Rhetoric, Philosophy, and the Public Intellectual

Author(s): Nathan Crick

Source: Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2006), pp. 127-139
Published by: Penn State University Press
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Rhetoric, Philosophy, and the Public Intellectual

Nathan Crick

When we went inwe foundProtagoraswalking in theporticoflanked

by two groups.... Following behind and tryingto listen towhat was
men
being saidwere a group ofwhat seemed tobe mostly foreigners,
whom Protagoras collects fromvarious cities he travels through.He
enchants themwith his voice likeOrpheus, and theyfollow the sound
of his voice

in a trance.

...When

he

turned around with

his flanking

groups, theaudience to therearwould split intotwo in a very orderly

way and thencircle around toeitherside and formup again behindhim.
Itwas quite lovely.
Plato (1997a, 315a-b)
Of all of the dramatic portrayals inPlato's dialogues, themajestic figure cut by
Protagoras ofAbdera in theProtagoras stands out as themost impressive.Not
only does he possess the intellectual acuity to argue Socrates to a standstill,but
he also has the rhetorical ability to transforma group of strangers intoan ordered
community through only the sound of his voice. In thisway, Protagoras seems
to embody both thewisdom of a philosopher and the charisma of a rhetorician.

Historical treatments add weight to his characterization. First, Protagoras was

the founder and chief spokesperson for the sophisticmovement, which dramati

cally altered the educational system of his age by offering training in public
speaking and civic arts to the "average citizen" rather thanonly to an elite class
of aristocrats (Havelock 1964, 230). Second, Protagoras was a wide-ranging
thinkerwhose writing and teaching extended humanistic ideals to thefields of
"ethics, politics, theology, education, cultural history, literary criticism, lin

guistic studies, and rhetoric" (Sprague 1972, 3). Third, he was a close friend of
Pericles and his "theory and practice of a political rhetoricwas valued highly
inPericlean Athens" and led to his being given the responsibility ofwriting the
laws for the new pan-Hellenic colony of Thurii (Jarratt 1998, 26). Thus, even

ifwe take Plato's characterizations to be exercises in hyperbole, there seems

to be an element of truthin Socrates's remark thatProtagoras was considered

"thewisest man alive" during his time (Plato 1997a, 309d).

Philosophy
Copyright

and Rhetoric, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2006.

2006 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.

127

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128

NATHANCRICK

However, despite these accomplishments, Protagoras is generally not

considered a candidate for the titleof "public intellectual." The reasoning forhis
exclusion is based on the prevailing notion that "idea of the public intellectual

is a product of the Enlightenment" (Rahe 2003, 27) and is thus a "distinctly

modern idea" (Pangle 2003,15). Hence, it is "because of this essential, ifoften
unarticulated, connection to themodern movements of progress and enlighten
ment that itfeels not onlywrong but anachronistic to apply the term 'intellectual'
to Plato or the Sophists" (Melzer 2003, 7). According to this view, theAge of
Enlightenment gave birth to the "public intellectual" because of itsrevolutionary
belief that through thedissemination of the fruitsof philosophy and science, one

could "enlighten" the state of public opinion and thereby replace a traditional
with a rational society. Public intellectualswere thosewho acted on this faithby
so as
situating themselves "midway between the greatminds and the people
to serve the function of transmittingand popularizing philosophic knowledge"
(7). By contrast, the opinion of antiquitywas summed up inPlato's belief that
"it is impossible that a multitude be philosophic" (quoted inRahe 2003, 27).
Protagoras, being a part of antiquity, is thus placed in a historical category that

makes him ineligible to be a public intellectual, despite the fact that sophistical
thought "is considered by some crucial in the epistemic shiftcalled theGreek
enlightenment" (Jarratt1998, xviii).
Clearly, modern assumptions about what itmeans

to be a public intel
are
lectual
largely derived frommodern Enlightenment beliefs that society
can progress through the spread of rational knowledge. Only on the basis of

