LD Brief 2014 March April

Foundation Briefs
Advanced Level March/April Brief
Resolved: Placing political conditions on

humanitarian aid to foreign countries is
unjust
March/April 2014
Contents
foundationbriefs.com
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Table of Contents..............................................................................................................................................................
Table of Contents..............................................................................................................................................................
The Structure of a Foundation Brief.............................................................................................................................
Definitions.........................................................................................................................................................................
Definitions.........................................................................................................................................................................
Unconditional vs. Conditional Aid. BG................................................................................................................
Definition of Humanitarian Aid TF......................................................................................................................
Status Quo is of Humanitarian Aid as Including Political Conditions TF............................................................
Definition of Humanitarian Aid to Include Disaster Relief TF............................................................................
Distinction from Developmental Aid TF..............................................................................................................
Definition of conditional aid and the types of policies included. CFS.................................................................
Explanations of the different types of conditional aid. CFS.................................................................................
Definition of Aid Dependence. ABB....................................................................................................................
Topic Analysis...................................................................................................................................................................
Topic Analysis...................................................................................................................................................................
Defend Your Source..........................................................................................................................................................
Defend Your Source..........................................................................................................................................................
Authors..........................................................................................................................................................................
Organizations................................................................................................................................................................
Aff Evidence.....................................................................................................................................................................
Aff Evidence.....................................................................................................................................................................
General..........................................................................................................................................................................
The international consensus is that conditionality should not be applied to humanitarian action. CFS...............
Impartial Aid Better....................................................................................................................................................
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Impartial aid would increase the cooperation of states receiving aid and benefit the global community.
CFS.....................................................................................................................................................................
Negative Impact on Recipient Country.......................................................................................................................
Aid should help countries achieve political independence, not serve host nations agenda. PNG.....................
Paternalistic aid is not justified according to Locke and Kant. PNG..............................................................
Conditional aid actually harms recipient nation. PNG.......................................................................................
Negative Impacts On Aid and Aid Relations..............................................................................................................
Political conditions decrease quality of aid. PNG..............................................................................................
Political conditions mean that nations who need it most do not receive aid. PNG............................................
Political conditions encourage aid relations with corrupt leaders and states. CFS.............................................
The amount of need does not affect the amount of aid from political donors. CFS...........................................
Phantom Aid is not justified. PNG..................................................................................................................
Conditions Ineffective.................................................................................................................................................
Political conditions are ineffective when placed by NGOs. PNG......................................................................
Studies show that political conditions do not increase effectiveness. PNG........................................................
A study of US bilateral aid data shows conditional aid does not focus on advancing societal well-being.
CFS.....................................................................................................................................................................
The amount of aid given when there are political conditions is based on political survival and not what
would be successful. CFS...................................................................................................................................
Empirical Examples....................................................................................................................................................
Politicized Humanitarian Aid Bad Syria Proves TF........................................................................................
Politicized Humanitarian Aid Bad Kosovo Proves TF....................................................................................
Politicization of Aid Bad Afghanistan proves TF............................................................................................
Politicized Humanitarian Aid Bad Afghanistan Proves TF.............................................................................
During Rwandan Genocide, conditional aid exacerbated human rights abuses. PNG.......................................
Politicized of Aid Violates the Four Tenants of Humanitarianism TF................................................................
Myanmar only desires aid that is nonpolitical. PNG..........................................................................................
Conditionality was counterproductive in Haiti. PNG.........................................................................................
Politics are responsible for the failed humanitarian aid during the Darfur crisis. Without political
conditions it could have been successful. CFS...................................................................................................
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Studies show that conditional aid is highly unsuccessful, particularly in Africa. CFS......................................
Conditional aid is the reason that Africa has a weak domestic economy and poor policies. CFS.....................
Israel-Palestine/Gaza Strip......................................................................................................................................
Conditional aid sent to Palestine focused on politics and was unsuccessful because it ignored the real
economic problems. CFS....................................................................................................................................
Conditional aid has greatly contributed to the structural issues of the Palestinian Authority. CFS...................
Political aid creates a system of dependency and long-term government instability. CFS................................
Short-term interventions would work best with aid to the Gaza Strip. CFS.......................................................
The international aid to the Gaza Strip is very political and has been accused of supporting the Israeli
occupation. CFS..................................................................................................................................................
Conditional aid has actually sustained the Israel-Palestine conflict. CFS..........................................................
3 additional warrants to why Gaza Strip aid has causes more conflict. CFS......................................................
Gaza Strip aid has caused the Gazans to become very dependent on the humanitarian assistance. CFS...........
Conditions on aid to Palestine oppress Palestinians. BG....................................................................................
Kant.............................................................................................................................................................................
Political conditions treat other humans as simply means to an end. PNG..........................................................
Kants Humanitarianism TF................................................................................................................................
Deontology..................................................................................................................................................................
Humanitarian Aid fails Deontology Not for the Right Purposes TF...............................................................
Western Dominance....................................................................................................................................................
Political Humanitarian Aid funds Western Policy Agendas TF..........................................................................
United States aid has an unjustified military agenda. PNG................................................................................
The use of humanitarian aid with political conditions is seen as imperialist and threatens the safety of aid
workers. CFS.......................................................................................................................................................
Table Showing Overreliance on Aid in Parts of Africa. ABB.............................................................................
Neo-Colonialism.........................................................................................................................................................
Conditional aid fuels dependency on western states in such a way that it promotes neo-colonialism. BG.
.............................................................................................................................................................................
When we attach conditions of good governance to aid, this attempts to force western views onto other
countries. BG......................................................................................................................................................
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Conditions about good governance and democracy are attempts of the west to increase control over
other countries. BG.............................................................................................................................................
Conditioned aid has forced African countries to pander to the West or let their citizens starve this shifts
the blame of colonialism to Africa and normalizes global injustice. BG...........................................................
Sovereignty.................................................................................................................................................................
Politically Aided Governments Lose Sovereignty TF........................................................................................
Independence Key to Humanitarian Aid TF.......................................................................................................
Neutrality Key to Humanitarian Aid TF.............................................................................................................
Humanity Used as Justification for Sovereignty Violations TF.........................................................................
Those Providing Aid in a Position of Power over Those Receiving it. ABB.....................................................
Status Quo...................................................................................................................................................................
Current Processes are More Reflective of Intervention than of Humanitarianism TF.......................................
Foreign Aid has Become a Political Agenda TF.................................................................................................
Conditional Aid Inevitable..........................................................................................................................................
Political Conditions Inseparable from Aid TF....................................................................................................
Private donations demonstrate how aid still occurs without a political agenda. PNG.......................................
Despite potential for co-option, aid does consistently improve the situation. PNG...........................................
Aid can be Used as a Pretext.......................................................................................................................................
Religious groups Disguise Proselytizing as Aid. ABB.......................................................................................
Aid Morally Required for its Own Sake.....................................................................................................................
Chart Showing Various Theories on Why Aid Related to Health is Morally Required. ABB............................
Securitization..............................................................................................................................................................
Humanitarian Aid Linked to Securitization TF..................................................................................................
Form of Technology....................................................................................................................................................
Humanitarian Aid is a Veiled Form of Governmental Technology TF...............................................................
Psychosocial Humanitarian Intervention Bad TF...............................................................................................
Neg Evidence..................................................................................................................................................................
Neg Evidence..................................................................................................................................................................
Unconditioned Aid May Decrease Aid.......................................................................................................................
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Humanitarian Aid is Crucial TF..........................................................................................................................
Must Combine Political and Social Agendas TF................................................................................................
Unrestrained aid exacerbated the situation in Rwanda, Sudan, and Liberia. PNG.............................................
States Only Have Obligations to Their Own Citizens................................................................................................
Governments only have obligations to their own citizens. BG..........................................................................
When governments do give aid they must condition it to protect the freedom, wellbeing, and interests of
their own citizens. Conditioned aid can be used to promote a states own political interests. BG.....................
Aid in conflict situations is inherently a political tool. PNG..............................................................................
Multilateral action is much more effective than unilateral action. PNG............................................................
Justification for Countries not Acknowledging International Obligations. ABB...............................................
Current System means that Wealthy Countries will not Provide Aid Without Incentive. ABB.........................
Corrupt Regimes.........................................................................................................................................................
Unconditional aid increases chances for regimes to be re-elected. BG..............................................................
Paternalistic aid is justified when subjects autonomy is impaired. PNG.......................................................
Nonpoliticized aid in Myanmar legitimizes the military regime. PNG..............................................................
In Somalia, nonpolitical humanitarian aid fails. PNG........................................................................................
When blindly given, aid is co-opted for military use. PNG................................................................................
Failure to use aid as a political weapon has led to negative consequences. PNG..............................................
Societies with Health Problems that Receive Aid are Usually Unjust. ABB......................................................
Justification for UN Politicizing Humanitarian Aid in Haiti. ABB....................................................................
Right to Democracy as a Justification for Attaching Conditions to Aid. ABB...................................................
Oppressive Regimes may Justify taking Extraordinary Measures. ABB........................................................
U.N. Security Councils Moral Authority Supersedes Sovereignty of Tyrants. ABB........................................
Humanitarian Benefits................................................................................................................................................
Political conditions are key to ensure standard humanitarian conditions. BG...................................................
Without conditions there cannot be an effective allocation of resources. BG....................................................
Conditionality provides a method of ensuring citizens will actually receive grants of money given to a
state. BG..............................................................................................................................................................
Political conditions for aid are not absolutely constraining. PNG......................................................................
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Conditional aid is justified under the right conditions. PNG..............................................................................
The practice of Smart Aid is an example of justified conditional aid. PNG...................................................
Aid fails without proper administration. PNG....................................................................................................
Ability to Attach Conditions Incentivizes NGOs. ABB......................................................................................
Unjust to Forcibly Separate Aid and Intervention. ABB....................................................................................
Government Intervention Leads to Less Non-Government Aid. ABB...............................................................
Womens Rights Situation shows need to Change Culture in many Cases. ABB..............................................
Secondary Rights are Justified for Countries Giving Aid. ABB.....................................................................
Unconditioned Aid Harmful in Corrupt and Unstable Regions. ABB................................................................
Democratization..........................................................................................................................................................
Empirical evidence proves political conditions on aid promote democracy .BG............................................
UN Withholds Aid to Promote Democratization. ABB......................................................................................
Imposing Democratization is Necessary to Truly Respect Sovereignty. ABB...................................................
Poverty........................................................................................................................................................................
Unconditional aid increases poverty. BG............................................................................................................
Aid dependency and corruption crushes the effectiveness of aid and prevents any social progress. BG...........
Unconditional aid kills free trade. BG................................................................................................................
Institutional Reform....................................................................................................................................................
Conditioned aid can create institutional reform within a country. BG...............................................................
Wealthy Countries.......................................................................................................................................................
The majority of aid is given by wealthy and western countries. BG..................................................................
Wealthy countries are responsible for the global inequalities that exist but refuse to acknowledge it.
Small acts of charity such as aid are used to justify non-action. BG..................................................................
CP Get Rid of Aid.......................................................................................................................................................
Aid is Ineffective Haiti Proves TF...................................................................................................................
Turn on Conditional Aid.............................................................................................................................................
Humanitarian Aid as a Political Tool Backfires TF............................................................................................
Morality.......................................................................................................................................................................
De-politicized Aid is Moral in Itself TF.............................................................................................................
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Fundraising.................................................................................................................................................................
Apolitical Fundraising more Successful TF.......................................................................................................
Cant Default to a AFF Mindset TF............................................................................................................................
Aff Counters....................................................................................................................................................................
Aff Counters....................................................................................................................................................................
A2: Conditional Aid Solves for Corrupt Regimes......................................................................................................
Conditional aid does not solve 100% for corrupt regimes. BG..........................................................................
A2 Intergovernmental Organizations Solve Self-Interest Argument..........................................................................
National Self-Interest is Present Even in Joined-Up Governmental Organizations TF......................................
Neg Counters..................................................................................................................................................................
Neg Counters..................................................................................................................................................................
N2 Monetary Aid More Effective From NGOs..........................................................................................................
Private donations are not more useful than public, national donations. PNG....................................................
N2 All US Aid is politicized.......................................................................................................................................
The decision for the amount of aid the US gives is largely nonpolitical. PNG..................................................
Cases...............................................................................................................................................................................
Cases...............................................................................................................................................................................
Aff Case......................................................................................................................................................................
Neg Case.....................................................................................................................................................................
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Definitions
The Structure of a Foundation Brief

Topic Analysis
This is a general reflection on the resolution. It will provide to you an impression of the topic at hand,
challenges you will face while debating, and a picture of where we see the debate headed.
Framework
Often times, the most important part of the debate is to actually win before the debate begins. With this
section, we will set you up for such a feat. With unique analysis on how to lay the conditions for victory, you
will be guaranteed to begin battle already with an advantage.
Strategy Sections
Foundation Briefs is committed to making sure you understand the evidence provided to you. We will never
simply throw quotes at you and hope you can understand what we are trying to imply. That is where the
Strategy Section comes in. At the beginning of all major sections (i.e. the section in the brief regarding alQaeda) there will appear a small section of original Foundation Briefs analysis to tell you how we see the
evidence being used, what rhetoric will please the judge and which counterarguments to be prepared for.
Important note: Webpages and online articles that are long and continuous will always be cited as page one (1)
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Definitions
Definitions
Unconditional vs. Conditional Aid. BG.
CesiCruzandChristinaSchneider.(2012)The(Unintended)ElectoralEffectsofForeign
AidProjects.
Conditional aid refers to aid that is tied to a specic use, such as building a school or pursuing an
infrastructure project. Unconditional aid is not tied to a specic use and usually comes in form of budget
support. Unconditional aid provides the government with more exibility. Although governments should use
unconditional aid to consolidate their budget and to spend the resources to promote economic growth in the
most effective way, donors have almost no inuence on how the money is spent once it is disbursed to the
recipient.11
Definition of Humanitarian Aid TF

GlobalHumanitarianAssistance(2014).
Humanitarian assistance is aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect
human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. The characteristics that mark it out from other forms
of foreign assistance and development aid are that: It is intended to be governed by the principles of humanity,
neutrality, impartiality and independence. It is intended to be short-term in nature and provide for activities in
the immediate aftermath of a disaster. In practice it is often difficult to say where during and in the immediate
aftermath of emergencies ends and other types of assistance begin, especially in situations of prolonged
vulnerability. Traditional responses to humanitarian crises, and the easiest to categorise as such, are those that
fall under the aegis of emergency response: Material relief assistance and services (shelter, water, medicines
etc.) Emergency food aid (short-term distribution and supplementary feeding programmes) Relief coordination,
protection and support services (coordination, logistics and communications). But humanitarian assistance can
also include reconstruction and rehabilitation (repairing pre-existing infrastructure as opposed to longer-term
activities designed to improve the level of infrastructure) and disaster prevention and preparedness (disaster risk
reduction (DRR), early warning systems, contingency stocks and planning). Under the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) reporting
criteria, humanitarian assistance has very clear cut-off points for example, disaster preparedness excludes
longer-term work such as prevention of floods or conflicts. Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation includes
repairing pre-existing infrastructure but excludes longer-term activities designed to improve the level of
infrastructure. Humanitarian assistance is given by governments, individuals, NGOs, multilateral organisations,
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Definitions
domestic organisations and private companies. Some differentiate their humanitarian assistance from
development or other foreign assistance, but they draw the line in different places and according to different
criteria. We report what others themselves report as humanitarian assistance but try to consistently label and
source this.
Definition that can be used on both sides for fair debate. Cut parts as needed.
Status Quo is of Humanitarian Aid as Including Political Conditions TF

BMJ,2002.SeparatingHumanitarianAidfromPolitics.BritishMedicalJournal324.
Jean-Michel Piedagnel left his management job with a French sailboat company in 1995 at the start of the
Yugoslav conflict. He felt that the international community had not done enough to prevent the conflict and
joined Mdecins Sans Frontires. He has been the executive director of the organisation for just under a year. I
felt frustrated. I had always been interested in doing something for the world, and there are only a few ways you
can get involved. You can join the military, you can get into politics, or you can join the humanitarian world.
He is passionate that these three options should remain distinctand that humanitarian groups remain faithful
to the definition of the word. The problem with the word humanitarian is that it has become synonymous with
charity or assistance. It has lost its original meaning, which is of neutral, impartial, and independent assistance,
with no political or religious aim. Over the last 10-20 years we have seen development non-governmental
organisations and governments use the word humanitarian to cover political concerns and we have seen
the dilution of what humanitarian assistance is. Governments have been very keen to promote the
concept of a humanitarian warthat soldiers are sent out for humanitarian reasons. That's all
nonsense. British troops are in Afghanistan to impose a political settlement. So there is a contradiction
they are a warring party. Peace keeping is a political process. Any involvement of the military involves
politics, and humanitarian groups should be outside politics. He says that his organizations work has been
hampered by political or military involvement in the delivery of aid.
Establishes status quo as that of including political condition. May be used for either side; use depending
on goodness/badness of status quo.
Definition of Humanitarian Aid to Include Disaster Relief TF

Diego,Nicholas(2010).TheGeneralIneffectivenessofForeignAid:ALookatPoverty
Reduction.
Humanitarian aid refers to the material or logistical support provided for humanitarian purposes, such
as relief following a natural disaster. 4 The aid currently being sent to Haiti remains a prominent example.
While this type of assistance can have negative consequences, the moral and ethical foundations of
humanitarian aid are sound. The goal is to provide support: in particular the supply of food, medicines, shelter,
and healthcare, [...with...] Inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations working impartially and
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Definitions
with strictly humanitarian motives, as according to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182. 5
Efforts of impartiality have commonly been pursued in order to keep focus on the afflicted party rather than on
foreign and domestic political agenda. This is a point of distinction from developmental aid. Humanitarian aid is
also unique in its application because it is typically an immediate response aimed at relieving suffering in a
narrow time frame. Long-term objectives, which include rebuilding of infrastructure and alleviating poverty, are
rarely undertaken.
Paves way for NEG argument that pending political conditions on disaster relief is taking advantage of
countries in a weak state.
Distinction from Developmental Aid TF

Reduction.
Developmental aid differs radically from humanitarian aid in that it has immense political roots and
focuses on long-term economic and social development. Modern institutions of developmental aid can be
traced back to the culmination of World War II with the creation of the World Bank in 1944 and the Marshall
Plan in 1949. During this period, bilateral6 developmental aid was commonly used by the United States to
combat the spread of communism and the influence of the USSR in the third world. Similar political
motivations have remained prevalent well into the 21st century drawing question to the true intentions of
developmental aid donors. In an effort to subvert these political motives, international organizations such as the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have emerged to provide multilateral aid. 7 Despite good
intentions, these organizations have become plagued by the very same problem that affects bilateral aid: general
ineffectiveness. Over the last five decades, Western nations have spent over 2.3 trillion dollars on foreign aid
and have virtually nothing to show for it8. This begs the question, why have bilateral and multilateral aid efforts
failed in finding a solution to world poverty?
Discards cards referring to developmental aid.
Definition of conditional aid and the types of policies included. CFS

Qarmout,Tamer.Beland,Daniel.(2012)ThePoliticsofInternationalAidtotheGaza
Strip
Understandings of conditionality have changed over time. Classic conditionality, on the one hand, was an
expression of the donors strategic and/or economic interest in addition to claims/conditions to ensure that the
aid would be channeled to achieve stated goals.3 Conditionality in the modern sense, on the other hand, is a set
of strategies employed by donors to stipulate political and/or economic changes from the recipient that
otherwise may not have been given a priority.4 Thus, in the modern sense, there are two forms of conditionality:
economic and political. Economic conditionality, which was introduced by the World Bank and the International
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Definitions
Monetary Fund, tied economic aid to the implementation of specific economic policies required by the donors,
whereas political conditionality usually links donor aid to the recipients implementing programs in such areas
as democratization and good governance. Although both types of conditionality are applied to assistance to
Palestine, this article focuses on politically conditioned aid directed at bypassing, isolating, and weakening the
Hamas administration in Gaza.5
Explanations of the different types of conditional aid. CFS

Leader,Nicholas.Macrae,Joanna.(200)TermsofEngagement:Conditionsand
ConditionalityinHumanitarianAction
A number of speakers attempted to introduce greater clarity to an often unclear subject. A distinction was made
between the conditions that need to exist in order for humanitarian work to be principled and effective, and
conditionality imposed to bring these conditions about. One speaker made a distinction between implicit
humanitarian conditionality, in other words humanitarians only working where conditions were acceptable, and
explicit political conditionality, i.e. donors imposing political demands on belligerents (see Section 2). Another
speaker identified ethical conditionally, or withdrawing when the net impact of aid was harmful, legal
conditionality, or conditionality with the objective of enforcing compliance with international law, and
political conditionality, which was to do with a donors foreign policy goals (see Section 7).
Definition of Aid Dependence. ABB

Brautigam,Deborah.(2004)ForeignAid,Institutions,andGovernanceinSubSaharan
Africa.EconomicDevelopmentandCulturalChange.
Those who write about foreign aid tend to avoid defining aid dependence concretely, but the implication is
almost invariably that aid dependence is a problematic condition caused by, but not synonymous with, large
transfers of aid. Roger Riddell, for example, has called aid dependence that process by which the continued
provision of aid appears to be making no significant contribution to the achievement of self-sustaining
development. Rehman Sobhan, writing in Bangladesh, calls aid dependence a state of mind, where aid
recipients lose their capacity to think for themselves and thereby relinquish 12control. This article defines aid
dependence as a situation in which a government is unable to perform many of the core functions of
government, such as the maintenance of existing infrastructure or the delivery of basic public services,
without foreign aid funding and expertise (provided in the form of technical assistance or projects). This
characterizes many countries in Africa today, where, as a team of African researchers charged not long ago,
many governments have developed a cozy accommodation with dependency.
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Definitions
Determining whether placing conditions on aid makes aid dependence more or less likely will be central to
debates on this topic.
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Analysis
Topic
Topic Analysis
This topic is easily one of the better topics of the season. With plenty of ground on both sides as well as the
possibility for diverse arguments, preparation and critical thinking will be paramount. With that, a couple of
thoughts on the resolution from the affirmative point of view:
The affirmative has compelling arguments that are both empirical and theoretical. First, regarding the empirical
arguments, strong evidence exists to suggest that conditional aid often fails to achieve the established goals, is
predicated upon impractical conditions or leads to serious problems with the aid and aid relations. Evidence for
all of these empirical arguments is provided in this brief and the good affirmative team will want to be well
versed in all of the potential issues. Indeed, combining these arguments into one impactful empirical contention
could be a strong place to start your case.
On the theoretical side of things Kant should provide a solid foundation as conditional humanitarian aid seems
to call the categorical imperative into question. Similarly, more theoretical arguments grounded in politics and
real-world issues such as neo-colonialism, sovereignty and deontology should offer fertile affirmative ground.
As such, the optimal affirmative strategy probably synthesizes one or more of these abstract arguments with the
aforementioned empirical contentions. This would unequivocally have the negative playing catch-up from the
get-go.
On the negative side of things you will definitely be fighting an uphill battle. However, you too have ample
ground for great argumentation. To begin, the negative will probably want to dispel the notion that aid
represents some form of obligation. Many judges may hold this preconceived notion and you should expect to
see it from prepared affirmatives. If you allow the judge to believe that aid is an obligation not an option, you
will already be at a large disadvantage when it comes to debating what aid should look like.
In terms of more constructive arguments, there is empirical evidence that points to the value of conditional aid
(just as there is evidence to the contrary). Getting this out there quickly and effectively will be critical. Benefits
include reduced corruption, democratizing effects and more profound impacts for those targeted by the aid.
From a theoretical standpoint, the negative is at a slight disadvantage but concepts such as the social contract
and libertarianism should be helpful. For example, establishing that states have an obligation only to their own
citizens as a result of the social contract can lead to fruitful arguments about what aids goal is. Under this
framework, the goal of giving aid must be to make the donating countrys own population safer or better off or
there is no justification for aid under the social contract. If you can prove that conditional aid achieves those
goals better than blindly donating money, you will have a good shot at taking home the ballot.
With that, good luck!
James Mackey
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Source
Defend Your
Defend Your Source

Authors
Laetitia Atlani Professor of Anthropology at the University of Paris and Chief Technical Advisor for the UN.
Mohammed Haneef Atmar - Programme Manager, Norwegian Church Aid Afghanistan Programme.
Daniel Beland Canada Research Chair in Public Policy at the Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public
Policy.
James Boyce - PhD from Oxford University, Professor of Economics at University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Deborah Brautigam PhD and Professor of International Development and Comparative Politics at Johns
Hopkins University.
KM Bridges Works with the United Nations World Food Programme in Malawi and with a NGO consultancy
organization in Sydney, Australia.
Terry Buss - PhD from Ohio State University, Executive Director and Distinguished Professor of Public Policy
at the Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University, in Adelaide, Australia.
Daniel Chong - Professor of political science at Rollins College, Florida.
Anne Chyzhkova: Coordinator at United Nations System in Guinea-Bissau.
Gordon Crawford - PhD in Development Politics, Director of the Centre for Global Development.
Cesi Cruz: Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of California San Diego.
Devon Curtis: A University Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of
Cambridge, and a Fellow of Emmanuel College.
Larry Diamond A senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. The work cited was a report to the Carnegie
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict Carnegie Corporation of New York.
Nicholas Diego Senior Economics Major at the College of Charleston.
Michael Dillon Department of Political Science, University of Lancaster
A. Cooper Drury - PhD from Arizona State University, international relations professor at Missouri University
Mark Duffield Professor at Institute for Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds.
Thad Dunning: Robson Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley and directs the
Center on the Politics of Development.
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Source
Lois Fielding PhD and Professor at University of Detroit Mercy Law.
Defend Your
Fiona Fox British relief service specialist.

