Cloning

First published Wed Sep 17, 2008

Dolly, the first mammal cloned from an adult body cell, came into the world as innocent as a
lamb; but she has caused panic and controversy, as well as a vast academic and popular literature
on the ethics and regulation of cloning. Following the announcement of her birth in February
1997 (Wilmut et al. 1997), an important question arose: if the cloning of mammals is possible,
will scientists soon start cloning human beings as well; and if they did, would this be wrong or
unwise? More than ten years later, many countries have legally prohibited human cloning or are
in the process of doing so, and various institutions, including the United Nations and the
European Parliament, are calling for a worldwide ban on all forms of human cloning.
This entry describes the most important areas of disagreement regarding the ethics of human
cloning, since human cloning has been the main topic of the cloning debate.

1. What is Cloning?
Strictly speaking, cloning is the creation of a genetic copy of a sequence of DNA or of the entire
genome of an organism. In the latter sense, cloning occurs naturally in the birth of identical twins
and other multiples. In the debate over cloning, however, the termcloning typically refers to
somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT). SCNT involves transferring the nucleus of a somatic cell
(any body cell other than a sperm or egg cell) into an enucleated oocyte, i.e. an oocyte from
which the nucleus and thus most of the DNA has been removed. The manipulated oocyte is
thereupon treated with chemicals or electric current in order to stimulate cell division and an
embryo is formed. Because the embryo's nuclear DNA is that of the somatic cell it is genetically
identical to the organism from which the somatic cell was obtained.
Dolly the sheep was the first mammal ever to be cloned using SCNT. Ian Wilmut and his team at
the Roslin Institute in Scotland replaced the nucleus from an oocyte taken from a Blackface ewe
with the nucleus of a cell from the mammary gland of a six-year old Finn Dorset sheep. They
transferred the resulting embryo into the womb of a surrogate ewe and approximately five
months later Dolly was born. Dolly had a white face. She was genetically identical to the Finn
Dorset ewe from which the somatic cell had been obtained.
Dolly, however, was not 100% genetically identical to the donor animal. Genetic material comes
from two sources: the nucleus and the mitochondria in the cytoplasm of a cell. Mitochondria are
organelles that serve as power sources to the cell. They contain short segments of DNA. In
Dolly's case, her nuclear DNA was the same as the donor animal; other of her genetic materials
came from the mitochondria in the cytoplasm of the enucleated oocyte. For the clone and the
donor animal to be exact genetic copies, the oocyte too would have to come from the donor
animal (or from the same maternal line as mitochondria are passed on by oocytes).

Dolly's birth was a real breakthrough, for it proved that something that had been considered
biologically impossible could indeed be done. Before Dolly, scientists thought that cell
differentiation was irreversible: they believed that, once a cell has differentiated into a
specialized body cell, such as a skin or liver cell, the process cannot be reversed. What Dolly
demonstrated was that it is possible to take a differentiated cell, turn back its clock, and make the
cell behave as though it was a recently fertilized egg.
Nuclear transfer can also be done using a donor cell from an embryo instead of from an organism
after birth. Cloning mammals using embryonic cells has been successful since the mid-1980s (for
a history of cloning, see Wilmut et al. 2001). Another technique to produce genetically identical
offspring or clones is embryo twinning or embryo splitting, in which an early embryo is split in
vitro so that both parts, when implanted in a womb, can develop into individual organisms
genetically identical to each other. This process occurs naturally with identical twins.
The cloning debate, however, has focussed on the use of SCNT. There are two possible uses of
SCNT: creating cloned human embryos to use in research and therapy, and creating human
embryos with the intention of gestating them into full-grown human beings. The latter is
calledreproductive cloning. The former is often referred to astherapeutic cloning, but in this
entry it will be discussed under the heading cloning for research and therapy. Both reproductive
cloning and cloning for research and therapy involve SCNT, but their aims, as well as most of
the ethical concerns they raise, differ. We will first discuss cloning for research and therapy and
will then proceed to outline the ethical debate surrounding reproductive cloning.

2. Cloning for Research and Therapy

In cloning for research and therapy, the embryo cloned through SCNT is not transferred into a
womb; rather, it is used to obtain tissue- or patient-specific stem cells. Stem cells are very
promising tools for research and therapy. Their unique capacities to divide and self-renew for
long periods of time and to differentiate into different types of body cells make them invaluable
tools in what is now calledregenerative medicine. Stem cells could serve as a virtually
inexhaustible source of replacement cells to regenerate diseased or damaged organs and tissues.
They could, for example, be induced to differentiate into cardiomyocytes to replace damaged
heart tissue or into dopamine producing cells for treatment of Parkinson's disease. One possible
source of stem cells is the human embryo at the blastocyst stage. Embryonic stem cells are
especially valuable because they can divide easily and are pluripotent, i.e. they have the capacity
to give rise to any of the around 200 different cell types of the human body. Embryonic stem
cells obtained from cloned embryos have the important advantage that they will not be rejected
by the patient's body after transplantation; given that the patient is the donor of the somatic cell,
the cells or tissue coming from the embryo will be genetically identical to the patient's other
body cells. Cloning, in other words, opens the way to autologous embryonic stem cell
transplantation.
In January 2008, a research team in California was the first to succeed in creating human
embryos in the blastocyst stage using SCNT (French et al. 2008). Of the five blastocysts created,
however, only one could be proven to be a clone. The scientists were not able to extract
embryonic stem cells from the blastocysts since all the material was used for DNA analyses. The