Enlightenment ideas could a so-called public intellectual persist in the "the

inspiritingbelief thathis own thoughts and insights ... once 'published' in the
modern sense" will inspire a "transformation of consciousness by thedispelling
of prejudice and the spread of theoretical truth" (Melzer 2003, 8). However, the
debate about the "public intellectual" is not over what the rolemeant over four
centuries ago. The question iswhat itmeans tous today and whether we should
continue to define public intellectualism in reference to now largely rejected

metaphysical assumptions that the public is a passive collection of isolated

minds, thatphilosophy is receptacle foruniversal truths,that intelligence is the
capacity to grasp those truths,and that rhetoric is the vehicle for their transla
tion and dissemination.
The Enlightenment ideal of thepublic intellectual remains a popular no
tion in academia. Take, for example, Alan Wolfe's editorial in theChronicle for
Higher Education, "The Calling of the Public Intellectual," which reinscribes
the notion that the function of a public intellectual's rhetoric is to dilute and
disseminate this truthto a passive and slightly irrelevantpublic.Wolfe begins by

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RHETORIC, PHILOSOPHY,AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL

129

defining a public intellectual as a sortof academic public relations officer "who

brings academic expertise tobear on importanttopic of theday ina language that
can be understood by thepublic" (2001, B20). However, the implied altruism in
thisdefinition isundercut by thedisregard for theactual impact of such rhetorical

performances. Speaking of how he gained his own title of public intellectual,

Wolfe does not credit the relevance of his scholarship, the popular influence

of his writing, or even the recognition of his work by the "public"; rather,he
credits his accomplishment to the fact thathe "found some people willing to
publish me" (B20). Furthermore, his authorityas a public intellectual comes not
from his audience, but "comes only fromme, and to be true to thatauthority, I
have to be true tomyself (B20). ForWolfe, public intellectualism reduces to
ameasure of one's personal motivation, publishing history, and courage to tell
the truth,and as such it is a title thatone can bestow upon oneself.
Of course, the reaction against this elitist notion of thepublic intellectual
has been equally popular. This reaction typically takes the form of Antonio
concept of the "organic intellectual,"which rejects the value of rhe
torical "dissemination" in favor of on-the-ground practices "that are purposeful,

Gramsci's

agential, and organizational" (Radhakishnan 1990,87). InGramsci's words, "the

mode of being of thenew intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, which
is an exterior and momentary power of feelings and passions, but in active par
ticipation inpractical life,as constructor,organizer, 'permanent persuader' and
not just a simple orator" (quoted inRadhakishnan 1990, 87-88). Intellectuals
are thus valued not for their ideas, but for their ideas-in-practice-with-others.

As Stanley Aronowitz explains, "their social weight consists in theirability to

link themselves with 'real' agents, namely classes, which forGramsci and all
Marxists are theonly forces capable ofmaking history" (1990,11). Consequently,

Aronowitz praises an intellectual such as JohnDewey not for thephilosophy that

embodied his life'swork, but forhis social activism thatoccurred largely at the
end of his professional career. To Aronowitz, "Dewey's commitment to social
action never waned. He intervened throughouthis life inpractical and political

issues trade unionism for teachers as well as industrialworkers, schools (as

well as education), and thedefense of the rightsof persecuted minorities, notably
Leon Trotsky and his Soviet followers" (1993,85). Such praise naturally follows
ideal of a new class of intellectuals "intimately associated with
the lifeworld of industrialworkers" (Michael 2000, 7).
Unfortunately, both of these conceptions of the public intellectualmiss

fromGramsci's

themark for the same reason an acceptance of an eviscerated conception of

rhetoric thatends up separating the theoreticalwork from the larger sociohistori
cal situation towhich it responds. Both assume that rhetoric,by itsnature, is

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130

NATHANCRICK

particular, practical, and stylistic,whereby theory is universal, contemplative,

and substantial. Consequently, rhetoric gets drained of content while theory
becomes puremeaning awaiting relevance. The only difference is thatwhere the
Enlightenment public intellectual values theprocess whereby rhetoric translates
timeless truthsfor passive absorption by the public consciousness, Gramsci's
organic intellectual rejects the idea of timeless truthsand respects only those

theories that are immediately put into practice by organized groups of social
actors. However, by dissolving intellectualwork into social activism, Gramsci
effectively dismisses the value of dedicated intellectual work as we know it.

Furthermore, because Gramsci is contemptuous ofwatered-down abstractions

and views rhetoric as water, inhis hands rhetoric loses even thepretense of dis
seminating knowledge and is reduced to a "momentary power of feelings and
passions." Intellectuals are thus leftwith theunhappy choice of either sending

press releases from the Ivory Tower or abandoning the tower completely for
"active participation inpractical life."