Suzanne Franks Professor of Politics and International Relations, City University of London.
Alan Gewirth: Professor of Philosophy at University of Chicago.
Carol Graham: A senior fellow and the Charles Robinson Chair at the Brookings Institution, a College Park
professor at the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, a research fellow at the Institute for the
Study of Labor (IZA), and the author of numerous books, papers and edited volume chapters.
Gerald Helman: Retired from the Foreign Service, was U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva and
deputy to the under-secretary of state for political affairs.
Saroj Jayasinghe - Professor in the Department of Clinical Medicine, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.
Robert Johnson - Has been a member of the California Bar since 1991, has had his own law firm in Dana Point
and San Clemente since May of 2006.
Mira Johri PhD in Philosophy, Researcher at La Universidad de Montreal.
Ravi Kanbur T.H. Lee Professor of World Affairs, International Professor of Applied Economics and
Management, and Professor of Economics at Cornell University.
Nicholas Leader Research fellow at the Humanitarian Policy group in ODI. He worked for Oxfam in several
countries in Africa, East Europe, and Asia.
Matthew Leriche - Fellow in Managing Humanitarianism at the London School of Economics and Political
Science.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita Political Science professor at New York University and is a senior fellow at
Stanford Universitys Hoover Institution.
Ross Mountain: Employee of United Nations working on humanitarian, recovery, development and
peacekeeping operations in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean, and the Pacific.
Wairimu R. Mugo: University of Texas at Arlington.
Tinashe Nyataro: Master of Social Science Degree in Development Studies (Cum laude),Bachelor of Social
Science (honours) in Development Studies, Bachelor of Arts from Fort Hare University and a Certificate in
Project Management from Damelin College.
Tamer Qarmout PhD student in the Johnson-Shoyama graduate School of Public Policy, University of
Saskatchewan. Formerly worked with the United Nations Development Programme in the Gaza Strip.
Francis Owusu: Department of Community & Regional Planning, Iowa State University
Andr Pasquier - Political Adviser, International Committee of the Red Cross.
James Peron: President of the Moorfield Storey Institute, an independent think tank.
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Defend Your
Source
Thomas Pogge: A German philosopher and the Director of the Global Justice Program and Leitner Professor of
Philosophy and International Affairs at Yale University.
Steven Ratner: An international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he is on leave from
the State Department's Office of the Legal Adviser.
Stefano Recchia - PhD, Columbia University. Assistant professor in international relations at Cambridge
University.
Eric Reeves: Professor of English Language and Literature at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts.
RJ Rummel Political science professor at the University of Hawaii
Christina J. Schneider: Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of California San Diego.
Anup Shah - Has been practicing law for 22 years, currently practices with Anup S Shah law firm and Aamstal
Law Associate.
Hugo Slim - Centre for Development and Emergency Practice, Oxford Brookes University.
Melanie Teff - Senior advocate & European representative for Refugees International
James Tully: Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Law, Indigenous Governance and Philosophy at the
University of Victoria.
Michael R. Ward, University of Texas at Arlington, College of Business Administration, Department of
Economics.
Gary Woller Professor at BYU
S. Akbar Zaidi: A visiting scholar in the Carnegie Endowments South Asia Program. A visiting professor at
Columbia University, with a joint appointment in the School of International Public Affairs and MESAAS, the
Department of the Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African Studies.
Organizations
British Medical Journal - s a weekly open-access peer-reviewed medical journal. It is one of the world's oldest
general medical journals and has been described as among the most prestigious.
CS Monitor - An international news organization that delivers global coverage via its website, weekly
magazine, daily news briefing, email newsletters, Amazon Kindle subscription, and mobile site.
Global Humanitarian Assistance: TheGHAprogramworkstoprovideobjective,independent, rigorous data and
analysis around humanitarian financing and related aid flows and has developed detailed and robust
methodologies for calculating the true value of humanitarian assistance that underpins all of our work.
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Defend Your
Source
International Crisis Group - International anti-conflict, non-profit, non-governmental organization, active in
around fifty countries.
Page 20 of 118
Aff Evidence
Page 21 of 118
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Aff: General
General
The international consensus is that conditionality should not be applied to humanitarian
action. CFS
There was however, consensus that conditionality should not be applied to humanitarian action; that it is both
ethically and practically inappropriate. Ethically it runs counter to the very nature of humanitarianism.
Practically it is unlikely to have much impact on belligerents anyway, owing to the small role that aid plays in
their decision-making. However, there was also consensus that there are grey areas that need careful treatment.
For example there is a subtle difference between withdrawing because conditions are no longer right for
humanitarian action, and setting demands or conditions on the authorities for re-starting work. The latter can
result in, in effect, handing over the keys for restarting work to the belligerents. A second grey area is a result
of the blurring of humanitarian and political boundaries, where the example of demanding equal access on the
basis of gender for instance could be seen as political or humanitarian. There is also an unclear boundary
between humanitarian aid and rehabilitation and development, where political conditionality is more acceptable.
Whatever the form of conditionality, it was pointed out that those who impose it should be accountable for its
consequences.
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Impartial Aid Better
Aff:
Impartial Aid Better

Impartial aid would increase the cooperation of states receiving aid and benefit the global
community. CFS
All donors present re-affirmed that need, i.e. impartiality, should be the sole criteria for funding, but accepted
that there was in reality political pressure on resource allocation. It was argued that donors are not just
chequebooks and that they too should be bound by an active concern for principles and should not fund if they
consider work to be ineffective and unprincipled. But it was also emphasised that donors should respect the
independence of agencies as this is a key element of the humanitarian system in that it enables them to respond
to need alone, free from political pressure. It was also argued that the humanitarian idea was in fact quite fragile
and that its long-term survival requires that donor governments do not attempt to use it for short-term political
goals. It was suggested that one way of ensuring this was to reinforce legislation in donor countries requiring
humanitarian funding to be impartial. It was also suggested that donors review the experience of bodies such as
the Afghanistan Support Group (ASG) and the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB) which have developed
in an ad hoc way. It was also suggested that adherence to humanitarian criteria be included in the DAC process.
In addition, it was suggested that donors and foreign policy actors needed to understand humanitarian principles
better, and that humanitarian agencies had a role to play in pointing out the humanitarian consequences of
certain courses of action.
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Impact on Recipient Country
Aff: Negative
Negative Impact on Recipient Country

Aid should help countries achieve political independence, not serve host nations agenda.
PNG
Recchia,Stefano.(2009)JustandUnjustPostwarReconstruction:HowMuchExternal
InterferenceCanBeJustied?
At the political level, liberalism in its various guises has always been concerned with freeing individuals from
tyranny by providing them with consent-based political institutions. However, leading liberal internationalists
such as Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Giuseppe Mazzinni, and John Rawls have consistently emphasized
that each people ought to work out their own institutions and governance structures, in accordance with the
principle of popular self-determination. Rawls insists that self-determination is an important good for a people,
and the foreign policy of liberal peoples should recognize that good and not take the appearance of being
coercive. We therefore have intrinsic moral reasons to adopt a liberal framework when discussing the ethics of
postwar reconstruction: the foreign policy of all states, and of liberal states in particular, should help war-torn
societies to develop new, inclusive self-government structures without imposing any long-term political
solutions from the outside.
Paternalistic aid is not justified according to Locke and Kant. PNG

Enlightenment liberals such as John Locke and Immanuel Kant insisted on the natural equality of human beings
everywhere; thus, they condemned paternalistic political relationships aimed at civilizing foreign peoples
without appeal. For Locke, the main difference between parent-child relationships and political affairs was
precisely that paternalism is admissible in the former but not in the latter. Children are immature beings that
need to be educated and guided; adults, by contrast, are generally capable of expressing coherent political
preferences and thus should never have policies imposed upon them by despotic kings or foreign imperial
rulers. To be sure, Locke justified British colonialism in North America, but he did so based on his theory of
property acquisition through labor, which has little or nothing to do with paternalistic projects aimed at
civilizing putative barbarians. Writing in the late eighteenth century, Kant likewise condemned paternalism in
politics, domestic as well as international, as the greatest conceivable despotism. Kants principled opposition
to paternalism in foreign affairs goes hand in with his strong support of popular self-determination and his
rejection of colonial rule.
Page 24 of 118
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Impact on Recipient Country
Aff: Negative
Conditional aid actually harms recipient nation. PNG

Shah,Anup.(2012)ForeignAidforDevelopmentAssistance.
As a condition for aid money, many donors apply conditions that tie the recipient to purchase products only
from that donor. In a way this might seem fair and balanced, because the donor gets something out of the
relationship as well, but on the other hand, for the poorer country, it can mean precious resources are used
buying more expensive options, which could otherwise have been used in other situations. Furthermore, the
recipient then has less control and decision-making on how aid money is spent. In addition the very nations that
typically promote free-markets and less government involvement in trade, commerce, etc., ensure some notion
of welfare for some of their industries. IPS noted that aid tied with conditions cut the value of aid to recipient
countries by some 25-40 percent, because it obliges them to purchase uncompetitively priced imports from the
richer nations. IPS was citing a UN Economic Council for Africa study which also noted that just four countries
(Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) were breaking away from the idea of tied aid
with more than 90 percent of their aid untied.
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Impact on Aid
Aff: Negative
Negative Impacts On Aid and Aid Relations

Political conditions decrease quality of aid. PNG
Recent increases [in foreign aid] do not tell the whole truth about rich countries generosity, or the lack of it.
Measured as a proportion of gross national income (GNI), aid lags far behind the 0.7 percent target the United
Nations set 35 years ago. Moreover, development assistance is often of dubious quality. In many cases, Aid is
primarily designed to serve the strategic and economic interests of the donor countries; Or [aid is primarily
designed] to benefit powerful domestic interest groups; Aid systems based on the interests of donors instead of
the needs of recipients make development assistance inefficient; Too little aid reaches countries that most
desperately need it; and, All too often, aid is wasted on overpriced goods and services from donor countries.
Political conditions mean that nations who need it most do not receive aid. PNG
In 2012, the OECD noted an almost 3% decline in aid over 2010s aid the first decline in a while. Although
this decline was expected at some point because of the financial problems in most wealthy nations, those same
problems are rippling to the poorest nations, so a drop in aid (ignoring unhealthy reliance on it for the moment)
is significant for them. It would also not be surprising if aid declines or stays stagnant for a while, as things like
global financial problems not only take a while to ripple through, but of course take a while to overcome.
During recent years, some developing countries have been advancing (think China, India, Brazil, etc). So if
there was declining aid due to many no longer needing it then that would be understandable. However, as the
data shows, whether it has been recent years, or throughout the history of DAC aid, the poorest countries have
received only a quarter of all aid. Even during recent increases in aid, these allocations did not change.
Political conditions encourage aid relations with corrupt leaders and states. CFS
BuenodeMesquita,Bruce.Smith,Alastair.(2009)APoliticalEconomyofAid
The second question focuses attention on the corrupt uses to which aid money is often put. The theory suggests
that these corrupt uses by small-coalition, autocratic leaders, are an essential, if not necessarily conscious, part
of the decision by donors to give aid, as well as being in the more obvious interest of corrupt leaders in
Page 26 of 118
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Aff: Negative
Impact on Aid
receiving aid. Large-coalition donors depend on effective policy implementation for their political survival.
They find it easier to purchase policy concessions from small-coalition leaders who rely on cronyism and
corruption as those leaders can best afford to sacrifice their own society's public-goods-oriented policies to stay
in power.
The amount of need does not affect the amount of aid from political donors. CFS
Humanitarian need, as indicated by life expectancy, does not seem to motivate the decision to give aid by either
the United States or other OECD members. Neither does it substantially affect the amount of aid given. Donors
give aid to large, geographically proximate states, especially those with whom they maintain trade relations or
whose security alignments may be up for grabs. The neediest do not receive the most; rather, those whose policy
compliance can be purchased at an affordable price apparently are offered aid and agree to take it.
Phantom Aid is not justified. PNG

This year we estimate that $37 billionroughly half of global aidis phantom aid, that is, it is not
genuinely available to poor countries to fight poverty. Nowhere is the challenge of increasing real aid as a
share of overall aid greater than in the case of technical assistance. At least one quarter of donor budgetssome
$19 billion in 2004is spent in this way: on consultants, research and training. This is despite a growing body
of evidencemuch of it produced by donors themselves and dating back to the 1960sthat technical assistance
is often overpriced and ineffective, and in the worst cases destroys rather than builds the capacity of the poorest
countries. Although this ineffectiveness is an open secret within the development community, donors
continue to insist on large technical assistance components in most projects and programmes they fund. They
continue to use technical assistance as a soft lever to police and direct the policy agendas of developing
country governments, or to create ownership of the kinds of reforms donors deem suitable. Donor funded
advisers have even been brought in to draft supposedly country owned poverty reduction strategies.
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Conditions Ineffective
Aff:
Political conditions are ineffective when placed by NGOs. PNG
Chong,Daniel(2002)UNTACinCambodia:ANewModelforHumanitarianAidin
FailedStates?
A distinction should be made between the conditions put on aid from large donor institutions, such as the World
Bank and IMF, and the prospect of NGOs attaching conditions to their aid. International financial institutions
invariably attach strings to their loans, ranging from timely repayment, to market reforms, to democratization.
These actors are relatively well co-ordinated compared to NGOs, and can exercise a large amount of leverage
over recipient governments. To the extent that these large donors can be persuaded to attach peace conditions to
their assistance rather than (or at least in addition to) structural adjustment conditions, it should improve the
impact of aid on conflict. Unfortunately, even these donors face self-imposed ideological, political, and practical
constraints that prevent them from exercising effective conditionality (see Boyce, this volume). On the other
hand, NGOs generally have less leverage, are insufficiently co-ordinated, and take more responsibility for
protecting the most vulnerable populations in a conflict. Therefore, attaching conditions to their aid is
more problematic. Various approaches have been employed (for details, see Boyce, this volume). In all
cases, conditionality would have the dual goals of attempting to pressure warring factions to end the
conflict, and allowing food and medical supplies to reach vulnerable populations without obstruction
(Barber, 1997; Lund, 1997; Prendergast, 1996). Of course, the problem with this approach is that
threatening to use the stick (the withdrawal of aid) often means risking the lives of thousands of nonstop combatants caught in the middle of the war zone. For many humanitarian organizations mandated
to save as many lives as possible, this option is simply not acceptable; it is trading short-term disaster for
long-term potential (Boyce, this volume). Moreover, when an aid organization uses threats or strict
conditions in its negotiations with warring parties, it may cause the belligerents to distrust the
impartiality of the organizations motives, and may sour relations between the organization and the
parties (Anderson, 1999). Even if aid organizations try to make humanitarian aid conditional on a peace
agreement or a Code of Conduct, they may still have difficulties with proper implementation. One party
to a conflict may actually want aid to be pulled out, eliminating the leverage that aid organizations think
they have (Lund, 1997). Or some of the warring parties may be unable to comply with the conditions set
by aid organizations (for example, when basic state institutions are not functioning), rendering
conditionality problematic.
Studies show that political conditions do not increase effectiveness. PNG
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Aff:
Crawford,Gordon(1997)ForeignAidandPoliticalConditionality:Issuesof
EffectivenessandConsistency
The main finding, however, from this evaluation of the impact of donor restrictive measures is their failure to
contribute to political change in 18 out of 29 country cases (62 per cent). How is this lack of effectiveness to be
accounted for? Reasons can be explored along two dimensions. One proposition is the relatively partial and
weak nature of the measures imposed by the donors. The other is the relative strength of the recipient country
government to resist the privations involved. Of course, many country cases will be explained by a combination
of the two dimensions.
A study of US bilateral aid data shows conditional aid does not focus on advancing societal
well-being. CFS
We develop and test implications of a new model derived from Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues' selectorate
theory of political competition.9 Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues speculated about the equilibrium conditions
associated with foreign aid but offered no formal model of the process and only limited tests of their
conjectures. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith modeled the political incentives for donor leaders to offer aid and
for recipient leaders to accept it, but they did not include the prospect of bargaining over the size of
concessions.10 They tested their model's predictions using U.S. bilateral aid data. The model here generalizes
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith's earlier model by allowing nations to bargain over the size of policy
concessions. This new, more general model leads to new implications that are tested here using bilateral aid
flows from all OECD donors. As we shall summarize below, the literature suggests that the United States is
motivated to give aid for different reasons than other states. Looking across the OECD, our analysis finds no
such difference. We find that in all nations, aid transfers occur according to the political survival interests
of donor and recipient government leaders, as identified by the theory. Recipient and donor leaders seek
substantive policies and resource allocations that protect their hold on power. To the extent that such
policies and allocations are compatible with good economic or social performance, they will make socialwelfare enhancing, "good" decisions. Yet, such instances are coincidental. If faced with a contradiction
between actions that enhance their own political welfare and actions that advance societal well-being,
donor and recipient leaders will select those policies that benefit themselves.
The amount of aid given when there are political conditions is based on political survival and
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Aff:
not what would be successful. CFS

The results indicate that the amount of aid given and to whom it is given are both consistent with the decisions
expected from political leaders who are motivated to enhance their political survival. As such, at least part of aid
giving appears to be driven by institutionally induced considerations in recipient and donor nations. Thus, the
answer to the first question posed above is that the right amount of aid is given for the purposes that motivate
donors and recipients, even if this is suboptimal from the perspective of alleviating poverty.
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Empirical Examples
Aff:
Empirical Examples
Politicized Humanitarian Aid Bad Syria Proves TF
Curtis,Devon(2001).PoliticsandHumanitarianAid:Debates,DilemmasandDissension.
HumanitarianPolicyGroup.
Skuric-Prodanovic shows that the political conditionality of Western aid policy in the Balkans led to
distinctions between vulnerable groups that did not correspond to their level of need, and that created
patterns of inclusion and exclusion. Some donor governments saw humanitarian assistance to Serbia as
being opposed to their foreign- policy interests. They feared that aid would be re-channelled into the hands of
the government. Skuric-Prodanovic argues that, for many Western donors, especially NATO members,
humanitarian aid was seen as supporting the longevity of the Milosevic regime, and as counter-productive to
their decision to intervene in Kosovo. Western governments had difficulty separating the notion of humanitarian
assistance from the political situation, when the majority of the population in Serbia seemed to be supporting
the Milosevic government. Even when humanitarian aid was delivered to Serbia, there were examples of
inclusion and exclusion. For instance, there was a differentiation between people who had been displaced from
Kosovo in 1999 and 2000, and people who had been displaced between 1992 and 1996, even though many lived
in very similar conditions, often in the same refugee camps. Likewise, Skuric-Prodanovic shows that, by the
second half of 2000, some urban areas in central Serbia received large amounts of humanitarian assistance,
while other more remote areas that were mainly controlled by the regime suffered a severe lack of aid. A
distinction was also made between displaced and non-displaced people, contributing to the alienation of
internally displaced persons and refugees in local communities in Serbia, and causing tensions to rise. This has
led Serbs to see humanitarian aid agencies as tools of Western governments, rather than as neutral or impartial
actors. Skuric-Prodanovic believes that the politicisation of humanitarian assistance and the exclusion resulting
from it has had a negative effect on the lives of vulnerable groups in Serbia, and has devalued the currency of
humanitarianism in the eyes of Serbs.
Evidence in this section can be used for the AFF.
Politicized Humanitarian Aid Bad Kosovo Proves TF

