BitcoinCooperativeProofofStake

StephenL.Reed
May21,2014

ABSTRACT
AhardforkreconfigurationofthepeertopeerBitcoinnetworkisdescribedthatsubstitutes
tamperevidentlogsandproofofstakeconsensusforproofofworkconsensus.Theblock
creationrewardsandtransactionfeesarereallocatedtoestablishandstaffasecurefinancial
datanetworkcapableofhandlingtheworldstransactionswithsubsecondresponsetime.The
newsystempaysdividendstostakeofferingbitcoinholders.IncontrasttoSatoshiNakamotos
meshnetworkconsistingofcompetingpeers,thissystemusesanenterpriseclassnetworkthat
isefficient,robust,andscalable,consistingofcooperatingpeers.Thenetworkbackbonenodes
hosttrustlessnomadicagents.Thousandsofdistributedfullnodesarepaidtoreplicatea
singletonblockchainbuiltuponevery10minutesbyanomadicmintagentwhoseactionsare
verifiedbyitspeers.Thisarrangementenablesimmediateacknowledgmenttoanissuingnode
thatitstransactionhasbeenaccepted.Lesseffortmeansthatsubsidizedtransactioncostswill
belower.Networkreconfigurationenablestheprocessingofnumerousmicrotransactions.
Stakeweighteddistributedconsensusisachievedwhennecessarywithlessthanonehalf
arbitrarilyfaultynodes.ImportantinvariantsoftheSatoshiSocialContractbetweencore
developersandusersaremaintained:Therewardschedule,theblockchainformat,thefixed
numberofbitcoins,andthedecentralized,trustlessprotocolareuntouched.Thesystem
remainsaglobaldistributeddatabase,withadditionstothedatabasebyconsentofthemajority,
basedonasetoftransparentrulestheyfollow.
Keywords:bitcoin,proofofstake,remoteattestation,superpeernetwork,multiagentsystem,
networksecurity.

1.SatoshiNakamotosBitcoinandtheCurrentSituation.
SatoshiNakamotos[1]Bitcoinsoftwareassumesanarbitrarilyfaulty,insecure,andadversarial
peertopeerenvironment.Nodistinctionismadewithregardtothecapabilitiesoffullnodepeers,
norofthemeshnetworkconnectionsbetweenthem.Accordingly,noprovisionismadefor
efficienciesgainedviaspecializedpeers,noprovisionismadeforcooperatingpeers,noris
thereanyprovisionorincentivefornetworkinfrastructure,forsecurityorforoperations
management.
Transactionsarerelayedandacceptedintotheblockchainonabesteffortbasis.Anew
transactionreaches50%ofnodeswithin1.2secondsand90%ofnodeswithin2.9seconds[2].
Transactionsarenottimestamped.Thereisnodefiniteversionoftheblockchain.Incontrast,
incumbentcredit/debitcardpaymentsystemsarefaster[3]andmorecertainforconsumers.
Incumbentbankwiretransfer,e.g.Swiftnet[4],isfasterandmorecertainfor
businesstobusinessusers.Incumbentpaymenttransfersystemshavedatasecuritypolicies
thatBitcoinlacks[5]withregardtoprotectinghostcomputersandcustomerdata,e.g.private
keys.
Afewcentralizedpools,operatingadhocinfrastructureonthin2%commissions[6],create
mostnewblocks.Mostoftheremainderarecreatedbyafewcompetingpubliccloudandprivate
datacenters,includingunspecifiedminingdevicemanufacturers.


Uncompensatedfullnodeowners,burdenedbyoperatingcosts,aredwindlinginnumber[7][8],
andaregeographicallyconcentratedintheEasternUnitedStates.[9]

Proofofworkminingbydesignspendsblockcreationrewardsalmostentirelyonsinglepurpose
hashingdevicesandpower.Inthepastyear,thatamounttotaled$490,103,250.Thefollowing
logarithmicchartillustratestherapidgrowthofminersdailyUSDrevenueoverthelasttwoyears
[10].

Understandably,SatoshiNakomotosBitcoinhasbeendubbedapeertopeerheatengine[11].

2.ASimplifiedModelofSatoshiNakamotosBitcoin.

