Essay written by Cornelius Castoriadis in 1963 as an introduction to the French translation

of Kollontai's 'The Workers' Opposition'. Translated and published by Solidarity (London) in

March 1967 (Solidarity pamphlet No. 24).

Introduction by Maurice Brinton

In 1962 SOLIDARITY decided to republish Alexandra Kollontai's article on 'The Workers Opposition
in Russia' which had been unobtainable in Britain for over thirty years. 1
Kollontai's text, hastily written in the weeks preceding the Tenth Congress of the Bolshevik Party
(March 1921) describes the growth of the bureaucracy in Russia in a most perceptive and almost
prophetic manner. It deals in detail with the great controversy (one-man management or collective
management of industry) then racking the Party and warns, in passionate terms, of the dangers
inherent in the course then being pursued. It poses the alternatives in the clearest possible terms :
bureaucratic control from above or the autonomous, creative activity of the masses themselves.
In 1964 Kollontai's classic was translated into French and published in issue No. 35 of the journal
'SOCIALISME OU BARBARIE', with a preface by Paul Cardan on 'The Role of Bolshevik Ideology
in the Development of the Bureaucracy'. The pamphlet now in your hands is a translation of this
preface. 2
We believe Cardan's text to be important for two main reasons : firstly because there is still a
widespread belief among revolutionaries that the bureaucratic degeneration of the Russian
Revolution only started after and largely as a result of the Civil War. This pamphlet goes a
long way to show that this is an incomplete interpretation of what happened. The isolation of the
revolution, the devastation of the Civil War, the famine and the tremendous material difficulties
confronting the Bolsheviks undoubtedly accelerated the process of bureaucratic degeneration,
imprinting on it many of its specific features. The seeds, however, had been sown before. This can
be seen by anyone seriously prepared to study the writings and speeches, the proclamations and
decrees of the Bolsheviks in the months that followed their accession to power. In the last analysis,
the ideas that inspire the actions of men are as much an objective factor in history as the material
environment in which people live and as the social reality which they seek to transform.
Secondly, the text is of interest because of the various nuances it throws on the concept of
bureaucracy, a term we have ourselves at times been guilty of using without adequate definition.
Cardan shows how a managerial bureaucracy can arise from very different historical antecedents. It
can arise from the degeneration of a proletarian revolution, or as a 'solution' to the state of chronic
crisis of economically backward countries, or finally as the ultimate personification of state capital in
modern industrial communities. Cardan points out the common features of these bureaucracies as
well as the important aspects in which they differ. Such an analysis undoubtedly shatters many of
the orderly schemata of traditional socialist thought. Too bad ! This need only worry the
conservatives in the revolutionary movement.
M. B.

1. The Significance Of The Russian Revolution

Discussions about the Russian Revolution, its problems, its degeneration and about the society that
it finally produced, cannot be brought to a close. How could they be ? Of all the working class
revolutions, the Russian Revolution was the only 'victorious' one. But it also proved the mast
profound and instructive of all working class defeats.
The crushing of the Paris Commune in 1871 or of the Budapest uprising of 1956 showed that
proletarian revolts face immensely difficult problems of organisation and of politics. They showed
that an insurrection can be isolated and that the ruling classes will not hesitate to employ any
violence or savagery when their power is at stake. But what happened to the Russian Revolution
compels us to consider not only the conditions for working class victory, but also the content and the
possible fate of such a victory, its consolidation, its development, and the seeds that it might contain
of a defeat, infinitely more far-reaching than the ones inflicted by the troops of the Versaillese or by
Kruschev's tanks.
Because the Russian Revolution both crushed the White armies and succumbed to a bureaucracy,
which it had itself generated, it confronts us with problems of a different order from those involved in
the study of tactics of armed insurrection. It demands more than just a correct analysis of the
relation of forces at any given moment. It compels us to think about the nature of working class
power and about what we mean by socialism. The Russian Revolution culminated in a system in
which the concentration of the economy, the totalitarian power of the rulers and the exploitation of
the workers were pushed to the limit, producing an extreme form of centralisation of capital and of
its fusion with the state. It resulted in what was and in many ways still remains the most highly
developed and "purest" form of modern exploiting society.
Embodying marxism for the first time in history only to display it soon after as a deformed
caricature the Russian Revolution has made it possible far revolutionaries to gain insights into
marxism greater than those marxism ever provided in understanding the Russian Revolution. The
social system which the revolution produced has become the touchstone of all current thinking,
bourgeois and marxist alike.
It destroyed classical marxist thinking in fulfilling it, and fulfilled the deepest content of other systems
of thought, through their apparent refutation. Because of its extension over a third of the globe,
because of recent workers' revolts against it, because of its attempts at self-reform and because of
its schism into Russian and Chinese sections, post revolutionary bureaucratic society continues to
pose highly topical questions. The world in which we live, think, and act was launched on its present
course by the workers and Bolsheviks of Petrograd, in October 1917.

2. The Main Questions

Among the innumerable questions posed by the fate of the Russian Revolution, there are two which
form poles around which the others can be grouped.

