001 VESTIL VS.

IAC
AUTHOR: Carag, J.R.
[G.R. NUMBER 74431; November 6, 1989]
NOTES: (if applicable)
TOPIC: Liability for damages caused by animals
PONENTE: Cruz, J.
FACTS: (chronological order)
1. Theness Tan Uy, daughter of private respondent spouses Uy, was allegedly bitten by the dog of Petitioners Vestil in
the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil.
2. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the
forehead" and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but
was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva."
3. The following day, Theness died due to broncho-pneumonia.
4. Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of
"Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog
belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it
bite Theness.
5. CFI held in favor of the Vestils, and dismissed the complaint.
6. IAC reversed, having found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be
responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the spouses Vestil are liable for the death of Respondent Spouses

daughter
HELD: Yes, Petitioners are still liable.
RATIO:
1. Article 2183 reads as follows:
a. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it
may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages
should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
2. The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable.
In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and
so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame
and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers
even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was
only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the
animal.
3. According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or
on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural
equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must
answer for the damage which such animal may cause
4. Side Issues:
a. While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's
estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question.
She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property, which
was only six kilometers from her own house
b. Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice
weekly, according to at least one witness and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own
daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog.
c. The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when
the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with
their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually
d. Based also on the medical examination regarding the childs cause of death, it was clearly mentioned that
her cause of death was due to a complication of rabies.
e. We also reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, that the death certificate is
not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's
hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death
certificate stated a different cause of death.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
002 Dingcong v. Kanaan
AUTHOR: Sarah
G.R. No. L-47033; April 25, 1941
NOTES: The case is in Spanish. But thanks to google
TOPIC: Falling Objects
translate
PONENTE: AVANCEA, J.
FACTS:
1. Brothers Loreto Dingcong and Jose Dingcong are coarrentadarios of senior house Emilia Saenz located in Calle
Jose Ma. Basa City Iloilo, where they established the Central Hotel, being the owner first and last his manager.
2. Defendant Francisco Echevarria occupy the fourth No. 10 of that hotel.
3. The Kanaans (engaged in the trade name American Bazaar) acupaban turn the basement of the hotel where they
had established their "American Bazar" dedicated to buying and selling items and mencancias.
4. In the evening of September 19, 1933, Echevarria, to retire to bed, leave the tap open carelessly overlooked
ordinary without drainage basin. As the pipes of the hotel at the time they were in repair, when at midnight the
drew water pipes on the floor spread, traspasandolo and wetting articles and mencancias on low setting "American
Bazaar," causing a lost.
5. The Kanaans filed a case against Loreto Dingcong, Dingcong and Francisco Jose Echevarria for damages caused.
6. CFI: dismissed the case as to Loreto Dingcong to have died, and condemn Francisco Echevarria, absolving Jose
Dingcong. The plaintiffs appealed this decision absolves as Jose Dingcong.
7. CA: Reversed. Jose Dingcong responsible and condemn him to pay the plaintiffs the amount of damages caused to
them as assessed by the court.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not Dingcong is liable to Kanaan for the damage caused by the things that fell
HELD:
1. Yes.
RATIO:
1. Being Jose Dingcong joint tenant and manager of the hotel, with full possession of the top of the house, is liable
for damage caused by things that are thrown or fell from it (article 1910 of the Civil Code). Francisco Echevarria
was guest of the hotel and was directly, for his carelessness, leaving open the tap, allowed water from the pipe
drawing back on the ground and seep into the low, wetting the articles and merchandise of the plaintiffs. Jose
Dingcong, moreover, do not practice the diligence of a good father to prevent this damage, however they knew that
they could then be caused by repair pipes therefore must assume that Echavarria could not you use the tap
provided of any container with drainage, and if you only put a pan under it that, when filled, caused the water to
spread across the floor.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

