Friday, 22 August 2014

INEDIT INTERVIEW WITH MICHEL FOUCAULT 1979

This interview of August 1979 has long been unique in French. It was not publish
ed in its original language in 2013 in the luxurious annual review Lyon Rodeo pr
eceded and followed by a well-supplied file. Today in August 2014 he reappeared
in a new and beautiful Arabic translation by Ahmad Beydoun in the journal Kalamu
n Beirut.
The circumstances of the interview, cf. our article published in 2013 and Rodeo
on this blog entitled "Foucault maintenance", August 2014.

FS: If we talk about Iran: almost ten months have passed, is not it, from your i
nitial position on the Iranian revolution, stance which was first shocked and th
en strongly marked circles french intellectuals. These ten months have witnessed
the departure of the Iranian ruler and the mullahs attempt to install a governm
ent option that you mentioned and which you refused to reduce the Iranian uprisi
ng.
Elsewhere in the world was the Nicaraguan uprising, the drama of Indochinese ref
ugees ... It is perhaps time to retrospectively evaluate your various pronouncem
ents against Iranian issues.
What led you to your interest in Iran?
MF: Just reading an old book already that I had not read it yet, and that, thank
s to an accident and convalescence, I had time to read carefully the summer and
this is the last book of Ernst Bloch the Principle Hope [1].
It struck me, because it is a book that is actually rather little known in Franc
e, has had relatively little influence, which seems to be a problem quite capita
l. That is to say, the problem of this collective perception of history, uh, tha
t begins to emerge in Europe in the Middle Ages no doubt, and that is the percep
tion of another world down here, perception the reality of things is not definit
ively established and established, but there may be, inside of our time and our
history, an opening, a point of light and attraction which gives us access, from
this world to a better world.
But this perception of history is both a starting point for the idea of revoluti
on and, on the other hand, an idea of religious origin. These are essentially re
ligious groups and especially the religious groups that dissidents in the late M
iddle Ages and early Renaissance, brought this idea that, even within the world
of this world, something like a revolution was possible. That's it. So, uh, I wa
s interested in this topic because I think historically true, even if Ernst Bloc
h does not give it all a very satisfactory demonstration in terms of historical
science. I think it is an idea, which is still ...
FS: It's an idea due to the sixteenth century but religious groups.
MF: Oh that begins long before the sixteenth century, since ultimately the great
popular revolts in the Middle Ages had were already organized around this theme
.
it starts from the twelfth / thirteenth century, but obviously it explodes espec
ially the fifteenth / sixteenth century and it crosses all religious wars. Uh, s
o if you want, I was reading it when daily newspapers taught me that in Iran, he
was going on something that was an uprising, an uprising that was character of

being clearly not controlled by a Western revolutionary ideology, which was not
controlled or directed by a political party or even by political organizations,
which was a truly mass uprising: it was all a people stood against a system to p
ower, and finally in which the importance of the religious phenomenon, religious
institutions, religious representation was so obvious ... So it seemed to me th
at there was a connection between what I and read what was happening. And I want
ed to go see. And I really see this as an example, a test of what I was reading
in Ernst Bloch. That's it. So if you want, the fact that I was there, with one e
ye, if you will, conditioned by the issue of the report and hope political revol
ution or religious eschatology. That's it.
FS: And from this vision is not that which was originally a theoretical vision,
you were once in Iran?
MF: Not twice. [2]
FS: You were twice?
MF: A total of five weeks, what, 5 or 6 weeks. [3]
FS: And there you met a large sample of people?
MF: Large? You know as a Western, and in a time like this, can meet. That is to
say that I have seen of course academics from Tehran. I saw in Tehran a number o
f young men and young women who were not academic or were not academics, uh, who
were active in the revolutionary movement at this time. I met some but actually
rather few representatives of political staff. I met a number of people who wer
e to become important people of the new regime, namely Dr. Mehdi Bazargan, Dr. K
azem Sami [4] ...
FS: Yes
MF: And then I went to Qom, I met Shariat Madari. [5] And then I was in Abadan.
And I met there a small group of workers (...). I also met people administration
s in Tehran. Of course, I have absolutely not seen what was happening in the pro
vinces.
FS: Only in big cities.
MF: So I do not know that, so I have seen things in Tehran, Qom and Abadan.
FS: And so once there, what was for you the specific case of Iran?
It confirmed or overturned it your conclusions?
MF: If you want I think at that time and a lot of analysis in Europe, in France
in any case, we saw this idea that eventually deculturation Iran under the effec
t of the dictatorial regime of the Shah the hasty industrialization and a Wester
n model hastily imposed this deculturation had ... and then also the disruption,
political disorganization, had that Islam had become sort of the common vocabul
ary and minimum in which the people Iran claims that were expressed at the botto
m of the social and political demands. In other words, not being able to have a
revolutionary speech, a revolutionary ideology, a revolutionary organization in
the Western sense of the term, and although my faith, he would have folded on Is
lam. That was an interpretation that I have often heard, reported around me, and
this is the interpretation I have inaccurate flood. Because it seemed to me tha
t it was not somehow a single vehicle, that Islam was not in this movement a sim
ple vehicle for aspirations or ideologies, basically, would others. It was not f
or lack of better we would have used Islam to mobilize Muslims. I believe that t
here was indeed in this movement who was a widely popular movement, millions and
millions of people willing to confront an army and the police which was obvious

ly very powerful, it seemed to me that here was something that needed his streng
th ... what could be called a ... a willingness to both political and religious,
somewhat in the way of what could happen in Europe in the fifteenth / sixteenth
century when, for example, Anabaptists both rebelled against the political powe
r that was in front of them and found the strength and vocabulary of their revol
ts in a religious belief, a sincere and deep religious aspiration. This and that
's what I tried to say.
FS: and so I go there just to ask you about the main concepts that I
e been the most of your questioning theoretical concerns about Iran.
say, essentially three concepts, you'll tell me if there are others:
will, that of Islamic government and the political spirituality. We
those three. So what hit you, especially at the beginning, it is the
f a general will reach a people and you say that you believe that it
raction, it existed as God, as in books and there you see there....