The first question is : what kind of society was produced by the degeneration of the Revolution ?
(What is the nature and the dynamic of this system ? What is the Russian bureaucracy ? What is its
relationship to capitalism and the proletariat ? What is its historical role and what are its present
problems ?) The second question is : how could a workers' revolution give rise to a bureaucracy and
how did this happen in Russia ? We have studied this problem at a theoretical level 3, but we have
so far said little about the concrete events of history.
There is an almost insurmountable obstacle to the study of the particularly obscure period going
from October 1917 to March 1921 during which the fate of the Revolution was settled. The question
of most concern to us is that of deciding to what degree the Russian workers sought to take control
of their society into their own hands. To what degree did they aspire to manage production, regulate
the economy and decide political questions themselves ? What was the level of their consciousness
and what was their own spontaneous activity ? What was their attitude to the Bolshevik Party and to
the developing bureaucracy ?
Unfortunately, it is not the workers who write history, it is always 'the others'. And these 'others',
whoever they may be, only exist historically inasmuch as the workers are passive or inasmuch as
they are only active in the sense of providing 'the others' with support. Most of the time, 'official'
historians don't have eyes to see or ears to hear the acts and words which express the workers'
spontaneous activity. In the best instances they will vaunt rank and file activity as long as it
'miraculously' happens to coincide with their own line, but will radically condemn it and impute the
basest motives to it, as soon as it deviates from their line. Trotsky, for example, described the
anonymous workers of Petrograd in glowing terms when they flocked into the Bolshevik Party or
when they mobilised themselves during the Civil War. But he was later to call the Kronstadt
mutineers 'stool-pigeons' and 'hirelings of the French High Command'. 'Official' historians lack the
categories of thought one might also say the brain-cells necessary to understand or even to
perceive this activity as it really is. To them an activity which has no leader or programme, no
institutions and no statutes, can only be described as "troubles" or "disorder". The spontaneous
activity of the masses belongs, by definition, to what history suppresses.
It is not only that the documentary record, of the events which interest us is fragmentary, or even
that it was and remains systematically suppressed by the victorious bureaucracy. What is more
important is that what record we have is infinitely more selective and slanted than any other
historical evidence. The reactionary rage of bourgeois witnesses, the almost equally vicious hostility
of the social-democrats, the muddled moans of the anarchists, the 'official' chronicles that are
periodically rewritten according to the needs of the bureaucracy, the Trotskyist 'histories' that are
only concerned with justifying their own tendency retrospectively (and in hiding the role that
Trotskyism played at the onset of the degeneration) all these have one thing in common : they
ignore the autonomous activity of the masses, or, at best, they ''prove" that it was logically
impossible for it to have existed.
From this point of view, the information contained in Alexandra Kollontai's text 4is of priceless value.
Firstly Kollontai supplies direct evidence about the attitudes and reactions of a whole layer of
Russian workers to the politics of the Bolshevik Party. Secondly, she shows that a large proportion
of the working-class base of the Party was conscious of the bureaucratisation and struggled against
it. Once this text has been read, it will no longer be possible to continue describing the Russia of

1920 as 'just chaos', as 'just a mass of ruins', where the ideas of Lenin and the 'iron will' of the
Bolsheviks were the only elements of order. The workers did have aspirations of their own. They
showed this through the Workers' Opposition within the Party, and through the strikes of Petrograd
and the Kronstadt revolt outside the Party. It was necessary for both to be crushed by Lenin and
Trotsky for Stalin to emerge victorious.

3. The Traditional 'Answers'

How could the Russian Revolution have produced the bureaucracy ? The usual answer (first put
forward by Trotsky, later taken up by the fellow-travellers of Stalinism and, more recently still by
Isaac Deutscher) consists of 'explaining' the 'bureaucratic deformations' of what is 'fundamentally a
socialist system' by pointing out that the Revolution occurred in a backward country, which could not
have built socialism on its own, that Russia was isolated by the defeat of the revolution in Europe
(and more particularly in Germany between 1919 and 1920) and that the country had been
completely devastated 'by the Civil War.
This answer would not deserve a moment's consideration, were it not for the fact that it is widely
accepted and that it continues to play a mystifying role. The answer is, in fact, completely beside the
point.
The backwardness of the country, its isolation and the widespread devastation all indisputable
facts could equally well have resulted in a straight-forward defeat of the Revolution and in the
restoration of classical capitalism. But what is being asked is precisely why no such simple defeat
occurred, why the revolution defeated its external enemies only to collapse internally, why the
degeneration took the specific form that led to the power of the bureaucracy.
Trotsky's answer, if we nay use a metaphor, is like saying : "This patient developed tuberculosis
because he was terribly run down." But being run down, the patient night have died. Or he might
have contracted some other disease. Why did he contract this particular disease ? What has to be
explained in the degeneration of the Russian Revolution, is why it was specifically
abureaucratic degeneration. This cannot be done by referring to factors as general as
'backwardness' or 'isolation'. We night add in passing that this 'answer' teaches us nothing that we
can extend beyond the confines of the Russian situation. The only conclusion to be drawn from this
kind of 'analysis' is that revolutionaries should ardently hope that future revolutions should only
break out in the more advanced countries, that they shouldn't remain isolated and that civil wars
should, wherever possible, not lead to chaos or devastation.
The fact, after all, that during the last twenty years, the bureaucratic system has extended its
frontiers far beyond those of Russia, that it has established itself in. countries that can hardly be
called 'backward' (for instance Czechoslovakia and East Germany) and that industrialisation
which has made Russia the second power in the world has in no way weakened this
bureaucracy, shows that interpretations of the bureaucratic phenomenon based on 'backwardness'
and/or 'isolation' are both insufficient and anachronistic.