003 The Homeowners Association of El Deposito, et al., AUTHOR: De Guzman, Bien

vs. Hon. Lood,
NOTES:
G.R. No. L-31864
September 29, 1972
TOPIC: Nuisance
PONENTE: PER CURIAM
FACTS:
The Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS, successor-in-interest of National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority [NAWASA]) asserted ownership of a parcel of public land in barrios Corazon de Jesus and Halo Halo in San
Juan, Rizal, (more popularly known as "El Deposito" from the Spanish times). Said land, declared for taxation purposes in
the name of the old Mehopolitan Water District, are composed of aqueducts and an underground reservoir. Portions of the
land were sold or leased by NAWASA. MWSS desired the demolition and removal of the houses and structures on the
subiect land.
The petitioners claimed the same land, and moved to reopen the cadastral proceedings on it and moved to declare as null
and void as ex post facto legislation, municipal ordinance No. 89, as amended, of respondent Municipality of San Juan,
prohibiting squatting on public property and providing a penalty therefor, under which ordinance, petitioners claimed,
respondents were summarily demolishing and removing their houses and improvements.
The CFI denied the reopening of the cadastral proceedings. The same petitioners later filed a special civil action for
certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court, which was dismissed. Reconsideration was also denied for lack
of merit.
Petitioners filed on April 15, 1970 this action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to set aside
respondent court's questioned orders dated February 9, 1970 and March 30, 1970. In addition they also raise as issues also
the issue of validity and constitutionality of municipal ordinance No. 89-Amended as questioned by them in their action
below, and whether respondent Engineer may remove or demolish their houses without a special court demolition order
under said challenged ordinance.
ISSUE(S): Whether respondent judge "exceeded his authority and jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion"
HELD: No, the Court is satisfied that by no means may respondent court be said to have exceeded its authority or gravely
abused its discretion in issuing its questioned orders denying petitioners' motion below for a writ of preliminary injunction
allegedly "to maintain the status quo" and stay demolition and removal of their illegal constructions found to be public
nuisances per se and serious hazards to public health.
RATIO:
As was well stated in then Judge Reyes' order of September 19, 1968, petitioners failed after several hearings "to show that
they have even a color of title to entitle them to exercise the right of possession to the premises in question. On the other
hand, the land is admittedly public land and consequently the petitioners have no right to possession thereof.
Petitioners' lack of right to the injunction sought by them was further shown in the Court of Appeals' decision of February
4, 1969, where it noted that "their very evidence, their documentary proof, would justify that their houses were built upon
land of the Metropolitan Water District, that is to say, of the Philippine Government, therefore, such tax
declarations of petitioners' houses themselves are the best proof of their admission that their possession of the lands
they occupy was not and could not be adverse" and that "their shanties pose a veritable danger to public health."
No error, much less abuse of authority or discretion, could be attributed to respondent court's statements and reasons for
denying the injunction sought by petitioners, as per its order of March 30, 1970, denying reconsideration, as follows:
The Court does not lose sight of the fact that the land in question is public land, in the sense that it is untitled. However,
as the government now contends, the land in question is clothed with a public purpose to be utilized for public service by
the government. This fact has not been denied and as a matter of fact, the petitioners admit that the land in question is
public land. ...
(RE: NUISANCE)
The question of validity or unconstitutionality of municipal ordinance No. 89-Amended need not be resolved in this
proceeding, as it should first properly be submitted for resolution of the lower court in the action below. Suffice it to note
that the Solicitor General appears to have correctly stated the actual situation in that petitioners do not dispute the authority

of the San Juan council to pass ordinances providing for the summary abatement of public nuisances, and that the
ordinance in question may not be faulted for being ex post facto in application since it "does not seek to punish an action
done which was innocent before the passage of the same. Rather, it punishes the present and continuing act of unlawful
occupancy of public property or properties intended for public use." At any rate, the decisive point is that independently of
the said ordinance, petitioners' constructions which have been duly found to be public nuisances per se (without
provision for accumulation or disposal of waste matters and constructed without building permits contiguously to
and therefore liable to pollute one of the main water pipelines which supplies potable water to the Greater Manila
area) may be abated without judicial proceedings under our Civil Code.
As stated in Sitchon vs. Aquino, the police power of the state justifies the abatement or destruction by summary
proceedings of public nuisances per se. No error, much less any abuse of discretion, grave or otherwise, may
therefore be attributed against respondent court in having issued its orders denying for imperative reasons of public
health and welfare the preliminary injunction sought again by petitioners to allow them to continue occupying the
land in question with their condemned constructions and structures.
CASE DOCTRINE:
The police power of the state justifies the abatement or destruction by summary proceedings of public nuisances per se. No
error, much less any abuse of discretion, grave or otherwise, may therefore be attributed against respondent court in having
issued its orders denying for imperative reasons of public health and welfare the preliminary injunction sought again by
petitioners to allow them to continue occupying the land in question with their condemned constructions and structures.

004. JAIME PEREZ, both in his personal and official capacity

as Chief of the Marikina Demolition Office v. Spouses
Madrona
G.R. No. 184478, March 21, 2012
PONENTE: Villarama, J.

AUTHOR: Rikki

FACTS: (chronological order)

