Sie sind auf Seite 1von 11

[4 LR 19]

EN BANC
AM NO 90-5-2373 JULY 12, 1990
IN RE: ATTY. EMILIANO P. JURADO, JR. a.k.a. EMIL JURADO

Gentlemen,
Quoted hereunder for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated July 12,
1990.
Adm Matter No. 90-5-2373 (In Re: Atty. Emiliano P. Jurado, Jr. a.k.a. Emil Jurado).
The front page of the Sunday, May 27, 1990 issue of the Manila Standard, a national
daily, carried the banner headline: Rebellion complex does not exist SC. And below it in
smaller type, State back to Square One in cases vs. Enrile, et. al. The lead article
appeared in the following page under the sub-head High Tribunal reaffirms Hernandez
Doctrine with 14-1 vote and the by-line of Emil Jurado, Manila Standard Columnist and
reported, pertinently, that according to well-placed sources at the Supreme Court, in a
decision penned by Associate Justice Narvasa ** to be announced tomorrow for immediate
promulgation ** the court had ** upheld a long standing precedent known as the
Hernandez Doctrine ** (and) reaffirmed that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder
and other common offenses does not exist ** (and) * (b)y a vote of 14 to one ** denied the
governments motion (sic) to repeal the doctrine. It added that said majority included Chief
Justice Marcelo Fernan and that the lone opposition vote was Justice Leo Medialeas.
Mr. Jurados regular column on page 10 of the same issue which was titled SC
decision knocks out govt lawyers. And began with the word SCOOP in bold, reiterated
the above-quoted highlights of his page 2 report. If those details and the photographs
accompanying the report were not indication enough, mention therein of the names of
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, ex-Assemblyman Homobono Adaza and lawyer Rafael Recto,
among others, made clear what the main subject of those news items was: a supposed
decision awaiting immediate promulgation on one or another of the cases then pending in
this Court that challenged the validity of criminal informations charging various persons
with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder in connection with the failed
coup attempt of December, 1989.
The Monday, May 28, 1990 issue of the Manila Standard was headlined High Cort
ruling hailed. The lead Article by Amante E. Bigornia on page 2 reported that the ruling
had been hailed by unnamed legal luminaries and added further supposed details about
its adoption which the writer attributed to the papers equally anonymous sources. In his
column on page 9 of the same issue, Mr. Jurado elaborated in his earlier report as follows:
The Supreme Court is expected to promulgate today or tomorrow its
decision upholding the Hernandez doctrine that the complex crime of
rebellion with murder or frustrated murder does not exist. The decision will
be released as soon as it is signed by Justice Manuel (sic) Gancayco and

Encoded by Hezekiah D. Nicdao, Ateneo Law B2018

Justice Irene Cortes, who were expected to arrive from abroad over the
weekend. The two had earlier signified their intention to uphold the
Hernandez doctrine.
I must however, make certain clarifications about the Standard
exclusive yesterday on the Supreme Court decision. The High Court voted 140 (not 14-1, as reported yesterday). As explained by my unimpeachable
source, who is not connected in any way with the Supreme Court, Associate
Justice Leo Medialea, who was reported to have cast the dissenting vote, had
in fact inhibited himself from the process. Medialeas son is a junior partner
of the PECABAR Law Office, the firm of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile, who is
charged with this complex crime.
One Justice, who concurred in the decision abstained in the case of
the Panlilios because he is related to them and was their lawyer at one time.
The decision was penned by Associate Justice Andres Narvasa, whose
father the late Judge Gregorio Narvasa, decided in the 50s that the complex
crime of rebellion does not exist.
While headlines and news about the matter continued to greet Manila Standard
readers on Tuesday, May 29, 1990, the tenor of these had materially changed. The
headlines now proclaimed that Cory (referring to the President) awaits SC ruling and
Tribunal still deliberating rebellion complex issue. The news inside was no longer about a
decision already reached or a ruling made. It reported a statement of the Chief Justice,
made through Assistance Clerk of Court Luz Puno, that there was no such decision and
that the matter was still under deliberation. For the first time in three days, Mr. Jurados
subject was silent on the subject.
The sequence of events is revealing. Having stood by their news story of two days,
Mr. Jurado and his newspaper had already began to backtrack, as it were, by the third,
confronted, no doubt, with the hard fact that it was not and could not be, substantiated.
On that same Tuesday, the Court en banc issued a Resolution branding as false the
news reports of May 27, 1990, declaring that as of that day, no decision or resolution on the
subject of said reports have been signed, either by the supposed ponente or any other
member of the Court, and requiring Mr. Emil Jurado (full name Emiliano P. Jurado, Jr:
hereafter, respondent only), a member of the bar as well as a journalist, to explain within
five (5) days why he should not be dealt with administratively ** for publishing obviously
false statements relative to the Courts action on a pending proceeding or otherwise
indulging in speculation or conjecture, or airing illicit information about the same.
By the fourth day, nothing was left but excuses. In his column in the Wednesday,
May 30, 1990 issue of the Manila Standard, respondent acknowledge having received the
show-cause Resolution and sought to justify the questioned news items as legitimate
reporting duly verified [4 LR 20] by both himself and his editor-in-chief and approved for
publication of the latter. The same issued featured an editorial which relevantly:

