Torts And Damages Case Digest: Preciolita V. Corliss V. The Manila Railroad Co.

(1969)
FACTS:
Feb 21, 1957 near midnight: although the conductor applied the brakes Ralph W. Corliss' jeep collided with a locomotive of Manila Railroad
Company
in his eagerness to beat, despite the tooting of the horn and the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach the other side, but
unfortunately he became the victim of his own miscalculation
Case was filed by Preciolita V. Corliss, 21 year old widow
ISSUE: W/N the Manila Railroad Co. is negligent
HELD: NO. Decision is affirmed
negligence - The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstance justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury.
Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends
upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a
high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.
The weight of authorities is to the effect that a railroad track is in itself a warning or a signal of danger to those who go upon it, and that those
who, for reasons of their own, ignore such warning, do so at their own risk and responsibility
Corliss Jr., who undoubtedly had crossed the checkpoint frequently, if not daily, must have known that locomotive engines and trains usually
pass at that particular crossing where the accident had taken place
it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident and this consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before the crossing and allowing the
train to move on. A prudent man under similar circumstances would have acted in this manner
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC v IAC (DIONISIO)
148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO; Mar 10, 1987
Nature: Petition to review the decision of the IAC
FACTS:
- at about 1:30 am on November 15 1975, Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss. Dionisio had
taken "a shot or two" of liquor.
- Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed an intersection when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He
switched his headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford dump truck about 21/2meters away from his car.
- The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of the street
(i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. It
was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic.
There were no lights or any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear.
- The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his
employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning.
- Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck.
- As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two
gold bridge dentures.
- Trial court ruled in favor of Dionisio. IAC affirmed the lower courts ruling, with modification on award of damages.
Petitionerscomments
- the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor,
without his headlights on and without a curfew pass.
- if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that
private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained.
(NOTE: this was the contention of petitioners which SC noted in is decision)
Private respondents comments
- the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his
employer Phoenix
ISSUE:
WON the proximate cause of the accident was Dionisios negligence (driving faster than he should have, and without headlights) or the negligence of
the driver in parking the truck.
HELD:
- it is the drivers negligence. (see previous digest)
- ON CAUSE v CONDITION (under IV A 3c, page 5 of outline)
- petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States. These arguments, however,
do not have any validity in this jurisdiction.
- Even in the United States, the distinctions between" cause" and "condition" have already been "almost entirely discredited." Professors Prosser and
Keeton make this quite clear:
Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause
operated. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable.
But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the
result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case the latter
(is) the result of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition,"
but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring
about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even
the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the
highway may still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the
decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the
forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such
cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important, but the nature of the risk and the character of the
intervening cause."

- the truck driver's negligence, far from being a "passive and static condition", was an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision would not
have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck
created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down that street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held
responsible.
Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause. What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was only a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by
the truck drivers negligence

