Ebh 1983

Regime Decay: Conflict Management and International Organizations, 1945-1981
Author(s): Ernst B. Haas

Source: International Organization, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Spring, 1983), pp. 189-256
Published by: The MIT Press
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Regime decay: conflict managementand

internationalorganizations,1945-1981
Ernst B. Haas
If no less an expertthan the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations, Javier

Perez de Cuellar,declaresthat the United Nations "often finds itself unable
to take decisive action to resolve conflictsand its resolutionsare increasingly
defied or ignoredby those who feel themselves strongenough to do so," we
might reasonablythink that generaldisillusionmentwith the organizationis
fully justified.1 The Arab-Israeli conflict, South African repression and
aggression,Cyprus,unrest in SoutheastAsia, and the Kashmirdispute have
been on the UN agenda almost since its inception. Nor have the conditions
underlyingthese conflicts-arms races, insecurity,racialdiscrimination,demand for scarce resources, and mutually incompatible claims for national
self-determination-been improved by collective action.
Yet it would be erroneousto claim that "the United Nations has failed"
just because the record in the 1970s might show some markedchange over
the previous twenty-five years. Before correctingthe error, however, the
particularsof the decline must be admitted. First, the record of the United
Nations and of the Organizationof American States (OAS) in abating,isolating, and settling disputes among its members, as well as in stoppinghostilities, has worsened sharplysince 1970. Second, that decline has not been
compensatedfor by a proportionalimprovementin the successof the conflict
managementactivities of the Arab League and the Organizationof African
Unity. Third,recenteffortsto.manageconflictsin Timor,Lebanon,Cambodia,
Angola, Namibia, the Falkland Islands, and the Shatt-el-Arabhave been
characterizedmore by rhetoricalposturing than by efforts to maintain or
restore peace. Fourth, instead of routinized mediation and peacekeeping
I gratefully acknowledge the help given by Robert L. Butterworth and Edward T. Rowe, and
the research assistance provided by Jacqueline Reich, Daniel Verdier, and Benny Miller. I also
appreciate greatly the comments of Robert Jervis, Mark Zacher, Roger Haydon, Robert Keohane,
Peter Katzenstein, and Joseph Nye.
1. Annual report of the UN Secretary-General, as quoted in the New York Times, 7 September
1982.
$1.50
International Organization 37, 2, Spring 1983 0020-8183/83/020189-67
? 1983 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the World Peace Foundation
190
InternationalOrganization
activities,largepublicconferenceshave become the preferredway of managing

conflict. Finally, the major powers no longer exercise leadershipin conflict
management,the role of secretariatshas declined,and financialand political
disagreementsmilitate againstthe mountingof operationsto keep the peace
and supervise truce agreements.
1. Is collective conflict managementa failed regime?

The common impression that collective conflict managementhas failed derives from the mistaken notion that the United Nations and the regional
organizationsare autonomous entities, set up to coerce or cajole states into
substitutingcooperationfor conflict. Indeed, the very idea that cooperation
is the opposite of conflict is a misconception in which professionalanalysts
as well as the lay public widely indulge. The United Nations or the OAS
cannot "fail," but their members can behave in such a fashion toward one
anotheras to give life to the principles,norms,rules,and proceduresenshrined
in these organizations-or they can fail to do so.
These organizationswere createdto moderateconflict. (It bears repeating
that conflict among states was and is taken as a given; conflict is, after all,
almnosta synonym for politics.) They were designed to reduce "collective
insecurity dilemmas" stemming from their members' antagonisticstriving
for individual security.2While they stress concerted action by some or all
members as the desirable method for managingconflict, this is a long way
from institutionalizing"cooperation"as a principleof behaviorto substitute
for managed conflict. To insist that the success of the United Nations must
mean the victory of cooperation over conflict is to interpretworld politics
as an all-or-nothinggame.
Collective conflict managementis an aspect of foreign policy; it does not
replace foreign policy. Diplomacy and action in the United Nations or a
regional organizationprovide another way of implementingforeign policy.
Far from transcendingthe objectives that states considerto be their national
interests, conflict management organizationsare forums for realizingthese
interests when action outside the organizationsis either not possible or not
desired.Action by the organizationsnever monopolizesthe possibilitiesopen
to states; action outside them is usually possible and sometimes preferred.
It is, of course,truethat many in 1945 expectedthatthe cumulativechanneling
2. The term is borrowedfrom HaywardR. Alker Jr., James Bennett,and Dwain Medford,
"GeneralizedPrecedentLogicsfor ResolvingInsecurityDilemmas,"InternationalInteractions
7, 2 (1980), p. 166. In the traditionof researchon artificialintelligence,Alkerand his associates
seek to determineby modelingthe implicit(and possiblyexplicit)reflectivelogicalprocedures
the member states follow in bringingabout (or failing to bring about) cumulative conflictmanagementpractices.Alker claims the breakpointin UN history toward declininginstitutionalizationoccurredin the aftermathof the Congooperation(around1963), whereasmy data
suggestthe decline startedaround 1970. See the literaturehe cites.
Postwar conflict management 191

of national objectives into these organizationswould eventually lead to the
institutionalizedresolution of all interstateconflict by means of routinized
procedures.Bilateralconflictwould be moderatedas the techniquesof thirdpartyintercessionbecame acceptedand the organizationsmightthus develop
into autonomousagencies.Freedfrom continuingdependenceon theirmember governments they would become actors on the internationalstage in
their own rightand thus properlybecome the targetsofjudgments of success
and failure, much like autonomous bureaucraticagencies at the national
level. We know this did not happen;we wish to know what occurredinstead.
That inquiry necessitates the substitutionof the notion of "regime"for the
more familiar "organization."
Regimes are often confused with organizations,with the internationalsystem, and with internationalorder. They are none of these things. (When I
later continue the practice of anthropomorphizingthe United Nations the
reader should recall that this is verbal shorthandfor saying "the members
of the regime did such and such.") Deterrence,strategicbargaining,military
balances, unrequitedaspirationsfor national self-determination,the fear of
communist or capitalist encirclement-all of these are aspects of the international system and ingredientsof foreignpolicy. The desire for peace and
justice, an end to racismand the persecutionof minorities,and the reduction
of armaments-these constitute designs for a world order, a normatively
better future.Though regimesmay contributeto a new orderor confirmthe
patterns inherent in the system they are none of these things; rather, they
are man-madearrangementsto manageconflictthat originatesin the system.
Thus regimes ought not to be credited with maintaininginternationalequilibrium,redistributingresources,dampeningideologicalfervor,or providing
justice. Member states do these things or, more often, fail to do them. States
interactwithin regimes to realize national interests;in the process they may
accomplish outcomes related to systems maintenance or world order but
regimes are not designed to produce such outcomes. Analysts focus studies
of conflict management at the microlevel, the level of behavior. The association of the regimewith the system and with worldorderimplies projective
judgments at the macrolevel. It is the microperspectivewhich is our major
concern here.3
3. HaywardAlker considersthe conflict managementorganizationsto be a "quasi-regime"
publicness
ratherthan a full-fledgedregimebecausethey do not have all of these characteristics:
and/or positive covariationof objectives;recognizedbenefits;multilateralconsensuson rules;
substantialcoherenceand effectiveness;institutionalizationof contextualrelationships.See his
"A Methodologyfor Design Researchon InterdependenceAlternatives,"InternationalOrganization31 (Winter1977), pp. 37-38. For instance,Alkerconsidersthat severalMid-Eastcrises
since 1967 were not managedby the United Nations, despite UN peacekeeping,mediation,or
both, but by bilateralsuperpowerarrangements.For me, superpoweruse of the United Nations
itself constitutes evidence of action within the regime. No institutionalizedarrangementfor
conflictmanagementin any issue-areacan meet Alker'sprescriptionbecausehe confoundsthe
outcome of regime-developmentprocesseswith behaviorin the regimeat a given time. For a
fuller argumentabout the differencesbetween systems, orders, and regimes,and my reasons
for not consideringthe power constellationsin world politics as part of the regimebut of its
global context, see my "WordsCan Hurt You," InternationalOrganization36 (Spring1982),
pp. 210-12.
192
An internationalregime is a set of principles,explicit or implicit, norms,

rules, and decision-makingprocedures around which the expectations of
actors converge in order to coordinate actors' behavior with respect to an
issue of concern to them all-in this case, the management of interstate
conflict. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are
standardsof behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations.Rules are
specificprescriptionsand prohibitionswith respectto actors'behavior. Procedures are the prevailingpracticesfor makingand implementingcollective
choices.4 Analysts agree that these definitions tell us something about the
manner in which states come to terms with complex interdependencein
such fields as trade, money, health, and the protectionof the environment.
Whetherwe can say that regimesfor conflict managementexist is, however,
a matter of controversy.5Collective security,after all, is the issue-arealeast
likely to be enshrinedin a regime. The reason for this is clear:comparedto
otheraspectsof interdependence,collectiveinsecurityas a matterof definition
contains fewer shared objectives and more salient occasions for unilateral
assertion. Why, then, discuss conflict managementas if it were a regime?
The argument
I intend to show that talk of the "failureof the United Nations" and of
other entities as "organizations"is misleading and inaccurate. Failure as
compared to what? Is there more intolerableconflict today as compared to
1950 or 1970? Are noninstitutionalizedmodes of managingconflict more
successfulthan they were?I arguethat "decay"is a more appropriateimage
for describingwhat has happened. Decay implies the gradualdisintegration
of a previously routinized pattern of conduct. If the concept of regime has
been reasonablysuccessfulin describingsuch processesin other issue-areas,
we ought to make the attempt to show its utility in the field of collective
insecurityand its management.If the concept proves useful in this, the most
demandingof issue-areas,its utility in other arenas of world politics will be
all the more persuasive. Seen in this light, collective conflict management
provides the limiting case for determining the overall applicabilityof the
regime concept. It might give us a tool for describingthe growth, stability,
decay, or death of complex routinesof behaviorthat cut acrossinternational
organizations and take in only a portion of the total mandate of each
organization.
My argument, furthermore,seeks to demonstratejust how decay came
4. See the special issue of InternationalOrganization36 (Spring1982), especiallythe introductorychapterby Stephen D. Krasner,for the justificationand applicationof this definition
to a varietyof contexts.
5. Robert Jervis argues persuasivelyagainst the applicationof the regime concept to this
issue-area.He may turnout to be right.See his "SecurityRegimes,"InternationalOrganization
36 (Spring1982).

about. This requiresa historicaland statisticaldescriptionof the effectiveness
and the coherence of the regime, assuming, of course, that the existence of
a regimecan be demonstratedsuccessfully.Effectivenessconsistsof the ability
of member states to use the routines enshrinedin principles,norms, rules,
and proceduresto moderate successfullythe conflicts referredto the organizations;it also involves the ability to persuademembers to referthe bulk
of their disputesto the organizationsinstead of seekingunilateralor bilateral
solutions. Effectivenessthus consists of a wide scope of activity matched
with high success in management.The coherenceof a regimeconsists of the
mutual complementarityof its principles, norms, rules, and proceduresthe supportthese components give one another. Effectivenesscapturesperformance and behavior; coherence captures the institutionalroutines that
are designed to channel behavior.
Given the well-known lag between behavior and institutions we cannot
expect to map the life of the regime as if there were a perfect covariation
between effectivenessand coherence.If the concept has any utility, however,
we can expect that movement will be roughly in the same direction. This
allows us to posit four possibilitiesin observingthe "life"of regimes.Regime
"growth"occurswhen effectivenessand coherenceincreasein tandem. "Stability" prevails if the initial level of performanceremains steady and is
matched by an unchangingadjustment between the components. "Death"
occurs when scope declines even though the regime may remain successful
with respect to the remainingdisputes referredto it and even though the
coherence remains the same; of course success and coherence may also
decline. "Decay," finally, is the situation in which both effectiveness and
coherence decline but not necessarilyin such a fashion that scope, success,
and mutual complementarityof regime components covary perfectly.
My final task is to explain why decay occurredafter a period of growth
and after a decade of seeming stability. I shall examine several hypotheses,
which are far from mutually exclusive.
1. Decline in effectivenessand coherence is due to the waning hegemony of the United States in world politics; earliersuccess was associated with active American leadership.
2. Decline in effectivenessand coherence in the United Nations is due
to the increase in the number of voting blocs and the fragmentationof
common interests and consensus among them. Winningcoalitions on
issues that earliercommanded big majoritiescan no longer be formed.
3. Winning coalitions and a wide consensus were associated with the
predominanceof the Cold War and decolonizationas metaissues. The
decline in salience of the metaissues implies a fragmentationof concern
with conflict.
4. The remainingmetaissues create an incentive for resolving conflicts
in regionalorganizationsratherthan in the United Nations in order to
isolate conflicts from global infection.
194
These hypotheses lead to a corollary:if hypotheses 3 and 4 are correct,the

members of the regime should show greatertoleranceof unresolvedconflict
than was earlierthe case. Reduced regime coherenceought to be associated
with greatertoleration of conflicts seen as nonthreatening.
Before undertakingthese examinationsI presentthe data on the disputes
and describe the variables used in their analysis.
2. Data and variables
The regime
The regimeis comprisedof the conflictmanagementroutinesof the United
Nations, the Organizationof American States, the Arab League (AL), the
Organizationof AfricanUnity (OAU), and the Councilof Europe(CE).These
are separateorganizationsand each has a mandate for doing a great many
things other than manage conflicts among its members. Hence we are not
talking about the overall effectiveness of each organization.Moreover, at
one time at least their founderssaw these organizationsas partsof one global
arrangementfor managingconflict. Accordingto the UN Charter,members
were to refer certain types of disputes to appropriateregionalorganizations
and makearrangementsfor coordinationbetweenthe regionalsand the United
Nations. The constitutions of most regional organizationscontain similar
professionsof adherenceto global principles,norms, rules, and procedures.
The regional organizationsalso serve as alliances, much like the North
I confine
AtlanticTreatyand WarsawPact (whichalso have "organizations").
my analysis to disputes that pit the members of the regionalorganizations
against one another. I exclude disputes between them and extraregional
powers because these tap the organizations'role as alliances ratherthan as
collective securityarrangements.Other tabulationsin the analysis do, however, capture such disputes.
Data base
The data base for the study of the regime is a set of 282 "disputes"that
occurred between July 1945 and September 1981. A dispute is a specific
grievance between two or more states about a specific subject involving an
allegationthat a norm of the regimehas been violated. Thus "imperialism,"
"the Cold War,""racism,"and "the threatof the arms race"arenot disputes.
Of the 282, 79 were not referredto any internationalorganization,123 made
the agenda of the United Nations, 28 went to the OAS, 25 to the OAU, 22
to the Arab League,and 5 to the Councilof Europe.Since it was impossible
to constructa universe of all disputes that were not referred,the nonreferred
set contains only disputes in which at least some fightingoccurred,that is,