derivation of human embryos by SCNT is still in its infancy stages, and no research team has
succeeded in deriving hES cells from human clones. Cloning for therapy is thus not likely to bear
fruition in the short term, if it will ever prove valuable at all. Apart from unsolved technical
difficulties with nuclear transfer, much basic research in embryonic stem cell research would be
needed. The term therapeutic cloning has been criticized precisely for this reason. It suggests
that therapy using embryonic stem cells from cloned embryos is already reality. In the phase
before clinical trials, critics say, it is only reasonable to refer to research on nuclear transfer
asresearch cloning or cloning for biomedical research (President's Council on Bioethics
(PCBE) 2002, de Wert and Mummery 2003).
Cloning for research will in all likelihood be the most promising application of SCNT.
Researchers could create large numbers of stem cells genetically identical to the patient and then
experiment on these in order to understand the particular features of the disease in that person.
The increased possibility to study disease in a dish would enable research that cannot be done in
patients themselves or where there are too few patients to work with as in the case of rare genetic
diseases. Stem cells genetically identical to a patient would also be of great value for drug
screening and toxicity testing. For example, hepatocytes (liver cells) derived from stem cells that
were obtained from embryos genetically identical to patients with various genetic and disease
backgrounds could be used for predicting the liver toxicity of candidate drug therapies.
Cloning for research and therapy seems to show great promise for future research and perhaps
therapy, then; but it has also raised various concerns.

2.1 Creating and Killing Embryos for Stem Cells

Much of the debate about the ethics of cloning for research and therapy turns on a basic
disagreement about how we should treat early human embryos. As it is currently done, the
isolation of embryonic stem cells destroys the embryo. Moreover, in cloning for research and
therapy, embryos are created solely for the purpose of deriving stem cells. Views on whether it is
permissible (and if so, under what conditions) to create embryos solely for instrumental use
differ profoundly.
Some argue that an embryo is a person or at least should be treated as if it were one; on these
views, creating and killing embryos for stem cells is a serious moral wrong. These positions state
that embryos should never be deliberately harmed or killed, even if this could save many lives
(Deckers 2007). In contrast, some consider the early embryo as a cluster of cells or as human
tissue lacking moral status. A common view among such proponents is that, given its promising
potential, conducting embryonic stem cell and cloning research is a moral imperative (Devolder
& Savulescu 2006). In between these polar positions are various intermediate views which claim
that, although the embryo has moral or symbolic value and therefore merits respect, using
embryos for research might sometimes be justified. Respect can be demonstrated, it is typically
argued, by using embryos only for research that has considerable potential for benefiting many
people and that cannot be done using less controversial means, and by acknowledging the use of
embryos for research with a sense of regret or loss (Robertson 1995, Steinbock 2001). One
common intermediate view holds that the use of surplus IVF embryos to obtain stem cells is
consonant with the respect owed to the embryo, whereas the creation and use of cloned embryos

for these purposes is not. According to this view, the morally relevant difference is that, in the
case of surplus IVF embryos, each of the embryos was created in the hope that it would develop
into a child. Each embryo was created for its own sake, or at least had a chance to continue
living. By contrast, in cloning for research, embryos are created for instrumental use only; they
are created and treated as a mere means, which some regard as incompatible with a respectful
attitude towards the embryo (National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) 1999). Others
(including both proponents and opponents of the use of embryos in research) have denied that
there is a moral difference between using surplus IVF embryos and cloned embryos as a source
of stem cells. In their opinion, if killing embryos for research is wrong, it is wrong regardless of
the embryo's origin (Doerflinger 1999, Devolder 2005).
A less common view states that obtaining stem cells from cloned embryos poses fewer ethical
problems than obtaining stem cells from surplus IVF embryos. Hansen (2002) has advanced this
view, arguing that embryos resulting from SCNT do not have the same moral status we normally
accord to other embryos: he calls the combination of a somatic nucleus and an enucleated egg a
transnuclear egg, which, he says, is a mere artifact with nonatural purpose or potential to
evolve into an embryo and eventually a human being, and therefore falls outside the category of
human beings. McHugh (2004) and Kiessling (2001) advance a similar argument. On their view,
obtaining stem cells from cloned embryos is less ethically problematic because embryos
resulting from SCNT are better thought of as tissue culture, whereas IVF represents instrumental
support for human reproduction. Since creating offspring is not the goal, they argue, it is
misleading to use the term embryo or zygote to refer to the product of SCNT. Their suggested
terms includeclonote and ovasome.