4. Bureaucracy In The Modern World

If we wish to understand the emergence of the bureaucracy as an increasingly important class in
the modern world, we must first note that paradoxically, it has emerged at the two opposite poles of
social development. On the one hand, the managerial bureaucracy has appeared as a natural

product in the evolution of fully developed capitalist societies. On the other hand, it has emerged as
the 'forced answer' of backward countries to the problems of their own transition to industrialisation.
The Russian bureaucracy is a particular variant, and will be discussed after the other two.

A. Modern capitalist societies

Here there is no mystery about the emergence of the bureaucracy. The concentration of production
necessarily leads to the formation within industry of a managerial stratum, whose function is
collectively to undertake the management of immense economic units, the administration of which
is beyond the capacities of any one individual owner. The increasing role played by the state, in the
economic as well as in other spheres, leads both to a quantitative extension of the bureaucratic
state machine and to a qualitative change in its nature.
Within modern capitalist society, the working class movement degenerates through
bureaucratisation. It becomes bureaucratic through becoming integrated with the established order,
and it cannot be so integrated without being bureaucratised. In a modern capitalist society, the
different elements constituting the bureaucracy technico-economic, statist and "working-class"
coexist with varying degrees of success. They coexist both with each other and with the truly
"bourgeois" elements (owners of the means of production). The importance of these new elements
in the management of modern society is constantly increasing. In this sense, it might be said that
the emergence of the bureaucracy corresponds to a final phase in the concentration of capital, and
that the bureaucracy is the personification of capital during this phase, in much the same way as the
bourgeoisie was its personification during the previous phase.
As far as its origins and its historical and social roles are concerned, the nature of this particular
type of bureaucracy can be understood in terms of the classical marxist categories. (It doesn't
matter in this respect that those who today claim to be marxists fall so far short of the possibilities of
their own theory that they cannot give any historico-social definition of the modern bureaucracy.
They believe that in their theory there is no room for any such thing as the bureaucracy, and so they
deny its existence and speak of modern capitalism as though nothing had fundamentally changed in
the last 50 or 100 years.)

B. The economically 'backward' countries

Here the bureaucracy emerges, one might say, because of a vacuum in society. In almost all
backward societies, it is clear that the old ruling classes are incapable of carrying out
industrialisation. Foreign capital creates, at best, only isolated pockets of modern exploitation. The
young native bourgeoisie has neither the strength nor the courage to revolutionise the old social
structure from top to bottom, in the way that a genuine modernisation would require. We might add
that the native working class, because of this very fact, is too weak to play the role assigned to it in
Trotsky's theory of the "permanent revolution". It is too weak to eliminate the old ruling classes and
to undertake a social transformation which would lead; without interruption, from bourgeois
democracy through to socialism.
What happens then ? A backward society can stagnate for a longer or shorter period. This is the
situation today of many backward countries, whether recently constituted into states or whether they
have been states for some time. But this stagnation means in fact a relative and sometimes even an

absolute lowering of economic and social standards, and constant disruptions in the old social
equilibrium. This is almost always aggravated by factors which appear accidental, but which are
really inevitable and which are greatly amplified in a society that is disintegrating. Each break in
equilibrium develops into a crisis, nearly always coloured by some national component. The result
may be an open and prolonged social and national struggle (China, Algeria, Cuba, Indochina), or it
may be a coup d'Etat, almost inevitably of a military nature (Egypt). The two examples are very
different, but they also have features in common.
In the first type of example (China, etc), the politico-military leadership of the struggle gradually
develops into an independent caste, which directs the 'revolution' and, after 'victory', takes in hand
the reconstruction of the country. To this end it incorporates converted elements from the old
privileged classes, and seeks a certain popular basis. As well as developing the industry of the
country, it comes to constitute the hierarchical pyramid which will be the skeleton of the new social
structure. Industrialisation is carried out of course according to the classical methods of primitive
accumulation. These involve intense exploitation of the workers and an even more intense
exploitation of the peasants, who are more or less forcibly press-ganged into an industrial army of
labour.
In the second example (Egypt, etc), the state-military bureaucracy, while exercising a certain power
over the old privileged classes, does not completely eliminate them or the social interests they
represent. The complete industrialisation of such countries will probably never be achieved without
a further violent convulsion. But what is interesting from our point of view, is that in both
instances the bureaucracy substitutes or tends to substitute itself for the bourgeoisie as the social
stratum carrying out the task of primitive accumulation.
The emergence of this type of bureaucracy exploded the traditional categories of marxism. In no
way did this new social class gradually form, grow and develop within the womb of the preceding
society. The new class does not emerge because of the development of new modes of production,
whose extension has become incompatible with the old social and economic relations.It is, on the
contrary, the bureaucracy which brings the new mode of production into existence. The bureaucracy
does not even arise out of the normal functioning of the society. It arises from the fact that the
society is no longer capable of functioning. Almost literally, it originates from a social vacuum. Its
historical roots lie wholly in the future. It is obviously nonsensical to say that the Chinese
bureaucracy, for instance, originates from the industrialisation of the country. It would be far more
accurate to say that industrialisation is the result of the bureaucracy's accession to power. In the
present epoch, and short of a revolutionary solution on an international scald, a backward country
cannot be industrialised without being bureaucratised,