Inthesimplifiedfigureabove,AlicepaysBobwithanewpaymenttransactionissuedintothe
randomlyconnectednetwork[12][13][14][15].Alicestransactionisverifiedandrelayedbyeach
receivingnodetorespectivepeerswhodonotyethavethetransaction.Miningpoolnodes
choosewhethertoacceptAlicestransactionintoanewblock,andcompetewithothermining
poolstocreateahashproofofworkmeetingthecurrentnetworkdifficulty.Thewinningmining
poolpaysitsparticipatinghasherswiththeblockcreationrewardandincludedtransactionfees.
Therewardmaynotbespentuntilafter100additionalblockshavebeencreated.Aliceexpects,
butisnotguaranteed,thathertransactionwillbeincludedintoanewblockwithinanaverageof3
minutes.Thenewblockshereceiveshasacertainlowprobabilityofreversion,decreasingwith
time,shouldanotherminingpoolcreateasuperiorblockchainwithgreateraggregatedifficulty.
Thelongestchainruleensurespracticalconvergenceonaconsensusblockchainafterabout6
newblockshavebeenaddedaftertheblockcontainingAlicestransaction,whichisaboutan
hourattherateof10minutesaveragebetweenminedblocks.Bobinspectshisconsensus
versionoftheblockchaintoensurethatthetransactionisconfirmed,i.e.acceptedintoablock.
3.AlternativeCryptocurrencyInnovations.
SatoshiNakamotossolutiontothedoublespendingproblemrequiresthethermodynamiceffort
ofhashingtoachievedistributedconsensus[16].Thefirst,yetimpractical,improvementwasto
5

somehowobtainefficientunboundedagreement,i.e.theconsensusthatpermitsblockchain
checkpointsinthecode,andrandomlypermitafullnodetocreatethenewblockwithoutan
onerousproofofworkcalculation.[17].
Subsequentinnovationstoaddressproofofworkeffortwereimplementedasalternative
cryptocurrencies.PrimeCoin[18]substitutesthepurportedusefulworkoffindingcertainnew
primenumbersfortheSatoshimethodofSHA256hashing.IfBitcoinusedthismethod,the
amountofthermodynamiceffortwouldbereducedatinybitbythebenefitoffindingthese
numbers.
ProofofstakewasfirstmentionedinJuly,2011byQuantumMechanic[19].Stakevotingasa
methodtoachievedistributedconsensusforbuildingtheblockchainwasnotavailableasan
optiontoSatoshibecauseBitcoinstartedin2009withnostake.ByJuly10,2011,themarket
capitalizationofbitcoinhadrisento$106,345,680.Subsequently,twoproofofstakealgorithms
wereauthoredin2011andaredescribedintheBitcoinWiki[20],
PeerCoin[21]isthecyrptocurrencywiththefourthhighestmarketcapitalization[22],featuring
proofofstakeasanadjuncttoproofofwork,ultimatelyobviatingtheneedforacalculation
effort.ThestakeisdeterminedbyCoinAgeametricfavoringlargelongunspenttransaction
inputs[23].Criticspointoutthepeersmaycontributestaketomorethanonecompetingbranch
oftheblockchain[24][25].
Numerousalternativecyrptocurrenciesbasedonproofofstake[25]howeverretaintheoriginal
Satoshidesignofadversarialpeersracingagainsteachothertobuildnewblocksonabranching
blockchain.TheytypicallytweakparametersoftheoriginalSatoshiimplementationtoofferfaster
confirmationtimes,differingmaximumcurrencylimits,anddifferingblockrewardschedules.
4.CooperationWithoutTrust.
PreviousresearchintocooperatingtrustlessagentsbyNickSzabo(1997)[27],(1997)[28],and
(1998)[29]arguedthatauthorityismoretrustworthywhendistributed,inparticularwhenthereis
aseparationofpowers.Szaboproposedaquorumofpeerstoapproveactionsbyanagent
otherwisesubjecttofraud.Heproposedunforgeableauditinglogs,securedbyonewayhash
functions,thatauditorscouldreviewtoensuretheabsenceoffraud.AndrewMilleret.al.[30]
describedalogicallanguageforthedescriptionofauthenticateddatastructureswhose
operationsareperformedbyanuntrustedagentandwhichcanbeverifiedbyanotheragent.
ManiatisandBaker[31],describetheprocesswherebysuchlogscanbemadetamperevident
throughtimelineentanglement.
AccordingtoargumentspresentedbySzabo[32],trustedthirdpartiesintroducesecurityrisks
intoasecurityprotocolandshouldthereforebeminimizedinthedesign.HementionsByzantine
(arbitraryfaulting)resilientreplicateddatabases,e.g.FleetandPhalanx,whichavoid
dependenceontrustedthirdparties.
PeerReview[33]isaC++librarywhichhasprovidesaccountabilityforavarietyofdistributed
6