2.2 Research Protections and the Need for Oocytes

If it is to become successful, more research would need to be done on cloning techniques. Given
the loss rates involved, such research would require a large number of eggs or oocytes. Oocyte
donation involves various risks and discomforts (for a review of the risks see Committee on
Assessing the Medical Risks of Human Oocyte Donation for Stem Cell Research et al. 2007).
Among the many issues raised by participating in such donation is what model of informed
consent should be applied. Unlike women who are considering IVF, non-medical oocyte donors
are not clinical patients. They do not stand to derive any reproductive or medical benefit
themselves (though Kalfoglou and Gittelsohn 2000 argue that they may derive a psychological
benefit). Magnus and Cho (2005) have argued that this group of donating women should not be
classified as research subjects since, unlike in other research, the risks to the donor do not lie in
the research itself but in the procurement of the materials required for the research. They have
suggested that a new category named research donors be created for those who expose
themselves to substantial risk only for the benefit of others (in this case unidentifiable people in
the future) and where the risk is incurred not in the actual research but in the procurement of the
materials for the research. Informed consent for altruistic organ donation by living donors to
strangers has also been suggested as a model, since, in both cases, the benefits will be for
strangers and not for the donor. Critics of this latter suggestion have pointed out, however, that
there is a disanalogy between these two sorts of donation. The general ethical rule reflected in
regulations concerning altruistic donation, namely that there must be a high chance of a good

outcome for the patient, is violated in the case of egg donation for cloning research (George
2007). Mertes and Pennings (2007) believe that although it makes sense to regard non-medical
oocyte donors as a special category, that doesn't mean that there are new ethical issues to be
considered. Their view is that oocyte donation for cloning should be approached with the same
set of principles that are currently applied to other types of research with healthy research
subjects: risks and benefits need to be balanced, and concerns about informed consent and
possible undue inducement or exploitation of research donors should be carefully considered.
Given the risks for the donor in the absence of direct medical benefit, and given that the benefits
for research are uncertain, it is not surprising that the number of altruistic non-medical oocyte
donations is very low. Financial incentives might be needed to increase the supply of oocytes for
cloning research. But this raises concerns about the commodification of human reproductive
material, undue inducement, and the exploitation of women. In some countries, including the US,
selling and buying eggs is legal. Some object to these practices because they consider oocytes as
integral to the body and think they should be kept out of the market: on their view, the value of
the human body and its parts should not be expressed in terms of money or other fungible goods.
Some also worry that, through commercialization of oocytes, women themselves may become
objects of instrumental use (Alpers and Lo 1995). Many agree, however, that a concern for
commodification does not justify a complete ban on payment of oocyte donors and that justice
requires that they be financially compensated for the inconvenience, burden, and medical risk
they have endured, as is standard for other research subjects (Steinbock 2004, Mertes and
Pennings 2007).
A related concern is the effect of financial or other offers of compensation on the voluntariness
of oocyte provision. Women, especially economically disadvantaged women from developing
countries, might be unduly induced or even coerced into selling their eggs (Dickinson 2002).
Baylis and McLeod (2007) have highlighted how difficult it is concomitantly to avoid both
undue inducement and exploitation: a price that is too low risks exploitation; a price that avoids
exploitation risks undue inducement.
Concerns about exploitation are not limited to concerns about payment, as became clear in the
Hwang scandal (for a review, see Saunders and Savulescu 2008). Woo-Suk-Hwang, a leading
Korean stem cell scientist, had claimed to be the first to clone human embryos using SCNT and
to extract stem cells from them. In addition to find that Hwang apparently fabricated many of his
research results, Korea's National Bioethics Committee also found that Hwang had pressured
junior members of his lab to donate eggs for his cloning experiments.
Some authors have argued that regulating the market in oocytes could minimize ethical concerns
raised by the commercialization of oocytes and could be consistent with respect for women
(Resnik 2001, Gruen 2007). Researchers are also investigating the use of alternative sources of
oocytes for cloning research, including fetal oocytes, and eggs from adult ovaries obtained post
mortem or during operation, oocytes derived from stem cells, as well as animal oocytes. Others
have suggested asking people about to undergo IVF to donate one or two of their oocytes,
perhaps in return for a reduced fee for their fertility treatment, as these women already face the
risk of hormone stimulation. If cloning for therapy becomes an option, families, eager to help

their dying or sick relative, may well volunteer sufficient oocytes for the treatment of their sick
relative.