believe hav
That is to
the general
could take
existence o
was an abst

MF: If you want, with my experience of European, I always saw the delegate gener
al will, or confiscated represented by politicians, by political organizations o
r political leaders. And I think, let's be cynical with ourselves, that de Gaull
e has represented France in 1940, this may be a fact but I know every child I wa
s at that time that the general will the French did not reach that side (laughs)
. And say the representation of France by de Gaulle it was, it is a phenomenon t
hat was politically desirable and that has historically been fruitful, but in re
ality it's not quite how it happened (laughs). In democracies where MPs, ministe
rs, presidents, speak for the community, the state and society, the general will
, it is still something that is rarely felt.
FS: Yes, but ...
MF: And in the political groups that claim holders of the fundamental aspiration
s of the population, there is a lot of bureaucracy, a lot of leadership, a lot o
f hierarchy, many seizure of power, etc. But it seemed to me, rightly or wrongly
, and there I may be quite wrong, that really when, in September, the Iranians t
ook to the street in front of the tanks, they descended, not forced or coerced b
y someone, it was not a group of people who are exposed in their place, uh, beca
use he was in possession of their identity, it was not them, they would not they
did not want the regime suffered. And that, even without having been in the cou
ntry, I think it is a phenomenon that struck everyone as we have seen in Tehran
and elsewhere in Iran. And from what I told you anyway collectively people no lo
nger wanted it.
FS: What was, is not it, the characteristic of this general will? What it was ba
sed? Only the refusal of the sovereign?
MF: So this is indeed the point if you want the most difficult on which to argue
. We can, we could simply say they wanted more of this scheme and it is only tha
t it came down the general will. But I think, and there I may be wrong, they act
ually wanted something else. And another thing they wanted, precisely, was neith
er another political regime or a regime of mullahs, more or less implicitly; wha
t they wanted, what they had in the back of the head or if you want to look afte
r them when they might still almost daily skin in these events, it seems to me t
hat they were looking for, it was a kind of eschatology finally took the form th
is general will was not the form of a will to state or political organization, i
t was to me it seems a kind of religious eschatology.
FS: ... which would also be done on earth?
MF: Yes, finally, if you like, it was that which gave shape and force their will
and not just a rejection of the current regime in the form of disgust at the me
ss, mismanagement, corruption, the police, the killings. Good. It also took shap

e, it was basically a religious eschatology.

FS: So about Islamic government in your "Open Letter to Mehdi Bazargan" [6], you
say that it is the word government in which they were enough, so instead it's n
ot the Islamic word that scares you but then you say that between these two term
s there could be reconciliation, contradiction, or new line [7]. So is what you
can discuss these various possibilities and perhaps to which of them is being to
convey?
MF: Well then, I think, in fact, this notion of Islamic government, there was a
lot of ambiguity, uh much ambiguity. And to tell the truth when I asked the ques
tion, because everyone told me about the Islamic government, Sami Kermani to Sha
riat Madari, passing by Mehdi Bazargan, everyone was telling me what you want is
a government Islamic and when asked how it was, the answer was very vague, uncl
ear. And even secured a promise to do anything has ever been able to Shariat Mad
ari, it's not so reassuring, it is not because we said "minorities be respected!
"This is not because we said" we even tolerate the communists! "Just for that y
ou have to be reassured. I even think we should be worried when you hear that. B
ut it's not just that. I think by Islamic government, people like that, in their
mass, sought, thought of something that was essentially a form non-political ba
ckground coexistence, a way to live together, and resembles in no way a form, sa
y Western, political structuring. Now this was probably untenable in this form.
That to which we may go, it is of course a government in the hands of the mullah
s. And when I said is that the contradiction possibility of a new threshold, I m
ean is it possible, from something as ambiguous in itself, as a blur, and as qui
ckly risks falling into a government mullahs, is that it is possible to develop
something? And is that the circumstances, pressures of all kinds, political, eco
nomic, military, diplomatic, will allow Iran to develop a solution ...
It seems to me that there was at least one common point between all the world, w
hen there was talk of an Islamic government, whether the workers of Abadan, Shar
iat Madari, Bazargan ... and have a common point that was trying to find forms o
f coexistence, social forms, forms of equality, etc., which are not the Western
model.
FS: and is it could be called that, is not it, without referring to someone, a k
ind of stateless society?
MF: If you want, yes, yes, yes, absolutely. Absolutely. Again everything was ver
y vague and necessarily very confused.
FS: But, that is to say, is that Islam in general is presented, who presented hi
mself at times, as both a religion and state, is that this religion which presen
ts itself as a doctrine of ultimate power is not in itself carrier of any possib
ility of limiting state power?
MF: it is in any case they have, what they always told me there. And I was assur
ed that Islam being what it is, could itself carry any dangers that are inherent
even in subtle forms, thoughtful, balanced with a Western democracy. That is wh
at I was told. It is in any case this kind of hope, which again in its form is s
o similar to what is found in the sixteenth century Europe. It seems to me that
this is what is (...)
FS: So we move on to this notion that is not worth you flowers (laughs) that of
political spirituality. And if you explain a little, is not it, how the spiritua
l is politicized and spiritualized politics?
MF: You know, I will probably one day a study on the reactions of the French inc
redible about my position on what happened in Iran, I do not know how you reacte
d in other European countries but France it was absolutely crazy.
It was an example of something that ... really people came out for themselves. Y

