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Reference
FirstpublishedMonJan20,2003substantiverevisionFriSep26,2014
Referenceisarelationthatobtainsbetweencertainsortsofrepresentationaltokens(e.g.,names,
mentalstates,pictures)andobjects.Forinstance,whenIassertthatGeorgeW.Bushisa
Republican,Iuseaparticularsortofrepresentationaltokeni.e.thenameGeorgeW.Bushto
refertoaparticularindividualnamely,GeorgeW.Bush.Whilenamesandotherreferentialterms
arehardlytheonlytypeofrepresentationaltokencapableofreferring,linguistictokenslikethese
havelongstoodatthecenterofphilosophicalinquiriesintothenatureofreference.Accordingly,this
entrywillfocusalmostentirelyonlinguisticreference.Formoreonthereferenceofmentalstates,see
theentriesoncausaltheoriesofmentalcontent,externalismaboutmentalcontent,andteleological
theoriesofmentalcontent.Formoreonthereferenceofpictures,seetheentryonGoodman's
aesthetics.
Propernamesarestandardlyconsideredaparadigmexampleoflinguisticreferenceor,more
specifically,arelationthatobtainsbetweencertainsortsoflinguisticexpressionsandwhatspeakers
usethoseexpressionstotalkabout.Otherexpressionswhicharegenerallyconsideredtobeofthe
referringsortincludeindexicalslikeI,here,now,andthat.Whileitishighlyquestionablethat
allwordsrefer,mostphilosophersoflanguageassumethatatleastcertainsortsofterms(e.g.proper
namesandindexicals)regularlyandreliablydoso.Itisthesesortsoftermsthatwillserveasour
primaryfocusbelow.Assumingthatatleastcertainsortsoftermsdoinfactrefer,thecentralquestion
regardinglinguisticreferencebecomes:howdosuchtermsrefer?What,inotherwords,isthe
mechanismofreference?Subsidiaryquestionsconcerntherelationbetweenreferenceandmeaning,
referenceandtruth,andreferenceandknowledge.Somephilosophershavethoughtthatthenatureof
referenceisabletoshedlightonimportantmetaphysicalorepistemologicalissues.Other
philosophers,however,arelesssanguine.Indeed,certainphilosophershavegonesofarastodenythat
referenceisasubstantiverelation,onedeservingofseriousphilosophicalscrutiny.
1.Introduction
2.ProperNames
2.1DescriptivistTheories
2.2CausalTheories
2.3HybridTheories
2.4FurtherComplications
3.Indexicals
3.1PureIndexicals
3.2ImpureIndexicals
3.3UnifiedTheoriesofReference
4.OtherTerms
4.1NaturalKindTerms
4.2DefiniteDescriptions
4.3NonReferringExpressions
5.OtherIssues:Reference,Reality,andKnowledge
5.1ReferenceandReality
5.2ReferenceandKnowledge
6.NegativeViewsofReference
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1.Introduction
Weuselanguagetotalkabouttheworld.Muchofwhatwesayabouttheworldappearstobe
meaningfulsomeofit,presumably,iseventrue.Forinstance,Iseemtobesayingsomethingtrue
when,intheappropriatesortofsetting,Iassertivelyutter:
1. GeorgeW.BushisaRepublican.
Howdowemanagetodosuchthings?How,forinstance,doImanagetotalkaboutGeorgeW.Bush
andtherebysaymeaningfulandtruethingsabouthim?Inaword:howdoIrefertoGeorgeW.Bush
bymeansofthenameGeorgeW.Bush?Metaphorically,weseemtobeabletouselanguagetotalk
abouttheworldbecausewords,oratleastcertaintypesofwords,somehowhookontothingsinthe
world,thingslikeGeorgeW.Bush.Propernamesthatis,expressionslikeGeorgeW.Bushand
TonyBlairarewidelyregardedasparadigmaticreferringexpressions.Althoughitmayseem
implausibletosupposethatallwordsrefer,thatallwordssomehowhookontobitsofreality,
severaldifferenttypesofwordsarearguablyofthereferringsort.Theseinclude:propernames,
naturalkindterms,indexicals,anddefinitedescriptions.Particularissuesarisewithregardtoeachof
these,andeachwillbediscussedinsomedetailbelow.
Thecentralissues,thecentralquestions,concerningreferencearefour:(i)Whatisthemechanismof
reference?Inotherwords,invirtueofwhatdoesaword(ofthereferringsort)attachtoaparticular
object/individual?(ii)Isthereasinglemechanismofreferencecommontoallreferringterms,ordo
differentsortstermsattachtotheirreferentsinvirtueofdifferentsortsofthings?(iii)Whatisthe
relationbetweenreferenceandmeaning?Forinstance,isthemeaningofawordtobeidentifiedwith
themechanismbywhichitrefers?Oristhemeaningofareferentialtermperhapsbestunderstoodas
thereferentitself?(iv)Whatistherelationbetweenreferenceandtruth?Morespecifically,doesthe
referenceofaword,oritsmechanismofreference,somehowenterintothetruthconditionsof
assertiveutterancesofsentencescontainingthatword?
Theprimaryfocusinthisarticlewillbeonthefirsttwoofthesequestions,thoseconcerningthe
mechanismofreferenceandwhetherthereisasinglemechanismcommontoeachsortofreferring
term.However,aswillbecomeevidentinwhatfollows,addressingthesefirsttwoquestionswill
provetobeimpossiblewithoutaddressingthelattertwotoaswell.Theoriesofpropernameswillbe
consideredfirst,inSection2,aspropernamesareconsideredbymanytobereferringtermspar
excellence.What'smore,themechanismbywhichpropernamesreferisarguablyuniquetosuch
expressions.Section3willfocusonindexicals,inlargepartbecausethemechanism(s)bywhichthey
referarguablystandinsharpcontrasttothecaseofpropernames.Aswewillsee,however,thereisat
leastsomereasontodoubtthetenabilityofthiscontrast.Section4willconsistofabriefdiscussionof
twofurthersortsofexpressionswhichareoftenclassifiedasreferringtermsnaturalkindtermsand
(singular)definitedescriptionsalongwithseveralsortsofexpressionswhicharetypicallynot
conceivedofasreferringtermse.g.quantifiers,prepositions,verbs,andadverbs.Section5will
canvasssomepossibleconnectionsbetweenbothreferenceandrealityandreferenceandknowledge.
Finally,inSection6,afewwordswillbesaidaboutsocallednegativeviewsofreference,
accordingtowhichreferencedoesnotconstituteasubstantiverelationbetweenlanguageandreality
andisthusnotatopicworthyofseriousandsustainedphilosophicalinquiry.

2.ProperNames
Propernamesareparadigmaticreferringexpressions.If,properlyspeaking,therearesuchthingsas
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referentialtermsthatis,termsthatsomehowhookontothingsintheworldthenpropernames
aresurelyamongthoseterms.Whatarepropernames?Forthepurposesofthisarticle,onemight
thinkofpropernamesasatleastroughlycoextensivewiththesortsofexpressionsthatordinary(non
philosophicallytrained)speakersstandardlycallnames,expressionslikeGeorgeW.Bush,
Barcelona,andMountEverest.Whatdotheseexpressionshaveincommon?Invirtueofwhatdo
theyconstituteagenuineclassoflinguisticexpressions?Atleastatfirstglance,thesewouldappearto
besyntacticallysimpleexpressionsthatrefer,oratleastpurporttorefer,toparticular
objects/individuals.Thus,GeorgeW.Bushreferstoaparticularman,Barcelonareferstoa
particularcity,andMountEverestreferstoaparticularmountain.Andeventhoughitis
questionablewhetherexpressionssuchasSantaClausandSherlockHolmesactuallyreferto
anythingatall,therecanbenodoubtthattheyatleastpurporttorefer:toSantaClausandSherlock
Holmes,respectively.Theyarethustobecountedaspropernamesforpresentpurposes.
Therearemanytheoriesconcerningthemeansbywhichpropernamesrefer.Wewillconsiderthree
ofthemorepopular(andplausible)kindsoftheories:descriptivisttheories,causaltheories,and
hybridcausaldescriptivetheories.Thenwewillconsidertwomoregeneralissuesregardingthe
referenceofnames,issuesthatarisefortheoristsofanypersuasion.