I believe this is a false choice, for both conceptions are based on the
same fallacy that something called the Ivory Tower exists as a place with
high walls that shelter an elite class of thinkerskept separate from thepractical
problems of theirage. This fallacy, in turn, is based on an implicit adherence to
theAristotelian distinction between theoryand practice embodied in the tension
between episteme (contemplative knowledge such as science and philosophy)
and techne (productive knowledge such as art and rhetoric).On theone hand, the
Enlightenment oratorwants to disseminate episteme using techne.On the other

hand, theGramscian activist disregards thewhole process and instead embraces

pure praxis, or practical action. In both cases, however, episteme is impotent
on its own, while techne is purely derivative. Praxis, meanwhile, because it is
separated from episteme, driftsuncomfortably toward formsof irrationalismand
dogmatism. Neither of these conceptions of the public intellectual is therefore
adequate. In fact, they are both equally debilitating to promoting passionate
intellectual inquiry and intelligent social practice.
However, it is difficult to envision another alternative untilwe reconcep
tualize the binary between theory and practice on which these conceptions are

based. This essay proposes thatwe arrive at a more enriched definition of the
Aristotelian hierarchy of knowledge and
public intellectual by rejecting the strict
returningto the sophistic notion of techne thatabsorbs elements of episteme and

praxis within it. In itsoriginal usage, techne included "every branch of human or
divine skill, or applied intelligence, as opposed to theunaided work of nature"
(Guthrie 1971, 15).As JohnDewey points out, "it is suggestive thatamong the
Greeks, till the rise of conscious philosophy, the same word, le^ur], was used

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RHETORIC, PHILOSOPHY,AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL

131

for art and science," for theirart "involved an end,mastery ofmaterial or stuff
worked upon, control of appliances, and a definite order of procedure, all of
which had to be known in order that there be intelligent skill or art" (Dewey
1915, 195). Thus, techne included both "contemplative" arts such as science

and "productive" arts such as rhetoric for thevery reason that theyboth charted
new paths of thought and action thathuman beings could use to navigate their

way through a changing world. In thisway, to practice a technewas also to

engage in a form ofpraxis.
Once we begin to understand that scientific, theoretical, philosophical,
humanistic, and artisticwork all carrywith them thepotential to transformour

world by altering human beliefs, habits, and behaviors, we can begin tomove
beyond the form/contentdistinction that continues to separate theory from
practice, thought from action, intelligence from passion, and philosophy from
rhetoric.This redefinitionneither collapses the importantdistinctions between
thevaried disciplines, nor claims that there is no difference between thosewho
publish in obscure academic journals and those who actively engage public
audiences. Rather, it rejects thenotion thatdirectly engaging public audiences
is what makes one a public intellectual. It forces us to consider thatwhile

it is an effort to
intellectualwork may be intellectual, it is nonetheless work
change theworld through the transformativepower of ideas. Examples might

include Darwin's Origin of Species, Sinclair's The Jungle, Kant's Critique of

Pure Reason, Holmes's Common Law, Dewey's Democracy and Education,
Thucydides's History of thePeloponnesian War, DuBois's Souls ofBlack Folk,

Marx's

Capital, Mill's On Liberty, Orwell's 1984, Emerson's Nature, Smith's

Wealth ofNations, Stowe's Uncle Toms Cabin, Hegel's Phenomenology of
Spirit, Copernicus's Commentariolus, or Plato's Republic. For every successful
work, of course, there are thousands of failures, but one cannot even begin to

make such distinctions if they are judged by theirform or content in isolation.

Only when they are all seen as forms of techne can we begin an inquiry into
how any intellectualwork as a whole interactswith and possibly transformsthe
world inwhich it is created.
This embrace of the sophistical notions of technehas a significant impact
on how we define the "public intellectual." According to the new definition,
public intellectuals are not determined by counting public pronouncements,

measuring class allegiances, or fitting theirwork into a convenient pigeon

hole. Rather, public intellectuals are those who react to the problems of their
sociohistorical situation by creating enduring works that broadly influence
cultural habits and institutionalpractices during their lifetimes. Thus, I argue
that thework of public intellectuals arises in response to and is directed toward