C. Russia
Here the bureaucracy appears retrospectively to have played the historic role of the bourgeoisie of
an earlier period, or of the bureaucracy of a backward country today, and it can therefore be
identified to a certain extent with the latter. The conditions in which it arose however were entirely
different. They were different precisely because Russia was not simply a 'backward' country in
1917, but a country which, side by side with its backwardness, presented certain well-developed
capitalist features. (Russia was, after all, the fifth industrial power in the world in 1913.) These
capitalist features were so well developed that Russia was the theatre of a proletarian revolution,
which called itself socialist (long before this word had come to mean anything or nothing).

The first bureaucracy to become the ruling class in modern society, the Russian bureaucracy was
the final product of a revolution which appeared to the whole world to have given power to. the
proletariat. The Russian bureaucracy, therefore, represents a very specific third type of bureaucracy
(although it was in fact the first clearly to emerge in modern history). It is the bureaucracy which
arises from the degeneration of a workers' revolution, the bureaucracy which isthe degeneration of
that revolution. This remains true, even though the Russian bureaucracy, from the onset, was partly
a stratum 'managing, centralised capital' and partly a 'social group whoso objective was to develop
industry by every possible means'.

5. The Working Class In The Russian Revolution

In what sense can one say that the October Revolution was proletarian, given the subsequent
development of that revolution ? Although the seizure of power in October 1917 was organised and
led by the Bolshevik Party and although this Party assumed power almost from the very first
day one has to ask this question if one refuses simply to identify a class with a party claiming to
represent it.
Many people (various social democrats, sundry anarchists and the Socialist Party of Great Britain)
have said that nothing really happened in Russia except a coup d'Etat carried out by a Party which,
having somehow obtained the support of the working class, sought only to establish its own
dictatorship and succeeded in doing so.
We don't wish to discuss this question in an academic manner. Our aim is not to decide whether the
Russian Revolution warrants the label of proletarian revolution. The questions which are important
for us are different ones. Did the Russian working class play a historical role of its own during this
period ? Or was it merely a sort of infantry, mobilised to serve the interests of other, already
established forces ? Did the Russian working class appear as a relatively independent force in the
great tornado of actions, demands, ideas, forms of organisation, of these early years ? Or was it just
an object manipulated without much difficulty or risk, merely receiving impulses that originated
elsewhere ? Anyone with the slightest knowledge of the real history of the Russian Revolution could
answer without hesitation. The independent role played by the proletariat was clear-cut and
undeniable. The Petrograd of 1917 and even later was neither Prague in 1968 or Canton in 1949.
This independent role was shown, in the first place, by the very way in which the workers flocked to
the ranks of the Bolshevik Party, giving it support, which no one at that time could have extorted
from them. The independent role of the working class is shown by the relationship between the
workers and this Party and in the way they spontaneously accepted the burdens of the civil war. It is
shown above all, by their spontaneous activity in February and July 1917, and even more in
October, when they expropriated the capitalists without waiting for Party directives, and in fact, often
acting against such directives. It is shown in the manner in which they themselves sought to
organise products on. It is shown finally in the autonomous organs they set up : the factory
committees and the Soviets.
The Revolution only proved possible because a vast movement of total revolt of the working
masses, wishing to change their conditions of existence and to rid themselves of both bosses and
Czar, converged with the activity of the Bolshevik Party. It is true that the Bolshevik Party alone, in
October 1917, gave articulate expression to the aspirations of the workers, peasants and soldiers,

and provided them with a precise short-term objective : the overthrow of the Provisional
Government. But this does not mean that the workers were just passive pawns. Without the
workers, both inside and outside its ranks, the Party would have been physically and politically nonexistent. Without the pressure arising from their increasingly radical attitudes, the Party would not
even have adopted a revolutionary line. Even several months after the seizure of power, the Party
could not be said to dominate the working masses.
But this convergence between workers and Party, which culminated in the overthrow of the
Provisional Government and in the formation of a predominantly Bolshevik Government, turned out
to be transitory. Signs of a divergence between Party and masses appeared very early, even though
these divergences, by their very nature, could not be as clear-cut as those between organised
political trends. The workers certainly expected of the Revolution, a complete change in the
conditions of their lives. They undoubtedly expected an improvement in their material conditions,
although they knew quite well that this would not be possible immediately. But only those of limited
imagination could analyse the Revolution in terms of this factor alone, or explain the ultimate
disillusionment of the workers by the incapacity of the new regime to satisfy working class hopes of
material advancement. The Revolution started, in a sense, with a demand for bread. But long before
October, it had already gone beyond the problem of bread : it had obtained men's total commitment.
For more than three years the Russian workers bore the most extreme material privations without
flinching, in order to supply the armies which fought the Whites. For them it was a question of
freedom from the oppression of the capitalist class and of its state. Organised in soviets and factory
committees, the workers could not imagine, either before, but more particularly after October, that
the capitalists might be allowed to stay. And once rid of the capitalists, they discovered that they had
to organise and manage production themselves. It was the workers themselves, who expropriated
the capitalists, acting against the line of the Bolshevik Party (the nationalisation decrees, passed in
the summer of 1918, merely recognised an established fact). And it was the workers who got the
factories running once more.