the most serious conflicts that remained outside the scope of the regime.6
Double counting exists in the sense that 20 disputes were referredto the
United Nations and to a regional organization,and that 3 disputes were
referredboth to the OAU and to the ArabLeague.Tables 1 and 2 summarize
the distributionover time of the disputes that involved militaryactivity and
their referralto the respective forums.7
Eachof the 203 disputesthat appearedon the agendaof the United Nations
and the five regionals was coded in terms of ten large variables. Each of
these was then broken down into several smaller categories, some in the
form of scales. One group of large variablesseeks to capturethe salience of
the dispute-its seriousnessin challengingpeace. Anotherseeks to place each
dispute in the overall context of world politics. The final set deals with the
manner by which the membershipmanaged the conflict.
Salience. The seriousnessof a threatto worldpeaceconsistsof the intensity
of a dispute, the type of warfare(if any) that prevailed, and the extent to
which the dispute was spreadingbeyond the initial contestants. Intensity
includes the number of casualties, the length of the dispute, the likelihood
of its disappearingwithout UN intervention, and the chance that it might
lead to nuclearwar. Three degreesof fightingare possible: skirmishingand
military operations designed to frighten an antagonist without leading to
major militaryengagements,limited militaryoperationssupportiveof a dip6. RobertL. Butterworth,Joseph S. Nye, and I createdthe data set for the period 1945-70;
we reported it in Haas, Butterworth, and Nye, Conflict Management by International Orga-
nizations (Morristown,N.J.: GeneralLearningPress, 1972). The definitionof "dispute,"the

specificationof variablesused in the analysis, and the coding proceduresare describedthere
and in the Appendix;I used the same definitionsand proceduresin this study. Data for the
ManagingInterstateConflict(Pittsburgh:
period1971-78 weretakenfromRobertL. Butterworth,
University Centerfor InternationalStudies,Universityof Pittsburgh,1976) and from Butterworth's unpublishedmanuscript,"ManagingInternationalConflict"(1980). I am responsible
for preparingdata for the period since 1978 and for mistakes in coding and interpretation
throughout.Disputes are creditedto the five-yearperiodduringwhich they were firstreferred
to the organizationand are counted only once, even if they remainedon the agenda during
subsequentperiodsand even if successcame aboutin a laterperiod.Certainlong-liveddisputes
were broken up accordingto coding rules describedin Haas, Butterworth,and Nye, Conflict
Management,notably those between Israeland the Arab states, the Kashmirdispute,and the
situationin South Africa.Butterworthcomparedcomputationsof successbasedon the present
method with the alternativeof creditingsuccess to the periodin which it actuallyoccurred.He
found that the two curves were hardlydistinguishable.
7. The Ns in various tables will differaccordingto need. Comparisonsbetweenreferredand
nonreferreddisputeswill use an N of 217 or below. Some tables will use only referreddisputes
that involved militaryactivity,i.e., an N of 87 for the United Nations and 51 for the regionals
out of total Ns of 123 and 80 respectively.The total numberof disputesreferredto the United
Nations and the regionalswas somewhathigher.I excludeddisputesin which no management
action was possible since therewas nothingfor the organizationto do shortof enforcement.In
other instancesthe partiesappealedto the organizationfor propagandareasonsand expected
no action. Examplesof disputes excluded are the Eichmannabduction,the Baghdadreactor
raid,and variousairplaneincidentspittingthe United Statesagainstthe USSR. There were 23
excluded disputes for the United Nations, 4 for the regionals.
196
TABLE 1. All disputes involvingmilitary operationsand fighting (N
= 217),
in percent
Referralsby Era
To UN
To regionals
N
%
Nonreferred
N
%
Total
N
1945-50
24
10
42
13
54
1951-55
20
45
20
35
1956-60
26
35
19
12
46
1961-65
49
21
43
15
30
13
27
1966-70
21
12
57
19
24
1971-75
25
32
32
36
1976-81
52
18
35
14
27
20
38
1945-81
217
87
40
51
24
79
36
Note. Excludesdouble-countingof disputes referredto more than one organization.Most

successfulorganizationis credited.
TABLE 2. Serious disputes involvingmilitary operationsand fighting
(N = 103), in percent
Referralsby Era
To UN
To regionals
%
N
Nonreferred
%
N
Total
N
1945-50
19
42
11
58
1951-55
60
40
1956-60
11
64
36
1961-65
23
10
44
30
26
1966-70
11
64
18
18
1971-75
12
33
42
25
1976-81
22
13
62
33
1945-81
103
52
51
22
21
29
28
Note. Excludesdouble-countingof disputes referredto more than one organization.Most

successfulorganizationis credited.

lomatic or political offensive, and full-scale military operationsdesigned to
defeat the enemy in battle, destroyhis forces, or conquerhis territory.Extent
of spreaddistinguishesamong disputes involving only the parties(bilateral),
situationsin which one or both of the partiesreceive militaryand diplomatic
aid from third parties though the outsiders are not willing to fight (local),
disputes that neighboringcountries are willing to enter militarily(regional),
and situationsin which states externalto the region might enter the fighting
(global).
GlobalContext.The globalcontext of concerninvolves, firstand foremost,
the question of whether a given dispute was related to the Cold War or the
struggleover decolonization.I distinguishbetween these two metaissuesand
"others."In addition, I distinguishbetween interstateconflictsinvolving no
civil war and civil wars that have resulted in various degrees of external
intervention. Alignments of the parties with respect to Cold War alliances
are also of interest. The four possibilities are, first, the parties are allies,
eitherbecause they belong to the same collective self-defensepact or because
they have military and political understandingswith the leaders of these
pacts; second, the parties are members of opposing blocs; third, one party
is alignedwhile the other is nonaligned;fourth, both partiesare nonaligned.
Finally, the power of the parties to a dispute was coded on a scale running
from superpowerto the weakest states.
Management. Managinga dispute involves making collective decisions,
mounting field operations, exercising leadership, and building consensus.
Decisions vary from minimal discussion that does not lead to the adoption
of a resolution or shifts the dispute to another organization,througha substantive resolutionthat does not call for action (i.e., an essentiallyrhetorical
statement),to a resolutionthat calls for operationsof some kind. Operations,
in turn, cover a wide spectrum, from none being authorized through factfinding, mediation, and conciliation, which involve missions rangingfrom
one to perhaps twenty people (small), to truce-observation,peacekeeping,
and enforcement measures (large),which involve-at the extreme-entire
armies.Resolutionshave to be sponsored,advocated,and supportedin order
to be adopted. I determined whether leadershipin these activities was exercised by one superpower,jointly by both superpowers,a large power, or
by middle, small, and smallest states (all others). I also determinedwhether
leadershipwas exercisedby the Secretary-Generalor the presidingofficerof
the SecurityCouncil,eitheractingalone orjointly with a membergovernment.
The consensus variable codes the vote by which the strongestwinning resolution was adopted. Possibilitiesrangefrom no consensus throughthe bare
satisfaction of the constitutional voting requirementor a generous margin
beyond the minimal requirementto near-unanimity.8
8. See the Appendix for the coding procedure.Tables A throughG in the Appendix show
the incidenceof these variablesover time.
198
The dependentvariable:success
Unlike regimesthat deal with economic and scientificissues, a regimethat
manages conflict takes for granted that the norms enjoining members to
settle their disputes peacefully and to abstain from the use of force will be
violated. Hence the prevalence of violations does not provide de facto evidence that no regime exists; the failureof the rules and proceduresto limit
or punish violations, however, does. But even if it is true that the regime's
success in managingconflict is not very impressive, some questions remain:
lack of success as compared to what? Is it a matter of consistent failure or
does the record show change over time?
Conflictmay be successfullymanagedin variousways. I labelthese various
ways of being successful"abatement,""isolation,""settlement,"and "stopping hostilities." Every dispute is capable of being settled and abated but
not every dispute was judged likely to escalatebeyond the initialpartiesand,
obviously, hostilities cannot be stopped if the dispute did not involve any
fighting.Each disputewas scoredon whetherthe organizationwas somewhat
successful on each of the dimensions applicable to the dispute, whether it
scored a great impact, or whether no impact of any kind was discernible.A
score of one hundredmeans that the organizationmade a majorcontribution
on all applicabledimensions during the period in question; a score of zero
means that not even limitedimpacton a singledimensioncould be observed.9
The aggregatesuccess of the United Nations since its inception is 23, as
compared to 34 for the OAS, 20 for the OAU, 15 for the Arab League,and
18 for the Council of Europe. Figure 1 shows a decay curve for the United
Nations and suggests a pattern of stability for the regionals.
3. Effectiveness of the regime
The UN Charter'sprinciples, norms, rules, and procedures
Three principles of the regime are explicitly stated in the UN Charter.
One affirms the notion of collective security (Art. 1); the second reaffirms
the sovereign equality of the members (Art. 2[1]); the third reaffirmsthat
treaties are binding (Arts. 2[2] and 25). A fourth principleis implicit in this
regime as in all others: the benefits accruingto the members are expected
to be roughlyreciprocaleven though sacrificesmade in furtheringthe explicit
principles need not be.10
9. See the Appendixfor furtherspecificationsof the dimensionsof successand the scale. See
Tables H, M, N in the Appendix for the success scores.
10. I find it impossibleto decide whetherthese principlesinvolve mattersof fact, causation,
or rectitudesince all three seem to be expressedby the Charter'sformulationif we read it in
the context of the experiencesand expectationsof the drafters.Rectitudeis obviously present.
Fact and causation cannot be distinguishedbecause the drafterswere acting on the basis of
what they consideredto be lessons of the Leagueof Nations and the interwarperiod.See Ruth
B. Russell, A History of the UnitedNations Charter(Washington,D.C.: Brookings,1958).
N
35 ,
30 -
- 30
35
REFERRALS
25
EFERRALS
i25
20 --20
15
1510
G
SUCCESS
GREAT
5DLIMITED
1945
--
- 10
GREATSUCCESS
SUCCESSSS
.L*TE*CCESS*
65
50
55
60
70
FIGURE 1. Success by era,
75
1945
801
1945
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
UnitedNations (N = 123), left, and regional
organizations (N = 80), right
What, then, are the norms? The Charterrecognizesseveral rights of the

members. All peace-lovingstates able and willing to abide by the principles
are entitledto membership(Art.4). Disputes "essentiallywithinthe domestic
jurisdiction"of a member are exempt from the principlesand other norms
(Art. 2[7]). The rightof self-defenseremainsunimpaired(Art. 51). Regional
securityarrangementsoutsidethe United Nations are permissible(Art. 52[1]).
The obligationsof members specify the types of behaviorsrequiredto meet
the principleof collective security. Thus "all Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means. . ." (Art. 2[3]); "all Members shall
refrain in their internationalrelations from the threat or use of force . . ."

(Art. 2[4]); and "all Membersshall give the United Nations every assistance
in any action it takes . . ." (Art. 2[5]). Finally, the recognized superiority of
the Security Council in the management of conflicts (Art. 24) implies a

particularright for its permanentmembers and an obligationfor all others
to abide by the inequality.
Norms are specificationsof behaviors requiredto make principles real.
Rules specify behaviors required to make norms real.11The UN Charter
lists these in the enumerationof the powers of its main organs;the same is
11. Zacher prefers the term "program"to "rules" because this realm not only includes
injunctionsof do's and dont's but also specifiesthe collective actions the membersmay take
to attain the norms, thus enhancingnational and joint capabilities.I have given the same
meaningto rulesin my "TechnologicalSelf-Reliancefor LatinAmerica:The OAS Contribution,"
InternationalOrganization34 (Autumn 1980). In the currentcontext "rules" seems more
appropriate.My discussion of the UN rules relies on the Charterand neglects furtherrules
containedin the GeneralAssembly'sand the SecurityCouncil'sRules of Procedure.
200
true of decision-makingprocedures.Both can also be phrasedas "obligations

of the members,"an expressionI avoid only becauseit is cumbersome.The
rulesprovide for the creationof a MilitaryStaffCommitteeto aid the Security
Councilin mountingenforcementactionsand for the duty of the membership
to aid in their execution (Arts. 26, 47, 48). The details of how the peaceful
settlement of disputes is to be carried out are enumerated in Articles 33
through38. The SecurityCouncil determineswhetherarmed attacksor acts
of aggressionhave taken place (Arts. 39, 40). It also decides whether and
what type of enforcement measures shall be taken (Arts. 41, 42, 48, 49).
Member states are obliged to earmarkmilitary forces for such operations
(Arts. 43-45). The General Assembly is to initiate studies and inquiriesto
determinewhether situationsexist that warrantthe triggeringof the conflict
managementrules (Arts. 13, 14). It also has the rightsto concern itself with
collective security when a specific dispute is not on the Security Council
agenda, to call threats to peace to the Council's attention, and to be kept
informedby the Council (Arts. 10, 11, 12). Regionalarrangementsare to be
coordinatedwith UN plans (Arts. 52[2-3], 53, 54). The SecurityCouncil is
to enforce awards of the InternationalCourt of Justice (Art. 94). And the
members are to hold Charterreview conferences (Art. 109). The General
Assembly approves the budget, assesses the annual contributions of the
members, and suspends members for failureto pay them (Arts. 17[3], 19).
Decision-makingprocedurestell us how the rules can be triggered.The
General Assembly's resolutions are only recommendations (Arts. 11, 12,
35[3]). Importantrecommendationsrequirea two-thirdsmajority,less importantones a simple majority(Art. 18). The GeneralAssembly can suspend
or expel members (Arts. 5, 6) and establish subsidiaryorgans(Art. 22). The
SecurityCouncil'soligarchicmembershipis specifiedin Art. 23 (as amended)
and its restrictive voting procedures in Art. 27 (as amended). States not
members of the Council are to be representedin discussions concerning
conflicts in which they are involved (Arts. 31, 32). The SecurityCouncilcan
block amendments to the Charter(Art. 108), applicationsfor membership
(Art. 4[2]), and the election of the Secretary-General(Art. 97); authorityfor
initiating action on membership, amendments, and electing the SecretaryGeneral is vested in the General Assembly. Finally, the Secretary-General
has the right to call threateningconflicts to the attention of the members
(Arts. 12[2], 99).
So much for the formal components of the regime, as instituted in 1945.
Are these principles,norms, rules, and proceduresmutually supportiveand
coherent?The norms do support the principles(if we overlook the fact that
the principleof sovereign equality is not perfectlyserved by enshriningthe
oligarchyof the five permanent members as a norm). However, the norms
are not mutuallysupportivein every way becausethereare two majorescape
clauses. The norm of individual and collective self-defense, when coupled
to the voting procedure in the Security Council and the status of regional