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NATHANCRICK

resolving exigencies of their sociohistorical situationmuch in the same way

that rhetoric seeks to address exigencies in "rhetorical situations"; the only

difference is that public intellectuals, as intellectuals and not politicians or

pundits, respond to exigencies that are broader in time and in space thanwhat
are traditionally considered "rhetorical situations." For example, Copernicus's
work challenged traditionalnotions of theplace of human beings in theuniverse;
Sinclair's work revealed the horrors of twentieth-century industrial capitalism
inAmerica; Kant's work institutionalized the separation between science and
moral values inGermany; Dewey's work established the vital connection be
tween educational practice and democratic social life; and Protagoras's work
provided a defense of rhetorical training in the face of the aristocratic tradition.
The form and the content of thework of each of these intellectuals differed,but
what theyhad in common was that theywere all techne that sought to transform
their sociohistorical situation.
What, then, is the relationship of thework of a public intellectual to her
or his situation? To answer this question, I return to Lloyd Bitzer's landmark
essay, "The Rhetorical Situation," which I believe establishes the ground for
a productive definition of the public intellectual. Although he had written his
essay primarily to inquire as to "the nature of those contexts inwhich speak
ers orwriters create rhetorical discourse" (1968, 1), he did not restrict such an
inquiry to rhetorical discourse; the same inquirymight be made intowriters of
scientific, artistic, or philosophical discourse as well. Thus, by analogy, "a phi
losopher might ask,What is the nature of the situation inwhich a philosopher
'does philosophy'?" (1). Bitzer's essay implicitly accepts thateven philosophy,
traditionally themost "contemplative" of all arts, isnonetheless related to some

actual situation. I believe we need to accept this premise in order to arrive at

an operable definition of a public intellectual thatneither decontextualizes nor
devalues thenature of intellectualwork. When Bitzer concludes that"rhetoric as
a discipline is justifiedphilosophically insofaras itprovides principles, concepts,
and procedures bywhich we effectvaluable changes in reality" (14), we should

not believe these conditions are restricted to rhetoric; they should apply equally
to philosophy, as they do to science, art, or any other discipline that embodies

passionate, intellectual ideas in concrete form.

The key to understanding how the situational perspective applies to the
public intellectual requires us to broaden our conception of the "rhetorical situ

ation" first outlined inBitzer's essay. Bitzer defines a rhetorical situation "as
a natural context of persons, events, objects, relations, and an exigence which
strongly invitesutterance" (5). This "utterance" must be in the form of rhetoric,

which Bitzer defines as "a mode of altering reality, not by direct application

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RHETORIC, PHILOSOPHY,AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL

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of energy to objects, but by the creation of discourse which changes reality

through themediation of thought and action" (4). Thus, Bitzer arrives at his

threepreconditions for a rhetorical situation: the exigence, or "an imperfection

marked by urgency" (6), the audience, or "those persons who are capable of
being influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change," and the con
straints, or those "persons, events, objects, and relations which are part of the
situation because theyhave thepower to constrain decision and action needed
tomodify the exigence" (8).
All of these conditions, however, tend toward theparticular inBitzer 's
account. As he says, "a particular discourse comes into existence because
of some specific condition or situation" (4, emphasis added). Thus, we have
examples likeKennedy's assassination (9) or Roosevelt's Declaration ofWar

(11). The emphasis on particularity, of course, has been a hallmark of rhetorical

practice since theSophistic interpretationof kairos, or "timeliness," as a "radical
(White 1987, 14). For the sophists, "kairos alludes
principle of occasionally"
to the realization that speech exists in time and is uttered both as a spontaneous

formulation of and a barely constituted response to a new situation unfolding in

the immediate present" (Poulakos 1995,61). Thus, we find sophists likeGorgias

orHippias bragging of theirability to speak on any subject and thriving in com

petitive forums such as the intellectual contests at theOlympic Games (61).
Yet we do not live only in a series of atomistic moments. Situations

certainly come and go in themoment, but they also develop and linger over
time.As Bitzer himself points out, "rhetoric situations come into existence,
then eithermature or decay or mature and persist conceivably some persist
indefinitely" (Bitzer 1968, 12). In theChristian tradition, for instance, kairos
did not deal with particular human responses to individualized situations, but

"was focused on the central event of Christ, who is said in thebiblical writings
tohave come en kairo, sometimes translated as 'the fullness of time'
implying
a culmination in a temporal development marked by themanifestation ofGod
in an actual historical order" (Smith 2002, 55). This notion of kairos as appro

priateness within themeasure of historical time is also used in "theHistory of

Thucydides, where he claims thathis work is a creation 'forever': because of the
cyclical image of timepresupposed throughout thebook; the eventswill recur"
(54). In these conceptions, kairos extends through time and space, expanding
our notion of "situations" beyond our immediate experience. Such situations
raise the possibility that "kairos signals the need to bring universal ideas and
principles to bear in historical time" that in turn "require wisdom and critical
judgment" for theirapplication (56).

