OVERVIEW

Only scenario for extinction

Bostrom 2002 (Nick Bostrom, 2002. Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale. "Existential Risks:
Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," 38,
www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html)
A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both
a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among
those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might

annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization. Russia and the US retain large nuclear
arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other
states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for
instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankinds potential permanently.
Russian economic collapse causes accidental nuclear war
FORDEN 2001 (Geoffrey, senior research fellow at the Security Studies Program at MIT, Policy Analysis, May 3)
Because of that need, Russias continuing economic difficulties pose a clear and increasing danger to itself, the world at
large, and the United States in particular. Russia no longer has the working fleet of early-warning satellites
that reassured its leaders that they were not under attack during the most recent false alert in 1995 when a scientific
research rocket, launched from Norway was, for a short time, mistaken for a U.S. nuclear launch. With decaying satellites, the possibility exists
that, if a false alert occurs again, Russia might launch its nuclear-tipped missiles .
DoD providing a market revives the entire US SMR industry
Andres & Breetz 11 (Richard B. Andres is Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College
and a Senior fellow and energy and environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic
research, institute for national Strategic Studies, at the national Defense University. Hanna L. Breetz is a
doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts institute of technology.
February 2011, Small nuclear reactors for military installations: capabilities, costs, and technological
implications, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf)
The Valley of Death. Given the promise that small reactors hold for military installations and mobility, DOD
has a compelling interest in ensuring that they make the leap from paper to production. However, if DOD does
not provide an initial demonstration and market, there is a chance that the U.S. small reactor industry
may never get off the ground. The leap from the laboratory to the marketplace is so difficult to bridge that it is
widely referred to as the Valley of Death. Many promising technologies are never commercialized due to a
variety of market failures including technical and financial uncertainties, information asymmetries, capital
market imperfections, transaction costs, and environmental and security externalitiesthat impede financing
and early adoption and can lock innovative technologies out of the marketplace. 28 In such cases, the
Government can help a worthy technology to bridge the Valley of Death by accepting the first mover costs and
demonstrating the technologys scientific and economic viability. 29
Historically, nuclear power has been the most clear-cut example . . . of an important general-purpose
technology that in the absence of military and defense-related procurement would not have been developed at
all. 30 Government involvement is likely to be crucial for innovative, next-generation nuclear technology as
well. Despite the widespread revival of interest in nuclear energy, Daniel Ingersoll has argued that radically
innovative designs face an uphill battle, as the high capital cost of nuclear plants and the painful lessons
learned during the first nuclear era have created a prevailing fear of first-of-a-kind designs. 31 In addition,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology reports on the Future of Nuclear Power called for the Government to
provide modest first mover assistance to the private sector due to several barriers that have hindered the
nuclear renaissance, such as securing high up-front costs of site-banking, gaining NRC certification for new
technologies, and demonstrating technical viability.32
The tech is incomplete military as a first mover boosts it substantially
Andres & Breetz 11 (Richard B. Andres is Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College
and a Senior fellow and energy and environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic
research, institute for national Strategic Studies, at the national Defense University. Hanna L. Breetz is a
doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts institute of technology.

February 2011, Small nuclear reactors for military installations: capabilities, costs, and technological
implications, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf)
All current proposals and discussions center on microreactors (small, modular, and potentially transportable)
rather than on the megareactors that have been the focus of commercial nuclear energy development. 3 These
kinds of innovative small reactors have been rapidly generating interest outside the military as well. The NRC
held stakeholder workshops in October 2009 and February 2010 to begin discussing novel licensing issues, and
it released a paper on potential policy, licensing, and technical issues in March 2010. 4 DOE conducted a June
2010 workshop on small reactors, including technical panels on assessment, instrumentation, materials,
modeling, and policy. 5 Three bills related to small reactors have been making their way through the Senate:
the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative Improvement Act and the Nuclear Power 2021 Act were placed on the
Senate legislative calendar in September 2010, while the Clean Energy Act of 2009 remains in the Energy and
National Resources Committee. Moreover, President Barack Obamas 2011 budget request included $39
million for the development of small modular reactors.
It should be emphasized that none of the small reactor designs currently under consideration for commercial
development have been licensed by the NRC, let alone constructed, demonstrated, or tested. Given the early
stage of the technology, DODs first mover pursuit of small reactors could therefore have a profound
influence on the development of the industry. DOD does have substantial experience with nuclear energy
historically, both the U.S. Army and Navy have incorporated nuclear reactors into their operations 6 that
could make it particularly well suited to taking a leading role in testing small reactors.
DOD investments spill over high purchasing power, encourages tech development
Makhijani 10 (Shakuntala Makhijani, research associate at the Worldwatch Institute working with the
Climate & Energy program on Low Carbon Development Strategies, M.S. in sustainable systems from Michigan
& BSFS in Science, Technology, and International Affairs from Georgetown, 8-12-10, US military takes a
leadership role in sustainable energy development, http://blogs.worldwatch.org/revolt/u-s-military-takes-aleadership-role-in-sustainable-energy-development/)
At the briefing, Brigadier General Gerald E. Galloway, a member of the CNA report team, observed that the

