Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
SEMINARI
E CONVEGNI
Universals in
Ancient Philosophy
edited by
Riccardo Chiaradonna
Gabriele Galluzzo
Table of contents
Introduction
Riccardo Chiaradonna, Gabriele Galluzzo
23
41
87
113
185
209
255
299
329
353
381
425
Bibliography
471
Index locorum
509
Index of names
537
Introduction
For the connection between semantic debates in the Middle Ages and the problem
of universals, see Klima 1993; Klima 1999.
3
For an introduction to the problem of universals in contemporary metaphysics,
see Armstrong 1978a; Armstrong 1989; Loux 2006a; Loux 2007. See also Oliver
1996.
3 Introduction
5 Introduction
7 Introduction
ways, however, in which this general intuition may be leshed out. One
common idea is that Aristotelian universals are concrete, while Platonist universals are abstract. As is oten observed, it may be diicult to
draw a clear contrast along the lines of the concrete-abstract distinction, since the terms abstract and concrete have been understood
in so many diferent ways in the history of philosophy7. But certainly
many contemporary philosophers believe that concrete entities exist
in space and time, while abstract entities exist neither in space nor in
time. his general idea can be given some more content if we turn to
the relationships of dependence obtaining between universals and their
particular instances. According to Aristotelians, universals depend for
their existence on the existence of their particular instances: the universal redness, for instance, exist only if there are particular red things.
Aristotelians, in other words, accept the so-called Principle of Instantiation: there are no uninstantiated universals. On this view, it seems
fairly reasonable to conclude that universals exist in space and time because they exist wherever and whenever their instances, which are spatiotemporal entities, do. For Platonists, by contrast, universals do not
depend for their existence on the existence of their particular instances: the universal redness exists whether or not there are particular red
things around. Platonists, in other words, reject the Principle of Instantiation: there can be, and there actually are, uninstantiated universals8.
On this conception, universals are better thought of as existing, at least
primarily, outside space and time. For some universals, i.e. uninstantiated universals, clearly do not exist in space and time, since they do not
have any spatiotemporal instances. But if some universals exist outside
space and time, there seem to be good reasons to think that all do, and
hence also instantiated universals exist outside space and time. Indeed,
for Platonists the relation of instantiation should not be cashed out in
terms of parts or constituents: there is no sense in which universals
that are instantiated are parts or constituents of their instances; there
is no sense, in other words, in which the redness of red things is a part
or a constituent of them or even exists in them. For Platonists, particular things acquire their properties and characteristics by entering
into some special relation, by somehow participating in, entities entirely distinct from them and belonging to an entirely diferent realm.
7
For an Aristotelian who accepts only properties and does away with kinds, see
Armstrong 1997.
9 Introduction
tially derives from Aristotles account, in the Metaphysics, of the diference between Platos conception of universals and his own. It is Aristotle who claims, in a critical vein, that Plato conceived Forms as universals, but made universals separate from their particular instances. In
the same critical vein, Aristotle sometimes attributes to Forms a somewhat ambiguous metaphysical status, presenting them as both universals and particulars. Castelli reviews the complex issue of Aristotles
reconstruction and critique of Platos doctrine of Forms. Instead of
solving the problem in terms of the correctness or incorrectness of Aristotles report, she tries to lead the controversy between Aristotle and
Plato back to their fundamental disagreement about what it means for
something to be one, as well as to their radically diferent conceptions
of the notions involved in the dispute, such as universality and particularity. In doing so, she also touches upon the question of whether
the separation of Forms from particulars can or cannot be understood
in terms of the Principle of Instantiation, i.e. in terms of the existential independence of Forms from their sensible instances. Francesco
Ademollos paper is entirely devoted to a textual and philosophical reconstruction of Platos theory of Forms. For one thing, he argues that
Platos Forms are universals and so explains away those passages in
the Dialogues that have led some scholars to conclude that Forms are
(or are also) perfect particulars. One line of argument to this efect is
particularly worth mentioning in this context. here is a typical claim
of Platos that seems to commit him to a paradoxical endorsement of
the Principle of Instantiation10. On the face of it, Plato maintains that
Forms are self-predicated: the Form of large, for instance, is large and
the Form of animal is animal. Now, if this claim is taken in the sense
that Forms are instances of themselves (e.g. the Form of large is a large
thing and the Form of animal is an animal), then for Plato there are
actually no uninstantiated universals simply because there is always
at least one instance of the relevant universal, i.e. the Form itself. Ademollo argues against the view that Forms are instances of themselves
and contends that there are good reasons to think that self-predication
does not imply that predicates apply to Forms and to their instances
in the same sense. Furthermore, the paper deals with the issue of the
metaphysical status of Forms as universals, i.e. with the problem as to
what kind of universals they are. Ademollo lends further support to
the view that Platonist universals are in fact non-spatiotemporal enti10
ties. He qualiies, by contrast, the sense in which Plato rejects the Principle of Instantiation. Platos opinion is not that there are uninstantiated universals but rather that there can be such universals both in
the sense that Forms existed uninstantiated before the creation of the
world and in sense that they are only contingently instantiated and so
could exist without having any actual instance.