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NATHANCRICK

134

The latterconception of kairos undoubtedly has a certainHegelian ring

to it,but one does not need to carry over such spiritual ormetaphysical com
mitments to think of kairos historically. In fact,we do it all the timewhen it
comes to contemporary histories of philosophy. What JohnDewey wrote in
Philosophy and Civilization is now largely common sense: "philosophers are
parts of history, caught in itsmovement; creators perhaps in some measure of

its future,but also assuredly creatures of itspast" (1931, 4). Even antifounda
tional thinkers likeRichard Rorty agree. In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity
(hardly a Hegelian book), Rorty advocates an acceptance of "Hegel's definition

of philosophy: 'holding your time in thought,'"which Rorty construes tomean

"finding a description of all the things characteristic of your time ofwhich you
most approve, with which you unflinchingly identify,a description which will
serve as a description of the end towardwhich thehistorical developments which
led up toyour timewere means" (1989,55). Thus, by showing how philosophers
react tobroad movements inhistory and culture,bothDewey and Rorty advance
a notion of kairos that includes one's entire sociohistorical situation.

The question, however, is whether intellectuals such as philosophers,

scientists, or artistsmerely reflect qualities of their situations or whether they
act as agents of change. Rorty seems divided on the issue. On the one hand,
to "put a moratorium on theory" in order to "kick
itsphilosophy habit" (Rorty 1998a, 91). Claiming that their overemphasis on
theoryhas rendered academics "impotentwhen itcomes tonational, stateor local

he chides leftistacademics

politics" (1999, 129), Rorty advises them to drop theoryand "get back into the
class struggle" (259). On theotherhand, he advocates a brand of pragmatism that

would "treat theoryas an aid to practice" (30) and defines pragmatists as those
"involved in a long-termattempt to change the rhetoric, the common sense, and

the self-image of theircommunity" (1998b, 41). He even praises Dewey not for
his social activism, but for his professional philosophizing. Rorty writes, "the
period between theWorld Wars was one of prophecy andmoral leadership the
heroic period ofDeweyan pragmatism, duringwhich philosophy played the sort
of role in the country's lifewhich Santayana could admire" (1982, 61).
Unless we are to completely deny philosophy any rhetorical character, and
thus engage in a self-defeatingdemarcation problem thatreinscribes an absolute
distinction between theory and practice, we should pursue the line of inquiry
suggested by Rorty's second position. To furtherthis inquiry, I put forward the
concept of what I call the "philosophical situation." The oxymoronic sound
to this concept is intentional; it encourages us to embrace Dewey's pragmatic
notion that "philosophy is love of wisdom; wisdom being not knowledge but
knowledge-plus; knowledge turned to account in the instructionand guidance
itmay convey inpiloting life through the storms and the shoals thatbeset life

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RHETORIC, PHILOSOPHY,AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL

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experience as well as into such havens of consummatory experience as enrich

our human life from time to time" (Dewey 1989, 389). This definition asks us

to consider thateven themost abstract intellectualwork as a potential form of

productive art if itcan work itsway into thepublic consciousness and transform
the habits and common sense of a culture.After all, despite Plato's attempt to
corrupt it, the original meaning of theword "sophist" was simply "wise man,"

derived from the Greek word forwisdom, sophia. Accordingly, Protagoras

identifies the "wise man" as one who "replaces each pernicious convention by a
one" (1997b, 167c) and who does so "by theuse ofwords" (167b).
The concept of thephilosophical situation follows Protagoras's conception and
embraces all thosewho use the power of ideas to transform theworld around

wholesome

them,whether they are scientists, artists, or sophists.

