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DAVID
WHAT
L. HULL
PHILOSOPHY
OF BIOLOGY
IS NOT*
Periodically
through the history of biology, biologists have tried to do
a philosopher has turned his attention
a little philosophy
and occasionally
to biology. In the past decade or so a body of literature has arisen which
might legitimately be called 'philosophy of biology'. The purpose of this
paper will be to review the contributions made to this literature by phi
losophers during the past 10 or 15 years. Earlier work will be discussed
if it has proven especially
influential. The contributions
made by
on
to
of
will
be
touched
the
biologists
biology
only briefly,
philosophy
both because the biological
literature is too vast to permit anything like
a fair summary in the confines of a short paper and because the strengths
only
and weaknesses
of this literature tend to be quite different from the efforts
In this paper, though it is sure to result in acrimony,
of philosophers.1
not
refrained from criticism. There is too great a discrepancy be
I have
tween what philosophers
produce
of biology
comment.
and what
of biology
should be
philosophy
to pass over without
One striking feature of the remarks made by philosophers
about biology
For example, Mario Bunge in a
is how frequently they are misinformed.
in the construction
and assaying of
paper on the weight of simplicity
theories
scientific
What
gave Darwin's
various
rivals,
of evolution
notably
theory
creationism
the vicious
logically
faulty
(remember
tained several false or at
individual",
"Acquired
of bacteria,
the theory,
porting
its explanatory
controlled
industrial
were
power
selection
through natural
Lamarckism?
Darwin's
circle
of
the "survival
of
the victory
theory was
the fittest");
observed
was
conditions
of antibiotic-resistant
(the development
in butterflies,
and a few other processes
sup
one century
after The Origin
of Species
appeared);
smaller
than that of its rivals
theories
(irrefutable
clearly
it had no inductive
the maximumpostfactum
basis
explanatory
power);
a bold
on the contrary,
invention
unobservables.
And,
containing
high-level
to condemn
sins were not enough
the theory, Darwin's
system was far more
of
its rivals.
its
in part
it con
melanism
have
than any
over
is good
least unproven
assertions
variation
for the
("Each
are inherited",
if favorable,
"Sexual
selection
characters,
it had not been tested by observation,
let alone by experiment
operates
universally");
on living species under
strains
and
question:
...2
but was,
if these
complex
158
DAVID
L. HULL
of evolutionary
theory seem evenly divided on the question of
whether the survival of the fittest is false or tautological.
In spite of the
tiresome regularity with which this claim ismade, it has little foundation.
Critics
others. A
do neither. (This
survival, but biologists
detail later in conjunction with Anthony
Darwin's
theory.)
attempt to reconstruct
that Darwin
Bunge contends
Flew's
several
of whether
assertions.
good for the individual. Such organs were imperfect and useless.4 Darwin
some effect" but
did believe that "use and disuse seem to have produced
sufficient evidence to induce us to believe that muti
lations are ever inherited".5 Nor did Darwin believe that sexual selection
operated
and females
due to sexual
selection.6
a
in butterflies was observed
says that industrial melanism
after The Origin of Species appeared, when actually two long
were published
by Tutt in 1890 (only 30 years after the
monographs
in British
and melanochroism
in
which
he
that
melanism
argued
Origin),
Bunge
century
of moisture
Lepidoptera were due to a combination
action of natural selection.7 And, although it might
point to a philosopher,
butterflies.
almost
the
seem an insignificant
all of the observations were on moths, not
WHAT
PHILOSOPHY
OF BIOLOGY
IS NOT
159
no inductive
are especially
in
disinterest
It is certain
theory is discouraging.
evolutionary
theory as a biological
that he would not treat quantum theory in such a cavalier fashion. The
differences between mesons and pions are important. The differences be
tween moths
and butterflies
a philosopher
does not
example
of the views which he criticizes is provided
sufficient understanding
by Peter Caws when he terms the interbreeding criterion of the biological
he recognizes
that the reason
definition of species 'artificial'. Although
of a class of living things is that they
for the similarity of the members
A
second
have
have a common
Even
draw,
in this case,
and some
together)
the same
have
he adds:
ancestry,
the borderlines
rather
been
used
artificial
for
between
criteria
judging
been very
to produce
individuals
difficult
to
offspring
belong
to
species.8
later.)
because of his failure
to understand
the role of the ability to
Perhaps
of species, Caws terms
in
definition
fertile
the
produce
offspring
biological
'artificial'. Numerous
this criterion
objections have been raised to the
160
DAVID
definition, most
biological
the criterion of potential
L. HULL
frequently
to decide when
to Mayr,
is fulfilled. According
interbreeding
are potentially
two populations
interbreeding whenever
they are prevented
isolation. If any isolating mechanism
from breeding only by geographical
are
is operative,
separate species.9 But even the most persistent
they
critics admit
of interbreeding
to the evo
is central
If the ability
of sexually reproducing
organisms.
lutionary development
to produce fertile offspring is an artificial criterion in deciding what is to
count as evolutionary
units, one wonders what a natural criterion would
be like.10
have taken an interest in evolutionary
theory
philosophers
of the consequences which they see in it for man. A book entitled
is typical.11 Van
and Philosophy
Evolution
by Andrew G. van Meisen
Melsen's main thesis is that natural science deals only with the 'outside'
Numerous
because
of reality, but there is also an 'inside' to reality which the natural sciences
in man, who has direct access to
cannot touch. This 'inside' is manifest
a physical scientist might tell
the 'self, the primordial datum. Anything
us about man "is peripheral to this primordial datum". The existence of
this 'self is responsible for one of the gaps in the scale of nature, but there
are others. Just as there is an abyss between man and (other) animals,
Some authors of
there is an abyss between the living and the non-living.
a hiatus between
down
observable
plays
structure
in man's
self-consciousness".
It is this 'interiority' that ne
culminating
of these different levels of being.
the recognition
cessitates
What can possibly be said in reply to claims such as these? Of course,
can be a
A biologist
and self-conscious.
human beings are conscious
without
mechanist-reductionist-neo-Darwinian
being a simple-minded
can also be aware of the epistemological
dis
Such biologists
behaviorist.