According to Woodward, NATOs humanitarian intervention on behalf of the Albanian population of
Kosovo in MarchJune 1999 represents the final collapse of the divide between humanitarianism and
politics, with the general consensus that Operation Allied Force was regrettable, but that there was no
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Empirical Examples
alternative. Woodward questions this acceptance of the use of force in the Kosovo operation, and exposes
some of the links between politics and humanitarianism. She says that the stated goal of NATO officials
was diplomatic and political to force Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet accords of February 1999.
Furthermore, once NATO had threatened bombing in June 1998, it faced a loss of credibility if it did not take
action. Nonetheless, the situation in Kosovo was deliberately and successfully redefined as a potential
humanitarian catastrophe. Woodward claims that the specific approach to conflict resolution undertaken in
Kosovo was not a response to Kosovo, but to the perceived failure to act in Bosnia and Rwanda. Lobbyists
advocating bombing included human rights organisations and some humanitarians, who did so in the interests of
international humanitarian and human rights regimes. Woodward argues that the conflict in Kosovo was only
derivatively about human rights, and primarily about the rivalry between Albanians and Serbs over statehood
and the right to rule the territory. Second, events in Kosovo show that parties to the conflict learned to
emphasise terms such as victims of aggression, oppressed human rights and even genocide in order to
attract international support for their cause. Third, Woodward states that the decision to call the operation in
Kosovo a humanitarian intervention was made at the insistence of Britain, which argued for a legal basis for it.
By contrast, the US believed that Milosevics failure to comply with earlier demands was sufficient grounds to
intervene. Humanitarian intervention as seen in Kosovo has a number of operational consequences for
humanitarians. When an agency becomes a lobbyist for forceful action in support of humanitarian goals, it
becomes more difficult to deal with what Woodward calls the downside risks. For instance, she argues,
UNHCR and other agencies could not prepare for the possibility that the NATO operation might result in a
humanitarian emergency, for fear of sending signals to Yugoslav civilian and military officials that could have
undermined the strategy of coercive diplomacy. UNHCR officials announced prior to the bombing campaign
that the potential refugee exodus would total between 80,000 and 100,000 people, even though the real figures
approached 800,000. Knowing Macedonias objections to refugee camps on its border, UNHCR wanted to
avoid sending signals that would enable Skopje to present obstacles to the NATO operation. Woodward suggests
that humanitarians should accept that the line between the humanitarian and the political was crossed in
Kosovo, and should no longer stand behind an apolitical mandate. Rather, she believes that humanitarians are
best placed to develop the debate about the options and alternatives for addressing actual or impending
humanitarian catastrophes.
Politicization of Aid Bad Afghanistan proves TF

According to Mohammed Haneef Atmar, current humanitarian aid policies and practices in Afghanistan
are determined by Western foreign- policy goals, rather than by the actual conditions required for
principled humanitarian action. Humanitarian aid in Afghanistan acts as a fig leaf for political inaction, and
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Empirical Examples
as a foreign-policy instrument to isolate the Taliban. The humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality,
neutrality and independence are secondary to foreign-policy interests, and are abandoned when they conflict
with them. While Afghanistan received the highest per capita aid in its history during the Cold War,
humanitarian budgets were cut dramatically after the Russian withdrawal in 198889, despite continued human
suffering. While donors may have legitimate foreign-policy concerns regarding the Taliban, argues Atmar,
subordinating humanitarian principles to other political objectives has resulted in the loss of Afghan lives. For
instance, Atmar states that, if humanitarian aid agencies were able to receive unconditional humanitarian
resources and allowed to work with the public health authorities, they may be able to save the lives of children;
one out of four children die before five years of age, and 85,000 die each year from diarrhea. In response to the
discriminatory policies and practices of the Taliban, donors and some aid agencies have imposed punitive
conditionalities, including on security, gender equality and development/capacity-building. The net
impact has been the restriction of the right to humanitarian assistance, and the inability of the
international assistance community to adequately address short- term life-saving needs. According to
Atmar, the irony is that donors continue to use punitive conditionalities, even though they have not
produced the desired political and social changes, and have had negative humanitarian consequences.
Empirical example with Afghanistan.
Politicized Humanitarian Aid Bad Afghanistan Proves TF

Atmar,Mohammed(2001).PoliticisationofHumanitarianAidanditsConsequencesfor
Afghans.Politics&HumanitarianAid;Debates,Dilemmas&Dissension
Conference.
Currently, domestic and foreign policy concerns over terrorism, drugs, outflow of refugees and protection of
womens rights (at rhetorical level) trigger a response from the west which is characterized by a paradoxical
mixture of strategic withdrawal, containment and single-issue aggression. In political terms, instead of
employing a comprehensive policy of resolving the multi-layered conflict of Afghanistan, which is part of
a regional conflict system threatening peace and stability in the region, the powerful states delegate peace
making responsibility to UN. It is however transparently obvious that nothing of value is likely to come
out from the UN efforts (Maley 1998) without a reasonable level of western commitment and support,
both political and economic. Yet, the same powers undermine the peace making efforts of the UN by
imposing sanctions with a one-sided arms embargo. This will not only prolong the war and its disastrous
consequences for Afghans who already reel under the continued effects of the crisis over the past two decades,
but will also undermine UNs role as an impartial peace maker.
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Empirical Examples
Aff:
During Rwandan Genocide, conditional aid exacerbated human rights abuses. PNG
Boyce,James(2002)AidConditionalityasaToolforPeacebuilding:Opportunitiesand
Constraints
Many donors are reluctant to acknowledge the political impacts of their aid. This is especially true of the
international financial institutions (IFIs), where divergent views among member governments often make
political issues particularly controversial. The Articles of Agreement of the World Bank, for example, specify
that the Bank shall make loans `with due attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and without
regard to political or other non-economic influences or considerations. Yet, aid inevitably has political impacts.
Aid does not flow to countries' in the abstract, but rather to specific groups and individuals within a country. In
so doing, it affects balances of power. Consider, for example, the impact of aid to Rwanda in the years
preceding the 1994 genocide. From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, the annual flow of aid to the Rwandan
government rose by 50 per cent, notwithstanding the regimes complicity in inciting violence by Hutu
extremists against the Tutsi minority. `In so doing', Peter Uvin (1998: 237) observes, `the aid system sent a
message . . . and it essentially said that, on the level of practice and not discourse, the aid system did not care
unduly about political and social trends in the country, not even if they involved government-sponsored racist
attacks against Tutsi.
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Aff:
Politicized of Aid Violates the Four Tenants of Humanitarianism TF

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has an ethical framework known as its
fundamental principles, or principles of humanitarian action. These principles universality,
impartiality, independence and neutrality define and delimit the humanitarian space within which the
ICRC operates. These Red Cross principles have had a profound impact on wider humanitarianism.
Within humanitarian agencies, there has been agreement on the humanitarian imperative the idea
that human suffering necessitates a response.There is also wide agreement on the principles of impartiality
and universality. The principles of neutrality and independence have also been borrowed by other humanitarian
agencies, although more equivocally, and by fewer organisations. According to Pasquier, the new form of
politicisation of humanitarian aid may challenge all four of these principles. Universality and impartiality imply
that humanitarian action should reach all conflict victims, no matter where they are, or which side they support.
Impartiality means that humanitarian response should be guided by need alone, and that there should be no
distinction between good and bad beneficiaries. Yet by subordinating humanitarian objectives to political
and strategic ones, some victims may be seen as more deserving than others, and impartiality is foregone.
For instance, Skuric-Prodanovic shows that the level of humanitarian response in Serbia in the second half of
1999 was much lower than in Albania and Macedonia. In Montenegro, humanitarian aid was also more than
abundant. These differences did not correspond to different levels of need. Skuric-Prodanovic argues that few
donors were willing to fund humanitarian assistance in Serbia, and few international NGOs were willing to face
the difficulties of working there, and therefore chose the more prominent and politically correct Kosovo,
Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro.
Moral argument for the AFF. Politicized humanitarian aid is not humanitarian.
Myanmar only desires aid that is nonpolitical. PNG

InternationalCrisisGroup,(2002)MyanmarThePoliticsofHumanitarianAid.
In the early 1990s, the government-in-exile, the National Coalition Government of Burma (NCGUB), called for
a total aid boycott. It was adamant that no international aid organisations, including UN agencies, should be in
Myanmar. Their presence, it argued, merely served to legitimise an illegitimate regime, was manipulated by the
government for political purposes, and thus was unable to help intended beneficiaries. They should focus
instead on helping Myanmar refugees in neighbouring countries and developing cross- border programs in areas
11
outside government control. This position was embraced by exile groups and pro-democracy activists around
the world, who have accused and in some cases still accuse aid organisations working in Myanmar of not
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Empirical Examples
understanding the real situation in the country. Some have even argued, somewhat contradictorily, that aid
would undermine the peoples thirst for freedom and thus postpone the revolution that would usher in a new
era of democracy. The NLD in Myanmar has sought to outline a more nuanced position, which rejects 'aid to the
government' but supports 'aid to the people'. Soon after her release from house arrest in July 1995, the partys
leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, put forward two main principles for foreign aid: (1) International aid agencies have
an obligation to work in close cooperation or consultation with the elected NLD leadership. (2) Aid should be
delivered to 'the right people in the right way. In later interviews, the influential Nobel laureate has expanded
on this theme, arguing that the NLD is not against aid as long as it is not channelled through government
structures, is properly monitored, and distributed equally to all those in need, irrespective of their political
views.
Conditionality was counterproductive in Haiti. PNG

Buss,Terry(2006)WhyForeignAidtoHaitiFailed
Conditionality in the Haitian case may have been counterproductive, confrontational, or misguidedtiming,
political feasibility, cultural barriersthereby increasing aid ineffectiveness (CIDA, 2004).The World Bank
concluded:the Bank has been unable to leverageconditionality, delayed program/project funding, overall
levels of fundingin support of the implementation of important reforms, particularly in governance and public
sector management and in sound economic policies; political pressures of other stakeholders and the fragility of
the whole situation were simply too great to allow the Bank to operate as it would have in a more normal
setting (2004, p. 6-7). Canadians opined that: Haiti exemplifies some of the negative consequences of
conditionality for both recipient and donor. 1994 to 1997 was marked by donor-driven reform agendas and
conditionality-based financing in Haiti. Results from this period are unsurprising. Donor-driven agendas
contributed to poor commitment and ineffective implementation on the part of the government of Haiti and to
frustration and Haiti fatigue for the donor community. This in turn contributed to the withdrawal of some donor
agencies. Following the 2000 disputed elections, strict conditionality was imposed to promote transparency of
governance, solid macroeconomic policies, and fiscal responsibility. Once again, it is highly questionable how
constructive this set of conditionality was given that the system did not reform (CIDA, 2004, p. 11).
Politics are responsible for the failed humanitarian aid during the Darfur crisis. Without
political conditions it could have been successful. CFS
Bridges,KM(2010).BetweenAidandpolitics:DiagnosingtheChallengeof
HumanitarianAdvocacyinPoliticallyComplexEnvironmentstheCaseofDarfur,
Sudan
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And so, without an anchoring identity, humanitarianism is floundering. There is considerable confusion over
where the line between aid and politics now lies. Arguably this has been a significant contributing factor
towards what is perceived by many as the tragically insufficient and even systematic failure of humanitarian
interventions in the Darfur crisis. At the same time the extent to which effective advocacy is less about abstract
rules than it is about subjective judgments based on specific contexts suggests that there is little possibility or
even desirability of a one size fits all solution. The remedy must be sought somewhere between the extremes
of being carbon copy agencies and being a community that has no sense of its distinctive role or future function.
Of the first extreme there seems little danger, but the latter option is worryingly emblematic of
humanitarianism's current condition.
Studies show that conditional aid is highly unsuccessful, particularly in Africa. CFS
Kanbur,Ravi.(2000)ForeignAidandDevelopment:LessonsLearntandDirectionsfor
theFuture
In fact, the Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank pointed to precisely this problem, only more
generalized (World Bank, 1992). They concluded that although compliance rates on conditions were below
50%, tranche release rates were close to 100%. Mosley et. al. (1995) make precisely the same point in a more
academic analysis. These studies, and Oxfams own cautions above, suggest that the problem is not simply what
the conditions are (although there is debate enough to be had on that score!)--it is that conditionality of
whatever type has failed in Africa (for an overview of this failure, see Collier, 1997)
Conditional aid is the reason that Africa has a weak domestic economy and poor policies.
CFS
Kanbur,Ravi.(2000)ForeignAidandDevelopment:LessonsLearntandDirectionsfor
theFuture
In my view, the real cost to Africa of the current aid system is thus the fact that it wastes much national energy
and political capital in interacting with donor agencies, and diverts attention from domestic debate and
consensus building. As I have argued, donor conditionality is not, in the end, fully satisfied. And, in the end, the
aid flows anyway. But the process leading up to this outcome is debilitating in the extreme. It is not so much
that it undermines, ultimately, the logic of domestic political economy. It just represents a long and tedious
distraction, and leaves the impression that the government dances to the tune of the donors, which in turn affects
the domestic political economy--sensible policy measures are often opposed simply on the grounds that they
were allegedly recommended by the donors, for example.
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Aff:
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Aff:
Israel-Palestine/Gaza Strip
Conditional aid sent to Palestine focused on politics and was unsuccessful because it ignored
the real economic problems. CFS
Strip
In analyzing the role of donor assistance in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it is essential to examine two
important issues. The first issue is aids political agenda, and the second is the context of assistances planning
and delivery. In the Palestinian context, Khalil Nakleh has argued that, since the beginning of the peace process,
the aid agenda has been highly political and associated with donor objectives and preferences. Thus, the
political objectives of each donor were always reflected in the timing and nature of aid. Conditional aid to the
PA was also intimately tied to progress in the peace process and, in many cases, it was to achieve specific
political goals instead of aimed primarily at solving concrete social and economic problems.11
Conditional aid has greatly contributed to the structural issues of the Palestinian Authority.
CFS
Strip
Moreover, the continuous setbacks in the peace process and their negative security and economic consequences
have, on many occasions, contributed to shifting the focus of the aid agenda. Under the Oslo accords,12 Israel
kept its control over land, water, labor, and capital, as well as borders. According to Sara Roy, closure policies
have created severe restrictions on movement between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and have turned the
latter into a balkanized area where regions are separated from one another by security checkpoints.13 By 2007,
following years of massive donor financing, Roy indicates, such policies contributed materially to systemic,
probably irreversible structural misshapes in the Palestinian Authority. It has more than doubled financial
assistance to the Palestinians since 2000, yet is locked into policies that are bringing about the very
humanitarian crisis it seeks to alleviate, while generating long-term dependence on external funding.14 Overall,
as this quotation suggests, international aid to Palestine is controversial in its politics and problematic in its
effects.
Political aid creates a system of dependency and long-term government instability. CFS
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Aff:
Strip
Maha Rezeq, a Palestinian professional with extensive work experience with Save the Children and the United
Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF) in Gaza, argues that channeling funds through international aid agencies
and civil-society institutions has helped perpetuate the humanitarian crisis by supporting an aid industry in
which civil-society institutions take over the responsibilities of the nearly dysfunctional government, rather than
helping the government meet the needs of its people in times of crisis. Essentially, this scenario limits the
governments autonomy, leading to long-term instability. In doing so, it also ignores larger community needs.20
Short-term interventions would work best with aid to the Gaza Strip. CFS
Strip
Overall, the donor community preferred to fund short-term humanitarian interventions that lack sustainability
and reinforce the Gaza Strips economic dependency. This policy was aimed at preventing a humanitarian crisis
in the Gaza Strip while, simultaneously, preventing the Hamas government from achieving any tangible
progress on the social and economic fronts.
Aid interventions with political conditions are generally long term. The Gaza Strip would be better off
with short-term, emergency aid.
The international aid to the Gaza Strip is very political and has been accused of supporting
the Israeli occupation. CFS
Strip
Since the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip and the Israeli blockade over Gaza which followed, aid policies in
the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip have been heavily influenced by politics. The decision by the international
community and the Quartet to boycott the Hamas government acted as the mainframe for aid interventions in
the Gaza Strip. In the aftermath of the Israeli attack on Gaza in 20089, the members of the Quartet, who
represent the main international political players in the peace process and the donor community at large, have
been accused of steadily supporting the Israeli occupation and turning a blind eye to what John Holmes, the UN
undersecretary-general for humanitarian affairs, referred to as the collective punishment of Gazas civilian
population.43
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Aff:
Conditional aid has actually sustained the Israel-Palestine conflict. CFS

Strip
Overall, donor policies in the Hamas-run Gaza Strip have been shaped by the political stand of the international
community and bodies such as the Quartet toward Hamas. These policies have not been neutral and have not
played a constructive role in resolving the Palestine-Israel conflict and enabling Palestinians to achieve their
political, social, and economic aspirations. Instead, these policies have played a role in sustaining the IsraelPalestine conflict and the Israeli occupation while fueling the Palestinian internal split by taking sides.
3 additional warrants to why Gaza Strip aid has causes more conflict. CFS
Strip
In the Hamas-run Gaza Strip, the conduct of aid policies under the Israeli blockade has exacerbated the
political, social, and economic problems and challenges facing Palestinians. First, aid assistance has been used
to undermine Hamass role in the Strip by supporting and sustaining the Palestinian presidents decision to
prevent PA public servants from reporting to duty. Such decisions have had very negative consequences,
including the deterioration of public services and the expansion of Hamass ideological influence through its
control of such key public sectors as education. Second, donor policies have politicized the presumably neutral
role of international aid agencies in the Gaza Strip through imposing many restrictions on their operations,
including the no-contact policy. By encouraging Hamas to target them, this policy has also created difficult
working conditions for many local organizations partnering with international actors. Third, to a large extent,
donor policies have failed to respond to the recovery and development needs of the Gaza residents in the
aftermath of the 2008 Israeli war and in the new context created by the tunnel economy.
Gaza Strip aid has caused the Gazans to become very dependent on the humanitarian
assistance. CFS
Strip
Finally, donor policies have failed to challenge the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip. The Israeli blockade is
sustained because of the international communitys decision to deliver, through its donor groups, assistance aid
in a highly constrained environment. This debilitating economic environment has made Gazans increasingly
dependent on humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, Hamas has managed to survive the economic sanctions and
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Empirical Examples
to entrench its control of the Gaza Strip. Finally, Gaza Strip residents continue to suffer under the Israeli
blockade while relying on aid assistance for survival. Meanwhile, international political and donor organizations
continue their own policies of denial while implicitly continuing to pay the humanitarian costs of the Israeli
occupation.
Conditions on aid to Palestine oppress Palestinians. BG.

RossMountain.(2011)HumanitarianaidforPalestiniansshouldn'tbenecessary.
Meanwhile, things are made worse by restrictions applied by Israel, for Palestinians and the
humanitarian agencies operating there. Palestine is one of the most complex aid environments for
humanitarian agencies, which need to overcome the obstacles and limitations imposed by the Israeli
authorities. These include the restrictions on the movement of goods and people between zones and the
bureaucratic procedures they entail, as well as the no-contact policy with Hamas stipulated by key donors. As a
result, Palestine is a challenging and expensive environment to operate in. As one interviewee said, the
no-contact policy "undermines the whole humanitarian response: creating parallel networks, wasting
money, in addition to not using available services and resources". Another example of the multiple
restrictions are the procedures demanded by the Israelis for the delivery of food supplies to Gaza, which cost the
World Food Programme and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA) $4m per year. In this context, humanitarian actors say donors are simply not doing enough. Many of
the humanitarian organizations we met complained of donor passiveness in advocating for access and of
their acceptance of additional operational costs when at the same time they agreed that the Israeli
blockade and occupation were the main obstacles to restoring a minimal level of livelihood and human
dignity to the Palestinians. If the situation seems bad for aid agencies, consider the plight of the
Palestinians, who have to endure the Israeli barrier and numerous closures; the arbitrary opening and
closing of checkpoints, as well as the random acceptance of the differentiated passes and permits;
settlement expansion; forced evictions; and demolitions across the occupied territories. The humanitarian
crisis this causes, along with the constant fear of violence, has led to failing hopes and desperation. At a time
when many donor governments are looking to maximise the results and value of their funding, the situation in
Palestine shows just how far the response is from achieving efficiency, much less impact. The commitment of
one donor to keep constructing what the Israeli authorities keep demolishing on account of a lack of valid
building permits illustrates this game of doing, undoing and redoing. The huge amount of money spent on
humanitarian assistance would be unnecessary if the international community pressured Israeli authorities to lift
the blockade, respect international humanitarian law, and allow full access to humanitarian aid and recovery. As
the political maneuvering proceeds, there are ways to ameliorate the suffering of Palestinians. Donors can start
by not placing political conditions on their assistance and challenging every party, both Israeli and Palestinian,
that delays, controls or misuses aid. They should also avoid short-term funding cycles and grant humanitarian
organizations the flexibility they need to implement long-term programmes to meet long-standing needs. But
even if NGOs, the UN and donor agencies provided an exemplary response and they should deploy all efforts
to this end the solution to the humanitarian crisis in the occupied territories remains political. The most
efficient humanitarian response will always fall short if it continues to depend on the interests of Israel
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Empirical Examples
and the convenience of donor capitals. The international community, particularly the main humanitarian
donor governments, must understand that their approach of providing large sums of money without calling for
the end of the blockade and occupation is not the best way to help the Palestinians in reality, it allows the
protraction of the humanitarian crisis. The current period is critical. Donors need to back the agencies they fund
with a real commitment to building a Palestinian state, something they all agree to. The absence of a solution
will lead to more violence, a deeper humanitarian crisis and further instability, none of which will benefit the
Palestinians or the Israelis.
Page 43 of 118
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Aff: Kant
Kant
Political conditions treat other humans as simply means to an end. PNG
Johnson,Robert(2008)KantsMoralPhilosophy
Most philosophers who find Kant's views attractive find them so because of the Humanity formulation of the
CI. This formulation states that we should never act in such a way that we treat Humanity, whether in
ourselves or in others, as a means only but always as an end in itself. This is often seen as introducing the
idea of respect for persons, for whatever it is that is essential to our Humanity. Kant was clearly right
that this and the other formulations bring the CI closer to intuition than the Universal Law formula.
Intuitively, there seems something wrong with treating human beings as mere instruments with no value
beyond this. But this very intuitiveness can also invite misunderstandings. First, the Humanity formula does
not rule out using people as means to our ends. Clearly this would be an absurd demand, since we do this all the
time. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any life that is recognizably human without the use of others in pursuit of our
goals. The food we eat, the clothes we wear, the chairs we sit on and the computers we type at are gotten only
by way of talents and abilities that have been developed through the exercise of the wills of many people. What
the Humanity formula rules out is engaging in this pervasive use of Humanity in such a way that we treat it as a
mere means to our ends. Thus, the difference between a horse and a taxi driver is not that we may use one but
not the other as a means of transportation. Unlike a horse, the taxi driver's Humanity must at the same time be
treated as an end in itself. Second, it is not human beings per se but the Humanity in human beings that
we must treat as an end in itself. Our Humanity is that collection of features that make us distinctively
human, and these include capacities to engage in self-directed rational behavior and to adopt and pursue
our own ends, and any other capacities necessarily connected with these. Thus, supposing that the taxi
driver has freely exercised his rational capacities in pursuing his line of work, we make permissible use of these
capacities as a means when we behave in a way that he could, when exercising his rational capacities, consent
to for instance, by paying an agreed on price.
Kants Humanitarianism TF
Slim,Hugo.NotPhilanthropybutRights.CentreforDevelopmentandEmergency
Practice.
In his famous Essay on Perpetual Peace in 1795, the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant, reflected on
why a state should show hospitality to refugees and strangers. In doing so, he seemed to voice a certain
impatience with a particular kind of humanitarian thinking: "Our concern is not with philanthropy but right,
and in this context the right of an alien not to be treated as an enemy upon arrival in another's
Page 44 of 118
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Aff: Kant
country...the right to visit, to associate, belongs to all by virtue of their common ownership of the earth's
surface. (Kant, 1795, p118). Kants humanitarian philosophy is one of equality, rights and duties. Philanthropy
as a rather generalised moral project is not sufficient unless it rooted in a considered political philosophy and
connected to some wider political framework of rights and duties. Writing more than fifty years after Kant in
1848, two young German radicals, Karl Marx and Frederich Engels made a stinging critique of what they saw
as the reactionary, palliative and self-serving nature of a certain type of charitable endeavor.
Base card for Kant argument.
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Deontology
Aff:
Cruz
Humanitarian Aid fails Deontology Not for the Right Purposes TF
Atmar,Mohammed(2001).PoliticisationofHumanitarianAidanditsConsequencesfor
Afghans.Politics&HumanitarianAid;Debates,Dilemmas&Dissension
Conference.
Over years of crisis in Afghanistan, the principle of impartiality of humanitarianism has systematically
fallen victim to political considerations of donor states. In other words, political expedience of the donor
states has determined the purpose, extent and type of humanitarian response rather than human needs
alone. During the Cold War period, Afghanistan received the highest per capita aid in its history in a most
unprincipled manner. The United States alone provided military and humanitarian aid worth over US$600
million per annum after 1986 (Girardet, et al 1998:118). According to independent studies, donors were
prepared to accept up to 40% wastage (Goodhand, et al, 1999); and some others argue that only 20-30% of the
humanitarian aid reached its intended beneficiaries and the rest went astray mostly feeding war efforts
(Girardet, et al, 1998:119). While human needs were equally dire in the communist-held and resistance
controlled areas of the country, the West was prepared to provide aid only to the latter. Humanitarian aid was
thus mandated to play a complementary role as part of the wider Cold War politics to make the Russians bleed
(US official cited in Girardet, et al, 1998:120). With the withdrawal of the Red Army and despite the continued
human suffering, the rapid fall in humanitarian budgets made it obvious that it was not the plight of the Afghans
that mattered.
Moral argument for the AFF.
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Dominance
Aff: Western
Western Dominance
Political Humanitarian Aid funds Western Policy Agendas TF
Fox,Fiona(2001).NewHumanitarianism:DoesItProvideaMoralBannerforthe21st
Century?OverseasDevelopmentInstitute24(4).
In a world in which many of the old institutions, including nation-states, have lost their legitimacy, Western
NGOs and governments find themselves defining a new universal set of moral values. Developmental relief
and the new human rights humanitarianism are all based on Western moral values which are necessarily
posited in opposition to the barbarism of conflicts in the Third World. Several commentators have
pointed out that this may have as much to do with the Wests search for legitimacy in the post-cold war
world as it has with resolving Third World conflicts. Certainly the language of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton
during the Kosovo crisis reflected their belief that this was about more than helping one group of refugees.
Michael Ignatieff points to this: Moreover when policy was driven by moral motives it was often driven by
narcissism. We intervened not only to save others, but to save ourselves, or rather an image of ourselves as
defenders of universal decencies (1998). A move from saving lives towards promoting particular political
solutions carries the risk of NGOs providing a humanitarian mask for a new era of foreign interference. The US
governments resistance to signing the new International Criminal Court is a just one reminder that the new
universal human rights culture is understood by many as something created in the West for use against the lesscivilised nations of the world. Some aid workers are conscious that urging the West to intervene in the Third
World to guarantee human rights and allow access to relief, may put a humanitarian gloss on the foreign
adventures of the worlds most powerful countries. Save the Childrens Peter Hawkins believes that some
politicians quite openly saw the conflict in eastern Zaire as a way in to a part of Africa formerly the preserve
of France. And it is worth noting that Western officials now run Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor. (Ironically,
MSFs Bernard Kouchner, one of the founders of new humanitarianism is the same Bernard Kouchner who until
recently ran Kosovo on behalf of the international community.)
Western Agenda argument for the AFF.
United States aid has an unjustified military agenda. PNG