2.3 Economic and Social Justice Considerations

As McLaren (2001) has pointed out, personalized cloning therapies are likely to remain labor
intensive and hence expensive; as such, they would probably be a realistic option only for the
very rich, which may raise concerns about social justice, as well as concerns about economic
efficiency. On the other hand, therapies may become cheaper, easier and accessible to more
people after some time Moreover, cloning may cure diseases and not only treat symptoms.
Regardless of price, it remains true that the cloning procedure takes a long time, rendering it
inappropriate for certain clinical applications (e.g. myocardial infarction, acute liver failure or
traumatic or infectious spinal cord damage). If cloning for therapy would become available, it
would likely be reserved for chronic conditions. Ian Wilmut (1997) has suggested that treatments
could be targeted to maximize benefit. An older person with heart disease, for example, could be
treated with stem cells that are not a genetic match, take drugs to suppress his immune system for
the rest of his life, and live with the side-effects. A younger person might benefit from stem cells
that match exactly. Devolder and Savulescu (2006) have argued that objections about economic
cost are most forceful againstcloning for self-transplantation rather than cloning for developing
cellular models of human disease. The latter will enable research into human diseases and may
lead to the development of drugs to treat common diseases, such as cancer and heart disease,
which afflict people all over the world, and perhaps in inexpensive ways. Moreover, cloning
research is not necessarily more labor intensive than experiments on cells and tissues now done
in animals, these commentators say.
Some are skeptical about the claimed benefits of cloning for research and therapy. For many
diseases in which cloned embryonic stem cells might offer a therapy, there are also alternative
treatments and/or preventive measures in development, including gene therapy,
pharmacogenomical solutions and treatments based on nanotechnology. Further, other stem cell
sources might enable us to achieve the same aims as cloning, including adult stem cells,
embryonic stem cell banks with defined major histocompatibility complex backgrounds,
blastocysts with diseases identified through preimplantation genetic diagnosis, entities with a
lower or undetermined status (e.g., hybrids and parthenotes), or genetically manipulated
embryonic stem cells to reduce or actively combat immune rejection.
Although scientists have said that these alternatives are unlikely to completely replace the need
for embryo cloning, a recent development has raised hopes that it might do so. In November
2007, two separate research teams announced that they had reprogrammed human skin cells into
embryonic stem-cell- like cells (Takahashi et al.2007, Yu et al. 2007). They generated what has
been labelledinduced pluripotent stem cells (iPS cells) by inserting four transcription factors
into the genome of a human skin cell using retroviruses. Soon afterwards, proof of principle was
provided that iPS cells can be used for therapy, at least in mice (Hanna 2007). Unlike the
application of cloning technology, this method could provide tissue- and patient-specific cells
without relying on the need for human eggs or the creation and destruction of embryos. The
technique would also be less costly and less labour intensive, and would avoid most of the
ethical pitfalls of cloning and hES cell research.

This promise notwithstanding, many scientists have warned that it would be premature to stop all
cloning research. iPS cells are not identical to embryonic stem cells and different methods of
obtaining pluripotent stem cells might prove more useful for particular purposes. Cloning, for
example, may be capable of teaching us things that iPS cells cannot, and different diseases might
be treatable by different types of stem cells or some combination of stem cells.

2.4 A Slippery Slope to Reproductive Cloning

Slippery slope arguments express the fear that permitting a certain practice may place us on a
slippery slope to a dangerous or otherwise unacceptable outcome. Several commentators have
argued that allowing cloning for research and therapy is a first step that would place us on a
slippery slope to reproductive cloning. As Leon Kass (1998, 702) put it: once the genies put
the cloned embryos into the bottles, who can strictly control where they go?
Others are more skeptical about slippery slope arguments and think that effective legislation can
prevent us from sliding down the slope (Savulescu 1999, de Wert and Mummery 2003). If
reproductive cloning is unacceptable, these critics say, it is reasonable to prohibit this specific
technology rather than to ban non-reproductive applications of cloning. The UK and Belgium,
for example, allow cloning research but prohibit the implantation of cloned embryos in a womb.
Apart from the question of how slippery the slope might be, another question raised by such
arguments concerns the feared developmentreproductive cloningand whether it is really
ethically objectionable. Profound disagreement exists about the answer to this question.

3. Human Reproductive Cloning

The central argument in favor of reproductive cloning is expansion of opportunities for
reproduction. Human reproductive cloning could offer a new means for prospective parents to
satisfy their reproductive desires. It is most often presented as a possible treatment for infertility.
For those unable to produce embryos of their own, cloning opens up the possibility of using
donated eggs (or the woman's own eggs if she is able to produce viable eggs) and then using a
somatic cell nucleus of the mother or that of her partner to create a child closely genetically
related to one of them. If the female partner's egg is used to clone the genome of her male
partner, the resulting child would be genetically related to both parents since the egg contains the
mother's mitochondrial DNA. Helping infertile people to have a child through cloning has been
defended on the grounds of human wellbeing, personal autonomy, and the satisfaction of the
natural inclination to produce offspring (Hyry 2003, Strong 2008). Further, and in particular,
cloning could be used to provide homosexual couples with genetically related children. Offering
individuals or couples the possibility to reproduce using cloning technology has been said to be
consistent with the right to reproductive freedom, which, according to some, implies the right to
choose what kind of children we will have (Brock 1998, 145). Some authors think the main
benefit of reproductive cloning is that it would enable prospective parents to control what
genome their children would be endowed with (Fletcher 1988, Harris 1997 and 2004, Pence
1998, 1016, Tooley 1998). By cloning the genome of a healthy person, parents may avoid
passing on inheritable diseases to their child. People might also choose to give their child the
genome of a person with good health and other desirable characteristics in order to provide the

child with a wide array of possible life plans. Another possible use of reproductive cloning is to
help create a child that is a tissue match for a sick sibling. The stem cells from the umbilical cord
blood or from the bone marrow of the cloned child could be used to cure the diseased child. Such
children, referred to assaviour siblings, have already been created through sexual reproduction
or, more efficiently, through a combination of IVF, preimplantation genetic diagnosis and HLA
testing.
Many people, however, have expressed objections to human reproductive cloning and think it
should be legally prohibited worldwide. Some have no objections to reproductive cloning but do
not promote it either. In criticising the arguments that have been produced against cloning they
sometimes have been misidentified asdefenders of cloning. However, they seldom recommend
the practice, being for the most part content to expose the problematic nature of many of the
arguments against it.
What follows is an outline of some of the main areas of concern and disagreement about human
reproductive cloning.

