FROILAN GAUDIONCO, petitioner, vs. HON.

SENEN PENARANDA, respondent

G.R No. 79284. November 27, 1987
Facts:
On 29 May 1986, Teresita Gaudionco, the legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan Gaudionco, filed with the
RTC-Misamis Oriental, presided over by respondent Judge, Hon. Senen Penaranda, a complaint against
petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of
damages. On 13 October 1986, Teresita Gaudionco also filed with the MTC-General Santos City, a
complaint against petitioner for concubinage. On 14 November 1986, an application for the provisional
remedy of support pendente lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by Teresita
Gaudionco in the civil case for legal separation. The respondent judge then ordered the payment of support
pendente lite.
The petitioner believes that the civil action for legal separation is grounded on concubinage, so that all
proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended to await conviction or acquittal for
concubinage in the criminal case. Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to be
first secured before the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for
legal separation is his alleged offense of concubinage. He also alleges that the judge acted in abuse of
discretion in ordering him for payment of support.
Issue:
Whether or not the ground is sufficient in this case?
Ruling:
In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation,
based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage,
because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil
and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to
obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings support, and disqualification from inheriting from the
innocent spouse, among others. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be
issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding
or conviction is necessary.
Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife must also fail, as we find no proof
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in ordering the same. Support pendente
lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the
judge. If petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a
motion to modify or
Wherefore, the petition of petitioner is dismissed.

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992
Facts:
Jose Jo admits to cohabiting with 3 women and fathering 15 children. (wow) Prima Jo is allegedly the legal
wife who has a daughter named Monina. Prima filed for separation of conjugal property and support. The
TC ruled in favor of Prima in the support case but failed to render a decision on the separation of property.
Jose appealed, CA affirmed support but dismissed the separation of property for lack of a cause of action
and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Did the CA err in saying that (1) the judicial separation of conjugal property sought was not allowed under
Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code and (2) no such separation was decreed by the TC- Jose says
since the TC decision became final sorry nalang si Prima

Ruling:
The Court decided (2) first so even if Jose is correct in saying that the decision of the TC failed to state the
separation the Court cant let technicality prevail over substantive issues so the Court may clarify such an
ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment have become final.
On (1) -The CA dismissed the complaint on the ground that the separation of the parties was due to their
agreement and not because of abandonment. It held that an agreement to live separately without just
cause was void under Article 221 of the Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the
aggrieved spouse. Its conclusion was that the only remedy available to her was legal separation which will
result in the termination of the conjugal partnership.
Prima contends that CA misinterpreted Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code. She says that the
agreement was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for
him to visit and support her. They never agreed to separate permanently. And even if they did, this
arrangement ended in 1942, when she returned to him and he refused to accept her.
Art. 128 which superseded Art. 178 states that the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on
either of these grounds:
1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and
2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if she
said spouse does not leave the other spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the intent never to return, followed by prolonged
absence without just cause, and without providing for one's family although able to do so. The acts of Jose
in denying entry to the conjugal home to his wife as early as 1942 and consistently refusing to give support
from 1968 constitutes abandonment.
Since Jose had abandoned her and their child she is entitled to ask for the dissolution of their property
regime. Jose used a dummy to keep the properties from Prima but the Court said that these properties that
should now be divided between them, on the assumption that they were acquired during coverture and so
belong to the spouses half and half. The division must include such properties properly belonging to the
conjugal partnership as may have been registered in the name of other persons in violation of the AntiDummy Law.

EDUARDO ARROYO J.R., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. 96602. Nov. 19, 1991
Facts:
On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of Mrs. Linda Sare and
witness Jabunan, took the morning plane to Baguio. Arriving at around 11:00 a.m., they dropped first at the
house of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at Crystal Cave, Baguio City then proceeded to the Mines View
Park Condominium owned by the Neri spouses. At around 7 pm, accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the
Neris' condominium. Jabunan opened the door for Arroyo who immediately went knocked at the master's
bedroom where accused Ruby Neri and her companion Linda Sare were. On accused Ruby Neri's request,
Linda Sare left the master's bedroom and went upstairs to the sala leaving the two accused alone in the
masters bedroom. About forty-five minutes later, accused Arroyo Jr. came up and told Linda Sare that she
could already come down. The event was made known to Dr. Jorge Neri, husband of Ruby Neri, who
thereafter, filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the RTC-Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri,
and Eduardo Arroyo. Both the RTC and the CA found the two accused guilty of adultery.
Ruby Vera Neri and Eduardo Arroyo filed for a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
CA. On appeal, both accused alleges the following: that they were into an illicit affair, however, they denied
that they had sexual intercourse on November 2, 1982 which Dr. Neri claims; and finally, that a pardon had
been extended by Dr. Neri, and that he had later contracted marriage with another woman with whom he is
presently co-habiting.
Issue:

Whether or not the pardon of Dr. Neri is tenable to free the two accused of their criminal liability?

Ruling:
The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: "Art.344-The
crime of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both parties, if they are
both alive, or in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense that consent is
granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit affair, nevertheless, for either
consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal complaint. In the
present case, the compromise agreement stating the pardon given by Dr. Neri, was executed only on
February 16, 1989, after the trial court had already rendered its decision dated December 17, 1987 finding

petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Because of this, the said pardon is not sufficient to free the two
accused namely Ruby Vera Neri and Eduardo Arroyo of the crime adultery.

BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, plaintiff-appellant, vs.LEONILA GINEZ, defendant-appellee.