6. The Bolshevik Policy

The Bolsheviks saw things very differently. In so far as the Party had a clear-cut perspective after
October (and contrary to Stalinist and Trotskyist mythology, there is documentary proof that the
Party was utterly in the dark as to its plans for after seizure of power) the Party wished to establish a
"well-organised" economy on "state capitalist" lines (an expression constantly used by Lenin) on
which 'working class political power' would be superimposed. 5 This power would be exercised by
the Bolshevik Party, 'the party of the workers'. 'Socialism' (which Lenin clearly implies-to mean the
'collective management of production') would come later.
All this was not just a 'line', not just something said or thought. In its mentality and in its profoundest
attitudes the Party was permeated from top to bottom by the undisputed conviction that it had to
manage and direct in the fullest sense. This conviction dated from long before the Revolution, as
Trotsky himself showed when, in his biography of Stalin, he discusses the 'committee mentality'.
The attitude was shared at the time by nearly all socialists (with a few exceptions, such as Rosa
Luxembourg, the Gorter-Pannekoek trend in Holland, or the 'left communists' in Germany). This
conviction was to be tremendously strengthened by the seizure of power, the civil war, and the

consolidation of the Party's power. Trotsky expressed this attitude most clearly at the time, when he
proclaimed the Party's 'historical birthright'.
This was more than just a frame of mind. After the seizure of power, all this becomes part of the real
social situation. Party members individually assume managing positions in all realms of social life.
Of course this is partly because "it is impossible to do otherwise" but in its turn this soon comes
to mean that whatever the Party does makes it increasingly difficult to do otherwise.
Collectively, the Party is the only real instance of power. And very soon, it is only the summits of the
Party. Almost immediately after October, the soviets are reduced to merely decorative institutions.
(As witness to this, it is interesting to note that they played no role whatsoever in the heated
discussions which preceded the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, in the spring of 1918.)
If it is true that the real social conditions of men determine their consciousness, then it is illusory to
ask of the Bolshevik Party that it should act in a way not in accord with its real social position. The
real social situation of the Party is henceforth that of an organisation ruling society : the Party's point
of view will no longer necessarily coincide with that of the society itself.
The workers offer no serious resistance to this development, or rather to this sudden revelation of
the essential nature of the Bolshevik Party. At least we have no direct evidence that they did.
Between the expropriation of the capitalists and the taking over of the factories (1917-1918) and the
Petrograd strikes and the Kronstadt revolt (winter of 1920-1921), we have no articulate expression
of the workers' independent activity. The Civil War and the continuous military mobilisation, the
concern with immediate practical problems (production, food supplies, etc.) the obscurity of the
problems, and, above all, the workers' confidence in 'their' party, account in part for this silence,
There are certainly two elements in the workers' attitude. On the one hand, there is the desire, to be
rid of all domination and to take the management of their affairs into their own hands. On the other
hand, there is a tendency to delegate power to the one Party, which had proved itself to be
irreconcilably opposed to the capitalists and which was leading the war against them. The
contradiction between these two elements was not clearly perceived at the time, and one is tempted
to say that it could not clearly have been perceived. .
It was seen, however, and with great insight, within the Party itself. From the beginning of 1918 until
the banning of factions in March 1921, there were tendencies within the Bolshevik Party which
opposed the Party's line, and the rapid bureaucratisation with astonishing clarity and farsightedness. These were the "Left Communists" (at the beginning of 1918), the "Democratic
Centralist" faction (1919) and the "Workers' Opposition" (1920-1921).
We have published details on the ideas and activities of these factions in the historical notes
following Kollontai's text. 6 The ideas of these groups expressed the reaction of the workers in the
Party and, no doubt, of proletarian circles outside the Party to the state-capitalist line of the
leadership. They expressed what might be called "the other component" of Marxism, the one which
calls for actions by the workers themselves and proclaims that their emancipation will only be
achieved through their own activity.
But these opposition factions were defeated one by one, and they were finally smashed in 1921, at
the same time as the Kronstadt revolt was crushed. The feeble echoes of their criticism of the
bureaucracy to be found in the Trotskyist "Left Opposition" after 1923, do not have the same
significance. Trotsky is opposed to the wrong political line of the bureaucracy and to its
havingexcessive power. He never questions the essential nature of the bureaucracy. Until almost the