Encoded by Hezekiah D. Nicdao, Ateneo Law B2018

a) Admitted that breaking the story of the alleged decision before its
promulgation went against the usual practice of awaiting the Courts
pronouncement thereof;
b) Admitted, also, awareness of the principle underlying such practice: **
that premature disclosure and discussion may affect the Supreme
Courts deliberation on the matter;
c) Sought to justify such action on the peoples right to know about
decisions with ** momentous effect on many prominent people **
(and) important implications for the political process o this country;
d) Expressed the editors feeling that no violation of such principle
against premature disclosure of the Courts decisions had been
committed; and
e) Clearly implied that the decision to publish the report as a news story
under respondents by-line, instead of as an item in his column, had
meant to evoke a reaction from the Court which would have ignored a
column item as opinion or gossip.
It is now of public knowledge that respondents claimed reliance on unimpeachable
sources had been totally misplaced. At the time of publication of the reports in question, no
ruling or decision on any of what have become widely known by the misnomer rebellion
complex cases had issued or was about to issue. No action or pronouncement of the Court
had given any intimation that a ruling on the merits on any of them was in the offing. As a
matter of fact, said cases were still under deliberation, and the members of the Court had
yet to reach that agreement or consensus upon which alone a formal ruling or judgment
could follow. Quite apart from the consideration that a decision or resolution of the Court
becomes such, for all legal intents and purposes, only from the moment of its promulgation1
and none had to that time been promulgated, it was also a fact that no decision or
resolution of the tenor and character reported had been signed, either by the supposed
writer thereof, or by any other member of the Court.
Only on July 5, 1990 did the Court promulgate its Decision in G.R. Nos. 92163
(Enrile vs. Salazar, et. al.) and 92164 (Sps. Panlilio vs. De Leon, et. al.) upholding the
Hernandez ruling2 in the rebellion cases filed against the petitioners herein. Its contents, by
showing up the many inaccuracies in Mr. Jurados earlier accounts, attest to the falsity of
his report of its existence on or before May 27, 1990. Thus, insofar as concerned the
question of wheter or not the Hernandez ruling remains binding precedent, it was not a 140 nor a 14-1, but a 12-1 decision, two members of the Court being on leave. The member
first reported as having dissented (Medialea, J.) did not in fact do so. He concurred with the
majority in G.R. No. 92164 and abstained from voting in G.R. 92163. It was the Chief
Justice who filed a dissent on that principal issue. No member abstained in G.R. No. 92164
by reason of either blood or past professional relationship with the petitioners therein. Of
the 12 member majority, six (6) issued or concurred in separate opinions which, without
affecting their concurrence on the main ruling upholding Hernandez, expressed dissent on,
or reservations about, some points raised and discussed in the majority opinion. The fact
1

Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Lopez Enage 152 SCRA 80 (1987); Ago vs. Court of Appeals, 6 SCRA 530 (1962)