IPS noted that recent US aid has taken on militaristic angles as well, following similar patterns to aid during the
cold war. The war on terrorism is also having an effect as to what aid goes where and how much is spent. For
example:
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Aff: Western
Dominance
-Credits for foreign militaries to buy US weapons and equipment would increase by some 700 million dollars
to nearly five billion dollars, the highest total in well over a decade. (This is also an example of aid benefiting
the donor!)
-The total foreign aid proposal amounts to a mere five percent of what Bush is requesting for the Pentagon
next year.
-Bushs foreign-aid plan [for 2005] actually marks an increase over 2004 levels, although much of the
additional money is explained by greater spending on security for US embassies and personnel overseas.
-As in previous years, Israel and Egypt are the biggest bilateral recipients under the request, accounting for
nearly five billion dollars in aid between them. Of the nearly three billion dollars earmarked for Israel, most is
for military credits.
This militaristic aid will come largely at the expense of humanitarian and development assistance.
The use of humanitarian aid with political conditions is seen as imperialist and threatens the
safety of aid workers. CFS
Bridges,KM(2010).BetweenAidandpolitics:DiagnosingtheChallengeof
HumanitarianAdvocacyinPoliticallyComplexEnvironmentstheCaseofDarfur,
Sudan
Where increased political engagement is a direct contributor to rising insecurity among aid workers, its
undertaking needs to be seriously considered. Post-9/11 this is more pertinent than ever as agencies are
increasingly perceived to be instruments of Western state diplomacy.24 If agencies ultimately choose to
abandon neutrality, then they cannot expect immunity of humanitarian space.25 If they are unsure of their
own neutrality then it is hardly likely that those party to the conflict will be any clearer.
Table Showing Overreliance on Aid in Parts of Africa. ABB

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Dominance
Aff: Western
It follows that countries tying their aid to political conditions will have a great deal of dominance over
governments of the poorer countries that they are donating to because they are so heavily reliant on outside
money to fund government spending.
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Colonialism
Aff: Neo-
Neo-Colonialism
Conditional aid fuels dependency on western states in such a way that it promotes neocolonialism. BG.
TinasheNyatoro.(2008)TheHistoryofForeignAidDependency:Challengesfor
Africa.
Foreign aid has done more damage to African countries. It has led to a situation where African countries
have failed to set their own pace and direction of development, free of external interference, since
development plans for developing countries are drawn thousands of miles away in the corridors of the
IMF and World Bank. This article further noted that developed countries view aid as something to be
bartered with. Thus, the West exchanges aid for political or ideological support or uses aid to influence
strategic decisions and strengthening allies. The African state has no autonomy to control and direct national
capital and even increase its bargaining position with respect to foreign capital. In the light of this, postcolonial
African development has been thwarted by external pressure acting against internal values and
traditions. In short, aid has led to the re-colonisation of Africa through the strings attached to it. Foreign
aid is a tool of statecraft used by the government providing it to encourage or reward politically desirable
behaviour on the part of the government receiving it. It is an instrument of coercion and a tool for the
exercise of power with little relevance to the lives of the recipients. More so, the pattern of bilateral aid
distribution is explained by donor interests rather than the recipient interests. Realising the failure of aid to
African countries, this article recommends the following: There is need to repudiate all forms of foreign aid,
excluding disaster relief assistance. The postcolonial state is designed to serve foreign interests thus the state
should be recaptured and restructured to serve African interests. For the above two recommendations to take
place, there is the need for an exit strategy from aid dependence that requires a drastic move both in the mindset
and in the development strategy of countries dependent on aid. There is a need for a deeper and direct
involvement of people in their own development. This requires a radical and fundamental restructuring of the
institutional aid architecture at the global level.
When we attach conditions of good governance to aid, this attempts to force western views
onto other countries. BG.
AnnaChyzhkova(2011)Unit3:NeoLiberalismandGovernance:GoodandGood
EnoughGovernance.
By 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, in the context of the demise of communism and growing prodemocratic movements, the USA were showing to the world the direction of the only possible path to a greater
quality and freedom, namely democratic neo-liberalism (Grieg et al., 2007). At the same time, the democratic
neo-liberalism proponents, financial institutions and aid donors were pointing to the direction of what did
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Aff: NeoColonialism
not allow the structural adjustment to work out the way it should have during the 80s the quality of
governance. So the new theory was born, namely the quality of governance as the condition for
development. Quality of governance, with the variety of meanings attributed by different international actors to
the concept of good governance (democracy and protection of human rights, sound administration and efficient
management), became a new condition for aid disbursement. Political condition for aid became a rival to the
economic condition. As per World Bank: Underlying the litany of Africas development problems is a
crisis of governance. By governance is meant the exercise of political power to manage a nations affair
(The World Bank, cited in Leftwich, 2000). Good governance proponents tried to shape the South to the
model of the West in terms of good governance structure, and failed to explore if there are necessary
conditions to house and sustain good governance (Leftwich, 2000). The proponents of the good governance
theories, in the early days, pointed to corruption, lack of accountability, and disregard for the rule of law and so
on as main cause of bad governance, whereas Mike Moore saw political underdevelopment [was]as the root
cause of poor governance (Moore, 2001). Thus, the long list of wishes related to good governance in the
South was set by the West. It was an unrealistic list of conditions to be met to qualify for aid
disbursement. No country could have hoped to have this required list of characteristics, as per Hewitt
(Hewitt, 2011). Developing countries (aid recipients), found themselves with the long unrealistic to do list
trying to adjust their structures again. Since to do adjustment list was long and aid was needed badly (many
countries were heavily indebted by that time), governments were treating problems and implementing reforms
simultaneously which represented a high risk of achieving little. Very quickly governments found themselves to
work towards aid donors priorities rather than on their own priorities or those can tangibly make a difference to
the poverty reduction.
Conditions about good governance and democracy are attempts of the west to increase
control over other countries. BG.
JamesTully(2005)OnLaw,DemocracyandImperialism.
The third set of critics are those who see the length and breadth of informal imperialism and often the layers of
imperial relationships laid down during the age of colonial imperialism. In response, they argue that the
language and practice of self-determination of peoples and democracy offer a genuinely non-imperial and antiimperial alternative. If subaltern peoples and Indigenous peoples could only exercise their right of selfdetermination, through international law and reform of the UN or through revolution and liberation,
they would free themselves from European and American imperialism. This view is widely expressed in the
South and the Third World, as well as at the World Social Forum. It is also advanced in a modified way by
critical international law theorists, who rightly see the new democratic norm of international law (and the
right to democracy) as the extension of the right of self-determination. On this view, a state would be
recognized under international law only if it were democratic, or democratizing, and if it recognized the right of
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Aff: NeoColonialism
self-determination for any peoples within its territory. To be able to exercise the powers of self-determination or
to be able to organize as a democracy is to be free of imperialism. Unfortunately, these two theses do not
stand up to scrutiny. The protection of self-determination and democratic government under
international law and the exercise of powers of self-determination and democratic self-rule are internal to
informal post-colonial imperialism. They are literally the two main ways by which the conduct of
subaltern actors is governed by informal imperial rule: that is, through supporting, channeling and
constraining their self-determining and democratic freedom. 9.1 Self-determination During the early years
of decolonization, one of the first leaders to see the internal relation between informal imperial rule, selfdetermination and democratization was Woodrow Wilson. He argued that every people should be able to
exercise the right of self-determination and democratic self-rule, but that the more advanced democratic
states had the responsibility to educate the elites, train the military, and intervene militarily from time to
time to guide the self-determination of former colonial peoples along its proper stages of development to
openness to free trade and western-style democratization. The United States was the world leader in this
form of enlightened rule because of its long experience of this kind of rule by means of the Monroe Doctrine
over the former colonies of Central and South America. The U.S. also had the responsibility to intervene
militarily to protect the decolonizing peoples from their two main foes: the old European colonial powers who
claimed the colonies as their closed spheres of influence and the reactionary internal leaders and movements
who tried to close their economies to foreign domination and build up economic and democratic self-reliance
through controlled trade (as the U.S. has always done in its own case). In this way, Wilson was able to respond
positively to the demands for self-determination of colonized peoples, except for the Indigenous peoples of
America, yet to channel informally their exercise of self-determination into state building and economic
development within the existing imperial system. Of course, the granting of the right of self-determination to
colonized peoples was a repudiation of Kants non-resistance theory, but it provided a normative justification
and explanation from another Western tradition (popular sovereignty and self-determination from Locke and
Rousseau down to Sartre and Fanon) for the transition form colony to post-colony (something Kants theory did
not provide), while retaining the constitutive features, developmental language and the normative sub-languages
of the Kantian and neo-Kantian narrative; yet expressing these in the distinctive U.S. traditions of the Monroe
Doctrine, Open Door freedom, the ever-expanding frontier, and the exporting of democracy. In Chalmers
Johnsons words: Wilsonprovided an idealistic grounding for American imperialism, what in our own time
would become a global mission to democratize the world. More than any other figure, he provided the
intellectual foundations for an interventionist foreign policy, expressed in humanitarian and democratic rhetoric.
Wilson remains the godfather of those contemporary ideologists who justify American power in terms of
exploiting democracy. At the same time, decolonizing elites and radicals in the former colonies adopted the
language of self-determination to justify decolonization and polity-building, but they were constrained by the
plenitude of overt and covert means of informal imperialism and the deeper dependency relations that continued
through decolonization to exercise their political, legal and economic powers in accord with the latest versions
of the developmental and normative sub-languages of the shared narrative of modernization. Far from
[Benedict] Andersons image of peoples whose inchoate dreams finally found form in nationalism, the social
and political movements of the decolonized nation-states have been highly various in their dreams, and have
been repeatedly forced to attempt to fit their dreams and goals into the limits of the nation-state form, to become
nations or parts of a nation, content with local sovereignty and the project of national development. Throughout
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Aff: NeoColonialism
the Cold War this way of governing the former colonies through the guided exercise of self-determination and
democratic development, and the military protection of them from their internal and external enemies, was
extended to the fight against communist and socialist movements from Roosevelt and Truman to Kennedy and
Johnson. Today, a very similar tripartite language is employed. The league or coalition of the U.S. and its allies
are said to bring free trade and democratization, to support the self-determination of peoples subject to tyranny
and closed societies by military intervention in and economic sanctions against failed and rogue states. The
kind of democracy that is developed in these relationships of self-determination and dependency are not
only unstable (as we saw in section 6), but also what is called in the area studies literature low intensity
democracy. This is a kind of narrow representative democracy governed by foreign economic relations and
low intensity military intervention, and in tension with the more participatory democratic aspirations of the
majority of the population. As the authors who introduced this term state: By invoking the American
counterinsurgency catch-phrase Low Intensity Conflict, it is our intention to show that perhaps more than in
any time in the recent past, it is now that the struggle to define democracy has become a major ideological
battle. As Partha Chatterjee concludes, rephrasing the similar reflections of Gandhi and Fanon: Europe and the
Americas, the only true subjects of history, have thought out on our behalf not only the script of colonial
enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of our anti-colonial resistance and post-colonial misery. Far from
offering an external perspective on, or a practical alternative to post-colonial imperialism, the exercise of selfdetermination and democratization is the assigned role of subaltern actors within the imperial rule of
development and normative globalization.
Conditioned aid has forced African countries to pander to the West or let their citizens starve
this shifts the blame of colonialism to Africa and normalizes global injustice. BG.
FrancisOwusu.(2003)PragmatismandtheGradualShiftfromDependencyto
Neoliberalism:TheWorldBank,AfricanLeadersandDevelopmentPolicyin
Africa.
In the hope that it might win them aid and extra debt relief, African leaders appear to have told the rich
world everything it wants to hear, including the endorsement of neoliberalism as a legitimate solution to
Africas crisis. NEPAD is the first initiative conceived and developed by Africans for Africa that does not
blame the West for the continents socio-economic demise and puts the responsibility for cleaning up the mess
on Africa. As already argued, unlike other African initiatives that advocate self-reliance, NEPAD embraces freemarket principles. By evoking the globalization imperative, NEPAD conveniently avoids the domestic-versusexogenous-factors debate and [it] plays down the injustices in the global economy. NEPAD is also similar in
many ways to the current Bank and IMF approaches, including the CDF and the Highly Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) program. These qualities make 17 the initiative acceptable to many in the international
community. How important is NEPADs embrace of neoliberalism? The proponents of the initiative may have
learned from experience that in order for the voices of African leaders to be heard in discussions about
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Aff: NeoColonialism
the future of the continent, they must learn to speak the language of the hegemonic discourse the
language of neoliberalism. Also, they may have realized that Africa would not get the needed support
from foreign donors through retelling of past exploitation and cries about the injustices in the world
economy. Thus, NEPADs endorsement of neoliberalism could be seen as a pragmatic solution to the
continents development quagmire: it provides an opportunity for the developed nations to participate in
Africas development efforts without admitting their role in creating the crisis. However, for those who seek
transformation in the global political economy in favor of African countries, the initiative is a great
disappointment. Despite this, NEPADs views on democracy, governance and the role of the state in
development make it attractive to many in the international community (Kanbur, 2002). In the past two decades
of neoliberal hegemony, the role of the state in the economy has been debated and African states in particular
have come under severe attack for mismanagement of the economy, corruption, authoritarianism and abuse of
power, poor human rights records, ethnic conflict and wars, and general inefficiency (Sandbrook, 1986; Young
and Turner, 1985; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982, Ayittey, 1998; Frimpong-Ansah, 1991). As a result, African
leaders have been on the defensive and the international financial institutions have required countries to
pursue minimalist state policies. Unfortunately, years of experimentation with such policies have not
produced the desired results, leading many in the development community to search for new ways to
discipline the African state. NEPADs promise to deliver good governance in exchange for investment
therefore meets the demands of donors and gives legitimacy to the Banks new policy level conditionality for
disbursing development aid. Furthermore, we have already discussed the importance of NEPADs respectable
and credible leadership in promoting the initiative in the international community and how such legitimacy
could make NEPAD acceptable to Africans. In sum, NEPADs global attraction has more to do with African
leaders decision to turn away from a dependency approach and adopt a western development approach. The
initiative falls short of demanding structural transformation in the global political economy that has been at the
heart of past African initiatives. As Taylor and Nel (2002:178) remind us: African-based initiatives are
vitally needed, but what is emerging is a nascent reformism, emanating from key elites in the
developing world, that far from ushering in a twenty-first century NIEO, remains rooted in an orthodox
discourse that benefits but a small elite.
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Sovereignty
Aff:
Sovereignty
Politically Aided Governments Lose Sovereignty TF
Fox,Fiona(2001).NewHumanitarianism:DoesItProvideaMoralBannerforthe21st
Century?OverseasDevelopmentInstitute24(4).
Perhaps the most obvious risk of a new more political humanitarian action is that warring sides will no
longer accept the neutrality of aid workers in crisis. New humanitarians accept that speaking out carries
a risk of losing access to those in need but they insist this is a price worth paying for drawing
international attention to human rights abuses. There is nothing new about individual aid workers being
thrown out of countries for opposing government policies it has been happening in countries like Kenya for
many years. There is also a long tradition of relief agencies passing information on abuses to human rights
groups like Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International as a way of raising awareness without losing access
to those in need. What is new is the much more common desire of relief agencies themselves to speak out in the
middle of a humanitarian crisis. Hugo Slim notes this trend in his review of humanitarian principles and points
to the dangers: Agencies cannot expect immunity or humanitarian space if they are leaning towards
solidarity (Slim, 1997). Another risk of politicising humanitarian aid is that aid agencies are seen to have lost
their independence from Western governments whose aid policies have often had more to do with promoting
national interest than meeting human need. Aid agencies are in no position to demand that governments separate
aid from foreign policy when we are also doing politics with aid.
Link card need to pair with violating sovereignty bad card.
Independence Key to Humanitarian Aid TF

Pasquier,Andre(2001).PoliticsandHumanitarianAid:Debates,Dilemmasand
Dissension.CommonWealthInstitute,London.
The ICRC has never deviated from a humanitarian concept that is founded on principles whose raison dtre is
to mark out and define the humanitarian space within which it operates. It is worth taking the time to look at
these principles, which we all feel we know quite well, so as to consider together how, even today, they can help
us delimit this humanitarian space. Four of them are particularly important: universality, impartiality, independence and neutrality. Universality implies that humanitarian action embraces all conflict victims,
wherever in the world they may be; and impartiality that it is concerned with providing assistance and
protection to all the victims of a given conflict, no matter to which side they belong, and whatever their
background, social status, religion, race or ethnic origin. Bearing this in mind, it is obvious that some of the
responses given by humanitarian operations in recent years did not sufficiently take these two principles into
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Aff:
Sovereignty
account and that, for example, under pressure from the media and in line with the priorities of governments,
notably those of the West, the crises that occurred in Europe received vastly preferential treatment over those
unfolding at the same time in Africa, even though in Africa the number of people in situations of extreme
distress was considerably higher. Genuinely humanitarian action is entirely incompatible with such
"discriminatory" impartiality. So this is the first point of tension between humanitarian and political
priorities, one that should concern us all and that underlines how important it is for humanitarian
players to safeguard the third principle I mentioned, that of independence. This third principle enables
humanitarian players to conduct activities that are not governed by considerations or interests that must remain
alien to them. Without independence, humanitarian action cannot legitimately assert itself as a moral
counterforce vis--vis the belligerents. Yet the principle of independence has now become blurred with the
growing involvement in humanitarian operations of the United Nations, which remains subject to the decisions
of its member States, in particular the permanent members of the Security Council. The scale of humanitarian
operations in recent years highlights another factor that can undermine the principle of independence: in order
to do their work, humanitarian agencies remain essentially dependent on the financial support they get from the
exclusive club of major donor States which, by deciding to grant or not to grant support for a given operation in
a given situation, can influence the application of the principle of independence which is vital for impartial
action.
Conditions violate independence.
Neutrality Key to Humanitarian Aid TF

Pasquier,Andre(2001).PoliticsandHumanitarianAid:Debates,Dilemmasand
Dissension.CommonWealthInstitute,London.
However, this neutrality and this is a capital point I feel should be made here is not absolute. It is a
functional matter, not an end in itself, and can in no way be equated with a moral neutrality that would
compel humanitarian organizations to remain silent and, passively, to accept the unacceptable. When
violence, as the expression of a deliberate policy, reaches a certain pitch, this practical neutrality must be
abandoned as an indi- cation that humanitarian action is no longer an adequate response to the crisis. At
that stage the international community has to act rapidly to find a solution in the United Na- tions Charter, for
massacres and genocide are political crimes that can be combated only by political action and, if necessary, by
force. The principle of neutrality therefore also obliges humanitarian agencies to recognize their own limits in
such extreme situations. But while the abandonment of this principle marks the dividing line between political and humanitarian action, it has to be admitted that in recent years the humanitarian and political worlds have
not succeeded in agreeing on a framework and conditions for effective complementary action which, when the
vital interests of conflict victims so demand, would enable them to back each other up without becoming
merged. Except in extreme situations of this kind, the principle of neutrality in my opinion retains its full
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Aff:
Sovereignty
relevance as an instrument of humanitarian action. As for those who feel it has outlived its usefulness, what do
they propose as an alternative? Indeed, what alternative can there be for an organization like the ICRC, whose
mandate is to act as a humanitarian intermediary capable of bringing aid to all victims, regardless of the side to
which they belong? The countless examples of prisoners visited, hostages freed, and medical and other aid
supplied to displaced persons on all sides of a conflict as a result of ICRC action show that this practical
function of neutrality is worth preserving.
Neutrality is humane.
Humanity Used as Justification for Sovereignty Violations TF