For example,
tinctions which give rise to these and similar utterances.
the ones in which we
G. G. Simpson
says that "our human universes,
our inner perceptions
as
on
our
much
really have
beings, depend at least
as on the external, physical facts".12 But the philosophers who emphasize
the distinction
with
between
evolutionary
inner world
somehow
counts
against
the
sufficiency
of
evolutionary
WHAT
PHILOSOPHY
OF BIOLOGY
IS NOT
161
they conflict
with,
are extraneous
to or are consonant
with
modern
theory.
evolutionary
who wish to insulate the
is frequently the case with philosophers
finds evolutionary
'self from all inroads by science, Van Meisen
theory
of
as
a
Darwin's
Even
scientific
below par
today
theory.
explanation
in general
"The theory of evolution
evolution
lacks a solid foundation.
As
is, as we have seen, essentially based on 'belief rather than anything else."
and
views of G. G. Simpson
But he also discusses
the evolutionary
If
Teilhard de Chardin as if they were on an equal footing scientifically.
on
must
what
is
based
Teilhard's
the synthetic theory of evolution
belief,
theory be based on? What kind of proof is necessary before a scientific
the evidence
Is there no difference between
theory can be accepted?
and
Teilhard's
views?
adduced in support of modern evolutionary
theory
so
not
in
two
much
their
is
conclusions
theories
between
the
The difference
and arguments adduced by their authors to support
seems to have no conception of what a scientific theory is,
is, or how evidence can be brought to bear on a scientific
evidence
view remains
problem. And finally we are reminded that "the Aristotelian
an
even
context
world
view".
of
in the
valid
evolutionary
extensive. It also follows
The literature of this genre is unfortunately
a surprisingly
theory is not
the best
scientific
are superior
all evolutionists
tradition.
Teilhard
de Chardin
or in order to tar
162
L. HULL
DAVID
was
One
feature
of efforts
to discover what
consequences
evolutionary
theory has for man is that evolutionary
theory
as a scientific theory plays no role whatsoever
in his exposition. All he
would have needed to know in order to develop his thesis is that man
from other animals and that living creatures developed from non
matter.
All the intricacy of evolutionary
the diffi
living
relationships,
culties with various mechanisms,
the recalcitrant
of
data, the wealth
are
over.
evidence
Whatever
of
supporting
passed
biology
philosophy
might be, this is not it.15
One exception among those philosophers
who are primarily interested
evolved
in evolutionary
for the nature
theory because of its possible consequences
In his book The Ascent of Life he goes to the
of man is T. A. Goudge.16
evo
trouble of providing a philosophically
oriented analysis of modern
lutionary theory. Since his views on evolutionary
theory are not especially
and depart in no important respect from those of the biolo
controversial
Haldane, Huxley, Mayr,
gists he cites in his preface (Carter, Dobzhansky,
one might wonder what point there could
M?ller,
Simpson, and Wright),
be in a philosopher
going over the same ground. This perplexity can be
whole approach to the
quickly be reading the book. Goudge's
a
is
from
different
that
of
scientist. He does not organize his expo
subject
sition according to various kinds of empirical phenomena
(e.g., kinds of
re
mechanism,
species,
isolating
hybridization,
genetic
populations,
dispelled
combination,
etc.) but according
be found among the phenomena
structing particular
torical explanations,
explanations
statements).
implications
phylogenetic
the causal
is very cautious
Goudge
the importance
but
lution,
in his assessment
he puts
on the question
in evo
by the
WHAT
title of his book. He
PHILOSOPHY
is interested
OF BIOLOGY
in the ascent
IS NOT
163
man
earlier
than
flexible
is concerned,
he is extremely
far as man
He is a dominant
type and the dominant
species of mammal
primate. He is also "almost certainly the youngest
now on earth" and as such "there is a sense in which he is quite literally
the highest species".17 As cautious as these claims are, Goudge
goes too
far. There is no evidence to indicate that man is the youngest
species of
and, even if he were, he would hardly thereby become the highest
but hardly the highest
species. Perhaps the highest species of mammal,
his
is
in
Man
flexible
and so
very efficient,
adaptiveness,
species period.
on. So are cockroaches. Man is unique. So are cockroaches. Only when
mammal
direct means
new difficulties
ses of biology
any clarity
provided any insights into biological phenomena,
themselves have been unable to provide, a deeper under
biologists
theories? When
have turned their
philosophers
standing of biological
attention to biology they have tended to limit themselves to a few issues and related topics. One thing is obvious
vitalism, teleology, reductionism,
have not been motivated
from this list. Philosophers
in their choice of
which
ities exist. The major problem with this defense of vitalism and teleology
or mechanist
ever held any differently. Even though
is that no materialist
much of the heat generated by these controversies was due to misleading
164
DAVID
L. HULL
were entirely
that the disagreements
to these disagreements,
and central to all of
in
them is the role of 'principles' in science. For example, J. H. Randall
it is hard
formulations,
verbal. There
to believe
is substance
that Aristotle's
formal
his attempt to rehabilitate Aristotle
emphasizes
of understanding.19
and final causes are principles
They don't enter
do
the
don't
into
world
of
things.
They
anything.
Living creatures
causally
and can be understood
do what they do because of their organization
in terms of their organization.
finality is for there to be regularities
only
All
to exhibit
Randall
himself
is applicable
overly crude, but to the extent that contemporary
knowledge
to the various stages of these controversies,
the mechanist-materialists
were right. The only remaining
is even vaguely related to
issue which
these
theses
is the translation
of expression
of teleological modes
into
of the characteristics
the specification
of
are frequently described ideologically.