99 Phil. 515 (1956)

Encoded by Hezekiah D. Nicdao, Ateneo Law B2018

that so many members of the court found need to express their own views underscores,
independently of any disavowals on the part of the Court or its officers, the improbability of
any consensus having been reached much more, of a decision having been written or
signed at the time of the news reports in question.
Under date of June 1, 1990, respondent filed a Compliance with the show-cause
Resolution which, while assuming responsibility for the publication of the news reports of
May 27, 1990 above referred to and offering his apologies to the Court ** if ** (he had) in
some way, actually hampered the administration of justice, or obstructed the orderly
workings of the Court, ** pleads in justification freedom of the press as well as the right of
the public to information on matters of public concern, both he avers, being guaranteed by
the Constitution.
What said Compliance makes immediately apparent is the wide variance between
the plain import of the news reports in question and that the of the information upon which
respondent admittedly based the same. Said reports which according to respondent were
drafted, in part at least and in for inclusion in his column, two days before they were
actually published3 - invariably advert to the supposed ruling in the past tense, i.e., as a fait
accompli, a decision already reached, putting into writing and signed, thus (t)he Supreme
Court has upheld a long standing legal precedent known as the Hernandez doctrine **; (b)y
a vote of 14 to one, the Tribunal already denied the governments motion to repeal the
doctrine **; and (t)he ** decision was penned by Associate Justice Andres Narvasa and
concurred in by 13 other justices.: Bit, also by his own account, the information upon which
he based those reports was merely to the effect that ** the Supreme Court deliberations
clearly pointed to an overwhelming majority for upholding the Hernandez doctrine ** and
indicated ** the existence of a trend towards (such) a consensus among the members of the
Court.4 While such information might have inspired speculation about a possible ruling, it
simply did not warrant making, much less publishing as news, a conclusion that a decision
on the matter had already been written and signed.
Thus, said reports, insofar as they assumed to chronicle an actual state of facts,
were not only objectively false, even in the context of what respondent claimed had come to
his knowledge, they were also grossly exaggerated and, at best, speculative. If all that
respondent had obtained from his unidentified sources was information had reached a
consensus, or that there was a trend towards a consensus, for upholding the Hernandez
ruling and it is notable that even as he claims that his editors had checked out said
information prior to publication and obtained further details confirming its accuracy, he
neglects to mention any of those detains its evolution into straight news that a ruling had
in fact been written and signed [4 LR 21] and was about to be promulgated cannot be
defended on the ground of either truth or honest error.
Neither does it merit belief that respondents editors had seriously applied
themselves to checking independently the capacity of information about a supposed ruling
before proposing to respondent and/or authorizing its publication. The implicit admission in
3

Compliance, p. 2, par. 1

Id., also pp. 4-5 par. 1

Encoded by Hezekiah D. Nicdao, Ateneo Law B2018

the editorial of May 30, 1990 that the reports were published as straight news, not as
comment or gossip, in order to provoke a reaction from the Court clearly suggests that it
was the Court that was expected to confirm or verify the story, that expectation itself
providing the justification for its publication; there would otherwise be no reason for such
action had respondents editors attempted more than a desultory check or verification of
said story. It further suggests that the Court, ** jealous of its inner workings **, has to be
prodded into announcing or promulgating its decisions already made, however important,
far-reaching or urgent, the questions resolved and unmindful of the right of the people to be
informed thereof. The notion must be speedily rejected and laid to rest, being wholly false
and denigrative of the collective sense of duty of the members of this Court.
Nothing so far stated, however, should be taken as in any manner implying that
objective truth or good faith will exonerate respondent here. The really relevant question
being whether the report and comments in questions, regardless of their truth and of the
motives or purposes behind their publication, are protected by the constitutionallyguaranteed freedom of the press and the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.5 There is no dispute of the existence and fundamental character of these
guarantees. But equally fundamental, needing no express statement or sanction in statute
or charter because inherent in the very nature of the judicial power and indispensable to
the free and untrammeled exercise by the courts of their traditional functions, is the
principle of confidentiality of all actuations of, or records or proceedings before, a Court in a
pending action which are not essentially public in character. Such principal the Court holds
to be equally firmly established by immemorial tradition and to inhere in the judicial
power that is vested by the Constitution in this Court and in the lower courts established
by law.6 Awareness of such principle is in fact acknowledge, expressly by respondents
editors in their May 30, 1990 editorial as already pointed out, and at least implicitly by
respondent himself, if indeed he is not chargeable with such knowledge as a lawyers. As far
as the proceedings in this Court are concerned, these confidential matters include, among
others, raffling of cases, deliberation and discussions of the en banc or the divisions, drafts
of decisions and resolutions embodying conclusions reached and dispositions agreed upon
by the members in consultation.
Nor is the tension or confrontation resulting from the interplay of these adversarial
principles a new or recent development. It is as old as their common history, a longstanding subject of judicial inquiry, and the weight of jurisprudence thereby developed
clearly supports the view that a publication relating to judicial action in a pending case
which tends to impede, embarrass or obstruct the court and constitutes a clear and present
danger to the administration of justice is not protected by the guarantee of press freedom
and is punishable as contempt.
In American Law, it is regarded as an interference with the work of the courts to
publish any matters which should be kept private, as, for example, the secrets of the jury
room.