Respondent-spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda B. Pante are registered owners of a residential property located in
Greenheights Subd, Phase II, Marikina Cirt and coverede by TCT No. 169365 of the Registry of Deeds of Marikina.
In 1989, respondents built their house thereon and enclosed it with a concrete fence and steel gate.
In 1999, respondents received a letter dated May 25, 1999 from petitioner Jaime S. Perez, Chief of the Marikina Demolition
Office stating that the structure that they built encroached on the sidewalk and that is in violation of PD 1096 of the National
Building Code and RA 917 on Illegally Occupied/Constructed Improvements within the road right-of-way.
The respondents are given 7 days to remove the said structure. As a response, respondent Madrona sent petitioner a letter
stating that the May 25, 1999 letter (1) contained an accusation libelous in nature as it is condemning him and his property
without due process; (2) has no basis and authority since there is no court ordering him to demolish the said structure; (3)
cited legal basis and authority which do not explicitly give the petitioner the authority to demolish; and (4) contained a false
accusation since their fence did not in fact extend to the sidewalk.
In Feb. 28, 2001, petitioner sent another letter with the same contents as the previous one but this time giving respondents
10 days to remove the fence allegedly protruding in the sidewalk.
This prompted the respondents to file a complaint for injunction before the Marikina RTC on March 12, 2001. Respondents
also sought the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner and all persons acting under him
from doing any act of demolition on their property and that after trial, the injunction be made permanent.
On March 16, 2001, the RTC issued a TRO against petitioner. On July 27, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondent, and permanently enjoined defendant Perez from performing any act which would tend to destroy or demolish
the perimeter fence and steel gate of the respondents' property.
The RTC held that respondents, being lawful owners of the subject property are entitled to a peaceful and open possession
of every inch of their property and petitioner's threat to demolish the concrete fence around their property is tantamount to
a violation of their rights as property owners who are entitled to protection under the constitution and laws.
The RTC also ruled that there is NO SHOWING THAT THE FENCE WAS NUISANCE PER SE and presents an immediate
danger to the community's welfare, nor is there a basis for petitioner's claim that the fence has encroached on the sidewalk
as to justify its summary demolition. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the respondents' structure is a nuisance per se that presents an immediate danger to the community's
welfare and can be removed without the need of judicial intervention since the clearing of the sidewalks is an infrastucture
project of the Marikina LGU and cannot be restrained by the courts as provided in PD 1818.

HELD:
NO.
Nuisance per se vs. nuisance per accidens; only nuisance per se may be summarily abated without judicial intervention. If
petitioner indeed found respondents fence to have encroached on the sidewalk, his remedy is not to demolish the same
summarily after respondents failed to heed his request to remove it. Instead, he should go to court and prove respondents
supposed violations in the construction of the concrete fence. Indeed, unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be
abated summarily without judicial intervention.
Respondents fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It
was built primarily to secure the property of respondents and prevent intruders from entering it. And as correctly pointed
out by respondents, the sidewalk still exists. If petitioner believes that respondents fence indeed encroaches on the
sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a
nuisance per accidens, its summary abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted.

With regard to respondents claim for moral damages, this Court rules that they are entitled thereto in the amount of
P10,000.00 pursuant to Article 2217 of the Civil Code. As testified to by respondents, they suffered anxiety and sleepless
nights since they were worried what would happen to their children who were left by themselves in their Marikina residence
while they were in Ormoc City if petitioner would make real his threat of demolition on their fence.
We likewise hold that respondents are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000.00 to serve as an example
to other public officials that they should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.
WHEREFORE, the March 31, 2008 Decision and September 10, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV.
No. 83675 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Jaime S. Perez, Chief of the Demolition Office of Marikina City
is ORDERED to pay respondent Spouses Fortunito L. Madrona and Yolanda B. Pante moral damages in the amount of
P10,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000.00.

SALAO v. SANTOS
G.R. No. L-45519

April 26, 1939

TOPIC: Nuisance per accidens

1. Rufina Salao and Lucio Lucas, instituted an action to restrain the defendant, Teofilo C.
Santos, as municipal president of Malabon, from enforcing compliance with his letter
of October 22, 1935, wherein said plaintiffs were directed to observe the requirements of
ordinance No. 23, series of 1929, of said municipality, on the matter of the operation
of their smoked fish factory (umbuyan).
2. The evidence discloses that for many years prior to the enactment of this ordinance,
plaintiffs had already established a smoked fish factory and had continually operated the
same since then.
3. Lucio Lucas, one of the plaintiffs herein, was criminally prosecuted in the justice of the
peace court of Malabon for non-compliance with the requirements of the ordinance
aforementioned, but was acquitted to the charge.
4. Eligio Gozon, intervenor, whose house is situated near the smoked fish factory of the
appellants, denounced said factory as a nuisance, by lodging a complaint in the central
office of the Bureau of Health seeking relief against its continuance.
5. An investigation was then conducted by the health authorities, and as a result thereof it
was found that appellants' smoked fish factory was being operated not in accordance with
the requirements of said ordinance.
6. Bureau of Health and the district health office took steps to enforce the ordinance and
requesting plaintiffs compliance therewith.
7. Compliance was refused on the ground that said plaintiff was not within the purview of the
ordinance in accordance with the decision of the justice of the peace court above stated.
8. The municipal president required the plaintiffs to comply with the ordinance of 1929 within
30 days on threat of having his license revoked.
9. On October 10, 1935, however, the municipal council of Malabon had already enacted
ordinance No. 10, series of 1935, amending ordinance No. 23 of 1929, the pertinent
provisions of which follow:

ARTICLE I. Ordinance No. 23, series of 1929, is hereby amended by

adding a new article thereto which reads as follows:
"Art. 3-(3). That this ordinance shall be effective only with regard to those that
will be established after the approval hereof, and shall not be applicable to
those already operating at the time of the approval of this ordinance."
ARTICLE II. The effectivity of this ordinance shall retroact to the date of the
approval of ordinance No. 23, series of 1929.