U.S. military has a long history

of technological innovation, including helping to develop the Internet and engaging in military research that served as the
basis for the civilian nuclear power industry. The DOD also recently conducted a series of renewable energy analyses for its facilities,
including an assessment of the six most promising solar technologies and the development of models to determine economically viable solar projects for
military bases. As the nations largest energy consumer , the DOD is in a natural position to take the lead in

developing and implementing renewable energy systems. Among notable successes so far are the 140-acre solar photovoltaic array
at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada (the largest in the country, producing about 30 million kilowatt hours per year) and the 270-megawatt geothermal
power plant at the China Lake Naval Air Weapons Station in California, which has powered the entire base since the 1980s. Dorothy Robyn, DODs
Deputy Under Secretary for Installations and Environment, promoted the idea of using military installations as test beds for

sustainable energy systems to ensure the reliable procurement, cost, and performance of equipment. These
installations often function as fully operational towns, meaning that lessons learned and approaches could be
applied more broadly in civilian towns and cities. The DODs purchasing power alone could go a long way
toward achieving the economies of scale still required to bring down the costs of some renewable technologies.
These investments would benefit the military as well, given that the DOD spends $4 billion annually to power and cool installations,
and that its missions are often put at risk from fragile grid systems and the need to transport fuel through dangerous territory.

2NC AT: US NOT KEY

Domestic gas restores American bargaining power, pushes Russia out of europe

Nye 12
Joseph S. Nye, a former U.S. assistant secretary of defense, is a professor at Harvard University and the author
of "The Future of Power." Korea Times, July 22, 2012, Energy independence in interdependent world, lexis, jj
At the same time, America's bargaining position in world politics should be enhanced. Power arises from asymmetries
in interdependence. You and I may depend on each other, but if I depend on you less than you do on me, my
bargaining power is increased. For decades, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have had a balance of asymmetries in which we depended on them as
the swing producer of oil, and they depended on us for ultimate military security. Now the bargains will be struck on somewhat better
terms from America's point of view. Likewise, Russia has enjoyed leverage over Europe and its small neighbors
through its control of natural gas supplies and pipelines. As North America becomes self-sufficient in gas, more
from various other regions will be freed up to provide alternative sources for Europe, thereby diminishing Russia's
leverage. In East Asia, which has become the focus of U.S. foreign policy, China will find itself increasingly dependent on
Middle Eastern oil. American efforts to persuade China to play a greater role in regional security arrangements
may be strengthened, and China's awareness of the vulnerability of its supply routes to U.S. naval disruption in the
unlikely event of conflict could also have a subtle effect on each side's bargaining power. A balance of energy
imports and exports does not produce pure independence, but it does alter the power relations involved in energy
interdependence. Nixon got that right.
That drives out Russia

Jaffe and OSullivan 12 Amy Myers Jaffe is the Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies at the
James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, and Meghan L. OSullivan is the Jeane
Kirkpatrick Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard
University. "The Geopolitics of Natural Gas," July, http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pubHKSGeopoliticsOfNaturalGas-073012.pdf

Knowledge of the shale gas resource is not new. Geologists have known about the existence of shale formations for years but accessing those resources was long held to be an issue of technology and cost.
In the past decade, innovations have yielded substantial cost reductions, making shale gas production a commercial reality. In fact, shale gas production in the United States has increased from virtually

Rising North America shale gas supplies have significantly reduced US

requirements for imported LNG and contributed to lower US domestic natural gas prices. The natural gas
supply picture in North America will have a ripple effect around the globe that will expand over time, not only
through displacement of supplies in global trade but also by fostering a growing interest in shale resource
potential in other parts of the world.
The importance of the commercialization of shale cannot be understated from a geopolitical, environmental, or
market development perspective. Given the assumption that known shale gas resources will be developed
according to their commercial viability in North America and elsewhere, the reference scenario projects shale
gas production could more than quadruple over the next two decades, accounting for over 50 percent of total
US natural gas production by the early 2030s. Still, the countries of the former Soviet Union will collectively be
the largest supplier of natural gas (conventional and unconventional) by 2040, with North America a close
second. The reference case anticipates the strongest supply of shale gas will be in North America, where the
recoverable shale resource comprises more than a quarter of the world's 4,024 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) and is
rivaled in size only by the shale plays in Asia and Oceania.
These supply trends will have a significant impact on gas trade flows. Not only will the United States be able to
avoid growth in LNG imports for the next three decades, but the reference case projects that North America
will export 720 million cubic feet per day of LNG by 2030. Australia will rival Qatar as the world's largest LNG
exporter by 2030. Qatar and Australia will remain the largest LNG exporters through 2040, collectively
accounting for about 40 percent of global LNG exports.
LNG supplies whose development was anchored to the belief that the United States would be a premium
market will continue to be diverted. In the reference case, the US market remains the lowest priced major
market region in the world throughout the model time horizon. Many US terminals once expected to be actively
utilized will remain relatively empty. During the period from 2013 to 2015, US terminals see some growth as
new volumes from Australian LNG development push African LNG cargoes to the US marketa trend
exacerbated by growth in LNG supply from West Africa in the 2014-2015 period.
The reference case projects that consumers in Europe will receive a double benefit from the rise in global gas
supply. Not only will Europe increasingly find alternatives to Russian pipeline supplies , but these alternative supplies
will exert pressure on the status quo of indexing gas sales to a premium marker determined by the price of
petroleum products. In fact, Russia has already had to accept lower prices for its natural gas and is now
nothing in 2000 to more than 10 billion cubic feet per day (bcfd) in 2010.