As said, contemporary Platonists oten go for an abundant theory of
universals. his is due to their endorsement of a language-based version of the so called one-over-many principle: there is a universal corresponding to every, or at least to a high number of, non-synonymous
predicates. In his chapter, David Sedley calls into question the widespread assumption that Plato subscribed to the claim that there is a
form corresponding to every general term. Sedley does not deny that
Forms are universals, i.e. entities capable of being multiply instantiated,
but challenges the view that Forms were postulated as the ontological
characterization of general terms or predicates. For one thing, the texts
that have traditionally been taken as evidence of Platos endorsement of
the one-over-many principle should be construed as making the more
familiar and less uncontroversial assumption that there is one and only
one Form for every plurality of things for which we have reasons to
postulate a Form. For another thing, the Plato of the middle dialogues
does not endorse an unrestricted version of the theory of Forms: there
are pluralities to which no Forms correspond. In particular, there seem
to be no Forms of natural kinds. On the basis of some passages from
Republic V and X, Sedley argues that, in the canonical version of the
theory of Forms, Plato seems to introduce Forms only for pairs of opposite properties and for artefacts. It is only in the later dialogues that
Plato broadens the range of Forms and hence comes close to endorsing
the one-over-many principle. But in these contexts, Sedley argues, it is
less clear that Plato is still talking about Forms conceived of as transcendent entities that are ontologically prior to their sensible instances.
Another common assumption of the contemporary debate about
universals is that Aristotle was a realist about universals. his view,
however, has been questioned both in Antiquity (see Riccardo Chiaradonnas chapter on ancient commentators) and in contemporary
scholarship. Mauro Mariani and Gabriele Galluzzo try to give further
strength to the realist interpretation of Aristotle by analysing in some
detail Aristotles views on universals in the Organon and the Metaphysics. More particularly, Mariani rejects the irrealist understandings
of Aristotles theory of predication in the Organon. According to one
view, for instance, Aristotles talk of universals should be understood
11 Introduction
For a survey see Armstrong 1978a, pp. 11-57; Loux 2006a, pp. 46-83.
See Quine 1948.
13 Introduction
contrast, that there are properties, but also insist that they are as particular as the objects of which they are the properties: thus the red of a
particular pen is itself particular and numerically distinct from the red
of all the other objects in that it is the red of one particular object and
not of another. hus, there are no universal entities, but things are provided with an array of unrepeatable and unsharable property instances, which are oten labelled by contemporary philosophers tropes14.
It may be useful to see how the two varieties of nominalism difer in
terms of metaphysical explanation. Take the phenomenon of attribute
agreement: why are all red things red? Generally, nominalists appeal to
resemblance or similarity: it is simply a fact about the world a primitive fact that cannot further be explained that things resemble each
other and so can be grouped together in accordance with their resemblance relationships. It is important to realize, however, that diferent
things enter into resemblance relationships depending on the form of
nominalism one chooses to endorse. For austere nominalists, it is the
objects themselves that resemble each other. he world is populated by
collections (or classes, if one believes in them) of similar objects. he
property red, therefore, either does not exist at all or is just a collection
of similar things. For trope-theorists, by contrast, resemblance relations obtain, strictly speaking and primarily, among tropes, i.e. among
particular properties. hus, on this view, the property red is a collection of similar tropes, i.e. a collection of all the tropes of red. Certainly,
objects too are similar in virtue of possessing similar tropes, but it is
primarily among tropes that the similarity relationship obtains.