Both
and
nonteleological
language
those systems whose actions
of these tasks are proving a good
first expect.20
The
deal more
intricate
at
status of reductionism
a recent conference
by the Commission
the discussion
from
WHAT
of reduction. A biochemical
which
have
OF BIOLOGY
PHILOSOPHY
IS NOT
165
explanation
been
explained previously
to
have not been 'reducing' Mendelian
genetics. Geneticists
genetics
molecular
genetics in the sense of providing translation rules. The relation
too
is
ship
complex for that. For example, classical genetics speaks of
genetics there is no such
things like "the gene for albinism". In molecular
as
or
one
a
for
of
albinism.
several changes in the
the
gene
thing
Any
numerous
different loci can
inversions, etc.) at
genetic code (deletions,
is the molecular
result in the failure to produce pigments. What
version
statement
that in man
of the Mendelian
in molecular
Is the molecular
biology?
at all related to that for recessive
epistasis
are closely
for
explanation
These
epistasis?
in Mendelian
related
inmolecular
comparable explanations
is interested in the question
inferential and definitional
relations
between
thermo
there is
of biology than whether or not biology
certainly more to the philosophy
can be reduced to chemistry and physics! During
the last decade or so,
to
center
of
been
forced
the
the
has
stage in the philosophy
briefly
biology
and prediction
in evo
and
in their
lutionary studies
by Hempel
Oppenheim
classic paper on the logic of explanation.22 After setting out four con
ditions of adequacy for scientific explanation,
they state that the same
as well. Although
formal analysis applies to scientific prediction
almost
of science because
of the relevance
of explanation
to a remark made
may
from
166
DAVID
L. HULL
Was Hempel
and Oppenheim's
introduction
The
legislation?
in the philosophy
of science points up even more strongly
controversy
a
the need for careful and detailed study of the logical structure of modern
evolutionary
theory and its relation to historical data.
Periodically
philosophers
have discussed
but
their
evolutionary
treatments have
reconstructions,
lutionary
desired. Abraham Kaplan considers evolutionary
theory a concatenated
theories like relativity theory, but he
theory in contrast to hierarchical
theories.24 A. G. N.
says little about the actual structure of concatenated
Flew on the other hand contends that there is a deductive core to Darwin's
in the Origin.25 Several attempts have been made
to specify
core
is. Flew cites Julian Huxley's
formu
precisely what this deductive
lation26 but finds it 'curiously slapdash'. His own formulation
is scarcely
better. He says, for instance:
argument
a priori, because
are empirical
the argument
itself proceeds
the premises
it can
are also empirical.
which
That
all tend to reproduce
yield conclusions
living organisms
at a geometrical
that the resources
to sustain
themselves
ratio of increase;
they need
life are limited;
and that while
each usually
after its kind sometimes
there
reproduces
are variations
which
in their turn usually
after their kind:
all these propo
reproduce
Though
sitions
are nonetheless
and empirical
for being manifestly
and incontestably
contingent
is a struggle
for existence;
and that through
this struggle
for existence
occurs:
are nonetheless
natural
selection
both of these propositions
equally
contingent
as a matter
and empirical
for the fact that it follows,
of logic a priori,
that
necessarily
wherever
the first three hold the second
two must
hold also.27
true. That
there
Everything which Flew says is true, important and needs saying, with
one exception. Neither
of his conclusions
follow deductively
from the
can
be deduced is that not all those
premises which he presents. All that
organisms
which
survive.
Flew
is aware
WHAT
PHILOSOPHY
OF BIOLOGY
IS NOT
167
only
are analytically
to evolutionary
actual
connected
survival,
in general must
within
theory, but
a distinction
in order
is the difference be
be ignored. This distinction
could happen, given the appropriate
laws, and what actually
does happen. For instance, given Newton's
laws, a planet must revolve
around a star in a conic section. Which of these possible paths the planet
science
tween what
concerning
survival
possible
to survive".
within
is to be construed
Sometimes
as the sufficient
Sometimes
Darwin's
168
DAVID
L. HULL
philosophers
to
evolutionary
theory
criticize. For example,
have
an evolutionary
succession" and
unique series of changes characterizing
of no inductive generalization
that we are "in possession
regarding the
of such high probability
and generality as
modus operandi of evolution
in an
will justify us in asserting with any confidence what happened
example"?31 The evolution of Hypohippus was a unique event,
but the occurrence of adaptive radiations,
the invasion of new ecological
on are not. Such phenomena
cases
so
of
and
evolution
niches,
convergent
historical
since Schindewolf's
proved instructive,
theory, unlike the
a
of
the paper
scientific
is
Teilhard,
theory. Although
musings
respectable
a
out
account
of
two
balanced
the
theories, it
fairly
begins by setting
gradually develops into a sustained attack on the orthodox neo-Darwinian
should
have
views of Simpson. But the synthetic theory has been criticized before.
Like all scientific theories it is under constant revision and re-examination,
and
in many
consider
instances
the severest
critics
are found
themselves
ticular criticisms
Grene's
WHAT
PHILOSOPHY
OF BIOLOGY
IS NOT
169
the two
that, as far as the evidence is concerned,
on a par. She claims that Simpson and Schindewolf
if at all, about the 'facts'". The two theories merely
theories
seldom,
the data". Although
"provide alternative frameworks for understanding
for some details one point of view is preferable, for other details the other
point of view is preferable. Thus, "it seems to be purely a matter of choice
which we prefer. ... Perhaps what we need, then, is a more
inclusive
will
both
of
which
assimilate
sides
the
theory,
adequately
ambiguity".35
"disagree
must
be defined
reason
that Schindewolf's
and so is at
quately explanatory. Only that it is not self-contradictory
- not
for asking philosophical
least a possible starting-point
for
questions
as
mean
to do."37
answers,
my critics suggested I
giving philosophical
is to be said of Grene's argument? In the first place, almost all
What
biologists
disagree with her assessment of the evidence. Taking the two
of the evidence supports the syn
theories on a whole, the vast majority
thetic theory, and it is in just those cases where Schindewolf departs most
radically from the synthetic theory that the evidence is most decidedly
belief that basi
against him.38 For example, Grene cites Schindewolf's
have a 'sudden origin'. There
cally new types or patterns of organization
were no feathered creatures. Then there were. The fossil evidence happens
on this issue, but given what we know of genetics and
it is unlikely that such macro-phenotypic
physiology,
changes resulting
from mutation
could occur in the space of a single generation
and the
results be viable - even once, let alone in the origin of every new type.
It does not help in the least to say that the gross phenotypic
changes were
not to be decisive
due
to micromutations
change
early
in the genetic make-up
in development.