allowing a portion of its sales in Europe to be indexed to spot natural gas markets, or regional market hubs,
rather than oil prices. This change in pricing terms signals a major paradigm shift.
Yet as Europe moves to gas-on-gas pricing, global marker prices in the reference scenario fail to converge
through 2040. Europe's price premium will hover at more than SI above Henry Hub prices, even as Europe
develops its own shale resource and diversifies sources of supply.
Shale gas eventually makes up 20 percent of European market. European shale gas production begins in
earnest in 2020s, and approaches 20 percent of the total market by 2040. LNG import growth is the second
fastest growing source of European supply. The availability of shale gas under the reference case means that
Caspian flows will not make economic sense as a competing supply to Europe. The Nabucco pipeline project,
for example, is not constructed until lower-cost Iraqi gas is
able to flow into the line.
Smrs in particular trade off with ngas
Marston 12 (Theodore U. Marston PHD. Principal @ Marston Consulting. Board of Managers, Idaho
National Laboratory. Formerly DOE NERAC Generation IV Oversight Committee 2001-2002)
The primary economic challenge to the commercialization of smLWRs is whether the electricity production
costs are (1) affordable and (2) competitive with other forms of generation. With regard to affordability, smLWRs
offer potential optionality to the US electric utilities, when the only real options for large generation additions
are gas fired, coal fired or large nuclear plants. SmLWRs, being smaller and modular, potentially offer a more
manageable nuclear option. SmLWRs are more affordable, i.e. less of a fiscal risk. They can be deployed in much
smaller increments, matching the utilities load growths better and reduce the single shaft generation risk to
an acceptable level.
Competing with other forms of electricity generation is a much greater challenge today. Vast amounts of natural
gas are being discovered across the US in so-called tight gas (shale) deposits, resulting in cheap and abundant natural gas . The
current spot market price of natural gas is less than $3.00/MMBTU . Carbon restraints (taxes or credits), which would
improve the competitiveness of smLWRs, appear unlikely to arise in the near future . However it is expected that carbon emissions
If the economics of the
smLWRs are what some of the designs claim, there is a real chance to compete with natural gas fired plants , particularly when carbon
from large stationary sources will be reduced systematically over time one way or another, and US utilities are very interested in reducing their carbon footprints.

he cost competitiveness of smLWR depend heavily on

constraints are in place. T

achieving the following opportunities:
l Streamline design and manufacturing are necessary to offset the economies of scale of other generation options, particularly nuclear plants. ALWRs are becoming larger and larger due to the economies
of scale. The only prospect to reverse this effect for the smaller smLWRs is to streamline the shop fabrication of the NSSS and other modules, ship them to the site and install them rapidly. The requisite
quality standards must be maintained throughout the entire process.
l

Modularity of the smLWRs provides the opportunity to transform how we design, build, operate and decommission nuclear power plants.

Specifically, SMRs solve market risk and fit the need to replace natural gas
Rosner and Goldberg 11 (Robert Rosner, Professor, Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics, and
Physics, and the College; Senior Fellow @ UChicago. Stephen M. Goldberg is Special Assistant to the Director
at Argonne National Laboratory)
(November 2011. Energy Policy Institute at Chicago The Harris School of Public Policy Studies Small Modular
Reactors Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S.
https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalcopy.pdf)
SMRs could potentially mitigate such a risk in several ways. First, SMRs have lower precompletion risk due to shorter construction schedules
(24-36 months as compared with 48 months). Second, because of their smaller size, SMRs have lower market risk because there is
significantly less power than needs to be sold as compared with GW-level plants . Finally, the modular nature of
SMRs affords the flexibility to build capacity on an as-needed basis. In the case of unsubsidized financing,
particularly relevant to merchant markets, utility decision makers that have significant aversion to risk of future
natural gas spikes (i.e., gas prices rising to about $7/Mcf or one standard deviation above the recent average behavior of natural gas prices) would possibly view
alternatives to gas-fired generation as attractive options , particularly if the investment requirements are
comparable SMRs could potentially fit the bill.