What is ancient nominalism like? Generally speaking, the view that
there are simply no properties is not a particularly appealing one for
many ancient philosophers. But there are some interesting exceptions or partial exceptions. Mauro Bonazzi, for instance, presents an
extreme form of nominalism, which can be aptly labelled particularism and is characteristic of the Sophists. Although the Sophists do
not represent a suiciently homogeneous movement and difer from
one another on a number of crucial issues, they all seem to share a certain view about reality: the world in itself is a cluster of unconnected
and ever-changing particulars and so there is no structure of reality
or intrinsic unity independently of the perceiving subject. Protagoras
seems to have interpreted this general assumption in a rather relativ14
For the notion of a trope see the classical Williams 1953. See also Campbell
1990; Simons 1994.
istic way. Since reality is never objective or absolute, but is always the
result of the interaction between objects and individual subjects, each
individual subject ends up inhabiting a world of her own, distinct in
principle from that of all the other perceiving subjects. Similar claims
were defended by Gorgias: reality is just an unconnected multiplicity
of particulars, beret of any intrinsic unity or structure; it is only language that imposes unity and structure on reality. hrough language,
in other words, we try to carve reality at its joints, but the carving is
not the result of some structural isomorphism between predicates and
reality. On this perspective, language has no descriptive function, but
rather serves pragmatic purposes in orienting and facilitating the individual and social life of human beings. Bonazzis reconstruction also
has interesting consequences from a historical point of view: rather
than a development of Socrates thoughts about universals, Platos
theory of Forms would thus be a conscious response to the views held
by the Sophists.
Another interesting example is best understood if we make use,
once again, of Aristotles distinction between substantial universals
(or kinds) and accidental universals (or properties in the strict sense).
Chiaradonna reconstructs the debate between two Aristotelian commentators, Boethus of Sidon and Alexander of Aphrodisias, on the
status of substantial universals, i.e. species and genera. For Alexander,
cospeciic and cogeneric particulars are grouped together on the basis
of a common essence, that is an immanent universal that is common
to all individuals of the same species or genus. Boethus, by contrast,
denies that there are any common essences or natures, and maintains
that species and genera are just collections of individuals. It is Boethus
view that is of interest to us. From what we know, it is unlikely that
Boethus extended his irrealist position to accidental properties as well.
hus, Socrates particular paleness or particular height should be as
real as Socrates himself. But certainly Boethus believed that there are
no natural kinds in reality and provided an extensional and reductive
account of kinds in terms of collections of particulars. Presumably,
Boethus collections are nothing over above their members and so can
hardly be understood as classes in the modern sense. What matters,
however, is that on Boethus view the fact that a certain group of particulars belong to a natural kind is grounded on primitive facts of similarity among the particulars in the group and not on some universals
the particulars in question somehow share.
Unlike austere nominalists, many ancient philosophers believe that
there are particular properties and it is on the basis of particular prop-
15 Introduction
erties that they account for general concepts and terms. Does this imply that a good number of ancient nominalists were trope-theorists
ante litteram? Not quite. In order to clarify matters it may be useful
to distinguish between the belief in trope-like entities such as particular properties and the endorsement of a full-ledged trope-theory. he
reason for the distinction is that most, albeit not all, trope-theorists
combine a nominalist stance on the traditional problem of universals with a certain view about the metaphysical structure of material
objects, according to which these are nothing but bundles of tropes.
hus, for many trope-theorists, particular properties hang together
without inhering in any particular substance or even any material
substratum. Now, this view on the structure of material objects is not
popular among ancient philosophers who believe in particular properties. Aristotle, for instance, is a good example of the distinction we
are trying to make. According to the traditional interpretation (see
Marianis paper), Aristotle admits, at least in the Categories, particular and unsharable property instances: Socrates paleness is peculiar
to Socrates and is numerically distinct from, say, Platos. But Aristotle
hardly counts as a trope-theorist. For one thing, he also accepts universal properties alongside property instances: so there is a universal
paleness of which both the particular paleness of Socrates and the particular paleness of Plato are instances. For another, property instances
for Aristotle clearly need a substratum to inhere in; what is more, they
need an independently identiiable substance to inhere in.