10. Plaintiffs, in view of the president's order, instituted the present action for

injunction to restrain him from enforcing his order. The trial court dismissed the
action. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WON Plaintiffs should be compelled to comply with the said ordinance
HELD: NO, appellants' smoked fish factory was established long before the enactment of the
ordinance in question.
RATIO: Municipal ordinances, like all statutes, are to be construed as having only prospective
operation unless the intention to give them retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used. There is nothing in the ordinance showing the
intention to give it a retrospective effect.
1. It expressly refers to "fabrica o negocio que se ha de levantar" and not to factories already
established.
2. That such was the intention of the ordinance of 1929 is confirmed by ordinance
No. 10 of 1935, which expressly provides that the amended ordinance "shall not be

applicable to those already operating at the time of the approval" of the same.
3. This amendatory ordinance is valid, despite the allegation to the effect that the municipal
president intended its enactment for the protection of appellants and to frustrate the order
of the health authorities. Whatever might have been the personal motives of the municipal
president, no improper motive can be attributed to the municipal council in its enactment,
and, therefore, the same stands as the expression of the true intention of the body.
4. Nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens.
Nuisance per se: recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it
constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated
summarily under the undefined law of necessity.
Nuisance per accidens:
That which depends upon certain conditions and
circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due
hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law
constitute a nuisance. (Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Co. vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, 24
Phil., 471; Monteverde vs. Generoso, 52 Phil., 123, 127.)
Appellants' smoked fish factory is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry. If it be, in fact,
a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, then it would be merely a nuisance per accidens.
Consequently, the order of the municipal president and those of the health authorities issued
with a view to the summary abatement of what they have concluded, by their own findings, as a
nuisance, are null and void there having been no hearing in court to the effect.
Judgment is reversed, with costs against appellees.

006 Bengzon v Province of Pangasinan

G.R. No. L-41941
January 9, 1936
TOPIC: Abatement of Nuisance
PONENTE: Butte, J.

AUTHOR:
NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS:
1. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in action for damages for

maintaining a nuisance continuously injurious to the plaintiff and his family by reason of the
maintenance and operation of a stand pipe, pumping station and open reservoir for the storage of water
upon the premises immediately adjacent to the plaintiff's residence.
2. Plaintiff owns a two-storey house made of wood and covered with nipa on Avenida Rizal, municipality of
Lingayen, Province of Pangasinan. His family (composed of 8 members) has resided there for 27 years.
3. During the years 1924-1925, upon the adjacent lot, the defendant constructed a reinforced concrete stand
pipe 28 meters high and 9 meters in diameter. Within the base of this cylindrical tank there are 3
machines: One electrical, one gasoline and one crude oil. On the side of the tank nearest the plaintiff's
residence and at a distance of 3.4 meters is a chimney which rises to about the height of the gable of the
house. The tank itself is 3.8 meters from the house of the plaintiff.
4. March, 1927: the plaintiff protested to the governor of the province for the manner in which the plant was
being operated and asked that he be indemnified for the value of his house and lot so that he might move
his family and his effects to another residence.
5. Trial court: after making an ocular inspection of the plant and hearing the testimony of the witnesses, it
ruled that the operation of the pumps and the tank creates some annoyance and discomfort to the plaintiff,
these are but ordinary and incidental to the reasonable conduct of the defendant's water system. The court
further held that inasmuch as the plaintiff did not protest till after the plan was constructed, his action is
barred for laches.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to damages?
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
1. The doctrine that one who consents to permits or acquiesces in the erection of structure with knowledge

of the purpose for which it is to be put and the consequences of its uses are productive of a nuisance, is
not applicable here, for the plaintiff neither consented to, permitted or acquiesced in the erection of the
structure; nor could it fairly be said that he had knowledge in advance of all the consequences of the
erection and the manner of operation of the plant here in question. The amended complaint in this case
was filed on January 4, 1930, from which we infer that the suit was instituted some time before that date.
But there is nothing in the record which warrants the inference of an estoppel by acquiescence.
2. In locating its pumping station within 3.8 meters from the house of the plaintiff, the defendant should
reasonably have foreseen that the noise, vibrations, smoke, odor and sparks coming from the plant during
its operation, not only during the day but during the night as well, would cause a constant annoyance,
discomfort and danger both to the property of the plaintiff and the health and comport of himself and his
family. The chimney which is just opposite the plaintiff's house at a distance of only 3.4 meters emits
smoke, gases of crude oil and gasoline and occasionally sparks well. The plaintiff testified that at times
the smoke blinds him and his family affecting their lungs and their eyes and that the noise and vibrations
affect their sleep. As against the testimony of the plaintiff, who is exposed day in and day out to these
conditions, and of his neighbors who corroborate him, the brief ocular inspection made by the court on
one day, although conducted with eminent fairness, seems to us to be entitled to less weight. The
witnesses for the defendant, its employees, naturally minimize the harmful effects to the plaintiff of the
operation of the machines in the pumping plant. But the evidence as a whole leaves us with clear

conviction that the construction and operation of this pumping plant in such close proximity to the
plaintiff's residence has rendered the same practically uninhabitable without exposing to risk the
comfort, health and, in case of fire, even the live of the plaintiff and his family.
3. We find from the preponderance of the evidence that the fair present value of the appellant's premises
involved in this suit is P3,000; and as, under the circumstances, the maintenance of the nuisance is
practically tantamount to an expropriation, we have concluded that the defendant-appellee should be and
it is hereby required and adjudged to pay by him to it of a valid conveyance of the premises, free of liens
and incumbrances, reserving to the plaintiff-appellant the right to remove his improvements therefrom
within three months from the date of payment of the said P3,000.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