SPHERE MOD-1NC
Gas exports are key to Russias sphere-single biggest internal
Colonel Alexander L. Koven United States Air Force 1/3 2012 (UNDER THE YOKE: EUROPE'S NATURAL
GAS DEPENDENCY ON RUSSIA; www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA561551)
To protect its leverage over Europe, Russia has created a two-part strategy.First, Russia strives to control
natural gas corridors into Europe by building or acquiringtheir own gas pipeline networks while
simultaneously blocking the construction of nonRussian pipelines.30Second, Russia is using divide-andconquer tactics against the EUby crafting bilateral agreements with their European customers.31Gas is Russia's
main form of leverage over the West. According to RobertLarsson, a Swedish defense researcher, Russia has
used its energy leverage in thefollowing ways: supply interruptions (total or partial), threats of supply
interruptions (covertly or explicit), pricing policy (prices as carrots or sticks), usage of existing energy debts,
creating new energy debts, hostile take-overs of companies or infrastructure32 Since 1991, there have been 55
incidents in which Russia has used this leverage. Yet, not all countries receive the same treatment. Larsson
believes that Russia has divided up its customers into three different groups.The first group is the former
Soviet territory, basically the CIS[Commonwealth of Independent States] and the Baltic countries
wherenumerous incidents have been recorded. The second group is made up byformer Warsaw Pact members
of which some now also are EU and NATOmembers. Against these states, Russia has been less willing to use
theenergy weapon to the same extent as against its former space and satellites, but they are definitely being
seen as affordable collateraldamage. Concerning the third group, which basically consists of theWestern
states of Europe, the USA and possibly Japan and India, no cutoffs aimed at them have been made as far is
known, but issues ofconcerns exist, especially as these states are affected by Russias policytowards the CIS
states.33As Larsson noted, natural gas has been an especially powerful tool against his"first group", the newly
independent republics from the Soviet Union. "In recent years,Russia has showed no compunction about using
its energy resource as a tool ofcoercion and intimidation against its central and east European neighbors,
includingBelarus, Poland, the Czech Republic, Georgia and most notably, Ukraine."34The main purpose of
these actions is to regain economic control over former Soviet territory andto minimize Western influence in
the near abroad. "From Moscow's zero-sumperspective, European influence in the field of governance, energy
and security in theregion [former CIS nations] all contribute to denying Russia's domination over theregion,
something that it in turn perceives as a threat to its own security."35
US encroachment on Russias sphere of influence kills cooperation
Eyal 2010 (Jonathan, U.S., Russia truly committed to improving their relations, 26 June 2010, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the-china-post/special-tothe-china-post/2010/06/26/262241/US-Russia.htm)
Yet the

meeting between the Russian and American leaders also cements a blossoming new partnership between their
countries, after decades of frosty relations . This is one foreign policy achievement for which U.S. President Obama can justifiably feel proud. Since the
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, all U.S. presidents have tried to forge better relations with Moscow, but usually with little success. The old Cold War
confrontation was quickly replaced by a feeling of mutual resentment. The Russians objected to what they saw as
America's encroachment into their old sphere of influence , as Nato kept expanding into Eastern Europe. And the U.S., in

turn, fretted about the alleged absence of democratic reforms in Moscow. Relations sunk to their lowest ebb when Russian troops invaded Georgia in August 2008, a conflict
exacerbated by miscalculations in both Moscow and Washington. But

by the time Obama came to power, many of these disputes were

already over. Nato's expansion into the former Soviet republics reached its natural conclusion, while in Russia, Medvedev, a politician who believes in diplomacy, took
over from Vladimir Putin, now Prime Minister, who instinctively opted for confrontation. Obama identified a reset in U.S.-Russian relations as
one of his chief foreign policy objectives. He cancelled plans to build U.S. missile defense installations in Europe, to Moscow's great delight.
And he swiftly re-launched nuclear disarmament talks. There were hiccups on the way. Obama's sudden tilt towards Russia alarmed some European countries, who feared that
their security interests would be sacrificed. A nuclear disarmament deal proved difficult to negotiate, and still has to be ratified by the U.S. Congress. And Obama himself
committed a gaffe when, during his first official visit to Moscow early last year, he made disparaging remarks about Putin, who continues to exercise considerable influence.
But ultimately, Obama's

strategy has worked because, as Sergey Rogov, who heads Russia's Institute for the U.S.
and Canadian Studies, points out, Russian officials were persuaded that Washington had truly
abandoned its paternalistic tone towards Moscow. As a result, Russia swung behind the U.S. in
adopting sanctions against Iran, and this ensured that China also accepted the need for sanctions. However,
the U.S.-Russian rapprochement has only begun. Although bilateral trade has doubled during the past year, it still stands at a puny US$24
billion, less than America's trade with Taiwan, and a mere fraction of the total value of America's trade with China, a figure which is 15 times larger.

