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Boas
PRESIDENTIALADDRESSES
Conflictsinvolvingfirst-orderpsychicelementsalone-for instance,between
an attractionand an aversionto the sameobjector action--do not pertainto the will
at all. They are not volitional,but merelyimpulsiveor sentimental. Conflictsthat
pertainto the will ariseout of a person'shigher-order,reflectiveattitudes. But even
conflictsthat do implicatea person'swill are nonethelessdistinctfrom ambivalence
PRESIDENTIALADDRESSES
if some of the psychicforces they involveare exogenous-that is, if the person is not
identifiedwith them and they are, in that sense, externalto his will.
An addictwho strugglessincerelyagainsthis addictionis contendingwith a
force by which he does not want to be moved and which is thereforealien to him.
Since the conflict is not wholly within his will, he is not volitionallydivided or
ambivalent.The unwillingaddictis wholeheartedlyon one side of the conflict from
whichhe suffers,and not at all on the other. The addictionmay defeat his will, but
does not as such disruptits unity.
A person is ambivalent,then, only if he is indecisiveconcerningwhetherto
be for or againsta certainpsychicposition. Now this kind of indecisivenessis as
irrational,in its way,as holdingcontradictorybeliefs. The disunityof an ambivalent
person'swill preventshim from effectivelypursuingand satisfactorilyattaininghis
goals. Like conflictwithinreason,volitionalconflictleads to self-betrayaland selfdefeat. The troubleis in each case the same:a sort of incoherentgreed-trying to
have things both ways-which naturallymakesit impossibleto get anywhere. The
flow of volitionalor of intellectualactivityis interruptedand reversed;movementin
any directionis truncatedand turnedback. Howevera person startsout to decide
or to think, he finds that he is gettingin his own way.
The extent and the severityof ambivalencenowadaysare probablydue in
some part to conditionsespeciallycharacteristicof our time. But volitionaldisunity
itself is, of course,nothingspecialand nothingnew. St. Augustineobservedthat "it
is ... no strangephenomenonpartlyto will to do somethingand partlyto will not
to do it." Divisionof the will,he believed,is "a diseaseof the mind"fromwhichwe
suffer in punishmentfor OriginalSin.12At least in his view, then, ambivalencein
one degree or anotheris inherentin the destinyof man.
5. If ambivalenceis a disease of the will, the health of the will is to be
unified and in this sense wholehearted. A person is volitionallyrobustwhen he is
wholeheartedin his higher-orderattitudesand inclinations,in his preferencesand
decisions,and in other movementsof his will. This unityentailsno particularlevel
of excitementor warmth. Wholeheartednessis not a measureof the firmnessof a
person'svolitionalstate, or of his enthusiasm. What is at issue is the organization
of the will, not its temperature.
As in the case of the unwillingaddict,the unity of a healthywill is quite
compatiblewith certainkinds of virulentpsychicconflict. Wholeheartednessdoes
not requirethat a person be altogetheruntroubledby inner opposition to his will.
It just requiresthat, with respectto any such conflict,he himselfbe fully resolved.
This means that he must be resolutelyon the side of one of the forces struggling
within him and not on the side of any other. Concerningthe opposition of these
forces,he has to knowwherehe himselfstands. In otherwords,he must knowwhat
he wants.
To the extent that a person is ambivalent,he does not reallyknowwhat he
wants. This ignorance or uncertaintydiffers from straightforwardlycognitive
deficiency. There may be no informationconcerninghis will that the ambivalent
10
person lacks. The problemis ratherthat since his mind is not made up, his will is
in fact unformed. He is volitionallyinchoateand indeterminate.
This is why ambivalence,like self-deception,is an enemy of truth. The
ambivalentpersondoes not hide fromsome truthor concealit fromhimself;he does
not preventthe truthfrombeing known. Instead,his ambivalencestandsin the way
of there being a certaintruth about him at all. He is inclinedin one direction,and
he is inclined in a contrary direction as well; and his attitude towards these
inclinationsis unsettled. Thus, it is true of him neither that he prefers one of his
alternatives,nor that he prefersthe other, nor that he likes them equally.
Since ambivalenceis not a cognitive deficiency,it cannot be overcome
merelyby acquiringadditionalinformation.It alsocannotbe overcomevoluntaristically. A person cannot make himselfvolitionallydeterminate,and therebycreate a
truth where there was none before, merelyby an "act of will." In other words, he
cannotmakehimselfwholeheartedjust by a psychicmovementthat is fullyunderhis
immediatevoluntarycontrol.