The magnitude
is not at issue but the magnitude
of
the
of the
170
DAVID
L. HULL
concept
gestalt
is another matter.
but if Grene
affecting
in direct
type.42
It seems to be this confusion
arguing in her two evolutionary
the controversy. A later paper
matical
Essentialism
is to resurrect
version
objections,
since
opposition
to the traditional
notion
of
she criticized
Fisher's
of evolutionary
theory did not meet with
in this paper Grene explicitly states what
mathe
any strong
it is she is
WHAT
PHILOSOPHY
OF BIOLOGY
IS NOT
171
could
From what
has been said thus far, the reader might infer that philoso
have
little to contribute to biology. On the contrary, there are
very
phers
of
the scientific endeavor to which philosophers
could con
many aspects
tribute. My complaint
is that by and large they have not. A classic ex
have been in communication
with
ample of how ineffectual philosophers
is provided by the taxon-category
distinction.
J. H. Woodger
biologists
of
most
his
what
he
called
the
life
spent
"turning
Boole-Frege
doing
in biology". The differences between
indi
searchlight upon statements
viduals, classes, and classes of classes is one instance in which such an
effort could have resulted in considerable benefit for biology. The logical
was be
tools were available. The time was right. Just when Woodger
in mathematical
to
his work
logic, biologists were beginning
the
to
to
intensive
All
it
takes
re-examination.45
subject
species concept
appreciate how greatly the work of these biologists would have benefited
from having more than an intuitive grasp of the differences between de
ginning
fining the name of a particular species (a class) and defining the name of
the species category itself (a class of classes) is to read the literature of the
did provide just such an analysis in his book The
period. But Woodger
Axiomatic Method
in Biology.46
Unfortunately,
Woodger's
account went
unnoticed.
10 years later, when biologists did begin to point out the sig
Finally,
nificant differences between what they called taxa and categories,
the in
crease in clarity was substantial.
It would be pleasant to be able to say
a
that philosophers
in the recognition and dissemination
role
played
large
of this important
logical distinction,
but
seem to be the
172
DAVID
L. HULL
and termi
had to work out the appropriate distinctions
case. Biologists
were
same
At
this
time
themselves.
for
philosophers
producing
nology
involved whether
parallel accounts.471 have asked several of the biologists
they found these accounts helpful. They replied in the negative. What was
for this failure
the reason
Two
in communication?
factors
to
combined
of these philosophers
from having any significant impact
keep
on biology. In setting forth these factors, I do not mean to imply that all
some of the blame
parties were equally guilty in every respect or that
the work
not
an individual
and that the relation between
individuals,
not the
it belongs
is membership,
the species to which
relation.48 These issues were raised because two biologists had
organism
and
part-whole
advanced
independently
the notion
that species are as much concrete,
as
are
individual
organisms. On this score I think
things
spatiotemporal
in
his
is
but
arguments Gregg seems almost willfully blind
right,
Gregg
reasons
such an as
these
to the
biologists might have had for making
sertion. The point that they were trying to make was that species are not
of isolated individuals like the class of all things
just sets, just collections
in
of a species are interrelated
smaller than a breadbox. The members
significant ways, among which is spatiotemporal
biologically
questions of whether a class can be identified
proximity. The ontological
with itsmembers, whether the class of all cells that compose an organism
that organism, or
that compose
is identical to the class of all molecules
numerous
for that matter, whether the whole universe can be viewed as an organism
are irrelevant to the issues raised by these biologists. Gregg says that this
one which
is resolved by reference to
problem "is a pseudo-taxonomic
the semantic
evidence
slightest
structure
of language,
distribution,
interbreeding
(geographical
If so, then Gregg
bearing whatsoever".49
problem.
The second
cation between
factor which
has contributed
these philosophers
no purely biological
relations, etc.) has the
has misidentified
to the failure
and biologists
the
of communi
is their method
of doing
WHAT
PHILOSOPHY
OF BIOLOGY
IS NOT
173
of biological
statements
of science - the formal reconstruction
philosophy
a
There
is
continuum
with
in the notation of mathematical
respect
logic.
to the degree to which these 'formalists' utilize mathematical
logic. At
one end such notions are used just for clarity and consolidation
in the
are
of definitions. At the other end
those works in which the
presentation
is set-theoretical.
entire presentation
of doing philosophy
This method
obvious one is that few biologists
The
One
of mathematical
is a case in point. Too often the applications
or less common
more
to
in
the
that
biology give
impression
problems
logic
in
tiresome
when
have
ideas
been
exactitude
they could
expressed
place
more
a
more
sentences
in
of
few
have been conveyed
easily and
directly
tinction
plain English.
The second drawback
the message.
which
becomes
occasioned
The
is that more
substantive
often
than
in biology
problem
as special, technical
is forgotten
The numerous papers which have been
the formalization
an excellent
the task of
hierarchy with
in
1952
had
attempted a
logic. (Woodger
similar reconstruction.50)
The problem is that biologists make use of in
In fact, the distri
in constructing
their classifications.
tensional notions
providing
in the confines
reconstruction
of the Linnaean
of extensional
of the characters
consideration
174
DAVID
L. HULL
what
will
continue
characters
Linnean
will
this reconstruction
to make
among
their decisions
specimens. The
in intensional or modal
their
hierarchy
expended in attempting
confines of extensional
to reconstruct
logic may
need
be first-rate
to
of biology.
being philosophy
A second instance in which
of evolutionary
theory the answer has been that two characters are homo
logous if they are similar because of origin from a common ancestor. A
are homologous
or not two characters
in an
as to whether
decision
to
sense
and
recourse
to
evidence
all
available
evolutionary
requires
scientific theories, including evolutionary
theory. Because of
the intricacy of the inferences involved in such decisions and the frequent
more
paucity of evidence, some biologists have suggested that a different,
should be substituted
basic notion of homology
operational homology
for the notion of evolutionary
homology.
numerous
At
first, operational
homologies
served directly with no recourse
were
to
supposed to be something ob
inferences or scientific theories.