arrangements,contradictsthe norms that are to govern state behavior. The
domestic jurisdiction clause throws in doubt the type of conflict that is to
be managed in the regime. Nevertheless, rules and proceduresdo serve the
norms with a high degree of consistency.12Thus, while the fit among the
partsof the regimeis not perfect,it is good enoughto warrantthe continuation
of our inquiry.
Regime characteristicsof regional organizations
In general,the regime components of the regionalorganizationsresemble
those of the United Nations. Certainimportantdifferences,however, require
comment. By virtue of the Rio Pact the OAS is simultaneouslyan alliance
designed to protect the members against extrahemisphericthreats and a
collective security organization.The members need merely consult on extrahemisphericthreats, while the rules and proceduresgoverning disputes
among members are essentiallythe same as in the United Nations. No veto
exists:a two-thirdsvote is sufficientto decide on bindingenforcementaction,
though dissenters are not obliged to participate.
The Arab League also functions simultaneouslyas an alliance and as a
collective security organization.Despite the fact that it came into being in
1945 as a result of Britishinitiatives, the Leaguesoon adopted the principle
of self-defenseagainstEuropeanimperialinterestsand the creationof Israel.
Unlike the OAS the Leaguehas placed little emphasis throughoutits life on
explicitproceduresand clearrules. Heads of state effectivelymake decisions,
preferably by general consensus. Unanimity is required for important
decisions.
The OAU has fifty member states includingall countries on the African
continentexceptSouthAfrica.Modeledexplicitlyafterthe OAS it nevertheless
developed few of the institutionalcharacteristicsof that organization,with
its emphasis on detailed proceduresand rules and its penchantfor legalism.
Votingrulesmean little. Effectivedecisionsrequirethe personalparticipation
of heads of states who have tended to considera prominentrole in the OAU
as a sign of prestige.
The organizationhas been victimized by conflictingprinciplesand norms
about collective security and extraregionalthreats. From its beginning in
1963, the OAU has had to face the fact that its members were committed
to three contradictoryprinciples.One group saw in the OAU the first steps
toward the creation of a Pan African federationof states, a matter of little
interest to the Arab-Berberstates of North Africa. All the members also
proclaimed that the principle of expelling imperialism from the continent
was central to the OAU's task, thus making the OAU an alliance against
South Africa and Portugal.
12. For a far less charitable interpretation of the coherence of these elements see Hans Kelsen,
The Law of the United Nations (New York: Praeger, 1950).
202
At the same time, the membership committed itself to the principle of

collective security, based on the supporting norms of absolute sovereign
equalityamong members and the finalityof nationalbordersinheritedupon
independence.The OAU, despite the Pan Africanideal and despite the antiimperial principle,was to preservethe territorialintegrityof existing states,
not to tamper with them in pursuitof the equally pronouncedcommitment
to institutionalized,peaceful change and national self-determination.The
contradictionbetween these norms and principleswas resolved in favor of
collective security for any existing government, regardlessof its ideology,
behavior, or alignment outside Africa. How to treat liberationmovements
in the remaining colonial territories,however, remained an issue that the
membership never resolved when it was confronted with the existence of
rival movements, as in Angola and Eritrea.As I write in 1982, this issue,
expressed in the Western Sahara conflict, threatens the very future of the
OAU.
Effectiveness:scope and success
We now have to determine whether the record of referralsto the international organizationswarrantsthe conclusion that, at least for a period of
time, they were made responsiblefor managingthe bulk of the disputesthat
arose in world politics. Sixty-fourpercent of all disputes involving military
operations were so referred;the number rises to 72 percent if we consider
only the more serious disputes."3However, the pattern varies a good deal
over time. The United Nations' share of these referralsdeclinedto one third
duringthe 1970s from a high of 57 percentin the previous five-yearperiod.
Yet duringthe most recentfive years, 62 percentof the more seriousdisputes
still found their way to the UN agenda while only 5 percent remainednonreferred.Of all disputesinvolving militaryoperations,the numberof disputes
not referredto the regime fell from a high of over one half in 1945-50 to
24 percent in 1966-70, only to rise again to over one third since that time.
Again, however, the resurgenceof extraregimedisputes is less pronounced
when we restrictour attentionto the more seriousdisputes.Moreover,some
of the decline in the United Nations' share was absorbed by the regional
organizations.
It appears,therefore,that the scope of the regimeis decliningeven though
it continues to dominate the universe of interstateconflict. This decline is
made more concretewhen we pinpointthe characteristicsof the UN caseload
and compare it with nonreferreddisputes.14 Table 3 contrasts the cases on
the organizationalagendaand the cases that were not referredto the regime
in terms of their threat to world peace.
13. Discussion relies on Tables 1, 2.
14. Discussion relies on Table A in the Appendix.
TABLE 3.
Attributesof referredand nonreferreddisputes(percentof
caseload, N = 217)
Variable
UN
Regionals
Nonreferred
Intensity:high
65
45
37
Warfare:high
30
24
14
Spread:regional/global
23
38
22
Issue:Cold-War/decol.
55
20
61
Parties:Cold-Waraligned
65
47
66
Parties:super/large
46
18
45
While disputes referredto the United Nations were more threateningthan

the nonreferreddisputes in terms of intensity and amount of fighting,the
same is not true with respect to other characteristics.The nonreferredcases
include more Cold War and decolonizationcases, while the sharesare about
the same in terms of spread, alignment, and power of the disputants. We
can safely conclude, however, that the cases dealt with in the regimeare the
more serious ones and are numericallypreponderant.
How successful were the organizationsin managingthis caseload?The
decline in UN success is presentedin Figure2 (left), that of the regionalsin
Figure2 (right).The recordof the regionalsaggregatesthe differentialsuccesses
of the various organizations.The caseloadof the Councilof Europehas been
very small, about one dispute per era. The OAS accounts for most of the
decline in success, since that organizationalways scored above 33 percent
before 1970 but dropped to 25 percent in 1975 and to 17 percentby 1981.
The Arab League, however, improved its performanceover the years even
thoughits most recentscorewas only 19 percent.The OAU, finally,progressed
from 17 percentin 1965 to 30 percentin 1971-75, only to drop back to 10
percent in the most recent period. There is no question that the general
record of the regionalsmatches the decay in UN success since 1975.
When we turn to the dimensions of possible success (Figure3), however,
we see that failure on one of the dimensions does not necessarily imply
failureon all. Figure 3 uses the universe of 63 disputes in which the United
Nations scored limited or great impact. Most of the instances of successful
settlement occurred before 1970.15 Success in isolating conflicts has also
15. The casesof "great"successin settlingdisputes:Indonesianindependence,statusof British
Togoland, status of Cyrenaica,removal of KMT troops from Burma,West Irian, Suez war,
status of BritishCameroon,Thai/Cambodianborder(1959-60), Congo independence,status
of AfricanHigh CommissionTerritories,status of Ifni.
Casesof "limited"success:CorfuChannel,FrenchwithdrawalfromLevant,statusof Namibia,
Russianwives, Palestinetruce(1949-56), ChinaSea piracy,Algerianindependence,Israelborders
border
(1957-67), WadiHalfa,BuraimiOasis,Laoscivil war(1959-62), Moroccan-Mauritanian
204
45 -
45
40 --40
35 --35
SUCCESS
%)CCESS
(%)
- 30
30
25 --25
15
- 1
\
\/REFERRALS
10
1945
20
/-
20\
(N)
\%
50
55
60
65
70
75
80'
1945
10
REFERRALS(N)
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
Referralsand success by era, UnitedNations (N = 123), left,

and regional organizations(N = 80), right
FIGURE 2.
declined, but less dramatically."6The United Nations' record in stopping

hostilitiesremainshigh, though it worsenedafter 1965.17 Abatement,clearly
the least demanding activity in the managementof conflict, has been quite
good throughoutthe life of the organization.Decay does not yet amount to
irrelevance.18
Sarawak/Sabah, Tutsi restoration attempt, Panama Canal 1,
Kuwait independence,
(1960-61),
Equatorial Guinea inFalkland Islands, Katanga exiles, Arab-Israeli confrontation (1967-73),
Panama Canal 2, Chilean repression, Farakka barrage,
Bahrein independence,
dependence,
Transkei border, South African race policies (1976-), Western Sahara war, Benin coup, Burmese
U.S. hostages in Iran.
refugees, Israeli raids in Lebanon (1978-82),
16. The cases of "great" success in isolating disputes: Corfu Channel, Greek civil war, AzerSuez war,
baijan, Kashmir secession, Kashmir negotiations, Korean negotiations (1951-53),
civil wars (1958), Bizerta, status of
status of British Cameroon, Sakiet raid, Lebanon/Jordan
African High Commission Territories, independence of South Yemen, Cyprus civil war, status
Turkish
of Panama Canal, second Kashmir war, Iran expansion in Persian Gulf (1969-75),
invasion of Cyprus, Benin coup, Litani River war.
West
17. The cases of "great" success in stopping hostilities: Korean negotiations (1951-53),
Cyprus civil war, Iran expansion in the Persian Gulf (1969-75).
Irian, Congo independence,
18. High and very high intensity cases that the United Nations failed to manage though they
Soviet intervention in Hungary, status of Portuguese
were referred: Korean War (1950-51),
colonies, Cuban missile crisis, repression in South Africa (1962-76), Yemen civil war, Portuguese
Rhodesia-Zambia
border
Guinea, status of Rhodesia, Vietnam war, Eritrean independence,
territories, South African attacks on
fighting, status of Timor, repression in Israeli-occupied
border fighting, invasion of Kampuchea, repression in El SalAngola, Rhodesia-Mozambique
vador, Afghanistan.
100%_
80
60
FAILEDTO/
ISO
FAILEDTO
SETTLE
40
1945
50
FAILED
TO
STOP HOSTILITIES
t~~
55
FIGURE 3. Dimensions offailure,
60
65
70
FAILEDTO
AT
75
80
UnitedNations (N = 63), in percent
But that time may come. I compared the eventual outcome of the 79
nonreferreddisputeswith 75 disputesinvolving militaryoperationsthat were
referredto the United Nations but which it did not managewith any degree
of success.'9I consideredas failuresall disputes that remain unsettled, that
peteredout without resolution,and that resultedin the victory of one party.
Successfulresolution could be achieved either by mediation or by bilateral
negotiationoutside the United Nations. The resultsappearin Figure4. Until
the period 1965-70 even "failed" UN cases were settled peacefully more
often than were nonreferreddisputes; since that time, the reverse has been
true.
Correlatesof decay: the UnitedNations
To the extent that interpretationscan be offeredwithout lookingat specific
disputes and without allowingfor situationsspecificto certaineras-such as
the personalityof secretaries-generalor the overall turbulenceof the global
system- success for the United Nations over its entire history has ten
characteristics.20
19. Discussion relies on Tables H, I, J, K in the Appendix.
20. Discussion based on Table L in the Appendix.
206
70% -
60 -
50
/ j
\s
NONREFERRED
BUT RESOLVED
EVENTUALLY
//
40
/
/
/
30
UN FAILED
BUT RESOLVED
EVENTUALLY
10
1945
50
FIGURE 4.
55
60
65
70
75
80
Eventual resolutionoffailed UN and nonreferreddisputes
(N = 154), in percent
1. The most intense disputes are the most likely to be managed. Insignificant and very low-intensity disputes can be marginallyinfluenced.
Disputes in the intermediatelevels of intensity seem to be the most difficult to manage.
2. Unfortunately,the findingsfor intense disputes do not match the
performanceof the United Nations with respect to the seriousnessof
the fighting.Only 45 percent of the cases involving active warfarewere
managed, though the United Nations' impact tended to be moderate or
great. Success comes more readily when the fightingis very limited,
though then the impact is usually slight. It also seems clear that cases
which did not involve fightingwere not taken very seriously.
3. However, the most contagious disputes are the ones most frequently
influenced by the United Nations, very often with great success. Disputes that the neighborsof the main contendingparties are about to
enter actively are the most difficultto manage, whereas it seems relatively simple to score some minimal impact on purely bilateral
disputes.
4. Decolonization disputes are most readily managed, Cold War disputes very rarely (and then with minimal impact), while disputes not
related to the metaissues show a very indifferentrate of success.
5. Cold War alignments complicate the managementof conflict
considerably.
6. Disputes involving the superpowersare very rarely managed with

success, but cases pitting the weakest UN members against each other
do not fare so well either. Disputes involving middle powers such as
Argentina,Mexico, Egypt, Pakistan,the Netherlands, Belgium,and
Spain yield most easily to UN action.
7. Strong decisions bring results. However, the failure to make a decision does not necessarilyimply the failure of conflict management.
8. Energeticmeasures to enforce a truce and to separatethe contestants
bring results, overwhelminglywith great success. But small-scalemediation and conciliation also pay off over half of the time. However, we
must recall that many of the instances of "no operation"were such as
to make field missions inappropriateor impossible.
9. Weak powers make poor leaders but more powerful states do not do
much better. When the superpowershappen to exercise their leadership
together, of course, they are usually successful.The single most effective
mode of leadershipis the initiative of the Secretary-General,acting
either alone or in concert with one of the largerstates.
10. No effective action is possible without a wide or very wide consensus among the members.
There is an appreciabledifferencebetween situations in which a major
impact was scored and those in which a marginalone was scored.2'Major
impact is correlatedwith active warfare,decolonizationissues (until 1965),
disputes involving super and large powers (until 1970), strong decisions,
largeoperations,and the leadershipof the Secretary-General.These add up
to a very restrictiveprofile of disputes on which the United Nations had a
major impact. Much more versatility,however, is suggestedby the cases in
which we observe only minor impact. Instances of marginaleffectiveness
are spread over a wide spectrum of dispute attributesand modes of management. If the membershipis sufficientlyconcerned,it appears,the United
Nations may still make a limited differencein a wide varietyof circumstances
even thoughthe memberswill tend not to use it in decisivelyabating,isolating,
or settling their disputes.
Can the United Nations' decline in success and scope since 1970 be correlated with any of the variables for describingsalience?Figure 5 suggests
that the decline in effectiveness accompanies an increase in the number of
high-intensitydisputes; hence one wonders why success was high in earlier
periods with high-intensity conflicts. Moreover, the decay in the regime's
effectivenesscontinued in the face of a decline in the incidence of disputes
with majorfightingsince the relativelysuccessful1966-70 periodand matches
a trend toward more localized disputes. While decay cannot be explained
exclusively in terms of the changing salience of conflict, it appears as if a
decline in salience induces the members to tolerate conflict rather than to
manage it.
21. Discussion based on Tables M, N in the Appendix.
208
60% HIGH INTENSITY/
50 -
40-
WARFARE
30 -HIGH
*
.0.
10
SPREAD
REGIONAL/GLOBAL
1945
50
55
60
65
70
FIGURE 5. Salience of disputes by era,
75
80
UnitedNations (N = 123), in
percent
A similarexplanationof this decay seems to be associatedwith the changing