G.R No. L-10033. December 28, 1956
Facts:

Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant Leonila
Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with
their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. At about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of
her sister-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in
Asingan, Pangasinan. As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from his sisterin-law and some from anonymous writers informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. On crossexamination, Benjamin admitted that his wife also informed him by letter, that a certain "Eliong" kissed her.
All these communications prompted him in to seek the advice of the navy legal department. In August,
1952, Benjamin went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of
Leonilas godmother. She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of a cousin ofBenjamin,
where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamin
tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery but
Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left. After that and despite such belief,
Benjamin still exerted efforts to locate her and failing to find her, he went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "to
soothe his wounded feelings". On November 18, 1952, Benjamin filed in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against his wife, Leonila who filed an answer vehemently
denying the averments of the complaint and setting up affirmative defenses. After the issues were joined
and convinced that reconciliation was not possible, the court set the case for hearing on June 9, 1953.
Benjamin presented his evidences, but the counsel of Leonila moved for the dismissal of the complaint due
to the fact that there was condonation. Both the RTC and CA believed that there was indeed condonation.
Issue:

Whether or not there has been condonation?

Ruling:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation or,
condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense
which the latter has committed". It is to be noted, however, that in defendant's answer she vehemently and
vigorously denies having committed any act of infidelity against her husband, and even if we were to give
full weight to the testimony of the plaintiff, who was the only one that had the chance of testifying in Court
and link such evidence with the averments of the complaint, we would have to conclude that the facts
appearing on the record are far from sufficient to establish the charge of adultery preferred against the
defendant. Certainly, the letter that plaintiff claims to have received from his sister-in-law, must have been
too vague and indefinite as to defendant's infidelity to deserve its production in evidence; nor the
anonymous letters which plaintiff also failed to present; nor the alleged letter that, according to plaintiff, his
wife addressed to him admitting that she had been kissed by one Eliong, whose identity was not
established, do not amount to anything that can be relied upon.
The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, legal
separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation
shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband clearly shows that there was a
condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery"
committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to adultery
were committed by the defendant-wife, reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of
the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to
be brought to the house of his cousin and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and

one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as
husband and wife- all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a
reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband.
The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to
adultery. Although he believed that her wife committed adultery, he still persuaded her wife.
It is important to note that a divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where the parties continue
to live together after it was known, or there is sexual intercourse after knowledge of adultery, or sleeping
together for a single night, and many others. The resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis of
condonation will generally be inferred, nothing appearing to the contrary, from the fact of the living together
as husband and wife, especially as against the husband.
Because of this, the Supreme Court agreed with the RTC and CAs findings that there was indeed
condonation on the part of Benjamin Bugayong, therefore, the foregoing case is hereby dismissed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GUADALUPE ZAPATA and DALMACIO

BONDOC, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-3047. May 161951
Facts:
In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc
against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having
repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 to March 14, 1947. The defendant-wife
entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months of arresto mayor which penalty she
served. In the same court, on September 17, 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for
adulterous acts committed by his wife and her paramour from March 15, 1947 to September 17, 1948. On
February 21, 1949, each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint on the ground that they
would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court upheld the contention of
the defendants and quashed the second complaint.
The trial court held that the adulterous acts charged in the first and second complaints must be
deemed one continuous offense, the defendants in both complaints being the same and identical persons
and the two sets of unlawful acts having taken place continuously during the years 1946, 1947 and part of
1948 is within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision that No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
Issue:
Whether or not consent attended the case?
Ruling:
Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency; it is an instantaneous crime which is
consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourse
constitutes a crime of adultery. True, two or more adulterous acts committed by the same defendants are
against the same person- the offended husband; the same status- the union of the husband and wife by
their marriage; and the same community represented by the State for its interest in maintaining and

preserving such status. But this identity of the offended party, status and society does not argue against the
commission of the crime of adultery as many times as there were carnal acts consummated, for as long as
the status remain unchanged, the nexus undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass upon
that status constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many
complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime.
In the instant case the last unity does not exist, because as already stated the culprits perpetrate
the crime in every sexual intercourse and they need not do another or other adulterous acts to consummate
it. After the last act of adultery had been committed as charged in the first complaint, the defendants again
committed adulterous acts not included in the first complaint and for which the second complaint was filed.
Another reason why a second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts does not
constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, at the time of the commission
of the crime charged in the second complaint, the paramour already knew that his codefendant was a
married woman and yet he continued to have carnal knowledge of her. Even if the husband should pardon
his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for
adulterous acts committed after the pardon was granted, because the pardon refers to previous and not to
subsequent adulterous acts
The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby reversed
and set aside, and the trial court is directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in accordance with
law.

JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.

G.R. No. L-13553. February 23, 1960

Facts:

Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba, Nueva
Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several children. In March 1951, plaintiff
discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one
Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man, plaintiff sent her to
Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that
while in the said city, defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards
the end of June 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then
they had lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations
with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation; to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a
criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation.
The RTC and CA held that a legal separation could not be decreed due to the confession of
judgment by the defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not pardon attended the case at bar?
Ruling:
The mere circumstance that defendant told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated
from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to answer
the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the dismissal.
Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion, which implies more than
consent or lack of opposition to the agreement. In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not
be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other
party to procure evidence necessary to prove it; and proof that the defendant desires the divorce and
makes no defense, is not by itself collusion. Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place without
collusion by the parties, according to the evidence. The Supreme Court does not think plaintiff's failure
actively to search for defendant and take her home constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous
relations with Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after
he had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her
home. Hers was the obligation to return.
Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the
appealed decision and decree a legal separation between this spouse. Costs of all instances against
Serafina Florenciano.