systems,providingthemwiththemeanstojustifytheiractionstotheirpeers.
5.ASingleMintBitcoinSystem.
IncontrasttoSatoshisBitcoin,theproposedsystemexhibitscoordinatedandcooperative
behavior.AccordingtoSzabo,trustlesscooperationispossibleinadistributedsystemthrough
authenticatedpeerattestationofcorrectbehavior.Consensus,achievedinthissystemby
stakeweightedvoting,isprimarilyrequiredwhenmisbehaviorisdetected.Themethodis
resistanttoadversarieslackingsufficientstake.Afaultyormisbehavingpeerisdisconnected
fromthenetworkbyaquorumofitsstakeweightedpeers.

Inthesimplifiedfigureabove,acentraltrustlessmintagentcreatesallnewblocks,appendedto
anonforkingblockchain,onafixedschedule,withoutproofofworkeffort.
AlicepreparestopayBobwithanewpaymenttransaction.Hertamperevidentlogrecordsthe
issuanceactivitydetailsthatincludethelocaltimestamp,theBitcointransaction,andthe
connectionendpoints,e.g.themints,bitcoinaddress.Thetransactiontobesentispackaged
withthetransactiondetails,andanauthenticatedhashofAlicestamperevidentlog.The
transactionsentdirectlytotheconnectedmint.
Themintdirectlyreceivesthetransactionandlogsitsarrival.Themintimmediatelysendsback
toAliceanauthenticatedhashofitsowntamperevidentlogcontaininghertransaction.Atthis
pointthetamperevidentlogsofAliceandthemintareentangled[31].Despitedifferencesintheir
respectivelocalclocks,thetemporalorderofthedistributedprocessstepscanbeverifiedby
7

anyobserverqueryingthelogs.Aliceknowsthatthemintreceivedhertransaction.
ThemintagentvalidatesAlicestransaction.Ifinvalid,thatstatusisloggedanditsentbackto
Alice.Otherwise,thetransactionisacandidateforinclusionintothenewblock.Ifthereisno
transactionfee,thetransactionmaybeacceptedaccordingtoarulethatpermitsacertain
percentageoffreetransactionsperblock.Ifrejectedbythatrule,thatstatusisloggedanditis
sentbacktoAlice.Otherwisethemintlogstheacceptedtransactionstatus.
Themintbroadcaststheacceptedtransactionsdirectlytoitspeers,namelyAliceandBob.Bob
immediatelyknowsthatAlicespaymenttohimwillbeincludedinthenextblockcreatedbythe
mintwithtrivialproofofworkatexact10minuteintervals.Whenthemintcreatesthenewblock,
itkeepsacertainportionoftheblockrewardandtransactionfeesforitself,andpaysthe
remainderdailytoAliceandBobasimmediatelyspendabledividendsinproportiontotheir
offeredstakes.BobandAlicebothlogtheacknowledgedtransaction,andverifytheworkofthe
mintbybuildingtheirownnewblockusingthesameinputsinthesametimestampedorderas
themint.TamperevidentlogsfromAlice,themint,andBobpermiteachoftheseparticipantsto
provethattheybehavedcorrectly.Eachparticipantidentifiesitselfbyacertainbitcoinaddress
thattheyrespectivelycontrol.Theprivatekeyoftheaddressisusedtodigitallysigncertain
messagesandtoverifythatresponsesweresentbytheintendedrecipient.
Becausethereisasinglemint,thereisnoneedforaproofofwork.Thetamperevidentlogs
facilitateremoteattestationofcorrectpeerbehavior.TheidentityofAliceandBobaresupported
bytheirrespectivestakes.Whenthereisaneedforaconsensus,votesaretalliedandweighted
byofferedstates.Misbehavingnodesarebannedfromthenetwork,thusstronglymotivating
honestbehavior.

