An Analysis of Napoleonic Successes and Failures During the Peninsular War from May 1808 to

January 1809 through an Application of Clausewitz's Reciprocal Actions of War

James Williford
HTY 200
Professor Libby Bischof
09 MAY 2012

Table of Contents - 1
Introduction - 2
Historiography - 7
Rise of the Spanish Insurgency - 9
Invasion and Early Occupation: The Campaigns of General Junot and Marshal Murat - 12
Napoleons Wraith: The Counter-Offensive into Spain - 15
Conclusion - 18

Introduction
In the twilight of the 19th Century, the premiere land power of the world, French Emperor
Napoleon Bonaparte's army captured Spain and force the King of Spain, then Ferdinand II son of
Carlos IV of the Bourbon lineage, to abdicate his throne. The reason for Napoleon's desire to capture
Spain fell ultimately to two factors: the proclamation against Napoleon by Manuel Godoy calling Spain
to arms prior to the battle of Aurstadt and Napoleon's desire to directly control the operations of Spain.
The war, which lasted more than seven years eventually led to Napoleon quitting the Spanish theater in
1815. Napoleons eldest brother, Joseph was announced as the new King of Spain in May of 1808 1.
On the day of the removal of the final royal member of the Spanish royal family from the palace in
Madrid, a day immortalized by Francisco Goya's painting Dos De Mayo, the Spanish rose up against
the French and were brutally crushed. While the French military occupied Spain, under the command
of General Junot, the Spanish people were brutally disarmed on a national level. People with large
knives or even scissors outside of home were put to death in French occupied areas such as Bayonne,
Navarre, and the Old Castille.
The uprisings and the subsequent brutality of the French soldiers resulted in the revolt of the
Spanish population against the French military. Without the aid of a strong national defense force and
before significant British aid arrived, the citizen forces later called Guerillas were instrumental in the
most crushing defeat the Napoleonic forces had yet suffered during the battle of Bailen in the summer
of 18082. Throughout the summer insurgent forces continued to rebuff the French forces allowing the
British to land a full army in Portugal and liberate the country at the Battle of Vilermo. By October of
1808, the initial French campaign had all but failed, King Joseph Bonaparte had left Madrid, the
Spanish insurgents had taken control of the national government, and the French forces fortified North
of the Ebros river in expectation of the final attack against them 3
1 Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War. Oxford, Claerendon Press, 1902. 55

2Esdaile, Charles J., The Peninsular War. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 88
3David Chandler., The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1966, 566.

Suffering a series of defeats at the hands of the insurgents he had clearly shown a disdain for,
Napoleon was outraged and said I see that everybody has lost their head since the infamous
capitulation of Bailn. I realize that I must go there myself to get the machine working again and
prepared to invade the Iberian Peninsula with Le Grande Armee 4. In November 1808, Napoleon's
forces would crush the insurgent forces in a sweeping campaign that saw the successful execution of a
double envelopment against the Spanish insurgents. Napoleon and his Marshals recaptured Madrid in
less than two months, defeated General Moore of the British Army, and captured the infamous
insurgent General Palafox in the siege of Zargoza 5.
The current scholarly belief is that the French Army failed during their initial campaign of the
Peninsular War due to the heroism and tenacity of the Spanish insurgents6. The current belief
highlights the failure of the Napoleonic forces not as a strategic error on behalf of the French Army,
but rather, as a compliment to the insurgents. More classical writing by early authors such as W.F.P.
Napier, a British General who served under the Duke of Wellington and fought on the Iberian
peninsula, however, largely dismissed the Spanish insurgents and lays the credit of victory to the lack
of discipline of French soldiers when compared to the quality of the British soldiers and commanders
such as General Moore 7. In the face of modern recurring difficulties against insurgencies in
mountainous nations this paper breaks from current scholarly thought and examines the failures of
Napoleonic forces in regards to the writings of Carl Von Clausewitz in his seminal text, On War. First
published in 1832, On War has served as the standard text on military theory for the better part of two
centuries. Clausewitz, a contemporary of Bonaparte, was a field marshal in the Prussian army and he
described war as having three extremes that must be approached: maximum use of force, the goal is to

4 As cited in Chandler, 620.

5 Chandler, 682.
6 Charles Esdaile., Fighting Napoleon: guerrillas, bandits, and adventurers in Spain, 1808-1814, 1st ed. Great Britain, St
Edmundsbury Press Ltd, 2004, 12.
7 W.F.P.Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France: From AD 1807 to AD 1814, New ed. New
York, A.C. Armstrong & Son, 1882, 18.

disarm the enemy, and the maximum exertion of strength 8.

