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Regionalism, Functionalism, and Universal International Organization

Author(s): Ernst B. Haas
Source: World Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Jan., 1956), pp. 238-263
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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REGIONALISM, FUNCTIONALISM,
AND UNIVERSAL
ORGANIZATION*
INTERNATIONAL
By ERNST B. HAAS

of basicconstitutional
OTHING compelsthereexamination

of theirpeacefulrevision.
so muchas thepossibility
postulates
underUnitedNationsReviewConference
Hencethemuch-advertised
oftheCharter
structure
thetheoretical
scorestheneedforcontrasting
whichhaveevolvedwithinitsframewiththereality
ofthepractices
to thosewho strive
whileit mightgivesupport
work.Suchan effort,
mayalso leadto theconclusion
of thestructure,
forseverealterations
organization
ofinternational
practices
thateventhoughtheoperational
peacemightbe more
of the Charter,
failto meetthe specifications
to dependon operational
securein theColdWareraifit is permitted
What,then,is the basic
vagariesratherthan on legal precision.
oftheCharter
andwhattheactualpractice?
theory
is
of peaceand security
thatthepreservation
It is a commonplace
the fundamental
aim of the UnitedNations.Collectivesecurityto contempotasksalsoentrusted
offunctional
thanthemyriad
rather
theadvancein particular
including
organizations,
raryinternational
of colonial
and the emancipation
mentof economicdevelopment
achievethe
and
Economicwell-being
peoples-wasthebasicpurpose.
in 1945 as means
wereconsidered
mentofnationalself-determination
not as basic aims in theirown right.
towardthe end of security,
of
of a firmconcert
as theresultant
was conceived
security
Further,
Counciland
in theSecurity
poweroftheBigFive,as institutionalized
organizaregional
oftheCharter,
itsvoting
rules.Finally,
in thetheory
linkedto theUnitedNationsand subordinate
tionswereto be firmly
Council.As SenatorVandenberg
of the Security
to the direction
formulaforputting
argued,"We havefounda soundand practical
intoeffective
gearwithglobalinstitutions..
regionalorganizations
fromglobalunityof theworld'speaceand
We do notthussubtract
intoa
we weld theseregionalking-links
on the contrary,
security;
* I amgreatly
andadviceandtoFred
forcritical
comments
toPaulSeabury
indebted
assistance.
vonderMehdenformuchresearch

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

239

globalchain."'Only Article51 foreshadowed

of the
the possibility
regionaltailswaggingtheglobaldog,rather
thanacknowledging
the
directing
superiority
oftheuniversal
organ.
Each of thesepostulates
has in factbeenupsetby thepatterns
of
behaviormanifested
in international
since1947. If the
organizations
term"regionalorganization"
is understood
as connoting
any kind
ofbasicpolitical
tie,bilateral
ormultilateral,
basedona treaty
ormerely
on traditional
understandings,
withthesoleprovisothatparticipation
is by definition
limitedto certainstatesselectedaccordingto some
principle
of mutualpolitical-military
need,thenon-universal
pattern
wouldseemtobegrowing
byleapsandbounds.Ofoureighty
sovereign
states,
onlyfifteen
lackmembership
in suchsystems;
ofthesixtycurrentUnitedNationsmembers,
onlysevenremainunaffiliated,
and if
we counttheAfro-Asian
bloc as a "system,"
to
thenumbershrinks
four.True,in termsof theirqualitative
cohesion,
thesesystems
vary
fromthelooseness
oftheCommonwealth
to themilitary
andpolitical
rigorofNATO; butin almostall,thescopeofcooperation
and even
ofcentralized
decision-making
goesconsiderably
beyondtherolegiven
totheUnitedNations.
The adventof regionalism
reflects
thedisintegration
of theconcert
of poweras theguarantor
of security.
Collective
security
withinthe
universal
organization
has becomethefunction,
notof a concert,
but
of a pair of new operational
maxims:permissive
enforcement
and
balancing.2
Permissive
enforcement
impliesthedelegation
ofenforcing
powertoa member
stateor a groupofsuchstates,
or eventoregional
As manifested
systems.
in theUnitingforPeaceResolution
and in the
Koreansituation,
theprinciple
makespossibletheenlisting
ofUnited
Nationssymbols
andvalueson behalfofanypolicywhichsucceeds
in
obtaining
thesupport
oftwo-thirds
ofthemembership.
Putin regional
terms-as,indeed,has been clearlydone by American,
British,
Canadian,andAustralian
statesmen-permissive
enforcement
impliesthe
of enforcing
delegation
powerto a NATO or a SEATO as theonly
focusofstrength
whichcouldbe expected
toundertake
large-scale
militaryoperations.
comesaboutas theresultof
Balancing,
by contrast,
theefforts
ormediating
ofa neutral
bloc'sseeking
toprevent
permissive
enforcement
ofcompromise
offers
operations.
Through
andconciliatory
formulas-asin the Indianschemeforthe repatriation
of Korean
1 As citedin NormanJ.Padelford,
"RegionalOrganizations
and theUnitedNations,"
International
Organization,
viii, No. 2 (May 1954),p. 216.
2 For elaboration
of theseconcepts,
see my"Typesof CollectiveSecurity:An Examinationof OperationalConcepts,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,XLIX, No. i (March
'955).

240

WORLD POLITICS

of regional
prisoners-such
a bloc seeksto preventthe utilization
thenbesecurity
strength
underUnitedNationssymbols.
Collective
withthe world
comesa function
of a delicatenegotiating
process,
of
ora concert
organization
theforum,
notofa community
conscience
power,butofcounterbalancing
forces
unwilling
to seeka showdown,
fearful
ofalienating
friends
or neutrals,
andtherefore
willingto make
concessions.
Finally,the theoryof the Charterhas in factbeenupsetby the
in theirown
intrusion
offunctional
interests
clamoring
forrecognition
rightrather
thanas adjuncts
tothepreservation
ofpeace.No longeris
thesecurity
regional
issuethedominating
onein all relations
between
oneconomic,
blocs.Thereisan evident
practice
ofbartering
concessions
social,and colonialquestions
forsupport
on security
issues.Indeed,it
hasbeensuggested
between
thattherearetwoColdWars:theconflict
theWestandtheSoviets,
oftheAfro-Asian
blocagainst
andthestruggle
theWestin theeffort
to eradicate
"colonialism."3
Thus,thefunctional
and security
claimsofregionalsystems
as thesourceof
haveemerged
theactualfunctioning
of universal
international
organizations.4
It is theeffort
of thisarticleto suggesta numberof propositions
the elaboration
permitting
of a limited"Cold War" theoryof the
betweeninternational
and worldpolitics,
relationships
organization
ofregional
to theeraofan activetripolarization
restricted
in validity
ifnotofpower.The first
is togo beyond
taskofsuchan effort
cohesion,
in I945 and to explainthe
of theCharteras expounded
thetheory
adventofregionalism,
thedisplacement
oftheconcert
ofpoweras the
ofsecurity,
andtheintrusion
offunctional
into
instrument
aspirations
the politicalintercourse
of the UnitedNations.Furthermore,
such
an interpretive
mustputconductin theUnitedNationsand
attempt
intotheover-all
context
offoreign
policyaims
regionalorganizations
and clashes.The interpretation,
assumesbasically
thatpartherefore,
3 Coral Bell, "The UnitedNationsand the West,"International
Aflairs,XXIX, No. 4
(October 1953). This pointis workedout in the formof an equilibriumtheoryof
labeled"multipleequilibrium"becauseof its extensioninto
international
organization,
a non-power
dimension,
by JiriLiska,in "The MultipleEquilibriumand the American
National Interestin International
Organization,"Harvard Studies in International
Affairs,
iv, No. I (February1954).
and relatedfactorsin the UnitedNationsare
4Criticsof the adventof regionalism
legion.Neutralists,
despitetheirespousalof "thirdforces,"numbersignificantly
among
of Westernpolicy.See, e.g., ByronDexter,"Locarno
them,but so do firmsupporters
Again,"ForeignAffairs,
xxxii,No. i (October1953); Paul H. Douglas, "Unitedto
EnforcePeace,"ibid.,xxx,No. I (October1951); Commissionto Studythe Organizationof Peace,RegionalArrangements
forSecurityand the UnitedNations,New York,
I953.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