That escalates to nuclear war

Cohen 10prof, Russian Studies and History, NYU. Prof emeritus, Princeton (Stephen, US-Russian Relations in an Age of American Triumphalism: An Interview with
Stephen F. Cohen, 25 May 2010, http://www.thenation.com/article/us-russian-relations-age-american-triumphalism-interview-stephen-f-cohen)

Russia cannot have the sphere of influence it wants in the former

Soviet territories. This issue, the fundamental, underlying conflict in U.S.-Russian relations, needs to
The third post-1991 conflict is stated like a mantra by American policymakers:

be rethought and openly discussed. The United States had and has spheres of influence. We had the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America and tacitly cling to it even today. More to the point, the

expansion of NATO is, of course, an expansion of the American sphere of influence, which brings America's military, political, and economic might to new member countries. Certainly, this has been the
case since the 1990s, as NATO expanded across the former Soviet bloc, from Germany to the Baltic nations. All of these countries are now part of the U.S. sphere of influence, though Washington doesn't

The United States can have spheres of influence but Russia cannot, not even in its own security
If U.S. policymakers and their accommodating media really care about American national
security, which requires fulsome Russian cooperation in many areas, they would rethink this presumption. Instead, leaders like
Senator McCain and Vice President Biden repeatedly visit Tblisi and Kiev to declare that Russia is not entitled to influence in those capitals while trying to tug those governments into NATO. Unless
we want a new, full-scale cold war with Russia, we must ask what Moscow actually wants in former Soviet
republics like Georgia and Ukraine. There are, of course, Russian political forces that would like to restore them to their Soviet status under Moscows hegemony. But for the Kremlin leadership,
from Putin to Medvedev, their essential demand is an absence of pro-American military bases and governments in those neighboring countries. In a word, that they not become members of NATO . Is
that unreasonable? Imagine Washingtons reaction if pro-Russian bases and governments suddenly began
appearing in America's sphere, from Latin America and Mexico to Canada. Of course, there has been no such discussion in the United States.
openly use this expression. So American policy is this:

neighborhood. Moscow understands this, and has reacted predictably.

And that has created the fourth major conflict with Russia since 1991: Moscow's perception that U.S. policy has been based on an unrelenting, triumphalist double standard, as it has been. Washington can
break solemn promises, but Moscow cannot. The United States can have large and expanding spheres of influence, but Russia can have none. Moscow is told to make its vast energy reserves available to all
countries at fair-market prices, except to those governments Washington has recruited or is currently recruiting into NATO, such as the Baltics, Ukraine, and Georgia, which Moscow should supply at
sharply below-market prices. Moscow is asked to support Washington's perceived national interests in Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, but without considering that Moscow may have legitimately different
security or economic interests in those places. And so it goes. Journal: What have been the consequences of this attitude toward Russia? Cohen: I think we've had an omen: the so-called "RussianGeorgian" war in August 2008. It's called the "Russian-Georgian" war, but was also a proxy American-Russian war. Washington created Saakashvili's Georgian regime and continues to support it.
Washington created his fighting force and supplied it with American military minders. American leaders were in Tblisi in the days and weeks leading up to the war. Georgia fired the first shots, as the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has confirmed. And since then Washington and the mainstream U.S. media have made excuses for what Georgia did by blaming Russia. What
they should be focusing on instead is that this was the first ever American-Russian proxy war on Russia's own borders, potentially the most dangerous moment in American-Russian relations since the
Cuban Missile Crisis. What would have happened, for example, if an American with or near Saakashvili's forces had been killed by the Russians? There would have been clamor in the United States for
military retaliation. Or if Moscow thought, as it seemed to have at first, that the Georgian attack on South Ossetia would be backed by NATO forces if necessary? In July 2009, President Obama went to
Moscow and told President Medvedev that Russia was a co-equal great power with legitimate national interests, implying that Washington's reckless policy that led to the Georgian war would end. A few
days later, an American warship sailed into a Georgian port. Moscow wondered who sent it, and who is running current U.S. policy. Journal: Is the current U.S. policy toward Russia putting us in greater
danger than during the Cold War? Cohen: The real concern I have with this "we won the Cold War" triumphalism is the mythology that we are safer today than we were when the Soviet Union existed.

we are not safer for several reasons, one being that the Soviet state kept the lid on very dangerous things. The Soviet Union was in
control of its nuclear and related arsenals. Post-Soviet Russia is "sorta" in control, but "sorta" is not enough.
There is no margin for error. Reagan's goal in the 1980s was not to end the Soviet Union, but to turn it into a
permanent partner of the United States. He came very close to achieving that and deserves enormous credit. He did what had to be done by meeting
Gorbachev half-way. But since 1991, the arrogance of American policymaking toward Russia has either kept the
Cold War from being fully ended or started a new one . The greatest threats to our national security still reside in Russia. This is not because it's
communist, but because it is laden with all these nuclear, chemical, and biological devicesthats the threat . The reaction
Though it is blasphemous to say so,

of the second Bush administration was to junk decades of safe-guarding agreements with Moscow. It was the first time in modern times that we have had no nuclear control reduction agreement with the