Through the comparison of the failure of Junot's forces and Napoleon's army's successes in light
of these extremes this paper examines and identifies factors that created the means for failure of the
Napoleonic forces in the Peninsular War. I argue that the French empire failed to stabilize and
effectively subdue the Iberian Peninsula between May of 1808 to November of 1808 due to the French
commanders inability to approach Clausewitz's stated extremes of war in the same manner in which the
Spanish Guerillas did. The initial French failure stemmed from their failure to decisively direct and
control pure violence against the Spanish uprisings, and their inability to actively disarm the guerillas
by forcing them into a position that was less agreeable than surrender. Junot and Murat failed to disarm
the enemy, as the enemy is placed in a position that to surrender is to be rendered completely
defenseless. Clausewitz wrote that the worst of situations is to find oneself completely defenseless.
Through French brutality and the propagation of art and media such as the paintings of Francisco Goya
the people of Spain believed that to surrender was to be defenseless and thus the people of Spain had
no reason to not fight 9. Lastly the French forces failed to exert the maximum level of strength needed
when comparing numbers of soldiers as well as taking into account the level of their will. Napoleon
committed only 120,000 soldiers to the initial campaigns, most of whom were raw conscripts and knew
little of war 10. The only veterans, according to Chandler's Campaigns of Napoleon were with Junot in
Portugal and numbered less than 25,000 of the total 120,000 troops stationed on the peninsula 11.
Meanwhile, according to Esdailles Fighting Napoleon many provinces such as Castille and Navarre
were accustomed to irregular warfare and had plans in place which, if the need arose, all the males of
the villages would band together to fight against an enemy 12. So while Napoleon had committed
insufficient numbers to the Spanish campaign, he also failed to commit soldiers with the will to fight
8
9
10
11
12

Carl VonClausewitz, On War, 1984 ed. Princeton: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1993, 4.
Esdaile, Fighting Napoleon, 12.
Esdaile, The Peninsular War, 7-36.
Esdaile, The Peninsular War, 8.
Chandler, 618. David G Chandler, The Art of Warfare on Land, 2000 ed. Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, 2000, 158-166

against the Spanish insurgents who had a very high will and moral. These failures will be examined
independently and then in comparison to Emperor Bonaparte's sweeping successes of his November
1808-January 1809 campaign in which the Emperor directed every element and approached these
extremes while his Marshall's had failed to in the past and as they would after the Emperor left Spain .
The differences in the means of conducting each campaign and how the application of Clausewitz's
extremes from On War led to either success or failure in campaigns that occurred in a similar time
period serves as the primary focus of this paper.

Historiography
The written history of the campaigns of the Peninsular War began with Major General Sir WFP
Napier of the British army, who first published History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of
Francein in 182813. Napier, a military man by nature, bore witness to the brutality of the Peninsular
war while he served under the Duke of Wellington. However, much of his work is extracted from
correspondence of the Duke of Wellington, General Sir John Moore, other English commanders, his
own recollections and journals, and surprisingly a significant amount of documents from Marshal Soult
of Napoleon's Le Grande Armee for whom Napier expressed the utmost and deepest respect for,14
Napier chronicled the war as from the perspective of a soldier; he documented and described troop
strengths and movements, offered notes on strategy, and explains the concepts and outcomes of sieges
in fine detail. Napier almost completely dismissed the contributions of the Spanish insurgent forces 15.
He explained the Peninsular war in a fashion very akin to how any war fought during the Napoleonic
era would have been. For Napier, the Peninsular war was a battle of line companies with the Spanish
simply harassing the French but the true victors were the Anglo-Portuguese soldiers under the Duke of
Wellington.
The next seminal text to emerge about the Peninsular war was Charles Oman's A History of the
Peninsular War in 1902. Oman was a fellow of All Souls College in England, and the first professional
historian to attempt an unbiased, comprehensive, and objective view of the war16. Oman acknowledged
Napier as author of a significant work that will never be able to be replaced but ultimately discounted
much of what Napier wrote as being quite biased and unfair, often to an extreme or cruel degree.17.
13 Napier, 1. General Napier served under Duke of Wellington and General Sir John Moore during the Peninsular war. His
writing frequently shows a personal disdain for the Spanish. He represents his opinion in a manner that suggests he feels
that not only the insurgents were unfit soldiers, but the soldiers of the Spanish military itself.
14 Napier,2. Napier discusses that he received a significant amount of material from Marshall Soult and that the Marshall
had not requests to limit Napier's writing to ensure France is written of in a favorable fashion.
15 Napier, 5. Napier considers the Spanish insurgents to be substandard in every regard. This is not only in comparison to
the English soldiers but the French line soldiers as well. Napier does, however, make the distinction between the French
conscripts and the French line soldiers in Le Grande Armee.
16 Oman, 1. Oman initially praises Napier, but later cites him as being prejudicial. Later, language such as silly and
foolish emerges when he speaks of Carlos IV.
17 Oman, 11.