Wood,Susan(2000).HumanitarianWar:ANewConsensus?UnitedNationsUniversity
Press.
The extent to which Kosovo represents a fundamental change in the narrowing standoff between
humanitarianism and politics, however, is largely due to a third element of the context the decision to declare
the right to intervene and violate Yugoslav sovereignty on humanitarian grounds. This decision was the result of
more than six months deliberation, and thus delay, to satisfy the insistence of British officials that there be a
legal basis for the intervention. American officials, for whom the object of the campaign was Slobodan
Milosevic, to find a way to be done with him once and for all, were content to claim in a series of moveable
justifications, first, that Milosevic had reneged on his agreement, embodied in U.N. Security Council Resolution
1190, to hold Yugoslav security forces in the province at pre-March 1998 levels, and then, had refused to sign
onto the Rambouillet Accords. For Foreign-and-Commonwealth-Office lawyers, there were two parties to both
the fighting and the negotiations. The decision to ignore the U.N. Security Council in the aggressive use of
military force not as in Bosnia and Herzegovina to deploy all necessary means, including U.N. troops, to
protect a humanitarian operation, but a NATO bombing campaign to interrupt a civil war needed an open-andshut legal case. This need arose not only out of concern for the precedent that would be set, but also about
the need for an argument around which the NATO coalition could coalesce, in the presence of clear
opposition from a number of NATO states and deep worry from others. Humanitarian principles could
trump sovereignty.
Those Providing Aid in a Position of Power over Those Receiving it. ABB
Jayasinghe,Saroj.(2007)FaithbasedNGOsandhealthcareinpoorcountries:a
preliminaryexplorationofethicalissues.JournalofMedicalEthics.
The Indonesian example illustrates how aid workers of faithbased NGOs aim to develop a special relationship
and trust with the community before embarking on proselytising work. They do not violate the Code, as they do
not directly link humanitarian assistance to proselytising work. However, is this ethical when one considers the
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Aff:
Sovereignty
asymmetric power relationship between the aid worker and a recipient? Having provided assistance at a time
of dire need, the aid worker has considerable power over the individual and family. The faithbased NGOs
therefore will find it easy to convince individuals about their opinions or beliefs. On a larger scale, too,
asymmetric power relationships arise when a faithbased NGO negotiates with a government struggling to cope
with a disaster or a distressed community. NGOs could also use their asymmetric power relationship and exploit
the vulnerability of individuals or communities to further their own goals. An analogous situation is the power
of doctors over their patients during clinical encounters, or the vulnerability of patients in the process of
recruiting research subjects.12 Though there are several ethical principles relevant to these situations, in order
to prevent the exploitation of patients and research subjects, there are no such guidelines to prevent the
exploitation of vulnerable individuals by faithbased NGOs.
It seems unethical to exploit this relationship with a vulnerable group of people for the personal gain of a
more powerful group at their expense.
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Securitization
Aff:
Status Quo
Current Processes are More Reflective of Intervention than of Humanitarianism TF
Bowden,Mark(2001).RespondingtoConflictinAfrica.
These military and humanitarian lessons should not be construed as an argument against military or
humanitarian interventions, but rather to suggest the limitations and weaknesses of this approach,
particularly where there are doubts as to the scale and duration of international commitment.
Interventionism pushes both the political and humanitarian actors together into unsatisfactory and
ultimately unproductive relationships in which both parties blame each other for their dilemmas and
failures. While there will be circumstances in which intervention is justified and the need to avert genocide
provides a clear case for intervention. But then it must be rapid, to an appropriate scale and able to deal with the
broader issues of the timely delivery of justice.
Reject status quo argument.
Foreign Aid has Become a Political Agenda TF

Duffield,Mark(2001).GoverningtheBorderlands:DecodingthePowerofAid.Overseas
DevelopmentInstitute25(4).
The reuniting of aid and politics has set in motion a wide-ranging if contested process of institutional
metropolitan reform. Cold war barriers between aid and political departments have tended to blur
and become more equivocal. If Boutros- Ghalis Agenda for Peace (1992) was an early articulation of human
security made possible by the securitisation of aid, then the 1997 UN reforms were an attempt to realise this
vision institutionally (Macrae and Leader, 2000: 335). The American, British and Dutch governments, for
example, have also undertaken institutional reforms to bring aid and politics closer together. At the same
time, however, a new division of labour is also emerging between these categories. Foreign and defence
ministries are tending to retain or develop their authority in those zones of insecurity that retain economic or
strategic interest, while aid departments, especially humanitarian departments, have become important players
in shaping international policy in the remaining non-strategic areas. Countering the criticism that aid has
become a substitute for political action (Higgins, 1993), as Macrae and Leader have argued within this two-tier
system ... aid is no longer a substitute for political action, it is the primary form of international policy at the
geo-political periphery (3031).
Link card
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Conditional Aid Inevitable
Aff:

Political Conditions Inseparable from Aid TF
Franks,Suzanne(2010).SuzanneFranks:Youcan'ttakethepoliticsoutofhumanitarian
aid.Independent.co.uk.
Alex De Waal, the author of Famine Crimes, describes how incomprehensible these situations are to outsiders
and potential donors, where leaders "use the humanitarian imperative for their own ends... deliberately
cultivating starving children in order to attract aid... which can be used to feed soldiers or further war
aims." Many of the rules governing humanitarian action in what are now called "complex emergencies"
were actually worked out as a result of what happened in Ethiopia. It was the more radical agencies of
that period, such as Medicins Sans Frontieres, which tried to articulate the unforeseen dilemmas of
humanitarian intervention and the vital need to understand the political dimension to the suffering. They
were arguing that in such circumstances it was no longer possible to choose between a political and a
neutral position. And the resulting paradox emerged that, contrary to the received wisdom of the charitable
givers, a starving child may know only politics.
Argument for feasibility of NEG.
Private donations demonstrate how aid still occurs without a political agenda. PNG
Individual/private donations may be targeted in many ways. However, even though the charts above do show
US aid to be poor (in percentage terms) compared to the rest, the generosity of the American people is far more
impressive than their government. Private aid/donation typically through the charity of individual people and
organizations can be weighted to certain interests and areas. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note for example,
based on estimates in 2002, Americans privately gave at least $34 billion overseas more than twice the US
official foreign aid of $15 billion at that time:
-International giving by US foundations: $1.5 billion per year
-Charitable giving by US businesses: $2.8 billion annually
-American NGOs: $6.6 billion in grants, goods and volunteers.
-Religious overseas ministries: $3.4 billion, including health care, literacy training, relief and development.
-US colleges scholarships to foreign students: $1.3 billion
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-Personal remittances from the US to developing countries: $18 billion in 2000
Aff:
Despite potential for co-option, aid does consistently improve the situation. PNG
FailedStates?
Despite the many possible negative impacts of humanitarian aid on conflict, we should remember two essential
points. First, humanitarian aid does save lives, at least in the short term. Even though aid operations in places
like Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan have been heavily scrutinized recently, there is relative consensus that the
interventions were successful in reducing the number of deaths and averting widespread famine (Prendergast,
1997: 151). Second, we should remember that humanitarian aid can have positive effects on conflicts insofar as
it empowers peace-making communities and provides disincentives for violence. This is the primary challenge
for aid agencies in the early twenty-first century.
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Pretext
Aff: Aid As
Aid can be Used as a Pretext

Religious groups Disguise Proselytizing as Aid. ABB
The suspicion is deepened by the activities of certain religious groups working closely with NGOs. An example
is the missionary efforts to target the 10/40 Windowthe Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist nations between 10
degrees and 40 degrees north latitude.7 Fragile states, natural disasters and conflicts offer an opportunity
for these organisations to provide humanitarian assistance and conduct proselytising work, as illustrated
by the report after the 2004 tsunami that rage and fury has gripped this tsunamihit tiny Hindu village in India's
southern Tamil Nadu after a group of Christian missionaries allegedly refused them aid for not agreeing to
follow their religion Jubilant at seeing the relief trucks loaded with food, clothes and the muchneeded
medicines the villagers, many of who have not had a square meal in days, were shocked when the nuns asked
them to convert before distributing biscuits and water.
It seems unjust to force people to choose between their religious beliefs and food. Not all aid is morally
appropriate.
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Morally Required
Aff: Aid
Aid Morally Required for its Own Sake

Chart Showing Various Theories on Why Aid Related to Health is Morally Required. ABB
Johri,Mira.(2012)GlobalHealthandnationalborders:Theethicsofforeignaidina
timeoffinancialcrisis.GlobalizationandHealth.
It follows that groups that attach political conditions that benefit themselves are failing to meet their
moral obligations to act for the sake of aiding others.
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Morally Required
Aff: Aid
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Securitization
Aff:
Securitization
Humanitarian Aid Linked to Securitization TF
Dillon,Michael(2000).GlobalGovernance,LiberalPeace,andComplexEmergency.
Alternatives25.
Pursued as a deliberate policy of comprehensive social transformation, and of power projection,
development becomes allied in novel ways via global liberal governance with geopolitical military and
economic institutions and interests. The transformation is therefore to be effected according to the
current efficiency and performance criteria of good governance--economically and politically--set by the
varied institutions of global liberal peace. In the process, sovereignty, as the traditional principle of political
formation whose science is law, is being supplemented by a network-based account of social organization
whose principle of formation is "emergence" and whose science increasingly is that of complex adaptive
systems. These ensure that the political issue posed by Stiglitz rarely progresses beyond an afterthought. This
incendiary brew is currently also fueled by a resurgent liberal moralism. That moralism generates its own
peculiar forms of liberal hypocrisy. These include: the calling for intervention by the international community
against Indonesian actions in East Timor while liberal states furnished Indonesian armed forces with the very
means of carrying out those actions; and seeking to proscribe child soldiers while failing to address the global
arms economy that furnishes the children with their weapons.
Card for Securitization K.
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Technology
Aff: Form of
Form of Technology
Humanitarian Aid is a Veiled Form of Governmental Technology TF
For policy-makers and others who define insecurity as under-development, and who believe that the causes of
conflict are internal, it is logical to conclude that international responses should address and alter the internal
practices of countries undergoing conflict. Nonetheless, as Duffield points out, changing domestic practices
in what he calls borderland (that is, developing) countries would be beyond the capacity and legitimacy
of metropolitan (Western developed) states.The convergence of aid and politics brings in the skills and
resources of non-state actors and legitimises their growing role.This is the basic rationale for uniting
humanitarian aid and politics. As aid evolves and explicitly attempts to change behaviours and attitudes in
recipient countries, the social concerns of aid agencies merge with the security concerns of metropolitan states.
Duffield believes that this merger is at the heart of an emerging system of liberal international governance.
Contrary to popular claims, globalisation and the rise of non-state actors and private associations have not
resulted in a weakening of powerful metropolitan states. Instead, in response to globalisation, these states have
learned to govern in new ways, through non-territorial and publicprivate networks. The reunification of
humanitarian aid with politics is an example of the trend towards the re-exertion of metropolitan
authority. Humanitarian aid should therefore be seen as a technology of government. Viewed in this
way, non- state and private associations do not constitute threats to metropolitan authority. Rather, they
are essential in helping metropolitan states govern in new ways.
Can be used for a government coercion case.
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Technology
Aff: Form of
Psychosocial Humanitarian Intervention Bad TF

Psychosocial programmes have become an integral part of the international humanitarian response to
complex emergencies. Psychosocial activities include trauma counselling, peace education programmes
and initiatives to build life skills and self-esteem. Describing a given population as having experienced the
trauma of conflict is sufficient for international agencies to judge that they are in need of psychosocial
assistance. Under this model, individuals who have witnessed violent conflict are seen as being at risk of
becoming future perpetrators. Psychosocial intervention is believed to be required to rehabilitate victims and to
break the cycle of violence and conflict. Pupavac shows that these types of intervention represent governance at
a distance, a form of government through social risk management by a transitory class of global professional
consultants. Pupavac argues that this response is at best unhelpful, and at worst dangerous. It represents
unprecedented external regulation of societies and peoples lives. The effect is to construct whole populations as
traumatised. Individuals are automatically seen as dysfunctional because they have undergone the experience of
war. Yet Pupavac argues that the appearance of a traumatic condition in war is particular, not universal. We do
not always know how people express their distress, and some of the mechanisms that have been developed to
deal with distress in Western countries may not be relevant in other contexts. Psychosocial intervention may
hinder local coping strategies and take away ownership of the process of recovery. The benefits of psychosocial
intervention are assumed by aid agencies, rather than backed up by research, and there is a risk that such
intervention denies moral capacity and personality to recipient populations.
Targets specific act of providing humanitarian aid.
Page 67 of 118
Neg Evidence
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March/April 2014
Unconditioned Aid May Decrease Aid
Aff:

Humanitarian Aid is Crucial TF
Another factor contributing to the drive to reunite humanitarian aid and politics is the sense that aid agencies
have had difficulty in reacting to the changing nature of conflict and security.The well-known criticism that
humanitarian aid can prolong or exacerbate war and can help to sustain war economies has fuelled calls
for humanitarian assistance to be subject to risk assessments that weigh up short- and long-term levels of
risk resulting from it. The withholding of humanitarian aid can therefore become part of a political
strategy of containment, and can be seen as ethically defensible by an appeal to the argument of doing no
harm. If, on the other hand, humanitarian assistance is provided, it should be used as part of a strategy
for conflict reduction, thus ensuring that it does not get into the hands of the wrong people. A second
criticism of humanitarian assistance is that aid has not helped to reduce the overall vulnerability of populations.
This developmentalist critique argues that humanitarian relief creates dependency, and reduces the capacity of
communities and local groups. Relief does not address under-development. The response to this critique has
been a growing tendency to link humanitarian assistance with poverty alleviation, environmental protection and
institutional development, in an overall integrated package of conflict management and development.
Interestingly, operational agencies in the United Nations and the non-governmental sector first advocated a
stronger role for humanitarian aid in conflict reduction. The growing convergence between humanitarianism
and conflict resolution would not have been possible without the active support of a number of aid agencies.
Sets up for argument of unpoliticized aid will decline.
Must Combine Political and Social Agendas TF

Bowden,Mark(2001).RespondingtoConflictinAfrica.
The strong assertion of humanitarian by NGOs and other humanitarian actors throughout the second part of the
1990s led many to confuse their role with increasingly political areas of action. Humanitarian agencies
strayed into areas such as demobilisation and reintegration of armed forces that in the new military
context had become increasingly political issues. Yet Governments and the International community as a
whole were keen to address the institutionalised basis of conflict in Africa that revolved around the
collapsed, fragile or predatory state. State building became a necessary precondition to re-establishing
security. However, Humanitarian agencies have not as yet determined how to respond to this new agenda
and the challenges that this poses to their impartial status. Nor has the international community fully
recognised the task that it has embarked upon. Under such circumstances a degree of confusion is inevitable.
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Aff:
New strategies and relationships need to develop. Humanitarian agencies will have to make judgements as to
how best to square the circle between state building and impartial humanitarian action in order retain their
ability to respond to the changing nature of conflict in Africa.
Compromise between aff and neg; neg argument because neg can strike balance.
Unrestrained aid exacerbated the situation in Rwanda, Sudan, and Liberia. PNG
FailedStates?
In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, hundreds of thousands of refugees fled to camps in Zaire,
which were controlled by Hutu militias. The militants stole humanitarian aid given by international
organizations for the refugees, and the camps provided a base from which to launch guerilla attacks and further
massacres inside Rwanda. In Sudan, humanitarian assistance was channelled through government-created
peace villages, which supported the governments military strategy of depopulating rebel-controlled areas
(Bryans et al., 1999: 19). In Liberia in 1996, warlords stole 400 vehicles, equipment, and humanitarian supplies
from a number of NGOs, and subsequently used them in their war effort.
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Neg: Poverty
States Only Have Obligations to Their Own Citizens

Governments only have obligations to their own citizens. BG.
AlanGewirth.(1998)EthicalUniversalismandParticularism.
There are justified kinds of loyalty to one's own country or other community whereby one has special
concern for its flourishing both collectively and distributively. The objects of the concern may range from its
national security and welfare policies to its political institutions and economic workings, social and cultural
arrangements and traditions, and even aesthetic considerations, as well as the communal relationships fostered
by living together in a political society. The forms of concern may range from the mandatory but willing
payment of taxes to participation in its political and social life and other modes of special support for one's
compatriots, all accompanied by feelings of communal loyalty. Particularistic priority of concern for such
interests of one's country and compatriots can be justified by the universalist principle of equal human
rights, but through a different component of the principle from the freedom one that justified familial
preferences. There is a crucially important respect in which one's country is not a voluntary association,
adherence to whose rules is at the option of its members. The respect in question is that one's country, to be
morally legitimate and hence deserving of support, must be at least a "minimal state," which is
characterized by impartial enforcement of the criminal law and thus equal protection of the freedom and
basic well-being of all the inhabitants. The minimal state, then, secures the equal rights to freedom and
basic well-being of all persons within its territory and it enforces the mandatory nonviolation of these
rights on the part of all such persons. Thus, the minimal state with its criminal law is justified by a
universalist principle. The claim rights of each person to receive the equal protections in question are
accompanied by the power rights of state officials to practice their legally authorized protection-securing roles
and hence to receive appropriate forms of obedience.
When governments do give aid they must condition it to protect the freedom, wellbeing, and
interests of their own citizens. Conditioned aid can be used to promote a states own
political interests. BG.
DevonCurtis.(2001)PoliticsandHumanitarianAid:Debates,Dilemmasand
Dissension.http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odiassets/publications
opinionfiles/295.pdf.
Nonetheless, the relationship between humanitarian aid and politics is changing. The key theme of the
conference was how humanitarian action appears to be increasingly tied to new political objectives, and to the
overall political response of donor countries to complex emergencies. Humanitarian aid is becoming an
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Neg: Poverty
integral part of donors comprehensive strategy to transform conflicts, decrease violence and set the stage
for liberal development. This changing role of humanitarian aid is frequently called the new
humanitarianism. It has characterised international responses to many recent conflicts, including in
Afghanistan, Serbia and Sierra Leone. Examples of the closer integration with political objectives include
the forced repatriation of refugees, attempts at conflict resolution in conjunction with humanitarian aid,
and the withholding of aid to meet political objectives.
Aid in conflict situations is inherently a political tool. PNG

FailedStates?
In short, the insertion of humanitarian aid into a conflict situation can conceivably be a political and
humanitarian catastrophe of its own. Not only can the material resources fall into the wrong hands and be used
for the wrong purposes, but the aid also conveys implicit political messages that can make the conflict worse.
Some writers have gone so far as to argue that most current international humanitarian aid in Africa is either
useless or damaging, and should be abandoned completely (DeMars, 2000; de Waal, 1997). In the worst
scenarios, aid has the potential to prop up states that fail to fulfill their basic functions of security,
representation, and welfare, and power struggles that destabilize states. Deciding whether or not to provide aid
is thus fraught with political repercussions. International aid agencies may be faced with the dilemma that their
aid is being used to prolong the conflict, but that without aid thousands of vulnerable non-combatants may die,
while the withdrawal of aid may cause impoverished warriors to plunder civilian populations even more
violently (Keen, 1998). Aid agencies are in an unenviable ethical position.
Multilateral action is much more effective than unilateral action. PNG

Crawford,Gordon(1997)ForeignAidandPoliticalConditionality:Issuesof
EffectivenessandConsistency
An internationally co-ordinated action by donors stands a better chance of success than a unilateral action in
terms of attaining the policy reforms pursued: There is considerable evidence to support this hypothesis. The
large majority of effective cases were characterized by donor co-ordination. Of particular note are the instances
of Kenya and Malawi, where donor pressure was co-ordinated through the mechanism of the World Bankchaired Consultative Group, most commonly associated with economic conditionality. In both cases, the united
front presented by donor governments was a significant factor in the decisions of established regimes to institute
political reforms. In Lesotho, co-ordinated action was led by neighbouring states and supported by donor
governments. In Guatemala, the US and the EU were united in their opposition to Serrano's 'self-coup'. In Haiti,
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Neg: Poverty
international opposition to the ousting of Aristide was led initially by the Organization of American States
(OAS), and later by the United Nations.
This card can be used as a counter for opponents evidence that political conditionality lessens the impact
of humanitarian aid.
Justification for Countries not Acknowledging International Obligations. ABB

However, for many, national borders delimit the prime locus of moral responsibility. The duty to alleviate
suffering abroad is seen as discretionary, and distinctly secondary to domestic concerns. Two arguments
dovetail to support this latter perspective. A realist conception of international relations suggests that the proper
role of every national government is to represent and advance the interests of its own nation. Similarly, many
ethicists hold that we have more important moral duties towards co-nationals, with whom we share a common
past, the benefits and burdens of social cooperation, and a common destiny [17]. The view that charity
begins at home may seem particularly salient in the current context of financial uncertainty and the
prospect of a global economic recession.
It is possible that this attitude means that aid will most likely only occur if people stand to benefit from
giving it. This may make the ability to profit from conditioned aid necessary to make sure that aid is
given.
Current System means that Wealthy Countries will not Provide Aid Without Incentive. ABB
Asking why severe poverty and inequality persist worldwide, Yale Universitys Thomas Pogge focuses on
structural causes. Pogge asks whether the current global institutional orderfor which the governments of
the rich nations (and hence their citizens) bear primary responsibility figures as a substantial
contributor to the life-threatening poverty suffered by billions in the developing world [22].
Pogge challenges us to reflect on the relationship between the persistence of severe poverty and inequality
worldwide and recent decisions concerning our path of globalization [22]. While the legacy of colonialism
persists, Pogges argument focuses primarily on events since roughly 1980. He raises two issues: first, the
governments of wealthy nations enjoy a crushing advantage in terms of bargaining power and
expertise; and second, international negotiations are based on an adversarial system in which country level
representatives seek to advance the best interests of their nation. Systematic consideration of the needs of the
global poor is not a part of the mandate of any of the powerful parties to the negotiation. The cumulative results
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are, in Pogges view, predictable: a grossly unfair global order in which benefits flow predominantly to the
affluent [22].
Clearly, it will be insufficient to rely on any moral responsibility to give aid for its own sake to bring
about changes in the real world.
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Regimes
Neg: Corrupt
Corrupt Regimes
Unconditional aid increases chances for regimes to be re-elected. BG.
This card could also be used for the aff to say that unconditional aid could keep good regimes in power;
however, it seems likely most rounds will focus on how aid helps people in places where the government is
corrupt.
AidProjects.
The recipients could therefore use the foreign aid to expand targeted spending before the election.12 In
other words, if foreign aid is provided unconditionally, the government receives new opportunities to
pursue scal strategies that maximizes its chances of reelection.Figure 3, which graphs the amount of
unconditional aid (aid that is given to support the budget or debt relief efforts) and the amount of conditional aid
(all other aid that is attributed to a specic sector) separately, shows that the amount of unconditional aid
provided is small compared to the amount of aid that is earmarked for specic projects. One can see
immediately that the bulk of foreign aid has been given with strings attached and conditional aid has become
more important particularly in the last decade. If foreign aid is provided conditionally the room to maneuver
for the recipient government becomes smaller since the additional funds cannot be distributed to the
discretion of the incumbent.
Paternalistic aid is justified when subjects autonomy is impaired. PNG