The concept of realityis fundamentallythe concept of somethingwhich is
independentof our wishesandby whichwe are thereforeconstrained.Thus, reality
cannotbe underour absoluteand unmediatedvolitionalcontrol. The existenceand
the characterof what is real are necessarilyindifferentto mere acts of our will.
Now this must hold as well for the realityof the will itself. A person'swill
is real only if its characteris not absolutelyup to him. It must be unresponsiveto
his sheer fiat. It cannotbe unconditionallywithinhis power to determinewhat his
will is to be, as it is withinthe unconstrainedpowerof an authorof fiction to render
determinate-in whateverway he likes-the volitionalcharacteristicsof the people
in his stories.
Indeterminacyin the life of a realpersoncannotbe overcomeby preemptive
decree. To be sure, a personmay attemptto resolvehis ambivalenceby decidingto
adhereunequivocallyto one of his alternativesratherthan to the other;and he may
believe that in thus makingup his mindhe has eliminatedthe divisionin his will and
become wholehearted. Whethersuch changeshave actuallyoccurred,however,is
anothermatter. When the chips are down he may discoverthat he is not, after all,
decisively moved by the preference or motive he supposed he had adopted.
RememberHotspur'sreplywhen Owen Glendowerboasted "I can call spiritsfrom
the vasty deep." He said: "Why,so can I, or so can any man;but will they come
when you do call for them?"13The same goes for us. We do not control, by our
voluntarycommand,the spiritswithinour ownvastydeeps. We cannot have,simply
for the asking,whateverwill we want.
We are not fictitious characters,who have sovereignauthors;nor are we
gods, who can be authorsof more than fiction. Therefore,we cannotbe authorsof
ourselves. Reducing our own volitional indeterminacy,and becoming truly
wholehearted,is not a matterof tellingstoriesaboutour lives. Nor, unlesswe wish
to be as foolish as OwenGlendower,canwe proposeto shapeour willsby stipulating
peremptorilyat some momentthat now we are no longer dividedbut have become
solidly resolute. We can be only what natureand life make us, and that is not so
readilyup to us.
PRESIDENTIALADDRESSES
11
cannot make coherent use of freedom. Those who care about freedom must
thereforebe concernedabout more than the availabilityof attractiveopportunities
amongwhichpeople can choose as they please. Theymust also concernthemselves
with whetherpeople can come to knowwhat they wantto do with the freedomthey
enjoy. It may be, as St. Augustinesupposed,that a thoroughlyunified will comes
only as a gift of God. Still, the extent to which people suffer from volitional
indeterminacyis not entirely independent of the social, political, and cultural
12
conditionsin which they live. Those conditionsmay either facilitateor impede the
developmentof unambivalentattitudes,preferences,and goals.
7. So far I have providedfor wholeheartednessonly a brief conceptual
sketch, elaboratedprimarilyin relationto an equallysketchyaccountof the notion
of ambivalence.Now I will try to developa more fully articulatedunderstandingof
what it is to be wholehearted,by construingit as tantamountto the enjoymentof a
kind of self-satisfaction. In speakingof self-satisfaction,I do not mean to refer
pejorativelyto a state of narcissisticcomplacencyor smugness. The state I have in
mind-a state of satisfactionwiththe conditionof the self-is utterlyinoffensiveand
benign. Clarifyingits structurewill actuallyhelp not only to illuminatewhat is
involvedin being wholehearted. It will also help in copingwith an allegeddifficulty
in hierarchicalanalysesof the self. And I believe that, in addition,it will enhance
our understandingof a rathertroublesomenotion-the notionof identification-that
is fundamentalto any philosophyof mind and of action.
Consider a person who believes something wholeheartedly, who is
wholeheartedin some feelingor attitude,or who intendswholeheartedlyto perform
a certain action. In what does his wholeheartednesswith respect to these psychic
elementsconsist? It consistsin his being fullysatisfiedthat they, ratherthan others
that inherently (i.e., non-contingently)conflict with them, should be among the
causes and considerationsthat determinehis cognitive,affective, attitudinal,and
behavioralprocesses.