2.1DescriptivistTheories
Accordingtodescriptivisttheoriesofpropernames,aparticularuseofapropernamerefersbymeans
ofsomedescriptivecontentassociatedwiththatnamestandardly,itisassumed,viathespeaker's
associationofsomedescriptivecontent,inhermind,withthenameinquestion.Thisdescriptive
contentisthoughttouniquelydeterminethename'sreferent.WhenaspeakerusesthenameNandin
doingsosuccessfullyreferstoaparticularobjectorindividualx,thedescriptivistthusclaims(i)that
thespeakermustbethinkingofNasthe(unique)Fand(ii)thatxmustinfactbethe(unique)F.In
otherwords,thedescriptivisttheoryofpropernamespositsthatreferentialsuccesshingesonspeakers
attachingtoeachnameintheirrepertoiresomedescriptivecontentFwhichuniquelysinglesoutsome
specificobjectintheworld.Conversely,whenspeakersneglecttoassociateasufficientlyprecise
descriptionwithaname,thedescriptivistshouldpredictthatreferencefails.
Classicaldescriptivists,likeGottlobFrege(1892)andBertrandRussell(1911),wereperfectlywilling
toacknowledgethatthedescriptivecontentinquestionmightvarysometimesquitemarkedly
fromonespeakertothenext.Indeed,accordingtoRussell,suchcontentmayvaryacrosstimeforone
andthesamespeaker.Thus,whileImayassociatethenameBushwiththedescriptivecontentthe
previousU.S.president,LauraBushmayassociatethesamenamewiththedescriptivecontentmy
husband.WhenObamaisnolongerpresident,myidentifyingcontentwillnodoubtchange
perhapstosomethingliketheU.S.presidentwhocompromisedontheissueofgovernmentfunded
stemcellresearch.IfGeorgeandLauraweretodivorce,heridentifyingdescriptivecontentwouldno
doubtchangeaswellperhapstomyexhusband.Ineithercase,theindividualreferredtobymeans
ofthenameisdetermined(or,asitisoftenput,ispickedoutorfixed)bytheparticulardescriptive
contentthespeakerassociateswiththatname.Becausethedescriptivecontentinquestionistypically
characterizedbymeansofadefinitedescription(anexpressionoftheformtheF),suchtheoriesare
often(evenifsomewhatmisleadingly[1])knownasdescriptivisttheoriesofpropernames.
Muchoftheappealofdescriptivisttheoriesofpropernamesstemsfromthefactthatsuchtheoriescan
benaturallyexpandedintotheoriesofmeaning(orsemanticcontent).Whenthesetheoriesare
expandedinthisway,theyoffersomesignificantadvantageswhencomparedtotheirmain
competitor,theMilliantheoryofpropernames(afterJ.S.Mill,1867).Inparticular,thedescriptivist
theoryofmeaning(asopposedtothemoremodestdescriptivisttheoryofreference)caneasily
accountforthenontrivialityofidentitystatementsinvolvingcoreferringnames,sentences
containingemptynames,sentencescontainingtruenegativeexistentials,andpropositionalattitude
reports.Inshort,thedescriptivisttheoryofmeaningnotonlyoffersanaturalpairingforthe
descriptivisttheoryofreferencetogether,theyofferanappealingexplanationforawidevarietyof
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linguisticphenomena.
LetusturnnowtothesortsofcasesthathaveprovedproblematicforMillianismorthethesisthat
themeaningofapropernamejustisthebearerofthatnameinordertocometobetterunderstand
theappealofdescriptivism.Considerthefollowingfoursentences:
2. HesperusisPhosphorus.
3. SantaClauslivesattheNorthPole.
4. Vulcandoesnotexist.
5. FredbelievesthatCicero,butnotTully,wasRoman.
HereiswhytheMillianviewfacesproblemswiththesesortsofcases.Suppose(asisinfactthecase)
thatHesperusandPhosphorusrefertothesamething(theplanetVenus).Supposeaswellthat
SantaClausandVulcanbothlackreferents,[2]andthatFredisaperfectlyrationalagent,andthus
notinclinedtoharborcontradictorybeliefs.Then,Millianismwouldpredictthat(2),whichseems
informative,istrivial(sinceitsmeaningturnsouttobeoftheforma=a).Itwouldpredictthat(3),
whichseemsmeaningful,ismeaningless(onaccountofthemeaninglesssubjectterm).Itwould
predictthattheintuitivelytrueandmeaningful(4)isabsurd(asitsmeaningfulnesspresupposesthe
existenceofwhatitdeniesexists).Anditwouldpredictthat(5),whichattributesseeminglyconsistent
beliefstoFred,attributestohimbeliefsthatnominimallyrationalagentcouldpossiblyentertain
(simultaneously)namely,thebeliefsthatxwasRomanandthebeliefthatoneandtheverysamex
wasnotRoman.Ofcourse,Millianshaveofferedvariousresponsestotheseconcerns.[3]Theusual
strategyhasbeentoclaimthattheintuitionssurroundingutterancesofsentenceslike(2)through(5)
aretheresultofmistakingwhatismerelycommunicated(orimplicated)forthepropositionliterally
expressed.Thus,althoughwhatisliterallyexpressedby(2)istrivial,whatitservestocommunicateis
not.Althoughtheremaybenopropositionliterallyexpressedby(3)or(4),propositionscan
nonethelessbecommunicatedbyutterancesofthosesentences.Finally,althoughanutteranceof(5)is
likelytoexpressafalsehoodassumingFredisarationalagentsuchanutterancemay
neverthelesscommunicatesomethingtrue(supposing,forinstance,thatFredhastwodistinctmodes
ofpresentation,orwaysofthinkingabout,thefamousRomanorator).
IncontrasttotheMillianapproach,whichinvolvesexplainingawaysuchwaywardintuitions,the
descriptivistapproachembracesthesesameintuitionsasprobative.Inparticular,thedescriptivist
mightclaim(asmanysuchtheoristshave)thatthereferencefixingdescriptivecontentassociatedwith
apropernameconstitutesthemeaningofthatname.Onsuchaview,aviewthatwewillcall
expandeddescriptivism,notonlydoesthedescriptionthepreviousU.S.presidentdeterminethe
referenceofthenameBush(asInowemploythatname),themeaningofthisdescriptionalso
constitutesthemeaningofthatname.Solongasweallowthatpropernamesthatarecoreferringcan
havedifferentdescriptivemeanings,thenwecanaccountfortheinformativenessof(2)andforthe
factthat(5)ascribesconsistentbeliefstoFred.JustsupposethatthemeaningofHesperusisthe
brightesteveningstar,themeaningofPhosphorusisthebrightestmorningstar.Then(2)expresses
theinformativeclaim(orproposition)thatthebrightesteveningstaristhebrightestmorningstar.Or
supposethatCiceromeansthemostfamousancientoratorandTullymeanstheguycalledTully
bytheEnglish.Then(5)ascribesconsistentbeliefstoFred:thebeliefthatthemostfamousancient
oratorwasRomanandthebeliefthattheguycalledTullybytheEnglishwasnotRoman.Moreover,
ifweallowthatpropernamesthatfailtorefermayneverthelesshaveassociateddescriptivemeanings,
thenwecanaccountforthemeaningfulnessofsentenceslike(3)and(4).Byclaimingthatthe
referencefixingdescriptivecontentofanexpressionisitsmeaning,descriptivisttheoriesofreference
arethusabletostraightforwardlyaccountforavarietyofcasesthathaveproventobeenduringly
problematicforMillians.
What'smore,Millianismitselfincontrasttoitscompetitor,expandeddescriptivismfailstoeven
begintoaddressthequestion:whatisthemechanismofreference?Whilethetheorycanbe
supplementedwithananswertothisquestion(byadopting,say,thecausaltheoryofreference
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discussedinthenextsection),thispairingmayseemlessnaturalthanthepackageofferedbythe
expandedversionofdescriptivism.Expandeddescriptivismoffersatightparallelbetweenthetheory
ofmeaningandthetheoryofreference:apropernamereferstoitsbearerinvirtueofthefactthatthe
nameisassociatedwithacertaindescriptivecontentasitsmeaning,andthefactthatthiscontent,in
turn,isuniquelysatisfiedbythename'sbearer.Millians,incontrast,canhardlyaspiretosuch
theoreticalelegance.
Thecentralchallengetothedescriptivisttheoryisthatthereisreasontosuspectthatpropernamesare
notsemanticallyequivalenttosingulardefinitedescriptions.Incontrasttodescriptivism,RuthBarcan
Marcus(1961)proposedthatweoughttoconceiveofpropernamesastags.Tosaythatproper
namesaretagsis,forMarcus,tosaythattheyhavenolinguisticmeaningandarethereforenot
semanticallyequivalenttoanysingulardescriptionoftheirreferents.Propernamesdonot,onthissort
ofview,referbywayofthedescriptionstheyallegedlystandfortheyreferdirectlytotheirbearers.
Marcus's(1961)viewthusconstitutesaversionofwhathascometobeknownasthedirect
referencetheoryofnames.Importantconsequencesofthistheoryinclude,asMarcus(1961)notes,
thenecessityofidentitystatementsbetweencoreferringpropernamessomethingwhich,though
highlyintuitive,isnotguaranteedbymanydescriptivisttheoriesofpropernames.[4]Otherimportant
consequencesincludethedissolutionofpuzzlesinvolvingsubstitutivityinmodalcontexts(Marcus
1993).
Nearlyadecadelater,SaulKripke,inatriooflecturessubsequentlypublishedasNamingand
Necessity(1980),proposedasimilarviewofpropernames.[5]ForKripke,asforMarcus,proper
namesreferdirectly,withoutthemediationofanyassociateddescriptivecontent.AndKripke,like
Marcusbeforehim,makesnoteofthefactthatthissortofviewguaranteesthenecessityofidentity
statementscontainingcoreferringpropernames.However,Kripkearticulateshisversionofthedirect
referencetheorynotintermsofthenotionoftagging,butintermsofthenotionofrigiddesignation,
anotionthatappliesnotonlytopropernames,butto(atleastcertainsortsof)definitedescriptions
andtonaturalkindtermsaswell.
ThisbringsustoKripke'sthreewellknownobjectionstodescriptivisttheoriesofpropernames
(1980).[6]Theseare:first,theproblemofunwantednecessity(sometimesreferredtoasanepistemic
problem)second,theproblemofrigidity(sometimesreferredtoasamodalproblem)and,third,the
problemofignoranceanderror(sometimesreferredtoasasemanticproblem).[7]Thefirstand
secondproblemsapplyonlytoexpandeddescriptivisttheoriesofreference,theoriesthatclaimthat
themeaningofapropernameisitsreferencefixingdescription.Thethirdproblemappliestomore
basicversionsofthedescriptivismaswell,versionsthatcommitonlytotheweakerclaimthatthe
referenceofapropernameisdeterminedbytheassociateddescriptivecontentwhileeschewingthe
claimthatthiscontentalsoservesasthename'smeaning.
Togettheseproblemsmoreclearlyinview,considerassertiveutterancesofthefollowingsentences:
6. Aristotle(ifheexisted)wasaphilosopher.
7. Aristotlewasfondofdogs.
8. Einsteinwasagenius.
Supposethat,foraparticularspeakerFred,thedefinitedescriptionthatmostaptlyexpressesthe
meaningofAristotleisthelastgreatphilosopherofantiquity.Then,ifexpandeddescriptivismis
correct,asentencelike(6)shouldsound(toFredatleast)trivial,necessary,andanalytic.Itshould
soundastrivial,necessaryandanalyticasBachelorsareunmarriedorSquareshavefoursides,at
leasttoFred.Butitprobablywon'tevenFredwillprobablybewillingtoadmitthatAristotlemight
neverhavegoneintophilosophy.Hadthingsbeendifferent,Aristotlemight(forinstance)havedied
ininfancyorpursuedacareerinthetheater.Thisistheproblemofunwantednecessity.
Nowlet'sconsiderjustsuchapossibleworld:aworldinwhichAristotlediedininfancy.Supposethat
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thispossibleworldis,inotherrespects,prettymuchliketheactualworld.Andsuppose,forthe
moment,thatweadoptthedescriptivisttheory.Then,sentence(7),asusedbyEnglishspeakersinthe
actualworld,wouldarguablybetrueofsuchapossibleworldjustincasePlatowas(inthatpossible
world)fondofdogs!For,giventhesuppositionsinquestion,Platowouldarguablyhavesatisfiedthe
descriptionassociatedwithAristotle(byhypothesisthelastgreatphilosopherofantiquity).Butit
seemsintuitivelyimplausibletosupposethatthenameAristotleasweinfactusethatnameinthe
actualworldcouldbeusedtorefertoanyoneotherthanitsreferentintheactualworld,namely
Aristotle.Ofcourse,hadthingsbeenrelevantlydifferent,thenameAristotlemighthavebeenused
torefertoPlato(say),butgivenhowthenameisactuallyused,itcannotbeusedbyspeakerstorefer
toPlatointhisoranyotherpossibleworldinwhichPlatoexists.Allthissuggeststhatnames
arerigid:suchthattheyrefertothesameindividualineverypossibleworldinwhichthatindividual
exists.Definitedescriptions,incontrast,donotappeartoberigid:thedefinitedescriptionthelast
greatphilosopherofantiquitymightwellreferto(ordenote)PlatoinaworldwhereAristotledies
ininfancy.Thissuggeststhatnamesaresemanticallydifferentfromdescriptions,whichinturn
suggeststhatthemechanismbywhichanamereferscannotbeidentifiedwithsomedefinite
description.Thisistheproblemofrigidity.
Nowletusmoveontothetwinproblemsofignoranceanderror.SupposethatFredbelievesof
Einsteinonlythathewasaphysicist.Then,hewillfailtorefertoEinsteinviahisuseofthename
Einstein,sincetheassociateddescriptivecontent,aphysicist,failstopickEinsteinoutfromamong
countlessotherphysicists.Thisistheproblemofignorance.SupposenowthatFredbelievesthat
Einsteinwastheinventoroftheatomicbomb.(AccordingtoKripke(1980)manyspeakersbelieve
this,orusedtoatleast.)Thedescriptivisttheorywouldthenpredictwhatissurelyfalsethatwhen
suchaspeakeruttersasentencelike(8),herefersnottoEinsteinbuttoOppenheimer(thepersonwho
didinfactinventtheatomicbomb).Thisistheproblemoferror.
Fortheseandotherreasons,many(perhapsmost)philosophersoflanguagehaverejecteddescriptivist
theoriesofpropernamesinfavorofeithercausalorhybridtheories.Noteveryone,though,has
rejecteddescriptivism.JohnSearle's(1983)responsetoKripke'sthreeprongedchallengebasically
claimsthatthetheoryrefutedbyKripke(thesocalledFregeRusselltheory)isastrawman,andthat
aplausibleversionofthedescriptiontheory(namely,Searle's)cancircumventeachandeveryoneof
Kripke'sobjections.Oneneedonlyacknowledgethatthereferencefixingcontentassociatedwiththe
useofagivennameneedn'tbethesortofcontentexpressiblebyasingledefinitedescription,oreven
byanopendisjunctionofsuchexpressions.Forthereisnoreasontoinsistthatreferencedetermining
contentmustbeexpressiblelinguistically.Rather,thereferencefixingcontentisidenticaltothe
totalityofagivenspeaker'sintentionalcontentthatis,thetotalityofmentalcontentagiven
speakerassociateswiththenameinquestion.Thereferentwillbewhateverobject/individualfitsthe
bulkofthiscontent.Moreover,suchcontent(whichislikelytovarywidelyfromspeakertospeaker)
isnottoberegardedasgivingthemeaningofaname,wherethemeaningofanameisconstruedas
somethinglikeadefinition.
Oncetheseamendmentsaremade,theproblemsnotedbyKripkeareeasilyavoidedaccordingto
Searleatleast.Inresponsetotheproblemofunwantednecessity,Searleeffectivelybitesthebullet.
Onhisview,itisindeedanecessarytruththatAristotle(forinstance)satisfiesasignificantchunkof
theintentionalcontentassociated(bythespeaker)withthenameAristotle.Butthisdoesnotmean
thatAristotlewasaphilosopherisonparwithBachelorsareunmarried.Fortheassociated
descriptivecontentisnotinanywaysynonymouswiththenameitdoesnotdefinethename,it
merelyfixesitsreference.Inresponsetotherigidityproblem,Searlepointsoutthatintuitionsof
rigidityareeasilyenoughaccommodated:onecansimplyrigidifythereferencefixingdescription.
Thus,Aristotlerefers(inallpossiblescenarios)totheindividualwhoactuallydidsuchandsuch.
Finally,inresponsetotheproblemsofignoranceanderror,Searlepointsoutthatonceallofthe
relevantintentionalcontentistakenintoconsideration,theseproblemssimplydonotarise.For
associatedwithEinsteinwillofcoursebethecontentindividualwhomothersinmycommunitycall
Einstein.Ifthiscontent,whichmightwellbesufficienttopickoutEinstein,hassignificantweight
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forthespeaker,itcouldeffectivelytrumpanydivergentcontent.Itmightthussucceedinpicking
outtherightindividual:Einstein.(Andifitdidn't,thatwouldonlyshoweitherthatthespeakerwasn't
reallyreferringtotheindividualothersinhiscommunitycallEinsteinorelsethatthecommunity
doesn'tactuallyhaveapracticeofusingthenameEinsteintorefertoEinstein.)
DespiteSearle'singeniousdefenseofthedescriptivisttheory,manyhavefounditultimately
implausible.Thisisprobablydue,atleastinpart,totheconvictionofmanycontemporary
philosophersthatthereissomethingmagicalaboutdescriptiontheoriesofreference.Suchtheories
appear(accordingtothesephilosophers)toimbuethemindwitharathercuriousproperty:onethat
allowsitscontentstomagicallyattachtothingsoutsideofit.MichaelDevitt(1990),echoingHilary
Putnam(1981),makesthisverycomplaint.Hefirstmakesthegeneralpointthatnothinginsidean
objectissufficienttodetermineitsrelationtosomethingoutsideit.Hethenappliesthisprincipleto
thecaseathand,askingpointedly(p.91):
Howcansomethinginsidetheheadrefertosomethingoutsidethehead?Searleseesno
problem:Itjustdoes.That'stherealmagic.
Evans(1982,p.298)hadmademuchthesamepointearlier,whenhewrote:
Whatmakesitoneratherthananotherofapairofidenticaltwinsthatyouareinlove
with?CertainlynotsomespecificationblueprintedinyourmindIfGodhadlooked
intoyourmind,hewouldnothaveseenwithwhomyouwereinlove,andofwhomyou
werethinking.
Thebasicideaisthis:mentalcontent,howeverdetailed,issimplynotsufficienttopickoutsome
extramentalentity.(Suchargumentsarecomplicated,however,bythefactthatcertaintheoriesof
mentalcontentcontendthatsuchcontenttoocanonlybeunderstoodinrelationtothingsoutsideof
thespeaker'shead.Seetheentryonexternalismaboutmentalcontent.)
Morerecently,adifferentoffshootofdescriptivismhascometotheforeinphilosophicalinquiries
regardingnames,anoffshootthatitselfsubsumestwocloselyrelatedviews:metalinguistic
descriptivismandpredicativism.AccordingtometalinguisticdescriptivistslikeWilliamKneale
(1962),KentBach(1987,2002),BartGeurts(1997),andAlexisBurgess(2013),whattheuseofa
namelikeGeorgemeansisthebearerofthenameGeorge.Alongsimilarlines,TylerBurge
(1973)andDeliaGraffFara(forthcoming)havearguedthatwhatnamesmeaninisolationisactually
acertainsortofproperty,namelythepropertyofbearingthenameGeorge.Sincesentences
containingnamesinthesubjectplaceintuitivelyaren'tabouttheseproperties,predicativists
supplementthisinitialclaimwithafurtherone:bareoccurrencesofnames(asinthesubjectplace)
areaccompaniedbyanunpronouncedthat(Burge)orthe(Fara),soastoformthecomplexthat
GeorgeortheGeorge.Thus,forpredicativistslikeBurgeandFara,thesemanticvalueofanamein
thesubjectplaceisequivalenttothatofacomplexdemonstrativeoranincompletedefinite
description.Howsuchtermsreferwill,therefore,dependwhetherandhowonethinksthatcomplex
demonstrativesorincompletedefinitedescriptionsrefer.Bach,forone,claimsthatdefinite
descriptionsdonotreferatall,atleastsemanticallyspeaking.That,inturn,meansthatnamesdonot
referatleastnotsemanticallyandthat,perhapssurprisingly,thereferenceanameturnsoutto
bewhollyinconsequantialforthetruthconditionsoftheutteranceinwhichitoccurs.Bytreating
incompletedefinitedescriptionsandcomplexdemonstrativesdifferently,however,othermeta
linguisticdescriptivistsandpredicativistshavemanagedtoavoidtakingonthissortofcommitment.
Bothmetalinguisticdescriptivisismandpredicativismaboutpropernamesaretypicallyspelledoutas
commitmentsregardingthelogicalformofcertainsortsoflinguisticexpressions.Thatis,these
theoriesaretypicallyunderstoodtobeinthebusinessofexplainingwhatsortsofsemanticvalues,or
meanings,nameshaveratherthanexplaininghownamesgettheirreferents.Nonetheless,theseviews
bringwiththemsubstantiveclaimsaboutreferenceaswell.Inparticular,metalinguisticdescriptivists
andpredicativistsalikegenerallyagreethatthebare(orsubjectplace)useofanamereferstoa
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particularbearerofthatname,eveniftheydisagreeaboutwhethersuchreferenceis,properly
speaking,semantic.Thismeansthatthesetheoristsoweusanexplanationbothofwhatitmeansto
bearanameandofwhatitisaboutparticularcontextsinvirtueofwhichaparticularuseofaname
referstoaparticularbearerofthatname,asopposedtosomeotherbearer.Forthemostpart,
predicativistsandmetalinguisticdescriptivistsalikehavehadrelativelylittletosayabouteitherof
theseaspectsoftheirtheory.Instead,theyhavepreferredtoleaveitopenhowexactlyincomplete
definitedescriptionsandcomplexdemonstrativesmanagetopickoutreferentsincontexts.Likewise,
theyhavebeencontenttoappealtoanintuitivenotionofwhatitistobearanameratherthan
spellingoutpreciseconditionsforwhenitisthatanobjectorindividualcanrightlybesaidtostandin
thisrelationtoaparticularname.OnerecentexceptionisAidanGray(forthcoming),whois
concernedtodefendpredicativismfromthechargeofviciouscircularity.Theworryisthis:suppose
thatGeorgepicksoutthepropertyofbearingthenameGeorge.Whichpropertyisthis?Well,it
wouldseemtobethepropertyhadbyallandonlythethingstowhichwecanproperlyapplythename
George.Butnowourexplanationhasappealedtopreciselythesamepropertywewerehopingto
explicateinthefirstplace,thepropertyofbearingthenameGeorge!
Grayproposesananalysisofthenamebearingrelationintermsofthemutualpresuppositionsof
speakersinagivenspeechcommunity.Thishastheinterestingupshotofofferingaprimafacie
appealingwayofexplainingthephenomenonofreferenceshiftviaerror,inwhichanamecomesto
bebornebysomethingotherthanitsoriginalbeareralthoughnospeakereverintendstousethename
inanythingotherthanthewaythatitwasoriginallypassedontothem.ForGray,namebearingcan
shiftduetotheintroductionofawidespread,butfalse,presuppositiontotheeffectthatsomeobjectx
hasinpastbeenthebearerofthenameN.Referencechangeviaerroris,however,morestandardly
posedasanobjectiontothemaincompetitortodescriptivisttheoriesofthereferenceofnames:causal
theories.Itistime,therefore,toturnourattentiontosuchtheories.