ou understand that three different journalists certainly not poor, then get to m
ake my own fake texts by assigning them to me. Finally making false with phrases
that were not mine, texts that were not me, words that were not me, to attribut
e them to me to show that I approved the executions of Jews, you could say that
I approved the action of Islamic Courts etc. In suitable journals. So finally, p
eople went crazy.
FS: How do you explain this madness?
MF: Oh, well then I would love to tell you. I have no explanation. And the other
day, yesterday I saw a journalist, a newspaper, a weekly newspaper, I met in Ir
an, I asked the question "how do you explain the attitude of your colleagues? ".
It is a Jewish and he said "oh, I think it's hatred of Islam".
FS: There is a book, I quote because I made a report last week in the journal, e
ntitled Orientalism [8] ...
MF: Yes. This is Edward Said. I know Edward Said. I know the book.
FS: Oh, you know Edward Said!
MF: Yes it is a very interesting book.
Well, at least I do not know, in any case people have become crazy. In political
spirituality; the sentence I said was this: I said what I found there was somet
hing like finding a political spirituality, and I said that this concept is now
for us quite obscure, which was quite clear, familiar in the sixteenth century.
Well, there's no big deal. Rather we can say, "That's not true, they did not see
k a political spirituality" but come and say, as was said again recently in Le M
onde ...
FS: Claude Roy?
MF: Claude Roy. In a huge lie. And they do not apologize and they never excuse.
But I still will be having. I have never personally sucked, though say it, a pol
itical spirituality. I said, "I saw there a curious movement, very weird, and yo
u can not, I think, understand that by analogy with past things here, the politi
cal spirituality. You have a superb example, that it would still not forgotten s
ince it still has some news to us is Calvinism. What is Calvin otherwise the wil
l to move, not just a religious belief, not just a religious organization but a
form of spirituality, that is to say, individual relationship to God, from indiv
idual relationship to spiritual values, to pass it in the policy. Well uh, Calvi
nism, that was the project of Calvinism project that has the form of another rel
igious movement. This is what happened in the West. This is what took place in t
he West and that's what, to me it seems there was this movement of the Year 78 i
n Iran. Personally, uh (laughs) I never thought that politics spirituality can b
e present, how to say, an aspiration ...
FS: a reply
MF: ... an answer or possible aspiration or desirable in the West. It is a thous
and miles. The best evidence that is far removed is that we are therefore oblige
d to make historical references to try to understand. Secondly, I have never cla
imed that the policy spirituality was the solution, even with the problems of Ir
an, for the mere fact to remember what had happened in the XV and XVI Europe, an
d although it does not lead like that, and it leads to hard things. Never politi
cal spirituality, it was heaven on earth. See Calvin, spirituality and politics
Calvin, it has led to some bonfires (laughs). This is good ah. In other words, I
described something I saw in Iran. I may be wrong, and there I accept a possibl
e discussion. But wanting to lend me, as an individual aspiration, what I descri
bed as me it seems a will or own aspiration to Iran is a dishonesty French newsp

apers still make a sound .

FS: But still you described the movement with sympathy?
MF: ...
FS: No, I say that, ...
MF: Absolutely
FS: and your positions, it was a great comfort in the middle you describe hostil
ity to this revolution. You were the only one to say something really new as ana
lysis, saying that this is not the fanatics who take to the streets and that is
the return of Islam.
MF: Yes, well uh, if you want to, uh, first, because I do not think we can ever
understand something to which we are hostile. And if I had a kind of feeling of
hostility to all this, I will not be gone, because I would have been sure not un
derstand. Second, it seems to me that the risks, and finally the possibilities t
hat now, in so-called third world, revolutionary movements, movements, if you li
ke, violent and intense social and political change, now go uh increasingly try
to take root on the cultural background of these countries, instead of trying to
be modeled on the West, the liberal West and Marxist West. I think that is what
is likely to spread. Whether it is being spread. And what happens in Afghanista
n is that guy. [...] Well, I think we have here, then, if only as a point of vie
w, if you will, properly historical ... we must give credit, you can pay attenti
on to what is going on .
But last third, if I had sympathy even beyond this historical and political curi
osity is because I do think that, given what the Shah's regime, political oppres
sion, economic, population of operation, masked imperialism, etc. and although a
n entire people revolt against the regime, that's good. And I say very well to t
he extent that Islam has at least allowed this, is that all the people actively
involved. There it is recognized. It seems to me that until the bottom of the Ir
anian situation, this movement had echoes the same extent as it related to somet
hing that people recognize as their own. While the movement is done in the name
of the class struggle, or in the name of freedom, I'm not sure it would have had
the same echo and that it would have the same force. That's why I have sympathy
, but sympathy was never to say that a, uh, it was necessary to avoid this, two
that what was out was going to be heaven on earth, far there, far from it. I jus
t wore a judgment of reality on a strength that I noticed and immediate objectiv
es which I could only agree to the extent its immediate objectives was the rever
sal of the imperialist regime, this operating system, this regime ...
FS: ... massacres.
MF: this police terror.
FS: So we may have the opportunity to return, you stand completely apart from al
l this current so-called return to the sacred?
MF: Absolutely. I have never taken any position uh I think if you want for a Wes
tern man, in any case, I, like Western, I consider that my attitude towards reli
gion looks at no one and I never took no political position, no public position
on it. I never talk about it. And I am, if you like, both too historian and rela
tivistic too for the absurd idea (laughs) to do what I could see in Iran the ban
ner of a new prophecy: go back to the sacred! All that, it does not concern me r
ight. I in any case I do not do it. I tried to describe what I saw. The problem
is why what was happening there, the reality out there has been such an injury f
or the West. To the point where I who was describing this reality, we were talki
ng a lot besides, I could be considered a kind of prophet himself fanatic.