Political philosopher Dennis Thompson suggests that the problem of paternalism is best conceived not as a
question of choosing between liberty and paternalism but as a question of reconciling paternalism with liberty.
In other words, paternalistic interference is justified when it can be reconciled with the principle of liberty
that is, when it benefits a subject whose autonomy is seriously impaired due to lack of knowledge or ability, and
who is therefore unfree in a morally relevant sense. I argue that the inhabitants of war-torn societies are often
collectively unfree because of serious political impediments to popular self-determination. If narrowly
circumscribed and adequately managed, paternalistic interference can be freedom-enhancing under similar
circumstances and is, therefore, morally justified.
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Nonpoliticized aid in Myanmar legitimizes the military regime. PNG

This has been a general concern regarding any form of international engagement with the military regime and
has caused some INGOs in Myanmar to try extremely hard to avoid being used for propaganda. Generally
speaking though, while the government does try to cash in on the goodwill generated by international
development projects by associating itself with the implementing agencies, these efforts are usually low-key. In
any case, we are dealing with legitimacy at the margins. No government gains international legitimacy simply
by allowing aid organisations to operate in the country. Local inhabitants are very well aware that the goods
come from foreign benefactors, not the government.
In Somalia, nonpolitical humanitarian aid fails. PNG

Teff,Melanie(2012)SomalianHumanitarianAidandSecurity:Separate,ButStill
Unequal?
With increasing difficulties in gaining access to assist populations in need, most international aid agencies
prefer that humanitarian issues be kept entirely separate from the international political and security agenda.
They fear the politicization of aid and the resulting lack of access to populations in need. Aid agencies have
seen how the use of humanitarian issues to justify military or political actions can backfire and impact badly on
the most desperate of populations. They are aware that they must maintain a strictly neutral stance, and not be
associated with any party to the conflict. And they are already resisting pressure by donor governments to direct
their assistance in line with the political objectives of those donors such as pressure to direct assistance into
areas liberated from Al Shabab in order to provide peace dividends, rather than directing their assistance
strictly on the basis of most acute need. Yet we are all aware that humanitarianism does not take place in a
vacuum. Unless and until a political solution is found to the problems in Somalia, the humanitarian crisis will be
never-ending. Security and humanitarian actors have been working at cross-purposes in the Horn of Africa for
decades. On some occasions, this has meant direct interference, where regional or Western governments stop
assistance from reaching those who need it for political reasons. At other times, the interference is indirect but
no less harmful for example, when military actions produce unnecessary displacement or prevent Somalis
from rebuilding their lives and livelihoods. The activities of the parties to the growing conflict inside Somalia
from Al Shabab, to the TFG, to Kenya, Ethiopia, and including AMISOM in its latest offensive outside of
Mogadishu are having a negative impact on the safety and wellbeing of civilians, including people living in
displacement camps. Military operations do not adequately take into account the impacts on civilians, including
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Regimes
the need of farmers to plant and harvest. Without a real effort on this score, food insecurity will be exacerbated,
and additional internal and international displacement of civilians will result.
When blindly given, aid is co-opted for military use. PNG

Leriche,Matthew(2004)UnintendedAlliance:TheCooptionofHumanitarianAidin
Conflicts
When compared with the exploitation of natural resources or narcotics, which are geographically dispersed, the
co-option of international humanitarian aid has likely become one of the most reliable sources of funding for
belligerents. Because people in the West feel guilty, or obligated, when they see suffering masses on their
television screens while enjoying their own comfort or even opulence, they open up their checkbooks and send
money. The well-intentioned aid and relief organizations in turn are determined that regardless of the political
situation they will use the donated money or supplies to provide for the many innocents who are harmed by the
conflict that rages, for whatever reason (and there are many). Relief organizations may be only marginally
successful in reaching a portion of the civilian population; the rest of the time they may be controlled,
manipulated, and bullied by the local tyrants (including governments) whose war is producing the suffering that
relief providers intend to alleviate. The combatants, well aware of how aid organizations operate, abuse the
shortcomings in the system and funnel resources from donors into their war machines. The huge number of aid
agencies clamoring for support from the same pool of donation money and material supplies must show how
they are aiding those who suffer. Often in their haste to secure funding, aid organizations rush into war zones
without thoroughly assessing their potential impact. It is this dynamic that the intelligent field commander of a
local militia or opposition group exploits.
Failure to use aid as a political weapon has led to negative consequences. PNG
Leriche,Matthew(2004)UnintendedAlliance:TheCooptionofHumanitarianAidin
Conflicts
Despite being widely known, the utilization of the humanitarian aid system as a logistical support system for
war is one of the most overlooked constituent tactics of modern warfare. As such, it has not received adequate
research or public attention. The lack of consideration of this tactic has had a significant effect on the failure of
interventions in many of the worlds conflicts. Indeed, this unorthodox approach to military logistics should be
considered as one of the factors that contributes to intervention failures, as in Somalia in 1992 or Rwanda in
1994. The cunning co-option of the massively valuable resources of the humanitarian aid system is how many
militaries and paramilitaries have continued to support their soldiers and campaigns despite the loss of military
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assistance. The determination of aid organizations to remain neutral, however noble, enables local commanders
to continue to pillage aid resources intended for those who suffer. Those with guns never go hungry.
Societies with Health Problems that Receive Aid are Usually Unjust. ABB
Rawls describes several criteria that must be satisfied in order for a society to be just. At the domestic level, a
just society must satisfy Rawlss principle of equality of opportunity [33]. Yet, there is extensive empirical
evidence that health problems are disproportionately concentrated in disadvantaged population sub-groups,
reflecting and exacerbating social and economic differences between the members of a society [34].
Everywhere the burden of disease is high, the chance to survive to adulthood, when the rights and privileges of
democratic citizenship can be exercised, differs sharply across social groups. Deeply unhealthy societies
therefore cannot guarantee that those with similar abilities, skills and initiative have similar life chances,
regardless of starting point.
Out of respect for national sovereignty, Rawls offers a less stringent version of the equality of opportunity
principle for state members of the just international community. The international version stipulates that all
states must, at a minimum, maintain equality of opportunity in education and training [32]. However, child
survival, school performance and life prospects are importantly affected by preventable and treatable health
conditions, and negative effects are concentrated among vulnerable population sub-groups [3]. Where the
burden of disease is high, the principle of equality of opportunity in education and training cannot be
met.
Rawls also views basic economic entitlements as essential to just political arrangements [32]. A high burden of
disease contributes to the entrenchment of poverty and threatens subsistence rights, with greatest impact upon
the vulnerable and powerless [34,35]. For this ensemble of reasons, societies with a high burden of disease
necessarily fail to meet criteria for just political arrangements.
Violations of sovereignty are less likely to be a concern in areas with extreme poverty or poor health,
because these societies are generally unjust. This may justify imposing political conditions on them.
Justification for UN Politicizing Humanitarian Aid in Haiti. ABB

Fielding,Lois.(1992)TakingtheNextStepintheDevelopmentofNewHumanRights:
TheEmergingRightofHumanitarianAssistancetoRestoreDemocracy.Ethics
andInternationalAffairs.
In the series of resolutions regarding Haiti, the Security Council extended humanitarian intervention to
include measures against the usurpation of the sovereign prerogative of a population to be governed by
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those it has democratically elected. This placed the international community at a crossroads in the
development of a right of humanitarian assistance. The right of humanitarian assistance to restore democracy is
6
supported by and, in turn, supports the emerging concepts of an emerging right to democratic government, the
7
right of a population to be free from internal as well as external aggression, and the right of victims of human
8
rights violations to receive assistance. Since these rights support a concept of humanitarian assistance,
which is more expansive than a right to assist democratic restoration, it can be argued that a right to
assist democratic restoration is only the core of a much broader right of humanitarian assistance.
It follows that political conditions may be considered inseparable from humanitarian aid in cases where
they are meant to improve life for people in oppressive situations.
Right to Democracy as a Justification for Attaching Conditions to Aid. ABB

Commentators note the right to democracy developing within international agreements. Thomas Franck
finds that democracy, "while not yet fully word made law, is rapidly becoming in our time, a normative rule of
the international system."' 2 Gregory Fox asserts that "parties to the major human rights conventions have
created an international law of participatory rights."'3 The principle of democracy and the rights which
together constitute the democratic prerogative are "guaranteed in all comprehensive human rights
instruments."'4 Among these instruments are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. The Universal Declaration states: "The will of the people shall be the basis of the
authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures."'" The
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights provide that: "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and '6 cultural
development."'Thomas Franck argues that these documents together with regional instruments constitute "a net
of participatory entitlements."- " In addition, the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) declares
that "representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace and development of the
region" and that promoting democracy is "an essential purpose of the OAS."'18
The rights set forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American Declaration)
approximate those of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.9 The American Declaration sets forth rights
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Regimes
and duties which are viewed by the General Assembly of the OAS as international commitments and as
specifying the fundamental human rights addressed in the Charter of the OAS.2 The American Declaration
states in article XX: "Every person having legal capacity is entitled to participate in the government of his
country, directly or through his representatives, and to take part in popular elections, which shall be by
secret ballot, and shall be honest, periodic and free."'
Conditioning Aid in a way that promotes democracy may therefore be considered morally justified.
Oppressive Regimes may Justify taking Extraordinary Measures. ABB

Reflecting a concern about sovereignty, sensitivity to the positions taken by nations in the region of
conflict is apparent in the emphasis of the Security Council on the supporting parallel measures
undertaken by the OAS regarding Haiti. Resolution 841 states that OAS efforts regarding Haiti call for
"extraordinary measures" to be taken by the Security Council.215 The request of the "legitimate
government" of Haiti for Chapter VII enforcement measures was significant in the Security Council's decision
to act in Resolutions 862 and 940,216 and the request from the Permanent Representative of Haiti is stated to be
significant in Resolution 841."7 The General Assembly Resolution on Strengthening the Coordination of
Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations places responsibility for humanitarian assistance
primarily on the state. 8 The affected state "has the responsibility first and foremost" to provide for victims and
"has the primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian
assistance within its territory,2 9 Each state is asked to "facilitate the work of these organizations in
implementing humanitarian assistance, in particular the supply of food, medicines, shelter and health care, for
which access to victims is essential."' 20
When there is a choice between respecting a leaders sovereignty and providing aid to oppressed people,
the moral priority should be the latter of these two.
U.N. Security Councils Moral Authority Supersedes Sovereignty of Tyrants. ABB

It is preferable that the Security Council be the international body to assist for humanitarian purposes
because of the potential for abuse by individual states seeking political and territorial gain in the guise of
assistance. Alternatively, action by a regional organization or group of states would be preferable to unilateral
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state action. In the event that the Security Council cannot act, international law does not require the rest of the
world community to stand idly by as atrocities and human rights abuses unfold. The legal right of the
international community to reach within a state to protect a population from massive human rights
violations begins with Reisman's concept of "popular sovereignty," described as "people's sovereignty rather
than the sovereign's sovereignty." 9 Since sovereignty is derived from the will of the people and does not belong
to the ruler who holds power over the state, the ruler is included among those who can violate the sovereignty of
the state.' Reisman, arriving at the same conclusion as did Perez de Cuellar, asserts that sovereignty is no
barrier to intervention to protect the population from human rights abuses.241
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Humanitarian Benefits
Neg:
Political conditions are key to ensure standard humanitarian conditions. BG.
EricReeves.(2013)HumanitarianConditionsinDarfur:Themostrecentreportsreveal
arelentlessdeterioration.
The moratorium has in fact expired according to several sources within the humanitarian community. This is
most likely to affect international nongovernmental humanitarian organizations registered only in Darfur
(as opposed to Sudan generally). But a number of these organizations are key implementing partners for
both the UNs World Food Program and USAID. It is once again open season for Khartoum in the
harassment, abuse, obstruction, and denial of access to those working to provide food, primary health
care, shelter, and clean water to desperate civilians. In early February 2013 NIF/NCP President Omar alBashir pardoned Mubarak Mustafa, a man convicted of assisting in the escape of four men who in 2008 brutally
murdered USAID official John Granville and his driver, Abdurrahman Abbas Rahma. The message to the U.S.
in al-Bashir's pardon was clear, as was the regime's complicity in the escape of the assassins. International
response to Khartoums most recent decisions is unclear and indecisive. But unless the moratorium is
renewedat least nominally securing what are in fact standard humanitarian operating conditions in
virtually all countrieswe may be sure that people will suffer and die as a consequence.
Without conditions there cannot be an effective allocation of resources. BG.

EricReeves.(2013)HumanitarianConditionsinDarfur:Themostrecentreportsreveal
arelentlessdeterioration.
The camps population urged different foreign aid organizations to find a solution to their water-shortage
problem, particularly as the summer is approaching. It appears that the government has blocked
organizations attempts to provide solar energy devices to displaced camps, the coordinator reported. He
explained the solar panels would facilitate water supply as old machines could be substituted by new, low-cost
ones. The coordinator added that the government is also preventing organizations efforts to bring medicines
and aid to the camps. He said the International Medical Corporation has been waiting for permission to bring
drugs to the displaced since August 2012. (Radio Dabanga [Zalingei], January 24, 2013) And from North
Darfur Radio Dabanga reports (January 23, 2013) on other water issues: Displaced [persons] living at
camp Kassab near Kutum in North Darfur, are facing a severe shortage of drinking water due to the
disruption of 10 hand pumps out of a total of 26and of two water tanks. Sheikh Taher Ismail told Radio
Dabanga that Kassabs population is witnessing a water crisis for about four days. He said the displaced must
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travel long distances to fetch water from villages such as Kambot and Thanawi in Kutum locality. Ismail
appealed to competent authorities and organizations to expedite the provision of maintenance to the camp.
This deliberate delay or obstruction of critical improvements and repairs in displaced persons camps, as
well as the delay of potentially life-saving medicines, has long been standard practice by the regime,
contravening international humanitarian and human rights law, and in aggregate amounting to crimes
against humanity (see African Studies Review, December 2011 at http://www.sudanreeves.org/?p=2734). So
long as civilian displacement continues at present rates, humanitarian resources will be overwhelmed by the
difficulties of access, insecuritymuch of it contrivedand lack of supplies and distribution capacity.
Conditionality provides a method of ensuring citizens will actually receive grants of money
given to a state. BG.
GeraldB.HelmanandStevenR.Ratner.(1992)SavingFailedStates.
Unfortunately, those methods have met with scant success in failing states, and they will prove wholly
inadequate in those that have collapsed. Western aid cannot reach its intended recipients because of
violence, irreconcilable political divisions, or the absence of an economic infrastructure. Somalia provides
a dismaying example. An IMF program is not possible where there is in effect no government. Grants of
money, uncoordinated technical assistance programs, and occasional visits by humanitarian and relief
organizations have not been enough to bring states such as Bosnia and Somalia back from the brink of
death. Although international organizations deserve much credit for responding to distress, the emergence of
additional failed states suggests the need for a more systematic and intrusive approach.
Political conditions for aid are not absolutely constraining. PNG

However, these obstacles should be actively addressed rather than left for some future democratic government
to tackle. Instead of placing absolute constraints on international assistance, the focus should be on improving
monitoring and distribution to minimize existing problems and facilitate more aid reaching people in need. If
properly applied, international assistance could in fact serve to promote political recon- ciliation and build the
social capital necessary for a successful democratic transition. Foreign governments and donors do not face a
choice between promoting political change or supporting social development in Myanmar. Both strategies
would have to be integral parts of any genuine effort to help this country and promote stability and welfare for
its 50 million people, as well as the broader region. In order to facilitate responsible and effective delivery of
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more international assistance, all the main protagonists, inside and outside the country, need to reassess their
positions and do their part to generate the kind of cooperation and synergy that has so far been lacking.
Conditional aid is justified under the right conditions. PNG

Constraints
Several lessons can be drawn from the Bosnian experience. First, it is indeed possible to use aid conditionality
as a tool for peacebuilding. Its usefulness will vary depending on the circumstances in the recipient country;
opportunities may be greater in what Ottaway (this volume) terms `open power situations, where several
groups are contending for power, than in monolithic `closed' power situations, where one group dominates; and
conditionality may be least feasible in fragmented power situations where there are no state-level authorities
with whom to bargain. Even in fragmented settings, however, there may be some scope to apply conditionality
at the local level. Second, although peace conditionality can be a useful tool, it is not a `magic bullet'. It is only
one of several instruments that external actors can use to support a peace process. Others include diplomatic
pressure, trade sanctions, and the deployment of peacekeeping forces. These instruments can be complementary,
as demonstrated in the Serb Republic, where aid conditionality was accompanied by arrests of indicted war
criminals and the seizure of hardliner-controlled television transmitters and police stations. By helping to erode
political support for the hardliners, aid conditionality lowered the costs of using force; at the same time, the
threat of force eroded the fallback position of the Bosnian Serb leadership, increasing the attractiveness of the
aid-for-peace bargain. The use of `sticks' as well as `carrots' is particularly important in dealing with `spoilers'
leaders who regard peace as a threat to their power and interests, and who are willing to use violence to
undermine it (Stedman, 1997). Finally, the scope for peace conditionality has been constrained not only by
political circumstances in recipient countries, but also by the policy priorities of the aid donors themselves.
Even in Bosnia, the scene of unprecedented efforts to link aid to peace implementation, inconsistencies among
donors have often undermined these efforts.
The practice of Smart Aid is an example of justified conditional aid. PNG

Constraints
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When faced with tradeoffs, one decision-making strategy is to weigh the good against the bad and to choose the
best (or least bad) alternative. This approach resembles benefit-cost analysis, but in the case of war and
humanitarian emergencies, the benefits and costs include human lives. In choosing how much and what types of
aid to provide, to whom, and with what conditions attached, the donors must weigh how their aid will affect
vulnerable populations on the one hand and political leaders on the other. Peace conditionality can be applied
selectively to the aid that is most beneficial to leaders and political elites, and least vital to the well-being of
poor civilians. This approach can be termed `smart aid'. In the same way that `smart sanctions' target the
international economic assets and activities of political rulers, smart aid would aim for `greater political gain
and less civilian pain (Lopez and Cortright, 1997: 329). Among the measures proposed by advocates of smart
sanctions are freezes on the foreign bank accounts of individual leaders, restrictions on their ability to travel
abroad, and the withholding of loans from IFIs. In the latter measure, smart sanctions shade into smart aid.
Aid fails without proper administration. PNG

Buss,Terry(2006)WhyForeignAidtoHaitiFailed
According to the World Bank, after 1995, there was a total mismatch between levels of foreign aid and
government capacity to absorb it (OED, 1998). USAIDs Mission in Haiti echoed the sentiment in its Resource
Review1998:Most of Haitis public institutions were too weak and ineffective to provide the level of
partnership needed with USAID or other donors to promote development.These institutions are characterized by
lack of trained personnel; no performance based incentive system; no accepted hiring, firing and promotion
procedures; heavy top down management; and a decided lack of direction (USAID, 1998, p. 2).The UN Ad
Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti concluded, in 1999, during the ongoing electoral crises that: Unfortunately [and
ironically], capacity building within those national institutions that have a mandate for aid coordination is being
hampered by the political stalemate which has made it difficult to approve new technical cooperation projects,
some of which would have strengthened managerial and coordination capacity (ECOSOC, 1999, p. 15). The
UN recommended that:The long-term development program of support for Haiti address the issues of capacitybuilding of governmental institutions, especially in areas such as governance, the promotion of human rights,
the administration of justice, the electoral system, law enforcement, police training, and other areas of social
and economic development, which are critical for enabling the Haitian Government to adequately and
effectively coordinate, manage, absorb and utilize international assistance and development aid (ECOSOC,
1999, p. 18).The Government of Haiti, in 1997, also concluded it had a serious aid management problem
(Republic of Haiti, 1997).
Ability to Attach Conditions Incentivizes NGOs. ABB
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It is difficult to state the number of active NGOs in a country, let alone internationally. In the year 2000, there
were an estimated 26 000 international NGOs, and the current number would be much higher.5 Short
lived NGOs, which work specifically during a crisis with little accountability and disappear after the crisis,
confound these estimates.
NGOs are not a homogeneous group, and an unknown proportion combine aid with political, social or
religious agendas, such as proselytising work (that is, seeking the religious conversion of an individual or a
group), aid for profit, and spreading the ideology of donor governments. There have been several reports of
NGOs spreading religious faiths in poorer countries.
It should be noted that many of these groups provide humanitarian aid because it helps them to influence
people in developing coutries. Losing this type of motivation would lead to decreased aid.
Unjust to Forcibly Separate Aid and Intervention. ABB

To look at another ethical issue, consider two communities in a country devastated by a natural disaster
community A, with a large population in serious need of healthcare, and community B, with a smaller
population than A's and with fewer medical needs. Let us assume that a faithbased NGO selects community B
because it will allow proselytising work while A disallows it. Denying aid to the more needy community, A, is
obviously discriminatory and violates the second requirement of the Code. Giving aid to community B violates
the third requirement of the Code, that aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious
standpoint. The other issue relates to allocation of resources. From a secular point of view, providing
assistance to community B (which has fewer medical needs) does not maximize total welfare
(utilitarianism) nor does it assist the most needy community (egalitarianism).10,11 In other words, scarce
resources available to the NGO are not allocated using the principles of justice.
It may be better to simply allow organizations with outside motivations to intervene where they want, as
separating them from certain needy communities may be unjust.
Government Intervention Leads to Less Non-Government Aid. ABB

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Governments that are required to respond to certain activities of NGOs also face ethical issues. Agreeing to
allow faithbased NGOs to operate frees muchneeded resources for use in other communities, and
preventing them from providing humanitarian assistance could have catastrophic consequences. An
extreme example is when a community requiring emergency healthcare does not receive aid because the
government wishes to defend its principle of maximising welfare and allocating resources according to need.
This would be a difficult decision to defend ethically, especially if there is an acute scarcity of resources to meet
the health needs of the whole population. The government could request the faithbased NGO to omit
proselytising work and provide only humanitarian assistance. This transfers the responsibility of
resolving an ethical dilemma to the NGO, which has to decide whether to provide only humanitarian
assistance or withdraw services.
Transferring the above ethical decision to the NGOs will result in some choosing not to provide as much
aid in many situations.
Womens Rights Situation shows need to Change Culture in many Cases. ABB
Atlani,Laetitia.(2000)ThePoliticsofCultureinHumanitarianAidtoWomenRefugees
whohaveExperiencedSexualViolenceTransculturalPsychiatry.
How culture is defined and considered by international aid programs has been the subject of many debates.
Psychological services for refugee victims of sexual violence have only recently become an issue on the
international agenda. However, the usual responses to these situations and the concepts that underlie them
have already been subjected to change and evolution.
Until recently, psychological assistance to these individuals was limited to a few heterogeneous and
uncoordinated assistance programs provided by humanitarian organizations. Several international NGOs and
international aid programs have intervened in refugee camps and, based on decisions taken by specific
teams, were able to offer some support in these situations. However, these interventions were rare and
depended, unfortunately on the goodwill of individual field workers (G. Howarth-Wiles, UNHCR).
In 1994, UNHCR, the UN agency responsible for the organization of refugee camps, and the United Nations
Family Planning Agency (UNFPA), decided to develop joint criteria for reproductive healthcare services for
refugees. The goal was to draft a field manual on reproductive health interventions in refugee camps, including
aid to refugee victims of sexual violence. For one year, many international reproductive and other health
organizations active in refugee camps, including NGOs, UN agencies, and bilateral assistance programs, shared
their experiences in order to draft this manual.
It seems that respect for sovereignty should be less of an issue in areas where human rights violations are
occurring, as the culture may very well be a part of the problem in these areas.
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Secondary Rights are Justified for Countries Giving Aid. ABB