2.2CausalTheories
ThecausaltheorywasadumbratedbyKripke[8](1980)asanalternativetothedescriptivisttheoryof
nominalreference.Thecentralideaunderpinningthissortoftheoryisthat(theuseof)anamerefers
towhateverislinkedtoitintheappropriateway,awaythatdoesnotrequirespeakerstoassociateany
identifyingdescriptivecontentwhatsoeverwiththename.Thecausaltheoryisgenerallypresentedas
havingtwocomponents:onedealingwithreferencefixing,theotherdealingwithreference
borrowing.Referenceisinitiallyfixedwithadubbing,usuallybyperception,thoughalsoonoccasion
bydescription.Referenceisfixedviaperceptionwhenaspeakersays,ineffect,ofaperceivedobject:
You'retobecalledN.Referenceisfixedviadescriptionwhenaspeakerstipulates,ineffect:
WhateveristheuniquesuchandsuchistobecalledN.(AsnotedbyKripke(1980),thename
Neptunewasfixedbydescription,stipulatedbytheastronomerLeVerriertorefertowhateverwas
theplanetarycauseofobservedperturbationsintheorbitofUranus.)Afterthisinitialreference
fixing,thenameispassedonfromspeakertospeakerthroughcommunicativeexchanges.Speakers
succeedinreferringtosomethingbymeansofitsnamebecauseunderlyingtheirusesofthenameare
linksinacausalchainstretchingbacktothedubbingoftheobjectwiththatname.Subsequent
speakersthuseffectivelyborrowtheirreferencefromspeakersearlierinthechain,thoughborrowers
donothavetobeabletoidentifylenders.Allthatisrequiredisthatborrowersareappropriately
linkedtotheirlendersthroughchainsofcommunication.However,asKripkepointsout,inorderfora
speaker(quareferenceborrower)tosucceedinusingapropernametorefertotheobject/individual
thelenderwasusingthenametoreferto,shemustintendtodoso.Thus,Imayusethename
Napoleontorefertomypetcat,evenifIfirstbecameacquaintedwiththenameinasituationwhere
itwasbeingusedtorefertothefamousFrenchgeneral.Theimportantpointisthat,insuchacase,I
donotintendtousethenametorefertotheindividualthelenderusedittoreferto.Instead,Iintend
tointroduceanewnameintothelexicon,onethatjusthappenstosoundexactlylikeanameforthe
famousFrenchgeneral.
Oneofthemostseriousandenduringproblemsfacingthecausaltheoryofreference(assketchedby
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Kripke,atleast)isthatitappearstobeatoddswiththephenomenonofreferenceshiftviaerror.
GarethEvanscitesthecaseofMadagascar,onceusedtorefertoaportionoftheAfricanmainland,
butnowusedtorefertothegreatAfricanisland.MarcoPolowasapparentlythefirstspeakertouse
thenametorefertotheisland.Hewasundertheimpressionamisimpressionthatthiswashow
thenamewasactuallyused.Theproblemisthis:whenMarcoPolousedthename,hesurelyintended
torefertowhateverwasreferredtobytheperson(s)fromwhomheacquiredthename.Hisintention
wasnottointroduceanoveluseofthename.Buttheindividual(s)fromwhomPoloacquiredthe
nameintended(byhypothesis)tousethenametorefertoaportionoftheAfricanmainland.How,
then,diditcometorefertotheisland?Evansgoesontoprovideanimaginarycasethatmakesthe
samebasicpoint.
Twobabiesareborn,andtheirmothersbestownamesuponthem.Anurseinadvertently
switchesthemandtheerrorisneverdiscovered.Itwillhenceforthundeniablybethecase
thatthemanuniversallyknownasJackissocalledbecauseawomandubbedsome
otherbabywiththatname.(1982,p.301)
Thecausaltheoristfacesadilemmahere.First,shemightproposethat(contrawhatseemstobethe
naturalwayofdescribingthesecases)ineachcaseanewnamehasactuallybeenintroduced,i.e.
Madagascar2andJack2.Thiswouldentailthatnoteveryreferencefixinguseofanameturnsout
tobeintentionalsometimesnewnamesareintroduced,andtheirreferencesomehowfixed,
unintentionally.Alternatively,thecausaltheoristcanmodifyherviewsoastoallowforevents
subsequenttotheinitialdubbingtoaffectwhatagivennamerefersto.Devitt(1981)developsa
versionofthelatterstrategybycontendingthatanameistypicallygroundedinitsbearerin
numerousperceptualconfrontationsaftertheinitialdubbing.Aspartofwhatgroundsreference,these
perceptualconfrontationsarethussemanticallysignificantandcapableofeffectingreferencechange
overtime.Thebasicideaisthat,givenasufficientnumberofsuchgroundingsoverasufficientperiod
oftime,referencechangemayoccur.Thus,Madagascarwasabletoshiftreferencefromthe
mainlandtotheislandonceperceptuallybasedgroundingsintheislandbecameestablished.The
islandwaseffectivelydubbedMadagascarbymeansofsuchgroundings.(Notethatthisentailsthat
MarcoPolowasunlikelytobethefirsttousethenameMadagascartorefertotheisland,since,
althoughhemighthavebeenapttoapplythatnametotheisland,aninsufficientnumberof
groundingswouldhaveobtainedatthepointwhenhewashimselfusingthename.)Andtheman
knownbyallasJackisnotsocalledbecause,yearsearlier,someonedubbedanotherindividualthat
name.HeissocalledbecausenumeroususesofJackaregroundedinhim.
Althoughthecausaltheory(asrevisedbyDevitt)providesaplausibleaccountofnominalreference,
itsadvocatesstillneedtosupplementtheirtheoryofreferencewithatheoryofmeaningatheory
thataccountsforthefactthatpropernamesappeartohavesomesortofmeaningorcognitive
content.[9]Onitsown,thecausaltheoryofreferencedoesnotprovideanyanswerstothequestions
ofcognitivesignificancethatsobothereddescriptiontheoristslikeFregeandRussell.