Gradually biologists have come to see that such units were quite ephemer
al and of little scientific use and have expanded the concept to permit
inferences on the basis of certain scientific theories, in fact, any scientific
interpretations are
theory. When evolutionary
theory except evolutionary
As
the result is evolutionary homologies.
put on operational homologies,
to clarify the ideas
the reader may have detected, the efforts of biologists
of character and homology have been excursions into pure epistemology.
the scope of a decade, they have relived the history of phenomen
and logical atomism. There is really no need for
alism, operationism,
biologists to remake all the old mistakes and to explore every blind alley.52
Within
WHAT
PHILOSOPHY
OF BIOLOGY
IS NOT
175
Another
could have helped clarify the
place at which philosophers
over the problem
issues in a dispute between biologists
is the disagreement
of whether higher categories evolved first and then later diversified into
or whether
lower categories
species evolved first and then only later
and Schindewolf
incline toward the first
higher categories. Goldschmidt
view. Simpson and Mayr
subscribe to the latter view.53 The major diffi
is the logical crudity with which it is frequently
culty with this controversy
expressed. Both Marjorie Grene
versy at some length.54 Though
and T. A. Goudge
discuss this contro
they themselves do not make the fairly
straightforward
logical error at the bottom of the confusion, neither does
to
clarify the situation. The confusion lies primarily in the modes
anything
of Goldschmidt
of expression
and Schindewolf.
On neither view can
now
taxa
term
in use) evolve first and lower taxa such as
(the
higher
later. Perhaps Archaeopteryx
evolved in one fell swoop.
so
basic
its
is
novel
that
itmust be recognized as a
Perhaps
organization
new higher taxon regardless of any future developments.
Even so, a new
no
a
new
taxon
has
in
taxon.
evolved
lower
Given the
way
before
higher
species
principles
possible
evolve
of classification
for a new phylum
evolving simultaneously.55
The two sides are in disagreement,
concerns
one matter
gaps,
entirely on the basis of overall similarity and phenotypic
regardless of the number and diversity of taxa which eventually exhibit
this type of organization. Novelty
alone guarantees a taxon a high cate
of princi
gory assignment.
Simpson and Mayr classify on a multiplicity
classify
Thus
a taxon with
176
DAVID
L. HULL
The Biological Way of Thought. As might be expected from the fact that
to the International Encyclopedia
is a contribution
his monograph
of
Mainx
the verifiability criterion of meaning
emphasizes
Unified Science,
fulness and the unity of science. The errors and conceptual dangers which
he most frequently points out in biological works are attempts to pass off
claims as empirically meaningful
statements,
tautologies and metaphysical
for conceptual
and a tendency among biologists
realism. Both of these
tendencies are worth bringing to the attention of biologists,
but unfortu
treatment, he fails to reflect the increased sophistica
nately for Mainx's
tion of the positivist position which had occurred since its inception. For
instance he sees tautologies everywhere because he accepts a rather facile
notion of the relationship
between operations
used to test the applica
bility of a term and the definition
of that term. He
for
example:
If in the statement
"The
its
positive
the
light-requirement"
means
of the establishment
statement
ogous
Behavior
of
under
phototactic
reaction
concept
"light-requirement"
of the behavior
under the
the above
is proportional
of a Euglena
to
is only
defined
testably
by
stimulus
of light, this is a tautol
kind.56
the stimulus
of the examples which Mainx gives. Mainx would have done well to have
to the same series on the
earlier contribution
read Carl G. Hempel's
in empirical science.57 A careful read
of concept formation
of
this
earlier
ing
monograph
might also have suggested to him that the
basic distinction which pervades his book serves only to frustrate his
foundations
efforts
This
of the foundations
of biology.
express the
statements, which
of characters, and causal-analytic
statements, which express
as this distinction
a succession of states in time. As time-honored
is, it
coexistence
of the relationship
between con
just will not do as a characterization
in science. For example, Mainx
cept formation and theory construction
- the
three
in
different
the
recognizes
viewpoints
morphological,
biology
and the genetical. Although
he warns the reader that these
physiological
he
it sound as if a morpholo
three viewpoints
makes
overlap somewhat,
of
gist could analyze an organism into organs and tissues independently
of physiology,
descent. Further,
genetics or evolutionary
any knowledge
WHAT
PHILOSOPHY
OF BIOLOGY
IS NOT
177
their evolutionary
derivation be brought into play. This is the impression
his exposition gives although he says that it must be "remembered
that
even in these elementary descriptive
statements the beginning of hypoth
esis construction must be recognized".58
Currently, biologists are carrying on an extensive debate over just these
issues.59 Must the sequence of events in an actual scientific study be the
same as those inMainx's
There are good
reconstruction?
epistemological
reasons
out,60
for maintaining
the morphological
nected
One
ambitious.
Mainx's
178
DAVID
L. HULL
Most
contribution
of a philosopher
to biology
in over
a decade.
In conclusion,
there are many things that philosophy
of biology might
A
be.
philosopher might uncover, explicate, and possibly solve problems
in biological
He might even go on to communi
theory and methodology.
cate
these results
biologists.
He might
to other philosophers,
to scientists, and especially
to
show what consequences
and
biological phenomena
WHAT
OF BIOLOGY
PHILOSOPHY
IS NOT
179
or to show what
and for philosophy
even
other sciences and
consequences
philosophy have for biology. These
are some of the things which philosophers
of biology might do. With rare
theories
for other
have
sciences
paper will also appear in the Journal of theHistory of Biology 2 (1969), No.
1 Both
restrictions
stances
seemed
in the scope of
to demand
it. For
this paper
example,
have
been
Woodger
1.
ignored when
special circum
began his career as a biologist
and published most of his work prior to the time limits set for this paper, but he has
produced a body of work in the philosophy of biology too important not to include.