B. Security Council's Claim of Secondary Rights in the Emergence of the Right of Humanitarian Assistance to
Restore Democracy:
The right of humanitarian assistance certainly includes the right to deliver food, water, and shelter,"' and this
right, in turn, gives rise to additional rights necessary to fulfill such an obligation."' In the case of the right
to give humanitarian assistance in the form of food, water, and shelter, the secondary rights have come to
include a right of delivery or access,"2 a right to protect victims,"' and a right to protect U.N. personnel.'
It was argued by the UN Security Council that it would be impossible to give unconditional aid because
these secondary rights, are necessary to ensure that goods reach people and that staff are safe. In
situations with corrupt governments, secondary rights will by necessity include political conditions.
Unconditioned Aid Harmful in Corrupt and Unstable Regions. ABB

Finally, much of Africa has experienced political instability and war. More than half of the countries in
sub-Saharan Africa have had significant political instability since independence, including civil war and
violent coups. In the past few years, almost a quarter of the countries in the region have been involved in
regional or civil wars or are experiencing substantial internal strife. Poor leadership is a continual problem.
Political instability disrupts domestic revenue generation both because investment, production, and trade
generally drop during the period of instability and because tax collection becomes much more difficult. This, in
turn, increases the dependence of countries on aid receipts.
Our research suggests that, as expected, economic decline and political violence have had a negative impact on
governance, as measured by conventional indicators. However, this is not the whole story. As we show later in
the article, when we control for changes in per capita income and for political violence, we still see a
negative relationship between aid/gross national product (GNP) and the quality of governance. Could this
be because the aid system itself provides incentives and informal rules that reinforce the political constraints
faced by reformers in aid-dependent countries and in donor agencies?
Placing conditions on aid may be necessary to ensure that corrupt governments do not use aid money
corruptly.
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Neg:
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Democratization
Neg:
Democratization
Empirical evidence proves political conditions on aid promote democracy .BG.
ThadDunning.2004.ConditioningtheEffectsofAid:ColdWarPolitics,Donor
Credibility,andDemocracyinAfrica.
The end of the Cold War could make threats to withhold development assistance to African states more
credible, and therefore more effective, in two ways. First, the diminished geostrategic importance of
African clients in the postCold War period would imply that the loss of such clients would impose a
negligible geopolitical cost on powerful donors. Second, the dissolution of the Soviet Union may not only
have removed a geopolitical threat to the West but may have vindicated the liberal values of Western
donors, lending them a sense of the possibility of democratization all over the world. Thus the perceived
benet of promoting democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa rose even as the cost of losing African clients
declined dramatically. African leaders lost signicant leverage with which to resist aid conditionality, because
only one donor ~or group of donors! offered aid to them in the postCold War period. No longer able to take
refuge in balance-ofpower politics, recalcitrant African states could be more effectively pressed to undertake the
democratizing reforms that Western donors had de-emphasized during the Cold War. Proponents and opponents
of the perversity thesis of foreign aid alike provide no reason to expect the inuence of the putative moral
hazard to increase or decrease over time. In contrast, the clear prediction of the credible commitment story is
that aid conditionality should become more effective in the postCold War period. One should therefore
expect a positive relationship between aid and democracy in the postCold War period. This causal
mechanism and its empirical prediction are [is] supported by the qualitative evidence offered by previous
studies of democratic reform in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, Claude Ake has described a legacy of
indifference to democracy among Africas political leaders, a legacy [is] rooted in both the continents
colonial past and the attitudes of many African politicians after independence. 9 Faced with challenges to
their newfound political power, post-independence elites opted for a unifying developmental ideology that
sought to repress internal dissent. Importantly, however, this ideology found obliging complicity from Western
countries that were most concerned with the grand strategies of Cold War politics. Rather than press for
democratization, Ake argues that Western powers ignored human rights violations and sought clients wherever
they could. 10 This was as true for the Soviet Union as for the Western powers. At a time when Western donors
overlooked their liberal principles and the Soviet Union put priority on the advancement of socialist and
revolutionary vanguard parties, there was little external incentive for African states to undertake democratizing
reforms. ith my claim that threats to withhold aid became more credible as the importance of retaining African
clients diminished, however, Ake points to signicance of Africas greatly diminished strategic importance for
Page 90 of 118
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Neg:
Democratization
the adoption of democratic reforms in the postCold War period: The marginalization of Africa has given the
West more latitude to conduct its relations with Africa in a principled way. In the past, the West adopted a
posture of indifference to issues of human rights and democracy in Africa in order to avoid jeopardizing its
economic and strategic interests and to facilitate its obsessive search for allies against communism. Now that
these concerns have diminished, the West nds itself free to bring its African policies into greater harmony with
its democratic principles. 11 The failure to tie aid to democratic reforms during the Cold War period, therefore,
stemmed from the geostrategic priorities of donors+ On a more fundamental level, however, the greater
latitude of the West to demand democratic reforms in the postCold War period may have its source in the
credible commitment issue. Once competition with the Soviet Union for African clients had receded, Western
donors could much more credibly threaten to withdraw aid if democratic reforms were not enacted by recipient
states. If the argument advanced above is correct, one should expect to see the relationship of aid to
regime type in Sub-Saharan Africa to be characterized by temporal discontinuity. Previous quantitative
studies of the relationship between foreign aid and democracy have failed to take this source of
heterogeneity into account, instead assuming that parameter coefcients are constant over the two
periods. In the following section, I provide empirical evidence in support of the alternate hypothesis that a
structural shift in the effect of aid on democracy occurred with the end of the Cold War.
UN Withholds Aid to Promote Democratization. ABB

Recent policy trends of actors in the world community have further encouraged democracy as a right.' The
United Nations has monitored over thirty elections, including those in Namibia, Nicaragua, and Haiti.4' Several
Western European nations have attempted to withhold aid from those nations that are not democracies.
On a
regional level, the European Community and the United States have imposed on countries, such as the
former Yugoslavia and the Balkan States, "conditions on recognition" that include a commitment to
42
democratic governance.
The idea of democracy is supported by fundamental instruments of multilateralism, specifically the U.N.
Charter. Under Chapter I, article 1(2), "[t]he Purposes of the United Nations are to develop friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
Thomas Franck finds that the right of self-determination at present "entitles peoples in all states to free, fair, and
open participation in the democratic process of governments freely chosen by each state."' He argues that
interaction on the international level is increasingly based on respect for democracy.45 In defining the
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Neg:
Democratization
right of self-determination, Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr. ties the legitimacy of self- determination claims to "the
degree of representative government in the state."'
An argument could be made that the countries would not need to receive as much aid if they adopted
democratic practices. This brings into question whether a state can truly have a right to sovereignty if it
is not democratic.
Imposing Democratization is Necessary to Truly Respect Sovereignty. ABB

The concept of popular sovereignty is at the heart of the emerging right to restore democracy. Michael Reisman
notes that "sovereignty can be violated as effectively and ruthlessly by an indigenous as by an outside
force, in much the same way that the wealth and natural resources of a country can be violated as
thoroughly and efficiently by a native as by a foreigner."50
Seen in this manner, the sovereignty of Haiti was violated when the will of the people, ascertained in
open, free and fair elections, was thwarted by violent means. Reisman also argues that the right of selfdetermination signals "a radical decision that henceforth the internal authority of governments would be
appraised internationally. 1'lFurther, the appearance of "criteria for appraising the conformity of internal
governance with international standards of democracy" is evidence of the rise of popular sovereignty. 2
It may be argued that conditional aid is troublesome because it imposes on the sovereignty of countries
receiving it. However, imposing policies that corrupt leaders may disagree with is not analogous to
violating the sovereignty of a countrys populace.
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Neg: Poverty
Poverty
Unconditional aid increases poverty. BG.
CarolGraham.(2002)CanForeignAidHelpStopTerrorism?BrookingsInstitute.
The second "don't" is not to continue to aid countries that pursue poor macroeconomic policies. Fears about the
social costs of withdrawing aid should be met with selective humanitarian and technical assistance. In the end,
prolonged aid flows to countries that pursue poor policies result in no- or low-growth traps, with high
social costs in the form of poverty and unemployment. Countries that are recovering from conflict, such as
Afghanistan, are usually exempted from the imperative of following market-oriented policies, but the
exemption should be temporary to keep such countries from falling into low-growth, aid-dependency traps.
Aid dependency and corruption crushes the effectiveness of aid and prevents any social
progress. BG.
AkbarZaidi.(2010)Theproblemwithaid.QuotedinPakistansForeignAid
Addiction.
While some economists working for the government have welcomed the latest aid package to Pakistan on the
very simplistic grounds that it gives us foreign exchange, this justification trivialises the vast political and
economic repercussions of receiving assistance, with or without strings attached. While the negligent and
wasteful use made of economic assistance in the form of corruption and inefficiency is commonplace, and that
it lines the pockets of officials of often fledgling governments is well known, perhaps a key negative effect of
depending on aid is that it becomes a habit. Aid dependence is one of the most serious consequences of aid
and it takes countries away from attempting to undertake far-reaching economic and financial reform.
When aid is so readily available, why bother undertaking unpopular measures, such as raising taxes and
lowering the fiscal deficit and increasing savings and investment? Difficult political decisions which may
create employment and reduce poverty, such as land reforms, are also abandoned. While many governments are
faced with resource constraints, aid bails out governments that are in dire need of reform and offers short-term,
rather than structural, solutions. Moreover, it is this short-term nature of aid which causes further aid
dependence. Being bailed out once in a while is an acceptable safety net, but building roads, hospitals and
schools on donor money is folly. Social-sector and infrastructure projects are notorious for their tardiness and
their prolonged gestation period implies domestic resources being put in areas or sectors where the government
may have had other priorities.
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Neg: Poverty
Unconditional aid kills free trade. BG.

JamesPeron.(2001)TheSorryRecordofForeignAidinAfrica.TheFreeman.
Most of the problems that African nations face today are self-inflicted. Africa is the last major bastion of
heavily regulated markets. This has lead to stagnancy and decline. The continent itself is rich in
resources, but the incentive to produce has been destroyed by government policies. The West is quite
aware of this, but is too timid to do very much about it, and the aid bureaucracy keeps on delivering
funds no matter how bad things get. Mengistu continued to receive aid while intentionally starving thousands
and thousands of his citizens to death.24 Mugabe slaughtered thousands of opponents in the Matabeleland
region of Zimbabwe, but aid continued unabated.25 Even when General Sani Abachas military regime in
Nigeria, in the face of world opinion, executed human-rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, virtually nothing
happened. Various Western governments protested by withdrawing their diplomats, but within a few months
they were all back in place. The World Bank has admitted that almost all loans are fully disbursed to recipient
nations even if policy conditions are not met.26 In a 1986 report it said that there was no evidence to show
significant movement toward freer markets due to aid donations or policy restrictions.27 Various critics have
repeatedly pointed out that foreign aid not only doesnt encourage reform but often stifles it.
Development economist Peter Bauer has said there is an inherent bias of government-to-government aid
toward state control and politicization. Foreign aid, he argues, has contributed substantially to the
politicization of life in the Third World. It augments the resources of government compared to the private
sector, and the criteria of allocation tend to favor government trying to establish state controls.28
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Institutional Reform
Neg:
Institutional Reform
Conditioned aid can create institutional reform within a country. BG.
WairimuR.MugoandMichaelR.Ward.(2007)IsForeignAidConditionedupon
InstitutionalReform?
Multilateral organizations increasingly claim to be conditioning foreign aid on institutional reform of the
recipient country. We test whether increases in aid flows are related to current and future institutional
improvements by relating Economic Freedom measures of the quality of countries' institutions to foreign
aid flows during the 1973 period through the 2002 period. Consistent with binding conditionality, we find that
the amount of aid flowing to a recipient country is positively related to future improvements in its
economic institutions. Moreover, these effects appear to be strongest for improvements in monetary policy and
the business environment, precisely those institutions most often targeted. These results occur for aid from
individual donor countries but not from multilateral organizations and from individual donor countries.
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Countries
Neg: Wealthy
Wealthy Countries
The majority of aid is given by wealthy and western countries. BG.
GlobalHumanitarianAssistance.(2014).Governments.
Our annual GHA reports, which we have published since 2000, provide the most comprehensive
assessment of the international financing response to humanitarian crises, including how much the total
response was, where the financing came from, where it went and how it got there. The reports also consider
how the financing response measures up to humanitarian needs. The GHA Report is relied on by a wide range
of donors to inform their funding strategies and by civil society organisations for their advocacy and policy
work in holding donors to account against their commitments, and more broadly by a wide range of
stakeholders to understand the major global trends influence global humanitarian needs and the international
financing response. Preliminary data for 2010 estimates that donors gave US$11.8 billion compared to only US
$623 million from non-DAC donors. Whilst the United States, the European institutions, the United
Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands were the biggest players, additional funding mechanisms and
ways of channelling assistance created within the international community over the past decade have also
helped increase the visibility of humanitarian assistance from other governments.
Wealthy countries are responsible for the global inequalities that exist but refuse to
acknowledge it. Small acts of charity such as aid are used to justify non-action. BG.
ThomasPogge.(2005).WorldPovertyandHuman.
Citizens of the rich countries are, however, conditioned to downplay the severity and persistence of world
poverty and to think of it as an occasion for minor charitable assistance. Thanks in part to the rationalizations dispensed by our economists, most of us believe that severe poverty and its persistence are due
exclusively to local causes. Few realize that severe poverty is an ongoing harm we inflict upon the global
poor. If more of us understood the true magnitude of the problem of poverty and our causal involvement in it,
we might do what is necessary to eradicate it. That world poverty is an ongoing harm we inflict seems
completely incredible to most citizens of the affluent countries. We call it tragic that the basic human rights of
so many remain unfulfilled, and are willing to admit that we should do more to help. But it is unthinkable to us
that we are actively responsible for this catastrophe. If we were, then we, civilized and sophisticated I
challenge this sort of justification by invoking the common and very violent history through which the present
radical inequality accumulated. Much of it was built up in the colonial era, when todays affluent countries
ruled todays poor regions of the world: trading their people like cattle, destroying their political
institutions and cultures, taking their lands and natural resources, and forcing products and customs
Page 96 of 118
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Neg: Wealthy
Countries
upon them. I recount these historical facts specifically for readers who believe that even the most radical
inequality is morally justifiable if it evolved in a benign way.
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Rid of Aid
Neg: CP: Get
CP Get Rid of Aid

Aid is Ineffective Haiti Proves TF
Reduction.
It is now pertinent to refer back to Haiti for the discussion of aid dependency. Like many other
developing nations, Haiti has become dependent on foreign aid, annually receiving assistance equal to
9.41 percent of GDP (refer to Table 1). Meanwhile, between 1980 and 2002, Haiti had the fourth worst per
capita growth rate in the world. While aid organizations have pointed fingers at the nonfunctional
Haitian government, according to economist Terry Buss, it is developmental and humanitarian aid that
have allowed these bad institutions to exist, Aid dependency undermines institutional quality by
weakening accountability, encouraging rent seeking, facilitating corruption [...] and alleviating pressures
to reform from the government.20 Once a country begins receiving large quantities of aid, local
governments have little incentive to provide public services already being supplied by the foreign
community. This phenomenon is extremely common with humanitarian aid. Consequently, developmental
economists have argued that aid can exacerbate poverty conditions because it actually gives local officials a
disincentive to change policies and encourage economic growth. Aid organizations seem to understand this
concept, however their typical solution is to exert leverage on recipient governments; not exactly a sensible and
efficient course of action.
Complete opposite of AFF arguments could work.
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Conditional Aid
Neg: Turn on
Turn on Conditional Aid

Humanitarian Aid as a Political Tool Backfires TF
CSMonitor(2013).MakingUShumanitarianaidtoSyriaapoliticaltoolisineffective
anddangerous.
Prominent policymakers and commentators have argued that in light of perceived aid failures, the United
States should use its humanitarian aid toward explicitly political aims. Over the past few months, calls have
been growing for routing US humanitarian aid through groups that are themselves party to the conflict. The
intent is to use this relief as a political tool to support the main opposition alliance and to win the US political
credit with the population at large. Beyond being ineffectual, proposed moves to use aid as a political tool
would be dangerous. Humanitarian access to civilians in need relies on adherence to the core principles of
humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and operational independence. These are not abstract ideals; they are
pragmatic tools central to the credibility and safety of Syrians we serve and humanitarian workers.
Politicizing the aid effort would demolish these principles and put the Syrians we work with not to
mention my colleagues and me at much greater risk. In each Syrian town where my aid agency works,
we have invested months building the relationships with local militias, governing councils, and
community groups that enable our staff to safely deliver aid. If any party to the conflict sees us as partial
to one side or another, those relationships could quickly unravel, and our work would be severely
threatened.
Turn on argument for consequentialist AFFs.
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Morality
Neg:
Morality
De-politicized Aid is Moral in Itself TF
Practice.
De-politicised philanthropic or charitable discourse of this kind tends to take two forms. It speaks either
in a moral voice of pity, helplessness and rescue (Benthall, 1993, p188) or with the measured authority of
science and its apparently value-free analysis of technical problems and technical solutions (De Waal,
1997, p70). Often it combines the two. Speaking in this way, what de Waal calls philanthropic
humanitarianism has claimed its legitimacy by virtue of a general moral appeal that is combined with
an apparently irrefutable technical expertise. This technical altruism is then expressed in projects of
scientific certainties in economics, health, agriculture, education, micro-finance and social work. Such technical
philanthropy has not only held a grip on humanitarianism. Firoze Manji and other post-developmentalists
have observed how the rise of development has involved the same process at work (Manji, 1998; see also
Munck and OHearn 1999, Rist 1997).
Morality argument.
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Fundraising
Apolitical Fundraising more Successful TF
Practice.
Many humanitarian agencies in the second part of the 20th century were driven by quite radical
idealism, some with an increasingly rights-based hue like many church related agencies, Oxfam and MSF.
But many were not and were conventionally philanthropic. But, even the more radical agencies, seldom
found it in their immediate financial interests to develop a more political rights-based consciousness with
their domestic publics when appealing for large funds for suffering from war and disaster. In such
circumstances, it was consistently assumed that the best button to press in potential givers was the generic
philanthropic button. An apolitical description of people as needy victims requiring generosity was more likely
to generate the giving reflex than an image of people as oppressed rights- bearers demanding a duty from states
and peoples across the world.
Advantage card for depoliticizing aid.
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Default to AFF Mindset
Neg: No
Cant Default to a AFF Mindset TF

Practice.
In his recent review of politics and humanitarian action, Neil MacFarlane, urges humanitarian agencies to
recognize and explicitly advance their politics. He notes how the tendency of international humanitarians to
regard politics as bad and humanitarian action as good and moral is absurd and concludes that
the positioning of humanitarian agencies outside or above politics may prove self-defeating(MacFarlane,
2000, p7 and p89). By recognizing the strength of their own impartial political philosophy of rights in war and
by advocating it in the proper political terms to the proper political targets, humanitarians can make an impact
on politics from their rightful place within it.
Framework card.
Page 102 of 118
Aff Counters
Page 103 of 118
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Conditional Aid Does Not Solve
Aff Counters:
A2: Conditional Aid Solves for Corrupt Regimes

Conditional aid does not solve 100% for corrupt regimes. BG.
AidProjects.
Many conditional projects allow plenty of opportunities to misuse the funds for clientelistic strategies
because they are, for example, not properly monitored. The really interesting question is whether
incumbent governments can use foreign aid projects even if they have no inuence over their allocation.
If they are able to, then electoral effects should be persistent more generally. Indeed, there are two strategies that
governments could pursue even if they have no control over the foreign aid budgets. First, incumbents could
advertise the receipt of the foreign aid project as a consequence of their ability to extract the resources
from donors for the benet of their constituents. Such a strategy is likely to be successful if voters have no
information about the actual inability of the government to inuence the allocation of funds to its
constituents.13 Second, a large part of conditional aid is provided for projects that address the domestic
social and economic infrastructure, education, health, or the environment. In other words, they fund
public goods in the recipient countries. Since foreign aid inows imply an increase in the provision of public
goods, the government can redistribute some of its domestic budget resources that were earmarked for public
good provision and redirect them towards targeted goods. In other words, conditional aid will be used to provide
public goods as determined by the donor, but it also provides nancial room to maneuver for the recipient
government to provide more targeted funding without incurring higher decits. Consequently, the pre-electoral
boost in targeted spending persists although smaller than when governments receive aid unconditionally.
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IGOs Solve Self-Interest
Aff Counters:
A2 Intergovernmental Organizations Solve Self-Interest

Argument
National Self-Interest is Present Even in Joined-Up Governmental Organizations TF
The merging of humanitarian aid and politics also reflects changes in domestic policy in some donor
governments. Specifically, Macrae discusses the policy of joined-up government, which is intended to
increase the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of public policy by coordinating and rationalising
government activities. Joined-up government has extended into the humanitarian sphere. Bowden discusses
one UK example, the Africa Conflict Prevention Fund. The fund pools the resources of the Department for
International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence in
support of common conflict-prevention objectives. It outlines specific roles for foreign policy and development
and military actors in support of these aims. In many donor countries, there has also been an important
redefinition of national self-interest. Macrae argues that this is no longer narrowly defined in terms of
immediate commercial interests and security threats, but in terms of good international citizenship. This has
facilitated a more interventionist and integrated approach to humanitarianism and conflict resolution in many
recipient countries.
Self-explanatory.
Page 105 of 118
Neg Counters
Page 106 of 118
Page 107 of 118
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Counters: Monetary Aid From NGOs
Neg
N2 Monetary Aid More Effective From NGOs

Private donations are not more useful than public, national donations. PNG
Private donations, especially large philanthropic donations and business givings, can be subject to
political/ideological or economic end-goals and/or subject to special interest. A vivid example of this is in health
issues around the world. Amazingly large donations by foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation are impressive, but the underlying causes of the problems are not addressed, which require political
solutions. As Rajshri Dasgupta comments: Private charity is an act of privilege, it can never be a viable
alternative to State obligations, said Dr James Obrinski, of the organisation Medicins sans Frontier, in Dhaka
recently at the Peoples Health Assembly (see Himal, February 2001). In a nutshell, industry and private
donations are feel-good, short-term interventions and no substitute for the vastly larger, and essentially political,
task of bringing health care to more than a billion poor people.
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Counters: US Aid Not All Politicized
Neg
N2 All US Aid is politicized