FS: And with that you do not submit any, you have no explanation?
MF: No, I continue, I continue to be very, very skeptical, very embarrassed abou
t what is happening. Even when I talk to people, many of course people who are a
little close, many are completely disgusted the incredible stupidity, blindness
with which journalists always tell exactly the same thing that happens in Iran.
There is a phrase that seemed to me so typical of that and it's this: There are
two or three months, to a peripheral radio, I heard the following information:
"Regime Ayatollah Khomeini just cancel the order of two aircraft Concorde or two
... I do not know, but the government of Mr. Bazargan assured that the contract
s would be maintained. "So, for continued contracts was Bazargan government, and
for the canceled contracts, the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini (laughs). Is not i
t gorgeous?
FS: It's gorgeous, yes.
MF: Well that's it.
FS: You've never met in person?
MF: Ayatollah Khomeini? I Do Not. I did not encounter one hand, because if you w
ant, what interested me was to see what was happening there. He, the Ayatollah K
homeini, I knew first he said little, on the other hand, he was a political figu
re whose statements, prepared in advance by his entourage, had to have a certain
political sense. What he meant, I read in the newspapers. I knew perfectly well
that a conversation with him would get me nowhere. The problem once again it wa
s not to know what was in the minds of the leaders of the movement, was how to l
ive there those people who were literally the revolution and made the revolution
, I think -t he, for their own account.
FS: And in this sense, for some end of this issue, is that Islam could play a se
curity role against despotism as you have said?
MF: As told me. So listen, then personally I am very skeptical. This skepticism
is related firstly to my ignorance of Islam. Two, I know the history of Islam is
not inherently more comforting than the history of any other religion. Well, th
ird, Islam, Shia Islam in Iran, is not all the same kind of, you know, uh, direc
t emanation of the time of the prophet. There is a story, the Shiite clergy has
been linked to all sorts of forms of institutionalization of ethnic domination,
massacres, political and other privileges, etc. Culture, training Shiite clergy
is likely, is not very high. After all this, I think we should be a little wary.
But again, this is the problem of the Muslims, it is not mine. The problem for M
uslims is whether actually from that cultural background and the current situati
on and the general context, it is possible to draw from Islam and Islamic cultur
e, something like a new political form. That is the problem of the Muslims, and
that's where I think the problem that very intensely, a number of them at least,
among the most enlightened intellectuals, trying to solve. This is the problem
here that Ali Shariati tried to ask. This is the one he seems to me when I spoke
to Bazargan who was his concern. It was the concern of Shariat Madari well. And
I think the kind of attention both intense, dumb and full of apprehension with
which the Muslims I know in France following the events in Iran, I think it's re
lated to this: if Iran fails, that is to say, if it totally rocks in a regime of
mullahs both authoritarian and retrograde, so do it will not be a sign, a sign
in any case, that of Islam, as the bottom of the Islamic culture, one can not dr
aw resources to the search for a form of political society; if Iran succeeds the
n ... Because what really struck me was that if the French newspapers and if the
French have said, have so viciously opposed to what is happening in Iran, Musli
ms in Europe silent, they have not talked a lot.

FS: But they followed sympathetically.

MF: Yes, yes, I believe they followed sympathetically. But I think that their si
lence was the fact they felt for Islam, the party played very big, very importan
t.
FS: But even so ...
MF: They have to do with much, no rancor, but anxiety and bitterness, a number o
f things that are currently on Iran
FS: Oh, I wanted - but I think it's not worth it - you ask a question about the
special role of Shiism as an organization and as a doctrine, although this is no
t your field. But then come back here to a question a little broader but related
to the first, that is to say, in the context of French public opinion, the them
e of Islam is already frowned upon. How do you explain this lack of understandin
g towards the Iranian uprising and what you call the fear of what is there in hi
m irreducible? That is to say, here we go, is not it, the idea of irreducible.
MF: In Islam you mean?
FS: No, in the uprising.
MF: Oh, in the uprising. Oh yes, oh yes!
FS: It's an idea that you give in the last article of the World. [9]
MF: Yes, yes.
FS: This is an uprising where risks his life, that aspect ...
MF: Yes. Okay so I I ... What I wanted to say is this, is that of course always
an uprising and its reasons and explanations; and my faith, if you are a Marxist
historian, you establish under what conditions, after what pressure, why, it ri
ses. I mean, enter the same time it happens, when we want to try to capture the
same experience of the Revolution, then I say that there is something that can n
ot be pulled over an explanation or reason as miserable you are, also threatened
to starve one can be, when we get up, and where they say I prefer to die under
the machine guns that starve, there is something that the threat of starvation d
oes not explain. Well, there is if you want a game between sacrifice and hope, w
hich, each or which collectively a people, is responsible. It sets itself the de
gree of hope and acceptance of sacrifices that will allow him to face an army, p
olice ...
FS: We will talk about I think
MF: And that was, I think, a very singular phenomenon that breaks history
FS: We will talk at length about this. But to stay in this issue: the fact that
European opinion is that it is irreducible ... Why the European public is unable
to cash it in the sense that a cash boxer?
MF: We could imagine that we can after the great ... because ultimately Europe l
ived, that is to say, the European has lived on the Hope Principle which was org
anized around the idea of a political revolution with parties, an army, a vangua
rd, the proletariat etc ... well we know what a disappointment this led. So one
could imagine that now, any form of uprising, whatever and wherever it is, when
it no longer takes these old forms such missions, as hope, that causes both a ki
nd of irritation, if you want a kind of, I would say, a kind of cultural jealous
y. They do still not going to make a revolution in form to them, which we were u

nable to get to do, to make revolution in a form to us. We invented the idea of
revolution, which we have developed, we who have everything organized knowledge,
a political system, a whole party mechanism ... etc ... around this idea of rev
olution. Well we can give this explanation there. I'm not sure this is true.
FS: In any case, it would be true for some organizations, but this is not true f
or what would make the shock troops of the anti-iranisme.
MF: Yes
FS: That would be true for the communists, leftists. Not for the right.
MF: Oh no it of course, but then there, then we will say that it is the general
hostility against every form of uprising.
MF: Well, bah yeah yeah.
FS: The consciousness of the masses.
MF: Yes, absolutely.
FS: So uh an issue that connects to the former. In your books, you appear from d
evices or power devices, that will not cease to reproach yourself with such a gr
udge Castoriadis. I think it's from an interview with Logical Revolts [10] that
you mentioned plebs. Is the item uprising, revolt, does not it broke from the ou
tside in your work and you might say that the Iranian uprising played a role in
the use of this term?
MF: Look people are very, very odd. They will never allow this to talk about som
ething other than what they are talking themselves (laughs). When I speak of pow
er devices, I try to study how they function in society. I never claimed that th
ese power devices constitute the entire life of a society. I never claimed that
they exhausted history. I mean simply that as being my object, I want to know ho
w it works and where it seems to me that the analyzes of power that a lot of tho
se people you refer, citing uh state for example, or invoking a class, absolutel
y not realize the complexity of how the phenomenon of power.
FS: But there had studied part. Still, between the fact that you are describing
a mechanism of power, or device, and the fact that you show how, for example, is
currently in the course on sexuality or your last interview published in L'Arc
[11] the power relative to knowledge or desire is not repressive but politics ba
h there it becomes a much more inner element, much more inherent ...
MF: Yes, but ...
FS: ... in Discipline and Punish, say
MF: Well yes indeed in these texts ...
In Discipline and Punish, I was trying to study the mechanism of disciplinary po
wer is to me it seems, an important mechanism in society, at least in the XVIII
/ XIXth centuries. In more recent texts, I tried first to take more generally th
e problem of power. I tried to show that the power was always a relationship str
ucture. There is no power like substance, or the power is not a property monopol
ized by a social class. Or power, it is not a kind of capacity that would be pro
duced by a device like the state. In reality, there are power relations, power r
elations between people, between people that is to say between the agents where
one and the other, where each other are in different positions, asymmetrical. Bu
t who says that ... when we say ... the power relationship is, it means that the
re are two words, this means that the change of one of the two terms will change
the relationship. That is to say, far from being a kind of prison structure, po
wer is a network of relationships, mobile, changeable, modifiable, and often fra