241

is regarded
ticipation
in international
organizations
by policy-makers
as a meansfortheachievement
ofnationalpolicyaims.
theinitialpointofdeparture
Whilethenationalpolicyaimsprovide
in thesesuggestions
is to abstract
in theeffort,
concern
the
theprimary
fromtheseaimswhenthey
pattern
ofinterlocking
policieswhichresult
framework
of the
are activelypursuedwithinthe organizational
UnitedNations,NATO, or theCommonwealth.
holds
Our argument
at thelevelofregionalas
thata generalprocessof balancing
prevails
well as globalinternational
of whichsecurity
organizations,
issues,
colonialaspirations,
and economic
demandsformtheprimeconstituents.Eachoftheseconcerns
withinthecontext
ofregionalsysfigures
betweenregionalsystems-expressed
as votingblocs
tems;relations
in theGeneralAssembly-define
thenature
ofUnitedNationsactivity.
So longas theconditions
now determining
thepoliciesof statesconit is contended
tinueto dominate,
thattherangeof alternative
goals
openin theUnitedNationsis roughly
limitedbytheoperation
ofthe
balancing
pattern.
"Balancing"hereimpliesno morethanthetendency
of one setof
nationalor regionalaimsto be metbya countering
setofaspirations,
ofcompromise
witha measure
likelyto be workedoutso longas the
participants
proveunwillingto ignoreor overridecompletely
the
countervailing
pressures
createdbytheirpolicies.No notionof equal
countervailing
forces
isbeingentertained;
yetthescheme
heresuggested
is sufficiently
reminiscent
of theclassicalbalanceof powerpattern
to
of whether
thebalanceof power,considered
requirean examination
is applicableto thediscussion
as a toolof politicalanalysis,
of internationalorganization.'
II
The first
ofsucha scheme,
stepin thedevelopment
therefore,
must
be an analysis
ofthemajorregional
Attention
systems.
willbe focused
on thenatureofthecommunity
ofinterests
whichtiesthemembers
to
on thefactors
ofcohesion
oneanother,
andconflict
whichcharacterize
each systeminternally,
and on the processof adjustment-or
"balwhicheachretains
ancing"-through
whatever
it possesses.
viability
Withoutdoubt,theSovietregionalsystem
is themostsolidof the
of balancingdiffers
5This definition
fromEdward H. Buehrig'skindredsuggestion.
His conceptionseemsto me to be synonymous
withwhat is generallycalled "power
politics."See his "The UnitedStates,the UnitedNationsand Bi-polarPolitics,"InternationalOrganization,
iv, No. 4 (Novemberi950). For a treatment
of the balanceof
poweras a toolof politicalanalysis,see my "The Balanceof Power: Concept,Prescriptionor Propaganda?"WorldPolitics,v, No. 4 (JulyI953).

242

WORLD POLITICS

entirearray.A highdegreeof ideological,

and policy
institutional,
ifnotidentity,
is evident
in therelations
between
congruence,
Eastern
EuropeandMoscow.A combination
andpurgessuffices
ofconcessions
to reestablish
unitywhen tensiondoes develop.Whetherthrough
coercion
or voluntary
agreement,
then,on theintergovernmental
and
interparty
levelstheSovietblocactsas one.
Whether
thesamesweeping
can be madeaboutthe
generalizations
Soviet-Chinese
is anothermatter.
While the diplomatic
relationship
recordshowsthatfullagreement
between
Moscowand Peipingis alto theWestin thelastanalysis,
waysdisplayed
certainevidencealso
suggests
thatthetwohavenotalwaysmarched
in stepbefore
thelast
stagesofa jointthrust.
Thus,duringtheKoreanprisoner
negotiations,
to accepttheIndian-sponsored
Peipingseemedprepared
compromise
resolution
beforeMoscowwas readyto do so.' Again,duringthe
Indo-Clinese
talksatGeneva,differences
ofdegreeseemedindicated
by
thelessintransigent
takenbyMolotov
position
withrespect
toLaos and
Cambodia,as comparedwiththe initialargument
of Chou. Other
thattheamountand kindofeconomic
negotiations
suggest
aid given
to Chinaand thesecurity
issuein theFar East generally
makefor
friction
betweentheCommunist
If thereare differences
partners.
in
outlookand aim betweenthe two,it followsthatsomedegreeof
is calledforif theyexpectto maintaina commonfront
adjustment
towardtheirenemies.
The Westerncamp,composedof NATO, the SEATO-ANZUS
and the Organization
combination,
of AmericanStates(OAS), exhibitsno suchunity.Conflicts
betweenthepartners
ariseconstantly,
callingforadjustment
and redefinition
ofcollective
aims,withineach
as well as amongthem.Beforeexamining
system
thecombinedbehaviorof thethreesystems,
as reflected
in thepolicyof theUnited
Statesas theleadingmember
ofeach,thebasesofinternal
agreement
and division
mustbe outlined.
NATO exhibits
a highdegreeofconsensus
withrespect
to theneed
forintegrated
andpolitical
for
military
activity thedefense
ofEurope.
thatoverGermanrearmament,
Everycrisis-including
themostdivisiveissueso farconfronting
NATO-has beenresolved
on thebasis
of a largerdelegation
of powerto the system's
centralinstitutions.
ofagreement
It is becauseofthisbedrock
thata pervasive
community
of interests
couldtakeshape,givingriseto international
institutions
See "IndianProposalsfora KoreanTruce,"Indian PressDigest,ii, No. 3 (March
for a studyof diplomaticexchangesbetweenNew Delhi and Peiping, as
and presssources.
revealedfromIndian government
6

1954),

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

243

possessing
a de factodecision-making
powersurpassing
anyothercontemporary
example.The annualallocation
of thefinancial
burdenof
rearmament
by theNATO Counciland thedrafting
by theNATO
Secretariat
oftheagreement
to sharenuclearinformation
provideperhapsthemosttellingexamples
ofthistrend.
Whileeconomic
issueshaveprovided
forinternal
someammunition
NATO disagreement,
especially
in relation
to theforeign
tradepolicy
oftheUnitedStates,
onglobalissuesofeconomic
development
harmony
prevailsin thesystem.
All themembers
makecommonfrontin opposingthedemandsofunderdeveloped
nationsforambitious
internationalinvestment
schemes,
stressing
insteadtheprimacy
ofprivate
investment
and of development
planscarriedon withinimperialsystemsor theCommonwealth.
It is the colonialissuewhichmostconsistently
seemsto call for
intra-NATOadjustments.
Europeanopposition
to theaspirations
of
theAfro-Asian
blocmeetswithpronounced
American
ambivalence
on
thequestion
ofnational
self-determination.
Whileeconomics
andglobal
strategy
indicate
a policyofsupport
forEuropeancolonialplans,relationswiththeAfro-Asian
blocsuggesttheoppositecourse.That the
NATO members
succeedin displaying
unityon thisissuein United
Nationsdiscussion
is due,in part,to a processof internal
adjustment
in whichtheUnitedStatesso farhas paid a highpricein termsof
concessions.
The processofintra-NATO
balancing
becomescrucialto thefuncoftheUnitedNationsmachinery
tioning
inrelation
totheglobalscope
of anti-Communist
policy.Whenever
American
leadership
in NATO
appearsto be pushingin thedirection
of thegeographical
extension
ofthesystem
to extra-European
areasor to theintensification
of antiCommunist
measures,
resistance
comesto thefore.Britishdemands
foranAsianorGerman"Locarno"
haveclashedsharply
withAmerican
on "unitedaction"or EDC. Thusithappensthatan Ameriinsistence
can government
anxiousto mobilizethe geographically
restricted
NATO community
ofinterests
on behalfofglobalcontainment
measuresmustmakesignificant
adjustments.
The Canadianposition
is a casein point.UnlikeAmericans,
Canadianstendtoseein NATO an approximation
to a quasi-federal
Atlantic
Union,whiletheyseein UnitedNationscollective
a device"to
security
makepeacerather
thanwagewar. . . to prolongourefforts
to reach
a settlement."7
Britishsentiments
are similar.One leadingLaborite
7Canada, Departmentof ExternalAffairs,
Canada and the UnitedNations,1950,
Ottawa,I95I, p. ix.

244

WORLD POLITICS

notesthat"theofficial
British
pointofviewabouttheUnitedNations
is thatit is nowreallya forum,"
thatit shouldbe universal
and continuethespecialpositionof thegreatpowersthrough
theveto,but
thatit shouldnotbe regarded
as "an effective
instrument
of collective
security."
Regionalpactsservethispurposeinstead.But,in contrast
to
Americanpredilections,
Britons"oftenfavorbringing
the so-called
neutral
statesintothepicture,
sinceprecisely
becauseoftheirneutrality
theybringbacktheidea of detached
judgment
in placeof theclash
ofworldforces."8
Thesedifferences
aresymbolized
bytheposition
takenin European
"independent
neutralist"
circles.Whilesupporting
NATO in Europe
(although
usuallyopposing
Germanrearmament),
praising
theUnited
Statesforitsleadership
againstCommunism,
and appreciative
of economicas wellas military
aid programs,
these"neutralists"
nevertheless
demand"thatthefreenations
ofEuropeshouldnotbe ledintoplaying
theroleofsatellites
to anyPower;thattheyshouldbe freeto conduct
theirdomestic
affairs
according
to theirowndesign;and thatin the
fieldtheyshouldusetheirinfluence
foreign
in whatever
waytheyconsidermostconducive
to thepreservation
and organization
of peace."9
In termsofglobalcollective
security,
thisimpliestheintercession
of
a neutral
"thirdforce"tofacilitate
negotiations
and compromise,
even
thoughthisforcemightbe alliedtotheUnitedStatesin NATO. Such
neutralist
demandsmaybe expectedto growin popularity
and effectiveness
wheninstitutionalized
through
theWestern
European
Union
structure.
In termsof NATO solidarity
in UnitedNationscouncils,
thesesentiments
withthemtheneedforconstant
carry
internal
adjustmentin ordertopreserve
harmony,
an issueofparticular
relevance
to
thesolidarity
oftheWestwithrespect
toAsiansecurity.
SEATO, despiteFrenchand British
thusbyno means
membership,
theextension
ofAtlantic
to theFar East.
represents
regional
solidarity
EvenANZUS, itsmodestpredecessor,
was keptfrombeingfullyeffective
by disagreement
overwhether
Japanor Chinawas themain
and New Zealandarguedtheformer
targetof theAlliance.Australia
position,
theUnitedStatesthelatter.
Thesedifficulties
arecompounded
of SEATO. As madeplainat the
bytheheterogeneous
membership
theUnitedStatesregardsFormosan,
BangkokConference,
Korean,
and SoutheastAsian security
as merelocal aspectsof a
Japanese,
8Hugh Gaitskell,"The Searchfor Anglo-American
Policy,"ForeignAffairs,
XXXII,

No. 4 (July I954), p. 566.