HEDY GAN y YU, petitioner,

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GAN Toyota car driver, accused.
ISIDRO CASINO old man, victim
NATURE:
Petitioner Hedy Gan was convicted of the crime of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence in CFI
On appeal, petitioner was convicted only of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence
Petitioner has come to this Court for a complete reversal of the judgment below.
FACTS:
The accused Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila.
While in front of house no. 694 of North Bay Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked on one side of the road, one
following the other about two to three meters from each other.
As the car driven by the accused approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite
direction, followed by another which tried to overtake and bypass the one in front of it and thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by
the accused.
To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, the defendant swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front bumper of the
Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross the boulevard from south to north, pinning him against the rear of the parked
jeepney.
The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the rear of the parts truck ahead of it.
The pedestrian was injured and the body of the old man who was later Identified as Isidoro Casino was immediately brought to the Jose
Reyes Memorial Hospital but was (pronounced) dead on arrival.
An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was filed against petitioner in view of the above incident.
She entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for trial.
Petitioner sought and was granted a re-investigation by the City Fiscal, as a result of which the trial fiscal moved for the dismissal of the
case against petitioner during the resumption of hearing on September 7, 1972.
The grounds cited therefor were lack of interest on the part of the complaining witness to prosecute the case as evidenced by an affidavit of
desistance submitted to the trial court and lack of eyewitness to sustain the charge.
The motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal was never resolved.
The Court instead ordered the prosecution to present its evidence.
After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
THE TRIAL COURT RENDERED JUDGMENT FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
ON APPEAL, PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED ONLY OF HOMICIDE THRU SIMPLE IMPRUDENCE
Petitioner now appeals to this Court on the following assignments of errors:
ISSUE: Whether or not, Gan should be convicted of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide?
HELD: No, We reverse. Gan is acquitted.
RATIO:
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of
another is this:
Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution against its mischievous
results and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger,
and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in
which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence."
COURT - we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence resulting in Homicide.
The course of action suggested by the appellate court would seem reasonable were it not for the fact that such suggestion did not take into
account the amount of time afforded petitioner to react to the situation she was in.
For it is undeniable that the suggested course of action presupposes sufficient time for appellant to analyze the situation confronting her and
to ponder on which of the different courses of action would result in the least possible harm to herself and to others.
ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY V CA (LUIS ET AL)
179 SCRA 5 PARAS; November 6, 1989
FACTS
- 5- 6AM June 29, 1967 - strong typhoon "Gening" in Ilocos Norte brought floods and heavy rain. Isabel Lao Juan, (Nana Belen) went to her store,
Five Sisters Emporium, to look after the merchandise to see if they were damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood, Juan suddenly screamed "Ay" and
quickly sank into the water. Her companions, two girls (sales girlls) attempted to help, but were afraid because they saw an electric wire dangling
from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Yabes, the son-in law, upon hearing the electrocution of his mother-in-law, passed by the
City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current. The body was recovered
about two meters from an electric post.
- 4AM June 29, 1967- Engineer Juan, Power Plant Engineer of NPC at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain fluctuations in their electric
meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines.

- 6-6:30AM June 29, 1967- he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection and saw grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were
hanging from the posts to the ground. When he went to INELCO office, he could not see any INELCO lineman.
- Engr. Juan attempted to resuscitate Nana Belen but his efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. On the left palm of the deceased, there was
a hollow wound. In the afternoon, the dangling wire was no longer there.
- Dr. Castro examined the body and noted that the skin was grayish or cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor
found an "electrically charged wound" or a first degree burn. About the base of the thumb on the left hand was a burned wound. The cause of' death
was ,'circulatory shock electrocution"
- In defense and exculpation, INELCO presented the testimonies of its officers and employees, which sought to prove that (1) on and even before
June 29, 1967 the electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to
life and property. (2) The service lines and devices had been newly-installed prior to the date in question. (3) Also, safety devices were installed to
prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others. (4) 12 linesmen
are charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the areas respectively assigned to them. (5) They also presented own medical
expert and said that cyanosis could not have been the noted 3 hours after the death because it is only manifest in live persons. (6) Lastly, the
deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to INELCO because of
the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter
with electric current whenever the switch is on. The switch must have been left on, hence, causing the deceased's electrocution when she tried to open
her gate that early morning of June 29, 1967
- CFI: awarded P25,000 moral damages; P45,000 attys fees
- CA: P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for the victim's death and P18,229.45 for funeral expenses); P50,000 in compensatory damages,
computed in accordance with the formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of P15,000 as average annual income of the
deceased; P10,000 in exemplary damages; P3,000 attorney's fees
ISSUE
WON the legal principle of "assumption of risk" bars private respondents from collecting damages from INELCO
HELD
NO
Ratio The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding
circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by the salesgirls, the
deceased went to the Five Star Emporium "to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to
protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not.
For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the
consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril, or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property.
Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the
deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to INELCOs consent as she was on her
way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by
INELCOs negligence
Reasoning
- INELCO can be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered
Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the
intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place.
- In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City on the night of June 28 until the early hours of June 29, 1967, extraordinary
diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The
evidence does not show that defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area,
nor even manning its office.
- INELCO was negligent in seeing that no harm is done to the general public"... considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the
measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of
diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be" The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve
itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the
negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or
omission"
Disposition CA decision, except for the slight modification that actual damages be increased to P48,229.45, is AFFIRMED.
Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Sebastian M. Baking
G.R. No.156037
28 May 2007
Facts:
Sometime in 25 November 1993, Sebastian M. Baking went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. After undergoing an ECG, and
several examininations, Dr. Sy found the respondents blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal. The doctor then prescribed two medical
prescriptions- Diamicron for the blood sugar and Benalize for his triglyceride. Respondent then proceeded to Mercury Drug Alabang to buy the
prescribed medicines. The sales lady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum. Thus what was sold was Dormicum, a
potent sleeping tablet. Unaware of the wrong medicine, he took one pill on three consecutive days. On the third day he took the medicine, he met an
accident while driving his car. He fell asleep while driving. He could not remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact.
Suspecting the tablet he took, respondent went back to Dr. Sy who was shocked after finding that what was sold was Dormicum instead of
Diamicron. He filed the present complaint for damages against petitioner. The trial court favored the defendant which was affirmed by the CA hence
this petition.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is negligent, and if so, is the negligence the proximate cause of the accident
Ruling:
Art. 2176 provide the requisites of negligence: 1. damage suffered by the plaintiff, 2. fault or negligence of the defendant, 3. connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. It is generally recognized that the drugstore business
is imbued with public interest. Obviously, petitioners employee was grossly negligent in selling the wrong prescription. Considering that a fatal
mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She
should have verified whether the medicine she gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by the physician.
Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was respondents negligence in driving his car. Proximate cause is that cause, which in
natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioners employee been careful in reading the prescription. Without the potent effect of
Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in collision. Petition DENIED.