Oman reversed many of Napier's notions of Spanish martial prowess through referencing the work of
General Arteche Y Moro and discrediting Napier's sources due to accuracy and bias at the source18.
Oman's writings are based heavily on academic writing and the thus his interpretation of the events
likely differed from Napier based on his ability to view the Spanish insurgents without their failures
impacting his own personal safety. This factor was a luxury that Napier had not enjoyed during his
time in Spain during the Peninsular war.
Within the past forty years, several new books on the Peninsular war have emerged. Most
notable of these is Charles Esdaile's 2004 The Peninsular War: A New History and Fighting Napoleon:
Guerillas, Bandits, and Adventurers in Spain 1808-1814. Esdaile approached the history of the
Peninsular war utilizing a full-spectrum approach addressing not only the battles, movements, and
politics of the war, but also it's geo-political impacts and financial impacts on a more global scale.
Esdaile also returns to the discussion of validity of Spanish insurgents and his arguments are situated in
a middle ground between Oman and Napier. While Napier argues that the guerillas of history and art
are likely largely, if not completely, fabricated and the Spanish insurgents were less likely to fight in
disorganized clumps with hatchets, sabers, and pistols but rather would likely have appeared to be
poorly trained line infantry19. Esdaile acknowledged the importance of the guerrillas and cites sources
that suggest that the insurgents were not only important but critical in the French defeat in Spain20.

18 Oman, 3.
19 Esdaile, Fighting Napoleon, 6.
20 Esdaile, 9.

Rise of the Spanish Insurgency

The Spanish insurgency of the Peninsular war drew it's origins not from Napoleon, but from
Manuel De Godoy the Chief Minister of Spain. Godoy, became a member of the aristocracy nearly
overnight and finally rose to his title of Chief Minister and Grandee first class in 179221. In this
capacity, Godoy strove to reform the government, military, and clergy of Spain. As a result, the general
population of Spain as well as the clergy, and military orders of Spain disliked the Chief Minister but
Godoy was supported by the Royal Family22. As Spain become entangled with France as an ally
against England, its naval fleet and financial status suffered. In 1807, Napoleon and Godoy brokered
the Treaty of Fontainbleau which pulled Spain into a planned war against Portugal. Napoleon wished
to capture Portugal in order to stem the tide of English trade goods into continental Europe2324.
Godoy's reforms were not the only root of Spanish discontent however. Spain faced significant
financial troubles and a severe recession due to English blockades of Spanish ports and the lack of
Spanish naval power to keep long trade lanes from the Americas to Spain open25. The people of Spain
were highly impoverished with reforms that made poverty a criminal offense, creating a near-feudal
system in which the wealthy accrued massive tracts of land and hold the tenants liable for very large
portions of crops and products. Since the war of the Oranges in 1801 against the Portugese, Spanish
wealth and power had been on continual decline. Given Godoy's apparent overnight ascension from
soldier to statesmen the people saw him as the catalyst of the negative changes in Spain and directed
their resentment against him and, often, the King Carlos IV who was of the Bourbon lineage.
21
22
23
24

Charles Esdaile, The Peninsular War:A New History, New York, Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 10.
Esdaile, Peninsular War, 10
Esdaile, Peninsular War, 7.
Charles Oman, History of the Peninsular War, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1902, 4. Godoy was leveraged into the treaty of
Fontainebleau as he had issued a statement during Napoleon's campaign of Jena that called Spain's citizens to arms
against France After Napoleon's success at Tilsit, Godoy recanted and sought to repair the damage by casting the
direction of the call to arms of Spain at England and Godoy signed the treaty allowing 28,000 soldiers into Spain to
attack Portugal and promised 13,000 Spanish soldiers to aid in the campaign. With prior Spanish government consent
Napoloen would be able to move more soldiers in and through Spain and throughout the Iberian peninsula.
25 Esdaile, Peninsular War, 18.