I Guy Mollet,"Franceand theDefenseof Europe,"ibid.,xxxii,No. 3 (April I954),

pp. 365, 372-73.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

245

"front."
regional
ThePhilippines
andThailandareconcerned
primarily
withFormosaand Indo-China.
New Zealandand Australia
advocate
immediate
integrated
area propermilitary
planningforthetreaty
whichtheUnitedStatesopposes-whileBritainand Franceare concernedwithMalayaand Indo-China,
and PakistanwithIndia.The
ofsecurity
community
interests
one.
is atbesta tenuous
The picture
is mademorecomplex
withtheintroduction
ofeconomic
andcolonialissues.Large-scale
economic
is demanded
development
by
theAsianmembers
and supported
withtheAmerican
role
byBritain,
and contribution
leftin doubt.Pakistanand thePhilippines
standfor
theemancipation
of theremaining
coloniesin Asia; France,Britain,
andAustralia
shownoparticular
hasteindeparting.
It is therefore
hardlysurprising
thattheinstitutional
structure
of
SEATO so faris unimpressive.
The supra-national
NATO Secretariat
hasitscounterpart
in Bangkokonlyin theformofa permanent
council ofthediplomatic
ofthemember
representatives
states.Continuous
of contradictory
balancing
aimswillbe requiredto maintain
security
a harmony
of interests.
And pronounced
intra-SEATOadjustments
on economicand colonialquestions
willbecomenecessary
to cement
theagreement
on security.
This taskwill notbe madeeasierby the
commitments
andforces
conflicting
whichprevailwithinNATO. The
Atlanticreluctance
for extensive
Pacificsecurity
arrangements
can
andcolonialconcessions,
beovercome
hardly
byeconomic
sinceNATO
opposesAsianSEATO opinionin thesespheres
as well.
On balance,the impactof Afro-Asian
neutralism
may well be
becauseof thecuriousmediating
strengthened
roleexercised
by the
Commonwealth.
Withtwoofitsmembers
committed
totheneutralist
bloc-and sharplycriticalof SEATO-and fourothersparticipating
in theSoutheast
Asiansystem,
Commonwealth
statesmen
anxiousto
theirowncommunity
ofinterests
preserve
muststeera coursebetween
fullWestern
commitment
and encouragement
of neutralintercession
between
theSovietsand theWest.Insteadofunifying
thetwomajor
anti-Communist
regionalsystems,
then,theCommonwealth
is likely
to enhancethenecessity
forconstant
interregional
adjustments
implyofcommitments.
inga dilution
withintheOAS hingeson thesamebasicissues:security,
Balancing
and colonialemancipation.
economics,
As in NATO and SEATO,
American
aimsin theWestern
Hemisphere
regionalsystem
aredominatedbysecurity
considerations.
The Rio PactandtheBogotaCharter
havefashioned
a hemispheric
whichnotonlystabilizes
system
political
butwhichalsoisintended
relations
tocreatea solid
amongthemembers

WORLD POLITICS

246

HenceAmerican
front
amongthemagainstextra-hemisphere
dangers.
of forcesin
policyhas emphasized
thearmingand standardization
of Communist-tinged
SouthAmerica,the collective
discouragement
ofcooperative
forinternal
andtheundertaking
movements,
programs
And to theextentthatLatinAmericangovernments
share
security.
to keep thehemisphere
freefromOld
Washington's
determination
ofanykind,thereis certainly
in theOAS a minimum.
Worldinfluences
withrespect
tosecurity.
community
ofinterests
More thanthis,however,hardlyexists.For years,Latin Ameron OAS-sponsored
economicdevelopment
ican insistence
programs
on
ears
in
has fallen unsympathetic
More American
Washington.
and especiallyOAS-adminisinvestment,
moretechnicalassistance,
are demandedby Latin
teredhemispheric
commodity
agreements
The essenceof Pan-Americanism,
Americangovernments.
saysEze"The objectivewould be to
quiel Padilla,is economicsolidarity:
as one economic
treatthewholehemisphere
unit,and thusto rescue
fromthegripof blindeconomic
LatinAmerican
forces."'0
economy
and thefearof retaining
The desireforindustrialization
single-crop
in thesedemandsandtheyadd up to a
themes
economies
areconstant
chorusthanWashington's
muchmoreclamorous
concernforarmed
An
marked
of
strength. equally
divergence interests
existsin the
colonialsphere.In UnitedNationsas well as in OAS meetings,
the
in theWesternHemisphere
of colonialism
termination
has beendeto Britain,
manded,withan invitation
France,and Hollandto leave
Americanpossessions,
theirremaining
an aim to whichtheUnited
Statesisatbestindifferent.
is farfromstriking.
Cohesionin theOAS, therefore,
A judicious
processofbalancing
keepstheorganization
effective,
as demonstrated
of 1954: theUnitedStatesacceded
at theCaracasandRio Conferences
to theLatindemandforcommodity
to theextent
regulation
of sponto thatend,whiletheSouthAmericans
soringa conference
endorsed
withhemisphere
Washington's
preoccupation
security
bypassingresoin member
statesandbytacitly
lutionsagainstcommunism
approving
in Guatemala.
UnitedStatespolicyhad to give
intervention
Further,
andcolonialemancipation,
wayin therealmofeconomic
development
to retainthealmostsolid
effort
as setforthbelow,in thecontinuing
and conceptions
OAS-blocvotein favorof American
interpretations
enforcement.
of globalcollective
security,
i.e.,permissive
fromtheregionalsystems
bloc differs
so farexThe Afro-Asian
10 Ezequiel Padilla,"The Meaningof
2

(JanuaryI954),

p. 274.

Pan-Americanism,"
ForeignAffairs,
xxxii,No.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

247

of itsown.Apart
aminedin thatit doesnotpossessone organization
Islamicand Asian
Arab League,irregular
fromthe almostdefunct
withtheAfrohavebeentheonlymodesoforganization,
conferences
Two
efforts.
such
of
ambitious
most
the
1955
of
Asian Conference
oftheregionandmakeup theircomarecommontothestates
themes
and
witheconomicdevelopment,
of interests:
a vitalconcern
munity
everywhere.
to end colonialism
thedetermination
United
forlarge-scale
indemands
itself
issuemanifests
The economic
coupledwiththe
assistance,
outlaysand technical
Nationsinvestment
Yet
property.
foreign
andregulate
oftherightto nationalize
assertion
as
for"freedom,"
rejecteconomicaid as a substitute
thesecountries
"antagotheysee it. "The Arabworld,"wrotea Lebanesediplomat,
intodespair,
can no morebe restored
nizedand isolatedand thrown
as PointFourthanit
by suchshort-cuts
of strength'
intoa 'situation
totheAmerican
causebya
intoloveofandloyalty
canbe intimidated
showofforce.'""
uniis demonstrated
bloc,however,
Consensusin the Afro-Asian
"We arehereto challenge
in theattackon all colonialvestiges.
formly
theEgyptian
imperialism,"
ofnineteenth-century
thebasicassumptions
CouncilduringtheSuez Canal disdelegatedeclaredto theSecurity
cannotgeta subject
pute."If thewholeofAsia and Africacombined
thenthe
discussedbecauseof two or threegreatpowersobjecting,
will
timemaycomewhentheAsianand Africancountries feelthat
and notin theUN," Prime
theyare happierin theirown countries
Tunis,Morocco,New
NehrutoldtheIndianParliament.'2
Minister
and theformer
Italian
Iranianoil,Palestine
refugees,
Guinea,Cyprus,
theirstrugsymbolize
coloniesareall issueswhich,totheAfro-Asians,
domination.
of Western
gle againstall vestiges
as soonas theissueof collective
however,
disappears,
Agreement
of
thestatesin theregionare"neumost
No
raised.
doubt,
is
security
to enforcement,
conciliation
negotiain thesenseofpreferring
tralist"
ofmightand
toindefinite
bipolarization
thesuper-powers
tionbetween
YetthreeofthemhavejoinedSEATO and twoaremoving
influence.
in thesenseof rigorous
non-alignment
towardNATO. "Neutralism"
the Colombo
characterizes
only
alliance
system
withany regional
of theArabLeague
Pakistan)and thosemembers
Powers(excluding
of Iraq's Westernorientation:
Egypt,Syria,and
whichdisapprove
whichcallsforfurther
ofneutralism
SaudiArabia.It is theirdoctrine
11Fayez A. Sayegh,"The Arab Reactionto AmericanPolicy,"Social Science,xxvii,
No. 4 (OctoberI952), pp. I90-93.
12Bell, op.cit.,pp. 466-67.