SOCORRO MATUBIS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ZOILO PRAXEDES, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-11766. October 25, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur. For
failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple, on May 30, 1944, agreed to live
separately from each other, which status remained unchanged until the present. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff
and defendant entered into an agreement,the significant portions of which are hereunder reproduced: (a)
That both of us relinquish our right over the other as legal husband and wife; (b) That both without any
interference by any of us, nor either of us can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other
crime or suit arising from our separation; (c) That I, the, wife, is no longer entitled for any support from my
husband or any benefits he may received thereafter, nor I the husband is not entitled for anything from my
wife; (d) That neither of us can claim anything from the other from the time we verbally separated, that is
from May 30, 1944 to the present when we made our verbal separation into writing.
In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting and deporting themselves as husband and wife who
were generally reputed as such in the community with Asuncion Rebulado and on September 1, 1955, said
Asuncion gave birth to their child. On April 24, 1956, plaintiff Socorro Matubis filed a complaint for legal
separation Alleging abandonment and concubinage on the part of defendant. The RTC and CA dismissed
the case due to the presence of condonation on the part of the plaintiff.

Issue:

Whether or not condonation attended the case?

Ruling:
The very wording of the agreement gives no room for interpretation other than that given by the
trial judge. Counsel in his brief submits that the agreement is divided in two parts. The first part having to do
with the act of living separately which he claims to be legal, and the second part, that which becomes a
license to commit the ground for legal separation which is admittedly illegal. We do not agree in appellants
defense. Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are the most vital part in the said agreement. The
condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. The law (Art. 100 Civil Code) specifically
provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and or consented in writing,
the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy. Plaintiff's counsel even agrees that the complaint
should be dismissed. He claims however, that the grounds for the dismissal should not be those stated in
the decision of the lower court, "but on the ground that plaintiff and defendant have already been legally
separated from each other, but without the marital bond having been affected, long before the effectivity of
the new Civil Code." Again, we cannot subscribe to counsel's contention, because it is contrary to the
evidence.
Wherefore, the decisions of both RTC and CA are hereby affirmed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. RODOLFO SCHNCKENBERGER, defendantappellant

GR No. 48183. November 10, 1941
Facts:
On Mach 16, 1926, the accused, Rodolfo Schneckenberger married the complainant Elena
Cartegena and after 7 years of marital life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of character, to
live separately from each other. And on May 25, 1935, they executed a document in which they agreed to
live separately and to choose who they want to live with. On June 15, 1935, the accused, without leaving
the Philippines, secured a divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Mexico. On May 11, 1936, he contracted
another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel. Complainant herein instituted 2 actions for Bigamy in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for concubinage in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The first culminated in the conviction of the accused. On the trial of concubinage, accused interposed the
plea of double jeopardy, and the case was dismissed. But upon appeal by the fiscal, accused was
convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting accused in the offense of concubinage?
Ruling:
As to appellants plea for double jeopardy, it need only be observed that the offense of bigamy for
which he was convicted and that of concubinage for which he stood trial are two distinct offenses in law and
in fact as well as the mode of their prosecution. The celebration of the second marriage, with the first still
existing, characterizes bigamy; in the present case, mere cohabitation by the husband with a woman who is
not his wife characterizes concubinage.
Upon the other hand, we believe and so hold that the accused should be acquitted of the crime of
concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused clearly shows that each party intended
to forego the illicit acts of the other. As the term pardon unquestionably refers to the offense after its
commission, consent must have been intended, agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense
prior its commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent,
for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she
becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. In arriving at this
conclusion, we do not wish to be misconstrued as legalizing an agreement to do an illicit act, in violation of
law. Our view must be taken only to mean that an agreement of the tenor entered into between the parties
herein, operates, within the plain language and manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party from
prosecuting the offense.
Wherefore, judgment is reversed and the accused is hereby acquitted in the crime of concubinage.

PEOPLE OF THE PILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. URSULA SENSANO, defendant-appellant

No. 37720. March 7, 1933
Facts:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. they had one child. Shortly
after the birth of the child, the husband left his wife to go to Cagayan where he remained for three years
without writing to his wife or sending her anything for the support of herself and their son. Poor and
illiterate, she struggled for an existence of herself and her son until the day she met the accused Marcelo
Ramos who took her and the child to live with him. On the return of the husband in 1924, he filed a charge
against his wife and Marcelo Ramos for adultery and both were sentenced to 4 months and 1 day. After
completing her sentence, the accused left her paramour. Thereafter, she begged for the husbands pardon
and promised to be a faithful wife if he would take her back. He refused to pardon her or to live with her and

said she could go where she wished, that he would have nothing to do with her anymore and she could do
as she pleased. Abandoned for the second time, she and her child went back to Marcelo Ramos. The
husband, knowing that she resumed living with her codefendant did nothing to interfere with their relations
or to assert his rights as husband. Thereafter, he left foe Hawaii where he remained fro seven years
completely abandoning his wife and child. On his return to the Philippines, he presented the second charge
of adultery.
Issue:
Whether or not the second complaint would prosper?
Ruling:
We have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this case and his conduct warrant the
interference that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between the accused and therefore he is
not authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding. We cannot accept the argument that the 7 years
of consent on his part in the adultery of his wife is explained by his absence from the Philippines during
which period it was impossible for him to take any action against the accused. There is not merit in the
argument that it was impossible for him to take any action against the accused during the said 7 years.
Wherefore, the judgment is reversed.