gile. That's what I meant. So people like Castoriadis obviously did not understa
nd anything. Well we will not pick up their objections. Would stoop too low.
FS: Yes ah so. But it was only to see this sequence and therefore we can conside
r that you are leaving Ernst Bloch, but the event Iran will not bend theory ...
MF: No, the opposite. If you want, I think a power relationship is a dynamic rel
ationship and effectively defines to some extent the position of partners. But t
he position of the partners and the attitude of the partners, business partners,
also changing the power relationship. In other words, I simply wanted to show i
s that there is no power on one side and then the people to whom the power is ap
plied, because with an assumption like that, or it is accepted, or it must be ad
mitted that the power is omnipotent or it must be admitted that it is totally he
lpless. In fact it's never true. The power is not always powerful / powerless. I
t is in large part blind, but sees still a number of things, etc. Simply because
it is in fact how to solve the strategic relationship between individuals who p
ursue goals, stand each other, partially restrict the possibility of action part
ner but the partner escapes him, which a new tactic etc. It is this mobility the
n we must try to solve. And just as there are times when, if you like, occurs wh
at might be called a phenomenon of consonance in which power is stabilizing and
that it actually has a big subjugation, domination acceptance mechanism a compan
y; there are other times when the consonance is done in reverse, where the contr
ary to that time, it's the power of network that is rushed.
FS: In the history as you describe, there are powers finally here I use the term
s you use in the article of the World, there are infinite powers as you say, but
not all-powerful. There irreducible uprisings and rights you also call universa
l laws. Can you explain the nature and the biological basis, rational, economic,
of these three events, forums ... - how could you call them? What is the concep
t that could be grouped, Law and uplift? Finally this is to give a name, but it
is mainly these three concepts ...
MF: I'll say this is that I think uh, in systems like ours, that is to say in wh
ich there has indeed not only of the States with their devices with a series of
techniques that are exerted to get to govern the people, the proliferation of me
chanisms of power, therefore stabilize them through their multiplication, refine
ment, that uh, if you want, it always tends to govern too much. Is that there ha
s to be an internal excess Law Development of power.
FS: that would be in the institution?
MF: that would be in the institution.
FS: before in desire.
MF: Yes, well, uh, say, say that the desire of individuals and the institution o
perating at that time as multipliers of each other.
FS: Yes.
MF: Good. And that in that extent I believe that one of the fundamental roles of
the intellectual is precisely to argue in front of the governors, general limit
s not to cross and which are the guarantee of non-excess, finally the always pro
visional guarantee, always fragile, he'll have to defend: a threatened border!
FS: But those rights, these laws, the universal is what is the reason, that is K
ant? This is monotheism? You bring a notion, is not it, between the concept of p
ower and the uprising, you put a notion, that of law, and we see it, we do not e
xplain its origins to the optical. What is right? What is the universal? What is
the law?

MF: Well, then ... I speak this universal is again the correlative essential to
any system of power that begins to function in a given society. If there is not
a limit, well it is universally true that we are moving towards domination, desp
otism, enslavement of individuals, etc, etc. So this universal which is a fact o
f power, we must oppose another universal that will take quite different forms d
epending on the power to which we are dealing, but who will score each time exac
tly who will not cross this limit.
FS: So this universal, it bears the mark of what he opposes, it does not exist i
n itself, it is always the case with product.
MF: Yes, if you like, finally it is not ...
FS: I mean, there is not a "thou shalt not kill ', to take one example? But in e
ach case, there is for the law, limits which it must stop. How then do we define
them?
MF: If you want, human rights, rights in general, have a history. There are no u
niversal rights. But it is a universal fact that there is law. And it is univers
al it needs to be right. For if we do not oppose the right of the government to
the fact, if we do not oppose the right mechanisms and power devices, so they ca
n not not get excited, they never restrict self.
FS: So the right is something purely negative? It restricts this is not a positi
ve?
MF: No, no, finally here, I'm talking about those rights which I spoke, and we c
all you now want human rights. Between human rights and positive law is a legal
system, such as the scheme for a given society, ah this is not the same thing. O
ur law systems in the West have tried to present himself as logically derived fr
om the fundamental affirmation of human rights. Actually that's not true. Positi
ve law is a number of techniques, procedures, rules, procedures, requirements, r
egulations, prohibitions, etc. They are not human rights. Besides many legislato
rs had felt perfectly especially Bentham who said, when asked about the declarat
ion of Human rights in France, declaration of the French Revolution, he said, "b
ut the French revolutionaries are asses, they do not realize that account from t
he moment ... "
(Interruption, stopped cassette changing face)
MF: Even a law to be passed by the whole people, as long as it will make someone
something, will infringe on human rights. The fact is that between a system of
law, a system of positive laws in a society, and human rights, he heterogeneity
it. The human rights again, this universal form not defined in a specific form,
which is by what can be labeled a government ... ???
FS: and this is a product of what? of reason?
MF: Well, I would say no, it is a product of the will.
FS: So maybe we arrive at the concept of the uprising? The uprising ...
The desire so. What would the uprising? it could be a decision is not it?
MF: Yes, a will.
FS: it can also be a biological force?
MF: You know, you've noticed this thing anyway, you know, polycultural, you who
know what is happening here, you noticed that this concept will, in French cultu

re now is something we never talk? speaking of reason, we speak of desire.