global context in which disputes arise. Figure6 shows that increasingfailure
is correlatedwith the decline of the Cold Warand of decolonizationdisputes,
with the prevalence of parties not aligned with a Cold War bloc, and with
a trend toward more conflict among the smallermember states. Marginality
with respect to the major issues of world politics appearsto go with regime
decay.
These trends are reflected in the management practices of the United
Nations, as shown in Figure 7.22 Since 1970, the United Nations has often
substitutedrhetoricfor action. Resolutionsthat authorizeoperationscontinue
to be passed but less often than before. The relativeinactivityof the United
Nations in recent years was exceeded only during the height of the Cold
War. Yet small field operationscontinueto be popularand even the number
of truce-observationand peacekeepingoperations did not decline sharply
until 1975. By contrast,the changein the patternof leadershipis very striking.
After 1965 the United States and the Soviet Union seldom sought to lead
22. For descriptions of the major disputes referred to international organizations and of the
methods of conflict management applied to them see David W. Wainhouse et al., International
Peace Observation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966) and International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Leon Gordenker,
The United Nations Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1967); Mark W. Zacher, Dag Hammarskjold's United Nations (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1970) and his International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946-77
(New York: Praeger, 1979).
70%
60 -
PARTY MIDDLE,SMALL,
SMALLESTPOWER
50 -
40 -
/
/
"
/
"'OTHER" DISPUTES
30-
20
~ ,NNOT
20-
/--- ALIGNEDWITHCOLD WAR BLOC
\ /
10
1945
50
FIGURE 6.
60
55
65
70
80
75
Global context of disputesby era, UnitedNations (N = 123), in
percent
80 -
- 80
WEAK DECISIONS
LEADERSHIPBY
SUPER/LARGEPOWER
70 -
- 70
60 -a60
50
LEADERSHIPBY
SECRETARY-GENERAL
I
/
40
\/\WEAK/NO
40
~~~~~~CONSENSUS
30
NO OPERATIONS
50
30
7
75
80
120
20
10
1945
50
~~
55
60
65
70
010
75
80
1945
50
FIGURE 7. Decisions and operationsby era,
percent
55
60
65
70
UnitedNations, (N = 123), in
210
unilaterallythough they still occasionally launch joint initiatives. It should

be noted that the apparentlack of American leadershipbetween 1955 and
1960 is misleading:this was the era of initiatives launched by Dag Hammarskjold,usually with the active supportof the United States. Under Kurt
Waldheimthe office of the Secretary-Generalbecame less prominent,abandoning the leadershiprole to the very powers whose conflicts increasingly
dominatedthe agenda.These variables,ratherthan the relativelyunchanging
pattern of consensus, seem to account for the decline in energy.
Grantingthese changesand grantingalso the almost complete lack of great
successes in managementsince 1970, is there still a chance that the United
Nations will continue to have at least a limited impact in some situations
of conflict? For example, in recent years the United States moderated its
power to act unilaterally, partly in response to UN involvement, in the
Iranianhostage crisis and the second Panama Canal episode. South Africa
negotiated on Namibia, changed some apartheid rules, and reopened the
border with Transkei. Postponing the lifting of sanctions against Rhodesia
probably helped to topple the Smith government. The Secretary-General
made some contributionto managingthe Iranianhostageand Burmeserefugee
cases. Several of these disputes had spread beyond the immediate vicinity
of conflict.
A true test of the possible trend toward continued relevance requiresa
systematic comparisonof the core issues on the UN agenda. If it turns out
that success is heavily concentratedon certainsimple disputesinvolving the
withdrawalof willingEuropeancountriesfromunwantedcolonialpossessions,
or on Cyprus, or on the Middle East, then the argument for the United
Nations' relevance is weak. Such a test is attempted in Table 4. "Easy decolonization"comprisescasesaboutterritoriesthatthe imperialpowerseemed
eagerto relinquishby the time the disputereachedthe United Nations;"hard
decolonization"disputesimply a strongreluctanceon the partof the imperial
power.The key, of course,lies in the changein successattendanton managing
"miscellaneous"disputes.The United Nations seems to pass the test. Success
in the "miscellaneous"category, after 1975, rose above the proportion it
had occupied in the previously most successful era, 1956-60.
Do regional organizationscomplementthe UnitedNations?
I have already established that, while the OAS seems to be undergoing
decay, the Arab League,the OAU, and the Council of Europeseem to have
entered a period of stabilityafter initial periods of failure.23In the aggregate
23. Discussionbased on Tables E, F, G in the Appendix.OAS cases are discussedin Gordon
Connell-Smith,TheInter-AmericanSystem(New York:OxfordUniversityPress, 1966);Joseph
S. Nye, Peace in Parts(Boston:Little,Brown, 1971).ArabLeaguecasesarediscussedin Hussein
A. Hassouna, The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana,
1975); Robert W. Macdonald, The League of Arab States (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1965). OAU cases are discussedin Jon Woronoff,OrganizingAfricanUnity(Metuchen,

N.J.: Scarecrow,1970); R. David Meyers, "IntraregionalConflictManagementby the Organization of AfricanUnity," InternationalOrganization28 (Summer 1974), pp. 345-76.
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212
and with the exception of the period 1971-75, regionalorganizationswere

given cases that werefarless intensethan those the United Nations addressed.
Warfarewas rarelyaimed at defeatingor conqueringthe enemy. However,
extraregionalstates were often on the point of entering disputes in Africa
and the MiddleEast,thoughthe same was not truein the westernhemisphere.
Over 80 percent of the cases involved neither decolonizationnor the Cold
War;only 30 percentpitted membersof opposingCold Waralliancesagainst
each other; civil strife accounted for 56 percent of the caseload. Naturally,
given the membershipof these organizations,the bulkof the disputesinvolved
only the smallest states. In short, the regionalrecord of success excels that
of the United Nations in some of the contextual categories in which UN
performancehas been weak.
Our excursioninto the regionalorganizations'recordin managingconflict
is justified by the hypothesis that regionalorganizationshave a specialized
capability for dealing with relatively localized, low-intensity disputes and
thus complementthe overallmandateof the United Nations.It is alsojustified
by the fact that organizationaldecay does not seem to strike all collective
security organizationsevenly. What, then, distinguishedthe regionalorganizations from the United Nations in terms of leadership,consensus, and
operations?
OAS. For the OAS the watershedoccurredin 1965, with the authorization
of a peace-keepingforce led by the United Statesin the Dominican Republic
that a substantialminority of member states opposed. Their challengeprogressivelyunderminedthe earlierconsensuson norms because,as left-leaning
governments came and went in Latin America, the early congruenceof the
collective securityand anticommunistnorms eroded.Before 1965 the United
Stateswas able successfullyto justify OAS interventionin disputesthat pitted
right againstleft by pointingto the Soviet threat;after 1965 it was no longer
able to conflate the two principlesso readily because a substantialnumber
of other governments refused to acquiesce.
Before 1965 the United States used the OAS effectivelyin the furtherance
of its own objectives, which then coincided with the perceived interests of
most of the other members.The organizationdid well in insignificantas well
as in moderately intense disputes, in cases of limited fightingas well as in
disputes without fighting.It did even better when war was waged seriously.
It coped better with bilateraland local than with regionaldisputes but even
there the recordwas good. The United States also did well in using the OAS
to restrain Cuban forays into other Caribbeancountries. The OAS scored
successesagainstmembersin all the categoriesof the powerhierarchy.Strong
decisions predominated but even deliberationsthat resulted in no formal
decision at all scored limited impacts. Small-scaleoperations,usuallya conciliation commission of the Permanent Council in which certain perennial
diplomats played the key roles, regularlyscored limited successes, though

most of the major successes requiredlarge-scaleoperations (as in the Dominican Republic and the Honduran-Nicaraguanborder dispute). And the
United States acted as the leader,financier,and furnisherof militarysupport
half of the time.
Much of this changed after 1965. Mexico and Venezuela challengedthe
U.S. leadershipsuccessfullywith respect to Cuba and the Sandinistarevolt
in Nicaragua. Jamaica, Panama, and the Andean countries are no longer
reliable clients. Conciliation commissions no longer score easy successes
because they now reflectthe deep-seateddivisions among the membergovernments;fewer strongdecisions are made and far fewer field operationsare
attempted. New referralshave declined sharply and success has dropped
from 38 to 17 percent. American leadershiphas all but disappearedwhile
that of the middle powersis rising;consensus remainstenuous. Before 1965,
the United States was the object of complaints 14 percent of the time, but
that figure rose to 33 percent after 1965. Certainly,the experience of the
OAS since 1965 confounds the hypothesis that the regional organization
complements the United Nations, though before 1965 its record provides
considerablesupport for the notion. Now the two are decayingin tandem.
Arab League. Membershipin the Arab League expanded graduallyfrom
the core of Mid-easternArabstatesto includeall of North Africa,Mauritania,
the Palestine LiberationOrganization,and even Somalia. The success rate
of the League was dismal in its first decade, improved during the 1960s,
and stabilizedat 19 percentin 1976-81. Improvementin performancewent
with increasingintensityof disputes, more active warfare,and greaterthreats
of infection by regional and global confrontations.Since 1970, improved
performancealso covaries with increased Cold War alignmentsof the disputants. In the earlier period, most of the inter-Arab disputes were not
directly linked to superpowerrivalry in the Middle East. But as the Arab
states increasinglysplit into "moderate"and "radical"camps, considerations
of Cold Waralignmentsbecame more prominent.Presumably,the increasing
success-albeit at a very modest level-of the Arab Leagueis relatedto the
desire of member states to isolate the region from global infection. Limited
success in containingthe Lebanese civil war before 1982 and great success
in stopping two wars between the Yemens provide support for this interpretation.Increasingconsensus has made possiblethe mountingof relatively
large-scaleoperations in the 1970s.
Leadershipemerges as the most powerfulvariableto explain the change.
At first,Egyptsoughtto exercisehegemonicinfluence.The Secretary-General,
always an Egyptianuntil the 1970s, was extremely active even though he
had no clear constitutionalmandate and was widely perceivedto act in the
interests of Egypt. Iraq sought to challenge Egyptianhegemony from time
to time and during the 1950s factions would form around the two leaders;
hence, Egypt was ineffective as a conflict manager. In later years, Saudi
214
Arabia assumed a quiet hegemonic rule. Following the Camp David agreements Egypt was expelled from the League, headquarterswere moved to
Tunis, and a Tunisian became Secretary-General.He has not sought an
active role for himself. Saudi Arabia continues to finance most of the Arab
League's operations and to provide the diplomatic initiatives required to
manage conflict. Since everythingseems to depend on momentary constellations of hegemony in the League, it would be risky to project current
stabilityinto the future.Yet a limited complementarityto the United Nations
seems evident in 1982.
OAU. The effectivenessof the OAU has oscillatedmore dramaticallythan
that of the Arab League, from a success score of 22 percent in 1966-70 to
30 percent in the following lustrum, only to slide back to 10 percent since
1976. Duringthe 1970s its task became heavier:Africanwars became more
deadly, disputes spread more widely in the region as well as outside, and
the disputing parties were increasinglyaligned with one of the sides in the
Cold War. During the first period, one-half of the disputes grew out of civil
wars and revolutions; during the second the number fell marginally,to six
out of fourteen. Still, performance improved at first, decisions became
stronger, and one large operation was attempted in Chad. A look at the
identity of the cases may suggest why.
The number of strong decisions does not differ much between the two
periods, but their impact does. The OAU failed to managethe Nigerianand
Zairean civil wars during the first era, though it helped to moderate the
border dispute between Somalia and its neighbors.When governments feel
they can win a civil war, often with external help, they reject OAU intervention. Thus, duringthe secondperiod,Ethiopiarebuffedthe OAU's attempt
to manage the Ogaden and Eritreanwars, and disputes of this type remain
outside the OAU's competence. On the other hand, the OAU's strong decisions after 1970 did moderate the impact of Amin's coup in Uganda and
the effortin 1975 to overthrowthe governmentof Benin,stoppedthe genocide
in Burundi,and aided in getting Libya out of Chad.
While the OAU is not able to mount more small-scaleoperationsthan in
the past, the ones it does launchhave become more effective.Such operations
follow a routinized pattern. The president of the Conference of Heads of
States first attempts mediation on his own or in the company of a small
committee composed of heads of states. Failing this, the dispute may be
discussed in the full Conferencein order to strengthenthe hand of the mediators. During the 1960s, the Secretary-Generalsought an active role as
conflict manager, a role strongly resisted by member states of more conservative views and opposed to Pan Africanism. Succeeding secretariesgeneral have been more modest, leaving the managementrole to heads of
state. While leadershipwas diffused, the fact that there is neither a strong
executive head nor a hegemonic state (Nigeria'sleadershiprole being inter-

Comparisonof disputes referredto UN and regionals (N = 20),
in percent.
TABLE 5.
Success in 1966-81
Success in 1945-65
N
None
Some
Regionals Do Better
60a
UN Does Better
67c
No Difference
60
40
None
Some
Great
40b
33e
671
33d
50
50
Great
a. OAS: Arbenz overthrow,Haitian tyranny;CE: status of Cyprus.

b. OAS: Dominican intervention;AL: Kuwaitindependence.
c. AL: Wadi Halfa, BuraimiOasis.
d. AL: Lebanon/Jordancivil wars. Arguably,this case does not fit the profile.
e. OAS: Sandinistarevolt.
f. OAU: Benin coup, Chad civil war.
mittent)compels the OAU to seek Americanand Frenchassistancewhenever

operations are contemplated. The OAU is incapable of mounting and financing operations on its own and its success, when mediation by heads of
state proves insufficient,continues to depend on extraregionalactors. When
these actors'goalsin isolatingAfricanconflictsfrom the globalcontexthappen
to coincidewith the OAU membership's,managementactioncomplementing
that of the United Nations is possible.
Are regional organizationssuccessfulat UN expense?
We would characterizethe global conflict managementregime as a set of
competing organizationsand forces if we were to arrive at the conclusion
that the United Nations and the regionalsare rivals for the same kinds of
cases. What does the recordof the effectivenessof the regionalshave to tell
us on that score?
An examination of the twenty disputes submitted both to the United
Nations and to one or more of the regionalsallows one judgment of relative
effectiveness (see Table 5). A study of disputes that went to the United
Nations but match the profileof "typical"referralsto regionalorganizations
permitsanother.Typically,disputesreferredto a regionalorganizationbefore
1965 involved minimal fighting,were of low intensity, and had not spread
beyondthe neighborsof the antagonists.Few globalmetaissueswereinvolved,
the parties were small or middle powers, and they were either nonaligned
or members of the same Cold War bloc. If regionalsconsistentlyoutperform
the United Nations in managingsuch conflicts we would have to conclude
that their specializedcompetence complementedthat of the United Nations.
The record suggeststhat this did not happen with any degreeof consistency,
216
even though the OAS before 1965 performedin accordancewith the ideal
division of labor.
After 1965 the profile of disputes submitted to the regionals no longer
differedsystematicallyfrom the United Nations' caseload.The organizations
became competitorsfor the same task and the regionalsdid outperformthe
United Nations in three out of seven cases, as opposed to five out of thirteen
before 1965. Thus the global regime is decaying in another sense: its constituent organizationshave become rivals.
The same conclusionemergesfrom a second test. Therewereeightdisputes
referred to the United Nations that "normally" should have gone to the
OAS and the Council of Europe, all after 1963; in four of these the United
Nations scored successes, in a sense at the expense of regionalorganizations
because the parties did not trust them. Hence we must conclude not only
that the regionals are increasinglysuccessful at UN expense but also that
the reverse is true. There is no global division of labor among conflict management agencies now and there probablynever was one.24
Conclusion
The aggregatesuccess scored by most internationalorganizationsin managing conflicts has declined steadily after 1970. Success diminishedwith the
advent of disputes among small and middle powers that did not relate to
decolonizationand the Cold War;the dominationof the procedureby small
and middle powers who are nonaligned with respect to the Cold War; the
increasingaverage intensity of disputes;and the increasingincidence of disputes of local significance.These aspects of the internationalenvironment
in which conflicts arose, in turn, resulted in behaviors characterizedby the
reluctanceof most organizationsto adopt substantivelymeaningfuldecisions;
the absence of prominent leadershipby the superpowers;and the decline of
leadership by the Secretary-General.Put slightly differently,the historical
record suggeststhat collective effortsto manageconflict tend to thrive when
disputes are perceived to threatenglobal peace but that they languishwhen
disputes are scattered and relatively unconnected to global concerns. The
corollaryof this finding is the tendency on the part of some regionalorganizations to be increasinglyeffective in managingconflicts that do threaten
to infect the region with a global ailment. Since some disputes of global
significancecontinue to be referredto the United Nations and since states
24. This confirmsRobert Butterworth'sfinding.See his "OrganizingCollectiveSecurity:The
UN Charter'sChapterVIII in Practice,"WorldPolitics 28 (January1976), pp. 197-222. Five
of the eight cases involved aspects of the confrontationbetweenGreeceand Turkey;the other
three were Caribbeandisputesto which the United Stateswas a party.For additionalevidence
that states do not consistentlycoordinatepolicy in the United Nations with what is done in
regionalorganizationssee ErnstB. Haas and EdwardT. Rowe, "RegionalOrganizationsin the
InternationalStudies Quarterly17 (March 1973).
United Nations: Is There Externalization?"

apparentlyare unwilling to have the United Nations confront them energetically,the membersof the OAU and the Arab Leagueseek to compensate
by upgradingregional activity. This interpretationis strengthenedby the
finding that the number of high-intensitydisputes not referredto any organizationhas declined sharply since 1975.
4. Coherence of the regime
Change in regime coherence
Such are the facts of recent history. They suggest that the actors on the
stage of world politics have learned little; or, perhaps,they have learnedto
manageconflict without needingan effectiveregime.After all, the sharprise
in internationaldisputes since 1975 (after many ups and downs since 1945)
has led neither to nuclear nor to a big conventional war. Before coming to
any such conclusion,however, we have to show what happenedto the regime
duringthe process of decay. This requiresus to summarizechangesin principles, norms, rules, and proceduresin such a way as to throw into relief
the differencesin patternbetween the relativelysuccessfulinitial twenty-five
yearsand the more recentera of relativefailure.And this leads us to a crucial
question: why did improvements in regime coherence mapped during the
first period not lead to their stabilizationin the second?
Principles may change for a number of reasons, such as the appearance
of a largenumber of new ac'torswhose beliefs about causationand rectitude
differfrom the originalmembership'sbecause of the emergenceof new demands and of differentexpectationsof behavior. If these demands and expectations prevail and agreement on new principles can be achieved, the
regime "grows."If, however, the old and the new actors cannot agree, the
regime "dies." Evidence of the death of a regime includes the withdrawal
of largenumbers of members or of a few importantmembers, nonpayment
of contributions,systematicabsence from meetings, or consistent violations
of norms by most of the members. The United Nations is not often plagued
by such behavior. In all formal ways, the regime continues to exist and its
scoperemainswide. But it neithergrewnor stabilizedafter 1970;the attributes
of decay become crucialfor understanding.Decay must be studiedby looking
at the changing coherence of norms, rules, and proceduresin relation to
principles.Norms may requireadaptationfor two reasons. It may become
apparentthat the initial fit between norms and principleswas poor and that
norms must be adjusted to serve principles better. In addition, the initial
coherence among norms may have been deficient. The same is also true of
rules and procedures.Each component may sufferfrom poor adjustmentto
the next "higher"componentor with respectto the otherrulesand procedures.
Moreover,the lack of fit may occurbecause of initialdesign flawsor because
218
the next higher component is changing.Rules and proceduresmay require

adaptationbecause norms are changingor even if norms remain constant.
Thus the coherenceof a regimeincreasesif norms that wereinitiallypoorly
adjustedto one anotherare latermade more mutuallysupportive;it decreases
if norms are progressivelypermittedto contradictone another. Unless new
norms improve the principles, a change in norms underminesthe regime.
Coherence decreases when the new norms tend to make the principle of
collective security more problematic.
Regime componentsand the UnitedNations
The subsequentdiscussion focuses on changes in the United Nations and
neglects the regionalorganizations.We have seen that, despite the original
regimenorms,the regionalswereprogressivelydetachedfromUN procedures.
Their development as separate entities furtherunderlinesthe decay of the
original regime.
Mapping changes in regime components is a tedious business, justified

only if we take seriously our commitment as students of regimes to the
concepts we have developed for these studies. There is no justificationfor
using the terms unless we take the trouble to demonstrate what they can
tell us about historicalevents. Nevertheless,we ought not to expect a perfect
match between changes in regime components and the ups and downs in
regime effectiveness.Principles,norms, rules, and proceduresdo not change
even in five-year increments. Earlier changes are rarely repealed in later
periods;they linger on as new changes are superimposedon them.
If we isolate certain featuresof UN practice,the historicalrecord breaks
down into four eras, though they overlap a bit. The featuresof interest are
the overall patternof polarityin world politics;the salienceof the Cold War
in world politics and the alignments among states that show up in UN
behavior as a result; leadershipexercised by the Cold War superpowersin
the United Nations; and the consensus among the other members they are
able to mobilize. The combinationof these four featuresgives us eras I shall
label "the concert" (1945-47 and occasionallythereafter),"permissiveenforcementwith balancing"(1948-55), "permissiveengagement"(1956-70),
and-despite my best efforts to find a pattern-a rather chaotic period of
"no pattern"at all since 1970. The initialperiodof "the concert"corresponds
to the regimecomponents found in the UN Charter,which I have described
earlier.Changesin components,therefore,must be analyzedwith the concert
as the baseline. In the terminology used by Mark Zacher, the trajectoryof
the regime ran from a principleof consensus to one of competition.25While
25. See Zacher, International Conflicts. Zacher studied the same disputes as I, though using
an N of 116, asking under what circumstances the United Nations managed to intervene with
success. He defines success, unlike me, as the ability to halt aggression. He found that the United
Nations achieves success most frequently in disputes pitting a nonaligned member against a
member of a Cold War alliance (when the victim was nonaligned). Scrutiny of actual cases

that competitionin turn correspondedto a discerniblepatternfor over twenty
years, my evidence suggests that this is no longer the case. Table 6 shows
the changes.
Concert. Under the dominance of the idea of the concert, the Security
Councilruledthe regime.The five permanentmemberssanctionedall action;
their failureto agreeimplied inaction.They alone wereto enforcethe norms.
But this implied-since each had the veto-that either they were expected
to be in agreementon almost everythingor that they would keep disputes
among themselves off the agenda and confine the UN caseload to disputes
of no great salience in their foreign policies. In short, the United Nations
under the aegis of the concert assumed consensus on world order issues
among the permanent members, leadershipby the superpowers,and their
abilityto mobilize appropriatemajoritieson their behalf. It also implied the
absenceof polarityor, moreaccurately,a unipolarsystemunderthe hegemony
of the United States in which others acquiesced. With the advent of the
Cold War and bipolarity as a fact of life, none of these assumptions and
conditions remainedrelevant. If no new norms and rules had been invented
after 1947, the Cold War would have condemned the United Nations to
death then and there.
The importanceof changes in regime components is demonstratedby the
frequencyand impact of the veto in the SecurityCouncil (see Table 7). The
veto has a much more ambiguous relationshipto the practiceof collective
securitythan is usually supposed. The United States did not have to use its
veto before 1966 whereas the earlierfrequentSoviet use, though it was not
nearly as frequent as folklore maintains, ebbed at that point. The United
States and its major allies had regularrecourseto the veto after 1966, while
the Soviets were able to do without it until the most recent reemergenceof
the Cold War. I note, however, that the veto at no time crippledthe United
Nations. Changes in the regime's rules and proceduresmade possible continued impact on conflict managementdespite recourseto the veto.26
discloses that Zacher'sinstancesof success are identicalwith the cases I identifyas dominated
by the issue of decolonization.Whetherissueor alignmentis the morepowerfulpredictorcannot
be settled without consideringthe additionalvariablesI introduce.
26. Data for the left half of this table came from Robert S. Junn, "Voting in the United
Nations SecurityCouncil,"InternationalInteractions9, 4 (1983). I thank ProfessorJunn and
the editorsof InternationalInteractionsfor permissionto use the data. The Frenchand British
vetoes primarilyshelteredSouthAfricaand Rhodesiaduringthe 1970s, thoughthey alsoblocked
the U.S.-sponsoredresolutionagainstIsraelin 1956. Americanvetoes blockedsanctionsagainst
South Africain 1976 and 1980 and also shelteredRhodesiaand Israelagainstcondemnations.
Soviet vetoes were often cast to oppose resolutionsthat dealt with decolonizationcases, demonstratingSoviet dissatisfactionwith measuresconsideredtoo weak. On many other occasions
Soviet vetoes merely blocked Western-inspiredpropagandastatementsand thereforelacked
substantiveimpact.The disputesused for Table 7 are Frenchin Levant;Greekcivil war;Corfu
Channel;Berlin blockade;Indonesian independence;Korean war; Palestine truce; threat to
Thailand;Guatemalancivil war;Suez war;Hungarianintervention;Kashmirnegotiations;Lebanon/Jordancivil war; Zaire independence;Kuwait independence;Goa; Palestine borders;
220
The initial period was one of the United Nations' most successful. The
fact that Cold War alignmentsdid not interferewith its impact in Indonesia,
the Levant, Azerbaijan,and Palestine is partly accounted for by the Soviet
Union's not insistingon the logic of the veto and acceptingthe strongleadershipof the United States. The Soviet Union's restraintenabledthe concert
to function, a condition no doubt helped by a convergenceof its interests
with America's.
Permissiveenforcementwithbalancing.The Greekcivil warand the Korean
war spelled the end of the concert;they implied the advent of tight bipolarity
and full Cold War alignments inside and outside the United Nations, and
the United States commanded a two-thirdsmajorityby virtue of the alignments. The reciprocityof the implicationof "mutualabstention"in the use
of the United Nations by the superpowersgave way to its employment for
Cold War purposes. The membership applications of states suspected of
joining either alignment were blocked. The Soviet Union considered the
Secretary-Generala lackeyof the West. Afterthe predictableSoviet response
to American dominance-the use of the veto in crises such as the Greek
and Korean wars-the United States used its overwhelming majority to
initiatethe "Unitingfor Peace"norm (and its associatedrulesand procedures)
by shifting collective security operations from the Security Council to the
GeneralAssembly. While the impact of the United Nations on conflictmanagement declined after 1950, it remained a respectable24 percent.
The authorization of enforcement measures by the General Assembly
remained "permissive"because it carriedno binding force; a vote merely
authorizedstates willing to undertakean operationto do so. The Assembly
legitimizes a decision by a state or an alliance, making the United Nations
an adjunct of the alliance-or so it would be if the norm were permittedto
work unchecked. The Korean war and its eventual settlement, however,
suggestthat the norm of permissive enforcementdominates only as long as
the two-thirdsmajorityof the sponsoringstatesremainsunimpaired.If some
states change their minds and decide to attempt mediation or conciliation
between the antagonists,permissive enforcementyields to "balancing."ObMalaysianconfrontation;Bangladeshindependence;Cyprus invasion; Kampucheainvasion;
Sino-Vietnamborderwar; Namibia; attacks on Angola; Rhodesian U.D.I.; Afghanistanwar;
PanamaCanal2;Yom Kippurwar;Israeli-occupied
Arab-Israeliconfrontation;
Rhodesia/Zambia;
territories;Mayotte secession. An additional test of the importanceof the veto in blocking
impactwas used:wheneverthe blockingstatewas in a militaryand politicalpositionto frustrate
the intent of the resolutionby actionsavailableto it outsidethe UN framework,the veto alone
cannot be blamed for preventingconflictmanagement.At best eightsituationscould have been
dealt with more forcefully.All involved Britishvetoes. Had it not been for Britishactions to
shelter the Smith governmentof Rhodesia and block the expulsionof South Africa from the
United Nations it is possiblethat a coalitionof ThirdWorldand communiststateswould have
prevailed(if the United Stateshad remainedinactive).Butthe veto has complicatedthe mounting
of peacekeepingoperations.Franceand the Soviet Union have cast vetoes in certaindisputes
in orderto challengethe SecurityCouncil'spowerto intervene.They have therebycontributed
to the crisis over financingsuch operationsfrom regularUN funds.
TABLE 6.
Change in UN regime components
Concert
Permissive
Enforcement with
Balancing
Permissive
Engagement
No pattern
1945-47
1948-55
1956-70
1971-81
PRINCIPLES
Collectivesecurity
No change
No change
No change
Sovereignequality
No change
No change
No change
Treatiesbinding
No change
"Unjust treaties"
may not be binding
As in 1956-70
Reciprocityin
benefits
Upset by use of UN
for Cold War
Upset by use of UN
for decolonization
As in 1948-70
NORMS
Membershipcriteria
No change
Universality
supercedes
restrictionsof Art. 4
"Raciststates" may
be ineligible;
liberationgroups
may be eligible
Domestic
jurisdiction
Disregardedwith
inclusionof human
rightsissues
Disregardedfurther
with inclusionof
colonial civil wars
As in 1948-70
Self-defenselimited
by Art. 51
Disregardedas
SecurityCouncil's
monitoringpower is
not used
As in 1948-55
As in 1948-70
Regional
arrangements
Regional
organizationsused
to sidestepUN
As in 1948-55
Regional
organizations
sometimes
complementUN
Privilegedrole of big
powers
Sidesteppedvia
"Unitingfor Peace"
procedureby using
GeneralAssembly
As in 1948-55 but
not always
As in 1948-70 but
less often
No use of force,
peacefulsettlement,
mutual assistancein
case of violations
Recourseto
"Unitingfor Peace"
procedure
"Peacekeeping"as
intermediate
techniquebetween
peacefulsettlement
and enforcement;
use of General
Assembly
Decline of
peacekeeping;
special sessions/
conferencesof
GeneralAssembly
222
TABLE 6.
continued
Concert
1945-47
Permissive
Enforcementwith
Balancing
1948-55
Permissive
Engagement
1956-70
No pattern
1971-81
RULES
Graduatedsteps for
peacefulsettlement
(Chap. 6)
GeneralAssembly
committees assume
role of Security
Council
Peacekeepingblurs
distinctionbetween
Chaps. 6 and 7; Art.
39 avoided
As in 1948-70
Enforcementvia
SecurityCouncil
Noninvocationof
Arts. 39, 40. No use
of MilitaryStaff
Committee
As in 1948-55; label
of "aggressor"
avoided
As in 1948-70
Big power standby

forces
Disregarded;ad hoc
voluntaryforces for
fightingand truce
observation
Some routinization
of ad hoc voluntary
forces for
peacekeepingand
truce observation
Decline of
routinization
GeneralAssembly
role in collective
security(Arts.
10-14)
Upgradedvia
"Unitingfor Peace";
recommendation
only
As in 1948-55
Intensifiedwith ad
hoc conferencesto
deal with crises;
recommendations
only
Obligatoryfinancial
contributions
No change
Dispute over
paymentsof
peacekeeping
expenses;voluntary
contributions
Formulafor
combining
obligatorywith
voluntarypayments
ICJ decisions
enforceableby
SecurityCouncil
Disregarded
Disregarded
Disregarded
PROCEDURES
No change
No change
No change
No change
GeneralAssembly
role on membership,
choice of SecretaryGeneral
No change
No change
No change
No change
No change
GeneralAssembly
can only
recommend
SecurityCouncilcan
block new members,
Secretary-General
TABLE 6. continued
Concert
1945-47
Permissive
Enforcementwith
Balancing
1948-55
Permissive
Engagement
1956-70
No pattern
1971-81
SecurityCouncil
voting
Permanentmembers
fail to abstain in
votes on disputes to
which they are party
Double-veto
disused;abstention
by permanent
membernot a veto;
consensusprocedure
As in 1948-70
Secretary-General's
role in peacekeeping
and mediation(Art.
99)
Attempt to use Art.

99 ends in
resignationof
Secretary-General
Secretary-General
acquiresrightto use
his permanent
representativeas
mediator;propose
recruitand maintain
peacekeepingforces;
build supporting
voting coalitions
As in 1956-70 but
used more sparingly
viously, the antagonists would not consent to balancing unless they had
decided on their own that a continuation of the conflict was undesirable.
During the period 1948-1955, then, this combinationof circumstancesprevented the United Nations from becoming simply an appendage of one
superpower,like the OAS.
Permissiveengagement.The changesin regimecomponentsinitiatedduring
the late 1940s and the early 1950s were expanded and routinizedbetween
1956 and 1965, a periodthat saw some ofthe United Nations' more dramatic
successes and included a success score of 40 percent in 1956-60. Tight
bipolaritygave way to a much looser constellationof forcesas the nonaligned
movement was organized and as the large number of newly independent
states joined neither alliance, acquiringafter 1960 a two-thirds majorityin
the United Nations. At the same time the internal cohesion of both Cold
War alliancesdeclined and, for reasonsunrelatedto the United Nations, the
salience of the Cold War ebbed, resultingin the first detente afterthe Cuban
missile crisis. The dissolution of colonial empires was at the top of the
internationalconflict agenda and dominated the UN caseload, though this
trend interactedwith Cold War considerationsin some instances. Furthermore, this context providedthe opportunityfor Dag Hammarskjold's"quiet
diplomacy,"the engagementof the United Nations under"Unitingfor Peace"
auspices but no longer under the exclusive aegis of the United States and
the West. The enlargedmembershipgave the Secretary-Generalthe oppor-
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tunity to base UN intervention on shifting coalitions of supportingstates,
often including the United States as an enthusiastic backer. The Soviets,
while sometimes on the losing end of these coalitions, neverthelessreduced
their use of the veto from an annual average of .9 between 1945 and 1955
to .7 for this period (as opposed to .4 for the period after 1970).
The shift in the principleof reciprocity,highlightingthe rightsof colonized
peoples, implied several adjustmentsin norms, rules, and procedures.Decolonizationspurredthe changein the membershipand domesticjurisdiction
norms.It was also responsiblefor continuingthe shiftto the GeneralAssembly
of responsibilityfor active conflictmanagement.And that shift made possible
the adjustmentsin the "no force" and "mutualassistance"norms that gave
the Secretary-Generalthe opportunityto invent peacekeepingas a technique
straddlingthe pacific settlement of disputes and the prevention of armed
attacks and acts of aggression.
Rules were adjusted to serve the changed norms through the avoidance
of the Charter-sanctioneddistinctionbetween the steps envisagedin Charter
Chapters 6 and 7 (again through the invention of peacekeepingand the
"Uniting for Peace" resolution);the price paid for the shift, however, was
the serious controversy over obligatory payments, as states outside the
Secretary-General'scoalitions refused to contribute. Increasingregime coherence was by no means linear and uniform.
Proceduraladjustmentsrespondedonly in part to these changesin norms
and rules. The proceduresin the SecurityCouncil for selectingcommissions
and committees to aid the Secretary-General'supgradedrole in conflictmanagement derive from the change in rules. So do the routines for recruiting,
organizing,deploying, and supplying national peacekeepingforces, as well
as for negotiatingagreementsguaranteeingtheir rightsof action and access.
However, the change in decision-makingprocedurein the SecurityCouncil
was due to a waning Cold War, not to changes in rules.
On balance, then, the United Nations became more coherentas a conflict
managerby the early 1960s. The hierarchyof interlockingnorms, rules, and
proceduresbecame more mutually supportive and better able to serve the
principlesonce the principle of reciprocityhad been changed. Institutional
evolution occurredbecause of the short-term,self-interestedbehaviorof the
actors. Why, then, did it fail to stabilize?
The seeming growth of the regime, as evidenced by improved coherence
among its components and its effectiveness duringthe 1956-60 era, led to
a very precariousstability in the 1960s. Success dropped to 20 percent by
1965, though it rose again to 24 percent between 1966 and 1970. The very
adaptation of the norms to the altered principleof reciprocitymade some
of the originalrules inappropriateand their successorsmore ambiguous.The
norms dealingwith regionalismand self-defensewere, in effect, sacrificedto
the new principle. The nonreciprocalrelationship between the European
colonial powers and their Third World challengersunderminedthe rules on
226
binding financial contributions. Firmly earmarkedstandby military forces

became a victim of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution and of the ad hoc
peacekeepingmechanism; and that mechanism became unreliablebecause
of the dispute over financing.
The record of the InternationalCourt of Justice offers further striking
evidence of failure in the mutual reinforcementof rules. The Charterlists
judicial settlement as a form of pacific settlement and calls for Security
Council enforcementof awardsby the Court.27The actual record,however,
is dismal.
Because the active involvement of the General Assembly depended on
the existenceof an appropriatecoalition,predictableand consistentadherence
to new rules and proceduresof conflict managementcould not be attained.
Conversely,when concert-likeconditionsmade it possiblethe SecurityCouncil
could function with the active leadershipof the Secretary-General,but only
on occasion. While the Secretary-General'srole looked like an important
increasein regimecoherence,the enactmentof that role remainedin practice
entirely dependent on the political alignments triggeredby a given dispute
and the extraordinarypersonalityof Dag Hammarskjold.U Thant, though
he attempted to play the same role until 1965, was unable to routinizeand
stabilize the procedure.
The currentera: no pattern. No fundamentalchange in the components
of the regime occurred after 1970. Institutional innovations made earlier
continued to be used. Rules and proceduresthat had gone by the wayside
were not revived. Yet the regime was less coherent in several ways. Universality of membershipbecame a source of discord as it was extended de
facto to the Palestine LiberationOrganizationand the South West African
People's Organization;the watered-down domestic jurisdiction norm was
applied asymmetricallyto burden colonial and right-winggovernments;its
furtherextension to human rights concerns was aimed mostly at Israel and
South Africa.The SecurityCouncilcontinuedto be sidesteppedon occasion,
primarilyto restrainIsrael, South Africa, and white-ruledRhodesia. Earlier
adaptationswere not used when IndonesiaconqueredTimor, Chinaattacked
Vietnam, Vietnam invaded Kampuchea,Iraq moved into Iran, India aided
27. I considered20 judgments and advisory opinions of the Courtthat dealt with disputes
also on the political agenda of the United Nations. They break down as follows with respect
to implementation:8 cases declaredmoot, jurisdictionor standingof complainantdeclined,
withdrawn,pending;in 3 cases,judgmentimplemented;in 9 cases,judgmentnot implemented.
border,
The implementedjudgmentsare the Haya de la Torre asylum, Honduras-Nicaraguan
and the Temple of Preah Vihear cases. The nonimplementedjudgments are in these cases:
Corfu Channel, first Southwest Africa, Anglo-IranianOil Company, Portuguesecolonies in
India, UN peacekeepingexpenses, third SouthwestAfrica,Icelandicfisheries,WesternSahara,
Iranianhostages.No decisionrenderedsince 1962 has been implemented.Until then the number
of implementedand nonimplementedjudgmentswas about the same in each five-yearperiod.
The four advisory opinions used were really proxy adversarycases.

secessionist Bangladesh,and several Middle East countries fueled the civil
wars in Eritreaand Chad. A double standardseemed to prevail in conflict
managementas the membershipwas less inclined to interveneenergetically
in conflicts among Third World nations, even though it continued to make
use of the regimerulesand procedures,as they had evolved in decolonization
cases, in disputes involving Israel.
One explanationlies in the changingnatureof alignmentsand consensus,
which in turn represents a major shift in the internationalenvironment.
During the period before 1965, the nonalignedstates were fewer in number
and less united on issues. They became numericallydominant after 1965 as
some Latin Americanand Africanstates previouslyalignedwith the United
Statesjoined them. The Non-Aligned Movement as a whole gainedcohesion
from its programfor a New InternationalEconomic Order. (The fact that
most nonalignedstates also depend for favors on their oil-rich colleaguesis
not irrelevant.)Another reason lies in the decline of metaissues:the Cold
War and decolonization gave way to disputes that involved issues specific
to the antagonists in a given conflict. The additional fact that superpower
leadershipwas muted goes hand in hand with the decline of polarity-the
disintegrationof the loose bipolarclustersinto a congeriesof unstable blocs
that must tolerate crossovers among their members on a case-to-casebasis.
Under these circumstanceseven a Secretary-Generalmore resourcefulthan
Kurt Waldheim would have had trouble taking up the slack in leadership.
While many of these conditions were also visible during the relatively
successfulyearsbetween 1966 and 1970, leadership,consensus,and alignment
mark the differencefrom the currentperiod. The 1966-70 period saw the
advent of issues other than the Cold Warand decolonization,the emergence
of middle and small powersas the main contestants,and a risein the intensity
of warfare,especiallyin local and bilateraldisputes-all characteristicas well
of the period since 1970. On the other hand, leadershipby the SecretaryGeneral was still significantthen, one or both of the contestantsin disputes
was still a member of a Cold War coalition 71 percent of the time, and
consensus was at its highest point in UN history. Hence there was still room
for permissive engagement.There may still be now, since the components
of the regime have not changed much. But the overt commitment of the
member states gives little evidence of the necessaryinterests.Conflictmanagement behavior, then, mirrorsthe fact that the nonalignedmajority can
agree on collective action when a dispute triggersthe issue of racism or
zionism; but the nonalignedcannot be expected to be similarlyunited when
wars among their own members are at issue. The permanent members of
the SecurityCouncil take sides or urge action only when their own interests
are involved-as in the Middle East and Cyprus. The result is a United
Nations whose members are fundamentallydivided on the importance of
conflict managementas a task. The norms have not disappeared,the rules
remain in effect, and the procedurescontinue to be used; but the members
228
TABLE 8.
Comparisonof scope, success, coherence,by era

%of Disputes Wholly
or
Partly Managed
(N = 202)
UN
Nonreferred
Did UN Success
Did Regime
Coherence
Improveover
PreviousPeriod?
Changeover
PreviousPeriod?
1945-50
65
50
1951-55
33
57
No
Improvement
1956-60
69
67
Yes
Furtherimprovement
1961-65
44
50
No
Stable
1966-70
64
33
Yes
Stable
1971-75
42
22
No
Decline
1976-81
42
10
No
Furtherdecline
cannot agree on the circumstancesunder which they ought to be applied.

One consequenceis the remarkableuse of internationalpeacekeepingforces
in the Sinai and Lebanonsince 1978, which avoids UN procedures.Another
is the invited interventionof extracontinentalforces in Africa, again in disregardof previously used procedures.The regime has not died, but it has
decayed.
5. Why did the regime decay?
Beforewe considerthe explanatorypersuasivenessof the hypothesesadvanced
in the introduction,a prior question requiresan answer:did the decline in
effectiveness match the decline in coherence and did it match an increase
in the abilityof states to managetheir conflictspeacefullyoutside the regime?
Table 8 contraststhe successof the United Nations with the successachieved
by the parties in managingnonreferreddisputes. We would have to find an
inverse temporalrelationshipbetween the two columns in orderto conclude
that the world is about as well off without the United Nations. Table 8 also
contrasts, era by era, changes in coherence with declining success. Even
thoughthe matchingis not perfectthe movement is in the predicteddirection.
The United Nations laggedbehindbilateraland extraorganizational
success
in managingconflictduringthe heightof the Cold Warand duringthe period
of declining permissive engagement;it performedbetter than the extraorganizationaleffortsof states in five out of seven periods, includingthe most
recent decade. There is no dominantly inverse relationship. This finding
provides further evidence that obituaries for the United Nations are pre-

mature.28Why did improvements in coherence not always correspondto
improved performance?The same two five-year periods impair the perfect
match. Improvements in coherence in 1951-55 were achieved in defiance
of the Soviet Union, whose policy was also responsiblefor preventingadditional success in conflict management;this situation was reversed in the
next period, because the Soviets accommodatedthemselves to the regime's
changes.In 1961-65 the previousimprovementsin coherencewerestabilized
but performancedeclined anyway. By 1970, effectiveness and regime coherence were moving in tandem-downward. Clearlythere is a lag between
institutionalinnovation and stabilityand the behaviorof states with respect
to conflict management.
Declining American hegemony?
One popular explanation for the decay of the United Nations is the socalled "declining hegemony" thesis. Hegemony may be conceived as the
nationalcapabilityto advance long-rangevisions of world order(such as the
notion of collective security and other UN principles)by workingwith the
preponderantresourcesavailableto the hegemonforthe successof institutions
chargedwith that task. In addition a hegemon would be expected to make
side paymentsto reluctantcoalitionpartnersunwillingto followthe hegemon's
lead spontaneously;and the hegemon is expected to forego its own shortrange interests in favor of the final goal. Table 9 shows that the capability
of the United States,in terms of overall economic and militarypower,eroded
as the United Nations decayed. That, however, is not enough to prove that
there was a causal connection between the two trends.29
It is undeniable that the success of the United Nations until the early
1960swas due in largemeasureto Americanleadership,pressure,and support.
Most institutionalinnovationswere initiatedby the United Statesor its close
allies, the bulk of UN conflict managementpolicy and procedureswas consistent with Americaninterests,and the United States offeredside payments
in the form of shoulderingannually up to 33 percent of the organization's
regularbudgetand sometimesas much as 50 percentof the technicalassistance
28. Columns 1 and 2 derived from Tables H, I, J in the Appendix.Success for the United
Nationsis heredefinedas totalcasesin whichsome orgreatsuccesswas scoredperera(irrespective
of the amount of success as scaled elsewherein this study) divided by total cases per era.
of StephenD. Krasner,"American
29. My discussionof hegemonyfollowsthe conceptualization
Policyand GlobalEconomicStability,"in WilliamP. Averyand David P. Rapkin,eds., America
in a Changing World Political Economy (New York: Longman, 1982). Robert Keohane's "Heg-
emonic Leadershipand U.S. ForeignEconomic Policy in the Long Decade of the 1950s," in
ibid., arguesthat the declineof U.S. hegemonyoccurredfasterthan it should have if structural
variablesalone are consideredto be responsible(as they are in my Table 9). He holds misguided
short-terminterests foisted on the U.S. governmentby private interests(oil companies and
multinationalbanks) responsiblefor the rapid erosion of hegemony after 1965 because the
Americaneconomic decline is associatedwith oil-importand capital-exportpolicies followed
since 1945.
230
TABLE 9.
Indicatorsof U.S. power capability:ratio of U.S. to worldtotal

1950
National incomea
1960
1970
1976
1978
.45
.39
.31
.29
Crude Petroleum Production
.53
.33
.21
.14
.14
Crude Steel Production
.45
.26
.20
.17
.16
Iron Ore Production
.42
.19
.13
.10
.09
Wheat Production
.17
.15
.12
.14
.10
International Financial Reserves
.49
.21
.16
.07
.05
Military Expenditures
.32
.48
.35
.27
.25
Exports
.18
.16
.14
.11
.11
.58
.45
.32
.29
Foreign Aidb
a. Only market economy countries.

b. Only members of OECD, Development Assistance Committee.
Source. Updated from Stephen D. Krasner, "American Policy and Global Economic
Stability," in William P. Avery and David P. Rapkin, eds., American in a Changing World
Political Economy (New York: Longman, 1982), Table 2.2.
and humanitarianrelieffunds.Why, then, is the declininghegemonyargument

inconclusive?Some relevant considerationscan be gleaned from Figure8.3
The United States began to declareits reluctanceto make these side payments in 1962, with the insistence that peacekeepingexpenses be paid by
all members in proportionto their shareof the regularbudgetcontributions.
It became more strident in 1965, with the insistence that the American
contributionto the regularbudget be kept to 25 percentannually.However,
UN effectivenessimprovedafter 1965, albeitnot for long. Figure8 also shows
that the support the United States could garner in the General Assembly
declined sharplyafter 1960; however, this occurredtoo soon to be consistent
with the hypothesis and the same is true of the data summarizingU.S.
supportof and satisfactionwith UN decisions. True, the divergencebetween
UN decisions and U.S. preferencesgrew after 1960; but U.S. satisfaction
never fell below 54 percent and rose again after 1965, even though overall
UN effectivenessdeclined.This was not a bad showingfor a fadinghegemon.
The niggardlinessof the United Stateswith respectto financialcontributions
30. For the data dealingwith GeneralAssembly voting, see EdwardT. Rowe, "The United
States, the United Nations, and the Cold War,"InternationalOrganization25 (Winter1971),
p. 78. ProfessorRowe kindly suppliedme with the entriesfor GeneralAssemblysessionssince
1965. Confirmingtime-seriesdata can be found in Neil R. Richardsonand CharlesW. Kegley
Jr., "TradeDependenceand ForeignPolicy Compliance,"InternationalStudies Quarterly24
(June 1980). Data dealingwith UN actionor inactionfavoredand opposedby the United States
are taken from Table P in the Appendix.
90%
80 -
70 _
\
60 _
50 -
~~~UN
ACTION/INACTION
U.S. VOTEDWITHMAJORITYIN\
GENERALASSEMBLYIN = 2.334;
1945 78. ALLISSUES)
40 -
30 _-
UN SUCCESS
\\<____
tttt
^^^sss
lN
123)
,,s'
0s
10 _
1945
50
FIGURE 8.
55
60
65
70
75
80
Indicatorsof U.S. satisfaction with the UnitedNations, in
percent
can hardly be blamed on a declining economic position, since the sums in