The decision for the amount of aid the US gives is largely nonpolitical. PNG
A.CooperDrury,RichardStuartOlson,DouglasA.VanBelle(2005)ThePoliticsof
HumanitarianAid:U.S.ForeignDisasterAssistance,19641995.
We began this paper by asking if (and if yes, the degree to which) political factors influence U.S. foreign
disaster assistance, rhetorically the most nonpolitical component of U.S. foreign aid. Overall, our analysis puts
to rest the notion that U.S. foreign disaster assistance is purely objective and nonpolitical. It is not even close.
Rather, U.S. humanitarian aid is strongly political, although more so in the granting stage than in the allocative
stage. Indeed, our results paint a picture of high U.S. foreign policy decision makers as realists at heart, seeing
disasters as opportunities to enhance security. The subsequent decision of how much aid to allocate, however,
appears to be left more to the foreign disaster assistance bureaucracy (OFDA) and turns out to be only slightly
less political because in addition to the humanitarian criterion, OFDA officials also seek to be sensitive to a
variety of domestic U.S. concerns, in part to protect their own agency.
Page 109 of 118
Cases
Page 110 of 118
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Aff Case
Aff Case
I stand in firm affirmation of the resolution that states: Resolved: Placing political conditions on humanitarian
aid to foreign countries is unjust. For the purpose of this debate I provide the following definition:
Humanitarian Aid: Aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human
dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. The characteristics that mark it out from other forms of
foreign assistance and development aid are that: It is intended to be governed by the principles of humanity,
neutrality, impartiality and independence. It is intended to be short-term in nature and provide for activities in
the immediate aftermath of a disaster. (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2014)
The value for this round will be that of Justice, as per the use of the word unjust in the resolution, defined as
that violating principles of justice or fairness.
The criterion for this round is Upholding Deontological Purposes of Aid, defined by the International
Committee of the Red Cross as constituted by universality, impartiality, independence and neutrality.
Founded in 1863 and largely recognized as the largest organization for regulating humanitarian aid, the ICRC
further elaborates on the purpose of humanitarian aid:
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has an ethical framework known as its fundamental
principles, or principles of humanitarian action. These principles universality, impartiality, independence and
neutrality define and delimit the humanitarian space within which the ICRC operates. These Red Cross
principles have had a profound impact on wider humanitarianism. Within humanitarian agencies, there has
been agreement on the humanitarian imperative the idea that human suffering necessitates a response. There
is also wide agreement on the principles of impartiality and universality. The principles of neutrality and
independence have also been borrowed by other humanitarian agencies, although more equivocally, and by
fewer organisations.
Disregarding the four purposes of humanitarian aid is an obvious violation of justice per the moral purposes of
justice. Just as a court systems purpose is to protect those innocent, the purpose of justice is in the means of
which justice is served.
Contention 1 is thus that politicization of humanitarian aid is deontologically harmful to goals of justice
Page 111 of 118
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Aff Case
Curtis writes in 2001, Curtis, Devon (2001). Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and
Dissension. Humanitarian Policy Group.
According to Mohammed Haneef Atmar, current humanitarian aid policies and practices in Afghanistan are
determined by Western foreign- policy goals, rather than by the actual conditions required for principled
humanitarian action. Humanitarian aid in Afghanistan acts as a fig leaf for political inaction, and as a foreignpolicy instrument to isolate the Taliban. The humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and
independence are secondary to foreign-policy interests, and are abandoned when they conflict with them. While
Afghanistan received the highest per capita aid in its history during the Cold War, humanitarian budgets were
cut dramatically after the Russian withdrawal in 198889, despite continued human suffering. While donors
may have legitimate foreign-policy concerns regarding the Taliban, argues Atmar, subordinating humanitarian
principles to other political objectives has resulted in the loss of Afghan lives. For instance, Atmar states that, if
humanitarian aid agencies were able to receive unconditional humanitarian resources and allowed to work with
the public health authorities, they may be able to save the lives of children; one out of four children die before
five years of age, and 85,000 die each year from diarrhea. In response to the discriminatory policies and
practices of the Taliban, donors and some aid agencies have imposed punitive conditionalities, including on
security, gender equality and development/capacity-building. The net impact has been the restriction of the right
to humanitarian assistance, and the inability of the international assistance community to adequately address
short- term life-saving needs. According to Atmar, the irony is that donors continue to use punitive
conditionalities, even though they have not produced the desired political and social changes, and have had
negative humanitarian consequences.
THUS, Western aid to other countries many times is not independent, used instead to thinly veil Western policy
agendas. Afghanistan provides an empirical example to one of the longest-running wars for the United States,
one of the biggest donors of international aid.
Further, this conditional aid fuels dependency on western states, thus violating another tenant of neutrality.
Nyatoro writes in 2008, Tinashe Nyatoro. (2008) The History of Foreign Aid Dependency: Challenges for
Africa.
Foreign aid has done more damage to African countries. It has led to a situation where African countries have
failed to set their own pace and direction of development, free of external interference, since development plans
for developing countries are drawn thousands of miles away in the corridors of the IMF and World Bank. This
article further noted that developed countries view aid as something to be bartered with. Thus, the West
exchanges aid for political or ideological support or uses aid to influence strategic decisions and strengthening
allies. The African state has no autonomy to control and direct national capital and even increase its bargaining
position with respect to foreign capital. In the light of this, postcolonial African development has been thwarted
by external pressure acting against internal values and traditions. In short, aid has led to the re-colonisation of
Africa through the strings attached to it. Foreign aid is a tool of statecraft used by the government providing it
to encourage or reward politically desirable behaviour on the part of the government receiving it. It is an
instrument of coercion and a tool for the exercise of power with little relevance to the lives of the recipients.
Page 112 of 118
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Aff Case
More so, the pattern of bilateral aid distribution is explained by donor interests rather than the recipient
interests. Realising the failure of aid to African countries, this article recommends the following: There is need
to repudiate all forms of foreign aid, excluding disaster relief assistance. The postcolonial state is designed to
serve foreign interests thus the state should be recaptured and restructured to serve African interests. For the
above two recommendations to take place, there is the need for an exit strategy from aid dependence that
requires a drastic move both in the mindset and in the development strategy of countries dependent on aid.
There is a need for a deeper and direct involvement of people in their own development. This requires a radical
and fundamental restructuring of the institutional aid architecture at the global level.
THUS, The dependence of countries on aid by donors is intentional, meant to further the donor countrys own
goals, whether that be for natural resources, political influence, or regional power.
Further, this politicization of aid detracts from the original purpose of aid as a universal response to those in
need.
Mohammed explains in 2001, Atmar, Mohammed (2001). Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid and its
Consequences for Afghans. Politics & Humanitarian Aid; Debates, Dilemmas & Dissension Conference.
Over years of crisis in Afghanistan, the principle of impartiality of humanitarianism has systematically fallen
victim to political considerations of donor states. In other words, political expedience of the donor states has
determined the purpose, extent and type of humanitarian response rather than human needs alone. During the
Cold War period, Afghanistan received the highest per capita aid in its history in a most unprincipled manner.
The United States alone provided military and humanitarian aid worth over US$600 million per annum after
1986 (Girardet, et al 1998:118). According to independent studies, donors were prepared to accept up to 40%
wastage (Goodhand, et al, 1999); and some others argue that only 20-30% of the humanitarian aid reached its
intended beneficiaries and the rest went astray mostly feeding war efforts (Girardet, et al, 1998:119). While
human needs were equally dire in the communist-held and resistance controlled areas of the country, the West
was prepared to provide aid only to the latter. Humanitarian aid was thus mandated to play a complementary
role as part of the wider Cold War politics to make the Russians bleed (US official cited in Girardet, et al,
1998:120). With the withdrawal of the Red Army and despite the continued human suffering, the rapid fall in
humanitarian budgets made it obvious that it was not the plight of the Afghans that mattered.
THUS, The universality of humanitarian aid is lost when other purposes for aid are introduced, such as those
political in nature.
This leads to the a violation of the last tenant of aid, which is that of neutrality. Attaching any conditions of aid,
essentially hurting those that are already down, forcibly imposes violations of sovereignty, as the host country
is in desperation to accept. This is an obvious violation of neutrality.
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Aff Case
Fox writes in 2001, Fox, Fiona (2001). New Humanitarianism: Does It Provide a Moral Banner for the 21st
Century? Overseas Development Institute 24(4).
Perhaps the most obvious risk of a new more political humanitarian action is that warring sides will no longer
accept the neutrality of aid workers in crisis. New humanitarians accept that speaking out carries a risk of losing
access to those in need but they insist this is a price worth paying for drawing international attention to human
rights abuses. There is nothing new about individual aid workers being thrown out of countries for opposing
government policies it has been happening in countries like Kenya for many years. There is also a long
tradition of relief agencies passing information on abuses to human rights groups like Human Rights Watch or
Amnesty International as a way of raising awareness without losing access to those in need. What is new is the
much more common desire of relief agencies themselves to speak out in the middle of a humanitarian crisis.
Hugo Slim notes this trend in his review of humanitarian principles and points to the dangers: Agencies cannot
expect immunity or humanitarian space if they are leaning towards solidarity (Slim, 1997). Another risk of
politicising humanitarian aid is that aid agencies are seen to have lost their independence from Western
governments whose aid policies have often had more to do with promoting national interest than meeting
human need. Aid agencies are in no position to demand that governments separate aid from foreign policy when
we are also doing politics with aid.
The sum of these justice violations seen through politicizing aid sum to turn aid-giving actions from being
humanitarian in nature to being interventionist in nature.
Bowden explains in 2001 that Bowden, Mark (2001). Responding to Conflict in Africa.
These military and humanitarian lessons should not be construed as an argument against military or
humanitarian interventions, but rather to suggest the limitations and weaknesses of this approach, particularly
where there are doubts as to the scale and duration of international commitment. Interventionism pushes both
the political and humanitarian actors together into unsatisfactory and ultimately unproductive relationships in
which both parties blame each other for their dilemmas and failures. While there will be circumstances in which
intervention is justified and the need to avert genocide provides a clear case for intervention. But then it must be
rapid, to an appropriate scale and able to deal with the broader issues of the timely delivery of justice.
The politicization of aid is a gross violation of humanitys basic tenants. It is used as a form of veiled
intervention used to further the donors policy agendas, establish influence, and is often impartial. For these
reasons I affirm the resolution.
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Neg Case
Neg Case
I value justice as prescribed by the resolution. The value criterion is utilitarianism because the resolution is a
question of government action and just governments protect the most amounts of people. Governments are
utilitarian by nature because it is the only moral theory compatible with public policy.
Woller,Gary(1997).AnoverviewbyGaryWoller
Moreover, virtually all public policies entail some redistribution of economic or political resources, such that one group's gains must come at another group's expense. Consequently, public policies in a democracy must be justified to the public, and especially to those who pay the costs of those policies. Such [but] justification cannot
Appeals to a priori moral principles,

fail to acknowledge that public
policies inevitably entail trade-offs
since policymakers cannot justify
value conflicts to the
public
since public policies
imply winners and losers, the policymakers' duty [is thus]
to demonstrate that
their polices are
to the advantage of society.
a priori principles
do not themselves suggest
public policies,
, they create
regulatory unreasonableness while failing to
address the problem
simply be assumed a priori by invoking some higher-order moral principle.
such as environmental preservation, also often
among competing values. Thus
in any philosophical sense, and
interest requires them
inherent
inherently
to the public
the redistributive effects and value trade-offs implied by
based ethical systems have severe practical limitations as a basis for public policy. At best, [Also,]
and at worst
moral
somehow
overall
At the same time, deontologically
provide only general guidance to ethical dilemmas in public affairs and
a regimen of
appropriate
adequately
or actually making it worse. For example, a moral obligation to preserve the environment by no means implies the best way, or any way for that matter, to do so, just as there is no a priori reason to believe that any policy that claims to preserve the environment will actually do so. Any number of policies might work, and others, although seemingly consistent with the moral principle, will fail utterly. That deontological principles are an inadequate
basis for environmental policy is evident in the rather significant irony that most forms of deontologically based environmental laws and regulations tend to be implemented in a very utilitarian manner by street-level enforcement officials. Moreover, ignoring the relevant costs and benefits of environmental policy and their attendant incentive structures can, as alluded to above, actually work at cross purposes to environmental preservation. (There
exists an extensive literature on this aspect of regulatory enforcement and the often perverse outcomes of regulatory policy. See, for example, Ackerman, 1981; Bartrip and Fenn, 1983; Hawkins, 1983, 1984; Hawkins and Thomas, 1984.) Even the most die-hard preservationist/deontologist would, I believe, be troubled by this outcome. The above points are perhaps best expressed by Richard Flathman, The number of values typically involved in
public policy decisions, the broad categories which must be employed and above all, the scope and complexity of the consequences to be anticipated militate against reasoning so conclusively that they generate an imperative to institute a specific policy. It is seldom the case that only one policy will meet the criteria of the public interest (1958, p. 12). It therefore follows that in a democracy, policymakers have an ethical duty to establish a plausible
link between policy alternatives and the problems they address, and the public must be reasonably assured that a policy will actually do something about an existing problem
; this requires
the means-end language and methodology of
utilitarian ethics.
Good intentions, lofty rhetoric, and moral piety are an insufficient though perhaps at times a
necessary, basis for public policy in a democracy.
Additionally, the government is created by citizens for their protection. Citizens cede rights to government, so
its reciprocal obligation is to protect their interests. Deontology is bad because it fails to prescribe action. The
entire purpose of state policy is to manage between conflicting rights, but deontology makes this impossible
because some rights will always conflict, so it is useless in guiding governments.
The thesis and sole contention of my case is that placing political conditions on aid is just approach to spreading
democracy and lowering the amount of innocent death in unstable countries. Empirical evidence from Africa
proves that political conditions on aid encourages democracy.
ThadDunning.2004.ConditioningtheEffectsofAid:ColdWarPolitics,Donor
Credibility,andDemocracyinAfrica.
The end of the Cold War could make threats to withhold development assistance to African states more
credible, and therefore more effective, in two ways. First, the diminished geostrategic importance of
African clients in the postCold War period would imply that the loss of such clients would impose a
negligible geopolitical cost on powerful donors. Second, the dissolution of the Soviet Union may not only
have removed a geopolitical threat to the West but may have vindicated the liberal values of Western
donors, lending them a sense of the possibility of democratization all over the world. Thus the perceived
benet of promoting democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa rose even as the cost of losing African clients
declined dramatically. African leaders lost signicant leverage with which to resist aid conditionality, because
only one donor ~or group of donors! offered aid to them in the postCold War period. No longer able to take
refuge in balance-ofpower politics, recalcitrant African states could be more effectively pressed to undertake the
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Neg Case
democratizing reforms that Western donors had de-emphasized during the Cold War. Proponents and opponents
of the perversity thesis of foreign aid alike provide no reason to expect the inuence of the putative moral
hazard to increase or decrease over time. In contrast, the clear prediction of the credible commitment story is
that aid conditionality should become more effective in the postCold War period. One should therefore
expect a positive relationship between aid and democracy in the postCold War period. This causal
mechanism and its empirical prediction are [is] supported by the qualitative evidence offered by previous
studies of democratic reform in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, Claude Ake has described a legacy of
indifference to democracy among Africas political leaders, a legacy [is] rooted in both the continents
colonial past and the attitudes of many African politicians after independence. 9 Faced with challenges to
their newfound political power, post-independence elites opted for a unifying developmental ideology that
sought to repress internal dissent. Importantly, however, this ideology found obliging complicity from Western
countries that were most concerned with the grand strategies of Cold War politics. Rather than press for
democratization, Ake argues that Western powers ignored human rights violations and sought clients wherever
they could. 10 This was as true for the Soviet Union as for the Western powers. At a time when Western donors
overlooked their liberal principles and the Soviet Union put priority on the advancement of socialist and
revolutionary vanguard parties, there was little external incentive for African states to undertake democratizing
reforms. ith my claim that threats to withhold aid became more credible as the importance of retaining African
clients diminished, however, Ake points to signicance of Africas greatly diminished strategic importance for
the adoption of democratic reforms in the postCold War period: The marginalization of Africa has given the
West more latitude to conduct its relations with Africa in a principled way. In the past, the West adopted a
posture of indifference to issues of human rights and democracy in Africa in order to avoid jeopardizing its
economic and strategic interests and to facilitate its obsessive search for allies against communism. Now that
these concerns have diminished, the West nds itself free to bring its African policies into greater harmony with
its democratic principles. 11 The failure to tie aid to democratic reforms during the Cold War period, therefore,
stemmed from the geostrategic priorities of donors+ On a more fundamental level, however, the greater
latitude of the West to demand democratic reforms in the postCold War period may have its source in the
credible commitment issue. Once competition with the Soviet Union for African clients had receded, Western
donors could much more credibly threaten to withdraw aid if democratic reforms were not enacted by recipient
states. If the argument advanced above is correct, one should expect to see the relationship of aid to
regime type in Sub-Saharan Africa to be characterized by temporal discontinuity. Previous quantitative
studies of the relationship between foreign aid and democracy have failed to take this source of
heterogeneity into account, instead assuming that parameter coefcients are constant over the two
periods. In the following section, I provide empirical evidence in support of the alternate hypothesis that a
structural shift in the effect of aid on democracy occurred with the end of the Cold War.
Prefer this evidence because A) the majority of humanitarian aid goes to countries in Africa meaning this metastudy includes the largest amount of data. This makes the study highly accurate and conclusive. B) This study
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Neg Case
took into account the politics of states involved in the humanitarian intervention, something that previous
studies ignored. And C) Africa is the only place that has had long-term conditional aid. The benefits of political
conditions on aid are long-term thus this study can accurately evaluate the results of the aid. Short-term studies
fail to take this into account.
Conditionality ensures that citizens will be receiving the aid properly. This is particularly important in nondemocratic or corrupt regimes where unconditional aid fails.
GeraldB.HelmanandStevenR.Ratner.(1992)SavingFailedStates.
Unfortunately, those methods have met with scant success in failing states, and they will prove wholly
inadequate in those that have collapsed. Western aid cannot reach its intended recipients because of
violence, irreconcilable political divisions, or the absence of an economic infrastructure. Somalia provides
a dismaying example. An IMF program is not possible where there is in effect no government. Grants of
money, uncoordinated technical assistance programs, and occasional visits by humanitarian and relief
organizations have not been enough to bring states such as Bosnia and Somalia back from the brink of
death. Although international organizations deserve much credit for responding to distress, the emergence of
additional failed states suggests the need for a more systematic and intrusive approach.
It is very good if humanitarian aid with political conditions can increase the amount of democratic states.
Particularly in Africa and other unstable regions, democracy can drastically prevent conflicts between nations,
human rights abuses, environmental degradation, and increase economic stability.
Diamond,Larry(1995).PromotingDemocracyinthe1990s:ActorsandInstruments,
Issues,andImperatives.
The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly
democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to
aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their
own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor
terrorism against one another. They do not build Weapons of Mass Destruction to use on or to threaten one
another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long
run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible
because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments.
They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their
openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their
own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies
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Neg Case
are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can
be built.
Additionally, absent democratic checks, governments have killed over a hundred million people in the last
century.
Rummel,RJ(1994).Powerkills:GenocideandMassMurder
This is a report of the statistical results from a project on comparative genocide and mass-murder in this [the
twentieth] century. Most probably near 170,000,000 people have been murdered in cold-blood by
governments, well over three-quarters by absolutist regimes. The most such killing was done by the Soviet
Union (near 62,000,000 people), the communist government of China is second (near 35,000,000), followed by
Nazi Germany (almost 21,000,000), and Nationalist China (some 10,000,000). Lesser megamurderers include
WWII Japan, Khmer Rouge Cambodia, WWI Turkey, communist Vietnam, post-WWII Poland, Pakistan, and
communist Yugoslavia. The most intense democide was carried out by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, where
they killed over 30 percent of their subjects in less than four years. The best predictor of this killing is regime
power. The more arbitrary power a regime has, the less democratic it is, the more likely it will kill its
subjects or foreigners. The conclusion is that power kills, absolute power kills absolutely.
Based on these impacts that will occur if we do not spread democracy, it is clear that placing political conditions
on aid is just and will create a safer, developed world.
Page 118 of 118

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Foundation Briefs

Advanced Level March/April Brief

Resolved: Placing political conditions on

The Structure of a Foundation Brief

Definition of Humanitarian Aid TF

Status Quo is of Humanitarian Aid as Including Political Conditions TF

Definition of Humanitarian Aid to Include Disaster Relief TF

Distinction from Developmental Aid TF

Definition of conditional aid and the types of policies included. CFS

Explanations of the different types of conditional aid. CFS

Definition of Aid Dependence. ABB

Defend Your Source

Fiona Fox British relief service specialist.

Impartial Aid Better

Negative Impact on Recipient Country

Paternalistic aid is not justified according to Locke and Kant. PNG

Conditional aid actually harms recipient nation. PNG

Negative Impacts On Aid and Aid Relations

Phantom Aid is not justified. PNG

Studies show that political conditions do not increase effectiveness. PNG

not what would be successful. CFS

Politicized Humanitarian Aid Bad Kosovo Proves TF

Politicization of Aid Bad Afghanistan proves TF

Politicized Humanitarian Aid Bad Afghanistan Proves TF

Politicized of Aid Violates the Four Tenants of Humanitarianism TF

Myanmar only desires aid that is nonpolitical. PNG

Conditionality was counterproductive in Haiti. PNG

Conditional aid has actually sustained the Israel-Palestine conflict. CFS

Conditions on aid to Palestine oppress Palestinians. BG.

United States aid has an unjustified military agenda. PNG

Table Showing Overreliance on Aid in Parts of Africa. ABB

Independence Key to Humanitarian Aid TF

Neutrality Key to Humanitarian Aid TF

Humanity Used as Justification for Sovereignty Violations TF

Foreign Aid has Become a Political Agenda TF

Conditional Aid Inevitable

Aid can be Used as a Pretext

Aid Morally Required for its Own Sake

Psychosocial Humanitarian Intervention Bad TF

Unconditioned Aid May Decrease Aid

Must Combine Political and Social Agendas TF

States Only Have Obligations to Their Own Citizens

Aid in conflict situations is inherently a political tool. PNG

Multilateral action is much more effective than unilateral action. PNG

Justification for Countries not Acknowledging International Obligations. ABB

Paternalistic aid is justified when subjects autonomy is impaired. PNG

Nonpoliticized aid in Myanmar legitimizes the military regime. PNG

In Somalia, nonpolitical humanitarian aid fails. PNG

When blindly given, aid is co-opted for military use. PNG

Justification for UN Politicizing Humanitarian Aid in Haiti. ABB

Right to Democracy as a Justification for Attaching Conditions to Aid. ABB

Oppressive Regimes may Justify taking Extraordinary Measures. ABB

U.N. Security Councils Moral Authority Supersedes Sovereignty of Tyrants. ABB

Without conditions there cannot be an effective allocation of resources. BG.

Political conditions for aid are not absolutely constraining. PNG

Conditional aid is justified under the right conditions. PNG

The practice of Smart Aid is an example of justified conditional aid. PNG

Aid fails without proper administration. PNG

Ability to Attach Conditions Incentivizes NGOs. ABB

Unjust to Forcibly Separate Aid and Intervention. ABB

Government Intervention Leads to Less Non-Government Aid. ABB

Secondary Rights are Justified for Countries Giving Aid. ABB