2 Mario
'The Weight
Bunge,
of
Simplicity
in
the Construction
and
Assaying
of
Yale University
The Meaning
Press, New Haven,
of Evolution,
1949;
Simpson,
Columbia
University
Press, New York,
Simpson,
of Animal Taxonomy,
Principles
Brace & World,
1961 ;G. G. Simpson,
This View of Life, Harcourt,
Inc., New York,
and Evolution,
Harvard
1963 ;Ernst Mayr,
Animal Species
University
Press, Cambridge,
that certain principles
in the synthetic
1963. In most
the assertion
instances
Mass.,
G.G.
are tautologous
stems from an extremely
superficial
understanding
theory of evolution
over the precise
nature
and an embarrassing
of
of evolutionary
uncertainty
theory
to the Neo
in Mathematical
For
Eden,
Murray
Challenges
tautologies.
example,
and M. M. Kaplan),
Darwinian
The
(ed. by P. S. Moorhead
Interpretation
of Evolution
Wistar
Institute
logical
Under
nature
of
the assumption
that the tauto
1967, began with
in evolutionary
controversial.
theory was hardly
to the position
Eden
retreated
several biologists
that
present,
vacuous.
such claims are supposedly
the wrong word. Rather
Press,
Philadelphia,
certain
concepts
the onslaught
of
was
'tautology'
perhaps
to the assertion
From here he retreated
did not
form
experiment
tautological
maintaining
41 (1966) annihilates
40 (1965)
Evolution',
Philosophy
of the survival of the fittest must
Philosophy
Ethics,
University
4 Charles
Press, New
St. Martin's
of Toronto
similar allegations
'The Concept
of
by A. R. Manser,
argues later that the principle
18-34, though he himself
be made
into a tautology,
Anthony
Flew, Evolutionary
The Ascent
1967. See also T. A. Goudge,
York,
of Life,
1961.
Press, Toronto,
A Facsimile
the Origin
of Species:
Harvard
of the First Edition,
Charles Darwin,
The Descent
Mass.,
Press, Cambridge,
1966, pp. 450-456;
University
to Sex, 2 vols., Murray,
in Relation
And Selection
London,
1871, p. 92.
of Man,
5
Darwin,
472, 135.
Origin,
6
468, 89-90.
Darwin,
Origin,
7 J. W.
in British
'Melanism
and Melanochroism
Tutt,
Lepodoptera\
Entomologists'
Darwin,
On
Caws,
The Philosophy
of Science,
D.
Van Nostrand,
Inc., Princeton,
40-41.
1965, pp.
DAVID
180
L. HULL
91.
Animal Species,
on the species concept
is overwhelmingly
literature
biological
large. The best
can be found
discussions
of the pros and cons of the biological
definition
of 'species'
Ernst Mayr,
in Simpson,
and the Origin
Columbia
Systematics
of Species,
Principles;
'The Species
3
Evolution
1942); Ernst Mayr,
University
Press, New York,
Concept',
Mayr,
10 The
Ernst Mayr
American
for the
Association
(ed.), The Species Problem,
Science
Publication
Number
50, Washington,
1957; Ernst Mayr,
an Evolutionary
Factor',
of the American
Proceedings
Philosophical
(1949) 371-372;
Advancement
of
as
'Isolation
two philosophers
Animal
For
take
who
165-230;
Mayr,
Species.
see Morton
of the species
The
problem
seriously,
Beckner,
Columbia
Way
of Thought,
Press, New York,
University
1959, and Hugh
'Are Biological
34 (1967)
157-167.
Species Real?',
of Science
Philosophy
103
Society
the biological
Biological
Lehman,
11 Andrew
(1959)
aspects
Evolution
and Philosophy,
G. van Meisen,
Duquesne
Press,
University
New Paths
in Biology,
trans.:
1965. See also Adolf
1961 (English
Portman,
Pittsburgh,
& Row, New York,
1964) and Hans
Harper
Jonas, The Phenomenon
of Life: Toward
a Philosophical
& Row, New
1966.
York,
Biology,
Harper
12 G. G.
'The World
into Which
131 (1960) 966
Darwin
Led Us', Science
Simpson,
in Simpson,
This View, 3-25.
974; reprinted
13W. R.
'The Status of Species',
in Philosophical
Problems
in Biology
Thompson,
(ed.
E. Smith),
St. John's University
by Vincent
Press, New York,
1966, pp. 67-126.
14 P. B.
The Art of the Soluble,
& Company
Methuen
Medawar,
London,
Ltd.,
1967.
15 All of the above assertions
can be found expressed
in two volumes
edited
variously
E. Smith, Philosophy
St. John's University
by Vincent
of Biology,
Press, New York,
as well as in Pacific
Problems
Forum
1962, and Philosophical
of Biology,
Philosophy
6 (1968), No.
3, 1-99.
16
Ascent.
Goudge,
17
Ascent,
Goudge,
133, 134.
18 See the
cited number
Forum
o? Pacific
previously
(note 15), in which
Philosophy
that the vitalism-mechanism
several
cannot
be dis
argue
philosophers
controversy
as a dead
missed
issue. The major
in this number
is sufficiently
paper
by Hilde Hein
to such inanities
as "the
but in the others we are once again
innocuous,
subjected
human
less
than
the
intellect
violates
the
evolutionist's
laws
of
view,
the
the
of life", and
satisfactory
philosophy
are actually
and other primates
between man
the unaltered
human
Manier
species. Edward
these papers.
19 J. H.
Randall,
other examples
'Life's
Aristotle,
in addition
Irreducible
Structure',
and principles
Columbia
to Randall
Science
the remains
had
of abnormal
the unenviable
task
individuals
of
of replying
to
1960. Numerous
Press, New York,
University
could be given. For example, Michael
Polanyi,
160 (1968)
1308-1312
levels
various
recognizes
to certain
which
levels and not to others,
but he
apply
the lower processes.
See also Marjorie
higher
principles
'harnessing'
The Knower
and the Known,
Basic Books,
1966. No biologist
Grene,
Inc., New York,
or of principles
would
of levels of organization
which
deny the existence
apply to these
can William
do things? What
E. Carlo,
'Mecha
levels, but how can these principles
A Reappraisal',
Forum
6 (1968) 57-68, mean
nism and Vitalism:
Pacific
Philosophy
of organization
also has these
when
he
man,
shapes
says
that
it, molds
is a principle
it, and organizes
"there
of organization
it into a man"?
which
takes
the matter
of a
Philoso
WHAT
OF BIOLOGY
PHILOSOPHY
IS NOT
181
McGraw-Hill
New York,
An Introduction,
Book
Company,
1968, and
phy of Science:
V. E. Smith, Science
and Philosophy,
1965.