Like the rhetorical situation, the philosophical

situation shares the

same considerations

exigence, constraints, and audience

only defined
more broadly. First, an exigence is no longer limited to a particular event in a
restricted time and place, such as Roosevelt's reaction afterPearl Harbor, but

expands to include problems that face an entire culturewithin historical time,

such as Dewey's long-term effort to construct a working ideal of democratic
life. Second, constraints are likewise broadened from specific persons, events,

objects, and relations to include things like public institutions,governing bod

ies, religious beliefs, economic relations, historical forces, communal norms,
and ethnic identities. For example, Karl Marx wrote Capital to identify the
historical roots of the exigencies in his own age and then sought tomodify
institutional constraints by advancing his dialectical materialism, and his ideas

had a dramatic influence on social practices, even if theyultimately took a form

he had not envisioned.
The example ofMarx, however, raises themost controversial aspect of
public intellectualism thatof audience. For, itcould be argued,Marx not only
wrote the three ample volumes of Capital, he also co-wrote, with Engels, The
CommunistManifesto, which made the ideals of his early social theory"acces
sible" to the "public." The problem with this argument is that itmerely reverts
back to theEnlightenment conception of thepublic intellectual as a go-between.

It implies that ifMarx had not written for the "masses" as he did and had left
thiswork toEngels, then itwould be Engels, notMarx, who would be the true
"public intellectual."Marx would be lumped with the rest of insular academic

theoristswhile political ideologues like Lenin would be championed as the

new "organic intellectuals." In addition, rhetoric, in this conception, returns to
its traditional role of diluting and adapting a complex message to a public that
takes on the characteristics of a passive and somewhat irrationalmob. In other

words, once you deny thatan intellectualwork likeCapital has rhetorical value

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136

in its long-term ability to change habits of thought and action, you also deny
that its author is a public intellectual just as you deny that thepublic possesses
itsown form of intelligence.
then, is the audience of the public intellectual? Before answering
thisquestion, we must firstdispel themyth that thepublic consists of amass of
individuals and thatpublic opinion is the static beliefs of thatmass collectively
Who,

considered. For, as Hauser points out, "publics do not exists as entities but as
processes; theircollective reasoning is not defined by abstract reflection but by
practical judgment; theirawareness of issues is not philosophical but eventful"

(1999, 64). Consequently, an ideal public is not, as in theEnlightenment ideal,

a monolithic group of purely rational beings who adhere to the same body of
values and truths.A public consists of "the interdependentmembers of society
who hold differentopinions about amutual problem and who seek to influence
its resolution throughdiscourse" (32). Thus, the importantqualities of a public
are the habits of thought and behavior it relies upon tomaintain community
life and confrontproblems when they arise. Accordingly, we should judge the
role of public intellectuals in terms of how they alter these habits, particularly
those thatmanifest themselves inwhat Farrell calls "rhetorical forums," or those
symbolic environments "withinwhich issues, interests,positions, constituencies,
and messages are advanced, shaped, and provisionally judged" (1993,282). In
otherwords, public intellectuals are not outside of the public talking down to

it,but are necessary members of a public sphere participating within it.They

have their own unique contributions tomake, no more or less significant than
thatof the "average citizen."
The difference is that theircontributions are less immediate. Because

the

public intellectual reacts more to philosophical situations than tomore tradi

tional rhetorical situations, theirwork takes longer to influence the long-term
habits of a culture. Thus, their initial audience generally consists of thosewho
are equally aware of and have the ability to directly confront these broader is
sues. Typically, this audience includes those people who more truly fulfill the
role of organic intellectuals teachers, journalists, politicians, social activists,
community leaders, ormany of those individuals who fit the classic criteria of
"opinion leader" (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955, 33). These "opinion leaders" then
work to apply the ideas of public intellectuals within more situated contexts of
the classroom, the community, the townmeeting, the church, the newspaper,
and the political rally.However, once the ideas of the public intellectualwork
theirway into the culture over time, theybegin to take on a life of their own.

They solidify into certain ways of thinking and acting that become a part of
common sense. The facts that in theUnited States slavery is now condemned,
thatdemocracy has become a universal ideal, that free speech is enshrined in

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RHETORIC, PHILOSOPHY,AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL

137

theConstitution, and thatwe no longerbelieve the sun revolves around the earth
are indication of thedeep and lasting impact that ideas can have when they are
given concrete expression by the techne of thepublic intellectual.
None of this is to deny the importance of encouraging "intellectuals" to
be active in thepublic sphere throughpublications or social action. Aronowitz
is thus justified inpraising Dewey forhis commitment to social causes. I simply

want to insist that these activities are not what made Dewey a public intellec
tual. They are what made him a responsible democratic citizen. In otherwords,

the only thing thatmakes the contributions of intellectuals unique is that they
produce intellectual work. Therefore, they should be judged by how thequality
of thatwork affects long-term impacts on thepublic consciousness. Dewey, for
instance,was a public intellectual not because of his occasional intervention
in currentpublic affairs,but because he spent his lifebuilding a philosophical
system thatpromoted the ideals of democratic social life.Even today,Dewey's
work serves as a guide for implementing democratic methods inother countries,
including China (Su 1996) and Central and South America (Donoso 2001).