very end of his life Trotsky ignores the questions raised by the oppositions of 1918-1921, questions
such as : "who is to manage production ?" and "what is the proletariat supposed to do during the
dictatorship of the proletariat apart from working hard and carrying out the orders of 'its Party' ?"
We may therefore conclude that, contrary to established mythology, it was not in 1927, nor in 1923,
nor even in 1921, that the game was played and lost, but much earlier, during the period between
1918 and 1920. By 1921 a revolution in the full sense of the word would have been needed to reestablish the situation. As events proved, a mere revolt such as that of Kronstadt was insufficient to
bring about essential changes. The Kronstadt warning did induce the Bolshevik Party to rectify
certain mistakes, relating to other problems (essentially those concerning the peasantry and the
relationship between the urban and rural economy). It led to a lessening of the tensions provoked by
the economic collapse and to the beginning of the economic reconstruction, But this
"reconstruction" was firmly to be carried out along the lines of bureaucratic capitalism.
It was, in fact, between 1917 and 1920 that the Bolshevik Party established itself so firmly in power
that it could not have been dislodged without armed force. The uncertainties in its line were soon
eliminated, the ambiguities abolished and the contradictions resolved. In the new state, the
proletariat had to work, to be mobilised, and if necessary to die, in the defence of the new power. It
had to give its most "conscious" and "capable" elements to "its" Party, where they were supposed to
become the rulers of society. The working class had to be "active" and to "participate" whenever the
Party demanded it, but only and exactly to the extent that the Party demanded. It had to be
absolutely guided by the Party in relation to all essentials. As Trotsky wrote during this period, in a
text which had an enormous circulation inside and outside Russia : "the worker does not merely
bargain with the Soviet State : no, he is subordinated to the Soviet State, under its orders in every
direction for it is HIS State". 7

7. The Management Of Production

The role of the working class in the new state was clear. It was that of the enthusiastic but passive
citizen. The role of the working class in production was no less clear. It was to be the same as
before under private capitalism except that workers of "character and capacity" 8 were now
chosen to replace factory managers, who fled. The main concern of the Bolshevik Party during this
period was not : how can the taking-over by the workers of the management of production be
facilitated ? It was : what is the quickest way to develop a layer of managers and administrators of
the economy ? When one reads the official texts of the period, one is left in no doubt on this score.
The formation of a bureaucracy as the managing-stratum in production (necessarily having
economic privileges) was, almost from the onset, the conscious, honest and sincere aim of the
Bolshevik Party led by Lenin and Trotsky.
This was honestly and sincerely considered to be a Socialist policy or, more precisely, to be an
'administrative technique' that could be put at the disposal of socialism, in that the stratum of
administrators managing production would be under the control of the working class, "personified by
its Communist Party". According to Trotsky : the decision to have a manager at the heart of a factory
rather than a workers' committee had no political significance. He wrote : "It may be correct or
incorrect from the point of view of the technique of administration. It would consequently be a most
crying error to confuse the question as to the supremacy of the proletariat with the question of
boards of workers at the heads of factories. The dictatorship of the proletariat is expressed in the
abolition of private property, in the supremacy over the whole Soviet mechanism of the 9 collective

will of the workers, and not at all in the form in which individual economic enterprises are
administered." 9
In Trotsky's sentence : "the collective will of the workers" is a metaphor for the will of the Bolshevik
Party. The Bolshevik leaders stated this without hypocrisy, unlike certain of their "defenders" today.
Trotsky wrote at the time : "In this substitution of the power of the Party for the power of the working
class there is nothing accidental, and in reality there is no substitution at all. The Communists
express the fundamental interests of the working class. It is quite natural that in the period which
brings up those interests, in all their magnitude, on to the order of the day, the Communists have
become the recognised representatives- of the working class as a whole," 10 One could easily find
dozens of quotations from Lenin expressing the same idea.
So we had the unquestioned power of the managers in the factories, 'controlled' only by the Party
(what control was it, in reality ?). We had the unquestioned power of the Party over society,
controlled by no one. Given this situation, nobody could prevent these two powers from fusing.
Nobody could prevent the interpenetration of the two social groups personifying these areas of
power, or the establishment of an immovable bureaucracy, dominating all sectors of social life. The
process may have been accelerated or magnified by the mass entry of non-proletarian elements
into the Party, rushing in to jump on the band-wagon. But this was the result of the Party's policy
and not its cause.
It was during the discussion on the "trade union question" (1920-1921), preceding the Tenth Party
Congress, that the opposition to this policy within the Party was most forcibly expressed. Formally,
the question was that of the role of the trade unions in the management of the factories and of the
economy. The discussion inevitably focussed attention once again on the problems of 'One-man
management' in the factories and of the 'role of the specialists' questions which had already been
debated bitterly and at great length during the past two years. Readers will find an account of the
different viewpoints on these issues in Kollontai's text itself and in the historical notes that followed
it.
Briefly Lenin's attitude, and that of the Party leadership, was that the management of production
should be in the hands of individual managers (either bourgeois 'specialists' or workers selected for
their 'ability and character'). These would act under the control of the Party. The trade unions would
have the task of educating the workers and of defending them against 'their' managers and 'their'
state. Trotsky demanded that the trade unions be completely subordinated to the state : that they be
transformed into organs of the state (and the Party). His reasoning was that in a workers' state, the
workers and the state were one and the same. The workers therefore did not need a separate
organisation to defend themselves against 'their' state. The Workers' Opposition wanted the
management of production and of the economy gradually to be entrusted to "workers' collectives in
the factories", based on the trade unions; they wanted "one-man" management" to be replaced by
"collective management" and the role of the specialists and technicians reduced. The Workers'
Opposition emphasized that the post-revolutionary development of production was a social and
political problem, whose solution depended on utilising the initiative and creativity of the working
masses, and that it was not just an administrative or technical problem. It criticised the increasing
bureaucratisation of both State and Party (at that time all posts of any importance were already filled
by nomination from above and not by election) and the increasing separation of the Party from the
working class.