FS: Yes it is a bit abandoned concept.
MF: Yes, a little abandoned concept.
FS: We had broken our heads with terminally class, is not it, to tell us that th
e will is a synthesis.
MF: that's what it is.
FS: once you do the more defined as a synthesis, ...
MF: So there, you know I will not know to tell you much because I have slow-witt
ed. But for a number of months and years precisely about the analysis of these p
ower relations, it seems to me that we can not carry it properly without involvi
ng the problem of will. Power relations course are all invested by desires, of c
ourse they are all invested by rationality patterns and they involve wills.
FS: This is to say, a synthesis.
MF: No, I will say, I will say it is perhaps precisely this thing, beyond any ca
lculation of interest and beyond if you want the immediacy of desire, what there
was immediate in desire, the will is what can say "I prefer my end." That's it.
And that's proof of death.
FS: This is the maximum continuous test or test? When you say for example "the w
ill to know"?
MF: No, no, it's the end and extreme form, which is manifest to the naked state
when you say "I'd rather die."
FS: So it is a purely irrational decision?
MF: No, not at all, it does not need to be irrational. She did not need to be em
ptied of desire. There was a time when, if you will, subjectivity, the subject .
.. If you want, the will is what fixed to a subject's own position. That's it.
FS: The will is what sets for a subject position, his own position.
MF: The will is the one who said "I'd rather die." The will is what that says, "
I'd rather be a slave." The will is what that says, "I want to know," etc ...
FS: But what is the difference here between desire and subjectivity?
MF: Oh I would say that, uh, the will is the pure act of the subject. And the su
bject is what is fixed and determined by an act of will. These are actually two
concepts that are inverses of each other, is not it, for a number of things.
FS: And we do not fall here in forms of idealism that your research has dispelle
d? (laughs)
MF: why it would be idealistic?
FS: It's like the concept of man ...
MF: Yes. Because ...
FS: It's very Hegelian, is not it?

MF: I would say that it is rather Fichte.

FS: I know little about Fichte.
MF: If you want, what I criticized precisely in the concept of man and humanism
in the years 1950, 1960, it was the use of a universal understood as a universal
-concept. There would be human nature, there would be human needs, there would b
e an essence of man, etc. And that's the name of this universal human would be d
one revolutions, that it would abolish the exploitation, which would nationalize
industries that should join the Communist Party, etc. This universal that allow
s a lot of things and which involved the same time, in a way a bit naive, a tran
s-historical permanence of species or sub-historical, or meta-historical, man. S
o I think this is not acceptable rationally, and that is not acceptable either p
ractically. There, I think it escapes universalism when it is said that eventual
ly the subject is nothing other than the effect of a ... well, which is determin
ed by a will. A will is the very activity of the subject. In truth, you see, I g
uess many of whom I am close to the speed of light, not for his humanism but pre
cisely for his conception of freedom is to Sartre. And Fichte. Since Sartre Sart
re and Fichte ... is not Hegelian.
FS: When I speak of Hegel, I think at the beginning of "Self-awareness" of the P
henomenology of Spirit.
MF: Yes, yes that's right, yes indeed, he speaks of Fichte, or is very close to
Fichte.
FS: yes indeed, in Being and Nothingness, it is question of being for death.
While there, we will cross-check these questions, is not it. You write: "be resp
ectful when a singularity lifts, uncompromising as soon as power violates univer
sal." The duty of the intellectual is it to thwart the authorities when the upri
sing was in a weak position, and support what you call "respect" the uprising, w
hen it is in a strong position? And anti-strategic ethics (of course for the rea
ders of the newspaper, it will define the word) does she not find perpetually de
stabilizing, as provide support to endless uprisings without purpose. And Hegel,
as you said in your inaugural lecture he not waiting for you down the road "? (
laughs) asking a strategic anti-morality, and in fact you are against the govern
ment when he is strong and you are for lifting when he is strong, so ...
MF: I said that? It is a text?
FS: No, your text is only "be respectful when a singularity lifts, uncompromisin
g as soon as power violates universal." But when there uprising in Iran, and whe
n you press Mr. Peyrefitte made new laws, but you're opposed ...
MF: I I I I ... I'm not for lifting when it is strong only when it is strong and
not when it is low. When we shout at the bottom of a prison I am also for him.
FS: Of course. But here you are looking primarily to stop the power that strikes
it.
And when there was an uprising in force, he commands the respect you. Ultimately
it is always destabilizing design, so strategic? Finally the problem if my posi
tion is wrong, you can correct it.
MF: In this article you were referring to, I tried to set a little, if the posit
ion of the intellectual, because after all I do not see why I will make the law
intellectuals, I never made the law anyone, but finally, what I was trying to do
is what I had in mind. I have often been criticized elsewhere that I did not ha
ve a policy, and I do not say, for example: bah is how should operate prisons, o
r that's how it should treat mental illness. I never say it. And I say it's not

my job. And why it's not my job? Well just because I think that if intellectual
has to be like Husserl says, the universal official, it's not just taking a dogm
atic position, prophetic and legislator. The intellectual does not require the l
egislature to make the law does not say what should happen. I think his role is
precisely to show how perpetually which seems obvious in what makes our daily li
fe is arbitrary and fragile and that we can always raise us. And that there perp
etually and everywhere reasons for not accepting the reality as it is given to u
s and proposed. I do not know how a number of commentators and critics, commenta
tors more critical than if you have arrived at the idea that for me, things bein
g what they are, we could not move them. So I did just the opposite. I say, for
example, proposes to madness, but finally see this thing being announced as a sc
ientifically established truth and that is the existence of mental illness, ment
al illness, their typology, etc. all that actually look a little on what it is b
ased, and you find a variety of social, economic, political, etc., which are his
torically situated. And therefore it's all very fragile. My project I think it i
s ... a possible roles, otherwise what's the point intellectuals, my plan is to
actually increase everywhere, finally wherever possible, more opportunities to r
aise by relationship to reality is given to us, and to raise, not necessarily or
always in the form of the Iranian uprising, with 15 million people in the stree
t, etc. One may raise against a type of family relationship, against sex, it can
rise up against a form of pedagogy, can rise up against one type of information
.
FS: So this is a strategy of the uprising.
MF: So this is a strategy of the uprising. But not the overall uprising, univers
al and massive, as "we are sick of this rotten society, let it all to the winds.
" It is differentiated and analytical uprising, which shows what the reality of
things that we are in a civilization, proposed as obvious, natural, self-evident
and necessary. I tried to show how much they are historically recent, fragile,
so fragile, so mobile, so liftable.
FS: So as you explained, this notion of uprising but a perpetual uprising but wo
uld ultimately purposeless without temporal purpose without purpose since it wou
ld be anti-strategic?
MF: That is to say, I think that from the moment when everything that gives us o
pportunity to raise us all that seems unbearable, everything you want to change,
from time somebody just offer a comprehensive and general formula: "I can get r
id of while setting what it will accept after", I say it's fake. It is necessary
that men invented both against which they can and want to raise and what they h
ave turned their uprising. Or that to which they will lead the uprising. Having
reinvented indefinitely. Then I do not see in fact the end point in a story like
this. I mean I do not see the time when men will not have to lift. Although in
fact, it can actually provide for the forms of the uprising will not be the same
: the species of great upheavals such as peasants, starving in the Middle Ages,
and then burn from castles etc. good, it is likely that in countries like Wester
n countries, advanced industrial countries as they say, bah it did find more. No
w reversal of history. So the uprisings will change forms, but having to lift ..
. You see, when for example we take say the gay uprisings in the US, and compare
d to the great upheavals that there may be a country Third World now starving, o
r that there may be in the Middle Ages, it sounds ridiculous, but no, I would sa
y it's not ridiculous. Not that these uprisings then have a wonderful value that
others have not, but I will say it can not be and it is not desirable to have c
ompanies with no uprisings. That's it.
FS: And we go back a little over lifting and religion. Between this operating hi
story that is lifting and religious forms, their expression and drama, you put a
n affinity bond is not it, to use a term somewhat Hegelian - the term is also us
ed by Deleuze. How do you explain ... There is a time when you talk to rise is p