AGUEDA BENEDICTO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ESTEBAN DELA RAMA, defendant

No. 1056. December 8, 1903
Facts:
From the affidavit of the plaintiff is the following: that plaintiff and defendant had lived together from
the time of their marriage in July 1891 to August 1892. It is also admitted that the defendant suddenly,
without any previous warning, took his wife to the house of her parents, left her there, and never lived with
her afterwards. She also charged defendant with having committed concubinage with Gregoria Bermejo in
1982. She produced no evidence to support this allegation. On the other hand, the defendant presented his
counter-affidavit where he agreed on the time of their marriage. That on his return from an inspection of
one of his estates, his wifes maid gave him a letter in the own handwriting of his wife which was directed to
his lover, a Spanish corporal of the civil guard named Zabal. She admitted the genuineness of the letter, fell
upon her knees, and implored him to pardon her. That same day, he took her to the home of her parents,
told what had occurred, and left her there.
Respondent then filed for Legal Separation which was given by the RTC.
Issue:

Whether or not the Legal Separating filed by the respondent would prosper?

Ruling:
It is said that if the plaintiff is guilty, the defendant has condoned the offense. The wife can defeat
the husbands suit by proving that he has pardoned her.

Our conclusion is that neither one of the parties is entitled to Legal Separation. As conclusion of
law from the foregoing facts, we hold that neither party is entitled to judgment of Legal Separation against
the other. That judgment be entered that the plaintiff take nothing by her action.

WILLIAM H. BROWN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JUANITA YAMBAO, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-10699. October 18, 1957
Facts:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain legal
separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese
invaders, from 1942-1945, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she
begot a baby girl; that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from
internment; that thereafter the spouse lived separately and later executed a document liquidating their
conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share, the complaint prayed
for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage and that the
defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just and
equitable. The court subsequently directed the City Fiscal to investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of
the Civil Code, whether or not a collusion exists between the parties. As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal
Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross-examined plaintiff Brown. His questions elicited the fact that
after liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten children by her.
Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that, while the
wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of
action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code that there had been consent and connivance, and because
Brown's action had prescribed under Article 102 of the same Code since the evidence showed that the
learned of his wife's infidelity in 1945 but only filed action in 1955.
Issue:
Whether or not the prescription barred the success of the case?
Ruling:
ART. 100 of the New Civil Code states that The legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation or of consent to the adultery or concubinage.
Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion
between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. It is clear in this
court that the case should be dismissed because of Browns illegal act of cohabiting with another woman.
This court also found, and correctly held that Browns action was already barred, because he did
not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which
was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal

separation cannot be filed except within one 1 year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the
cause; and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred.
Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for denying the remedy sought,
it becomes unnecessary to delve further into the case and ascertain if Brown's inaction for ten years also
evidences condonation or connivance on his part. The decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint is
therefore affirmed.

JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.

G.R. No. L-13553. February 23, 1960
Facts:

Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba, Nueva
Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several children. In March 1951, plaintiff

discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one
Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man, plaintiff sent her to
Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that
while in the said city, defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards
the end of June 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then
they had lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations
with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation; to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a
criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation.
The RTC and CA held that a legal separation could not be decreed due to the confession of
judgment by the defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition will not prosper?
Ruling:
Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant
could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the
moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a
personal risk. In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that
the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to
prove it. And proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion.
Moreover, Art. 102 of the New Civil Code stating that an action for legal separation cannot be filed
except within one 1 year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause; and within five years
from and after the date when such cause occurred. This court decided that the 1-year requirement was
followed. The instance when plaintiff caught his wife in 1955 with another man was deemed to be start of
the 1-year requirement period. Since he filed on that same year-1955, he properly followed the above
stated provision.
Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the
appealed decision and decree a legal separation between this spouse. Costs of all instances against
Serafina Florenciano.

ELENA CONTRERAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CESAR J. MACARAIG, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in the Catholic Church of Quiapo, Manila.
Out of their Marriage, three children were born. Immediately before the election of 1961, defendant was
employed as manager of the printing establishment owned by plaintiff's father known as the MICO Offset.
In that capacity, defendant met and came to know Lily Ann Alcala, who place orders with MICO Offset for
propaganda materials for Mr. Sergio Osmea, who was then a Vice-Presidential candidate. After the
elections of 1961, defendant resigned from MICO Offset to be a special agent at Malacaang. He began to
be away so often and to come home very late. Upon plaintiff's inquiry, defendant explained that he was out
on a series of confidential missions.
In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant was living
in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. When defendant, the following October, returned to the conjugal home,
plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos' report from defendant in her desire not to anger nor drive defendant
away. Although plaintiff, in April 1963, also received rumors that defendant was seen with a woman who
was on the family way on Dasmarias St., she was so happy that defendant again return to the family
home in May, 1963 that she once more desisted from discussing the matter with him because she did not
wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away. All this while, defendant, if and whenever he returned to
the family fold, would only stay for two or three days but would be gone for a period of about a month. After
plaintiff received reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given birth to a baby, she sent Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia,
her father's employee, to verify the reports. The latter was driven by Lubos to the house in Singalong and
between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock that afternoon, she saw defendant was carrying a baby in his arms. Mrs.
Antioquia then went to the parish priest of Singalong where she inquired about the child of Cesar Macaraig