248

WORLD POLITICS

examination
in termsofthedynamics
ofregionaland universal
internationalorganization.
Rigorousneutralism
impliesdistrust
forall Western
ideologies,
but
a toleration
fortheirdissident
strains,
especially
in thesimultaneous
acceptance
ofbothMarxism
and liberaldemocracy
bythesamegroups.
This detachment,
in turn,facilitates
an indifference
to themeritsof
the ideologicalissuebetweenthe super-powers.
Universalcollective
security
is thekeytopeace,andnottherivalry
between
"powerblocs,"
whichNehrunevertiresof castigating
and withwhichhe identifies
regionalorganizations.
MohammedHattadescribed
abstention
from
theseblocsas designed"to workenergetically
forthepreservation
of
peaceandtherelaxation
oftension
generated
bythetwoblocs,through
endeavors
ifpossiblebythemajority
supported
ofthemembers
ofthe
UnitedNations.As an illustration
ofthispolicymaybe citedtheefforts
madebyIndonesiain concert
withtheAraband Asiancountries,
to
putan endto thewarin Korea."'3Conciliation
in the
and mediation
Cold War are the obviouspolicyderivatives
fromthe principleof
neutralism,
as consistently
preachedbyNehruand endorsed
evenby
Israel,Iran,andYugoslavia.
achievedby the innercoreof neuThe maximumof agreement
tralistAsian stateswas revealedin the 1954 ColomboConference:
overtheestablishment
of peacein IndoUnitedNationssupervision
disarmament
talksanda cessation
ofhydrogen-bomb
china,continued
of Peipingto theUnitedNations,detestsin thePacific,admission
in NorthAfrica,and thedesiranunciation
of colonialism,
especially
Conference
toconsider
ofcallingthe1955 Afro-Asian
theseissues
bility
the
was
in this
further.
Balancingamong five,however, manifested
directed
ofsolidarity
declaration
equallyagainstEastandWest:"The
theirfaithin democracy
affirmed
PrimeMinisters
. . . and . . . deto resistinterference
in the
claredtheirunshakabledetermination
oftheircountries
anti-Communist
affairs
and
byexternal
Communist,
is
that
this
It
surmised
otheragencies."'4
truly"neutral"statement
to Burma'sand Pakistan's
India'sconcession
concernover
represents
Sino-Soviet
expansion.
13MohammedHatta, "Indonesia'sForeign Policy,"Foreign Affairs,xxxi, No. 3
thispositionwiththeevenmorerelativistic
(AprilI953), pp. 444-45.Contrast
conception
offered
of neutralism
by "P." "MiddleGroundBetweenAmericaand Russia:An Indian
View,"ibid.,XXXII, No. 2 (January1954). See also RobertA. Scalapino,"'Neutralism'
in Asia," AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,XLVIII, No. i (March I954).
14 Article8 of the Final Communiqueof the Conference
of South-EastAsian Prime
Ministers;Indian Councilof World Affairs,
ForeignAffairsReports,iII, No. 7 (July
I954)

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

249

Suchare theinternal
harmonies
and disharmonies
of regionalsystems.Regionalcohesionis maintained,
or at leastsought,
by mutual
adjustments
and concessions
in therealmof security.
But,in addition,aidintherealmsofeconomic
development
andcolonialemancipationis bartered
forsupport
on security
issues.Evenso,intra-regional
balancingfrequently
failsto establish
a solidfronton all issuesand
unityofperformance
in theUnitedNationsis imperfect.
Henceitis at
theglobalinstitutional
levelthatadditional
concessions
aremadewithin
and amongregionalsystems
in orderto enablekeyblocsto marshal
thattwo-thirds
majority
whichis essential
to gainingUnitedNations
endorsement
foranysetof nationalpolicies.The continuing
impact
of functionalism
on security
mustnow be demonstrated
as it manifestsitself
through
regional
tensions
in theUnitedNations.
III
Aspirations
foreconomic
well-being
and demandsforcolonialfreedom are certainly
factors
whichwouldplayan evermoreimportant
rolein international
relations
evenif therewereno Cold War. Still,
interms
ofan over-all
pattern
offoreign
relations,
questions
ofsecurity
-collectiveor otherwise-are
dominant.
Whileit is no doubttrue
thatto India thematter
of economicdevelopment
and to Egyptthe
expulsionof the BritishfromSuez are of fargreaterconcernthan
therivalry
betweenthedemocratic
Soviet
Westand theCommunist
bloc,thefactremains
thattheseIndianand Egyptian
aspirations
gain
mostof theirinternational
to Cold
cogency
frombeingtiedsomehow
War strategy.
Hence the crucialfactorin a theoryof international
organization
remainsthequestionofcollective
security,
sinceit tends
to condition
theamountof impactenjoyedbythefunctional
realms.
How does balancingin the collective
fieldmanifest
itself
security
in the closelyrelatedareasof economicdevelopment
and colonial
emancipation?

Balancingimpliesthepreservation
of security
through
a processof
negotiation,
and mediation.
conciliation,
The conciliator
is an uncommitted
ora member
party,
ofa majorpowerblocnotfullyinagreement
withtheleaderof thegroup-inshort,
theAfro-Asian
and dissident
NATO or SEATO powers.Becauseofhiscrucialimportance
to both
super-powers
and theirallies,thepositionof theconciliator
mustbe
tosomeextent,
respected
leadingtoconcessions,
easingoftensions,
and
evendctentes.
A cumulative
in turn,setsup
of compromises,
pattern
ofpeace,stability,
expectations
andcoexistence
whichthesuper-powers
canviolateonlyat greatperilto theirreputation
and leadership
in the

250

WORLD POLITICS

and thecryforcolonialfreedom
development
world.Botheconomic
because
pattern,
tothebalancing
impetus
further
cananddo contribute
fromthe overdetracting
theycreatemoreand moreexpectations
approachwhichtheWestseeksto give
security-oriented
whelmingly
posithetotalbargaining
strengthening
thereby
totheUnitedNations,
that
however,
blocorblocs.It mustbe stressed,
tionoftheconciliating
role; for
fulfillthisparticular
onlyissueswhicharousecontroversy
ofstatistics,
ofwomenorthestandardization
as thestatus
suchmatters
in the usual senseof thatterm,do not give
although"functional"
and adjustment.
ofcompromise
riseto a pattern
and
thefunctioning
affect
How, then,doeseconomicdevelopment
national
and
Regional
totality?
a
as
Nations
United
impactof the
are singledout
investment
in therealmof international
aspirations
aroundproas theyrevolve
especially
as thekeyindexin theanalysis,
and a
(IFC)
Corporation
Finance
International
an
create
to
posals
(SUNFED).
Development
SpecialUnitedNationsFundforEconomic
is fairly
memberstates,the proposition
For the underdeveloped
and mostof theLatinAmericancountries
simple.The Afro-Asian
capitaland the
venture
feelthatthedearthof privateinternational
Bank call formore
lendingpolicyof the International
conservative
under
institution
an international
Theyprefer
UnitedNationsefforts.
by
dominated
orglobalagencies
assistance
tobilateral
control
collective
non-selfof
importance
the
nations.They stress
the industrialized
and theneedforgrants;theyobjectto thehigh
projects
liquidating
to theIntertermsattached
amortization
interest
ratesand stringent
loans.
andDevelopment
nationalBankforReconstruction
advois frankly
considerations
forsecurity
ofeconomic
A bartering
forIFC andSUNFED, Chile's
catedbyoneoftheleadersin thefight
hastakenup armsto repel
Nations
United
"The
Santa
Cruz:
Hernan
The mainburdenwas
security.
collective
and to vindicate
aggression
raw
. . . If theydid notreceive
beingcarriedbyWesterncountries.
theycouldnotphysicountries,
fromthe [underdeveloped]
materials
struggle
callyresist,and withouttheirmoralsupportthe collective
intoa mere
in thenameofpeacewoulddegenerate
againstaggression
interests....And thecomofpoliticaland economic
fightin defense
theUnited
areaswouldonlysupport
monmanin theunderdeveloped
ifhe wereconvinced
security
Nationsand itsgreatworkofcollective
theobjectofwhich
undertaking,
thatitsactionwaspartofa universal
of
and theself-determination
freedom
was to securepeace,individual
and
of
living
decent
a
standard
him
with
also
to
provide
and
peoples,

