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The Transparent Becoming of World and Quantum Field Brain Dynamics

An initial look at the work of Gordon G. Globus

The ontology of metaphysics is so embedded in the way we think, so coiled within the
very language that we must use, so protected, that we cannot get at it by a frontal
approach.
It is necessary to dwell in an author's work to grasp the underlying ontological
principles at work.
In the between-two of quantum field entanglement their belonging-together world is unfolded. World is a concretion transparently disclosed out of the enfolded
orders in the case of dual mode match. The brains supreme achievement is to bring
this match in the between-two under exquisite control. The transparent process of
becoming in which world appears, both waking and dreaming, is the belongingtogether of dual ontological modes described as quantum thermofield brain
dynamics.
World is not a persisting substance under efficient causality but instead worldthrownness is continually gifted in the transparent dynamical operation of the brains
between-two. The thermofield ground of this process is abground.
The Transparent Becoming of World, Gordon G. Globus

The scheme at work in Globus philosophical construction must be used, as he himself says, to
unflinchingly explore our interpretation of experience in terms of that scheme. Since the scheme
retains neither transcendental realism nor even the entangled agential realism of a Karen Barad, say,
(which given its focus on quantum entanglement is something that needs to be confronted, each from
each) the consistency of world-thrownness between Dasein and others has to be accounted for. The
parallel concretions of world-thrownness must also confront and be confronted by the parallax scheme
of iek.
The first problematic is that of the notion of abground, hardly itself a transparent word, coined as it is
from the German abgrund familiar to readers of Heideggers later works, particularly vom Ereignis. That
Ereignis itself is implicated in the irruption from the abground of accomplishable possibilities means a
fuller look at Heidegger, particularly the Heidegger of Malabous The Heidegger (Ex) Change, which
brings up the difficulty already inherent in quantum field entanglement, but made more acute by

Heideggers work, of the continuation of certain invariants in Globus scheme, invariants that for the
Heidegger Exchange cannot be invariant if metaphysics Is to be truly set in its place. Globus is aware
of the danger of the obviousness of metaphysical assumptions embedded in our understanding and
language, one has to be a master of suspicion in the Nietzschean sense to avoid falling into its wiles.
The second problematic is that world-thrownness must, in terms of supporting the notion of abground
and Ereignis, be world-historical-thrownness. The world-historical nature of metaphysics itself: its
intertwining with history in general; with the history of Spirit in Hegels sense; with the history of
currency as the last god; all these must be brought into play as to how the brain or neurological system
as a whole can reflect and encompass a history that, while not arbitrary, leaves no room for shortcuts
such as ascribing some sort of genotypic/phenotypic similarity to account for the embedding of that
history in the world-thrownness it discloses precisely as the historical determinations of the Self, which
as such is the same as World, but narrated differently. If Globus parallel concretion withstands ieks
alternate, primarily from, The Parallax View and Less Than Nothing, it still must survive the narrative
conception of Joyce and Beckett.
The third problematic is that world-thrownness doesnt appear to confront or challenge the subjectivity
of the I-Subject, the Janus-headed nature of the I-Subject that intimates a correspondence with the site
of The Heidegger (Ex) Change itself. That subjectivity that iek is so keen to hang on to as a
revolutionary a priori.
The last problematic (that I can project before treating each and allowing each treatment to inform the
others) is related to the first, in that whether brain science, whether quantum or not, and even if it
manages to shake off the notion of the brain as an information processing computer, seeing it instead as
a sort of ontological world-generator, retains too much of Cartesian/Newtonian physicalism and
materialism, whether in naming the generator as brain Globus isnt surreptitiously subscribing to the
brain as primarily physical and material, and whether the de-materialization of matter itself in quantum
mechanics is taken consistently enough that brain no longer means some sort of material substance.
And in the latter case, precisely what is meant by brain and why does Globus insist on giving it
primacy, at least as far as naming, if the goal is to nullify the separation of mind/brain by showing its
duality to be entangled, and therefore not dual in the sense of coming-together and breaking-apart but
as belonging-together such that each implies the other (though not as a necessary implication, an
implication of possibility).