and Lily Ann Alcala and she was given a copy of the baptismal certificate of Maria Vivien Mageline
Macaraig which she gave to plaintiff sometime in October 1963.
Plaintiff then entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to
convince him to return to his family. Mr. Macaraig; however, Macaraig refused. In November 1963, plaintiff
requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs. Enriqueta Majul, and the latter obliged and
arranged a meeting at her home in Buendia between plaintiff and Lily Ann Alcala. Lily Ann said she was
willing to give up defendant as she had no desire to be accused criminally but it was defendant who refused
to break relationship with her. In the early part of December 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two
children went to talk to defendant at his place of work. Plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann
Alcala and to return to the conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant
informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.
On December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation. When defendant
did not interpose any answer after he was served summons, the case was referred to the Office of the City
Fiscal of Manila pursuant to the provisions of Article 101 of the Civil Code. After a report was received from
Asst. Fiscal Primitivo M. Pearanda that he believed that there was no collusion present, plaintiff was
allowed to present her evidence. Defendant has never appeared in this case.
The RTC and CA dismissed the complaints because it failed to follow Article 102 of the New Civil
Code providing that an action for legal separation cannot be instituted except within one year after plaintiff
"became cognizant of the cause."
Issue:
Whether or not the rule on Prescription should be followed?
Ruling:
The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed within one year after the
date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the essence of the cause
of action. It is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable social institution so that the law
provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of its status.
In the instant action, the Court has to find that plaintiff became cognizant of defendant's infidelity in
September, 1962. Plaintiff made successive attempts to induce the husband to amend his erring ways but
failed. Her desire to bring defendant back to the connubial fold and to preserve family solidarity deterred
her from taking timely legal action.
The only question to be resolved is whether the period of one year provided for in Article 102 of the
Civil Code should be counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from September 1962 or from
December 1963. Computing the period of one year from the former date, it is clear that plaintiff's complaint
filed on December 14, 1963 came a little too late.
The period of "five years from after the date when such cause occurred" is not here involved.
Upon the undisputed facts it seems clear that, in the month of September 1962, whatever
knowledge appellant had acquired regarding the infidelity of her husband, that is, of the fact that he was
then living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala, was only through the information given to her by the driver of
their family car. Much as such hearsay information had pained and anguished her, she apparently thought
it best, and no reasonable person may justifiably blame her for it, not to go deeper into the matter herself
because in all probability even up to that time, notwithstanding her husband's obvious neglect of his entire
family, appellant still cherished the hope, however forlorn, of his coming back home to them. Indeed, when
her husband returned to the conjugal home the following October, she purposely refrained from bringing up
the matter of his marital infidelity "in her desire not to anger nor drive defendant away." True, appellant
likewise heard in April 1963 rumors that her husband was seen with a woman on the family way on

Dasmarias Street, but failed again to either bring up the matter with her husband or make attempts to
verify the truth of said rumors, but this was due, because "she was so happy that defendant again returned
to the family home in May 1963 that she once more desisted from discussing the matter with him because
she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away." As a matter of fact, notwithstanding all these
painful information which would not have been legally sufficient to make a case for legal separation,
appellant still made brave, desperate attempts to persuade her husband to come back home. In the words
of the lower court, she "entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to
convince him to return to his family" and also "requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs.
Enriqueta Majul" for the same purpose, but all that was of no avail. Her husband remained stubborn.
After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the only time
when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part of December
1963 when plaintiff, accompanied by their two children went to talk to defendant where she pleaded but
however was refused by the defendant.
From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the preceding
paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer leave Lily Ann to
return to his legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to decide whether to
sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then that the legal period of one year must be
deemed to have commenced.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is set aside and another is hereby rendered holding that
appellant is entitled to legal separation.

LUIS MA. ARANETA, petitioner vs. HON. HERMOGENES CONCECPCION, respondent

G.R No. L-9667. July 31, 1956
Facts:
The main action was brought by petitioner against his wife for legal separation on the ground of
adultery. Defendant filed an omnibus petition alleging that she was being molested and harassed, to secure
custody of their three minor children and a monthly support of P5, 000.00. Plaintiff opposed the petition,
denying the allegation and further alleging that defendant has abandoned the children; alleging that
conjugal properties were only worth P80,000.00, not 1 million pesos as alleged by defendant; also alleging
that defendant had abandoned them and had committed adultery, that by her conduct she had become
unfit to educate her children, being unstable in her emotions and unable to give the children the love,
respect and care of a true mother and without means to educate them.

The RTC granted the custody of the children to defendant. The main reason given by the judge, for
refusing plaintiffs request that evidence be allowed to be introduced on the issues, is the prohibition
contained in Art. 103 of the Civil Code stating that an action for legal separation shall in no case be tried
before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.
Issue:

Whether the cooling-off period is tenable in the case at bar?

Ruling:
It is conceded that the period of six months fixed in Art. 103 is evidently intended as a cooling-off
period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each
other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another.
Take the case at bar for instance. Why should the court ignore the claim of adultery supported by
circumstantial evidence the authenticity of which cannot be denied? And why assume that the children are
in the custody of the wife when it is precisely alleged in the petition and affidavits that she has abandoned
the conjugal home?
Evidence of all these disputed allegations should be allowed that the discretion of the court as to
the custody and alimony pendent elite may be lawfully exercised. The rule is that all provisions of the law
even if apparently contradictory, should be allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them if
necessary. Thus, the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided it
does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling-off period.
ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA,
respondent
G.R. No. L-53880. March 17, 1994
Facts:
On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage as well as for legal separation between her husband Enrico L. Pacete. In her complaint, she
averred that she was married to Pacete on April 30, 1938 before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato,
Cotabato; that they had a child named; that Pacete subsequently contracted in 1948 a second marriage
with Clarita de la Concepcion in Kidapawan, North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on
August 1, 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large
tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of
property either in his name and the name of Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita; that Pacete
ignored overtures for an amicable settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was
impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were served with
summons on November 15, 1979. They filed a motion for an extension of 20 days within which to file an
answer. The court granted the motion. On the due date, the defendants again asked for a second extension
which was again granted by the court. Again, on the agreed due date, defendants asked for another 15-day
extension which was however denied by the court. Initial proceedings using the evidence only of
Concepcion followed thereafter.
On 17 March 1980, the court through the Hon. Glicerio Carriga promulgated the herein questioned
decision namely: the valid issuance of the legal separation between Concepcion and Enrico Pacete and
declaring the subsequent marriage between Enrico Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion to be void ab
initio.