6.TheProposedDecentralizedEnterpriseClassBitcoinSystem.
AsSzabopointsout[32],thesimpletrustlessmintsystemdescribedabovehastheobvious
problemofcentralizationandlackofredundancy.Afaultinthemintcausessystemfailure,and
themintisacertaintargetforattack.Theproposedbitcoinsystemdistinguishesthebehaviorof
themintagentfromitshostnode.Themintagentisnomadic,andcanmoveitsprocessstate
fromonehostnodetoanotheronaconsensusscheduleorasotherwiseneeded,e.g.fault
recovery.
Thissystemisimplementedasahierarchicalnetworkoftransparentnomadicsoftwareagents
executingacommonopensourcesoftwareprogramwithdifferingroles.Therearenohumans
intheloopexceptasownersofnodeswhichhosttheagents.Thehumannodeownermayoffer
acontrolledbitcoinaddresscontainingstakeinreturnfordailydividends,butisotherwise
anonymous.

Thepaidforenterpriseclassnetworkcapableofhandlingalltheworldstransactionsis
configuredasasuperpeernetwork[34],inwhichcertainpeershavedistinguishedsuperior
capabilitiesthatallowthemtobethenetworkbackbone[35].Bitcoinmessagetrafficoriginatesin
theperipheralnodesandflowsdirectlythroughthebackbonetoreachtheMintagent.
AcknowledgedtransactionsandnewblockchainhashesflowoutwardsfromtheMinttothe
blockchainreplicatingfullnodes,andtowalletsbeyondthem.Singledirectconnectionsare
showninthefigureabove,howevereachnodehasmultipleconnectionstosuperpeerscarrying
redundantmessages,forfaulttoleranceandmisbehaviordetection.Eachsuperpeerisahubfor
numerousfullnodes.Toservicebillionsofendpointsandnumerousmicrotransactions,the
superpeerringmaybeaugmentedbyoneormoreouterringsthataggregateinboundmessage
9

traffic,andconverselydisaggregateoutboundtraffic.Globalbackbonenodessituatednear
carrierpointsofpresenceandthehubandspokenetworkarchitectureyieldsubsecond
responsetimesgiventhesimplicityofthesingleappendonlyjournallingBitcoindatabaseits
blockchain,andappendonlylogs.Subsecondresponsetimeisalsoenabledbythe6hopround
trippathtothemint.Scalingtoadditionalsuperpeerringswouldaddonly2roundtriphopsper
ring.
Superpeernodesarelikelytobebrandedentitiessuchthatafewbrandedentitiescontrolthe
majorityofsuperpeers.Importantfullnodesthatservehostedwallets,paymentprocessors,
exchanges,investmentfirmsandfinancialinstitutionsarelikelytobepreferentiallyconnectedto
reliablebrandedsuperpeers,ifnotactuallycolocatedphysicallyandoperatedunderthesame
brand.
ThissystemusesanattestableunforgeablelogorganizationinspiredbyNickSzabo.In
particular,thissystemusesattestedappendonlymemoryasdescribedbyChunet.al.[36]who
providemathematicalargumentsforisproperties.Itremainscorrectandkeepsmakingprogress
evenwhenhalfthereplicas,e.g.blockchainreplicas,arefaulty.Thisisanimprovementover
previousByzantineFaultTolerantalgorithmslackingatamperevidentlog,whichallowedonly
onethirdfaultyreplicas[37].
6.1.WhatAllNodesKnow.
AllfullnodeshaveabuiltinsetofbootstrapnodeDNSURIsandabuiltinsetoflikelygoodnode
IPaddresses.Allfullnodeshaveconsensusagreementastothecurrentsetofsuperpeers.All
fullnodeshaveasynchronousreplicaofthesinglenonforkingblockchainandconsensus
agreementastothelatestblockhash.Allfullnodeshaveconsensusagreementastothenew
transactionsthathavebeenissuedsincethelastblockcreation,andhaveconsensus
agreementastothetimestampedorderofacknowledgedtransactions.Allnodeshave
consensusagreementastotheapproximatedateandtime,andagreementastothecalendarof
superpeeragentassignmentsandactivities,e.g.thenetworkreconfigurationeachweekendby
adesignatedsuperpeer.
6.2.BehaviorCommontoAllFullNodesandSuperPeerNodes.
Eachfullandsuperpeernodehasidenticalsoftware,whichiscapableofperformingany
particularrole,orattestingtheroleofapeerbyreplayingthatpeersloggedoperationwithlogged
inputsandoutputs.
Eachnodevalidatesandmaintainsacopyofthesingletonblockchainandthecurrenthash.
Eachnodeownermaybemotivatedtocontributeatestnode,accordingtothereward
distributionpolicy.
EachnodecontrolsaBitcoinaddresswhoseprivatekeyisusedfordigitalsignatures.
Eachnodemaintainsatamperevidentjustificationlogofitsoperations,inputs,andoutputsin
10