007
PEDRO
J.
VELASCO,
plaintiff- AUTHOR:
appellant,
NOTES: (if applicable)
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO., WILLIAM SNYDER,
its
President;
JOHN
COTTON
and
HERMENEGILDO B. REYES, its VicePresidents; and ANASTACIO A. AGAN, City
Engineer of Quezon City, defendantsappellees
[G.R. No. L-18390
August 6, 1971]
TOPIC:
PONENTE: REYES, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: (chronological order)
Velasco bought three (3) adjoining lots. He sold two (2) of these to Meralco and maintained the
last one as his residence. Meralco constructed on their lots a sub-station at a distance of 10-20
meters away from appellants house. The company also built a concrete wall at the sides along
the streets but put up only an interlink wire fence (previously a sawali wall) on the boundary with
appellant. An unceasing sound emanates from the substation, caused by transformers. Such,
appellent contends, constitute a nuisance which has worsened his health condition and has
lowered the value of his property. Several witnesses came forth but their testimonies were vague
and imprecise. Resort was made to a sound level meter. The audible sound from different areas in
Velasos property was measured in terms of decibels. It was found that the sound exceeded the
average intensity levels of residences.
ISSUE(S): Can there be a nuisance caused by noise or sound?
HELD: YES
RATIO:
Several American decisions are cited showing that noise is an actionable nuisance. In fact,
Kentucky v. Anderson dealt with noise emanating from electrical machinery and appliances. The
determining factor, however, is not just intensity or volume. It must be of such character as to
produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities. However,
appellants testimony is too plainly biased. Nor are the witnesses testimonies revealing on
account of different perceptions. Consequently, sound level meters were used. As stated above,
the sound exceeds average residential decibels. Also, the testimonies of appellants physicians
(which were more reliable since they actually treated him, unlike the appellees) point to the noise
as having caused appellant loss of sleep, irritation and tension weakening his constitution.
Notable lastly is the fact that in the Kentucky case, where the nuisance was ordered abated, the
average reading was 44 decibels while in the instant, the readings include 52, 54, and 55. The
decision goes on to discuss the proper award of damages. But Meralco was ordered either to
transfer the facilities or reduce the produced sound to around.
While no previous adjudications on the specific issue have been made in the Philippines, our law
of nuisances is of American origin, and a review of authorities clearly indicates the rule to be that
the causing or maintenance of disturbing noise or sound may constitute an actionable nuisance
(V. Ed. Note, 23 ALR, 2d 1289). The basic principles are laid down in Tortorella vs. Traiser & Co.,
Inc., 90 ALR 1206:
A noise may constitute an actionable nuisance, but it must be a noise which affects injuriously the
health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent. Injury to a
particular person in a peculiar position or of specially sensitive characteristics will not render the
noise an actionable nuisance. In the conditions of present living noise seems inseparable from the

conduct of many necessary occupations. Its presence is a nuisance in the popular sense in which
that word is used, but in the absence of statute noise becomes actionable only when it passes the
limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker to
the needs of the listener. What those limits are cannot be fixed by any definite measure of
quantity or quality. They depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. They may be
affected, but are not controlled, by zoning ordinances. The delimitation of designated areas to
use for manufacturing, industry or general business is not a license to emit every noise profitably
attending the conduct of any one of them. The test is whether rights of property of health or of
comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss
which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding
property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise
although ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of
property of another owner who though creating a noise is acting with reasonable regard for the
rights of those affected by it.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