What should worry us every day and night is the triumphalist notion that nuclear war is no longer possible. It
is now possible in even more ways than before, especially accidental ones . Meanwhile, the former
Soviet territories remain a Wal-Mart of dirty material and know-how. If terrorists ever explode a dirty device in
the United States, even a small one, the material is likely to come from the former Soviet Union. The NunnLugar Act (1992) was the best program Congress ever enacted to help Russia secure its nuclear material and
know-how, a major contribution to American national security. But no one in Washington connects the dots.
Take Senator Lugar himself. He seems not to understand that we need Russia's complete cooperation to make
his own legislation fully successful, but he repeatedly speaks undiplomatically, even in ugly ways, about
Russias leaders, thereby limiting their cooperation and undermining his own legacy. In other words, to have a
nuclear relationship with Russia that will secure our national security, we must have a fully cooperative,
trusting political relationship with Moscow. Thats why all the talk about a replacement for the expired START
agreement, which Obama has been having trouble reaching with the Kremlin, is half-witted. Even if the two
sides agree, and even if the Senate and Russian Duma ratify a new treaty, the agreement will be unstable
because the political relationship is bad and growing worse. Evidently, no one in the Administration, Congress,
or the mainstream media, or, I should add in the think tanks, can connect these dots.
Russians.

COMPLEXITY

Predictions are good enough to act on. Their critique sets the bar too high
Chernoff 9 (Fred, Prof. IR and Dir. IR Colgate U., European Journal of International Relations,
Conventionalism as an Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory, 15:1, Sage)
For these and other reasons, many social theorists and social scientists have come to the conclusion that prediction is impossible. Wellknown IR reflexivists like Rick Ashley, Robert Cox, Rob Walker and Alex Wendt have attacked naturalism by emphasizing the interpretive nature of social theory. Ashley is
explicit in his critique of prediction, as is Cox, who says quite simply, It is impossible to predict the future (Ashley, 1986: 283; Cox, 1987: 139, cf. also 1987: 393). More
recently, Heikki Patomki has argued that qualitative changes and emergence are possible, but predictions are not defective and that the latter two presuppose an
unjustifiably narrow notion of prediction.14 A

determined prediction sceptic may continue to hold that there is too great a degree of

complexity of social relationships (which comprise open systems) to allow any prediction whatsoever. Two very simple examples may circumscribe and help to refute a
radical variety of scepticism. First, we all make reliable social predictions and do so with great frequency. We can predict with high
probability that a spouse, child or parent will react to certain well-known stimuli that we might supply, based on extensive past experience. More to the point of

IR prediction scepticism, we can imagine a young child in the UK who (perhaps at the cinema) (1) picks up a bit of 19th-century British imperial lore thus gaining a sense of
the power of the crown, without knowing anything of current balances of power, (2) hears some stories about the USUK invasion of Iraq in the context of the aim of
advancing democracy, and (3) hears a bit about communist China and democratic Taiwan. Although the specific term preventative strike might not enter into her lexicon, it is
possible to imagine the child, whose knowledge is thus limited, thinking that if democratic Taiwan were threatened by China, the UK would (possibly or probably) launch a
strike on China to protect it, much as the UK had done to help democracy in Iraq. In contrast to the child, readers of this journal and scholars who

study the
world more thoroughly have factual information (e.g. about the relative military and economic capabilities of the UK and China) and hold
some cause-and-effect principles (such as that states do not usually initiate actions that leaders understand will have an
extremely high probability of undercutting their power with almost no chances of success). Anyone who has
adequate knowledge of world politics would predict that the UK will not launch a preventive attack against China . In

the real world, China knows that for the next decade and well beyond the UK will not intervene militarily in its affairs. While Chinese leaders have to plan for many likely
and even a few somewhat unlikely future possibilities, they do not have to plan for various implausible contingencies: they do not have to structure forces geared to defend
against specifically UK forces and do not have to conduct diplomacy with the UK in a way that would be required if such an attack were a real possibility. Any rational decisionmaker in China may use some cause-and-effect (probabilistic) principles along with knowledge of specific facts relating to the Sino-British relationship to predict (P2) that the
UK will not land its forces on Chinese territory even in the event of a war over Taiwan (that is, the probability is very close to zero). The statement P2 qualifies as a
prediction based on DEF above and counts as knowledge for Chinese political and military decision-makers. A Chinese diplomat or military planner who would deny that
theory-based prediction would have no basis to rule out extremely implausible predictions like P2 and would thus have to prepare for such unlikely contingencies as UK action
against China. A reflexivist theorist sceptical of prediction in IR might argue that the China example distorts the notion by using a trivial prediction and treating it as a
meaningful one. But the

critics temptation to dismiss its value stems precisely from the fact that it is so obviously true.
The value to China of knowing that the UK is not a military threat is significant . The fact that, under current conditions, any