Because of this, Enrico Pacete filed a special action of certiorari questioning the period of trial by
the Hon. Carriaga.
Issue:
Whether or not the cooling-off period is mandatory?
Ruling:
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for
legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the
petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take
steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity
of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation
and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties
to alone dictate.
It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That other remedy,
whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse
compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted. The 6-months period is clear in this court
to have been followed by the RTC judge.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the proceedings are Nullified and Set
Aside. No costs.

SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents

G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994
Facts:

As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours
of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, the
administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years. Sabalones retired as ambassador in
1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their children but to Thelma Cumareng whom
he conducted a second marriage on October 1981 and their three children. Four years later, he filed an
action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located at Greenhills, Metro Manila, belonging to
the conjugal partnership. He claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without
any income. Private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation.
She alleged that the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and their six children. She also
informed the court that despite her husband's retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate family and
was instead maintaining a separate residence. In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of
legal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share.
After trial, the court decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share
in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his respondent wife.
This decision was appealed to the CA. Pendente lite, the respondent wife filed a motion for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction to command the petitioner from interfering with the administration of their
properties in Greenhills and Forbes Park. After hearing, the CA granted the preliminary injunction prayed
for by his wife. The petitioner argues that since the law provides for a joint administration of the conjugal
properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts erred in their decision?
Ruling:
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as
clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61 states that after a
petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement
between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator. While it
is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in the
decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties. That designation was
in effect approved by the CA when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now
under challenge. The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo
of the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the
plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may, before
final judgment, do or continue doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus make
ineffectual the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the plaintiff.

The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened
violation. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the petitioner's legitimate
wife (and the complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal separation), the private respondent has
a right to a share (if not the whole) of the conjugal estate. There is also, in our view, enough evidence to
raise the apprehension that entrusting said estate to the petitioner may result in its improvident disposition
to the detriment of his wife and children. We agree that inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared the
forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in the
meantime to participate in its management. Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently
installed the respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely
allowed her to continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the
petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family
Code.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.

REYNALDO ESPIRITU, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. 115640. March 15, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu who was employed by the National Steel Corporation and respondent
Teresita Masauding who was a nurse, first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan. In 1977, Teresita left for Los
Angeles to work as a nurse. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, to Pennsylvania as its liaison
officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife.
On August 16 1986, their daughter was born. On October 7, 1987, while they were on a brief vacation in
the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second
child was born on January 12, 1988. The couple decided to separate sometime in 1990. Instead of giving
their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children
and went back to California. She claims however, the she keeps in constant touch with her children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not
yet completed, he was sent back to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner
Guillerma Layug and her family. Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because
Reynaldo had filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of being arrested. The
judgment of conviction in the bigamy case was actually rendered only on September 29, 1994. Teresita,

meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and on December 8, 1992 and filed the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus against the two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole
proceedings to gain custody over the children.
The RTC suspended Teresita's parental authority and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental
authority. On appeal, the CA however gave custody to Teresita.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in suspending petitioners parental authority?
Ruling:

Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of scrutinizing the records to discover the
choice of the children and rather than verifying whether that parent is fit or unfit, respondent court simply
followed statutory presumptions and general propositions applicable to ordinary or common situations. A
scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita is more intent on emphasizing the "torture and
agony" of a mother separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a result of her character
being made a key issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the best interest and welfare of her
children. While the bonds between a mother and her children are special in nature, either parent, whether
father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her
suffering, pride and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount
consideration. The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody
suffers a future character and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-examined. Decision
should be based on the testimony of the daughter giving all negative characteristics about her mother.
Teresita. Moreover, the court finds Teresita being as she entered into an illicit relationship with Perdencio
Gonzales right there in the house of petitioner Reynaldo in Pennsylvania. The record shows that the
daughter suffered emotional disturbance caused by the traumatic effect of seeing her mother hugging and
kissing a boarder in their house. The record also shows that it was Teresita who left the conjugal home and
the children.
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both over
seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear front the record. From all
indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the First paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said article no longer
applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive value
for children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are
compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The children
understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth
by her behavior.

CARMEN LAPUZ SY, petitioner-appellant, vs. EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.

G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
Facts:
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S.
Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married on September 30, 1934; that they had lived together
as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that
they acquired properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of
his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses,
and counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go
Hiok. But before the trial could be completed Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on May 31,
1969. On June 9, 1969, Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" on two (2) grounds,
namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article
102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. On June 26,
1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario
Lapuz Both the RTC and CA denied the substitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate
the action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?
Ruling:
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of
the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by
allowing only the innocent spouse to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the
spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal
separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action
causes the death of the action itself.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being
the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a
decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the
action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the
expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
Accordingly, the decision of both the RTC and the CA are hereby affirmed.

Laperal vs. Republic

GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962
FACTS:
The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March
1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses. Aside from that, she
ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this
petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City
Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that

continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation
of the conjugal assets.
ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision
of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband.
HELD:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the
vinculum. The finding that petitioners continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion
in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation
in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been
dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to
hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.
Petition was dismissed.