JSONformat,whichisasetofattributevaluepairswhicharemachinereadablebymost
computerlanguages,andalsobyhumans.AnAPIpermitsthelogtobereadbyapeer.The
purposeofthelogistoattestcorrectbehavior,isolatemisbehavior,andtoautomatically
diagnosefaults.
Eachnodemaintainsconnectionstoasetofrandompeerswherebyastakeweightedmajority
canresolvecertaindisputedstateaccordingtoabyzantine,i.e.arbitrary,faulttolerance
algorithm.
TheassociatedfirewallbetweenthenodeandtheInternetmaybeconfiguredtodenyall
connectionsexceptthoseinthelistofpermittedIPaddresses.Inthisconfiguration,amanual
enrollmentstepisrequiredbeforethepeernodecanconnecttoagivenwhitelistedpeer.
TheBitcoinprotocoldoesnotactuallyrequireencryption,asthetransactions,messages,blocks
andtheblockchainarecryptographicallyverifiable.Pseudonymousaddresses,datesand
transactioninputs/outputsaretheonlycustomerdatarevealed.
6.3.ANewFullNode.
AnewfullnodejoiningthenetworkisassignedasetofpeersbytheuserselectedDNS
bootstrapnode.Thenewnodecrawlsthegraphofconnectednodes,constructingasetof
randomnodes.Thenewnodedeterminesthefitnessofitspeers[38],whichinreturndetermine
thenewnodesfitness.Theutilityfunctionvectorscoresuptime,inbound/outboundbandwidth,
latency,degreeofconnectionredundancy,CPUthroughput,andblockchainpresence.Itis
expectedthatordinaryfullnodeswillhavesufficientsymmetricbandwidthforrelaying
transactionsandmaintainingtheblockchain.Candidatesforsuperpeerstatuswillbeexpected
tohaveenterpriseclassbandwidth,failoverredundancy,CPUthroughput,DDoSprotection,
etc.,insofarasthesecanbemeasuredbyasoftwareprobe.Thenewnodesolicitsthe
membersofthesetofsuperpeersfromtenrandomconnectednodes.Usingoptional
manuallyconfiguredsuperpeersasanoverride,thenewnodeconnectstothreesuperpeers
havinglowlatency,providedtheyareeligibletoacceptadditionalfullnodepeers.Forexample,if
theBitcoinsuperpeernetworkisconfiguredbycoredevelopersat100superpeernodes,then
eachshouldreceiveamaximumof10%ofconnectionsprovidingacertainamountof
decentralization.Oneofthethreeconnectedsuperpeersistheprimaryconnectiontothe
network,theothertwoarebackupswhichcarryredundanttraffic.
Thenewnodeprovidesjustificationwhetheritshouldbeamemberofthesuperpeerset,when
askedbytheuniqueconfigurationnode.
EachfullnodeprovidesanAPIandadigitallysignedmachinereadablejustificationlogofits
actions,e.g,issuedtransactions,forwardedtransactions,receivedtransactions,newbroadcast
blockhashreceived,whichareverifiedrandomlybytheauditnode,andbyitspeernodes.
6.4.BootstrapNode.