The ideas of the Workers' Opposition were confused on some of these points. The discussion
seems on the whole to have taken place at rather an abstract level and the solutions proposed
involved forms rather than fundamentals. (In any case the fundamentals had already been decided
elsewhere.) Thus the Opposition (and Kollontai in her text) never distinguish clearly between the
essential role of the specialists and technicians as specialists and technicians, under the control of
the workers, and their transformation into uncontrolled managers of production. The Opposition
formulated a general criticism of specialists and technicians. This left it exposed to attacks by Lenin
and Trotsky, who had no difficulty in proving that there could not be factories without engineering
experts but who gradually arrived at the astonishing conclusion that these experts had, for this
reason alone, to be allowed dictatorial managerial powers over the whole functioning of the factory.
The Opposition fought ferociously for "collective management" as opposed to "one man
management", which is a fairly formal aspect of the problem (collective management can, after all,
be just as bureaucratic as one man management). The discussion left out the real problem, that of
where the source of authority was to lie. Thus Trotsky was able to say : "The independence of the
workers is determined and measured, not by whether three workers or one are placed at the head
of a factory, but by factors and phenomena of a much more profound character." 11 This absolved
him from having to discuss the real problem, which is that of the relationship between the 'one' or
'three' managers and the body of the workers in the enterprise.
The Opposition also showed a certain fetishism about trade unions at a time when the unions had
already cone under the almost complete control of the Party bureaucracy. "The continuous
'independence' of the trade union movement, in the period of the proletarian revolution, is just as
much an impossibility as the policy of coalition. The trade unions become the most important
organs of the proletariat in power. Thereby they fall under the leadership of the Communist Party.
Not only questions of principle in the trade union movement, but serious conflicts of organisation
within it, are decided by the Central Committee of our Party". 12
This was written by Trotsky, in answer to Kautsky's criticism of the anti-democratic nature of
Bolshevik power. The point is that Trotsky certainly had no reason to exaggerate the extent of the
Party's grip over the trade unions.
But despite these weaknesses and despite a certain confusion, the Workers' Opposition posed the
real problem : "who should manage production in the workers' state ?" And it gave the right answer :
"the collective organisations of the workers". What the Party leadership wanted and had already
imposed and on this point there was no disagreement between Lenin and Trotsky was a
hierarchy directed from above. We know that it was this conception that prevailed. And we know
what this "victory" led to.

8. On \"Ends\" And \"Means\"

The struggle between the Workers' Opposition and the Bolshevik Party leadership epitomises the
contradictory elements which have coexisted in Marxism in general and in its Russian incarnation in
particular.
For the last time in the history of the Marxist movement, the Workers' Opposition called out for an
activity of the masses themselves, showed confidence in the creative capabilities of the proletariat,
and a deep conviction that the socialist revolution would herald a genuinely new period in human
history, in which the ideas of the preceding period would become valueless and in which the social

structure would have to be rebuilt from the roots up. The proposals of the Opposition constitute an
attempt to embody these ideas in a political programme dealing with the fundamentally important
field of production.
The victory of the Leninist outlook represents the victory of the other element in Marxism, which had
for a long time even in Marx himself become the dominant element in socialist thought and
practice. In all Lenin's speeches and articles of this period, there is a constantly recurring idea,
almost like an obsession. It is the idea that Russia had to learn from the advanced capitalist
countries; that there were not a hundred and one different ways of developing production and the
productivity of labour, if one wanted to emerge from backwardness and chaos; that it was necessary
to adopt capitalist methods of rationalisation of production, capitalist managerial methods, and
capitalist incentives at work. All these, for Lenin, were no more than "means", which could be freely
placed at the service of a fundamentally opposite historical aim, the construction of socialism.
Similarly, Trotsky, when discussing militarism, was able to separate the Army, its structure and its.
methods, from the social system that it served. Trotsky said substantially that what was wrong with
bourgeois militarism and the bourgeois army, was that it served the bourgeoisie. If it were not for
this, there would be no cause for criticism. The sole difference, he said, lay in the question : "who is
in power ?" 13 In the same way, the dictatorship of the proletariat was not expressed by the "form in
which economic enterprises are administered". 14
The idea that the same means cannot be made to serve different ends, that there is an intrinsic
relationship between the instruments used and the results obtained, that neither the factory nor the
army are simple "means" or "instruments" but social structures in which two fundamental aspects of
human relationships (production and violence) are organised, that what can be observed, in them is
an essential expression of the social relations characterising a period these ideas, originally
obvious to marxists, were completely "forgotten". Production had to be developed by using methods
and structures which 'had proved themselves'. That the main "proof" of these methods had been the
development of capitalism as a social system, and that what a factory produces is not only cloth and
steel, but proletariat and capital, were facts that were utterly ignored.
This 'forgetfulness' obviously conceals something else. At the time, of course, there was a
desperate concern to raise production and to re-establish an economy that was collapsing. But this
concern does not necessarily dictate the choice of "means". If it seemed obvious to the Bolshevik
leaders that the only efficient methods were capitalist ones, it was because they were imbued with
the conviction that capitalism was the only efficient and rational system ofproduction. They certainly
wished to abolish private property and the anarchy of the market, but not the type of organisation
that capitalism had achieved at the point of production. They wished to change the economy, and
the pattern of ownership, and the distribution of wealth, but not the relations between men at work
or the nature of work itself.
At a deeper level, still, their philosophy was a philosophy that demanded above all the development
of the productive forces. In this case they were faithful disciples of Marx or, at least, of a certain
aspect of Marx, which became predominant in his later works. The development of the productive
forces was seen by the Bolsheviks, if not as the ultimate goal, at any rate as the essential means, in
the sense that everything else would follow as a by-product, and had to be subordinated to it. Man
as well ? Of course ! "As a general rule, man strives to avoid labour (...) man is a fairly lazy
animal". 15 To fight this indolence, all methods of proven efficiency had to be brought into