2.3HybridTheories
Referencechangeisnottheonlyproblemfacingthecausaltheoryofreference.Evans(1973)provides
severalexamplesofusesofpropernamesthataremostnaturallyaccountedforviaahybridtheory,
accordingtowhichthereferenceofapropername(asusedbyaspeaker)isthedominantcausal
sourceofthebodyofdescriptiveinformationthespeakerassociateswiththename.Consider,for
instance,thefollowinghypotheticalcasediscussedbyEvans:
Anurnisdiscoveredinwhicharefoundfascinatingmathematicalproofs.Inscribedatthe
bottomisthenameIbnKhanwhichisquitenaturallytakentobethenameofthe
constructoroftheproofs.Consequentlyitpassesintocommonusageamongst
mathematiciansconcernedwiththatbranchofmathematics.Khanconjecturedhere
thatandthelike.Howeversupposethenamewasthenameofthescribewhohad
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transcribedtheproofsmuchlaterasmallidscripsithadbeenobliterated.(1982,p.306)
Presumably,wewanttosaythatthenameasusedbycontemporarymathematiciansreferstothe
ancientmathematician,nottothescribe.Butthe(unamended)Kripkeancausalpicturewouldpredict
thatthenamereferstothescribe.Afterall,contemporarymathematiciansnodoubtintendtousethe
nametorefertotheindividualcalled,bythoseintheancientcommunity,IbnKahn.Theirintention
isnottointroduceanoveluseofthename.OnEvans'view,however,thenamereferstotheancient
mathematician,sinceitisthemathematicianwhoconstitutesthedominantcausalsourceofthe
descriptiveinformationassociatedwiththename:mathematicianwhoprovedsuchandsuch.Because
theancientmathematicianisresponsiblefortheexistenceoftheproofs,heisarguablythedominant
causalsourceofthedescriptiveinformationassociatedwiththenameIbnKahn.
TheadvantagesofEvans'theoryappeartobeconsiderable.Evanshimselfclaimsthathistheory
effectivelycombinesthevirtuesofthedescriptivetheorywiththoseofthecausaltheory,while
avoidingtheirrespectivevices.Likedescriptivistaccounts,Evans'hybridtheoryaccountsfor
cognitivesignificance(ofthesortevidencedbysentenceslike(2)through(5))aswellasreference
likecausalaccounts,itpreservestheintuitionthatonecannotrefertosomethingwithwhichonehas
nocausalconnectionwhatsoever.Moreover,Evans'theoryavoidstheproblemsofignoranceand
error.Foritdeniesthatreferenceisdeterminedbyfitorsatisfactionofanysortofdescriptive
content.
Itisworthnoting,however,thatcertainofthedetailsofEvanslikeviewsareopentoquestion.What's
more,thesedetailsmatterforthepredictionsthatwillbegeneratedbysuchviews.Evanshimself
shiftedhisstanceonwhatconstitutesadominantcausalsourcebetweenEvans(1973)andEvans
(1982),excisinganearlierrequirementthatdominantcausalsourcesmustreliablyputthelanguage
userinapositiontohaveknowledgeof,oratleasttruebeliefsabout,thereferent.OnEvans'later
view,speakersmustmerelybedeferringtoacoregroupwhoknowthereferentassoandso.More
recently,ImogenDickie(2011)hasarguedthatcertaininformationaboutthekindofthingthatis
namedmustalsobepreservedinchainsofEvansliketransmissionofreferencefromthosewhoknow
anobjectassoandsotothosewhodonot.
ItisalsoworthpointingoutthatEvans'proposalisbynomeanstheonlyhybridtheoryavailable.
Devitt's(1981)versionofthecausaltheory,outlinedinthelastsection,isalsoahybridtheoryof
sorts.Althoughhistheoryofreferenceborrowingisapurelycausalone,thereisadescriptiveelement
inhistheoryofreferencefixing.ThisdescriptiveelementisneededtohandlewhatDevittcallsthe
quaproblem,aproblementailedbytheviewthatreferencefixingisapurelycausal,non
descriptive,event.Thissortofviewofreferencefixing,Devittclaims,isfalse.Rather,inordertofix
thereferenceofaname,thenamermustatleastknowwhatkindofobjectsheisnaming.Thus,in
ordertosucceedinnamingacertaindogSpot,Imustatleastknowwhatkindofthingthe
nominatumtobeis:Imustatleastknowthatheis(say)ananimal.IfIthinkheismerelyan
inanimatespotinmyfieldofvision,Iwillnothavesucceededinnaminghim.Now,toknowwhat
kindofobjectoneisnamingistoconceptualizethatobject,tothinkofitasanobjectofacertainsort,
as(inotherwords),satisfyingacertainpredicate.Itisthustothinkofitquasuchandsuch.Thus,if
anactofreferencefixingistobesuccessful,thereferencefixermustthinkofthereferenttobeunder
acertaindescriptiononethatthatobjectorindividualactuallysatisfies.Ifthisisright,however,
thentheeventofreferencefixingcannotbeconceivedofinpurelycausalterms.

2.4FurtherComplications
Thethreetheoriesofpropernamescanvassedabovealltacitlyassumenotjustthatnamesareunivocal
thatis,thattheyarenotambiguousbutalsothatthereisonlyonebearerofaparticularnameat
aparticulartime.Withoutthisimplicitassumption,itwillnotbeenoughtoexplainwhyGeorgeW.
BushreferstoGeorgeW.Bush.WeneedtosaywhythisuseofGeorgeW.Bushreferstoone
personwhileanotherusemightwellrefertosomeoneelse.Inotherwords,whicheveroftheabove
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theoriesonefindsmostappealing,westilllackaclearwayofspecifyingwhichdescription,causal
chain,ordominantcausalsourceisrelevantforfixingthereferenceofapropernameataparticular
contextofuse.
DavidKaplan(1990)outlinesonenaturalwayofrespondingtothischallenge:heclaimsthateach
namereferstoonlyonething,butthatonecannottellwhichnamehasbeenusedmerelyfromthe
overtphonologicalformofthespeaker'sutterance.Inotherwords,Kaplanpositsthatthereareany
numberofnamesallwrittenandpronouncedGeorgeW.Bush.Butwhileeachofthesenamesis
writtenandpronouncedidentically,eachreferstoadifferentperson.Thequestionnowbecomes:what
determineswhichnameaspeakerhasusedincontext?Kaplansuggeststhattheanswertothis
questionhastodowiththespeaker'smentalstates,andinparticularwiththespeaker'sintentionto
talkaboutoneoranotherobject.WhileKaplanconceivesofsuchmentalstatesintermsofthecausal
theoryofreference,thebasicoutlineofKaplan'sproposalcouldalsobeadaptedtoahybridtheoryor
eventoadescriptivisttheorybywayofcertainammendations.Inparticular,thespeaker'smental
stateswouldhavetobecashedouteitherintermsofadominantcausalsourceorintermsofa
descriptivecontent,dependingonwhichtheoryoneisconsidering.
Anothernaturalsuggestionwouldbetoclaimthatnamesareactuallycontextsensitiveinsomeway
thatis,thattheyrefertodifferentobjects/individualsindifferentcontexts.Predicativistsandmeta
linguisticdescriptivistsalreadyholdaversionofthisview,invirtueoftheirholdingthatbareusesof
namesareequivalenttocomplexdemonstrativesorincompletedefinitedescriptions.Cancausal
theorists(orhybridtheorists,forthatmatter)alsoholdaviewlikethis?Yes.Suchaviewhasinfact
beensketchedbybothFrancoisRecanati(1997)andMichaelPelczarandJoeRainsbury(1998).
Accordingtothissortofindexicaltheoryofpropernames,thereisonlyonenameGeorgeW.
Bush,butcontextsomehowdetermineswhichGeorgeW.Bushisthereferentofanyparticularuseof
thatname.Thatis,contextservestotakeusfromthesetofobjectsnamedGeorgeW.Bush
(accordingtoastandardcausalhistoricaltheoryofnameacquisitionandtransfer)toaparticular
individualnamedGeorgeW.Bush.Supposingthatwhatitisaboutthecontextthatplaysthisroleis
infactthespeaker'smentalstates,thenthegapbetweenthissuggestionandKaplan'searlier
suggestionnarrowssignificantly.Thefollowingdifferenceremains,however:ontheindexicaltheory
ofnames,thereisjustonenameGeorgeW.Bush,whereasonKaplan'sproposalthereareany
numberofnamesGeorgeW.Bush,eachofwhichiswrittenandpronouncedinthesamemanner.
Whilethechoiceofoneortheotherofthesepicturesmayseemrelativelyminor,itwillturnouttobe
rathersignificantwhenweturntoconsiderwhetheritispossibletoofferaunifiedtheoryofreference,
onethatencompassesbothnamesandothersortsofreferentialterms.
Addingtothedifficultiesthatariseinofferingatheoryofreferenceforpropernames,SamCumming
(2008)haspointedtothefactthatnamessometimesappeartobeboundincontextbyindefinite
descriptivematerialearlierinthediscourse.AdaptingacasefromOscarWilde,Cummingoffersthe
followingexample:
9. ThereisagentlemaninHertfordshiregoingbythenameErnest.Ernestisengagedtotwo
women.(2008,p.535)
SuchcasesareproblematicforbothdescriptivistsandMillians.[10]Theproblemfordescriptivistsis
that(9)seemstrueeveninaworldwheretherearetwogentlemeninHertfordshiregoingbythename
Ernest,eachofwhomisengagedtotwowomen.Inthisworld,therelevantdescriptivecontentfails
toisolateasingleindividual,andthenameisthuspredictedtobeempty.ForMillians,theproblemis
that(9)canbesupplementedwithfurthermaterialthatwouldfiteitherofthemengoingbythename
ofErnest,e.g.Ernestistheolderoftwobrothers,Ernestistheyoungeroftwobrothers.
Intuitively,bothoftheseextensionscanbetrue,andyetforMilliansthereferenceofanameshouldn't
varywiththeadditionoffurthertext.Totheextent,then,thatbothcausalandhybridtheoristshave
beentemptedtoendorseMillianism,thisrepresentsaproblemforboththoseviews.Moregenerally,
casesliketheseputpressureontheclaimthatnamesalwaysfunctionasdevicesofreference.(For
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moreonboththereferenceandlogicalformofpropernames,seetheentryonnames.)

3.Indexicals
TermslikeI,you,here,now,he,she,this,andthat,oftencalledindexicals,are
typicallyofferedalongsidenamesasparadigmexamplesofreferentialterms.Interestingly,the
mechanismsthathavebeenproposedtoaccountforhowsuchtermsreferareratherdifferentfrom
thosewhichhavebeenproposedtoaccountforthereferenceofnames.Abriefinvestigationintothese
proposalswillhelptobringmoreclearlyintoviewthesecondofourmainquestions:istherejustone
mechanismbymeansofwhichreferringexpressionsrefer?Ordodifferentsortsofreferring
expressionsreferindifferentways?Infact,aswewillsee,itisnotevenclearthatallindexicalsrefer
inthesameway,letaloneallreferentialterms.Inparticular,adistinctionhasoftenbeendrawn
betweenwhatarecalledpureandimpureindexicals,withratherdifferenttheoriesofreference
beingofferedforeach.

3.1PureIndexicals
Whatarepureindexicals?Roughly,theyareexpressionsthereferenceofwhichdependsoncertain
veryregularaspectsofthecontextsinwhichtheyareused,wherecontextisunderstoodto
incorporate,interalia,aspeaker,hearer,time,andplace.Incontrast,impureindexicalsare
supposedtobemoreirregularintheirreference,sensitivetolesspublicaspectsofthecontextsuchas
thespeaker'smentalstate.Whileboththeexistenceandthesignificanceofthisdistinctionare
controversial,examplesofeachofthesesortsoftermsshouldthedistinctionprovebothrealand
significanttypicallyarenot.StandardexamplesofpureindexicalsincludeI,here,now,and
arguablyyou.Thelistofimpureindexicals,ontheotherhand,isgenerallyagreedtoincludethis,
that,he,she,andit.
Thetraditional(Frege/Russell)viewofindexicals,bothpureandimpure,isthatthereferenceofsuch
expressionsisfixedbysomesortofdescriptivecontentassociatedbythespeakerwiththeexpression.
Thisreferencefixingdescriptionisthemeaning,thepropositionalcontribution,oftheexpression.The
motivationforsuchaviewislargelyintuitive.Indexicalscertainlydoappeartomeansomething,and
theirmeaningspresumablyhavesomethingtodowithhowtheseexpressionsrefer.Forinstance,the
meaningofIisarguablythespeakerofthisutteranceandreferstothatindividualthemeaningof
nowisarguablythetimeofthisutteranceandreferstothattime.Andsoon.
OneobviousobjectiontothisviewisthatwhatthetermIreferstodoesnotappeartobesensitiveto
whatsortofdescriptivecontentaspeakermighthappentoassociatewiththatterm.Forinstance,the
factthatImighthappentoassociatethedescriptionthepreviousU.S.presidentwiththetermIdoes
notmeanthatIcanusethetermItorefertoGeorgeW.Bush,shouldIbesoinclined.Another
problemwiththisview,discussedextensivelyinKaplan(1989b),isthatreferencedetermining
descriptionsdon'tlooktobetherightsortsofthingstofigureintothepropositionalcontentsexpressed
byindexicalcontainingutterancesatleastontheassumptionthatsuchcontentsaresupposedto
helpexplainourjudgmentsaboutwhatissaid.Thus,consideranassertiveutteranceof:
10. Iamhungry
Suppose,first,thatIamthespeaker.Iutter(10).Now,supposethatyouarethespeaker.Youutter
(10).Whiletheremaybeasenseinwhichwesaidthesamethingthatis,thesenseinwhichwe
utteredthesamesentencetypethereisamoreinterestingandphilosophicallyrichsenseinwhich
wedidnot.Accordingtothedescriptivisttheoryofindexicalsunderconsideration,however,wesaid
thesamethinginthismoresubstantivesenseaswell.Iassertedthatthespeakerishungry,andsodid
you.Allthatdiffersisthecontextinwhichweutteredthisproposition.