It is important to note, however, that Godoy's actions alone did not incite the people to action.
The crown Prince, Ferdinand, behind the King's back, communicated with Napoleon to seek both a
Napoleonic family marriage and aid in gaining the crown26. The actions of Ferdinand were discovered
and both the prince and his co-conspirators were found guilty. While Ferdinand was pardoned, his coconspirators were sent into internal exile into Spain27. The people of Spain were furious and considered
this to be a plot orchestrated by Godoy himself to oust the prince who the people loved. Where the
people viewed Godoy as a change for the worse, they saw Ferdinand as their savior from not only
Godoy, but poverty and any other conceivable ailment they suffered.
In early 1808, Napoleon sets in motions the actions that cause the Spanish royal family to plan
to flee to the Spanish holdings in Mexico. Napoleon accused Spain of bad faith regarding the terms of
the Treaty of Fontanebleau and annulled the treaty. This action forced a new treaty that would sacrifice
the Spanish holdings north of the Ebros River. Many believe, however, that Napoleon may have made
this act to incite a revolt against Carlos IV28. The royal family fled Madrid, with Godoy, to Seville to
escape by sea where associates of Ferdinand incite a riot. But the riots were not limited to Seville.
Nationwide godoyists and Godoy-related symbols of reform are destroyed. Before long, violence
erupted as the jaded and anti-Godoy royal guard clashed with hussars29 from Godoy's personal
bodyguard30. The violence culminates in Carlos IV abdicating the throne to Ferdinand on March 19th,
1808. Ferdinand returns to Madrid where he is welcomed as a hero. The people of Spain were excited
for their new ruler whom they hale as not only a change from the old regime but also as a means to
bring Godoy to justice.
With the people of Spain jubilant over the regime change, blame for the subsequent insurgency
26 Oman 17-25. Ferdinand was, for a time, to be wed to a Bonaparte family member named Charelotte who was the
daughter of Lucien. Lucien eventually refused to allow the marriage ending the chance of marrying a Spanish royal
member into the family monarchy system that Napoleon was constructing. For there to be a Bonaparte on the throne in
Spain, Napoleon would be forced to completely replace the Bourbons with a family member.
27 Esdaile, Peninsular War, 24. .Escoiquiz, Infantado, and Montijo, et al were the accused and convicted conspirators.
The conspirators were generally wealthy, non-military families that in general were strongly anti-Godoy.
28 Esdaile, Peninsular War, 31.
29 A type of heavy cavalry armed with sabers common in the Napoleonic era militaries.
30 Esdaile, Peninsular War, 33.

rests upon the shoulders of Napoleon. Ferdinand, the new Spanish king was not accepted by either the
French commanders or the emperor himself. Marshal Joachim Murat, commander of French forces in
Spain, refused to recognize Ferdinand as King. Ferdinand, however, continued to seek to gain
Napoleon's favor through demonstration and statements of compliance with Napoleonic rule.
Ferdinand displayed the willingness to become a client kingdom of France.31. Secondly, Napoleon
failed to convince his brother Lucien to give his blessing for the proposed wedding of his daughter
Charlotte to Ferdinand. The people of Spain, expecting a union between the Bourbon family and the
Bonaparte family, grew increasingly agitated as time passed with no marriage.32 However, Napoleon
saw an opportunity to have both a Bonaparte on the throne of Spain and finally dispose of the
Bourbon's of the Spanish throne.33. Napoleon would arrest Carlos IV and the now king of Spain
Ferdinand as well as all of the extended family members and bring them to Bayonne. At Bayonne the
Emperor of France would force capitulation from first Carlos IV then Ferdinand34. Rumors of this
capitulation, in combination with the visible arrests of the royal family, led the people of Spain to turn
against the French on the second of May, 1808, a day that would be remembered as Dos De Mayo.
On the second of May, the people of Madrid revolt against the French soldier's occupying the
city under Marshal Murat. The riots were quelled through excess violence with many of the rioters
captured. Many of the captured rioters were executed at night outside of the city by French soldiers.
Both the second and third of May have been immortalized through the paintings of the famed Spanish
artist, Francisco Goya. Goya's paintings and etchings are amongst other Spanish based propaganda that
fueled the citizens of Spain into an insurgency that challenged the most powerful military in the
European theater.

31
32
33
34

Oman, 43.
Esdaile, Peninsular War, 22-26
Esdaile, Peninsular War, 29-30.
Oman, 54-56.

Invasion and Early Occupation:Campaigns of General Junot and Marshal Murat

Napoleon's forces, led by General Jean Andoche Junot35, entered Spain October 1807. This
invasion was a result of Napoleon's attempts to deny the English trade access to continental Europe
under his continental plan. Portugal was an ally of England and thus allowed trade giving England
access to continental trade on the mainland of Europe. Junot led 25,000 soldiers, veterans of
Napoleonic line companies, into Lisbon on by November 30th 36. While Junot occupied Portugal, other
French forces under the overall command of Marshall Murat. By the end of February, Marshall Murat
commanded a total of 90,000 to 118,000 French soldiers on Spanish soil which encompassed Moncey's,
Duhesme, Dupont's, and Bessieres' Corps3738. In late February, French forces move into action and take
Pampalona, Barcelona, and several frontier towns. Murat's forces were complemented by 6,000
imperial guard to his new headquarters in Vitoria. With little resistance, French forces continued to
move South, capturing Spanish cities, forts, magazines, and depots along the way. By March 23rd
Murat's forces held the city of Madrid, capitol of Spain, seeing Murat holding the city a day before
Ferdinand, the now king of Spain, reentered the city of Madrid39. Though Napoleon continued to keep
his options open and not decisively committing to open warfare or endorsing Ferdinand as king, he
wrote to Murat 'I hope with all my heart that there will be no war, and am only taking so many
precautions because it is my habit to leave nothing to chance. But if there is a war, your position will
be a very good one'40.
35 Oman, 8. Junot was considered an excellent soldier, but was not as capable of a commanders as his contemporaries such
as Soult or Murat. Junot, an old friend of Napoleon having known him since the battle of Toulon, was selected for the
command largely on his experience and knowledge of Portugal having served in the embassy several years prior. If
Junot succeeded in his orders, Junot would receive a Marshals Baton (essentially a promotion from General to Marshal)
and become a noble of the newly captured Protugal.
36 Chandler, 599. Of the 25,000 soldiers Junot began his campaign with, he arrived at Lisbon with just over 2,000 soldiers
in fighting condition. This was due to a grueling pace and harsh conditions. However, the invasion was described in
Chandler's book as an an armed parade and not a war.
37 Chandler, 605. The buildup of forces had been a gradual progression as forces were introduced into the Spanish theater
by divisions, such as the Division of the Western Pyrenees or Division of the Easter Pyrenees both raised in late 1807.
38 Chandler 605, and Esdaile 63. Esdaile and Chandler disagree on the total amount of French forces available to Murat.
There is a significant gray area due to forces used in Portugal and a high desertion rate or poor bookkeeping. These
factors, multiplied by hundreds of companies and battalions can lead to staggering differences in total troop strengths.
39 Esdaile, The Peninsular War, 35.
40 Esdaile, The Peninsular War, 31.