I understand that this approach may sound distinctly w -rhetorical given

what seems tobe a privileging of theoretical content over persuasive form.Mail
loux, for instance,believes thatsuch an "account erases the significantdistinction
between an academic professional who writes about publics only in scholarly
journals and the intellectualwho theorizes publics formultiple audiences, aca

(Mailloux 2006, 143). While acknowledging that

"research resultsmigrate... from academic disciplines to other sites beyond the
university," he nonetheless believes that the core of public intellectualism is the
demic and non-academic"

rhetorical performance of "disseminating and applying his or her own theories

in lay public spheres" (144). Similarly, Fuller believes that for a public intel

lectual to function as "an agent of distributive justice," he or shemust also take

on the role of a "professional crisis-monger" and "sophistic advocate" (Fuller
2006, 148). In both positions, the deciding factor inbeing a public intellectual

appears to be not one's long-term effects on public opinion, but themethod by

which such effectsmay (ormay not) be achieved. For Mailloux, thismethod
is public performance; for Fuller, it is social agitation. By contrast, I seem to
have retreated into the safety of academic

specialism (or the classroom) with

thenaive faith that the truth,once discovered, will carry itself to victory on the
wings of a Platonic ideal.
This interpretation,however, ignores thepragmatic and distinctly rhetori
cal quality that even abstract ideas can have when theyfilter into the common
sense of a culture. Public intellectuals are simply those scholars who become
identifiedwith authoring those ideas. By contrast,Mailloux thinks this posi
the importance of "speaking/writing in thepublic sphere" and thus

tionmisses

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138

NATHANCRICK

the "distinction between public intellectuals and academic political

philosophers in general" (Mailloux 2006,142). I disagree for two reasons. First,
collapses

academic political philosophers ingeneral rarely, ifever, have thepublic's atten

tion; and second, to place the burden of being a public intellectual on the bare
act of speaking or writing in the public sphere makes anyone with academic
credentials who appears in the public, regardless of the quality, originality, and
impact of their ideas, a public intellectual. Such a perspective culminates in an
unhelpful binary that separates content from form, philosophy from rhetoric,
and scholars from citizens.
I believe a more productive approach is not only to accept the rhetorical
principle thatabstract ideas only become forms of action once theyare embodied
in concrete persuasive discourse, but to also accept thephilosophical principle
thatpersuasive discourse, to effect long-termchange,must be guided by abstract
ideas. Insofar as these ideas help produce conviction and have consequences in
thepublic world, then these ideas functionrhetorically and theirauthors function
as public intellectuals. To assert otherwise, and toplace theburden primarily on

the act of speaking and writing in thepublic sphere, does not somuch erase the
distinction between public intellectuals and citizen activists as account for the
distinction purely by recourse to one's professional standing and education, a
position thatmay be flattering to "intellectuals" but largely useless for improv
ing the quality of democratic deliberation.
In sum, I have put forward the idea of the "philosophical situation" to
account for and give pragmatic value to intellectualwork, whether thatwork is

philosophical, scientific,or artistic.This situation expands thenotion of exigence,

constraints, and audience by linking them to the sociohistorical problems faced
by any public. Public intellectuals are thosewho respond to theirphilosophical

situation by producing a work that conceptualizes and provides direction for

solving longstanding and pervasive problems and are then successful inhelping
change the habits and practices of a public. Thus, even traditional philosophy

acts rhetorically,not because itemploys the tools of eloquence, but because, like
rhetoric, "philosophy grows out of, and in intention is connected with, human
affairs" (Dewey 1948, xi). For, as Dewey once wrote, "even highly abstract
theories are of efficacy in the conduct of human affairs influencing thehistory
which is yet to be" (1915, 6). It is for this reason that I have put forward the
idea of the philosophical situation. Iwish to argue that to produce intellectual
work in response to one's sociohistorical situation is also topractice a particular
form of rhetoric, and to successfully use thatwork to transformour common
world is to be a public intellectual.

Department of Communication
Louisiana State University

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RHETORIC, PHILOSOPHY,AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL

139

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