question are paltry. Moreover, the U.S. contributionto the UN Emergency
Force in the Sinai remained at 37 percent per year until 1967 (from a high
of 47% in 1957). The United States paid between one half and one third of
the Congoforce'sexpensesevery yearbetween 1960 and 1964. Contributions
to the force in Cyprushovered around 40 percent per year until 1971; they
rose to 50 percentfor the period 1973-78.3' On the other hand, the expenses
for the three UN forces separatingIsrael from the Arabs since 1974 have
been borne by the regular UN budget, a signal victory for the American
position. In short, when it suited Americanintereststhere was a willingness
to pay for UN operationsin excess of the declaredceiling on contributions.
One source of the mismatch between overall declininghegemony and the
continuing U.S. role in the United Nations may be in the confoundingof
hegemonywith influence.My data on leadershipclearlyshow that the United
Statesno longertriedvery hardto impose its conflictmanagementpreferences
after 1955, though Dag Hammarskjoldlargely assumed those preferences
31. Data through1971 takenfromWainhouseet al., InternationalPeacekeepingat the Crossroads, pp. 535-36; data since 1971 collected from the annual reports of the UN Board of
Auditors. I thank ProfessorM. J. Petersonfor pointingme to this source.
232
for the United States for another six years. Furthermore,after 1965 the
United States had to resort to the veto to defend its interests. Was this
inevitable?If the failureto exercise consistent leadershipis to be associated
with declining overall hegemony, it happened much too soon. Declining
influenceprobablyresultedfrom the appointmentin the 1970s of a number
of permanent representatives(Moynihan, Young, Kirkpatrick)chosen less
for their abilities to build supportingcoalitions than to propoundAmerica's
displeasurewith the Third World majority'seconomic and racial demands
or to demonstrate America's support for national self-determination.It is
quite possible that more diplomaticallyconservativerepresentatives(Scranton, McHenry)could, if given the time, have reassertedAmericaninfluence
in building coalitions.
Unstablealignments, shatteredconsensus
The notion of declining American influence is entirelycompatiblewith a
second hypothesis about the decay of the United Nations. As the number
of voting blocs increases the simple distinction between U.S. and Soviet
allies loses its salience as a constraint on behavior. It also means that, as
there are more sets of national interests to be brought under a single hat,
consensus comes about with greaterdifficulty.Therefore,winningcoalitions
have become more difficultto build.
This hypothesisalso assumesthat the earlysuccessesof the United Nations
are largelyexplicablein termsof the importanceof alignments.Whileeffective
conflictmanagementcould not be expectedin situationspittingthe opposing
Cold War coalitions against one another, conflict management was quite
possible when a member of one alignment faced a nonaligned antagonist.
Moreover, this hypothesis suggeststhat UN effectivenesswould remain respectableas long as the parties to dispute are superpowers,large powers, or
smaller states under the diplomatic and militaryinfluenceof a superpower.
Nonaligned small states, however, escape these constraints.The increasing
numbers would thus complicate conflict managementbecause they are not
reliablecoalitionpartnersand do not necessarilysharethe objectivesof other
states sufficientlyto be part of a stable consensus.
Figure 9 gives considerable support to this explanation.32It shows that
while the main nonimplementersof UN decisions were until 1970 the members of Cold War alignments, this is no longer true. Now the nonaligned
middle and smaller powers are the culprits.The curve confirms that in the
most recentperiodsthe earlierexplanatorypowerof alignmentsin predicting
UN involvement and UN success no longer holds. The diplomatic and
military texture of the world has perhaps grown too complex for effective
collective security practices.
32. The figureand discussionare based on Table 0 in the Appendix.
100% _
/_
80 -
NONIMPLEMENTERSARE
SUPERPOWERS AND/OR
THEIRALLIES
\/
^s
I
TO "OTHER" ISSUES
~~REFER
,,"
I
60
65
70
20 -
1945
FIGURE 9.
50
55
If
~ ~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
75
80
Nonimplementersof substantiveUN decisions (N = 50), in
percent
The decline of metaissues
This explanation is, in turn, entirely consistent with another hypothesis:
regime effectiveness and coherence are associated with a small number of
metaissues around which consensus could be built. Once these metaissues
lose their relevance and if no new overarchingconcern develops, conflict
management becomes less effective.
Figure9 also confirmsthis hypothesis.Decay is associatedwith the advent
of nonaligned smaller states as the main antagonists;so is the increasing
incidenceof issues otherthan decolonizationand the Cold War.The successes
scored by the United Nations before 1970 were heavily concentrated on
managingconflictsassociatedwith colonial liberationmovements. Now, few
remain and they are recalcitrantcases. On the other hand, civil wars among
rival movements in new countries,thoughperhapssupportedby other states,
cannot be considered as cases of decolonization. Global conflict may be
increasing, but the issues over which countries disagree no longer fit the
earliercategories.The regime has become the victim of the trend.
The attempt to achieve regional isolation
The decay of the United Nations and of the OAS has been accompanied
by a slight increasein the effectivenessof the Arab Leagueand a temporary
234
spurt in the effectiveness of the OAU. These developments have been associated with an increasein disputesthat threatenthe interventionof distant
and even extraregionalpowers and a spreadingof the dispute beyond the
immediate antagonists and their neighbors. This pattern suggests that, in
Africa and in the Middle East, states are makingan attempt to managetheir
conflicts in such a manner as to head off foreign intervention on a large
scale, though not always successfully. It is unlikely, in view of the earlier
histories of the OAU and the League, that the attempt would be made if
the United Nations were perceived as an effective forum for guaranteeing
isolation of disputes. Hence the decay of the United Nations with respect
to consensus, the unstable alignmentpattern, and the decline of metaissues
are consistent with the hypothesisthat these regionalorganizationsnow seek
to compensate for the deficienciesof global arrangements.
Toleranceof unresolvedconflict
These four hypotheses imply that the members of the regime display a
farmore tolerantattitudetowardthe nonresolutionof conflictthanthe original
principles and norms of the regime might have suggested,a situation predictable from the confirmationof the hypotheses. The principleof collective
securityis the principleof "all for one"; each state's insecurityis potentially
of concern to all states. The decay of the regime demonstratesthat belief in
this principlehas weakened duringthe almost forty years that have elapsed
since World War II. Tolerance for the nonresolutionof many conflicts, or
acceptance of a certain permanent amount of conflict, is but the corollary
of this weakenedbelief.33Does regimedecay thereforemean that states have
become indifferentto conflict and its collective management,that they have
learned nothing since 1965?
The conclusion that nothing has been learned can be justified only if we
assume that the purpose of the regime was to create a new international
order of peace, to transformthe internationalsystem of sovereignstates into
a supranationalsystem ruled by the superpowersand a few largestates, and
to turn the United Nations and the regionalentitiesinto a singleautonomous
organizationchargedwith enforcingthat supranationalism.Even if, in 1945,
it was hoped that the regime would prevent (or at least limit) the use of
force in all of internationalrelations,this hope was soon scaled down to the
expectation of limiting only those conflicts that, because of their potential
destructiveness,threatenthe system of independentstates. The regime was
33. Interviews with 125 high officials of the UN Secretariatand high-level members of
permanentdelegationsto the United Nations suggestthat peace is valued less highlyas a UN
objective than socialjustice and economic welfare,rankingahead only of environmentalprotection. Moreover, the relative indifferenceto peace covaries with age: the youngerare less
concemed with peace. See ChristineSylvester,"UN Elites:Perspectiveon Peace,"Journalof
Peace Research 17, 4 (1980), pp. 305-24.