08 VIRGILIO M. DEL ROSARIO and CORAZON

AUTHOR: Loila B. La Chica
PAREDES-DEL ROSARIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF NOTE/S:
APPEALS and METAL FORMING
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 118325 January 29, 1997
PONENTE: NARVASA, C.J.:
FACTS:
1. November 21, 1990 - Spouses Del Rosarios resided at No. 17 Tabuena Street, Corinthian Gardens, Quezon City.
They filed a complaint, charged MFC with a violation of Section 3 of Act No. 3740, "An Act to Penalize
Fraudulent Advertising, Mislabeling or Misbranding of Any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc ."
2. "In selling to the public roofing materials known as "Banawe" shingles, MFC made representations on the
durability of the product and the sturdiness of its installation" through massive advertisements in print media and
television and brochures :"
3. These representations particularly those characterizing the shingles as "STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND
STRONG" and that the "BANAWE METAL TILE structure acts as a single unit against wind and storm pressure
due to the strong hook action on its overlaps" "prompted the Del Rosarios to buy the "Banawe" shingles and
have them installed at their residence;" but barely two 2 months after completion of the installation, portions of the
roof were blown away by strong wind brought about by typhoon "Ruping."
4. DTI: MFC had indeed misrepresented its product because "as the records showed," strong winds actually blew off
part of the structure/roof of the Del Rosario Spouses and the same acted in parts (instead of as a single unit) when
strong winds blew, a part remaining while another part was blown off.
- MFC to pay an "administrative fine of P10,000.00" (within ten [10] days from finality of the decision), otherwise
its "business name and registration. . . would be deemed suspended and its establishment closed until the fine was
fully paid."
5. Office of the President: affirmed in toto
6. CA: (Court En Banc) Dismissed Metal Forming Corporation's appeal and affirming the decision of the OP dated
April 30, 1993.
7. Reduced fine to P5,000.00
a. (A)lthough the occurrence of a typhoon is a fortuitous event which by itself might have exempted
petitioner from liability to private respondents
b. ". . . it cannot efface the fundamental fact that (petitioner) acted in bad faith and/or with gross negligence
in failing to deliver the necessary accessories for the proper installation of the structure. . . and actually
installed inferior roofing materials at (private respondents') residence, in violation of the proper installation
procedure expressly specified in the former's brochures and advertisements for installation, i.e., the metal
tile attached to the roof panels should be by two (2) self-drilling screws for one [1] metal cleat. However,
instead of conforming with this procedure, (petitioner) attached some of the metal cleats with only one (1)inch ordinary nail each and others were fastened with only one (1) wood screw each.. . ."
8. MFC replaced and repaired the roof free of charge, evidently acknowledging that the damage was covered by its
one-year warranty on the materials and the installation. The repair work was observed and analyzed by the Esteban
Adjusters and Valuers, Inc., which was engaged by the Del Rosarios to determine the cause of the destruction.
9. After completion, Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc. submitted its report in which it made the following
conclusion: The tiles which were detached from the roof trusses were not fastened with two (2) wood screws on
each metal cleat as required but only with a single wood screw or a combination of a single wood screw and a 1inch nail which is contrary to the design and specification...some tiles installed were no longer than the roof span,
hence there is overlapping on the ridge roll/hip. It is very evident that the original subcontractor (which we were
not able to identify) were in haste to complete the project. . . .
10. MFC however declined to concede liability
11. Spouses commenced a civil action against MFC; sought to recover damages resulting from the events just narrated,
contending that aside from the destruction of the roof of their house, injury was also caused to its electrical wiring,
ceiling, furtures, walls, wall paper, wood parquet flooring and furniture. (Actual damages at P1,008,003.00; Moral
damages at P3,000,000,00; Exemplary damages at P1,000,000.00, and attorney's fees at P1,000,000.00)
12. MFC filed MTD:
It had no contractual relationship with the Del Rosarios since the contract for the purchase and installation of the
roofing, upon which the latter's claims were based, was actually entered into between it and another person, Engr.
Jesus M. Puno (identified as the Spouses' contractor).
13. RTC: Denied MTD; appeal denied

Breach of contract for the supply and installation of the roofing materials in the Del Rosarios' residence.
With serious damages caused
Defendant himself admitted its liability
There was an expressed warranty specified in the brochure that there should be two (2) metal screws for one (1)
cleat
Engr. Puno claimed that it was MFC who had a contract with the Spouses
There was a declared warranty by the MFC and was guilty of fraud and/or breach of warranty.
Engineer Puno acted as MFC's agent in the signing of the contracts for the supply and installation of the "Banawe''
shingles; hence, the contract was really between the Del Rosarios and that company.
14. CA: MFC favoured. There was no privity of contract between the Del Rosarios and MFC
a. The contracts were signed by Engr. Puno. On the face of the contracts, it does not appear that the Del
Rosarios were parties to it or that it was entered into for their benefit. It does not also appear that Engr.
Puno acted as agent of the Del Rosarios nor of the corporation
b. There is no evidence, apart from Engr. Puno's testimony, to show that any agency exists
c. The nature of the relationship between the Del Rosarios and Engr. Puno is also not clear from the records
of the case
d. Contract is not supported by the evidence presented
e. Del Rosarios had no cause of action against MFC
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a privity of contract between the parties. YES
HELD:
CA reversed, RTC reinstated. Upon the facts established by the evidence, MFC is answerable to the Del Rosarios for the
damage caused to the latter's residence when its roof was blown away by a typhoon.
RATIO:
1.
MFC represented the shingles as "STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND STRONG" and that the "BANAWE METAL TILE
structure acts as a single unit against wind and storm pressure due to the strong hook action on its overlaps.
2.
After reading MFC's brochures and advertisements, the Spouses instructed their contractor, Engineer Puno, to use
the "Banawe" shingles or metal tiles in the roofing of their house then under construction.
3.
Paraphrasing Article 1546 of the Civil Code, MFC, as seller to the general public had made a affirmations of fact
and promises relating to its advertised product, the "Banawe" tiles, the natural tendency of which was to induce the
buyers, as infact it did induce the Del Rosarios, to purchase the same, relying thereon.
4.
Pursuant to the Del Rosarios' instructions. Puno placed orders with MFC and signed the pertinent contracts for the
purchase of the shingles, accepted deliveries thereof and signed corresponding invoices, and made payments
thereon with the spouses funds.
5.
Deliveries were made by MFC's employees to the construction site of the Spouses' residence; and installation of the
metal tiles was made by MFC's workers.
6.
MFC "acted in bad faith and/or with gross negligence in failing to deliver the necessary accessories for the proper
installation of the structure. . . and actually installed inferior roofing materials at (private respondents') residence,
in violation of the proper installation procedure
7.
Two months after completion of the installation, portions thereof were blown away by the winds of typhoon
"Ruping,"
8.
MFC replaced the roof free of charge, in acknowledgment of its one-year warranty on the materials and their
installation.
9.
Whether Engr. Puno was an agent is not a factor in determining MFC's liability for its workers' use of inferior
materials and their defective installation of the "Banawe" metal tiles in the roof of the latter's residence. Puno was
in truth acting as contractor of the Del Rosarios and on their instructions.
ON DAMAGES
1. The Report of the Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc. to which the RTC accorded full credit for actual fdamages
does not contain any statement whatever of the amount of the damage. Lufthansa German Airlines vs. CA, et al.:
Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved and proved with
reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork as to the fact
and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have (been) suffered and on
evidence of the actual amount thereof.
2. MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in flagrant breach of its express warranties made to the general public and in
wanton disregard of the rights of the Del Rosarios who relied on those warranties, is adequately demonstrated by
the recorded proofs.

