope it is permissible to
have regard to all such factors as can legitimately be taken into account to
ascertain the intention of the legislature such as the history of the Act, the
reason which led to its being passed, the mischief which had to be cured as
well as Site cure as also the other provisions of the statute. This is the rule in
Heydon case". Taking this principle into account it appears that the object of
the amendment was to validate certain notices after the 1959 amendment
and after the lapse of eight years from the end of the assessment year and
also to nullify the effect of the Calcutta judgment in Debi Dutta Moody case.
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In Balchand Jain v. State of M.P . for holding that an order for anticipatory
bail could be issued under Section 438, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, to a
person apprehending arrest under Rule
184 of the Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, 1971, the Court
relied on the legislative history of the provision and on the
recommendations of the Law Commission and observations in the Law
Commission Report.
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were in accord' ;
or as it is more tersely put in United States v. Trans-Missouri
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Freight Assn .
'Those who did not speak may not have agreed with those who did; and
those who spoke might differ from each other.' The rule of exclusion has not
always been adhered to in America, and sometimes distinction is made
between using such material to ascertain the purpose of a statute and using
it for ascertaining its meaning. It would seem that the rule is adopted in
Canada and Australia.
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Assembly Debates although not conclusive, yet show the intention of the
framers of the Constitution enacting provisions of the Constitution and
the Constituent Assembly Debates can throw light in
ascertaining the intention behind such provisions. Reference to Constituent
Assembly Debates in
27
28
29
30
(1985)
(2002)
(1973)
(1973)
1
8
4
4
SCC
SCC
SCC
SCC
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1
237 AT P. 265
225: AIR 1973 SC 1461
225: AIR 1973 SC 1461
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The conception that the legislative history must be sternly adhered to barely
has any advocates now a days. It is just a tool and "aid" or "guide" as
stated in Pepper v. Hart
34
Now the discussion has thus swung towards ascertaining the significance
given to it. There exist no universal rules on the interpretation of legislative.
It is, though, a worthwhile duty for legal academics to examine the
possibilities and confines of a hierarchical order of different legislative
materials, ranging from preparatory reports by expert panels to commentary
by the Ministry. Besides, judges and legal scholars should observe the detail
process of how statutes are made in
order to be in a better position to consider
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their value.
So far as the Indian judiciary is concerned they have tried to clear the poison
of these external sources by way of verdicts.
Debates have been referred many a time by the court in order to reach a
conclusion in a case. Recently SC has cleared that in S.R. Chaudhuri v. St. of
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Punjab
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others while
enactment
or
amendment
is
the
result
of
34
[1993] AC 593
Holger Fleischer, Comparative approaches to the use of Legislative History in Statutory
Interpretation, 60 am. J. Comp. L. 401 2012
36 (2001) 7 SCC 126
37 AIR 1995 SC 1012
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Internet Sources
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/23251934?
Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&searc
hText=The&searchText=role&searchText=of&searchText=parliament
ary&Statutes
http://ijtr.nic.in/articles/art21.pdf
http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/articles/Interpretation-ofStatute5430.aUwTmSwSN
http://www.nhs.vic.edu.au/library/legaldate/LegalDate_Vol_19_No_2_May_
2007.pdf
http://caaa.in/Image/Interpretation%20of%20Statutes.pdf
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