plausible cause-and-effect understanding of IR that one might adopt would yield P2, that the UK will not attack China, does not diminish the value to China of knowing the

while
physics and chemistry offer precise point predictions, other natural sciences, such as seismology, genetics or
meteorology, produce predictions that are often much less specific; that is, they describe the predicted events in broader time frame and
UK does not pose a military threat. A critic might also argue that DEF and the China example allow non-scientific claims to count as predictions. But we note that

typically in probabilistic terms. We often find predictions about the probability, for example, of a seismic event in the form some time in the next three years rather than two
years from next Monday at 11:17 am. DEF includes approximate and probabilistic propositions as predictions and is thus able to catagorize as a prediction the former sort of
statement, which is of a type that is often of great value to policy-makers. With

the help of these non-point predictions coming from the

natural and the social sciences, leaders are able to choose the courses of action (e.g. more stringent earthquake-safety building codes, or
procuring an additional carrier battle group) that are most likely to accomplish the leaders desired ends. So while point predictions are not what political leaders require in
most decision-making situations, critics

of IR predictiveness often attack the predictive capacity of IR theory for its inability to deliver them. The
critics thus commit the straw man fallacy by requiring a sort of prediction in IR (1) that few, if any, theorists claim
to be able to offer, (2) that are not required by policy-makers for theory-based predictions to be valuable, and (3) that are not
possible even in some natural sciences.15 The range of theorists included in reflexivists here is very wide and it is possible to dissent from some of the

general descriptions. From the point of view of the central argument of this article, there are two important features that should be rendered accurately. One is that reflexivists
reject explanationprediction symmetry, which allows them to pursue causal (or constitutive) explanation without any commitment to prediction. The second is that almost all
share clear opposition to predictive social science.16 The reflexivist commitment to both of these conclusions should be evident from the foregoing discussion.

International politics is not a complex system the presence of authority minimizes complexity
and computer models are incapable of simulating future events without making unfounded
assumptions about agency
Earnest and Rosenau 06 (2006, David, PhD, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International
Studies at Old Dominion University, and James, PhD, University Professor of International Affairs at The
George Washington University, Signifying Nothing? What Complex Systems Theory Can and Cannot Tell Us
about Global Politics, in Complexity in World Politics ed. Neil E. Harrison, State University of New York Press,
2006, p. 143-4)
In this chapter we argue that those

who study international relations have failed to use complexity as a general theory
of complex systems (complex systems theory) because, while complexity is a meaningful metaphor, complex adaptive
systems at least as conventionally formulated by theorists like Holland (1992, 1995, 1998) and, in political science, Jervis (1997), Axelrod (1997),
and Axelrod and Cohen (1999) differ in important ways from social and political systems . Although they may
behave in complicated and confusing ways, social systems have structures of authority that may be
inconsistent with the definition of complex adaptive systems . These differences are more than mere
definitional or typological differences; we argue that in social systems, authority serves to minimize

complexity. One therefore cannot use complex systems theory to model even partly centralized or
hierarchical systemsprecisely those types of systems that proliferate in the world of politics . We argue, furthermore,
that by construction the simulation methods of complex systems theory cause the researcher to make assumptions
about those issues that are of most interest to international relations scholars in particular and to political science in general: who the actors are
and where authority resides. There is an underlying irony here. Although complex systems theory embraces contingent
phenomena, it is silent on precisely those accidents and path dependencies that are most important to
international relations theory. At a time in our disciplines embrace of the contingency of social agency, it is little surprise that few
scholars are embracing theory whose methods treat as exogenous the identities of political actors and the sources of authority.
From the perspective of international relations theory, the challenge of complex systems theory is to model

not merely
dynamics but also the emergence of actors identities and of political authority itself . Otherwise, IR scholars risk
modeling dynamic processes and systems that are theoretically uninteresting, sound and fury, signifying
nothingwhat one might call Macbeths objection. Scholars who apply complex systems theory to questions of global politics need to understand
both these perils as well as the promise of its methods.

Complexity models cant disprove empirical hypotheses useless as a theory of politics

Earnest and Rosenau 06 (2006, David, PhD, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International
Studies at Old Dominion University, and James, PhD, University Professor of International Affairs at The
George Washington University, Signifying Nothing? What Complex Systems Theory Can and Cannot Tell Us
about Global Politics, in Complexity in World Politics ed. Neil E. Harrison, State University of New York Press,
2006, p. 149)
Despite these advantages, the methods of complex systems theory alone cannot prove or disprove hypotheses
about global politicsalthough it is a theory of process, it cannot be a theory of politics. To make sense of the
intricacies of contemporary global politics, then, researchers who use simulations of complex adaptive systems
must supplement these efforts with empirical investigations. Of course, this requires scholars to embrace once
again those methodssuch as case studies or statistical models like ordinary least squareswhich we have derided for their emphasis on stasis and
linearity. Yet until a computer simulation can disprove a hypothesis, complex adaptive systems are little more
than thought experiments on a computermuch ado about nothing.3