5
6

ART III, SECS. 4 and 7, Constitution


ART VIII, SEC. 1, Constitution

Encoded by Hezekiah D. Nicdao, Ateneo Law B2018

A person charged with contempt of court in making utterances or publishing


writings which clearly constitute a contempt may not ordinarily escape liability therefor by
invoking the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and the press. Liberty of speech
and the press must not be confused with the abuse of such liberties. Obstructing, by means
of the spoken or written word, the administration of justice by the courts has been
described as abuse of the liberty of the speech or the press such as will subject the abuse to
punishment for contempt of court7

As a general rule, a publication tending to intimidate, influence, impede, embarrass


or obstruct the courts in the administration of justice in matters pending before them
constitutes contempt. This rule applies to any publication which has a tendency to prejudice
or prevent fair and impartial action in a cause under judicial investigation, whether by
threats or other forms of intimidation, or by reflections on the court, counsel, parties, or
witnesses, with respect to the cause. To constitute contempt, the publication need not be
made in the place where the court is held; circulation in or about such place is sufficient.
Except as otherwise provided by statute, it is not necessary to show that the
publication actually obstructed, impeded, or embarrassed the administration of justice,
although it must appear that its tendency was of that character. However, neither inherent
tendency or reasonable tendency to interfere with the orderly administration of justice in
an action then before a court for consideration is enough to justify a restriction of free
expression; the publication must have been made under such circumstances as would be
calculated to imperil the fair and orderly functioning of the judicial process, not remotely or
probably, but immediately, and it must constitute a clear and present danger to the
administration of justice, which danger must be serious and substantial.
* * *
A cause is pending within the rule relating to contempt from the moment an
indictment is returned to the court, or from the beginning of the action. A cause remains
pending so long as there is still something for the court to do therein, the doing of which
may be embarrassed, impeded, or obstructed by the complained of publication. This a cause
is pending when it is still open to modification, appeal, or rehearing and until the judgment
is rendered and the remittur issued, and a cause is still pending within the meaning of the
rule, although an order has been made dismissing the action on the payment of the fees.
[4 LR 22]
* * *
Divulging judicial secrets constitutes an interference with the proper functioning of
the courts and the administration of justice.8
In US vs. Sullens9 where the editor of a newspaper published an article commenting
adversely to the prosecution upon certain criminal proceedings pending in court at the time
of publication, forecast an acquittal of the defendants, it was held:
17 Am. Jur. 2d pp. 58-59
17 CJS, pp. 81-87
9 17 CJS, pp. 81-87
7

Encoded by Hezekiah D. Nicdao, Ateneo Law B2018

The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and
distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the
courts have corrective rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the
Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its
jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and taken
care of at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order
to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which tend to impair the
impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this court will
not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt **
* * *
This court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an
orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions.
This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court and, as a last resort, as an
individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an
unprejudiced tribunal. But such a case as this has never before occurred in the history of
the state so far as I know, and it is hoped will never occur again.