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

251

material
and socialprogress."'5
or nottheNATO and Soviet
Whether
theaims
blocstakeseriously
theringingCharter
phrasesadvocating
set forthby Santa Cruz, concernfor mobilizingor hamstringing
UnitedNationssecurity
operations
compelsattention
to thisjuxtaposition
ofissues.
Initially
at least,theWestopposedbothIFC and SUNFED. With
the exception
of Holland,the NATO and ANZUS countries
have
pointedto the need formakingoverseasinvestments
attractive
to
privateenterprise
and havestressed
thescarcity
of publicand private
capitalforlarge-scale
international
investment.
Domesticneeds,the
burdenof rearmament,
and the measures
of regionalorganizations
have all figuredin the argumentof the oppositionto IFC and
SUNFED.
A bartering
ofsecurity
has been
foreconomic
concessions,
however,
featured
bytheWestas well.Apparently
hopingto outmaneuver
the
of theSUNFED supporters,
argument
Americandelegates
explicitly

in i952 andI953 madeparticipation

inthedevelopment
schemes
con-

tingent
on savings
obtained
froma successful
program
ofglobalmultilateraldisarmament.
Despitethe outcryof opposition,
thisproposal
was to lay thegroundwork
fortheextensive
in
balancingoperation
theEighthGeneralAssembly.
The position
oftheSovietbloc,finally,
was themostclear-cut.
Like
theirWesternantagonists,
theSovietshaveopposedtheprojects.
But
theyarguethatIFC andSUNFED mustcertainly
leadtoever-growing
domination
overtheworldeconomy
byAmerican
imperialists.
Withoutanyqualification,
theCommunist
delegates
assertthatall internationalfinancing
mustleadtoa growth
ofWestern
monopolies.
Thesebeingthepositions
taken,howarewe to accountforthefact
thatresolutions
approving
bothprojects
werepassedin I953 byunanimousvotes,withtheSovietblocabstaining?"
The balancing
pattern
is implicit
in thecompromise
resolution
passed:disarmament
was to
makepossibleeconomic
intensive
development,
studyfortheIFC and
SUNFED was to go forward,
and Belgium'sRaymondScheyven
15As cited in RobertE. Elder and ForrestD. Murden,"EconomicCooperation:
Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development(SUNFED)," Woodrow
WilsonFoundation,New York,SeptemberI954, pp. 7-8.
16-SeeUnitedNations,Department
of EconomicAffairs,
Reporton a Special United
NationsFund forEconomicDevelopment,New York, 1953; UnitedNations,Official
Recordsof theGeneralAssembly,
7th Session,SecondCommittee,
SummaryRecordof
Meetings,and thesame documentforthe 8thSession.Also EconomicDevelopmentof
Underdeveloped Countries, U.N. Doc A/2430 and A/2447; and Elder and Murden,

op.cit.,fordetailson thelaboriousnegotiations
of theWorkingPartyand themediating
roleplayedby thesefourmavericks:Holland,Haiti, Greece,and Pakistan.

252

WORLD POLITICS

was to exploreprivately
thewillingness
of membergovernments
to
contribute
the necessary
funds.While Westernstatesmen
made it
quiteclearthattheirvotefortheprojects
did notimplyreadiness
to
contribute
to theinstitutions
proposed,
theAmerican
delegate's
statementon theissuewassufficiently
ambiguous
to encourage
expectations
amongthe underdeveloped
countries.
The trueimplications
of the
compromise,
however,
maybe seenwithinthecontext
of theglobal
balancing
process.
Thus,theWestclearlyyieldedtheprinciple
to theAfro-Asian
and
LatinAmerican
blocs.Bymerely
endorsing
theprojects
and-verbally
-wishingthemwell,theWesterngovernments
also weakenedtheir
opposition
totheidea.Refusal
toparticipate
atsomefuture
timewillbe
thatmuchmoredifficult
to justify
to a worldwhichalreadyaccuses
theWestof sacrificing
livingstandards
to armaments.
It maybe suggested,
furthermore,
thattheWest'syielding
wasin turnmotivated
by
thedesireto retainforsecurity
issuesthevotesoftheregionalsystems
standingforeconomicdevelopment.
As Jonathan
Binghamnoted:
"The temptation
to use the [technicalassistance]fundsformore
spectacular
purposes,
or to use themto win someimmediate
political
pointfroma wavering
government
(such as a favorable
voteon a
crucialissuein theUnitedNations)areconstant
andverygreat.Those
who are responsible
fortheday-to-day
conductof ourforeign
policy
are constantly
lookingforbluechipsto playwith,and an appropriationofseveralmilliondollarsforan aid program
in an arealookslike
a verynicebluechipindeed."'7
Afro-Asian
and LatinAmerican
ecoaims and the resultis a
nomicaspirations
meetWesternsecurity
compromise
bytheWestin thehopeof retaining
theloyalty
of some
orfuture
present
balancer.
One recent
consequence
hasbeentheAmerican decisionto contribute
to IFC, made,significantly,
at the OAS
Conference
at Rio.Another
has beena lessening
ofEuropeanoppositionto SUNFED, as illustrated
in theScheyven
Reportto ECOSOC.
ButtheSoviets
yielded
theirprinciples
as well.Byabstaining
instead
ofvotingagainsttheproposals,
thedetheytooseemedto underwrite
mandsof theunderdeveloped
in non-Soviet
countries
terms.Recent
Sovietcontributions
Proto theUnitedNationsTechnicalAssistance
of
Thesestepsimplya recognition
grammaybe interpreted
similarly.
and a yieldingto regionaldemandswhichmay rendera future
of theSovietblocquitehazardousin termsofpropaganda.
retreat
The secondmajorfunctional
areain whichbalancing
mightbe ex17Jonathan
B. Bingham,"PartisanPoliticsand PointFour," Bulletinof the Atomic
Scientists,
x, No. 3 (March I954), p. 85.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

253

pectedto operateis therealmof international

policytowardcolonial
emancipation.
The crucialindexof clashing
regionaland nationalaspirations
isprovided
bythedualissueofwhether
a listoffactors
should
be adoptedbywhichtojudgethedegreeofadvancement
towardselfachievedby a givendependency,
government
or independence
and
theresultant
PuertoRico,as of I953,was selfquestionof whether
or not.The decision-making
governing
in theGenprocessdisplayed
eralAssembly
on thisoccasionis likelyto yieldsomefruitful
insights.
A listoffactors
wasconsidered
ofthememnecessary
bya majority
berstatesin orderto be able to judgetheclaimsof colonialpowers
totheGeneralAssembly
whoceasedto transmit
annualreports
under
Article73e.Byclaiming
in questionhad achieved
thatthepossessions
thecolonialpowershad withdrawn
self-governing
status,
such
fifteen
areasfromthescopeoftheCharter's
XI since1947,including
Chapter
PuertoRico.Whilethefactors
wereformulated
and proposedto the
of"guidance,"
GeneralAssembly
a strong
movement
onlyforpurposes
in the GeneralAsdevelopedby I953 to vestexclusive
competence
of thesefactorsto any one territory.
semblyforthe application
It
followed,of course,thatin the futurecolonialpowersmustseek
on theirpossessions;
UnitedNationsconsentto no longerreporting
specifically,
thisimpliedAmericanlack of competence
to remove
fromUnitedNationsexamination
PuertoRico unilaterally
and discussion.
The inter-and intra-regional
balancing
processwas definedbythe
on thedual issue
initialpositions
takenbythemember
governments
of factors
and of competence."8
At one extreme
of thespectrum,
the
of
dim
view
the
whole
took
a
The
West
very
attempt. Europeanand
forvariousreasons,
rejected
Australasian
nations,
theprinciple
of the
and applying
UnitedNationsformulating
overthe
anysetof factors
possibledissentof the administering
state.Whileobjectingbitterly
in theGeneralAssembly,
to thevesting
of competence
as forcing
the
or independence
pace and timingof establishing
self-government
by
an anti-colonial
wishedfora majority
agency,theWestnevertheless
whichwouldreleasetheUnitedStatesfromtheobligation
to report
on PuertoRico, and thusgive a colonialpowera "cleanbill of
health."
18 These generalizations
are basedon: UnitedNations,Official
Recordsof theGeneral
Assembly,
7thSession,FourthCommittee,
SummaryRecordof Meetings,and thesame
documentfor the 8th Session.Also see ShermanS. Hayden and BenjaminRivlin,
"Non-Self-Governing
Territories:
Statusof PuertoRico,"WoodrowWilsonFoundation,
New York,SeptemberI954.