his being said, the bundle theory is not uninstantiated, as it were,
in ancient thought. Bronowskis contribution shows that Epicurus, besides endorsing a nominalist position on the problem of universals, also provided an account of the structure of material objects that closely
resembles a bundle theory. Indeed, Epicurus advances two distinct yet
compatible accounts of material objects, a physical account in terms
of material constitution and a metaphysical account in terms of particular properties. On the physical account, objects, i.e. bodies, are just
aggregates of atoms or aggregates of aggregates of atoms. he physical
perspective, however, does not tell the whole story. For a material object can also be regarded, from a metaphysical perspective, as a whole
made up of its properties or at least of all properties that accompany a
particular object as long as it exists. Epicurus insistence that properties do not need a substratum to hold together, as well as his use of
mereological terminology (whole) to characterize bodies in general
make his intuition very close to the claim that material objects are bundles of their particular properties.
17 Introduction
problem of universals, i.e. metaphysical cosmology and medicine. Adamson takes up a particularly diicult problem for ancient metaphysics, i.e. unique instantiations: cases, in other words, in which a universal has only one instance. he trouble with unique instantiation is that
universals are oten postulated to explain how it is possible for many
things to agree in their fundamental attributes. his general principle
may make it look otiose or useless to postulate universals in the case of
particulars that are literally one of a kind. he problem is made even
more acute by the fact that, for ancient philosophers, the only genuine
examples of unique instantiations the sun, the moon, the heavenly
bodies in general, and the universe as a whole are things that are
necessarily unique: for ancient philosophers, in other words, it is impossible, both physically and metaphysically, that there be more than
one sun or moon etc. Adamson highlights two diferent approaches to
unique instantiation. Aristotle and Alexander take multiple instantiation to be the normative case and hence are mainly concerned with
preserving the distinction between universal and particular even in the
case of unique instances. Aristotle, for example, argues that a deinition is always in principle applicable to a plurality of objects, even if it
should be applied in fact to just one. hus, we can distinguish between
the kind sun, which is captured by the deinition, and the individual
sun, which is the unique instance of the kind sun. Plotinus and Porphyry, by contrast, somehow reverse the picture and go out of their
way to prove that it is unique instantiation that represents the normative case. hey both argue, on diferent grounds and with diferent nuances, that, since heavenly bodies as well as the universe that contains
them are divine particulars and thus the best possible sensible objects,
there is no need for their species to be multiplied into a plurality of instances. On this view, therefore, the multiple instantiation that is characteristic of the species of sublunary objects is a mark of imperfection:
ideally, universals should not be instantiated more than once.
Ancient medicine is another battleield where the question of generality becomes pivotal. he theoretical problem with understanding
the status of medicine can be phrased in the following terms. Medical
practice deals with individuals: it is individual patients that a doctor
tries to heal. But is there any knowledge of individuals? And if not,
i.e. if knowledge is always of universals and kinds, what is the use of
medical knowledge in medical practice? Famously, Aristotle maintains
that individuals as such are unknowable: we always know the kinds to
which individuals belong and not individuals as such. Medical knowledge too, therefore, is about general and universal features and not
19 Introduction
21 Introduction
ful to both institutions for their inancial support, which has made it
possible to substantially improve early versions of the contributions.
In particular, this volume has been prepared within the framework
of the PRIN MIUR Projects La costruzione delle tradizioni ilosoiche.
Platonismo e Aristotelismo in et post-ellenistica (2007) and Le ilosoie
post-ellenistiche da Antioco a Plotino (2009).
he volume was submitted to the Edizioni della Scuola Normale
in June 2012 and subsequently peer-reviewed. We wish to thank the
Edizioni for their interest in our project as well as for their help and
assistance. Finally, our gratefulness also goes to Sergio Knipe, who has
revised the English of non-native speakers and given precious advice
on the editorial aspects of the volume.
Riccardo Chiaradonna, Gabriele Galluzzo