3.1 Safety and Efficiency

Despite the successful creation of viable cloned offspring in various species during the past
decade, researchers have very limited understanding of how cloning works on the subcellular and
molecular level. The rate of abortions, stillbirths and developmental abnormalities in cloned
mammals has been very high. Although the overall efficiency and safety of SCNT has increased
steadily over the past ten years, it is not yet a safe and efficient process. Another source of
problems is the possible shortening of telomeres. Telomeres are repetitive DNA sequences at the
tip of chromosomes. As an animal gets older, the length of the telomeres gets shorter. When the
telomeres of a cell get so short that they disappear, the cell dies. Shortly after Dolly was born,
scientists thought that she might suffer from premature aging as she was conceived from the
nuclear DNA of a six-year-old ewe. If she inherited the shortened telomeres of the older ewe, her
lifespan too might be shorter. This has led to concern about the longevity of cloned humans, and
concerns that such individuals, as teenagers, might become demented or get other diseases
associated with aging. More recently, scientists have offered some reassurance, after successfully
cloning healthy mammals with normal telomere length (see for example Kubota et al. 2004); but
further research would need to be done for full reassurance.
Many have argued that concerns about safety indicate that cloning in humans should be
prohibited. The strongest version of this argument states that it would be wrong now to produce a
child using SCNT because it would constitute a case of wrongful procreation (Strong 2005).
Some adopt a consent-based objection and condemn cloning because the person conceived
cannot consent for being exposed to significant risks involved in the procedure (Kass 1998,
PCBE 2002). Lane (2006), citing Derek Parfit's non-identity problem, has argued against these
views and claims that even if reproductive cloning is unsafe, it may still be morally permissible
if there are no safer means to bring that very child into existence so long as the child is expected
to have a life worth living. Scientists have said, however, that with the actual rate of
advancement in cloning, one cannot exclude a future in which the safety and efficiency of SCNT
will be comparable or superior to that of IVF or even sexual reproduction. A remaining question,

then, is whether, if cloning does become safe and efficient, those who condemn cloning because
of its experimental nature should continue to condemn it morally and legally. Some authors have
reasoned that if, in the future, cloning becomes safer than sexual reproduction, perhaps they
should instead make it our reproductive method of choice (Fletcher 1988, Harris 2004 chapter 4).

3.2 Welfare of the Individual Conceived through Cloning

3.2.1 Personal Identity, Individuality and Autonomy
One of the main concerns raised by human cloning is that it will threaten personal identity and
individuality, which in turn could lead to reduced autonomy of the person conceived through
cloning (Ramsey 1966, Kitcher 1997, Annas 1998, Kass 1998). In particular, those created from
cloning who know the person they were cloned from may experience difficulties in establishing
their identity. In its report on human cloning, the President's Council on Bioethics (2002, Chapter
5) wrote that being genetically unique is an emblem of independence and individuality and
allows us to go forwardwith a relatively indeterminate future in front of us. In a resolution on
cloning the European Parliament (1997) claimed that cloning violates each individual's right to
his or her own genetic identity.
Others have argued against these concerns. They refer to the millions of already existing
clones: genetically identical twins. Tooley (1998, 7982), for example, writes that if we
reproduce knowing that in doing so we will create twins, this does not seem to violate any right.
Moreover, these critics point out, notwithstanding the fact that twins sometimes look very similar
and often share character traits, habits and preferences, each twin considers him or herself as a
unique person with a distinct identity, as do their friends and relatives (Segal 2000). Others point
to the widely accepted view that what and who we become is influenced not only by our genes,
but also the complex and irreproducible context in which our life takes place. Individuals created
from cloning would, in essence, be delayed twins, which would, according to some authors,
make them even more distinct from their genetically identical predecessor (Devolder and
Braeckman 2001, Harris 1997 and 2004, Tooley 1997, 78).
Other commentators, however, have argued that twins provide a poor model for the
psychological and social aspects of cloning. Levick (2004, 123), for example has argued that
the twin model fails to reflect important aspects of the parent-child relationship that would incur
if the child is cloned from one of the rearing parents. Because of the dominance of the
progenitor, Levick argues, the risk of reduced autonomy and confused identity may be greater for
inter-generational cloned individuals than it would be for twins. Sren Holm expresses concern
that the clone will lead a life in the shadow of the genetically identical predecessor (Holm
1998). The cloned individual's life may be compared to the life of the older twin; people may
have problematic expectations of the clone; and she may feel damaging pressure to live up to
these expectations (Kass 1998, Levick 2004, 101, Sandel 2007, 5762). Others worry that she (or
he, of course) may have the feeling that her life has already been lived, that she is predetermined
to do the same things and repeat the choices made by the genetically identical foregoer, and may
thereby have difficulty assuming responsibility for her actions (Habermas 2003, 623, Levy and
Lotz 2005). According to some authors, such threats to a cloned individual's personal identity
and individuality may severely restrict the array of life plans available to him or her and,