254

WORLD POLITICS

indeThe Sovietblococcupiedtheopposite
pole.Fullandimmediate
stageof
pendenceforall colonieswas demanded.No transitional
with the colonial
or lingeringassociations
partialself-government
wereadmitted,
although
theywere
powerafterthegrantofautonomy
in theGeneralAssembly's
listoffactors.
Indeed,theSoviets
recognized
and prone
as misleading
rejectedtheveryidea of statingthefactors
to introduce
and evasion.Whilearguingforthe comtemporizing
to examineclaimsfornon-submispetenceof theGeneralAssembly
blocalso soughtto
underArticle73e,theCommunist
sionof reports
therelease
condemntheWesternstandon PuertoRico and obstruct
oftheUnitedStatesfromitsobligations.
of course,had reand theissueof competence,
The listof factors
Afro-Asian
and Latin
fromthecombined
ceivedtheirinitialsupport
among
American
blocs.However,therewas byno meansunanimity
in bothblocs
The overwhelming
majority
theseanti-colonial
nations.
butsevenLatinAmerican
wished
delegations
favored
thelistoffactors,
to avoidtheissueof competence
and releasethe UnitedStatesunresponsibilities
withrespect
international
conditionally
fromfurther
mostoftheColomboPowersandthree
toPuertoRico.To thiscourse,
insteada UnitedNaobjected,
proposing
Latin Americancountries
AmerofPuertoRicanconditions
in ordertoverify
tionsinvestigation
workedout in the Fourth
resolution
ican claims.The compromise
in givingtheUnitedStatesitscleanbillofhealth,
Committee
resulted
but also asserted
theexclusive
of theGeneralAssembly
competence
todecidesimilar
casesin thefuture.19
the tensionswithin
The votingin I953 on bothissuesillustrates
andamongblocs.The listoffactors,
for"guidance"
only,was adopted
The negabya voteof27 to 23,withChinaand Thailandabstaining.
NATO-ANZUScombination,
tivevoteswerecastbyalmosttheentire
bloc.The
fourLatinAmerican
delegations,
and thefullCommunist
fromthecolonialpowersthatthey
debatewascappedbya declaration
theresolution.
Butit was theissue
had no intention
ofimplementing
questionin full.In the
of PuertoRico whichraisedthecompetence
FourthCommittee,
theresolution
theUnitedStatesfrom
absolving
UnitedNationscompetence
but also asserting
further
responsibility
MostWesternstatesvoted
was passed22 to i8,.withi9 abstentions.
issue.The Soviet
becauseof thecompetence
negatively
or abstained
bloc plus Burma,India, Indonesia,Iraq, Guatemala,Mexico,and
becausetheydisputedtheattainment
of
Yugoslaviavotednegatively
self-government
byPuertoRico.
19Proposalsand votesare analyzedin Hayden and Rivlin,op.cit.,pp.

i6-i9.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

255

In theplenary
thesamegeneraltallyofvoteswasobtained,
meeting
fallingshortofthenecessary
two-thirds
majority.
However,earlierin
themeeting,
theAssembly
had approved
bya voteof30 to 26 a Mexicanproposal
toapplytheruleofsimplemajority
under
toall questions
Chapter
XI. HencetheWest,theSoviets,
andthedissident
Afro-Asians
and LatinAmericans
wereoutmaneuvered
and theresolution
was declaredadopted.The UnitedStates,
whichhad abstained
in theFourth
Committee
votebecauseof thecompetence
issue,was compelledto
votefortheresolution
in theplenary
meeting
in ordernotto loseits
cleanbillofhealthon PuertoRico.
In colonialmatters,
then,thepattern
ofbalancing
is farlessmarked
thanin therealmofeconomic
development.
The votesanalyzedshow
verylittleadjustment
and compromise
on thepartof thetwopolar
campsin thedirection
ofthebalancing
Afro-Asian
and OAS systems.
The sameconclusion
emerges
fromthepositions
takenin thei955 vote
on Algeria.No generalcompromise
formula,
compelling
the chief
antagonists
to endorsethebalancers'
position,
has yetbeendeveloped,
as evidenced
by thecombined
Westernand Sovietopposition
to the
principle
offactors.
And so longas no suchcommitment
is obtained,
thebalancingblocslackan additional
leverwithwhichto condition
theWestandtheSovietstorestraint
and concession.
However,
it may
wellbe thattheintroduction
oftheprinciple
ofsimplemajority
voting
will changethispicture.No longerwill thepolarblocsbe able to
counton thedefeatof balancingresolutions
forlack of a two-thirds
in plenary
majority
sessions.
If theprinciple
ofbartering
votes
security
forsupport
on colonialand economicmatters
to be operacontinues
tive,therefore,
it maywell be surmised
thatbalancingwill emerge
evenin thecolonialrealmas a process
ofconsiderable
Alimportance.
readythepolicyoftheUnitedStateson thisissuegivessomesupport
to sucha conjecture.
The actualimpactof balancingin thefieldof economicdevelopmentand thepotential
of a similarcourseof eventsin thecolonial
realm,then,are theconstituents
of a largerinterregional
processof
balancing
at theUnitedNations.The practice
ofcollective
security
as
advocated
bytheWestorthedenunciations
ofituttered
bytheSoviets
dependfortheirinstitutional
effectiveness
on theattention
giventothe
functional
aspirations
ofunderdeveloped
andanti-colonial
regions.
The
Cold War maywellbe expected
to deepenthisinterlocking
relationshipand thereby
increasethe bargaining
positionof the balancers,
Hencethemobilization
in therealmofcollective
of
especially
security.

256

WORLD POLITICS

willbecomeless
theUnitedNationsby one stateor regionalsystem
andlesslikely.

IV
It is evident
thattheprocessof exchanging
concessions
withineach
is by no meansuniformly
regionalsystem
successful.
Consequently,
issuesof security,
or colonialemancipation
economics,
maycontinue
toformthesubstance
ofdisagreement
andrivalaspirations
evenamong
oncetheissuereachesthelevel
members
ofthesameregionalsystem,
Whenever
suchsolidarity
ofUnitedNationsdiscussion.
is notachieved
forbalancing
at theregionallevel,theopportunity
at thegloballevel
sincetheregionalpartners
areunderpressure
increases,
to burytheir
in seeking
differences
andsincetheiropponents
toprevent
persist
such
fornegotiation,
agreement.
andcompromise
Opportunity
maneuvering,
levelas theeaseofreaching
therefore
at theuniversal
improves
agreementregionally
declines.
and UnitedNationsbalancing
The netresultof intra-regional
proto thetwosuper-powers
cedureswithrespect
is a lossoftheunilateral
nationalaims or dictateregionalpolicy.In
abilityto implement
principle,
theUnitedStatesseeksto mobilizetheUnitedNationson
behalfof thecontainment
to preserve
policy,attempts
theunilateral
natureof aid to economicdevelopment,
and bilateral
and prefers
to
colonialempires
subjecttheremaining
tono immediate
process
ofdisIn practice,
thebalancing
integration.
process
forces
American
policyelementsin all theserealms.In principle,
makersto sacrifice
the
SovietUnionis eagerto preventtheuse of theUnitedNationsfor
hinderorganizedschemesfor economicdecontainment
purposes,
thedissolution
andadvancerapidly
velopment,
ofempires.
In practice,
theSovietUnionnotonlyfindsitself
however,
unabletoachievethese
aimsbut mustfrequently
changeits positionto accommodate
itself
to thepressures
of balancing.
Nationalpolicies,subjected
to regional
further
toUnitedNationspressures
balancing,
subjected
interregionally,
deflected
are thusin effect
theoperations
ofinternational
through
institutions.
The degreeof deflection
nowremainsto be demonstrated.
theSovietblocis farlesssubjectto suchinfluences
Clearly,
thanare
The Sovietsystem
theAmerican-led
is unitedon all issues
systems.
ofinternational
withintheframework
arising
organizations.
a
Further,
Sovietleadership
whichfortactical
or strategic
reasonsis uninterested
in catering
toanyexternal
bodyofopinionhasnothing
togainbyconcessions
andwilltherefore
beimpervious
totheforces
ofbalancing.
The
factthatno singleregionalsystem
acceptsin fulltheSovietpositions