utting his life in danger and it's very close to what can be expressed much bett
er religion than by any other means of expression.
MF: Yes, um, I do not really understand the question.
FS: That is to say, the uprising itself, a voluntary uprising, where risks his l
ife is an uprising that is not such as to improve living conditions, but it is a
n uprising that is for example, could be done in the name of eschatology, or a r
adical change. So between these two poles of religion and the uprising, what con
nection there? And whether it is permanent?
MF: Oh, absolutely not permanent. Uh, you have forms of religion and moments in
the history of relations between societies and religions, religion can play that
role and she does not play. Catholicism in the nineteenth century, Europe had v
irtually no, did not offer opportunities, and phrases taken to an uprising. But
on the other hand, again, in the fifteenth century, if you want it is an intensi
fication of religious life, and a deep desire of a number of individuals to acce
ss a form of religious life, who has shoving and ecclesiastical institutions and
political institutions and their social role. Finally it depends [... Let me as
k you a question like that, off: it's for a newspaper, for a review?
FS: Yes it is a weekly.
MF: You know that already has thirty pages?
FS: Really? I do not know ...
MF: Yes it is your first interview, but we've already too much.
FS: Really? But that's because it's interesting ...
MF: Is what was in the questions you ask again, is that there were things (silen
ce) If I did not answer clearly is that I do not have responded at all.]
FS: Yes, you did not answer at all. I prepared my questions too focused on Iran
...
MF: No, but you know, I think you are right, because it's still something that t
hat ... I do not know ... If I have not answered is that you understand, there a
time when we are disarmed. I'm not a journalist. When I write the same text for
newspapers, I am writing this a little like ... book pages. That is to say by s
till a little attention to what I say. I do not write this on marble, at 4 am, i
n a quarter of an hour, well, when I say that I've seen seems to prove that the
Iranians are looking for something as a political spirituality, which is somethi
ng we are not familiar, it seems that the sentence is clear and there is no disc
ussion. When one is in front of people like Claude Roy and other handlers text a
nd say, "Foucault wants a political spirituality" we are faced with such a degre
e of lying, bad faith, it is well known that if one uses if you send a correctio
n, the correction will be read the same way, and there will be new falsification
s, etc. So I am silent for a while. I let it all settle. And then one day, in an
article in a book, I will take stock of all that, and I will show that it was a
lie. I did not want to go into polemics with people whose stupidity and bad fai
th erupt everywhere. That said I may be wrong, it might be that whenever someone
who ...
FS: Oh, no that's not worth it but as there is now this story, first last year o
f the "new philosophy", for which you promised at first, but which you are retra
cted.
MF: No no no I'm not retracted because I've never been engaged, I just said abou

t ...
FS: But you said somewhere that you were hired more than you want it
MF: oh no no
FS: Or in Le Nouvel Observateur, or in the Arc ...
MF: Oh listen I do not think.
FS: You did not want to be involved ...
MF: I may have said that I do not want to be involved, but I just did one thing,
it was an article about Glucksmann's book [12], which I think is an important b
ook. And especially his two books, and finally the cook and man-eating [13] seem
ed to me, at the time, a very important book, and that has not been the fate he
had me semble- there. Good when the second book was published, I said good bah t
his time we must not miss the book. He thought it had a great echo and I did not
need ... but the book Glucksmann had caused me problems. That's it. Good Glucks
mann was considered a "new philosopher", he defended himself. Me on the edge I d
o not care, Glucksmann's book interests me the other books people called new phi
losophers do not interest me. If little else after having traveled some, I stopp
ed reading. I do not care, I do not really care, I feel that this is not my busi
ness, and voila. So I can not be engaged me. But it's true because I said the bo
ok was interesting for Glucksmann problems ... then ... oh but that's very unhea
lthy. Again, where we made the people who write nonsense Police at that time of
day it goes, or is allowed to run with this space actually that people feel free
to say absolutely anything. And that's one of the policy issues and moral that
I could not solve.
FS: In any case in your last article in Le Monde, there were still a number of q
uestions here, there was a lot of issues raised and that merit further considera
tion.
MF: Yes, yes. But if you want all these things, anyway I'm never quite sure what
I say, and I would love that one can have exchanges, discussions, and people wh
o are no agreement can express their disagreements and ask questions etc. But fr
om the moment we meet in front of you people who do not carry that as prosecutor
s denouncing you as an enemy, sold, this agent, etc. What do we do? Or people wh
o traficotent texts and make us trials with falsified records. In fact, all that
stuff on Iran, I very much regret not having had, been no occasions to have wit
h the Iranians or even just Muslims, followed by discussions. Maybe I was wrong
but I want to lend me exactly what I said and nothing else.
FS: You distinguish two types of intellectuals. First, the universal intellectua
l you present sometimes as heir to the Marxist view of the proletariat and somet
imes as the heir of the man of justice and law. And you prophesy a bit - it's a
bit complicated - death. On the other hand, the specific intellectual that devel
ops from 45. Does your recent pronouncements on Iran and the Vietnam War did not
they would bring you a representation of the universal?
MF: Yes. So if you want uh by the specific and universal intellectual intellectu
al, I want to say is that it seems to me at least, in a society like ours, in th
e West, in Europe, to play a political role, the intellectual n has failed to sh
ift over to his knowledge, compared say to his specialty, he does not have to po
se as a prophet of humanity in general, I think he just looks at what he does, w
hat happens in what he does. This is where we come to this conception of the upr
ising which I spoke earlier. The idea that the role of the intellectual is to sh
ow how this reality presented to us as an obvious and self-evident, is actually
fragile. Well whatever the physicist in his laboratory, the historian who knows