operation : compulsory labour whose nature apparently changed completely if it was imposed by
a "Socialist dictatorship" 16 and technical and financial methods. "Under capitalism, the system of
piece work and of grading, the application of the Taylor system, etc., have as their object to increase
the exploitation of the workers by the squeezing out of surplus value. Under Socialist production,
piece work, bonuses, etc., have as their problem to increase the volume of social product, and
consequently to raise the general well-being. Those workers who do more for the general interests
than others receive the right to a greater quantity of the social product than the lazy, the careless,
and the disorganisers".17 This isn't Stalin speaking (in 1939). It is Trotsky (in 1919).
The Socialist reorganisation of production during the first period after a revolution is indeed difficult
to conceive without some 'compulsion to work', such as 'those who don't work, don't eat'. Certain
indices of work will probably have to be established, to guarantee some equality of the effort
provided between different sections of the population and between different workshops and
factories. But all Trotsky's sophistries about the fact that "free labour" has never existed in history
(and will only exist under complete communism) should not make anyone forget the crucial
questions. Who establishes these norms ? Whodecides and administers the 'compulsion to work' ?
Is it done by collective organisations, formed by the workers themselves ? Or is this task undertaken
by a special social group, whose function is to manage the work of others ?
'To manage the work of others'. Is not this the beginning and the end of the whole cycle of
exploitation ? The 'need' for a special social category to manage the work of others in production
(and the activity of others in politics and in society), and the need for a leadership separated from
the factories, and the need for a party managing the state, were all proclaimed and zealously
worked for by the Bolshevik Party, from the very first days of its accession to power. We know that
the Bolshevik Party achieved its ends. In so far as ideas play a role in historical development,
and, in the final analysis, their role is enormous, Bolshevik ideology (and some aspects of the
Marxist ideology underlying it) were decisive factors in the development of the Russian bureaucracy.
Published by SOLIDARITY (London)

SUBSCRIBE TO SOLIDARITY
A paper for militants in industry and elsewhere. Attempts a total critique of modern society, and a
systematic 'demystification' of its values, ideas, and forms of organisation. Discusses what
libertarian revolution is all about. Send 1. to SOLIDARITY (London), to receive forthcoming issues
of the paper and pamphlets to that value.

1.The first English translation had appeared (between April 22 and August 19, 1921) in
successive issues of Sylvia Pankhurst's WORKERS DREADNOUGHT. Our pamphlet on the
subject contains detailed footnotes describing the background to the controversy.
2.The present pamphlet was later translated into Italian (under the title 'Dal Bolscevismo all
Burocrazia' and published in 1968 by the Quaderni della Rivoluzione dei Consigli (V.C.Rolando
8/8, Ge-Sampierdarena). Later in the same year, it was also translated into Swedish (under the
title 'Bolshevism, Byrakrati'. ) and published by Libertad (Allmana vage 6, 4l460 Goteborg).
3.See Socialism Reaffirmed published by Solidarity (London) in 1961. This is a translation
of the editorial of issue No 1 of Soclalisme ou Barbarie.

4.The Workers' Opposition by Alexandra Kollontai, Solidarity Pamphlet No 7.

5.One quote, from among hundreds, will illustrate this kind of thinking : "History took such
an original course that it brought forth in 1918 two unconnected halves of Socialism, existing side
by side like two future chickens in the single shell of international imperialism. In 1918 Germany
and Russia were the embodiment of the most striking material realisation of the economic, the
productive, the social economic conditions of socialism, on the one hand, and of the political
conditions on the other." "Left Wing Communism an Infantile Disorder", Selected Works. Vol.
VII., p. 365.
6.See The Workers' Opposition by Alexandra Kollontai. Solidarity pamphlet, No. 7.
7.Terrorism and Communism, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1961. p. 168.
8.Terrorism and Communism, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1961. p. 260.
9.Terrorism and Communism, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1961. p. 162.
10.Terrorism and Communism, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1961. p. 109.
11.Terrorism and Communism, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1961. p. 161.
12.Terrorism and Communism, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1961. p. 110.
13.Terrorism and Communism, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1961. p. 172.
14.Terrorism and Communism, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1961. p. 162.
15.Terrorism and Communism, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1961. p. 135.
16.Terrorism and Communism, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1961. p. 149
17.Terrorism and Communism, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1961. p. 147