consequently, may violate a right to ignorance about one's future (Jonas 1974) or to an open
future (Feinberg 1980). Even if it is not only genes that determine who and what we become,
the cloned individual's perception may still limit a sense of self and independence and thus
reduce his or her autonomy, these commentators argue.
Others disagree (Harris 1997 and 2004, Tooley 1998, 845, Brock 1998, Pence 1998). They
believe the aforementioned concerns involve a misguided belief in genetic determinism that
could be minimized by adequate education and information. Further, they argue, even if people
persist in these mistaken beliefs and their attitudes or actions lead to cloned individuals believing
they do not have an open future, this does not imply that the clone's right to ignorance about
one's personal future or to an open future has actually been violated (Brock 1998, Buchanan et
al. 2000, 198). Some authors have also pointed out that a younger twin could derive benefits
from knowing the older twin's life-course, as he or she can learn from the older twins' mistakes
(Brock 1998, 154). Others point to comparisons with what we already accept in sexual
reproduction. Harris (2004, chapter three), for instance, has argued that if possible psychological
harm arising from knowledge of one's genetic origins is a sufficient ground to ban reproduction,
then interference in reproductive liberty would be very frequent, as there are many children now
who experience psychological harm because of such knowledge. Pence and others point out that
high expectations are true of most parenting and that parents with high expectations nonetheless
usually give their children the best chances to lead a happy and successful life (Pence 1998, 138).
Many of these critics also argue that parents reduce or increase the array of life plans available to
their children all the time through non-genetic means such as their education. In their view,
rather than prohibiting cloning, the more rational strategy would be to concentrate on how we
can help to prevent parents from restricting the array of available life plans open to their
children, regardless of the way in which the children were conceived.
3.2.2 Replacement Children
In 2004, US fertility doctor Panos Zavos claimed to have created a cloned embryo using tissues
from deceased people, one of them an 11-year-old girl who had died in a car crash. Such a result,
he stated, pointed to the possibility that people in the future could replace the deceased. Cloning
for the purpose of trying to create a replacement child has raised the concern that parents will
compare the new child with the deceased child and that the ghost of the dead child will get
more attention and devotion than its replacement, which could adversely affect the replacement
child's self-esteem. Parents may expect the child to be like the lost child, or some idealized
image of it, which could hamper the development of the replacement child's own identity
(Levick 2004, 11132).
Many people agree that, should reproductive cloning ever become a new reproductive technique,
efforts should be made to help candidate parents understand that bringing loved ones back to life
is impossible and that the child created through cloning is a different person. Others are less
concerned with this issue, arguing that, even if their intentions or reasons are misguided, creating
a replacement child is one of the many self-centered reasons why people decide to have children
and is not intrinsically related to cloning (Brock 1998, 1489; Pence 1998, 13140).
3.2.3 Awareness of Genetic Predispositions for Diseases

Another area of disagreement is the impact on the individual conceived through cloning of his or
her knowledge about the genetically identical predecessor's medical history. For instance, a
person conceived through cloning who knows that his genetic parent has developed a severe
single gene disease at the age of forty knows chances are very high that the same will happen to
him or her. Unlike people who choose to have themselves genetically tested, clones who know
their genetic parent's medical history will be involuntarily informed. Disagreement exists on
whether or not this is a good thing. Some have pointed out that having information about one's
genetic predispositions can prolong one's life by suggesting methods of reducing the risks
revealed by genetic information, including behavioural changes and preventive medication.
Others are concerned about psychological consequences for the clone, especially when the
inherited disease is non-treatable, as is the case with Huntington's disease.
Concerns about genetics leads others to the opposite conclusion: John Harris, for instance (2004,
chapter 1), argues that when we clone we can have available a tried and tested genome, not one
created by the genetic lottery of sexual reproduction and the random combination of
chromosomes. If we choose our cell donor wisely, Harris argues, we will be able to protect the
clone from many hereditary disorders and many other genetic problems.
3.2.4 Societal Prejudice and Respect for Clones
Some are concerned that clones may be the victims of discrimination who will not be respected
as full persons (Deech 1999, Levick 2004, 185, 187). Savulescu (see 2005 in Other Internet
Resource) has referred to possible negative attitudes towards clones asclonism: a new form of
discrimination against a group of humans who are different in a non-morally significant way.
Savulescu and others have argued that concerns about such discriminatory reactions and
prejudicial attitudes is not a sound ground for banning cloning; they argue that, rather than
limiting people to make use of assisted reproduction techniques, we should combat existing
prejudices and discrimination (see also Pence 1998, 46, Harris 2004, 923). Macintosh (2005,
11921) has warned that these prejudices as well as misguided stereotypes about human clones
are actually reinforced by common objections to cloning. For example, saying that a clone would
not have a personal identity prejudges the clone as inferior or fraudulent (the idea that originals
are more valuable than their copies) or even less than human (as individuality is seen as an
essential characteristic of human nature).
3.2.5 Complex Family Relationships
Another concern is that a cloned individual would be confused about his or her kinship ties (Kass
1998, O'Neil 2002, 678). Cloning, it is worried, will blur generational boundaries. For example,
a woman who has a child conceived through cloning would actually be the twin of her child and
the woman's mother would, genetically, be its mother, not grandmother. Some have argued
against these concerns, replying that a cloned child would not necessarily be more confused
about his or her family ties than other children. There are children now who never knew their
genetic parents, or whose nurturing parents are not their genetic parents, or who think that their
nurturing father is also their genetic father when they were actually conceived with the sperm of
the nurturing mother's lover, or have four nurturing parents because of a divorce, or are nurtured
by their grandparents. While these complex family relationships can be troubling for some