With the fall of Madrid, the removal of the Spanish king, and the uprising of dos de mayo, the
Spanish people and remnants of the Spanish military fielded a force of 114,000 soldiers of mixed
caliber. To bolster the Murat's forces, Napoleon commited conscripts to the Iberian peninsula bringing
the total French forces in Spain and Portugal to a combined strength of 120,00041. These soldiers are
poorly trained and lack the vigor and spirit of soldiers42. Napoleon disdained the Spanish insurgents
and ordered flying columns to move out and overawe the insurgents with a show of power. These
columns would be dispersed in every direction and to take key points 43. Bonaparte's orders would be
followed and generals with forces ranging from 10,000-13,000 soldiers to take Seville, Saragossa,
Cadiz, Cordoba, Valencia, Santander, and also keep and secure the Madrid-Burgos-Bayonne highway
open and safe to traffic. These flying columns met with little or no success and by the end of June
1808 Napoleon himself admitted he had grossly underestimated the Spanish44.
Napoleon altered his master plan to subjugate Spain's populace and sought to make the
campaign of the summer of 1808 be the hammer that brought Spain into line. He made a target priority
list and transmitted this list to his brother Joseph, the now king of Spain. However, the battle of
Medina de Rio Seco would serve as his only true victory with the Spanish generals Blake and Cuesta
being decisively defeated at Medina de Rio Seco45. The victory was incomplete as the French allowed
the Spanish to retreat and opted to instead sack the town for loot46. Napoleon placed general DuPont as
the priority and instructed his brother to reinforce DuPonts forces from 13,000 to 25,000 and assured
him that with that many men they would sweep away any resistance. While Napoleon was quite
41 Chander, 612. While the campaigns in Portugal and Spain seem disjointed in this paper, they operated nearly as a single
campaign. Junot and Murat both struggled in their theaters for different reasons and fought radically different forces
which is why the Portuguese theater has been all but omitted as Junot was defeated by British forces who were a simply
superior military force both in training and command and few scholars wonder over the why of Junot's defeat by the
British. Junot commanded approximately 25,000 soldiers by early 1808, which left the bulk of the 120,000 under
Murat's command.
42 Esdaile, The Peninsular War, 64.
43 Chandler, 614.
44 Chandler, 616.
45 Esdaile, The Peninsular War, 71. Blake and Cuesta do not fail due to the quality of leadership but the quality of
intelligence of the French movement. Expecting the French forces to arrive from the route from Valladolid they
entrenched their forces., Marshall Bessiers arrived along the flank and rear of Spanish forces with his forces that, while
outnumbered, stood in a strong position on the Spanish flank and rear that resulted in a strong victory.
46 Chandler, 616.

confident that DuPont would outnumber and destroy the enemy, DuPont himself did not feel as
confident. Due to the sacking of Cordoba, the last town DuPont's forces had reached, the now labeled
Army of Andalusia swelled to 30,000 insurgents and deserters from the now disbanded or absorbed
Spanish army. DuPont marched forth and was engaged by the Spanish general Castanos at Bailen who
eventually forced DuPont to completely surrender allowing 18,000 men to be taken prisoner47. These
men were largely mistreated, beaten, starved, and even openly executed leading to only DuPont, his
chiefs of staff, and several hundred soldiers being repatriated to France48.
The defeat at Bailen would have effects that were felt across Europe and especially in Spain.
Joseph, panicked by the sudden destruction of a 23,000 man force, quit his position in Madrid and fled
North and ordered all generals to do the same in order to consolidate forces. The siege of Zaragossa
was lifted and only handfuls of soldiers were left in key locations. This act would allow the Spanish to
harass general Duhesme all the way until he crossed the Ebros river. Josephs abandonment of the
Spanish positions would undo all the previous gain by Napoleon's forces and would bring about the end
of the first campaign of the Peninsular war 49.