SIOCHI V. GOZON
18 March 2010
Facts:
This case involves a 30,000 SQ.M. parcel of land (property)registered in the name of the Spouses Gozon.
Elvira filed with Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. Elvira filed a notice
of lis pendens, while the legal separation case was still pending. Meanwhile, Alfredo and Mario Siochi
(Mario) entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell involving the property for the price of P18 million. They
stipulated that Alfredo was to remove the notice of lis pendens on the title, to have the land excluded from
the legal separation case and to secure an affidavit from the wife Elvira that the property was the exclusive
property of Alfredo.
However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these stipulations. After
paying the P5 million earnest money as partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the
property in September 1993.
Meanwhile, the courts declared the Gozon spouses legally separated. As regards the property, the RTC
declared it conjugal. Alfredo also executed a deed of donation over the said property in favour of their
daughter Winifred without annotating the notice of lis pendens. Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of

Attorney executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18
million.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages,
Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order. RTC ruled in favour of Mario. CA affirmed. Mario appealed, contending that the
Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other
spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elviras conduct signified her acquiescence to the sale, Mario
prays for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property upon
his payment of P9 million to Elvira.
IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value.
ISSUE:
Could Alfredo /dispose alienate the property? NO.
Was Alfredos share in the conjugal property already forfeited in favour of their daughter by virtue of the
decree of legal separation? NO.

HELD:
This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the property
occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance
by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was
separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole
administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or the
authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The absence of the consent of
one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to
the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the
sale of the property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity.
The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the
Agreement is entirely void.
As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras
acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to
Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
We disagree with the CA when it held that the share of Alfredo in the conjugal partnership was already
forfeited in favour of the daughter. Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal
partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the
net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited in

favor of Winifred. Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal
partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.
With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI is not a buyer in good
faith. As found by the RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious person to make further inquiries about the
vendors title to the property.

People vs Jumawan,
G.R. Nos. 39303-39305; March 17, 1934
FACTS:
On the basis of a written statement made by Vicente Recepeda on July 18, 1976, and an affidavit executed by
Trinidad Alcantara on July 19, 1976, a complaint for murder was filed in the Municipal Court of Sariaya, Quezon, on
July 19, 1976, by Station Commander Sisenando P. Alcantara, Jr. against Francisco Jumawan, Cesario Jumawan,
Manuel Jumawan and Presentacion Jumawan for the death of Rodolfo Magnaye.
The lower court finds Cesario Jumawan, Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye, Manuel Jumawan, and Francisco
Jumawan guilty as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and punished under Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences each of them to suffer a penalty of life imprisonment and to
indemnify jointly and severally the parents of the victim in the amount of Twenty-four Thousand (P24,000.00) Pesos.
It appears from the evidence adduced during the trial that Rodolfo Magnaye was married on 26 January 1974 to
Presentacion Jumawan, one of the accused in the above entitled criminal case. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye left
the conjugal home and stayed with her sister Sebastiana Jumawan. Rodolfo Magnaye, on the other hand, went and
stayed with his mother Trinidad Alcantara.
The mother of Mrs. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye made several attempts to secure the signature of Rodolfo
Magnaye on a document agreeing to a separation from his wife so that both he and his wife will be free to marry
again but Rodolfo Magnaye persisted in refusing to sign said document.
On one occasion the mother of Mrs. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye even brought Rodolfo Magnaye and his
mother to the Provincial Constabulary Command to ask for the assistance of Sgt. Mortilla to assist her daughter in
securing a separation from Rodolfo Magnaye but they were told by Sgt. Mortilla that it cannot be legally done.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellants be liable of the crime of parricide or simply murder?
RULING:
Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but as it is, since her relationship to the deceased is not alleged
in the information, she, like the others, can be convicted of murder only qualified by abuse of superior strength.

Although not alleged in the information, relationship as an aggravating circumstance should be assigned against the
appellants. True, relationship is inherent in parricide, but Presentacion stands convicted of murder. And as to the
others, the relationships of father-in-law and brother-in-law aggravate the crime. The penalty for murder with an
aggravating circumstances is death. However, for lack of necessary votes, the penalty is reduced to reclusion
perpetua.

IMBONG VS OCHOA
GR No. 204819; April 14, 2014
FACT:
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion
and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their
perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates to sticker
campaigns, from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive
liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto,
however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
ISSUE:
Whther or not the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be spouses, as a
condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition
RULING:
Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family
planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, is a
reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The law does not even mandate the type of family
planning methods to be included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or reject
information they receive and they retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the
intervention of the State.
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000
Facts:
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86
years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, he was
Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and
Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of 30 years. In 1972, they
separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium,

Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio
City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. Out of their marriage, the spouses had 6 children. On
December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about 5
months in Antipolo City. The children alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an
overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug. As a consequence, Potencianos
health deteriorated. On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano
Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Makati. On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the
CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano Ilusorio due to his advanced age, frail
health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. She alleged that respondents refused petitioners demands to
see and visit her husband. The CA denied petitioners motion.
Issue:
Whether or not a wife may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in
conjugal bliss?
Ruling:
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the
petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The
evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano Ilusorios
liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years
of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind
does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial
choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not
appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He
made it clear before the CA that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that
declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the
Court of Appeals. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not
be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to
privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right.
Wherefore, this court affirms the decision of the CA, however, it nullifies the decision insofar as it
gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio.