And in Burns vs. State10:


Judicial proceedings, in a case which the law requires to be conducted in
secret for the proper administration of justice, should never be, while the case is on trial,
given publicity by the press. It is not infrequent that proceedings in courts of England in an
important criminal case are highly commended by the press of this country and comparison
with procedure in the latter unjustly made unfavorable thereto, without appreciating the
very things which attract favorite mention are promoted by restrictions upon personal
liberty which do not exist here at all, or are sparingly enforce. Such an occurrence during
an important criminal trial after retirement of the jury to deliberate upon their verdict, as
publication in a newspaper of the secrets of the jury room would, in the mother country, be
visited by prompt and severe punishment as contempt of court. That incidents of like
treatment of offenders may be found in the decisions of courts in this country, is well
illustrated by State vs. Howell.11 Here, the duty to abstain from such abuses is just as great
as elsewhere. Here, the sense of duty incident to good citizenship and public condemnation
of such abuses ought to be sufficient to prevent such occurrences. Moreover, trial courts
should be alive to the importance of protecting jurors from such interference during the
course of a trial particularly after the retirement to deliberate upon their verdict, in
important criminal cases.

Closer to home, in In Re: Lozano and Quevedo, which involved contempt proceedings
against the editor and writer of a newspaper which published an inaccurate account of a
closed-door investigation of a Judge of First Instance, this Court, after surveying earlier

10

(1929) 36 Fed. (2nd) 230, 238-239

11

80 Conn. 668-69 Atl 1057, 125 Am. St. Rep. 141.

Encoded by Hezekiah D. Nicdao, Ateneo Law B2018

American cases12 and quoting with approval from some, notably Sullen and Burns, supra,
held the respondents in contempt, saying:
The rule is well established than newspaper publications tending to impede,
obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in the administration of justice in a pending
suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the
courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It is also regarded as an interference
with the work of the courts to publish any matters which their policy requires should be
kept private, as for example the secrets of the jury room, or proceedings in camera (6
R.C.L.) pp. 508-515).
* * *
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This
constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The court has heretofore given
evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the Liberal Law which come dangerously
close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizen must
be preserved in all its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the
citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as is the
maintenance of the unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the
maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had
if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if
such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of
confidential proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the courts.

Upon similar considerations, contempt rulings were handed down by the Court in In
Re: Parazo13, where a reporter had refused to divulge the sources of a published account
written by his of alleged leakage in the bar examinations, and in In Re: Sotto14, where the
respondent in a published article criticizing the Courts decision in Parazo, not only called
said decision erroneous, but portrayed its members, or the majority of them, as
incompetent, narrow-minded blunderers capable of deliberate injustice, and threatened to
present a bill in the next Congress reorganizing the Court and reducing its membership.
And, more recently, in Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan and Raul M. Gonzalez15,
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled [4 LR 23] to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No
one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of
is that freedom of speech and expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute
and that the freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated
with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental
public fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice. For the protection and maintenance of the
freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and
orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable
12

Scott vs. Scott (1912), Am Ann Cas., 1912-b, 504; State of Iowa vs. Dunham (1858), 6 Iowa 245; Re: Shortbridge (1893), 99
CAL, 526; 2 1 L.R.A. 755; Ex. Parte Foster (1903), 60 L.R.A., 631
13
G.R. No. L-2581 (1948)
14

82 Phil. 595 (1949)

15

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578, February 1, 1989 Per Curiam Resolution

Encoded by Hezekiah D. Nicdao, Ateneo Law B2018

independent institutions for the delivery of justice, which are accepted by the general
community. As Mr. Justice Frank further put it:
*** A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor
an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other;
both are indispensable to a free society.
The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent
judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And
one of the potent means of assuring judges their independence is a free
press. Concurring in Pennekamp vs. Florida.16