47 Napier, 93.
48 Napier, 95. This was a gross violation of the treaty in which capitulation of DuPont's forces was obtained. Napier, a
British general at the time, was disgusted by this act as was other officers under General Sir John Moore.
49 Esdaille, The Peninsular War, 84-86.

Napoleons Wraith: Napoleon's Counter-Offensive into Spain

The loss at Bailen infuriated Napoleon. Napoleon turned his full attention to Spain, making
arrangements in the rest of Europe to ensure that other nations did not attempt to capitalize on the
diverted attention of the Emperor of the French empire. Napoleon threatened Prussia and Austria with
complete and utter destruction should they rise against him and offered Russia annexation rights of
pieces of the Ottoman empire, a right that the Czar of Russia had argued for for several years. After
making compromise in Europe, Napoleon returned to Spain with his Le Grande Armee, a military
machine that had crushed every opponent and left a wake of destruction behind it in Prussia, Italy,
Austria, Russia, and Egypt among others. No army had successfully stood before it or it's commanderin-chief and now the insurgents of Spain were to encounter Napoleon's full force when before they had
combated fragments alone.
Napoleon amassed his forces on the Ebros river and crossed over into Spain on October 30th,
1808. Napoleon's forces had not been able to stand against the Spanish insurgents in the previous
campaign as the Spaniards had not fought in the customary rank and file manner that Napoleonic forces
had fought against in Austerlitz, Jena, and every other campaign.50 With several months of preparation,
the Spanish organized into several more organized forces known as the armies of the center, right, and
left as well as the army of Andalusia which would later join with the army of the center. Now the
Spanish fielded forces with more conventional formations against Napoleon. Napoleon's troops
followed the strategy of breaking through and enveloping the enemy, a strategy that became iconic of
Napoleonic warfare51. Unlike during the summer campaign of 1808, Napoleon devised a massive
offensive operation using overwhelming forces as opposed to the minimized force used in the summer
campaign52. Napoleon's first victory was the battle of Gamonal on the 6th of November. Napier
commented that this army was the best army at the time in Spain referring to the well equipped and
50 Napier, 133.
51 David G Chandler, The Art of Warfare on Land, 2000 ed. Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, 2000, 158-166.
52 Esdaile, The Peninsular War, 129.

trained Spanish force composed of Walloon guard, hussars, and carbineers53. The Spanish were
crushed as the French cavalry bore down on their flanks, causing first a withdrawal followed by a
complete route leading to a not only complete but near instantaneous French victory54. The French then
gained further ground a the battle of Espinosa on the 10th of November. The Duke of Belluno and
Marshal Soult engaged General Blake and General La Ramona at Epinosa and broke the Spanish lines
forcing a route of Spanish forces55. With the fall of La Ramona and Blake's forces, the Army of the left
was left with little ammunition, few cannons, no cavalry, and of the 40,000 original soldiers only
20,000 remained and those that survived were exhausted, starving, and unfit for combat56.
The army of the center was crushed at the battle of Tudela where the forces of General Castanos
and Palafox, a force totaling 45,000 soldiers making up the army of the center in a strong defensive
position with the Spanish army of the reserve as well, were crushed or routed to Zaragossa by the
French armies under Marshal Ney. Castanos, the victor of Bailen, attractesd the hatred of the French
forces, and the French were eager to return upon the Spanish commander the abuse he had issued forth
to the French forces under General DuPont. The French forces attacked from the front on November
23rd, breaking the Spanish lines but the Spanish lines held and no flanking or rear attacks served to
route their forces. This skirmish between forces lasted until, on the 26th, French forces arrive to the
flank and rear in a classic Napoleonic variant envelopment serving as the coup de gras for the
struggling Spanish forces. Castanos retreated with the remaining army of the reserve to Madrid to
attempt to stop Napoleon and Palafox retreated to the city of Zaragossa to take up a defensive position
in the city that the French had failed to subjugate earlier in 180857. Of the army that had more than
45,000 soldiers, the Spanish army had been reduced to only 20,000 starved and exhausted soldiers who
53 Napier, 265.
54 Napier, 266.
55 Napier, 267-268. General La Ramona's veterans were originally tied up under Napoleon's command in Denmark at the
start of the war in early 1808, but escaped and joined the Spanish forces against Napoleon in Spain. Some reports
suggested that La Ramona's forces had fought to the last man but others reported that the veterans were captured,
pressed into service, and later captured during the Napoleonic retreat out of Russia. When they were captured in Russia,
the unit was still 4,000 strong which serves as an indicator of the strength of will of the Spanish veterans.
56 Esdaile, The Peninsular War, 134-135.
57 Chandler, The Art of Land Warfare,12.