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

257

may
and colonialemancipation
economicdevelopment,
on security,
event,
In that
to balancingoperations.
be quiteirrelevant
therefore
cannotbe expected.
andcompromise
negotiation
shouldfollowthe tacticalroad
the Sovietleadership
If, however,
dynamics
andfunctional
theregional
alliance,
theWestern
ofsplitting
formaneuver.
offerampleopportunity
of UnitedNationsprocesses
to bringabouta long-range
iftheKremlinweredetermined
Further,
processcould
in thebalancing
in theCold War,immersion
relaxation
purely
arewillingtorelaxtensions
be avoidedunlesstheSoviets
hardly
positionmustthen
on Americanterms.SupportfortheCommunist
to
be garnered;externalopinionbecomesvital.Hence,concessions
realms
the
in
especially
becomenecessary,
neutralists
theAfro-Asian
grounds
on security
concessions
and colonies.Similarly,
of economics
are to be wooedawayfrom
becomevitalif theEuropeanneutralists
to splitthealreadytenuous
Efforts
too closea tie withWashington.
and
mightbringwiththemeconomic
ofinterests
SEATO community
anti-Comin theFar East and eventhestrongly
colonialconcessions
ontheseissues.
byharping
mightbe attracted
munist
OAS membership
fromthebasic
departures
stillpresupposes
Butsuccessin suchventures
used in theUnitedNations.Whatevidenceis therethat
arguments
byMoscow?
sucha roadhasbeenfollowed
itshouldbe notedthattheSovietUnionwithIn thefieldofsecurity,
drewfromIranin 1946 partlyas a resultof verymildadversepubforce
Council,eventhoughno overwhelming
licityin the Security
to
consented
further,
was brought
to bearon Moscow.The Soviets,
afterthe
showof reluctance,
theKoreantruce,despitea considerable
bloc had takena stronghand in thenegotiations-even
Afro-Asian
repatriain theprisoner
in prestige
thoughRussiastoodtoloseheavily
byno means
theGenevasettlement
tionprocess.
And in Indo-China,
powerscouldhaveobtainedtheCommunist
thebestterms
represents
Soviet
againin evidence.
pressure
withNATO as well as Afro-Asian
program,
assistance
malignedtechnical
to theformerly
contribution
specializedagencies,and the
in two much-denounced
participation
modifications
all represent
ofbilateral
economic
aid schemes
initiation
ofbalancing.
aboutbythepressures
brought
in Soviettactics
and
motivated
The likelihood
thatthesechangesare expedientially
importance
their
from
not
detract
does
policy
in
change
no
basic
imply
In makingthecommitoftensions.
in termsofa possiblediminution
will be created
hopesand expectations
ment,howevercircumscribed,
be violated
can
which
realms
and security
in thecolonial,economic,
of neutralregionalblocson
theenmity
onlyat theriskof incurring

258

WORLD POLITICS

somefuture
security
issue.Thus,balancing
maymakeit farmoredifficultforthe SovietUnionto obtainAfro-Asian
supportforglobal
propaganda
resolutions
designedto embarrass
theWest.For a Soviet
Unioncommitted
evento theverbiage
of "peaceful
balcoexistence,"
ancingresultsin an evermorecomplexpattern
of interdependencies
whichhasthecumulative
effect
ofreducing
ofall nationalthepurity
and regional-policy
positions.
Evidencethatbalancing
hasresulted
in a deflection
ofactualAmerican policyis farmoreimpressive.
Of course,it remainstruethata
commitment
to a courseof "goingit alone,"of ignoringregional
solidarity
and UnitedNationsendorsement,
wouldrenderbalancing
pressure
irrelevant
to Americanpolicy.As in thecase of theSoviet
refusal
to makeanyconcessions,
no possibility
ofnegotiation
andcompromise
wouldthenremain.
Yet American
policyhas beenconcerned
withachieving
and maintainingthesolidarity
ofNATO, SEATO, and OAS on all issuesand
onall levels.Theheterogeneity
ofthealliancesystems
hasnotfacilitated
thistaskanditis likelythatthecommunity
ofinterests
in NATO will
suffer
dilution
in Europewiththeadmission
ofGermany,
whiletheindirectassociation
of a rearmed
JapanwithSEATO is almostcertain
to havethesameeffect
in Asia.Thus a Sovietleadership
benteither
on dividingtheWestor on placatingdissident
partsof it can take
comfort
fromtheregional
dynamics
ofglobalorganization
bycatering
to thecounsels
ofmoderation
whichmaybe addressed
to Washington
fromLondon,Paris,and Tokyo.At thesametime,American
policymakersprefer
to obtainUnitedNationsendorsement
in theeventthat
regionalsystems
are mobilizedagainstCommunism.
Regionalarrangements
"willbe employed
in theservice
ofCharter
principles
and
will notdegenerate
intomeremilitary
alliances,
employing
forceor
thethreat
offorcefortheachievement
ofnarrow
purposes
inconsistent
withtheCharter,"
BenjaminV. CohentoldtheGeneralAssembly.20
The attainment
ofsolidarity
withineachregional
system,
thecoordinationof thesediverseinterests
globally,
and theirsubordination
to the
elusivetwo-thirds
majority
of theGeneralAssembly
combineto imposebalancingon theUnitedStates,implying
departures
fromdoctrinalpurityand concessions
to all who requirereassurance.
WithinNATO, American
concessions
havebeenpatentin thefield
of Germanrearmament,
the military
in NATO, but
"stretch-out"
moststrikingly
in themodification
of America'sFar Easternpolicy
20

BenjaminV. Cohen,"Collective
UnderLaw," Department
Security
ofStateBulletin,

XXVI,No. 656 (January

2i, I952), p. Ioo.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

259

rolein
crises.NATO's restraining
in theKoreanand Indo-Chinese
modestroleaccordedto
in therelatively
further
Asia is manifested
Within
SEATO, despiteearlierAmericandemandsto thecontrary.
is evidentlargelyin therealmsof ecopattern
OAS, theconcession
whileconcessions
to theAfro-Asian
neunomicsand colonialcaution,
of security
feltin a reduction
claimsin the
tralists
makethemselves
to SEATO.
UnitedNationsandin theroleaccruing
fromthepressures
of balancingwere
resulting
Recentconcessions
announcement
madeevenin thecaseof PuertoRico.The American
debatethattheislandcommonwealth
duringtheGeneralAssembly
ifPuertoRicorequests
itwouldhardly
independence
maybe granted
Asian
of
and
the
the
OAS critics
without
of
havebeenmade
pressure
of Americanpolicyin
In fact,the "tightrope-walking"
colonialism.
is in itselfevidenceof the
of colonialism
UnitedNationsdiscussions
in theUnitedStatesvoteforthe
as demonstrated
impactofbalancing,
on PuertoRico, despitethe obnoxiouscompetence
finalresolution
clause.The colonialissuewillthusbecomemorecrucialto balancing
todepart
fromitsNATOas theUnitedStatesfeelscompelled
processes
ANZUS allies.2'
impactof balancing
exampleof thecontinuing
The moststriking
inAmerican
strategic
liesinthefieldoftheatom.Recentmajorchanges
arenotdue solelyto theinfluence
of international
planningcertainly
ofintraand inter-regional
Yet thecoincidence
tensions
organizations.
of Americanpolicy
on theroleof nuclearwarfareand therevision
has givenway
Thus"massiveretaliation"
is moststriking.
statements
is reenforced
in whichlocaldefensive
bymore
strength
to "a system
And"limited
military
strength.22
mobiledeterrent
power,"
i.e.,regional
withrelianceon tacticalnuclearweaponshas since
atomicstrategy"
ofAmerican
as a muchmoremodeststatement
military
planemerged
of disarmament
needfeltforthepursuance
nening.The continued
andthecontradiction
thelackoffaithintheirsuccess
despite
gotiations,
to muchbasicAmericanstrategic
impliesa
planning,
theyrepresent
allies
and
States'
nervous
to
the
United
critical
concession
further
It is likelythatthe UnitedNations-endorsed
neutralist
antagonists.
was inspired
ofatomicenergy
utilization
by
schemefortheindustrial
With thisincidenceof proposals,
similarconsiderations.
steps,and
ofthepurely
fromthedominance
measures
military
aspects
detracting
Z1 For an official
of thispoint,see VernonMcKay,"The UnitedStates,the
statement
UnitedNationsand Africa,"ibid.,xxviII, No. 7I2 (Februaryi6, 1953).
22 JohnFosterDulles, "PolicyforSecurity
xxxii,No. 3
and Peace,"ForeignAffairs,
(April I954), pp. 358-59.

260

WORLD

POLITICS

American
of UnitedNationsstrategy,
policyis moreand morecomandpatient
mitted
torestraint
negotiation.
V

anddemonstrations
If thepreceding
propositions
possessthevalidity
claimedforthem,therewouldno longerbe anyreasonforarguing
are incompatiinternational
thatregionaland universal
organization
butdependon one another.
The
ble.Clearly,
thetwonotonlycoexist
and conceptual
thedescriptive
linkbebalancingpatternestablishes
thatthebalancing
tweenthetwotypes.
Still,itshouldnotbe forgotten
modesof stateconduct.It assumes,
definite
first
pattern
presupposes
of thepresent
of policy
of all, thecontinuation
regionaldistribution
withits impliedtripolarization
of power.The
aimsand aspirations,
Sovietbloc is expectedto keeptheUnitedNationsfrombeingused
theWestfromturning
toprevent
enforcement
forpermissive
purposes,
of Westernglobalpolicies.In defaultof any
it intoan instrument
of transforming
theorganization
intoan instruseriousexpectation
mentof Sovietpolicy,thisis thebesttheKremlincan do. Further,
American
efforts
ofcourse
tomobilize
balancing
presupposes
continuing
thesymbols
oftheUnitedNationson behalfofglobalpoliciesofantiCommunism.
Finally,and mostimportantly,
balancingrestson the
resisted
will
be
thattheseefforts
assumption
bythebalancing
blocand
so thatcompromise
withinregional
bydissent
systems,
formulas
stradwillbe advanced.
andSovietpositions
In short,
dlingtheAmerican
the
hereoutlinedsimply
wouldhaveno meaningif
conceptual
apparatus
didnotexistandifopinionamongNATO members
Asianneutralism
without
a murmur
ofdissent.
endorsed
theAmerican
A veering
position
on Nehru'spart,forinstance,
as demanded
awayfromneutralism
by
would
thebalancing
So woulda British
somein India,
disrupt
pattern.
theAmerican
decisionto underwrite
completely
policyon China.
of balancingcontinue
to exist,thenatureof
If thesepreconditions
universalinternational
organizationwould undergoconsiderable
ofeconomic
withsecurity
features
change.The interdependence
would
financial
mostlikelyresultin increased
forinternational
support
detheaspirations
efforts.
forcolonialemancipation
velopment
Similarly,
tobegratified
as a result
beexpected
oftheprocesses
might
increasingly
at work,withuniversal
organizations
acquiringbroaderfunctions
in
boththesefields.The crucialchange,however,
wouldoccurin the
realmof collective
security.
Balancingheremightoperateso as to
on universal
commitments
reducetheemphasis
to resort
to collective
measures.
enforcement
ofregional
Byitsencouragement
commitments,