soon turnedinto the instrumentfor triplingthe numberof sovereignentities.
Manyof them wereand are motivatedby the same fearof collectiveinsecurity
that elicited the creation of the regime. The old system was reenforced,not
transcended,and given the principlesof the regimeno new ordercould come
from the old. No autonomousorganizationsdeveloped in the field of conflict
managementbecausethe membersdid not wish them to develop. We cannot
blame the United Nations or its members for not learningan institutional
lesson that calls for moral perfectabilityas the metaprincipleof the evolution
of internationalrelations.
The tolerationof relativelylow levels of conflict,however, is itself a lesson
that has been learned.No conflict that threatensthe system of independent
states has emerged since 1945. Even the Cold War was managed, at least
until now. Governments in the 1970s have learned to tolerate a level of
conflict that does not threaten the system as a whole, while the United
Nations and regionalorganizationscontinue to be effectivein abatingmany
conflicts and settling a few. Regime decay is not incompatiblewith learning
lessons at another level of consciousness. The toleration of conflict that
remains diffused, confined to weak states, and removed to the peripheryof
politics and geographymay be a second-bestsolution to the problemof war.
But it is better than making every conflict a matter of principle.Rousseau's
metaphor of the staghunt retains all of its evocative power: hunting hares
separatelymay not be as good as hunting a stag through collective effort,
but it beats starvingto death.
Appendix
Definition and operationalizationof variables