children, they are not insurmountable, these critics say. As with all children, the most important
thing is the relation with people who nurture and educate them, and children usually know very
well who these are (Harris 2004, 778).
Onora O'Neil (2002, 678) argues that such responses are misplaced. While she acknowledges
that there are already children now with confused family relationships, she argues that it is very
different when prospective parents seek such potentially confused relationships for their children
from the start.

3.3 Effects on Others and Society as a Whole

3.3.1 Adoption and the Importance of Genetic Links
Levy and Lotz (2005) and Levick (2005, 185) have advanced an argument against cloning on the
basis of potential harmful effects, not on the cloned individual, but on other children. One
concern is that the availability of reproductive cloning could reduce the adoption rate and hence
would work against the interests of children waiting to be adopted. In response, Strong (2008)
has argued that this effect is uncertain, and that there are other, probably more effective, ways to
help such children or to prevent them from ending up in such a situation. Moreover, if cloning is
banned, infertile couples may opt for embryo or gamete donation rather than adoption.
This discussion should be considered in the light of profound disagreement about the importance
of genetic links between family members and of genetics in general. Levy and Lotz (2005), for
instance, argue not only that there are no sound reasons to desire genetically related offspring,
but that allowing cloning to help fulfil such a desire will have harmful effects by giving too
much weight to genetics, potentially reinforcing a mistaken view that weown our children.
3.3.2 Genetic Diversity
An important concern voiced by some is the worry that, as an asexual way of reproducing,
cloning would decrease genetic variation among offspring and, in the long run, might even
constitute a threat to the preservation of the human race if the gene pool narrows sufficiently to
threaten humanity's resistance to disease. In response, many argue that if cloning becomes
possible, the number of people who will choose it as their mode of reproduction will very likely
be too low to constitute a threat to genetic diversity it would, for instance, be unlikely to be
higher than natural twinning, which, occurring at a rate of 3.5/1000 children, does not seriously
impact on genetic diversity. Further, even if millions of people would create children through
cloning, the same genomes will not be cloned over and over: each person would have a genetic
copy of his or her genome, which means the result will still be a high diversity of genomes.
Others argue that, even if genetic diversity were not diminished by cloning, a society that
supports reproductive cloning might be taken to imply that variety is not important. Conveying
such a message in a multicultural society, these authors say, could have harmful consequences.
3.3.3 Eugenics

One of the major concerns raised by cloning is that it could lead to eugenic practices. In one
sense of the term, eugenics is a positive notion: as Buchanan et al. (2000, 56) have pointed out,
the core notion of eugenics, that people's lives will probably go better if they have genes
conducive to health and other advantageous traits, has lost little of its appeal. And some see the
increase in control of what kind of genome we want to pass to our children as a positive
development (Fletcher 1988, Harris 1997 and 2004, Pence 1998, 1016, Tooley 1998). But this
shift from chance to choice also raises several issues (for an extensive analysis, see Buchanan
et al. 2000). First, the history of eugenics includes some of the darkest chapters of the western
world in the 19th and 20th centuries (for a history of eugenics as well as an analysis of
philosophical and political issues raised by eugenics, see Kevles 1985 and Paul 1995). The
eugenic movements in the 19th century in the United States and Europe were responsible for
hundreds of thousands of forced sterilizations, and the Nazi eugenic programs during World War
II involved some of the cruellest crimes against humanity, all in the pursuit of so calledracial
hygiene.
More recently, the language of eugenics has made a comeback, not only among critics but also
amongst proponents of these new biotechnologies. Some have called for a new liberaleugenics
(Agar 2004). Unlike the coercive and state-directed eugenics of the past, liberal eugenics defends
values such as autonomy, reproductive freedom, beneficence, empathy and the avoidance of
harm. Enthusiasts of liberal eugenics are interested in helping individuals to prevent or diminish
the suffering and increase the well-being of their children by endowing them with certain genes.
However, disagreement exists about whether and to what extent the new liberal eugenics really
differs from eugenic programs in the past (Buchanan et al. 2000, Habermas 2003, Sandel 2007,
7583). According to Sandel (2007, chapter 5), for instance, liberal eugenics might imply more
state compulsion than first appears: just as governments can force children to go to school, they
could require people to use genetics to have better children. Because cloning can be used to
create better people by copying the genome of people with desirable characteristics, some are
concerned that it may set a precedent for more problematic non-therapeutic interventions, such as
height, eye color and intelligence
This entry is not the right place to give an account of all the concerns raised by enhancement
technologies, but two important issues are directly related to cloning. Sandel (2007, 527) has
argued that cloning and enhancement technologies may result in a society in which parents will
not accept their child for what it is, reinforcing an already existing trend of heavily managed,
high-pressure child-rearing or hyper-parenting. Asch and Wasserman (2005, 202) have
expressed a similar concern; arguing that having more control over what features a child has can
pose an affront to an ideal of unconditioned devotion. The second concern, most often
expressed by disability rights advocates, is that if cloning is used to have better children, it may
create a more intolerant climate towards the disabled and the diseased, and that such practices
can express negative judgments about people with disabilities. This argument has also been
advanced in the debate about selective abortion, prenatal testing, and preimplantation genetic
diagnosis. Disagreement exists about whether these effects are likely. For example, Buchanan et
al. (2002, 278) have argued that one can devalue disability while valuing existing disabled
people and that trying to help parents who want to avoid having a disabled child does not imply
that society should make no efforts to increase accessibility for existing people with disabilities.