Satisfactory evidence of the psychological and mental trauma actually suffered by the Del Rosarios, the grant to
them of moral damages is warranted. Over a period of about a month. they experienced "feelings of shock,
helplessness, fear, embarrassment and anger."
3. Exemplary damages are properly exigible of MFC, "Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such damages
may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good; Exemplary damages meanwhile, which
are imposed as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions, may be
awarded only after the claimant has proven that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages
"Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against
or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions."
4. Since the judgment does not say why attorney's fees are awarded, there is no basis for such award, which should
consequently be removed.
5. MODIFICATIONS: Award of actual damages and attorney's fees is deleted, and the moral and exemplary
damages awarded are reduced from P500,000.00 to P100,000.00, and from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00,
respectively.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

009 ISIDRO v NISSAN MOTORS PHILS.,

INC.
G.R. No. 136500 DECEMBER 3, 1999
TOPIC:
PONENTE: Pardo, J.

AUTHOR: Jade
NOTES: (if applicable)
Article 1571. Actions arising from the provisions of
the preceding ten articles shall be barred after six
months, from the delivery of the thing sold. (1490)

FACTS:
21 December 1995 Conrado R. Isidro bought from Nissan Motors a brand new Nissan Sentra
with an express manufacturers warranty against hidden defects for a period of 24 months or
50, 000 kilometers, whichever comes first.
31 August 1998 Isidro filed with the RTC of QC a complaint against Nissan for breach of
warranty (2 years and 9 months after delivery)
7 October 1998 Nissan filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that Isidros cause of
action is already barred by the statute of limitation under Article 1571 of the Civil Code.
9 October 1998 Isidro opposed the motion to dismiss and pointed out that Article 1571
applies only to implied warranties and not to express warranties.
11 November 1998 The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription
complaint filed more than 2 years after delivery and beyond the period which Nissan expressly
warranted that it would repair or replace defective parts of the car.
Isidro filed a motion for reconsideration stating that prescription period of warranty is 4 years
in case of rescission and 10 years in case of specific performance. The trial court denied the
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the appeal via certiorari.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioners action for enforcement of the manufacturers express warranty has
prescribed
HELD
Yes, the action has prescribed.
RATIO:
Where there is an express warranty in the contract, the prescriptive period is the one specified
in the express warranty.
o In this case, the express warranty period is 24 months or 50, 000 kilometers, whichever
comes first.
The action to enforce the warranty was filed 2 and years from the date of the purchase or
delivery of the vehicle.
The period of the guarantee under the express warranty has expired.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

10 Coca Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc v Ca

AUTHOR:
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
NOTE/S:
TOPIC:
PONENTE: Davide, J.
FACTS:
1. Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen in Dagupan City.
2. In August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her
contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances.
3. She brought the said bottles for examination to DOH and it was found out that the soft drinks are adulterated.
4. As a result, her per day sales of soft drinks severely plummeted that she had to close her shop on 12 December 1989 for
losses.
5. She demanded damages from petitioner before the RTC which dismissed the same on motion by petitioner based on the
ground of Prescription.
6. On appeal, the CA annulled the orders of the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON the action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of
implied warranty under article 1561 of the CC which prescribes after six months from delivery of the thing sold.
HELD:
NO. We find no merit in the petition. The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of action in Civil Case No. D-9629
is found on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is
supported by the allegations in the complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the
reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption."
The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the
thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1567. In the case of Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and 1566, the vendee may elect between
withdrawing from the contract and demanding a proportionate reduction of the price, with damages either
case.
The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud, in which case the ordinary rule on
obligations shall be applicable. Under the law on obligations, responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all
obligations and any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. Responsibility arising from negligence is also demandable
in any obligation, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. Those guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay in the performance of their obligations and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are
liable for damages.
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may
be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar
the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which
breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict.
Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations.
Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on
negligence, breach of warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Quasi-delict, as
defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties asculpa aquiliana, culpa
extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) is homologous but not identical to tort under the common law, which includes
not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.

It must be made clear that our affirmance of the decision of the public respondent should by no means be understood as
suggesting that the private respondent's claims for moral damages have sufficient factual and legal basis.

011 GLADYS ESCOLA, Respondent, v. COCA

COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF FRESNO (a
Corporation), Appellant.
TOPIC: Rep Ipsa Loquitur
PONENTE: Gibson, J.

AUTHOR: Bea Mationg

NOTES:
Res ipsa loquitur does not apply unless (1)
defendant had exclusive control of the thing
causing the injury and (2) the accident is of
such a nature that it ordinarily would not occur
in the absence of negligence by the defendant.

FACTS:
Plaintiff, a waitress in a restaurant, was injured when a bottle of Coca Cola broke in her hand. She
alleged that defendant company, which had bottled and delivered the alleged defective bottle to
her employer, was negligent in selling "bottles containing said beverage which on account of
excessive pressure of gas or by reason of some defect in the bottle was dangerous ... and likely to
explode."
Defendant's driver delivered several cases of Coca Cola to the restaurant, placing them on the
floor, one on top of the other, under and behind the counter, where they remained at least thirtysix hours. Immediately before the accident, plaintiff picked up the top case and set it upon a nearby ice cream cabinet in front of and about three feet from the refrigerator. She then proceeded to
take the bottles from the case with her right hand, one at a time, and put them into the
refrigerator. Plaintiff testified that after she had placed three bottles in the refrigerator and had
moved the fourth bottle about eighteen inches from the case "it exploded in my hand."
The bottle broke into two jagged pieces and inflicted a deep five-inch cut, severing blood vessels,
nerves and muscles of the thumb and palm of the hand. Plaintiff further testified that when the
bottle exploded, "It made a sound similar to an electric light bulb that would have dropped. It
made a loud pop."
Plaintiff's employer testified, "I was about twenty feet from where it actually happened and I
heard the explosion." A fellow employee, on the opposite side of the counter, testified that
plaintiff "had the bottle, I should judge, waist high, and I know that it didn't bang either the case
or the door or another bottle ... when it popped. It sounded just like a fruit jar would blow up. ..."
The broken bottle was not produced at the trial, the pieces having been thrown away by an
employee of the restaurant shortly after the accident. Plaintiff, however, described the broken
pieces, and a diagram of the bottle was made showing the location of the "fracture line" where
the bottle broke in two.
ISSUE(S):
W/N the defendant company is liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff.
W/N the doctrine of rep ipsa loquitor applies.

HELD: Yes, the defendant company is liable; Yes, the doctrine applies.
RATIO:
Under the more logical view, the doctrine may be applied upon the theory that defendant had
control at the time of the alleged negligent act, although not at the time of the accident, provided
plaintiff first proves that the condition of the instrumentality had not been changed after it left the
defendant's possession.

The evidence appears sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the bottle here involved
was not damaged by any extraneous force after delivery to the restaurant by defendant. It
follows, therefore, that the bottle was in some manner defective at the time defendant
relinquished control, because sound and properly prepared bottles of carbonated liquids do not
ordinarily explode when carefully handled.
A chemical engineer for the Owens-Illinois Glass Company and its Pacific Coast subsidiary, maker
of Coca Cola bottles, explained how glass is manufactured and the methods used in testing and
inspecting bottles. The sample bottles are also subjected to the standard thermal shock test. The
witness stated that these tests are "pretty near" infallible.
It thus appears that there is available to the industry a commonly-used method of testing bottles
for defects not apparent to the eye, which is almost infallible. Since Coca Cola bottles are
subjected to these tests by the manufacturer, it is not likely that they contain defects when
delivered to the bottler which are not discoverable by visual inspection. Both new and used
bottles are filled and distributed by defendant.
Although it is not clear in this case whether the explosion was caused by an excessive
charge or a defect in the glass, there is a sufficient showing that neither cause would
ordinarily have been present if due care had been used. Further, defendant had
exclusive control over both the charging and inspection of the bottles. Accordingly, all
the requirements necessary to entitle plaintiff to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to supply an inference of negligence are present.
It is true that defendant presented evidence tending to show that it exercised considerable
precaution by carefully regulating and checking the pressure in the bottles and by making visual
inspections for defects in the glass at several stages during the bottling process. It is well settled,
however, that when a defendant produces evidence to rebut the inference of negligence which
arises upon application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it is ordinarily a question of fact for the
jury to determine whether the inference has been dispelled.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Res ipsa loquitur does not apply unless (1) defendant had exclusive control of the thing causing
the injury and (2) the accident is of such a nature that it ordinarily would not occur in the absence
of negligence by the defendant.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S): N/A