I. Salience
A. Intensity
a. Fatalities(civil and military)
1 = No fatalities
2 = 1-25
3 = 26-100
4 = 101-1,000
5 = 1,001-2,000
6 = 2,001-10,000
7 = 10,001-100,000
8 = over 100,000
b. Duration of Hostilities (years between first evidence of rival claims
and settlement and/or disappearance).
1 = less than one year
2 = 1-2 years
3 = 2-3 years
4 = over 3 years
c. Likelihoodof Abatement for Three Years. In the context in which
the dispute arose would the parties have ended hostilitiesand/or reduced the fervor of their claims if left to themselves by the
organization?
1 = yes, very likely
2 = possibly
3 = 50-50 chance
4 = possibly no
5 = no, very unlikely
(Examplesof abatement:reducingpropaganda,ending or reducing
militarypreparation,reopeningborder.)
d. Likelihoodof Disappearance.In the context in which the dispute
arose would the parties have let their claims lapse (with or without a
formal settlement)if left to themselves by the organization?
Postwar conflict management
237
1 = in less than one year

2 = in 1-5 years
3 = in 5-10 years
4 = in 10-20 years
5 = in more than 20 years
(Examplesof disappearance:formal settlement,droppingclaims, resuming normal diplomaticand/or commercialrelations.)
e. Likelihoodof Isolation. In the context in which the dispute arose
would the parties have permittedthe dispute to escalate if left to
themselves by the organizationby takingany of these measures:
1 = introducingnew issues and claims, expandingthe scope of fighting, or lesser measures
2 = succeedingin obtainingthe open diplomaticsupportof other
states
3 = succeedingin gettingothers to supply arms
4 = succeedingin gettingothers (except the U.S. and USSR) to furnish irregulartroops
5 = succeedingin gettingothers (except the U.S. and USSR) to join
fully in the fighting
f. Major War. How likely was it that the Soviet Union and the United
States would engage in a war over this issue, using nuclearweapons
or massive conventionalweapons on several fronts?
1 = impossible
2 = not impossible, but very unlikely
3 = quite possible
4 = likely
Formula for computingintensity:a x b (c + d) (e) (f) = 6,400
maximum
IntensityScale
1-19
Insignificant
20-39
Very low
40-99
Low
100-299
Moderate
300-999
High
Over 1,000
Very high
B. Type of Warfare
no militaryoperations
very limited
supportdiplomacy
defeat enemy
militaryoperationswithout fighting,casualties incidentalto rioting

militaryoperationsand fightingintended
as reinforcingdiplomaticmoves; political
moves consideredprimary
militaryoperationsand fightingconsidered
primaryto defeat enemy and/or conquer
his territory
238
International Organization
C. Extent of Spread (codedat time of referral)

bilateral
local
regional
global
exclusivelybilateral;third partiesnot involved at all

third partiesare giving militaryand/or
diplomaticaid to one or both of the parties, but are not preparingto fight
third partiesin the immediategeographical
region enter the dispute militarilyor are
about to do so
third partieselsewherein the world enter
the dispute militarilyor are about to do so
II. Global Context