Bruce, Milwaukee,
20 See
'Functional
in Biology',
Beckner,
Lehman,
Way, Hugh
Explanation
Biological
34 (1965)
J. V. Canfield,
in
1-19;
of Science
Philosophy
'Teleological
Explanation
in Nature,
discussions
(ed.),
Interrelations:
1966;
K.
in biology
The Biological
and Physical
Sciences,
to Reduction',
'Approaches
'Antireductionism
and
F. Schaffner,
137-147;
1966.
Inc., Englewood
Cliffs,
to the problem
devoted
of reduction.
Recent
can be found
R. T. Blackburn
in Grene,
Knower;
Prentice-Hall,
of literature
large body
of reduction
K.F.Schaffner,
Scott,
Philosophy
Molecular
Foresman,
of Science
Biology',
Chicago,
34 (1967)
Science
157
(1967) 644-647.
22 Carl G.
Hempel
and
Paul
'The Logic
Oppenheim,
of Explanation',
of
Philosophy
to the relevance
of explanation
in evolutionary
devoted
theory to
J. Scriven
in his 'Explanation
and Prediction
in Evo
thesis, Michael
130 (1959) 477-482,
is the most
with evolutionary
Science
concerned
lutionary Theory',
source for an example.
rather
than as a handy
See also
theory as a biological
theory,
the
symmetry
J. Scriven,
Michael
Philosophy
sota Press,
of Science,
Prediction,
'Explanation,
vol. Ill (ed. by H. Feigl
1962,
between
Minneapolis,
metric
Parity
Principles,
in Induction:
Teleology',
Press,
Some
1963; Hugh
Middleton,
pp. 477-482;
Explanation
Current Issues
Lehman,
and
in the
inMinnesota
Studies
Laws',
and G. Maxwell),
of Minne
University
Adolf Gr?nbaum,
'Temporally
Asym
versus
and Predicton,
and Mechanism
(ed. by B. Baumrin),
Wesleyan
University
'On the Form
of Explanation
in Evolutionary
24 Abraham
The Conduct
Chandler
San
of Inquiry,
Kaplan,
Publishing
Company,
1964.
Francisco,
25
'The Structure
of Darwinism',
in M. L. Johnson,
Michael
Aber
Anthony
Flew,
& G. E. Fogg, New
crombie
Books,
1959, pp. 25-44;
Penguin
Biology,
Baltimore,
Flew Evolutionary
Ethics.
26 Julian
The Process
Chatto
and Windus,
of Evolution,
London,
1953, p. 38.
Huxley,
27
28.
Flew,
'Structure',
28
28.
'Structure',
Flew,
29
29.
'Structure',
Flew,
30
Ethics,
Flew, Evolutionary
14, 36,14.
31 J. H.
& Kegan
1929 (2nd ed.: Routledge
Paul Ltd.,
Woodger,
Biological
Principles,
1948),
London,
32 For
differing
pp.
394,402.
on these views,
opinions
see W.
B. Gallie,
in History
'Explanation
and
of Function
from
in Natural
British
the Phi
Journal for
History',
'The
Beckner,
Way; M. J. S. Rudwick,
Biological
Structure
in Fossils',
British
Journal for the Philosophy
of
Marjorie
Grene,
'Two Evolutionary
Theories',
British
Journal
for
the Philosophy
O. H.
Simpson, Meaning;
1950.
bart, Stuttgart,
35
'Two Evolutionary
Grene,
Schindewolf,
Theories',
Grundfragen
der Pal?ontologie,
185-186.
Schweizer
of
182
36 G. G.
Simpson,
DAVID
'Types
in Modem
'Two
Evolutionary
L. HULL
American
Taxonomy',
Journal
of Science
238
(1940) 413-431.
37
Marjorie
Grene,
Theories:
Reply',
British
Journal
for
the
or
that
all
with
all aspects
any biologist
of
will
the
have
theory
synthetic
some reservation
one or another
- H.
Graham
cited several
of the tenets of the synthetic
theory, and Grene
Paul G. 'Espinasse,
Ronald
Adolf
Cannon,
Portman,
Good,
fails to mention
is that these
and C. H. Waddington.
What Grene
Thompson,
of the synthetic
aspects
theory and with each other. It
disagree with different
case that a unified,
to the current orthodox
viable alternative
theory has been
as an
at "phylogeny
to looking
herself makes
reference
forth. Grene
passing
about
examples
W. R.
scientists
is not
the
brought
ontogeny
as expressing
a fundamental
the history
of groups
rhythm
still, in its
to the rhythm
to us, but analogous
of individual
unknown
intimacy,
development".
extinct by the various mechanisms
of the synthetic
Instead of species becoming
theory,
of living
itself out". Marjorie
'The Faith
of
"this pattern
Grene,
simply
played
writ
large,
Darwinism',
gists have
at
Encounter
investigated
the Species:
Cycles
of
(1966)
Natural
112-126.
The
Visited
the Voyage
and Geology
of the Countries
of H. M. S.
History
during
the World,
Round
2nd ed., revised, Murray,
1845. Unorthodox
views
London,
Beagle
the weight
to be against
of evidence
do get a hearing. Unfortunately,
has proved
this
to these
fact that most
unorthodox
view. The
after
biologists,
listening
particular
to label them dogmatic.
leads Grene
If refusal
to
views, remain unconvinced
are being dogmatic.
is dogmatism,
then these biologists
the weight
of evidence
go against
39
was a strong proponent
of macroevolution
Goldschmidt
Although
by macromu
were
that the two positions
of each other and said
independent
tation, he was aware
dissident
so explicitly:
the
"Continuing
out further whether
we must
in the foregoing
find
chapters,
so
is capable
of being changed
system
suddenly
a slow accumulation
of small steps, but as a
derived
line of argument
the development
that a new
emerge without
type may
of what we called a systematic
mutation.
consequence
out in complete
Such an analysis may
be carried
independence
we developed
which
the architecture
of
concerning
conceptions
from
the detailed
the germ
and
plasm
a single macroevolutionary
its changes.