11

Thebootstrapnodeisafullnodehavingthepermanentresponsibilityofreturningacandidateset
ofconnectedpeernodestoarequestingnewnodejoiningorrejoiningtheBitcoinnetwork.
6.5.BehaviorCommontoAllSuperPeerNodes.
Superpeernodesmaybeprovisionedasmultiplecomputersinaclusterwithloadbalancing,
providedthattheirtemporaryresponsibilityissuitablyparallelizable.
Uponthescheduledterminationofasuperpeernodestemporaryrole,itsprocessstateis
serializedintoadigitallysignedJSONdatastructureandpassedinamessagetothenextsuper
peernodeconfiguredtohavethatrole.Thisbehaviorallowsthesoftwareagentstomovearound
thenetworkasnomads.Softwarecodedoesnotmove,theprocessstatemoves,asallnodes
executeidenticalsoftware.
6.6.ConfigurationAgent.
Thesingletonconfigurationagent,hostedbyasuperpeernode,hastheresponsibilityof
choosingwhichnodesaresuperpeersandsettingthenomadicagentschedule.Bycrawlingthe
network,itrecordstheutilityindicatorsofeachnodeandselectsthebestN,i.e.100,nodesas
superpeers.Itinstructsthemviaamessagetoensuredirect,possiblyredundant,connections
betweenthem.Attheconclusionofthemintingcycle,theconfigurationagentrandomlychooses
thenextconfigurationagentfromamongitssuperpeernodes.
Theconfigurationagentperiodically,e.g.weekly,solicitstomyselfproofofstaketransactions
frompeersthatindicatewillingnesstoofferstakes.Thesestakesestablishthedefaultreward
portion.
6.7.SeedAgents.
Theseedagents,hostedbysuperpeernodes,havetheresponsibilityforseedingfullnodesthat
jointhenetwork.Theseededfullnodeselectstheseedingagenthavingtheoptimalcombination
oflowlatencyandcurrentload.
6.8.MintAgent.
Thesingletonmintagent,hostedbyasuperpeernode,hastheresponsibilityofcreatingnew
blocksandmintingnewbitcoins.Newblockcreationissynchronous,usingtheconsensus
timestampatthehour,10minutespastthehour,20minutespastthehour,...attherateofsix
blocksperhour.Receivedtransactionsareimmediatelybroadcastbackintothenetworkwiththe
acknowledgedarrivaltimestamp,sothatallfullnodesmaybuildthenewblockin
synchronizationwiththemintagent.Whentheissuingfullnodereceivestheacknowledged
transaction,itmayindicatetotheuserthatthetransactionisacknowledged,i.e.goodtogo,but
notyetcommittedintotheblockchain.
Afteraggregatingnewtransactionsfor10minutes,themintagentcreatestheblockandlinksit
intoitsblockchain.Itbroadcaststhenewhashtoallfullnodes,whoconfirmitagainsttheir
12

respectivereplicas.Discrepanciesarereportedtotheauditnode.Transactionsthatarriveafter
themaximumblocksizeisreachedawaitthefollowing10minutecycle.Thecoinbase
transactionspecifiesasitsunspentoutput,theparticularBitcoinaddresscontrolledbythe
rewardagent.
Themintagentmayperformmergedminingonbehalfofanycompatiblealtcoin,e.g.a
proofofstakeversionofNamecoin.
6.9.RewardAgent.
Therewardagentdistributesdividendsdailytofullnodes.Bydefault,fullnodesare
compensatedfortheiroperatingcostsbyafixedproportion,andadditionallyreceivearewardin
proportiontotheirofferedstake.Superpeernodesreceivearewardcompensatingforthe
infrastructureexpensestheyincurwhenprovisioningthenetworkbackbone.Theseexpenses
mayreasonablyincludemediaadvertising,marketingsupport,andcompelledcontributionsto
variousbitcoinnonprofits,e.g.payingthesalariesofoperatorsmonitoringthenetwork,and
developersenhancingBitcoin.Rewardallocationpoliciesandothersystemicpolicydecisions
shallbeperiodicallydecidedbyhumanselectedintoacertainpaidfornonprofitorganizationby
thestakeweightedvotesoffullnodes.
6.10.PrimaryAuditAgent.
Theprimaryauditagentisasingletonhavingtheresponsibilityofpassiveandactiveauditor.It
receivesreportsofinconsistenciesfromanyothernode,e.g.somedisagreementwith
consensus,andperformsaninvestigation.Ifrecoveryisrequired,itmessagestherecovery
agentconcerningthenatureoftherecovery,e.g.revertthenewblock.Theauditagenthasthe
powertobanmisbehavingnodes.
Theauditagentdailypollseachofthefullnodesatrandomtimes,toensurethattheyhavethe
correctblockchainhash,andwhethertheentireblockchainispresent,e.g.blockchainbytesat
certainrandomoffsets.
6.11.SecondaryAuditAgents.
Thesecondaryauditagentsperformrandomchecksthatduplicatetheintentoftheprimaryaudit
agentandincertaincasesoffloadaudittasksforparallelization.
6.12.RecoveryAgent.
Therecoveryagentisasingletonhavingtheresponsibilityofperformingfaultrecovery.Typical
faultrecoveryincaseofadefectivemintwouldbethecoordinatedrollbackofthelast
committedblock,releasingitstransactionsforinputintoareplacementblockbyabackup
temporarymint.
Therecoverynodehasthepowertodisableafaultysuperpeerandreplaceitwithabackup.