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ConsiderationslikethesepointthewaytoKaplan'sdirectreferenceviewofpureindexicals,
accordingtowhichanindexical'scharacterdeterminesitsreferenceinacontext.Thereferenceofan
indexicalinacontextisitscontentthatis,itscontributiontowhatissaidorexpressedbythe
wholeofthespeaker'sutterance.Character,ontheotherhand,ismoreakintolinguisticmeaningthan
referenceandissupposed(accordingtoKaplan)toaccountforcognitivesignificance.Still,character
isinvariantacrosscontextsitisinsensitivetofactorslikewhatthespeaker'smentalstatehappensto
be,orwhathappenstobesalientincontext.Thecharacterofanexpressionprovidestherulesforits
correctuseincontext.Thus,thecharacterofIwillbearulespecifyingthattheexpressionrefersto
thespeakerinthecontextofutterance.Thecharacterofyouwillbearulespecifyingthatthe
expressionreferstotheaudienceinthecontextofutterance.Andsoon.
Sincecharactersareinsensitivetothespeaker'smentalstates,thereisnopossibilityofmyusingthe
termItorefertoGeorgeW.Bush.Norareyourandmyutterancesof(10)predictedtoexpressthe
sameproposition.What'smore,asKaplanpointsout,theviewallowsustoproductivelydistinguish
betweenmetaphysicalnecessityandwhatKaplancallslogicalnecessity.ThesentenceIamhere
nowrepresentsaclearexampleoflogicalnecessity:invirtueofwhattheindexicalsI,here,and
nowallmean,Kaplanclaimsthatthissentencecannotbeutteredfalsely.Yetclearlyitisnot
necessaryinanysortofmetaphysicalsensethataparticularspeakerbewherevershehappenstobeat
thetimeofutteranceshecouldhavejustaseasilybeensomewhereelseinstead.[11]
Althoughwidelyaccepted,severalconcernslingerforKaplan'sdirectreferenceaccountofindexicals.
First,Nunberg(1993)contendsthatindexicalshavedescriptiveusesaswell:usesthatareboth
semanticallysignificantandrelevanttowhatissaid.Asevidence,heofferssentenceslikethe
following:
11. Ithoughtyouweremymother.
Supposethatthereisaknockonthedoorandyouassumethatitisyourmother,whomyouare
expecting.Youthenopenthedoor,seethatthevisitor(x)isafriend,andutter(11)uponopeningthe
door.Youarguablymeanbythatutterancesomethinglike:Ithoughtthatthepersonatthedoorwas
mymother.Itseemsimplausibleintheextremethatyoumeantthatyouthoughtthatx,yourfriend,
wasyourmother!Youwouldnevermistaketheonefortheother.Second,somehavedisputed
Kaplan'sclaimthatpureindexicalslikeIarewhollyinsensitivetothespeaker'smentalstates.[12]
Third,itisunclearthatanythinglikeKaplan'sapparatusofintercontextuallystablecharacterscanbe
extendedtoaccountforimpureindexicalslikethisorthat.

3.2ImpureIndexicals
Incontrasttothepureindexicals,thereferenceofimpureindexicalslikehe,she,anditisnot
typicallythoughttobecharacterizablepurelyintermsofstableruleswhichthemselvesmake
referencetosomeabstractaspectofthecontext.Attheextreme,truedemonstrativeslikethisand
thatlooktobethesortofthingthatcanbeusedtorefertojustaboutanythinginjustaboutany
contextthusmakingitextremelydifficulttocharacterizethewayinwhichtheyreferintermsof
anysortofcontextuallyinvariantrule.
Still,severalpossibilitiespresentthemselves.Oneistomaketheruleitselfsensitivetocertain
variableaspectsofthecontext,suchaswhatissalientinthecontext(whateverexactlythatamounts
to).HowardWettstein(1984)offersaproposalalongtheselines,onewhichhasbeenmorerecently
revivedinAllysonMount(2008).[13]Thebasicideaisthatatermlikeshereferstowhoevercounts
asthemostsalientfemaleinthecontext.Similarruleswillapplytotheotherimpureindexicals.A
primafacieproblemwiththissortofviewisthatmultipleimpureindexicalscanbeusedinasingle
sentence,asin:
12. Thatisactuallylargerthanthat,it'sjustfurtheraway.
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Whatthismeansisthatsalienceisgoingtohavetobemorefinegrainedthanjustbeingrelativetoa
sentenceitmustbethesortofthingthatcanvaryoverthecourseoftheutteranceofasentence.
What'smore,wecanimagineanutterancelike(12)beingmadewithoutanyaccompanyingostensive
gestures,andevensucceedingincommunicatingadistinctcontentinsuchsituations.Itremainsan
openchallengeforsaliencebasedtheoriestoexplainjusthowsaliencecanchangeoverthecourseof
anutterance,andjustwhatitisaboutsentencesthemselvesthatcanservetoshiftwhatissalientina
context.Anotherchallengetosaliencebasedtheoriesofreferenceisthatitishighlyunclearthatany
singleobjectisevermaximallysalientrelativetoacontext,ratherthanrelativetoacontextanda
sortalorkind.Butsincesimpledemonstrativeslikethisandthatplausiblyfailtocomewithany
restrictionsonthekindsofthingstowhichtheycanbeusedtorefer,suchtheoriesleaveunresolved
howitisthatsimpledemonstrativesacquiretheirreferents.Finally,itissimplynotatallclearthatwe
cannotusetermslikethisorthattorefertoobjectsarelessthanmaximallysalientinacontext.A
rampagingwoollymammothmightwellcountasmaximallysalientinjustaboutanycontextquite
plausibly,itwould.Still,eveninacontextcontainingsuchacreature,itseemsthatIcansuccessfully
usethetermthattorefertothespearnexttoyouwhenIpleadforyoutoThrowthatatthe
mammoth,fortheloveofGod!
Inresponsetotheseandotherproblems,manyphilosophershavefollowedKaplan(1989a)in
claimingthatthereferenceofimpureindexicalsdepends,somehoworother,onthespeaker'smental
state.Whilethedetailsoftheresultingviewsvarysignificantly,whattheyshareisacommitmentto
somethinglikethefollowingcorethesis:whattheuseofanimpureindexicalrefersto,incontext,is
whateverthespeakerintendedtorefertobymeansofthatuse.[14]Evenwithjustthisbasic
commitmentinview,weshouldbeabletoseehowspeakerintentionbasedtheoriesofreferencewill
beabletoexplainthereferenceofmultipleusesofimpureindexicalswithinasinglesentence
(speaker'smentalstatescanbecomplex)aswellasreferencetononmaximallysalientobjectsor
objectsofakind(speakersarepresumablynotrequiredonlytointendtorefertosuchobjects).
Speakerorientedviewsofreferencefaceadifferentsetofproblems,howevermostnotablywhat
hasbeencalledtheHumptyDumptyProblem,aftersomeofHumptyDumpty'snotablecomments
regardingthedegreeofcontrolheexertsoverthemeaningsofhiswordsinLewisCarroll'sThrough
theLookingGlass.[15]Thisproblemis,infact,averygeneraloneitariseswheneveroneappealsto
thespeaker'sintentionstohelpdetermineeithermeaningorreference.Atitscore,theproblemisthis:
ifitisthespeaker'sintentionsthatdeterminethemeaningofaparticularsortofterm,thenwhat
preventsthespeakerfromusingthatterminahighlyunexpectedmanner,onethatintuitivelystrikes
usasbetrayingasignificantdegreeoflinguisticincompetence?Forinstance,whatwouldpreventme
fromusingthetermhetorefertoaninanimateobject,oreventhetermItorefertoGeorgeW.
Bush?Theworryisthatproponentsofspeakerintentionbasedviewsofindexicalreferencecanoffer
noadequateresponsetothischallenge.
Infact,anumberofdifferentstrategiesforrespondingtotheHumptyDumptyProblemhavebeen
proposed.Atoneextreme,StefanoPredelli(2002)suggeststhatourjudgmentstotheeffectthatone
cannotusehetorefertoaninanimateobjectorItorefertoGeorgeW.Busharenonprobativeand
shouldbediscarded.Usingthesetermsinthiswaymaynotprovetobeaneffectivewayof
communicatingtoanormalaudience,butreference,byPredelli'slights,isn'tconstrainedbypotential
communicativeefficacy.Attheotherextreme,onefindsKaplan's(1989a)originalsuggestion,which
isinfactfarmoremodestthanitisstandardlytakentobe.AccordingtoKaplan,aspeaker'smental
statesdeterminethereferenceoftruedemonstrativeslikethisandthatonlywhenthespeakeris
occurrentlyperceivingherintendedreferent.Beyondsuchcases,Kaplansimplydeclinestooffera
theoryofreferencefortruedemonstratives.[16]
Mosttheoristshavefoundthemselvesdissatisfiedwithbothofthesetwooptionstheformer
becauseitforcesonusahighlyrevisionaryunderstandingofhowthetheoryofreferenceistoaccount
forwhatwouldseemtobesomecoredataregardingindexicals,andthelatterbecauseiteffectively
givesupontheprojectofofferingageneraltheoryofreferenceforimpureindexicals.Suchtheorists
havethusattemptedtocircumventtheHumptyDumptyProbleminwaysthatfailtobringwiththem
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suchradicalconsequences.Thetwodominantstrategiestothisendhavebeen(i)toappealtoGricean
considerationsregardingthenatureofintentionstoreferor(ii)toimposesomefurtherrequirements
thatthespeaker'sintendedreferentmustmeetinordertocountasthereferentoftheimpureindexical
inquestion.Wewillintroduceeachofthesestrategiesinturn.
StephenSchiffer(1981)andKentBach(1992)werethefirsttotryinvokinganexplicitlyGricean
theoryofreferentialintentionsinordertoavoidtheHumptyDumptyProblemasitarisesfor
indexicals.Thebasicideaisthattherelevantsortsofintentionsforfixingthereferenceofimpure
indexicalsare,properlyspeaking,intentionsaimedatgettingthelistenertoidentifyaparticularobject
(x)asthereferent.Ifthespeakerintendstouseanindexicalinsomenonstandardwaytorefertox,
thenitisverylikelythatshewillalsotakeittobeimpossibleforherlistenertoidentifytheobjectto
whichshepurportedlyintendstoreferasthereferent.Insuchcases,accordingtotheGricean,the
speakerdidnotreallyintendtorefertox.Rather,shewasinsomeothersortofcomplex,confused
mentalstatewhichshouldnotinfactbecountedasagenuineintentiontorefertox.Thus,theGricean
predictsthatthespeakerwillhavefailedtorefertox,sincesuccessfulreferencerequiresagenuine
intentiontorefer.[17]OnelingeringproblemforGriceansisthatspeakerscan,andoftendo,have
strangebeliefsabouttheirlisteners'mentalstatesandcapacities.Suchbeliefsmightprovesufficientto
makethespeakerbelievethatthelistenerwillbeabletorecoverherintendedreferentthus
allowinghertogenuinelyintendtorefertosomeobjectevenincaseswherenoreasonablelistener
wouldinfactbeabletorecoverthatobjectasthereferent.Forexample,thespeakermight,for
whateverreason,havecometobelievethatthelistenerhastransparentaccesstothespeaker'smental
stateswheneversheusesanimpureindexical.Thisstrangebeliefshouldensurethat,whateverobject
xthespeakerhasinmindasthereferent,shewillbelieve:thelistenerwillbeabletorecoverxasthe
referent.AccordingtotheGriceanthen,thisspeaker'suseofanimpureindexicalshouldsucceedin
referringtowhateverxthespeakerintendsforittoreferto,andregardlessofwhatthevalueofx
happenstobe.Yetithardlyseemsrighttosaythatonemightsuccessfullyrefertoashipinthe
distancebyusingthetermhejustbecauseonemistakenlybelievesthatthelistenerwillbeableto
identifythatshipasone'sintendedreferentbymeansofdirectlyaccessingone'smentalstateatthe
pointwhenoneuttersthisterm.
TheotherdominantresponsetotheHumptyDumptyProblemhasbeentosaylittleaboutthenatureof
referentialintentionsthemselves,butrathertoimposecertainexternalconstraintsonwhenthose
intentionssucceedinfixingreference.Differenttheoristshaveexperimentedwithverydifferentsorts
ofconstraints.MargaReimer(1991a,1992),takingupasuggestionthatKaplanintroducedinhis
(1978)butthenlaterabandoned,suggeststhatwhentruedemonstrativeslikethisandthatare
accompaniedbyostensivegestures,thenthereferentitselfmustlieinthegeneraldirectionindicated
bythatgesture.WhileReimerherselffailstodoso,onecanimaginegeneralizingthissortofviewso
astomakeitamatterofthestable,contextinvariantmeaning(i.e.thecharacter)ofaparticular
indexicalnotjustwhetheritissensitivetoostensivegestures,butalsowhetheritissubjecttofurther
constraintsonreference,suchasgenderorsexconstraints(asisplausiblythecasewiththepronouns
heandshe)orinanimacyrequirements(asisplausiblythecasewiththepronounit).Oneworry
regardingthissortofview,however,isthatitwouldseemtoentailspeakerscannotusetheimpure
indexicalsthisandthattorefertoobjectsrepresentedbyotherobjectsinthedirectionofthe
speaker'sostensivegesturewhichseemsfalse.Forinstance,onecanpointtoapictureofCarnap
andsaytruly,ofCarnap,Thatisoneofthegreatestphilosophersofthetwentiethcentury.Thisis
despitethefactthatCarnaphimselfisnowheretobefoundinthedirectionindicatedbythepointing.
Anotherconcernwiththeviewisthat,whileitmightsucceedinconstrainingthewaysthatimpure
indexicalscanbeusedwhentheyhappentobeaccompaniedbypointings,itisunclearthatitcan
successfullybarallHumptyDumptyishusesofindexicals,particularlythosethatinvolvenogestures
atall.
Inaverydifferentvein,King(2014)hassuggestedthat,whilespeakers'intentionsservetofixthe
referenceofimpureindexicalsincontext,theydosoonlytotheextentthatthespeaker'sintended
referentcouldberecoveredbyasuitablyidealizedlistenerintherelevantcontext.Unfortunately,this
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notionofasuitablyidealizedlistenerpromisestobedifficult,ifnotimpossible,tospelloutinthesort
ofmannerthatwouldbenecessaryforthetheorytocountasbeinggenuinelypredictive.Inparticular,
whatlistenersareapttorecoverincontextislikelytodepend,interalia,ontheirinitialperceptual
state.Yet,beyondstipulatingthatthelistenermustbepayingsufficientattentiontothespeakerto
recoverthestringofwordsthatsheutters,itishighlyunclearthatthereisanysenseinwhicha
suitablyidealizedlistenerisgoingtohavetostartinanyparticularattentionalstate.Butifattentional
statesarenotpartoftheidealization,thenitislikelythattherewillbenoonethingthatasuitably
idealizedlistenerwouldidentifyasthereferent.Ifthatiscorrect,thenKing'sviewentailsthatusesof
impureindexicalsalmostalwaysfailtorefer.
BeyondthedifficultiesthatariseingrapplingwiththeHumptyDumptyProblem,significantproblems
ariseforspeakerorientedviewsofreferencewhenfacedwithspeakerswhoaresufficientlyconfused
abouttheworldand,inparticular,abouttheobjecttowhichtheyintendtorefer.Theclassic
exampleofthissortofconfusionisduetoKaplan(1978),whoasksustoimagineascenarioinwhich
thespeaker'spictureofRudolfCarnap,whichusuallyhangsbehindherdeskonthewall,hasbeen
replacedbyapictureofSpiroAgnew.Failingtorealizethis,thespeakernowpointsbehindherself,
directlyatthepictureofAgnew,andsays:
12. Thatisapictureofoneofthegreatestphilosophersofthetwentiethcentury.
AccordingtoKaplan,thisutteranceisclearlyfalse.Butsincethespeaker,insomesenseatleast,
intendedbothtorefertoherpictureofCarnapandtothepicturehangingbehindheronthewall,it
standsasachallengetospeakerorientedtheoriesofreferencetoexplainwhyonlythelatterofthe
speaker'sintentionsprovedrelevanttodeterminingthereferenceofheruseofthat.Bachhas
claimedthattheGriceanpictureofreferentialintentionscandealwiththissortofcasebydeeming
onlythelatterintentiongenuinelyreferential,Reimerthatthespeaker'sgestureconstrainswhichof
herintentionsisrelevant,andKingthatthisisactuallyacaseofreferencefailure.Noneofthese
responseshasyetachievedwidespreadacceptance,however.