MARIANO ARROYO, plaintiff vs. DOLORES VAZQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant

G.R No. 17014. August 11, 1921
Facts:
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock by marriage
in 1910 and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation, they lived together as husband and
wife until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their common home with the intention to live
separately from her husband. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce her to
resume marital relations, an action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial home
and live with him as a dutiful wife. The wife answered that she had left her husbands home without his
consent because of the cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Upon hearing the cause, the lower
court gave judgment in favor of the wife, authorizing her to live apart from her husband. They concluded
that the husband was more to blame than the wife and that his continued ill-treatment was a sufficient
justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in their judgment favoring the wife?
Ruling:
To begin with, the obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty
universally recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in Art. 142 and 143 of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, it has been determined that where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode, she can,
compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance. Nevertheless, the interests of both parties and
the society at large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the
separate maintenance of the wife. From this consideration, it follows that provisions should be made for
separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has
become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband.

We are therefore hold that Mariano Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute
return of the wife to the marital domicile. He is entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented
herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.
Therefore, reversing the judgment of the lower court, it is declared that Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo
has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and that she is admonished that it is
her duty to return.
ELOISA GOITIA Y DELA CAMARA, plaintiff vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant
Facts:
This is an action by the wife against the husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
Eloitia Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were legally married on January 7, 1915 and established residence
at San Marcelino where they lived together for one month because the wife returned to the home of her
parents due to the following reasons: that the husband demand wife to perform unchaste and lascivious
acts on his genital organs; that whenever wife rejected husbands indecorous demands, husband would
maltreat wife by words and inflict injuries on wifes lips, face and different parts of her body; and that
because wife was unable to desist husbands repugnant desires and maltreatment, she was obliged to
leave the conjugal home. The wife also seeks for support from his husband even if she lives separately.
The husband on the other hand, seeks the relief of the courts in compelling his wife to return back to their
conjugal home.
Issue:
Whether or not the wife is compelled to return to the marital dwelling?
Ruling:

Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties and
obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and
prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the legal existence is merged into one by marriage,
the new relation is regulated and controlled by the government upon principles of public policy for the
benefit of the society as well as the parties.
Marriage is an institution and its maintenance is in its purity which the public is deeply interested. In
the case at bar, when the continuance of the marriage becomes intolerable to one or both parties and gives
no possible good to the community, relief from the court should be attainable. The Supreme Court made
the observation that implied approval by the court of a wifes separate residence from her husband doe not
necessarily violate the sacredness and inviolability of the marriage. Since separation de-facto is allowed in
this case, it is only due to the fact that public peace and wifes purity must be preserved.
Lastly, the husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his
wife imposed by law; and where a husband, by wrongful, illegal and unbearable conduct, drives his wife
from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take the advantage of her departure to abrogate his duty to still
support his wife. In law, the wife is legally still within the conjugal domicile, even if living separately, thus he
is entitled to support and maintenance by the husband.

PASTOR TANCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA ESCANO, defendant-appellee

No. L-19671. November 29, 1965
Facts:
On February 24, 1948, Vicenta Escano and Pastor Tanchavez got married and the marriage was
unknown to the parents of Vicenta. The said marriage was solemnized by Lt. Lavares, an Army Catholic
Chaplain. Their marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the
local civil registrar.
Upon the knowledge of the parents of Vicenta, they took her to their house. Consequently, she
admitted her marriage with Tanchavez. Her parents were surprised because Tanchavez never asked for
the hand of Vicenta and were disgusted because of the great scandal because of the clandestine marriage
would provoke.
Thereafter, Vicenta continued to live with her parents, while tanchavez returned to Manila to his
job. As of June 1948, the newlyweds were already estranged. Vicenta filed a petition to annul her marriage;
however, she did not sign the said document. Thus, the case was dismissed because of her nonappearance at the hearing.
In 1950, Vicenta left for United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for
divorce. And on October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce, final and absolute was issued. In 1954, Vicenta
married an American and she lived with him and begotten children.
Issue:

Whether or not Vicenta failed to perform her wifely duties.

Ruling:
It was held that the refusal to perform her wifely duties and her denial of consortium and her
desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through he fault. Thus, the husband is entitled
for indemnity.

DIOSDIDIT CUENCA, et al, petitioner, vs RESTITUTO CUENCA, et al

No. L-72321. December 8, 1988
Facts:
Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon- Cuenca were legally married, begotten two children,
Restituto and Meladora as their heirs. Maria Bangahon brought properties into her marriage. Said property
was inherited by her from her parents.

However, Agrapi had a second family who claimed to be the legitimate family of Agrapino. Thus,
they claimed that the said properties are the conjugal property of Agrapino and Engracia, second wife.
The trial court decided in favor of the second family. However, the Court of Appeals decided
otherwise and thus favored the first family.
Issue:

Whether or not the said property of Maria is the conjugal property of Agripino and Engracia.

Ruling:
The Court held that, the said property an exclusive property of Maria which she inherited from her
parents and brought it to the marriage. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that, all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife. Thus, heirs of Maria were able to prove that that said property is the exclusive
property of their mother Maria. On the other hand, Engracia failed to prove otherwise.

JANE GO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

G.R. No. 114791. May 29, 1997
Facts:
Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1987. The video coverage of the wedding
was provided by the petitioner spouses Nancy and Alex Go. Spouses Ong claimed the video of their
wedding three times but they failed to have it. Because the newlywed couple will be having their
honeymoon in US, they agreed to have the video tape upon their return.
When the couple came home, they found out that the said tape had been erased by spouses Go.
Furious at the lost of the tape which suppose to be the only record of their wedding. Thus, they
filed a complaint. The RTC rendered its decision making spouses Go liable to the said erased tape. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Alex Go be held liable.

Ruling:

The Court held that, Alex Go argues that when his wife entered into the contract with Ong, she was
acting alone for her sole interest. Thus, they found it with merit. Under the law, a wife may exercise any
profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband.
Thus, it was only Nancy Go who entered into the contract. She is solely liable to the complainant
for the damage awarded.