3.4 Human Dignity

UNESCO's Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997) was the first
international instrument to condemn human reproductive cloning as a practice against human
dignity. Article 11 of this Declaration states: Practices which are contrary to human dignity,
such as reproductive cloning of human beings, shall not be permitted This position is shared
by the World Health Organization, the European Parliament and several other international
instruments. Critics have pointed out that the reference to human dignity is often problematic, as
it is rarely specified how human dignity is to be understood, whose dignity is at stake, and how
dignity is relevant to the ethics of cloning (Harris 2004, chapter 2, Birnbacher 2005, McDougall
2008,). Some commentators state that it is the copying of a genome that violates human dignity
(Kass 1998); in response, others have pointed out that this interpretation could be experienced as
an offence to genetically identical twins, and that we typically do not regard twins as a threat to
human dignity (although some societies in the past did), nor do we prevent twins from coming
into existence. On the contrary, IVF is a widely accepted fertility treatment and we know that
chances are very high that twins will result from this procedure.
Human dignity is most often related to Kant's second formulation of the Categorical Imperative,
namely the idea that we should never use a human individual merely as a means to an end. Some
are concerned that creating children through cloning could implicate this concept. Putnam (1997,
78), for example, imagines a scenario in which cloning is widely used by ordinary people to
create childrenjust like so-and-so, causing people to view them as objects or as commodities
like a new car or a new house, especially given the expense that would be involved in their
creation. These critiques have also been expressed with regard to other forms of assisted
reproduction; but some worry that individuals created through cloning may be more likely to be
viewed as commodities because their total genetic blueprint would be chosen they would
befully made and not begotten (Ramsey 1966, Kass 1998, PCBE 2002, 107).
Strong (2008) has argued that these concerns are based on a fallacious interference. It is one
thing to desire genetically related children, and something else to believe that one owns one's
children or that one considers one's children as objects, he writes. Other commentators, however,
have pointed out that even if parents themselves will not commodify their children, cloning
might still have an impact in society as a whole on people's tendencies to do so (Levy and Lotz
2005, Sandel 2007). A related concern expressed by Levick (2004, 1845) is that allowing
cloning might result in a society where production on demandclones are sold for adoption to
people who are seeking to have children with special abilities a clearer case of treating children
as objects.
The concern about using children as a mere means has been discussed in depth in the context of
creating saviour siblings. According to some, a child who is created to save a sick sibling is
created solely for instrumental purposes. Others have argued that, even if such a child is created
as a means, this does not imply it is created merely as means. Parents have children for all kinds
of instrumental reasons, including the benefit for the husband-wife relationship, continuity of the
family name, and the economic and psychological benefits children provide when their parents
become old. This is generally not considered to be problematic as long as the child is also valued
in its own right. According to some authors, there is good reason to think that such a child will

be raised in no less loving way than is normally the case (Harris 2004, 412, Pence 1998,
Devolder 2005).
McDougall (2008) and Birmbacher (2008) have argued not that cloning is in itself a violation of
human dignity, but that it can be under certain circumstances, as, for example, when it would
divert scarce resources away from those who lack sufficient health to enable them to exercise
basic rights and liberties.

4. Religious perspectives
No unified religious perspective on human cloning exists; indeed, there are a diversity of
opinions within each individual religious tradition. For an overview of the evaluation of cloning
by the main religious groups see, for example, Cole-Turner (1997) and Walters (2004). For a
specifically Jewish perspective on cloning, see, for example, Lipschutz (1999), for an Islamic
perspective, Sadeghi (2007) and for a Catholic perspective, Doerflinger (1999).

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