were both demoralized and without adequate supplies as they had lost all of their baggage and
magazines at Tudela. This blow crippled the army of the center in a way that it would never recover
from.
The fall of the army of the center and left would be swiftly followed by the French victory at the
battle of Somosierra on the 30th of November 1808. The French polish lancers would charge and route
a much larger force in the Somosierra pass Following the fall of the Somosierra pass, Napoleon moved
to take Madrid. Not willing to repeat the mistakes of the summer campaign, Napoleon arrived with an
overwhelming force of 45,000 soldiers though Madrid was garrisoned by only 12,000 veterans of
Bailen58. Napoleon offered the Grand Junta of Madrid the opportunity to surrender, but the people of
Madrid refused. Napoleon occupied the city and forced the newly formed Spanish government to
capitulate. The battles of Espinosa and Gamonal and the operations against the army of the center had
laid the North of Spain prostrate and open for Napoleon to march and seize Madrid December 4th, with
little resistance beyond Somosierra which had been swept aside with few casualties59.
Napoleon finalized his campaigns when his forces swept the Catalan province under the
command of Marshal St. Cyr. The French forces move into the province, which had difficulties
furnishing recruits to fight against the French, while the French forces were bolstered by 18,000 French
soldiers. The harbor city of Rosas was targeted for it's logistical capabilities. The city came under
siege on the 7th of November and resolutely held out until the 5th of December. After the fall of Rosas,
the French forces followed on to take Cardedeu on the 16th of December, sending the Spanish forces in
Catalan into full route where they held on the south side of the Llobreagat river. There, the Spanish
forces were outflanked and destroyed and the French forces sent the Spanish troops fleeing60. The last
of the Spanish soldiers were routed at the Llobreagat river on the 21st of December, marking the end of
the French counter-offensive in Spain.
58 Esdaile, The PeninsularWar, 136.
59 Napier, 269.
60 Esdaile, The Peninsular War, 138-140

Conclusion
The two campaigns of 1808 of the Napoleonic forces are closely related through date and
duration however the polarity in the results and means of the campaigns are striking upon analysis.
The first campaign of the Peninsular war was marked with corruption, violence, looting, and all-around
villainy commited on the part of the French61. The military actions were halfhearted and led by
commanders of both dubious intent and commanding above their own capabilities. Their orders were
then carried out by to few soldiers that hardly deserved the title, being conscripts, as they were largely
untrained, undisciplined, and ill-prepared for the rigors of life of a soldier in the field. The second
campaign, Napoleon's counter-offensive, was nearly the opposite. Led by arguably the greatest
strategic mind in Europe since the invention of gun-powder, the counter-offensive coupled brilliant
leadership, a massive military effort, and a calculating and vicious plan. Napoleon forced the discipline
of his commanders whilst the officers of the summer campaign were more preoccupied with the spoils
of war than the war itself. The difference between the two campaigns, when matched against
Clausewitz's reciprocal actions of war, explain the failures of the first followed by the success of the
second campaign.
Clausewitz states, along with his reciprocal actions of war, the definition of war. First, that war
is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. Force is the means of war, or how the object of
war is met62. The true object of war is for one party to impose it's will onto another party. In this, the
very essence of the Peninsular war is called into question as Napoleon's will must first be ascertained.
Napoleon's goal, if it was to gain more adequate control of Spain as both a neighbor and an ally,
Napoleon would have accepted Ferdinand as king of Spain. The removal of Ferdinand as king of Spain
was the principal factor in the uprising and insurgency that lead to the instability in Spain63. However,
as Napoleon removed Ferdinand from the throne, the assumption can be made that his object was not
61 John Lawrence Tone, The Fatal Knot: The Guerrillas War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain. London: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1994, 147.
62 Clausewitz, 83.
63 Tone, 153.

only to secure Spain but also to remove the last of the Bourbon lineage from power in Europe. With
the intent of Napoleon determined to a degree, the actions of the campaigns may be applied in
reference to the reciprocal actions of war.
The first reciprocal action of war, or extreme of war, is the maximum use of force. The extreme
of the maximum use of force states that each side of a conflict will continue to escalate the amount of
force used as no logical limit applies to the application of force. As each participant escalates, the
opponent must also escalate or be defeated through force by the enemy64 The operations of Murat were
marked with looting and pillaging by the French soldiers, often to a degree that showed that the officers
cared more for looting than for fighting the war itself65. Operations conducted in this manner were
doomed to fail. Officers failed to escalate force when they would stop to sack villages and miss key
opportunities. Moreover, when the officers were offered the option of the use of force in battle or the
retention of their war-chests, the retention of the war chests and baggage sometimes won out and led to
French failure in battle. This has been the suspected reason for DuPont's capitulation to the Spanish,
that DuPont surrendered in order to retain his accumulated baggage but also sacrificing 18,000 French
soldiers and initiating a key defeat that would create a cascade that impacted not only Spain but all of
Europe66. The following French campaign of November and December 1808 saw a rapid turnaround of
behavior. The French officers, under direct command of the Emperor Napoleon, curbed their appetite
for looting and focused on the fighting of the war67. Napoleon's actions during his campaign became
known for auspicious victories with bloody routes, the French cavalry cutting down those who fled.
Napoleon escalated force to the highest degree after the offer of capitulation was rejected, and finally at
the fall of Zaragossa in February 21, 180968. Napoleon offered the opportunity to surrender with
64
65
66
67
68