G.R. No. L-12219

37 Phil. 809
March 15, 1918
Case Title: Amado Picart vs. Frank Smith, Jr.
Case Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of La Union
FACTS:
On the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union, Picart was riding on his pony. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached
from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a
horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more
successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
Picart did not move his horse to the other lane, instead he moved his horse closer to the railing. Smith continued driving towards Picart
without slowing down and when he was already so near the horse he swerved to the other lane. But the horse got scared so it turned its body across
the bridge, and hence the horse struck the car and its limb got broken. Picart suffered injuries which required several days of medical attention while
the horse eventually died.
ISSUE: Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done

HELD:
Yes. Althought Picart was guilty of negligence in being on the wrong side of the bridge, the defendant was nevertheless civilly liable for
the legal damages resulting from the collision, as he had a fair opportunity to avoid the accident after he realized the situation created by the
negligence of the plaintiff and failed to avail himself of that opportunity; while Picart could by no means then place himself in a position of a greater
safety.
Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an appreciable interval of time, the
one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm and fails to do is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to
the prior negligence of the other party.

EMMA ADRIANO BUSTAMANTE, in her own behalf as Guardian-Ad-Litem of minors: ROSSEL, GLORIA, YOLANDA, ERIC SON and
EDERIC, all surnamed BUSTAMANTE, Spouses SALVADOR JOCSON and PATRIA BONE-JOCSON, Spouses JOSE RAMOS and
ENRIQUETA CEBU-RAMOS, Spouses NARCISO-HIMAYA and ADORACION MARQUEZ-HIMAYA, and Spouses JOSE BERSAMINA
and MA. COMMEMORACION PEREA-BUSTAMANTE, petitioners,

VS

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FEDERICO DEL PILAR AND EDILBERTO MONTESIANO,respondents

G.R. No. 89880 [February 6, 1991]

Facts:
At about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision occurred between a gravel and sand truck, with Plate No. DAP 717, and a Mazda
passenger bus with Motor No. Y2231 and Plate No. DVT 259 along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The front left side portion
(barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the drivers seat to the last rear
seat. Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained.
The trial court held that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or combined with each other in directly causing the accident which
led to the death of the passengers. It could not be determined from the evidence that it was only the negligentact of one of them which was the
proximate cause of the collision. In view of this, the liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary. The Court of Appealsruled on
the contrary, it held that the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and his reckless negligence in proceeding to overtake the hand
tractor was the proximate cause of the collision.
Issue:
Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar.
Ruling:
The principle of last clear chance applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger
demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the
jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. Furthermore, as between defendants: The doctrine
cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his
discovery of the latters peril, and it cannot be invoked as between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent actor
cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which could have avoided the injury.The Court is convinced that
the respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the defendants, since the case at bar is not a
suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and
drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability.