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DISINI V.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
Petitioners seek to declare various provisions of the Anti-Cybercrime Law and related Articles
of the RPC as void and unconstitutional because it violates certain constitutional rights.
SC ruled on the following provisions:
a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access; CONSTITUTIONAL
Re: strict scrutiny standard (used to assess validity of laws dealing with regulation of speech
and other fundamental rights as expansion from earlier apps to EPC);
SC: found nothing that calls for the application of the standard bec. no fundamental freedom is
being punished for what is essentially a condemnable act (illegal access). Ethical hackers have
prior permission from the client, so they are protected from this section.
b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference; CONSTITUTIONAL
Re: Overbreadth (gov't purpose invades protected freedoms), creates a chilling effect on
freedom of speech and expression.
SC: Petitioners fail to prove that under no set of circumstances that this section will be valid.
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting; CONSTITUTIONAL
Re: Violation of the EPC;
SC: Law is reasonable in penalizing for acquiring domain in bad faith to do ill. Challenge to
constitutionality of the section on ground of violation of EPC is baseless.
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft; CONSTITUTIONAL
Re: Violation of due process and privacy and correspondence, freedom of the press.
SC: Section regulates specific actions, no fundamental right to acquire another person's data.
Essence of the law is to punish identity theft for illegitimate purposes. Acquiring and
disseminating info made public by user himself cannot be regarded as theft (intent to gain
through overt acts of the offender). Press has nothing to fear bec. special circumstance is
present to negate intent to gain in the Section.
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; CONSTITUTIONAL
Re: Violation of freedom of expression of husband and wives and consenting adults and
would now be penalized.
SC: BiCam Cong. Committee's intent is to penalize those engaging in cyber prostitution.
Consenting adults are protected. Section only applies to persons engaged in the business of
it.
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography; CONSTITUTIONAL
Re: Doodling and imagining sexual abuse of minors by formulating idea on laptop would be
punishable, and if re-tweeted on Twitter, would be considered "aiding and abetting"
cybercrime.
SC: Constitutionality of section not successfully challenged,
BUT VOID AND UNCONSTI W/RESPECT TO INTERFERENCE.
g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Re: Spam being penalized
SC: If you prohibited transmission of spam, this would be violating the freedom of expression.
Unsolicited advertisements are legit forms of expression.
VOID AND UNCONSTI W/RESPECT TO INTERFERENCE.
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, RPC Art. 353, 354, 355; CONSTITUTIONAL
Re: Provisions of both RPC and Cybercrime law carry requirement of "presumed malice",
when the latest jurisprudence replaces it with "actual malice" for conviction. Laws on libel
should be stricken down.
SC: Presence of malice must be established. Libel is not a constitutionallyprotected
speech and gov't has obligation to protect private indivs from
defamation.
BUT VOID AND UNCONSTI W/RESPECT TO INTERFERENCE.
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
UNCONSTITUTIONAL in relation to Sec 4(c)(4), else, CONSTITUTIONAL
Re: Aiding/abetting in any of the offenses enumerated as "cybercrime" suffers
from
overbreadth, chilling effect on protected expression
SC: Liking, commenting, sharing or re-tweeting openly defamatory statements
are not
considered as "aiding or abetting". Only the original author is liable.
-When a penal statute encroaches upon freedom of speech, facial challenge grounded on
void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable.
-As-applied challenge (petitioner claims violation of consti right can raise any consti ground if

it violates own rights, prohibits assailing statute's constitutionality based on violation of rights
of 3rd party=prohibition against 3rd-party standing)
-But rule admits exceptions, petitioner may mount facial challenge to constitutionality of
statute even if his own rights were not violated.
-Ratio: Counter chilling effect, overbroad law. Legislature needs to clear this up.
-In relation to Sec 4 (c) (4) [libel], Sec. 5 is UNCONSTI because it is vague.
-But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should
be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal
Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference,
Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on
Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on
Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses
borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression.
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher; CONSTITUTIONAL
SC: Distinction creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes bec. offender evades ID
and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater
harm.
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175
CONSTITUTIONAL except online libel and online child porn bec. double jeopardy.
SC would rather leave determination of correct application of Sec. 7 to actual cases, with
exception of crimes of online libel and online child porn. Exceptions would be a blatant
violation of the constitutional prohibition vs. double jeopardy if charged under both laws.
l. Section 8 on Penalties; COURT CANNOT RULE BEC. SEP. OF POWERS
SC: Matter of fixing penalties for commission of crimes is a legislative prerogative. Courts
should not encroach on this prerog of the lawmaking body because judiciary can only interpret
and apply them.
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data COURT TO LEGIS.
Re: collection/recording of traffic data in real time curtails civil liberties and
provides
opportunities for abuse, invoked right to privacy.
SC: a) Decisional privacy: right to independence in making certain important
decisions
b) Informational privacy: refers to interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters,
b1) subjective test: legit explanation for privacy
b2) objective test: objectively reasonable
Court must make sure that laws are written with specificity and definitness to
ensure
respect for rights that Consti guarantees.
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data; CONSTITUTIONAL
Re: Undue deprivation of right to property bec. data preservation is
garnishment.
SC: Data that service providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not
made inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of preserving data
will not unduly hamper the
normal transmission or use of the same.
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data; CONSTITUTIONAL
Re: Like a subpoena, but subpoenas are a judicial function.
SC: Power to issue subpoenas is not an exclusively judicial function. Sec. 14 enforces court
warrant, not unlawful search or seizure, nor does it violate privacy of communications and
correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data CONSTITUTIONAL
Re: Supersedes est. search and seizure procedures.
SC: Merely enumerates the duties of law enforcers that would ensure proper collection,
preservation and use of computer data that have been seized bec. of court warrant, does not
pose any threats on rights of person from whom they were taken.
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data; CONSTITUTIONAL
Re: Destruction of data violates against deprivation of property without due process of law.
SC: Unclear that user has a demandable right to require service provider to save data. If user
wants to preserve data, he/she should've saved a copy or ask service provider before it is
deleted.
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data; UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Re: Stifles freedom of expression and violates right vs unreasonable searches and seizures.
SC: Violative indeed, because it precludes judicial intervention and disregards jurisprudential
guidelines bec. enables exec. ofcr to seize content without judicial warrant.
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice; CONSTITUTIONAL
Re: Bill of attainder, mere failure to comply = legis finding of guilt

SC: Non-compliance is a violation of PD 1829, Sec. 20 merely incorporates


elements. It is not an offense in and of itself.
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC);
and u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions.
BOTH CONSTITUTIONAL
Re: Congress invalidly delegates legislative power.
SC: Passes both completeness test and sufficient standard test.

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