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

261

butto
of theGeneralAssembly
subjectnotto theformalsupervision
of continuous
multilateral
themoderating
influence
and interregional
negotiations,
balancingmay well changethe natureof the United
on thepacificsettlement
ofdisNationsbyputting
primary
emphasis
putes."As thingsare,"wroteSir GladwynJebb,"thoughone may
admitthatcollective
remains
a 'primary'
resistance
to aggression
function,pacificsettlement
seemsto me . . . to havebecomethemoreimportant
froma practical
pointofview.For,afterall,ifWorldWarIII
actuallydoes breakout,nobodycan pretendthatwhatthe United
Nationsdoesor says,however
of
usefulit maybe,willbe an element
thefirst
importance
in thewinningofthewar.Whereasifwe areto
avoidWorldWar III theremustbe a longperiodofcoexistence
with
theSovietworldduringwhichtheUnitedNationsmightbe of the
greatest
value."23
Throughthecontinuation
of thebalancingprocess
the UnitedNationswould becomean agencyforconciliating
and
mediating
thetensions
whichproducetheColdWar.
If regionalsystems
fulfill
an activefunction
in globalorganization
by restraining
each other'saspirations,
how does thisconception
of
international
organization
differ
fromtheconventional
doctrine
ofthe
balanceof power?It couldbe arguedthattherivalregionalsystems
are theequivalentof the traditional
"weights"
in thebalance,and,
to carrythedescriptive
analogyone stepfurther,
thattheAfro-Asian
blocfulfills
theroleof thebalancer.
If thebalanceofpowerconcept
is considered
as a toolof politicalanalysis,
couldit notbe concluded
thatactivehostilities
between
thetwomajorantagonists
willnotcome
aboutbecauseof therestraining
influence
of thebalancer,
who could
throwhis weightintoeitherscale?Proceeding
alongtheselines,it
mightappearfeasibleto treatinternational
organization
todayas no
morethana specialcaseofa generalbalanceofpowertheory.
A numberoffactors,
however,
argueagainstthisprocedure.
In the
firstplace,noneof theregionalsystems
in question-with
theexceptionoftheSoviet-aresufficiently
homogeneous
topermit
anydefinite
in balanceof powerterms.
analysis
The Westcannotbe presumed
to
actagainsttheSovietblocin unambiguous
fashion
becauseof thefissureswithinit.The sameis trueofthebalancing
bloc,whichis most
in anyeventto sidecompletely
unlikely
withtheSovietsand already
showssignsoffavoring
theWest.Despiteitsneutralism,
thebalancing
23 Sir GladwynJebb,"The Free World and the UnitedNations,"ibid.,XXXI, No. 3
(April I953), pp. 386-87.The samepointis well made in W. T. R. Fox, "The United
Nationsin the Era of Total Diplomacy,"International
Organization,
v, No. 2 (May
I950), p. 266.

262

WORLD POLITICS

in themerits
of theissuesof the
blocis byno meansas disinterested
ofthebalanceof
ColdWaras wouldbe required
bya rigorous
theory
power.
Anotherconsideration
whichmakesthe similarity
betweenthe
andthebalanceofpowerevenmore
UnitedNationsbalancing
process
bloc.In theclassical
isthemilitary
ofthebalancing
weakness
superficial
to furnish
prototype,
thebalanceris supposedto be sufficiently
strong
in
a
The
crucial
showdown.
current
the
weight
military
powerof the
Afro-Asian
bloccouldhardlyqualifyforthisrole,thoughpossession
overtheresources
of theareawouldbe a choiceprize
of and control
indeedforeitherof themajorantagonists.
thecontemporary
Rather,
role.
importance
oftheAfro-Asian
combination
liesin itspsychological
attitudes
Sincetheregioncontrols
one-third
oftheworld'spopulation,
ofthesuper-powers
areofvital
ofhostility
orfriendship
towardeither
concernin anyfuturedivisionof powerbetweenthem.To win.the
balanceris a policyaim of somemomentforthemajorantagonists,
no armiesofconsequence.
evenifhe possesses
Finally,the analogyto the classicalbalanceof poweris deficient
is one-dimenthetraditional
since,as Liskahas demonstrated,
pattern
of
sional:it is concerned
onlywithphysical
powerand therelations
statesin termsof territory
and security.
The contemporary
balancing
in thecomplexsystem
ofinprocessis uniquein itsmultiple
aspects,
andfunctional
created
between
distinct
terdependencies
regional
aspiraand territory
so faras someof
tions,havinglittleto do withsecurity
areconcerned.
thechiefprotagonists
In fact,evenwithout
totheliberal's
concernagreeing
preconceptions
ing international
life,it maybe readilygrantedthatthebalanceof
powerand international
organization
implyhostileratherthancomplementary
principles.
The classicaldoctrine
of thebalanceof power
in largeparton an assumed
rested
ofthebalancing
statetoalign
ability
itselfwithwhatever
actualor potential,
seemedlikelyto
belligerent,
be defeated.
was of theessencein theconductpattern
Free-wheeling
associated
withthebalanceof power;neither
ideological
norinstitutionalrestraints
wereconsidered
necessary
or evendesirable.
Collective
undertheaegisof an international
security
organization,
however,
makessuchfree-wheeling
practices
muchmoredifficult,
and
in principle
is supposedto makethemimpossible.
If balancingrests
noton unrestrained
commitment
basedon national
assessments
ofselfinterest,
butdependsinsteadon suchmechanistic
institutional
devices
as two-thirds
anddoublevetoes,
majorities,
vetoes,
free-wheeling
tends
to be curtailed.
Thesedevicesderivetheirsanction,
in turn,frompat-

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

263

ternsof expectations,
basic hopes,and nationalaspirations
fora modicum of international
orderand predictability
of conduct.This factor,
therefore,
limitsthefreedomof maneuverof thechiefantagonists,
but
it also conditionsthe movementsof the balancingblocs.Their consequentinabilityto align themselves
in accordancewith
unconditionally
balanceof powerprescriptions
impliesa quitedifferent
speciesof internationalintercourse.
Restraintis imposedon thewelterof policyaims
not by outsideforce,nor by a voluntaryresignationof will or a determinedstrivingforworld community,
but by the need to caterto
theforceslet loose by the multipleprocessof balancing.2"
ExpedientialCold War considerations,
as reflected
in nationalpolicies pursuedin the UnitedNationsframework,
to assure
are sufficient
thecontinuity
of thispatternso long as each "actor"followshis proper
"role" in theglobal drama.Nevertheless
it is morethanlikelythatthe
veryforceswhich gain fromthe balancingprocess-theaims of economicallyunderdeveloped,
anti-colonial,
and pro-conciliation
governments-will ultimatelycontributeto its drastictransformation.
The
growthof industrialstrength
and independencein Afro-Asiawill reduce the efficacy
of barteringeconomicfor securityconcessions.The
increasein the numberof independentstateswill eliminateanother
areaofmutualcompromise
and ultimately
a multiperhapsreintroduce
polar patternof organizationin global politics,displacingthe current
tripolarscheme.This is themorelikelyinasmuchas diffusion
of technologyand especiallyof nuclearknowledgewill givethesmallerstates
an increasingmilitary
potential.The balancingprocess,therefore,
may
be a usefulconceptualtool forelucidatingthe impactof international
organizationduringtheCold War era and at thesametimecontainthe
seed of itsown destruction
in thelong run.International
organization,
understoodin theseterms,would not producethemillenniumof law,
progress,and orderexpectedby ardentadvocatesof international
cooperation.But it mightensurethe international
breathingspell necessaryto develop a multi-polarand multi-functional
patternof policy
expectations
and therebyfurther
the habitsof peacefuladjustmentof

basic tensions.

24 Reinterpretations
of UnitedNationsconceptsbased on similarmaterials,although
not necessarily
reachingidenticalconclusions,
are to be foundin Liska, op.cit.;Coral
Bell,"Koreaand theBalanceof Power,"PoliticalQuarterly,
xxv,No. I (January-March
I954);
and KennethDawson, "The United Nationsin a DisunitedWorld," World
Politics,VI, No. 2 (JanuaryI954).