A. Issue
colonial
interstate,Cold War (issue is communist versus noncommunist)
interstate,other (non-Cold War, noncolonial)
internal(Cold War)
internal(non-Cold War)
B. Alignment with Referenceto Cold War (formal alliance or close

diplomatic tie at time dispute was discussedby organization)
members of same bloc
members of opposing blocs
1 member of a bloc, 1 nonaligned
both nonaligned
C. Power of Parties
Parties to disputes were coded in terms of the scale developed in Robert
W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), Appendix A. Each state party to a
dispute was coded in each five-yearperiod.
Smallest
Cox-Jacobsonscore of 4 or less
Small
Cox-Jacobsonscore of 5-9
Middle
Large
Cox-Jacobsonscore of over 20
Superpower
Each conflict was then coded in terms of the followingdyads (disputes
involving more than two partieswere coded by selectingthe most powerful dyad):
Small or smallest v. small or smallest
Middle v. middle and all lesser powers
Largev. large and all lesser powers
Superpowerv. middle and all lesser powers
Superpowerv. superpowerand large power
239
III. Management
A. Decision
None
Weak
Strong
B. Operations
None
Small
Large
no discussionor formal discussionwithout

decision, or formal decision to referthe
dispute to anotherforum
formal decision requestingcompliance
from partieswithout callingfor any kind
of follow-up or supervision
formal decision requestingsettlementby
authorizinginvestigation,mediation, supervision, truce observation,peacekeeping,
enforcementmeasures
no operationauthorized
investigation,mediation, conciliation,involving a staff of 20 persons or fewer
supervision,truce observation,peacekeeping, enforcementmeasuresinvolving more
than 20 persons
C. Leadership
Leadershipis defined as initiative plus continuingpressureto obtain organizationaldiscussion and/or action.
One superpower
Two superpowers(even if one is passive and/or abstainsin vote)
One or more large powers
One or more middle, small and smallest powers
includes all situationsin which the SecreSecretary-General
tary-Generalor the presidingofficerof the
SecurityCouncil, either alone or in collaboration with a member state, takes the
initiative
D. Consensus
The extent of agreementis scaled in terms of power:
The constitutionalrequirementfor making
none
a decision is not met in the particularorganizationor organ.
One superpowerplus various other powers
weak
act to just meet the particularconstitutional requirement.In the SecurityCouncil, a positive vote of debatable
constitutionalityinvolving the questioh of
whetherthe vote or nonvote of a periianent member was a "veto."
240
International Organization
SecurityCouncil only. The minimum constitutionalformulafor adoptinga resolution is just met. Abstentionby a
permanentmember is considered
acquiescence.
The constitutionalrequirementfor passing
wide
a resolutionis met (or exceeded)without
all large, middle, and smallerpowers in
the organizationjoining the majority.In
the SecurityCouncil,abstentionsare consideredas acquiescence.
The constitutionalrequirementfor passing
very wide
a resolutionis met (or exceeded)by a wide
margin.In the SecurityCouncil all unanimous votes (no abstentionsor absences
permitted)and all resolutionsadopted
without formal vote.
Consensuswas coded on the basis of the strongestresolutionthat was
adopted by the relevant forum. When no resolutionpassed the strongest
defeated resolutionwas coded.
I V. Success
Did the existence and activity of the international organization contribute to the control of the conflict? Did states behave more cooperatively than they would have in the absence of organizational action?
The frame of reference is the manifest conflict-control function given
to the organization in its Charter.
A. Success in StoppingHostilities
n = no opportunityto stop throughno fault of organization
O= failed to stop
1 = helped to stop
2 = stopped
B. Success in ConflictAbatementfor Three Years
O= failed to abate
1 = helped to abate
2 = abated
(Examplesof abatement same as under Intensity:Abatement.)
C. Success in ConflictSettlement
O= failed to settle
1 = helped to settle
2 = settled
(Examplesof settlement same as under Intensity:Disappearance.)
241
D. Success in Isolating Conflict

n = conflict had no opportunityto expand
0 = failed to isolate
1 = helped to isolate
2 = isolated
(Evidence of isolation:third parties do not supportdisputantsdiplomatically or militarilywhen there was some chance that they might have
done so.)
Formula for computingsuccess:a + b + c + d = raw success,
maximum = 8
Success Scale:
organizationalaction made no difference
None
to outcome on any dimension (Oraw
score);
organizationalaction made some difference
Some, limited
on one or two dimensions (one or two 1
scores;raw score of 1 or 2);
organizationalaction made some difference
Great
on three or four dimensions (three or four
1 scores;raw score of 3 or 4);
organizationalaction made a great difference on at least one dimension plus at
least some differenceon one other (one or
more 2 scores + one, two, or three 1
scores;one or two 2 scores + not more
than two n scores;one 2 score plus one 1
score, plus Osor ns; raw score of 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8).
242
TABLE A. Salience and global context of disputes involvingmilitary
operationsand fighting: 1945-1981 (N = 217), in percent

Referredto UN
Referredto Regionals
(N = 87)
(N = 51)
(N = 79)
20
25
13
12
23
Low
16
23
15
Moderate
20
14
15
High
39
29
18
Very Limited
30
37
62
SupportDiplomacy
40
39
24
Defeat Enemy
30
24
14
Bilateral
18
33
46
Local
59
29
32
Regional
16
22
15
16
Cold War-Interstate
15
Cold War-Internal
10
10
Variable
Nonreferred
Intensity
Insignificant
Very Low
Very High
Typeof Warfare
Extent of Spread
Global
Type of Issue
Decolonization
38
13
Other-Interstate
29
41
36
Other-Internal
16
39
25
Membersof Same Bloc
13
25
15
Membersof Opposing
Blocs
18
14
33
1 Aligned, 1
Nonaligned
47
33
33
Both Nonaligned
22
27
19
Cold WarAlignment
TABLE A.
continued
Referredto UN
(N= 87)
Referredto Regionals
(N= 51)
Nonreferred
(N= 79)
Small/Smallestv.
Small/Smallest
27
76
37
Middle v. Middle and

Lesser
26
17
Largev. Large/Lesser
26
28
Superv. Middle/Lesser
13
14
Variable
Powerof Parties
Superv. Super/Large
TABLE E.
Correlatesof success: OAS

Success (N=
28)
1945-50
1951-60
1961-70
Variable
None 0
Some 2
Great 1
Nonea 3
Some 3
Great4
Noneb 1
Some 5
Great4
Intensity
Insignificant
Insignificant
Insig./Low
Warfare
None
Limited
Limited
Bilateral
Bilateral
Bilateral
Other
Other
Other
Same bloc
Same bloc
Same bloc
Smallest
Smallest
Super
Spread
Issue
Alignment
Power of Parties
Decision
Strong
Strong
Strong
Operations
Small
Small
Large
Leadership
U.S.
U.S.
Smallest
Consensus
Wide
Wide
Wide
1971-81
Nonec J
Some 4
Great0
Bilateral
Same bloc
Small
Codingsmade by selectingonly subvariablesthat scored a minimum of 33%per era. Dashes

reflecta distributionwhen no single subvariablescored 33%or when there were ties.
a. Failuresinclude Haya de la Torre asylum case and two insignificantsituationsinvolving
the Dominican Republic.
b. U.S. relationswith Cuba.
c. BeagleChanneldispute.
(
(N
^N
W)
'C
O7
(N
C
c(N
00
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00
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(N
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(N
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00
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tt
oc
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(N
(N
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(N
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(N
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tt~~C
(N
(N
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(N
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(N
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o
m
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(_N
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I
o
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rI.
00
C's
(71,
W)
"o
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00
t--
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r-
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00
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r-
00
4.1
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t--
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00
00
cl
r00
cl
W)
CD
(11
110
W)
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INO INO r-
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(11
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r-
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ct ::I cl
0~~~~~~0
Et
eN
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>
^
eN
2 4.
t-
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00
k~~~t
eN
00
r-
t-
00
'
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A~~~t
eeU
r4
-
\-
(N
r-
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0
roN
O
^o-
oo
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- ',
ent0~~~~~~~~~0
R~~~~~~~r
;
11
~:t ~S ~e
S0
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o o r -N O
e
e O
- rl
r~~~
t~~~~~~~~~~
C>
8-
'r
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(t
>
00
t
00
(N
TABLE F. Correlates of success: Arab League

Success (N = 22)
1950-1960
1961-1970
1971-1981
Variable
Nonea 5
Some 2
Great0
Noneb2
Some 2
Great I
Nonec 5
Some 3
Great2
Intensity
Insignificant
Very low
Warfare
None/limited
Spread
Issue
Alignment
Power of Parties
Decision
Operations
Supportdiplomacy
Regional,global
Regional,global
Other
Other
Nonaligned
Aligned
Smallest
Smallest
Strong
Strong
Small
Large
S-G
Smallest
Wide
Wide
Other
Strong
-
Leadership
Consensus
Wide

a. Wadi Halfa, Jordan/UAR tensions, Jordanianexpansion,BuraimiOasis, BaghdadPact
tensions.
b. Yemeni civil war, Algerian-Moroccanborder.
c. Dhofar rebellion,Sudanesecoup, WesternSaharawar, Euphrateswaters,Egypt/Libya
tensions.
248
TABLE G.
Correlatesof success: OAU

Success (N= 25)
1963-1970
Variable
Nonea 4
Some 5
Great I
1971-1981
6
Some 4
Great5
Noneb
Intensity
Warfare
Spread
None
Defeat enemy
Bilateral
Other
Other
Nonaligned
Nonaligned
Smallest
Smallest
Decision
Strong
Strong
Operations
Small
Small
Leadership
Smallest
Smallest
Consensus
Wide
Wide
Issue
Alignment
Power of Parties

a. Civil wars in Zaire, Nigeria,Djibouti;Battle of the Hostages.
b. Civil wars in Angola, Ethiopia;Kenya-Ugandaborder,Amin ouster, Eritreanrevolt,
Gafsa incident.
-ntn
--
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C
l
l
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tr
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b N C
00
r-
CD
X 0
INbe
N
en
1nW,~ 00
eft
Cl
e1
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en
en
-
00
00
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1-t
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00
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't
cl
Cl
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Cl
N
0-O
00
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00
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00
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00
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r-
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00
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st
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S:
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E
3\0
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CI
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000
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_-
TABLE J.
Outcomes of nonreferreddisputes (N = 79)

Resolved
Not Resolved
Bilaterally
By
Mediation
12
1971-75
1976-81
21
10
Total
79
16
25
18
11
Era
Unsettled
Peters
Out
1945-50
12
1951-55
1956-60
12
1961-65
1966-70
One Side
Wins
38%
62%
TABLE K. Outcomes of disputes referredto
UN, withoutor with minimal
impact (N = 75)
Resolved
Not Resolved
Era
Unsettled
Peters
Out
One Side
Wins
Bilaterally
Non- UN
Mediation
1945-50
1951-55
1956-60
1961-65
14
1966-70
11
0
2
1971-75
1976-81
20
Total
75
16
29
14
10
69%
31%
252
TABLE L. Correlatesof success: UnitedNations (in percent)

Of Which
Variable
Casesa
(N= 123)
No Success
(N= 60)
Some Success
(N= 32)
GreatSuccess
(N= 31)
Intensity
Insignificant,very low
36
48
36
16
Low, moderate
32
59
13
28
High, very high
32
42
25
33
None
30
52
32
16
Very limited
21
31
38
31
Supportdiplomacy,
defeat enemy
49
55
17
28
Bilateral
31
39
29
32
Local
53
60
26
14
Regional,global
16
30
15
55
37
42
26
33
Typeof Warfare
Extent of Spread
Typeof Issue
Decolonization
Cold War
20
67
21
13
Other
43
47
28
25
One or more aligned
62
52
20
28
Same bloc,
nonaligned
38
43
36
21
21
58
23
19
Largepowers
31
47
24
29
Middle powers
20
40
28
32
All others
28
50
29
21
None
28
64
24
12
Weak
20
67
29
Strong
52
36
26
40
Cold WarAlignment
Power of Parties
Superpowers
Typeof Decision
TABLE L.
continued
Of Which
Casesa
(N = 123)
No Success
(N = 60)
Some Success
(N = 32)
Great Success
(N = 31)
None
42
67
27
Small
40
46
27
27
Large
18
23
73
15
44
28
28
20
20
60
Large, middle powers
16
50
20
30
Small, smallest
powers
44
70
24
Secretary-General
21
15
31
54
None, narrow
27
76
24
Wide, very wide
73
41
26
33
Variable
Type of Operation
Leadershipb
One superpower
Two superpowers
Consensusc
a. Percentages in this column vertical.
TABLE P.
Era
b. N = 121.
c. N
119.
UN action/inaction and U.S. preferences(N =

N
Favored
Indifferent
Opposed
1]5a),
in percent
Nonfavored
Combined
Success
1945-50
19
84
11
16
33
1951-55
11
73
18
27
24
1956-60
15
73
20
27
40
1961-65
25
64
12
24b
36
20
1966-70
13
54
15
31b
46
24
1971-75
10
60
40b
40
14
1976-81
22
64
23
37
10
14
a. Excluding 8 cases in which the U.S. position was ambiguous.

b. Mostly "hard decolonization" cases in which the U.S. opposed action of the Committee
of 24.
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Regime Decay: Conflict Management and International Organizations, 1945-1981

Author(s): Ernst B. Haas

Regime decay: conflict managementand

If no less an expertthan the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations, Javier

activities,largepublicconferenceshave become the preferredway of managing

1. Is collective conflict managementa failed regime?

Postwar conflict management 191

An internationalregime is a set of principles,explicit or implicit, norms,

Postwar conflict management 193

These hypotheses lead to a corollary:if hypotheses 3 and 4 are correct,the

Postwar conflict management 195

nizations (Morristown,N.J.: GeneralLearningPress, 1972). The definitionof "dispute,"the

TABLE 1. All disputes involvingmilitary operationsand fighting (N

Note. Excludesdouble-countingof disputes referredto more than one organization.Most

TABLE 2. Serious disputes involvingmilitary operationsand fighting

Note. Excludesdouble-countingof disputes referredto more than one organization.Most

Postwar conflict management 197

Postwar conflict management 199

FIGURE 1. Success by era,

UnitedNations (N = 123), left, and regional

organizations (N = 80), right

What, then, are the norms? The Charterrecognizesseveral rights of the

refrain in their internationalrelations from the threat or use of force . . ."

the Security Council in the management of conflicts (Art. 24) implies a

true of decision-makingprocedures.Both can also be phrasedas "obligations

Postwar conflict management 201

At the same time, the membership committed itself to the principle of

Postwar conflict management 203

Attributesof referredand nonreferreddisputes(percentof

While disputes referredto the United Nations were more threateningthan

Referralsand success by era, UnitedNations (N = 123), left,

declined, but less dramatically."6The United Nations' record in stopping

Postwar conflict management 205

FIGURE 3. Dimensions offailure,

UnitedNations (N = 63), in percent

Eventual resolutionoffailed UN and nonreferreddisputes

Postwar conflict management 207

60% HIGH INTENSITY/

FIGURE 5. Salience of disputes by era,

A similarexplanationof this decay seems to be associatedwith the changing

Postwar conflict management 209

/--- ALIGNEDWITHCOLD WAR BLOC

Global context of disputesby era, UnitedNations (N = 123), in

FIGURE 7. Decisions and operationsby era,

unilaterallythough they still occasionally launch joint initiatives. It should

Press, 1965). OAU cases are discussedin Jon Woronoff,OrganizingAfricanUnity(Metuchen,

and with the exception of the period 1971-75, regionalorganizationswere

Postwar conflict management 213

Postwar conflict management 215

a. OAS: Arbenz overthrow,Haitian tyranny;CE: status of Cyprus.

mittent)compels the OAU to seek Americanand Frenchassistancewhenever

Postwar conflict management 217

the next higher component is changing.Rules and proceduresmay require

Mapping changes in regime components is a tedious business, justified

Postwar conflict management 219

Postwar conflict management 221

Change in UN regime components

Big power standby

Postwar conflict management 223

Attempt to use Art.

Postwar conflict management 225

binding financial contributions. Firmly earmarkedstandby military forces

Postwar conflict management 227