It is quite evident that in the particular circumstances of this case and upon
authority of the cited precedents, respondent cannot shield himself from culpability by
invoking the freedoms of the press and of information. There can be no doubt that his
published report and comments on a non-existent decision tended directly to embarrass the
court and obstruct its proper functioning, putting it to what should have been the
unnecessary task of defending or proving the integrity of its proceedings. Even assuming
that he had learned, correctly but surreptitiously through unauthorized leaks, of a voting
trend in favor of upholding the Hernandez doctrine, or of deliberations pointing to such a
trend, or even of a draft decision or resolution of the terms and tenor reported, premature
revelation thereof placed the Court in disrepute as an inept and incompetent guardian of its
own confidential proceedings or, worse, offered the temptation to rewrite the decision in
order to avoid such odium. These, considering that as the highest tribunal in the land, the
Court is and should serve as the model and exemplar for all lower courts to emulate,
constituted a clear and present danger to the orderly and impartial administration of
justice.
While he and his editors concede that it is the right and the duty of the Court to
protect the integrity of its proceedings, respondent would plead what he mistakenly
perceives to be a higher duly on his part, as a member of the press, to inform the public on
matters of general interest. This hoary argument finds its answer in the authorities already
cited and what has been stated about press freedom giving no license to breach the
confidentiality of pending judicial proceedings. No useful purpose is promoted, no
professional or civic obligation is served, by publishing information that is of its very
character confidential and should be kept so, before it is announced by the appropriate
authority. Another simpler answer is that there is no duty to publish false information. A
newsman owes the public no duty that he does not owe first to the truth.
Respondent cannot even pretend that he acted in good faith. He lays claim to having
been a full-time journalist for the last forty years. With that wealth of journalistic
experience, to say nothing of his legal education, and the conceded necessity of checking the
accuracy of his sources, he was inexcusably remiss in neglecting the most obvious and
direct way of verifying whether or not there was already a ruling or decision such as the
16

328 U.S. 331 at 354-356 (1946)

Encoded by Hezekiah D. Nicdao, Ateneo Law B2018

information given him may, in his belief, have portended a simple inquiry with the Clerk of
the Court which, as the Court stated in its show-cause Resolution, would have yielded the
information that none had yet issued or been promulgated.
Respondent expresses perplexity at being called to account for the publications in his
capacity as a member of the bar, not as a journalist. This distinction is meaningless, since
as the matter stands, he has failed to justify his actuations in either capacity, and there is
no question of the Courts authority to call him to task either as a newsman or as a lawyer.
What respondent proposes is that in considering his actions, the Court judges them only as
those of a member of the press and disregard the fact that he is also a lawyer. But his
actions cannot be put into such neat compartments. In the natural order of things, a
persons acts are determined by and reflect, the sum total of his knowledge, training and
experience. In the case of the respondent in particular, the Court will take judicial notice of
the frequent appearance in his regular columns of comments and observations utilizing
legal language and argument, bearing witness to the fact that in pursuing his craft as a
journalist, be calls upon his knowledge as a lawyer to help inform and influence his readers
and enhance his credibility. Even absent this circumstance, respondent cannot honestly
assert that in exercising his profession as a journalist, he does not somehow, consciously or
unconsciously, draw upon his legal knowledge and training. It is thus not realistic, nor
perhaps even possible to come to any fair, informed, and intelligent judgment of
respondents actuations by divorcing from consideration the fact that he is a lawyer as well
as a newspaperman, even supposing which is not the case that he may thereby be found
without accountability in this matter.
To repeat, respondent cannot claim absolution even where the Court to lend ear to
his plea that his actions be judged solely as those of a newspaperman unburdened by the
duties and responsibilities peculiar to the law profession of which he is also a member.
Withal, it has not escaped the attention of the Court that his Compliance, despite its
strong, even passionate, plea for exculpation does not hesitate to own and beg indulgence
for fault on his own part, if any be found, and in his own words, to place him at the Courts
mercy. And while the objectionable may, by implication, have cast doubt on the integrity of
the Courts proceed- [4 LR 24] -ings, they attribute no official or personal impropriety to any
member of the Court. These should be considered in mitigation of the imposable discipline
or penalty.
WHEREFORE, and upon all of the forgoing considerations, respondent is imposed a
fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), upon payment of which within a period of
FIVE (5) DAYS, from notice thereof, the matter will be considered CLOSED. Let a copy of
this Resolution be entered into his personal record with the office of the Bar Confidant.

Medialea, J. took no part.

Very truly yours,


(SGD.)

Encoded by Hezekiah D. Nicdao, Ateneo Law B2018

DANIEL T. MARTINEZ
Clerk of Court

Encoded by Hezekiah D. Nicdao, Ateneo Law B2018