3.3UnifiedTheoriesofReference
Atthispoint,itisworthpausingtonotejusthowsignificantthedifferencesarethathavebeenposited
toobtainbetweenthemechanismsbywhichnamesandindexicalsrefer.Withrespecttonames,it
seemedatleastplausiblethatsuchtermsmightreferbymeansofanassociateddescription,which
mightalsoserveastheirmeaningorcontentincontext.Withregardtoindexicals,incontrast,sucha
suggestionlookedhighlyimplausible.Manyindexicalsseemedtobesensitivetohighlyvariant
aspectsofthecontext,suchaswhatissalientorwhatthespeaker'smentalstatehappentobe.Names,
ontheotherhand,appearedtobefarlesssensitivetothesesortsoffactors.Suchconsiderationswould
seemtocastintodoubtwhetherthereisjustonewayinwhichreferentialtermsreferinotherwords,
suchconsiderationsmakeitlookratherplausiblethatthereismorethanonebasicmechanismof
linguisticreference.Perhapsthisisright.Perhapsthereisnoonemechanismbymeansofwhich
speakersuselinguisticitemstorefer.Ontheotherhand,thereareseveralwaysinwhichonemighttry
tobringgreaterordertothevariouscaseswehaveconsidered.
First,onemightdistinguishbetweentwofundamentallydifferentsortsofreferentialterms:context
sensitivereferentialtermsandcontextinsensitivereferentialterms.Thiswouldbeinthespiritof
Kaplan's(1990)proposalregardingthenatureofnames:partofwhatitistobeanameistobeaname
forsomething.Onceoneknowswhichnamehasbeenuttered,thereisnomorequestionwhatthe
referenceofthatnameisthoughitisstillopentoustoaskhowthatnameacquiredthatparticular
referent.Indexicals,ontheotherhand,areafundamentallydifferentsortofreferringterm,forwhich
anentirelydifferentsortoftheoryisappropriate.Suchtermsarenotboundupwithreferentstheyare
genuinelyusedtorefertodifferentthingsondifferentoccasions.Itremainstobeseenwhetherthese
arethemselvesbestaccountedforinaunifiedmanner,orwhetherdifferenttheoriesmustbeoffered
forpureandimpureindexicals.
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Ontheotherhand,onemightfollowRecanati(1997)orPelczarandRainsbury(1998)inassimilating
namestoindexicalsandclaimingthatnamestooaregenuinelyusedtorefertodifferent
objects/individualsondifferentoccasionsofuse.Inthatcase,onemighthopetoofferageneralized
theoryofwhatmakesparticularindexicals(including,now,names)refertospecificthingson
particularoccasionsofuse.Here,onemightappealtosomethinglikesalience,thoughoncemorefar
morewouldhavetobesaidaboutwhatmightmakeaparticularGeorgesalientwhenseveral
Georgesarepresentorhaverecentlybeenthetopicofconversation.Alternatively,onemightendorse
theclaimthatthereferenceofallindexicalexpressionsnamesandotherindexicalsalikeis
fixedbythecontentofanaccompanyingdescription.Finally,onemightappealtothespeaker's
mentalstatestofixboththereferenceofindexicalsandofnamesinanondescriptivemanner.Inthat
case,thespeaker'sveryabilitytothinkofaparticularindividualasbearinganamemightstillneedto
beexplainedintermsofacausalorcausaldescriptivehybridstory.Thatstory,inturn,would
effectivelylimitthesortsofthingsthatspeakerscouldintendtorefertowithparticularnames.
Alternatively,onemightfollowPredelliinclaimingthatspeakerscanusenamesandotherreferential
termstorefertowhatevertheyplease.Theyarejustwelladvisedtorefrainfromdoingsoiftheir
ultimateaimistobeunderstood.
Forthemostpart,philosophershavetendedtopursuethequestionofhowlinguisticitemsreferwith
respecttoparticularterms,ratherthanasageneralproject.Thismethodologymakessalientthevery
realpossibilitythatourbestaccountsofthereferenceofvariousdifferentsortsoftermswillproveto
bedifficult,ifnotimpossible,toreconcilewitheachother.Shouldthatturnouttobethecase,itraises
thequestionofwhetherweshouldinfactposittheretobeaunifiedphenomenonoflinguistic
reference.Infact,eventhespecterofsuchdisunityshouldpushustoask:invirtueofwhat,ifnotthe
mechanismbywhichtheyhookontoobjectsintheworld,mightreferentialtermsallcountas
devicesofreference?Thisquestion,inturn,pointstowardsabiggerpictureanalogue:whatisthe
phenomenonofreferenceingeneral,suchthatusesofcertainsortsoflinguisticitems(but,
presumably,notothers)countasgenuineinstancesofthisphenomenon?

4.OtherTerms
Thecomplexitieswhichariseintryingtounderstandthenotionoflinguisticreferencedon'tendwith
namesandindexicals.Here,wewillconsidertwofurthersortsoftermsthatareoftenthoughtofas
referentialnaturalkindtermsandsingulardefinitedescriptionsaswellaswhetherthenotionof
referencecanbeproductivelyextendedeventoarangeoftermstowhichitdoesnotintuitivelyapply.