Christianity in the first centuries, the sociologist who studies a society, it s

eems to me that all these people can perfectly, even from that there are more sp
ecial in their field, more specifically in their knowledge, bring up these point
s of weakness, the obvious and the real. While it's true that when we talk about
Iran, Vietnam, on what basis are we doing it? Well, euf, I do not think it's sp
ecific intellectual leave his position to say, me as governed, I believe that th
ere are a number of things that a government should never do.
FS: But the government is irrelevant ...
MF: Yes, regardless of the government
In other words, this is not the universal human being, if you like, but the gene
rality of what happens in the relationship between rulers and ruled that allows
anyone to talk about his problems.
FS: Yes, but it's a bit specious ...
MF: This is a specious ...
FS: Voltaire might say himself specific intellectual.
MF: Yes, but I think while there, there, I think willingly, look people in the e
ighteenth century, it was always like that they did, from something quite specif
ic. In other words, it was not I do not think ... when I speak of the universal
intellectual, and I try to stand out
FS: For example, Sartre, for you, is the universal intellectual?
MF: ...
FS: Well you're talking mostly late nineteenth and early twentieth century. But
me, saying, I especially thought of the period in France that preceded the 60 Yo
u spoke of Hungary, Poland.
MF: Yes, yes I think we should talk about. No, but I mean, ah I start hearth com
pletely tired.
FS: Um, I bothering you with my questions.
MF: No no no no it's a very interesting question you ask me there .. Well, what
I meant is that the universal intellectual, if one who wants to work as if he wa
s the representative a universal consciousness or as if, if you want a little fo
r him in his activity, writer, intellectual, like the political parties that cla
im to hold and truth of history and dynamics of the revolution, I say. not these
universal intellectuals who are only doublets sort of political parties, I do n
ot want it. However the intellectual, from which even intellectual work he does,
can play this role fragilisateur social stability, social, historical immobilit
y, political and economic ... Oh look, I'm sorry but I can not stand more!
FS: Last question, but a little challenge form. This will bring a fun note. I no
te there in your stance on Iran following terms: horror, drunkenness, beauty, gr
avity, dramaturgy, stage, theater, Greek tragedy, you talk about the fascination
of events, so beyond theology and genealogy, political stances, is that strict
Foucault would it not an artist from the time of Francis Bacon, Rebeyrolle and S
tanley Kubrick?
MF: Well, you flatter me by saying that. I'll just add
ow. Indeed, we always talk about, I do not know why, I
one cold, dry, rigid, which speaks only ... But do not
hich he speaks. Do not confuse what they say one thing

a little something you kn

have a reputation as some
confuse the speaker and w
and meaning that one begi

ns to speak of this thing. If I disconnect, if I try to disassemble, in the most

careful manner possible, the mechanisms of power, if I try to actually show how
power relationships have a kind of logic and subtle enough chain, which they gi
ve strength without removing their fragility, that does not mean that I am bound
emotionally positively to that kind of stuff. After all, I did folly, may as we
ll pass for a very lyrical book. I Do Not?
FS: Yes, your style, your style, is not it.
MF: If I wrote that book about madness trying to show precisely all these mechan
isms, it was not in a climate of indifference to me mad subjectivity.
FS: Yes.
MF: In the same way for crime and delinquency, etc. No no, I do not think you ar
e reporting this vocabulary, which actually is not very intellectualist, I do no
t think this is a new vocabulary intake. I do not say that by refusing to change
, I changed. But there is currently such a binding mode if the conversion should
have converted. Maybe I will be converted, I have changed a lot, but in any cas
e that you report there does not seem to be a completely new feature.
FS: No, I do not speak of its novelty
MF: Oh agree agree agree!
FS: But these facts as such
MF: Okay yes yes.
FS: One way to approach things aesthetics.
MF: Yes that's right, yes.
FS: There is a life side, it's not new, it is not new.
Well thank you.
MF: It is I who thank you.

[1] [1] Das Prinzip Hoffnung, 3 vols., 1954-1959. The French translation is begi
nning to look at Gallimard in 1976. Volumes II and III appeared in 1982 and 1991
. 3 volumes are translated from the German by Franoise Wuilmart.
[2] From 16 to 24 September and 9 to 15 November 1978.
[3] In fact, less than 3 weeks as indicated dates.
[4] The engineer Mehdi Bazargan was the founder of Iran's Liberation Movement in
1965 and Liberties Defense Committee and Human Rights in 1977. He was appointed
prime minister by Ayatollah Khomeini on his return to Tehran, he remained in th
at position for a few months (February 5 to November 5, 1979) because of its lib

eral and democratic ideas. Kazem Sami, a physician and psychiatrist, led the par
ty allied to JAMA Movement Bazargan and affiliated with the National Front of Ir
an .. He was the Minister of Health of the Bazargan government.
[5] Ayatollah considered the first among equals, Shariat Madari was for the sepa
ration of mosque and state and was very interested in social and economic proble
ms. In the words of Olivier Roy, he "summer Kitzbhel literally" defrocked "by Kho
meini. "In Sabrina Mervin: Shia worlds and Iran-Ifpo Karthala, 2007, p. 39.
[6] Le Nouvel Observateur, 14-20 April 1979, p. 46; taken in Sayings and written
Quarto collection, Gallimard, t. II
pp. 780-782.