It does not make
whether
any difference
step
a systematic
the chromosomal
is caused by a major
pattern,
change within
mutation,
or by a special kind of gene mutation
if such is imaginable.
with
effect,
generalized
is the single change which
affects
decisive
the entire reaction
of the
system
point
as opposed
to a slow accumulation
of small
simultaneously,
developing
organism
The Material
Yale
Uni
additive
Basis
of Evolution,
(R. B. Goldschmidt,
changes"
1940, p. 251).
versity Press, New Haven,
40 Walter
von Wahlert,
A Discussion',
J. Bock and Gerd
'Two Evolutionary
Theories:
The
British Journalfor thePhilosophy of Science 14 (1963) 140-146; Leigh Van Valen, 'On
Evolutionary Theories', British Journalfor thePhilosophy of Science 14 (1963) 146-152;
G.
S. Carter,
'Two
Evolutionary
Theories,
By
M.
Grene:
Further
Discussion',
British Journal for thePhilosophy of Science 14 (1963) 345-348; Marjorie Grene, 'Two
: Reply
Theories
Evolutionary
14 (1963) 349-351.
Science
One
to Dr.
the Philosophy
British
Journal for
of
Carter',
a philosophically
who attempted
oriented
philosopher
WHAT
Edward Manier,
criticism,
32 (1965),
phy of Science
'Discussion:
Mr. Manier's
reply', Philosophy
41 Ernst
Mayr,
OF BIOLOGY
PHILOSOPHY
'The Theory
of Evolution
was met with
244-252,
IS NOT
183
as Personal Knowledge',
Philoso
a harsh
rebuff, Marjorie
Grene,
as Personal
A Quasi
Knowledge:
of Evolution
Theory
33 (1966)
163-164.
of Science
and Evolution',
Harvard
Library Bulletin
'Agassiz, Darwin
This View
Animal
Species;
Simpson,
Principles;
Simpson,
165-194;
Mayr,
42
Grene,
Marjorie
in the Philosophy
'Positionality
of Helmuth
Plessner',
13 (1959)
of Life.
The Review
'Statistics
Grene,
Marjorie
and
British
Selection',
Journal
the Philosophy
for
of
was
out by certain
Lehman
and is bom
suggested
by Hugh
interpretation
comments
in Grene,
185.
Knower,
45 Theodosius
Genetics
and the Origin
Columbia
of Species,
Dobzhansky,
University
Press, New York,
1937; Mayr,
Systematics.
46 J. H.
in Biology,
The Axiomatic
Method
Press,
Woodger,
Cambridge
University
1937.
Cambridge,
47 John R.
The American
and Reality',
Naturalist
84
'Taxonomy,
Language
Gregg,
1954;
York,
J. H. Woodger,
and Language,
Biology
Cambridge
University
1952; Beckner,
Press, Cambridge,
Way.
Biological
48
'Taxonomy'.
Gregg,
49
426.
'Taxonomy',
Gregg,
50
and Language.
Woodger,
Gregg,
Language;
Biology
51 A. F.
'Review of Gregg,
The Language
of Taxonomy',
Parker-Rhodes,
Philosophical
66 (1957)
'On Category
Review
in
A. Sklar,
in Taxonomy',
124-125;
Overlapping
Form
in Science
and F. T. C. Harris),
D. Reidel
and Strategy
(ed. by J. R. Gregg
'An Analysis
;Leigh Van Valen,
1964, pp. 395-401
Dordrecht,
in Gregg
and Harris,
C. J. Jardine,
402-415;
Form,
Concepts',
'The Structure
and Construction
and R. Sibson,
of Taxonomic
Hierarchies',
1 (1967)
Biosciences
John R. Gregg,
'Finite
Linnaean
173-179;
Publishing
Company,
of Some Taxonomic
N.
Jardine
Mathematical
Bulletin
of Mathematical
and P. H. A.
Structures',
52 Robert
R.
Freeman
and Company,
29 (1967)
191-200.
of Numerical
Principles
H. Colless,
1963; Donald
Biophysics
Sneath,
San
Francisco,
in Phenetic
Taxonomy',
W. H.
Taxonomy,
'An Examination
16 (1967)
6-27;
Systematic
Concepts
Zoology
16 (1967) 289-295;
'The Phylogenetic
Colless,
Systematic
Fallacy',
Zoology
British Journal for
the Philosophy
of Homology
in Biology',
'The Concept
a similar analysis
some years
18 (1968)
125-139. Woodger
had provided
of Certain
Donald
Sokal
H.
N.
Jardine,
of Science
'On Biological
Transformations',
earlier,
in Growth and Form Presented
Essays
inW.
to D'A.
E.
le Gros
W. Thompson,
Clark
and P. R. Medawar,
Clarendon
Press, Oxford,
an excellent
of
summary
though Woodger,
Biological
Principles,
provided
a few biologists
to argue that sense
in phenomenalism,
the problems
inherent
continue
data or the like are the fundamental
of science;
e.g., J. S. L. Gilmour,
subject matter
in The New Systematics
Oxford University
1940,
(ed. by Julian Huxley),
Press, Oxford,
1945. Even
pp. 461-474;
J. S. L. Gilmour
and
S. M. Walters,
'Philosophy
and
Classification',
'Evolution
as Viewed
by One
Geneticist',
American
Scholar
40
Animal
Mayr,
Species.
'Two Evolutionary
Theories'
;Goudge,
Ascent.
184
DAVID L. HULL
55
Way,
110-131.
J. H. Woodger,
and Evo
and Language;
Biology
'Taxonomy
3 (1961) 67-78;
J. H. Woodger,
and the Axiomatic
'Biology
paper
'Clusters',
to
Australasian
Review
of Psychology
38
(1960)
1-36;
Hogben,
and
Ernst Mayr,
Helen Heise,
and Hugh
Lehman
for reading
to Marjorie
this paper.
Grene
is owed
for doing
Special
appreciation
ideas were
criticized
in the paper.
several of her own
severely
though
thank
on
even
was
prepared
under
grant
GS-1971
of
the National
Science
Foundation.