13

6.13.NetworkOperationsAgent.
Thenetworkoperationsagentisasingletonhavingtheresponsibilityofreportingnode,
superpeer,andnetworkperformanceandintegrityindicators,suchasnumberofconnected
nodes,nodechurnrate,bandwidthconsumedforvariouspurposes,storageconsumed,
responsetime,outages,detectedDDoSattacks,detectedSybilattacks,misbehavingnodes,
alerts,etc.ItprovidesaJSONAPIthatenablesareferencewebsiteoranyotherwebpageto
easilydisplaytheseindicatorsasfiguresorchartsinavarietyofnaturallanguages.Ithas
commandandcontrolresponsibilitiesforthecommonphysicalassetsofthenetwork.Humans
areinthelooptoacertainlimitedextent.
Possibly,thenetworkoperationsagentmigrateseveryfewhours,followinglocaltrafficpeaks
betweenworldfinancialcapitalsinsuccessivetimezones.Forexample,inorder:Sydney,
Tokyo,HongKong,Singapore,Moscow,Zurich,London,NewYorkandSanFrancisco.
6.14.SoftwareProvisioningAgent.
Thisagentisresponsibleforcoordinatingthedeploymentandreversionofsoftwarereleases,in
particulartosuperpeernodes.
7.SystemTestPlan.
Asystemtestplanwillbewritteninadvanceofcodingtheproposedchanges.Anorchestrated
testharness,preferablyusingexistingtools,willpermithighlyautomatedregressiontestingofa
distributedsetofBitcoinsoftwareinstanceswitharobusttestsuite.Earlydevelopmentworkwill
focusonthetamperevidentlogsandaqueryAPIaddedtothesoftwarethatpermitstracinga
transactionthroughthenetwork.
8.Conclusion.
TheproposedreengineeringismuchmorecomplexthanSatoshiNakamotosBitcoin.However,
thecomplexityoftheproposedsystemofferscompellingbenefitsmainlytheavoidanceof
thermodynamiceffortwhichiscurrently$490,103,250annualrate,andgrowinganaverage10x
eachyear.Rewardsarereallocatedfromproofofwork,totheprovidersofdecentralized
networkinfrastructure,andtostakeholdersasdividends.Thepaidforenterprisenetworkdesign
isscalabletohandlealltheworldstransactions.
Muchofthecomplexityoftheproposedsystemresultsfromverifiableuntrustedcooperation,
allowingcommonsenseteamworktorationalizetheroutingoftransactionstospecializedpeers,
andthesynchronousmaintenanceofareplicateddefiniteblockchain.Asaresult,customers
andmerchantsreceivesubsecondtransactionacknowledgement.
TheproposedBitcoinsystemistobedeployedinearly2016asahardforkoftheblockchain
withintheBitcoinnetwork,followingayearofpublicsystemtesting.Launchisconditionedon
wideacceptanceamongBitcoinusers,paymentprocessors,developers,exchanges,hosted
14

andcustomeroperatedwalletproviders,andtheBitcoinmedia.
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