This is compatiblewith his also being wholeheartedwith respect to other
psychicelements,which contingently(i.e., due to particularcircumstances)conflict
with these and whichare more importantto him. The fact that a person is satisfied
with an intention,a feeling,or a belief does not entailthat he is committedto acting
on it. Being wholeheartedwith respectto one element is consistentwith assigning
a higherpriorityto another. Someone may be satisfiedto have both elementsplay
active roles in his psychic economy, though not roles that are equally urgent or
compelling. The element that is less importantto him is not necessarilyalien,
threateninghim from outside the structureof his self. It maybe as much a part of
him as those other elementsthat are more importantparts of him.14
Now whatdoes it meanto sayof a personthat he is satisfiedwith his psychic
condition,or with some elementor aspectof it? It does not mean that he considers
it the best conditionavailableto him. Some people maybe so demandingthat they
are never willingto settle for anythingless than that. But as a rule, satisfactionis
not conditionedby an uncompromisingambitionto maximize. People often settle
gladlyfor less than what they thinkit wouldbe possiblefor them to get. From the
fact that someone is satisfiedwith his condition,then, it does not follow that no
alterationof it wouldbe acceptableto him. It goes almostwithoutsaying,of course,
that he would be satisfiedwith an improvedcondition. However,he might also be
satisfiedeven with a conditioninferiorto the one he is in.
What satisfactiondoes entail is an absenceof restlessnessor resistance. A
satisfiedperson mightwillinglyaccepta changein his condition,but he has no active
interest in bringingabout a change. Even if he recognizesthat he could be better
PRESIDENTIALADDRESSES
13
off, the possibility does not engage his concern:being better off is simply not
interestingor importantto him. This is not becausehe believesthat becomingbetter
off would be too costly, or because it is too uncertain. It is just that, as a sheer
matter of fact, he has no ambitionfor improvement;he acceptsthe state of things
as it is, without reservationand without any practicalinterest in how it compares
with other possibilities.Perhapshis conditioncouldbe improvedat no net cost, and
perhapshe is awareof this, but he simplydoes not care.15
To be satisfiedwith somethingdoes not requirethat a person have any
particularbelief aboutit, nor anyparticularfeelingor attitudeor intention. It does
not require,for instance,that he regardit as satisfactory,or that he accedeto it with
approval,or that he intend to leave it as it stands. There is nothingthat he needs
to think, or to adopt, or to accept;it is not necessaryfor him to do anythingat all.
This is important,becauseit explainswhy there is no dangerhere of a problematic
regress.
Suppose that being satisfieddid requirea person to have, as an essential
constitutivecondition of his satisfaction,some deliberatepsychic element-some
deliberateattitudeor belief or feelingor intention. This element could not be one
with which the person is at all dissatisfied. How could someone be wholehearted
with respect to one psychicelement by virtueof being halfheartedwith respect to
another? So if being satisfiedrequiredsome element as a constituent,satisfaction
with respectto one matterwould dependupon satisfactionwith respectto another;
satisfactionwith respectto the secondwould dependupon satisfactionwith respect
to still a third;and so on, endlessly. Satisfactionwith one's self requires,then, no
adoption of any cognitive,attitudinal,affective,or intentionalstance. It does not
require the performanceof a particularact; and it also does not require any
deliberateabstention. Satisfactionis a state of the entire psychicsystem-a state
constitutedjust by the absenceof any tendencyor inclinationto alter its condition.
Of course,a person maymakethe judgmentthat he is well enoughoff; and
on that basis he may decide to refrainfrom doing anythingto improvehis situation.
Makingthis judgmentor this decisiondoes not, however,either make him satisfied
or entail that he is satisfied. His decisionto refrainfrom tryingto changethings is,
in effect, a decision on his part to act as thoughhe is satisfied. Refrainingfrom
tryingto changethingssimulatesthe equilibriumin whichsatisfactionconsists. But
to simulate satisfactionis not the same as being satisfied. A person is actually
satisfiedonly when the equilibriumis not contrivedor imposedbut is integralto his
psychiccondition-that is, when that conditionis settled and unreservedapartfrom
any effort by him to make it so.
Being genuinelysatisfiedis not a matter,then, of choosing to leave things
as they are or of makingsome judgmentor decisionconcerningthe desirabilityof
change. It is a matter of simplyhavingno interestin makingchanges. What it
requiresis that psychicelementsof certainkindsdo not occur. But whilethe absence
of such elements does not requireeither deliberateaction or deliberaterestraint,
theirabsencemustnonethelessbe reflective.In otherwords,the fact that the person
is not movedto changethingsmust derivefromhis understandingand evaluationof
how things are with him. Thus, the essentialnon-occurrenceis neither deliberately
14
PRESIDENTIALADDRESSES
15
16
9. Ibid., 982b20.
10. Ethics, 3P17S.