4.1NaturalKindTerms
Putnam(1975)extendedKripke'sviewsofpropernamestosocallednaturalkindterms.Theseare
termsthatrefer(naturallyenough)tokindsofthingsthatarefoundinnature.Thekindsinquestion
arekindsofthesortstudiedbyscientists,whetherbiologists,chemists,orphysicists.Theyarekinds
individuatedbyunderlyingstructure:astructurethatpurportedlyexplainsthemoresuperficial
propertiesofthekind.Thus,theexpressionstiger,gold,andwaterarenaturalkindterms.Dust
bunnyandcowpattyarenotdespitethefactthattheyrefer(looselyspeaking)tokindsof
thingsfoundinnature.Thetraditionalviewofsuchtermsseesthemasdescriptiveincontent,where
thedescriptivecontentofsuchtermsdeterminestheirreference.Thatis,thekindisreferredtoin
virtueofthefactthatitsatisfiesthepropertiesexpressedbytheassociateddescriptivecontent.The
motivationforsuchaviewistwofold.First,itprovidesintuitiveanalysesincaseswhereapurely
referentialaccountofmeaningprovesunintuitivesecond,incontrasttoanaccountofthelattersort,a
descriptiveaccountofnaturalkindtermsoffersanexplanationofreference.
Theintuitivenessofthedescriptiveviewisbroughtoutbyseeinghowitmighthandlecasesthata
purelyreferentialaccountofnaturalkindtermswouldhavetroublewith.Consider,forinstance,
assertiveutterancesofthefollowingsentences:
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13. Furzeisgorse.
14. Gnomesaremythicalcreatures.
15. Unicornsdon'texist.
16. Fredbelievesthatfilberts,butnothazelnuts,aresweet.
(13)seemsinformative,(14)meaningful,(15)bothmeaningfulandtrue,and(16)appearstoattribute
consistentbeliefstoFred.Apurelyreferentialaccountofmeaning,accordingtowhichthemeaningof
anaturalkindtermisnothingotherthanitsbearer,wouldpredictthatthefirstoftheseutterancesis
trivial,thesecondandthirdmeaningless,[18]andthatthefourthattributesinconsistentbeliefstoFred.
Incontrast,supposethatweadoptadescriptivistaccountofmeaning.Then,providedcoreferring
termscanhavedifferentdescriptivecontents,andprovidedfurtherthatemptykindtermshave
descriptivecontents,wecanexplaintheinformativenessof(13),themeaningfulnessof(14)and(15),
andthefactthat(16)doesnotascribeinconsistentbeliefstoFred.(Theexplanationshereparallelthe
descriptivistexplanationsfor(2)(5).)
ButaccordingtoPutnam(1975),itwouldbeamistaketosupposethatnaturalkindtermsrefervia
descriptivecontentinsidetheheadofthecompetentspeaker.Icanrefertosuchthingsasfurze
(gorse)andfilberts(hazelnuts)evenifthedescriptivecontentIassociatewiththeexpressionin
questionisnotuniquelysatisfiedbysuchthingsindeed,evenifthecontentinquestionis
satisfiedby(say)walnutsorcashews.(Thisisbasicallytheproblemofignoranceanderror.)Putnam
madethesamebasicpointviaanumberofthoughtexperiments.Thus,IrefertoelmtreeswhenIuse
thetermelmandIrefertobeechtreeswhenIusethetermbeech.ButthedescriptivecontentI
associatewiththesetermsmaywellbethesamesomethinglikedeciduoustreeofsomesort.Thus,
itcannotbewhatisinsidemyheadthatdeterminesthattowhichIrefer.ConsiderthefamousTwin
Earththoughtexperiment.OscarandTwinOscarrefertodifferentkindsofsubstances(H2O,XYZ)
whentheyusethetermwaterdespitethefactthattheirnarroworinternalpsychologicalstatesare
identical,that(morespecifically)thedescriptivecontenttheyassociatewiththeterm(clear,odorless,
colorlessliquid,thatfallsfromtheskyandaccumulatesinlakes,rivers,andoceans)isthesame.The
moralis:thereferenceofanaturalkindtermcannotbedeterminedsolelybywhat'sinthehead.So,
ifmeaningsarereferencedeterminers,theyarenotinthehead.(Andiftheyareinthehead,theyare
notreferencedeterminers.)
ThisbringsustothePutnam/Kripkecausalviewofreferencefornaturalkindterms.Itissimilarto
Kripke'saccountofnominalreferenceindeed,itismoreorlessanextensionofthataccount.
Referenceisinitiallyfixedatadubbing,eitherbyperceptionordescriptionofsamplesofsome
particularnaturalkind.Thereferenceisthentowhateverhasaninternalstructureidenticaltothatof
thesamples.Inthecaseofwater,thiswouldbehavingthechemicalstructureH2O.Speakersata
dubbingareabletolendtheirreferencetoothersviacommunicativeexchanges,andtheseotherscan
thenlendreferencetostillothers.Speakerswhoareignorantastothepropertiesofthekindin
questioncanneverthelessusethenaturalkindtermtorefertothemembersofthekindbecause
underlyingtheirusesarecausalchainsstretchingbacktoareferencefixing.
Putnamthoughtthathiscausalaccountofnaturalkindtermscouldbeextendedtoartifactualkind
termsaswell.Thesearetermsthatrefertokindsofmanmadeobjects:pencils,clocks,telephones,
andsoforth.Putnammotivateshiscausalaccountofartifactualkindtermsbyappealingtointuitive
considerationsthatis,tothoughtexperiments.Supposeweweretodiscoverthatpencilsarenot
artifacts,butorganisms.Wewouldstillcallthempencils,andwouldbecorrectindoingso.This
showsthatthereferenceofsuchexpressionscannotbefixedviasomedescriptionoftheformartifact
thefunctionofwhichisto
Perhaps.Butthatonlyshows(atmost)thatthedescriptioninquestioncannotbeoftheparticularform
inquestion.Perhapstherelevantdescriptionisoneoftheform:thatwhichhassuchandsucha
function.Thereneedbenomentionofthenotionofanartifactperse.Infact,adescriptivistview,
accordingtowhichthereferenceofsuchtermsisfixedbyafunctionspecifyingdescription,is
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intuitivelyplausible.Why?Presumably,becauseartifactsarenotindividuatedbyanythinghidden,
butratherbysomethingtransparent,i.e.theirfunction.Iffunctionisindeedtransparent,itshouldnot
beimplausibletosupposethatreferenceisdeterminedbyadescriptionthatspecifiesthefunctionin
question.Doesthatmeanthatonemustknowthereferencefixingdescriptioninordertorefertothe
kindinquestion?No.Whatitmeansisonlythatnonexpertseffectivelydefertoexpertswhodoknow
(anddon'tjusttheorizeabout)therelevantreferencefixingdescriptions.Thequestionremains
whetherornotonecanproperlyconceiveofanorganismashavingafunctionextrinsictoitsown
being(asinPutnam'slivingpencilsexample).Butagain,onecaneasilymodifytherelevant
descriptiontosomethinglike:thatwhichpurportedlyhassuchandsuchafunction.Thiswouldallow
formistakenattributionsofartifactuality.

4.2DefiniteDescriptions
Adefinitedescriptionisanexpressionhavingacertaingrammaticalform:namely,theformtheF.
Forourpurposes,thecentralquestionregardingsuchphrasesiswhetherornotaquantificational
theoryofdescriptionsRussell'sinparticularisadequatetohandlethedataregardingwhat
Donnellanhascalledthereferentialuseofdescriptions.Somefurtherbackgroundisneededto
understandthisissue.
Russell(1905)famouslyopposedbothMeinong(1904)andFrege(1892/1952)byclaimingthat
definitedescriptionsarenotgenuinereferringexpressions,thattheyarenotlogicallypropernames
inRussell'sterminology.Inotherwords,theirpropositionalcontributionisnot(simplyoratall)their
denotation.Russell'sargumentsappealtointuitions(Russellwouldnodoubtcallthemfacts)about
truthvalueandmeaningfulness.Thus,considerassertiveutterancesofthefollowingtwosentences:
17. TheKingofFranceisbald.
18. TheQueenofEnglandhasthreesons.
(17)ismeaningful,thoughcertainlynottrue.AsRussellhimselfputsit,itisplainlyfalse.Russell's
TheoryofDescriptionspredictsthat(17)ismeaningfulbutfalse,expressinga(false)propositionto
theeffectthatthereexistsexactlyonekingofFranceandthatwhateveriskingofFranceisbald.
AccordingtoRussell,(18)shouldgetthesamekindofanalysisas(17).So,paceFrege,(18)turnsout
nottobeabouttheQueenofEngland.Indeed,itisaboutnothingatall:fordefinitedescriptionsare
notreferringterms,butexistentialquantifiers.Morespecifically,thepropositionexpressedbythe
assertiveutteranceofasentenceoftheformTheFisGisonetotheeffectthatthereisexactlyoneF
andwhateverisFisG.
P.F.Strawson(1950)claimedthatRussell'stheorywastheresultofoverlookingcertainfundamental
distinctions,includingthedistinctionbetweenreferringandmeaning.Attendtothesedistinctions,and
youwillseethatdefinitedescriptionsareindeedreferringexpressions,notquantifiers.Butthisdoes
notmeanthattheyarelogicallypropernames,onlythatspeakersusethemtotalkaboutparticular
objects/individuals,nottoassertthatthingsofacertainsortexist.Thus,consideranassertive
utteranceof:
19. TheKingofFranceiswise.
AccordingtoStrawson,suchanutterancewillbeneithertruenorfalse,sincethedefinitedescription
failstorefertoanything.Indeed,nothingatallhasbeenasserted(orstatedorsaid)bymeansof
thisutterance.OnRussell'sview,thestatementisfalseasitinvolvesthefalseclaimthatthereexistsa
uniquekingofFrance.Themeaningofthedescription,onStrawson'sview,isgivenbyarule:oneto
theeffectthatitistobeusedincaseswherethereisa(contextually)uniquekingofFrancetowhom
oneisreferringbymeansoftheterm.
KeithDonnellan(1966)thoughtthatdefinitedescriptionswerepragmaticallyambiguousinthatthey
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hadtwodifferentuses,andthatthesetwouseswererelevanttowhatissaid,tothestatementmade.
Oneoftheseuses,thesocalledattributiveuse,wascapturedbyRussell'stheorybutnotStrawson's
theotheruse,thereferentialuse,wascapturedbyStrawson'stheorybutnotbyRussell's.Orso
Donnellanclaimed.Toseethemotivationsforpositingthissortofambiguity,considerthefollowing
case.Smithisfoundbrutallymurderedanditisclaimed(onaccountoftheheinousnessofthecrime)
that:
20. ThemurdererofSmithisinsane.
Supposethatthespeakerhasnoideawhothemurdereris.Then,thedescriptionisusedattributively
tosaysomethingaboutwhoever(uniquely)murderedSmithandRussell'sanalysisapplies.That
is,thestatementistruejustincasethereisauniquemurdererofSmithandwhoevermurderedSmith
isinsane.ButnowsupposethatJonesisaccusedofSmith'smurderandthatthespeakerbelievesthat
Jonesisguilty.InattemptingtosaysomethingaboutJones,thespeakercomesoutwithanutterance
of(20).Inthiscase,thedescriptionisusedreferentially,topickJonesoutsoastosaysomething
abouthim.AccordingtoDonnellan,thestatementisthustruejustincaseJonesisinsaneevenifhe
isinnocentandtheactualmurderer(Robinson)isquitesane.Russell'stheory,accordingtoDonnellan,
cannotaccommodatethereferentialuse,andsoisincompleteatbest.
Kripke's(1977)respondstoDonnellan'sargumentbyaccusingDonnellanofmistakingpragmatic
factsforsemanticfacts.Morespecifically,KripkeaccusesDonnellanofconfusingspeakerreference
forexpressionreference.Kripkeclaimedthatthereferentialuseofdefinitedescriptionswasboth
genuineandinteresting,butwasnotproperlysemantic.ThusitwasnotrelevanttoRussell'stheory.
AccordingtoKripke,thetruthvalueof:
21. Themaninthecornerdrinkingchampagneishappytonight.
dependsonlyonwhetherthemaninthecornerdrinkingchampagneishappy.Thisissoevenifthe
speakerintendstorefertosomeoneelse,amaninthecornerwhoonlyappearstobedrinking
champagnebutwhoisinfactdrinkingsparklingwater.Insuchacase,thespeakermaysaysomething
true(orfalse)abouttheindividualtowhomheintendstorefer.Nevertheless,thetruthvalueofthe
sentenceitselfwillnotdependuponthepropertiesofthespeaker'sreferent,butonthoseofthe
semanticreferent:onthoseofthedescription'sdenotation,shouldtherebeone.Thus,accordingto
Kripke,Russell'stheoryofdescriptions,thoughperhapsnotwithoutitsproblems,isnotundermined
bythereferentialuseofdescriptions.AlthoughmanyhaveacceptedatleastthebasicsofKripke's
rejoindertoDonnellan,thedebateoverthereferentialuseoverwhetheritinfactundermines
Russell'stheoryofdescriptionscontinuesunabated.[19]

4.3NonReferringExpressions
Itseemsalmostobviousthatthereareexpressionsthatrefer.Butdoall(meaningful)expressions
refer?Intuitively,atleast,thereappeartobemanysortsofexpressionsperfectlymeaningful
expressionsthatdonotrefer.Consider,forinstance,thefollowingfivesentences:
22. Nobodyrunsfasterthanme.
23. Fredistall.
24. Doitforthesakeofthechildren.
25. Yes,Iamveryproudofyouandthechildren.
26. Sheskippedhappily.
Considertheitalicizedwordsineachandaskyourselfwhattheymightbeusedtoreferto.Nobody
certainlydoesn'trefertoanyoneFredreferstoFred,butwhatdoestallreferto?Aproperty?But
whichone?Anddosuchpropertiesreallyexistinasensethatwouldallowthemtobeobjectsof
reference?Thisiscontroversial.Whataboutsake(andothernounslikebehalfanddint)?And
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whatofyes,very,of,andand?Whatdoadverbslikehappilyreferto?Awayormannerof
someactivity?Again,isitplausibletosupposethatsuchthingsexistinasensewhichenablesthemto
beobjectsofreference?Notobviously.Thepointissimplythis:someperfectlymeaningful
expressionsdonotseemtobereferringexpressions,inwhichcaseatheoryofhowtheyrefer,ofhow
theirreferencerelatestothemeaningortruthofsentencesinwhichtheyoccur,wouldbebesidethe
point.Itseemsmorereasonable(oratleastmoreintuitive)tosupposethatsuchexpressionsderive
theirmeaningfromsomethingotherthanreference.Consequently,attemptstodevisetheoriesof
referenceforsuchexpressionsareratheruncommon,thoughcertainlynotunheardof.Frege
(1892/1952)offeredahighlysystematicconceptionofreferenceonwhichreferenceisassignedto
everyconstituentofasentencethatisrelevanttodeterminingitstruthvalue.(Quantifiers,for
instance,aresaidtorefertosecondlevelconcepts.)Muchlater,Montague(1960)constructeda
semantictheoryonwhichexpressionsofthesortinquestionareagainassignedreferents.Butitisfair
tosaythatthesenseinwhichsuchexpressionsmightbesaidtoreferisnotanintuitiveone,butrather
onethatishighlytechnicalandtheoryladen.