Clausewitz, 83-85.
Tone, 153.
Esdaile, The Peninsular War, 83.
Esdaile, The Peninsular War, 132.
Napier, 392. Zaragossa did not fall until February, but the orders were given and the city surrounded and laid to siege
before the departure of Napoleon back to France in December. So while the defeat and surrender of Zaragossa are not
affiliated with Napoleon's campaign of November 1808, the initial siege and instructions of the disposal of the occupants
can be affiliated with Napoleon.

complete amnesty for all crimes committed. Upon refusal, Napoleon ordered and directed a campaign
that would decimate the city and kill the defenders nearly to the man until their final and complete
surrender69.
The second extreme of war is the expression that the aim is to disarm the enemy. Under the
second extreme, commanders must force upon their enemy a situation less advantageous then that of
complete surrender, leading the enemy to desire to surrender completely and be disarmed than to
continue in his current situation70. Napoleon's forces failed to accomplish this during their first
campaign and early occupation. The Spanish who had not outright opposed Napoleonic forces, had
suffered and endured cruel mistreatment from the French before the military actions began. This led to
a hate of the French by the Spaniards and showed the Spaniards the disparity of their position should
they surrender. They would have their homes looted, their crops, wages, and products taxed, and their
citizens abused71. The removal of Ferdinand led to the uprising of Dos De Mayo that led to the
executions the following day. The Spanish were placed in the position that they felt they were
endangered through the French presence, not through conflict, and took arms against the French.
During the campaigns, the actions of the officers continued to arm the Spanish, not disarm them. The
sacking and pillaging of the town of Cordoba by DuPont bolstered the strength of the Army of
Andalusia, which later defeated DuPont under Castanos. DuPont's actions, in effect, empowered the
very force that would defeat him days later72. Napoleon again reversed his strategy in his second
campaign, offering amnesty to villages, towns, and cities for their actions if they surrendered. When
the cities refused he would visit upon them complete destruction of their military forces and often many
of their civilian population would be cut down in the battles. Madrid and Zaragossa serve as key
examples of the opportunity that Napoleon offered the Spanish people. When the offer was refused,
Napoleon would force the Spanish insurgents to choose between complete destruction or surrender.
69
70
71
72

Napier 384-388.
Clausewitz, 85-86.
Tone, 147.
Esdaile, The Peninsular War, 77-80.

His overwhelming successes would have likely seen an end to the war in Spain had the British forces
not been ready to strike in early 1809, a testament to the broken will of the Spanish insurgents73.
The final extreme of war, the maximum exertion of effort, serves as a simple comparison
between material commitment and the strength of will of each army 74. The initial campaign of
Napoleon's forces during the summer of 1808 sought to use minimal effort in both individual actions
and theater level operations. Napoleon committed very few of his standing army of veterans, forming
the majority of his forces from conscripts who were green and undisciplined. Once the military actions
began in early summer of 1808 Murat, under Napoleon's instruction, dispatched forces in small forces
of less than 15,000 in flying columns that were given instructions that overdrew their capabilities. In
contrast however, Napoleon's second campaign of the Peninsular war committed the majority of his
veteran army, a force of nearly 300,000 soldiers. This force operated in consolidated and concentrated
corps sized groups of never less than 30,000 during the major battles leading up to the capitulation of
Madrid and destruction of the insurgent armies of Spain75. Napoleon's exerted effort during the second
campaign far exceeded the effort of the first campaign, both in the quantity but also quality of soldiers.
The results of the battles fought in Spain from May 1808 to December 1808 cannot be disputed.
However, the cause for the results has been heavily debated. The evidence questions how the French
military machine failed to destroy the Spanish insurgents, who were largely untrained and ill equipped.
Through analysis, the reason becomes clear: the French failed in the first campaign where they crushed
the Spanish only months later due to their adherence to the extremes of war. Clausewitz, a
contemporary of Napoleon, designed the extremes of war looking at past military action, and the text
has withstood the test of time and continues to be the basis upon which many military operations are
planned and designed. Napoleon, adhering to the extremes of war and approaching them with as much
vigor and effort that the French empire could muster, swept aside Spanish resistance in a manner that
73 Esdaile, The Peninsular War, 139.
74 Clausewitz, 86.
75 Napier, 2263-289.

was not so reliant in the commander but depended upon the manner in which the war was fought.

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Esdaille, Charles J., Fighting Napoleon: guerrillas, bandits, and adventurers in Spain, 1808-1814, 1st
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