5.OtherIssues:Reference,Reality,andKnowledge
Referenceisarguablythecentralnotioninthephilosophyoflanguage,withclosetiestothenotions
ofmeaningandtruth.Butonemightwonderwhetherreferencehasimplicationsforphilosophical
issuesthatgobeyondthephilosophyoflanguageproper.Manyhavethoughtthatitdoes,andmanyof
thesephilosophershaveseenconnectionsbetweenreferenceandreality,thenatureofwhichisthe
subjectmatterofmetaphysics.Oneoftheoldestmetaphysicalproblemsthesocalledproblemof
nonbeinginvolvesthenotionofreference.Manyothershaveseenconnectionsbetweenreference
andknowledge,thenatureofwhichisthesubjectmatterofepistemology.Certainepistemological
problemse.g.Putnam'sinfamousbraininavatthoughtexperimentalsoinvolvethenotionof
reference.Incontrast,therearephilosopherswhobelievethatreferenceunderstoodasprovidinga
substantivelinkbetweenlanguageandtheworldisnotasubjectworthyofseriousphilosophical
study.Variousreasonshavebeengivenforthisnegativeattitudetowardreference,including:(i)
referenceisinherentlyindeterminate(Quine,1960),(ii)thenotionofreferenceiswithouttheoretical
value(Davidson,1984),and(iii)allthatonecansayaboutreferenceiswhatisembodiedby
instantiationsofaschemalike:areferstoa.Beforelookingbrieflyatthesenegativeviews,let's
lookatapossibleconnectionbetweenreferenceandreality.

5.1ReferenceandReality
Considerthefollowingsentence:
27. Pegasusdoesnotexist.
Surelythissentenceistrue.Moreprecisely,anassertiveutteranceof(27)wouldexpressatrue
proposition.Afterall,weallknowthatPegasusisapurelymythicalcreature.Yet,thetruthof(27)
wouldseemtoimplythatPegasusinsomesenseis,thatPegasushasbeingofsomesort.Otherwise,
howcouldwerefertothemythicalhorseandsaytrulyofitthatitdoesnotexist?Thus,Pegasusand
othernonexistentbeingsnonethelessare.Theyhavebeing,sinceotherwisewecouldnotcoherently
(andtruly)denythattheyexist.OrsoclaimedMeinong(1904).Howdoweavoidcommitmentto
whatQuine(1961)famouslycalledMeinong'sbloateduniverse?[20]Onesolution(namely,Quine's)
istodistinguishsharplybetweenmeaningandreference,andthenclaimthatalthoughPegasushas
noreference,itdoeshaveameaning.Inparticular,itsmeaningisgivenbyadefinitedescription
whichistobeinterpretedlaRussell(1905).Thus,(27)getsanalyzedas(somethinglike):
28. Theredoesnotexistauniquewingedhorse.
Or,moreprecisely:
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29. Itisfalsethatthereexistsauniquewingedhorse.
Whatthissentencesaysisclearlytrue,andwecansaythatitistruewithoutbeingcommittedtoeven
theminimalbeingofPegasus.Ineffect,thesolutionclaimsthatcertainexpressionsthatlooklike
namesarenotnamesinthelogicalsense:theirmeaning(ifany)isnottheirreference.Such
expressionsareinsteadabbreviatedRusselliandescriptions.Suchdescriptionsdonothavemeaningin
isolationinparticular,theydonotmeanwhattheydenoteandtheymayinfactdenotenothing.
Rather,theyhavemeaningonlyinthecontextofthesentenceinwhichtheyoccur,asentencewhose
assertiveutteranceexpressesacomplexexistentialpropositiontotheeffectthatthereexistsaunique
FandwhateverisFisG.ThisisnottheonlywayoutofMeinong'suniverseofnonexistentbeings,
however.Somephilosophershavearguedthatnamesoffictionalandmythicalcreaturesreferto
existentobjectsabstractobjectsinparticular.NathanSalmon(1998),forinstance,advocatesa
versionofthisgeneralview.SalmonclaimsthatPegasusandthelikerefertoexistentthingsto
abstractentities,manmadeartifacts.[21]Onsuchaview,(29)isactuallyfalse.Pegasus,amanmade
artifact,doesindeedexistandsocanbereferredto.Intuitionstothecontraryaretobeexplainedaway
asaconflationofspeakermeaningandwordmeaning,theformerofwhichmayinvolveaproposition
totheeffectthatPegasusdoesnotexistasaphysicalobject.Thiswayoflookingattheproblemof
nonbeingallowsSalmontoremainaMillianthatis,toremaincommittedtotheviewthatthe
meaningofapropernameisnothingmorethanitsreferencewhilealsoallowingthatexpressions
likePegasusaregenuinepropernames.(Formoreonreferencetononexistentobjects,seetheentry
onnonexistentobjects.)

5.2ReferenceandKnowledge
Nowlet'sturntoissuesofreferenceandknowledge,lookingspecificallyatPutnam'senvattedbrains.
Putnampurportstoarriveatasubstantiveconclusionthatwearenotbrainsinvatswiththe
assistanceofaparticulartheoryaboutthenatureofreferencenamely,thecausaltheory.Thebasic
argumentisthis.Ifyouwereabraininavat,youcouldnotthinkthatyouwerebutyoucanthinkthat
you'reabraininavatsoyoucannotbeabraininavat.Thereasonforthisisthatthinkingyouarea
braininavatrequirescausallinkstothingswhich,ifyouwereabraininavat,wouldn'texist.These
arethesortsofcausallinksbetweenthoughtandrealitythatwouldmakethinkingyouareabrainina
vatpossibleinthefirstplace.Soyoucan'thavesuchthoughts,ifthosethoughtsaretrue.Youcanin
facthavesuchthoughts,sotheymustnotbetrue.
TheliteraturerespondingtoPutnam'sargumentisenormous.SomewhohaverespondedtoPutnam
haveinterpretedhisargumentasarefutationofskepticismotherrespondentshaveinterpretedthe
argumentashavingaconsiderablymoremodest(metaphysical)conclusion:thatIamnotabrainina
vat.OneofthemostinfluentialresponsestoPutnam'sargument,assumingthismoremodestaim,was
putforthbyTonyBrueckner(1986).Bruecknercontendsthattheargumentdoesn'tyieldthe
conclusionthatPutnampromised:thatIamnotabraininavat.Rather,ityieldsonlythesignificantly
differentconclusionthat:myutteranceofIamnotabraininavatistrue.Somesubsequent
literaturehasexploredthelegitimacyofthedisquotationstepthat'sneededtogetfromwhere
Putnamgetsustowherehepromisedtogetus.AnotherinfluentialcriticismofPutnam'sargument
wasfirstmadebyPeterSmith(1984).SmitharguesthatPutnam'sargumentwon'tworkagainst
certainwaysofconstruingthebraininavathypothesis.ButSmith'scriticism,thoughcompelling,
respondsonlytoPutnam'sargumentconstruedasarefutationofskepticism.Afterall,theskeptic
needsonlyonecoherentskepticalhypothesistomotivatehisposition.
Howdoesallthisrelatetothecausaltheoryofreference?Thesentimentamongsomeepistemologists
isthatthesortofsemanticexternalismunderpinningthecausaltheoryissimplynotstrongenoughto
supportarefutationofskepticism.Thus,supposeweacceptthereasonableviewthatthecontentof
somethoughts/expressionsisnotcompletelydeterminedbywhatisgoingoninsideone'shead.
Supposethatsuchcontentsareatleastpartlydeterminedbythenatureofitemsonehasbeenincausal
contactwith.Eventhen,itisnotclearthatwehavethebasisforconcludingthatskepticismis
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incorrectevenifwedoendupwithaprioriconsiderationssupportingthemetaphysicalconclusion
thatwe'renotbrainsinvats.(SeeKeithDeRose(2000)formoreonthisview.Seealsotheentryon
skepticismandcontentexternalismformoreonPutnam'sbraininavatargument.)

6.NegativeViewsofReference
Thusfar,thisarticlehasbeenconcernedlargelywithwhatmightbecalledpositiveviewsof
reference.Reference,construedasarelationbetweenbitsoflanguageandbitsofreality,isassumed
tobeagenuine,substantiverelationworthyofphilosophicalscrutiny.Accounts(whetherdescriptive,
causal,hybrid,speakeroriented,saliencebased,characterdriven,etc.)arethengivenofwhat
constitutesthislink.Moreover,somephilosophers(asjustnoted)believethatreferentialtheorieshave
importantimplicationsformetaphysicalandepistemologicalissues.Butnotallphilosophersareso
sanguineabouteitherthepossibilityorthetheoreticalsignificanceofreference.Inclosing,wewill
brieflydiscussseveralnegativeviewsofreference.
W.V.O.Quine(1960)hasarguedthatreferenceisinherentlyindeterminateorinscrutable.Bythis,
Quinemeansthatthereisnofactofthematteraboutwhatourwordsreferto.Itisnotthatourwords
refertosomethingbutweareunabletodeterminewhatthatis.Rather,thereissimplynosuchthing
asthattowhichourwordsrefer.Nevertheless,Quinedoesnotgosofarastosaythatourwordsfailto
referinanysense.Hisviewisratherthatitmakessensetospeakofwhatourwordsrefertoonly
relativetosomepurposewemighthaveinassigningreferentstothosewords.Quine'sargumentfor
theinscrutabilitythesisinvolvesanapplicationofthethesisthatempiricaltheoriesare
underdeterminedbytheirsupportingevidence.Foranybodyofempiricalevidencewemighthave
aboutspeakersofagivenlanguage,therewillbeanumberofcompetingtheoriesastowhattheir
wordsreferto.Suchtheorieswillbeempiricallyequivalent:equallyconsistentwiththeempirical
data.Onetheorymightsaythat,inthelanguageinquestion,gavagaireferstorabbitsanothermight
saythatitreferstoundetachedrabbitpartsathirdmightsaythatitreferstotimeslicesofrabbits.
Quine'sviewsonunderdeterminationcanbeappliedtoone'sownlanguage.Theresultisthatthe
availableevidencenomoreforcesthespeakertotheconclusionthatbyrabbithemeansrabbits,than
itforceshimtoconcludethatbyrabbithemeansundetachedrabbitpartsortimeslicesofrabbits.If
aspeakerobserveshimselfusingthewordrabbit,theevidenceheamasseswillgiveequalsupportto
allthreetheories,aswellastomanyothers.So,accordingtoQuine,foranygivenbodyofempirical
evidence,therewillbenumerouscompetingtheoriesastowhatthewordsoneusesreferto.Andthere
willbenoprincipledwayofadjudicatingbetweenthesetheories.
DonaldDavidson'sinstrumentalistviewsonreferenceareevenmoreradicalthanQuine's.Davidson
(1984)claimsthatreferenceisatheoreticallyvacuousnotion:itisofabsolutelynouseinasemantic
theory.Hisbasisforendorsingthispositionishisconvictionthatnosubstantiveexplanationof
referenceispossible.Theproblemisthatanysuchexplanationwouldhavetobegiveninnon
linguisticterms,butnosuchexplanationcanbegiven.AsDavidsonputsit(1984,p.220):ifthename
KilimanjaroreferstoKilimanjaro,thennodoubtthereissomerelationbetweenEnglish(orSwahili)
speakers,theword,andthemountain.Butitisinconceivablethatoneshouldbeabletoexplainthis
relationwithoutfirstexplainingtheroleofthewordsinthesentencesandifthisisso,thereisno
chanceofexplainingreferencedirectlyinnonlinguisticterms.However,thisdoesnotmeanthatthere
isnohopeforsemantics.Onthecontrary,onDavidson'sviewaTarskiantheoryoftruthfora
languageisatthesametimeatheoryofmeaningforthatlanguage.Thepointhereisthata
Davidsoniantheoryofmeaninghasnoplaceforthenotionofreferenceperseinstead,itassimilates
whatwemightbetemptedtocallreferenceintothetheoryoflinguistictruth.
SimilarinspirittoDavidson'sviewsaretheviewsofdeflationistsaboutreference(nottobeconfused
withdeflationismabouttruth).Suchtheoristsclaimthatthereisnothingmoretoreferentialnotions
thaniscapturedbyinstancesofaschemalike:areferstoa.Suchaschemageneratesclaimslike
FregereferstoFrege.Suchviewsareoftenaccompaniedby,andmotivatedby,adeflationarytheory
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oftruth,accordingtowhichtoassertthatastatementistrueisjusttoassertthestatementitself.[22]
Inspiteofthemyriadconcernsregardingtheviabilityofthetheoryofreferencewhichserveto
underwritethesenegativeviewsofreference,thenatureoftherelationbetweenlanguageandreality
continuestobeoneofthemosttalkedaboutandvigorouslydebatedissuesinthephilosophyof
language.Whatremainstobeseenistowhatextentthisworkmayprovehelpfultobetter
understandingthemoregeneralnotionofreference,anotionequallyathomeinaestheticsand
philosophyofmindasitisinphilosophyoflanguage.

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