Defer to best evidence to resolve impacts only way to avoid

dogmatism and create effective policy analysis
Sil 2k

Rudra Sil, assistance professor of Political Science @ the University of Pennsylvania. Beyond boundaries?:
disciplines, paradigms, and theoretical integration in International Studies. 2001. P. 161.
In the end, there may be no alternative to relying on the judgment of other human beings, and
this judgment is difficult to form in the absence of empirical findings. However, instead of
clinging to the elusive idea of a uniform standard for the empirical validation of theories, it is
possible to simply present a set of observational statementswhether we call it "data" or
"narrative"for the modest purpose of rendering an explanation or interpretation more plausible
than the audience would allow at the outset. In practice, this is precisely what the most
committed positivists and inter-pretivists have been doing anyway; the presentation of "logically
consistent" hypotheses "supported by data" and the ordering of facts in a "thick" narrative are
both ultimately designed to convince scholars that a particular proposition should be taken more
seriously than others. Social analysis is not about final truths or objective realities, but nor does it
have to be a meaningless world of incommensurable theories where anything goes. Instead, it
can be an ongoing collective endeavor to develop, evaluate, and refine general inferencesbe
they in the form of models, partial explanations, descriptive inferences, or interpretationsin
order to render them more "sensible" or "plausible" to a particular audience. In the absence of a
consensus on the possibility and desirability of a full-blown explanatory science of international
and social life, it is important to keep as many doors open as possible. This does not require us to
accept each and every claim without some sort of validation, but perhaps the community of
scholars can be more tolerant about the kinds of empirical referents and logical propositions that
are employed in validating propositions by scholars embracing all but the most extreme
epistemological positions.

Complexity theory useless for policy making

Cairney 10

(Paul, Chair in Politics and Public Policy BA (Hons), MSc, PhD at Aberdeen University, Complexity Theory in
Public Policy http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/121_665.pdf, SEH)
Why has Complexity Theory Struggled for Attention? The first difficulty with complexity theory is that it is difficult to pin down.
While we may find similar discussions in a wide range of texts in the literature, this may be merely because it is vague. Its appeal in the sciences may be
because it means different things to different people, suggesting that initial enthusiasm and cross-disciplinary cooperation may be replaced by growing
scepticism. The second is that, when we do pin the meaning of complexity theory down, it seems to present a

deterministic argument. The danger is that if the complex system is predominantly the causal factor then we
lose sight of the role that policymakers play; there may be a tendency to treat the system as a rule-bound
structure which leaves minimal room for the role of agency. It is tempting to contrast this picture with interpretive social science
which rejects the assumption of structural constraint. Rather, it explores how agents perceive their decision-making environments; how they
reproduce, accept or challenge the structural, institutional and wider systemic constraints that they appear to face when making decisions. Indeed, they
may even reject terms such as institution and rule because they imply a sense of permanence or common understanding that has not been
demonstrated (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; 2006). This is the essence of the study of politics, explaining why different policymakers make different
decisions under the same circumstances. Yet, there is perhaps good reason to resist this temptation because, if the aim of complexity theory is to identify
a shift in rule-bound behaviour, then it could have something in common with interpretivist accounts which seek to understand how agents interpret,
adapt to and influence their decision-making environment. This seems to be Teisman and Klijns (2008: 289) point when they focus on agents adapting
to the fitness landscape. Further, as Schneider and Bauer (2007: 6) discuss, complexity theory appears to differ from the old functionalist logic of
systems theories that has gone out of fashion in political science. A kinder treatment of complexity suggests that, so far, it has been used in public
policy more to provide practical advice to public managers than to inform the wider theological debates on structure and agency we find in political
science. I return to this theme in the next section. The third is that it is difficult to identify or define a system and separate it

from its environment. For Mitleton-Kelly (2003: 30) this is not a problem because it is useful to work on the assumption that there is no fixed
boundary between the two. Rather, the picture is one of overlapping systems or an intricate web of inter-relationships, suggesting that systems as a
whole engage in co-evolution. Rather than a system adapting to its environment, we picture organisations influencing and being influenced by the
social ecosystem which consists of other organisations (2003: 31). This conclusion raises a fourth problem related to scale or perspective in complex
systems. Not only do we not know what a complex system is, but we dont know at what level we should view it.

Wider scientific accounts relate the benefit of complexity theory to the ability to step back and see the system
as a whole, in much the same way that we move from looking at molecules to observing the whole being. Yet, this doesnt guide us too
much, because we could still see systems at different levels, such as a healthcare system or a political system or
even an international political system (plus authors such as Mitleton-Kelly often seem to situate analysis at the organisational level).
While this gives us some flexibility, it could raise a whole host of further theoretical questions (are central policymakers
situated within, or treated as external to, the systems they cannot control? If a countrys political system is made up of a
number of other systems, does this suggest that there are super-emergent processes when systems interact with each other?). The fifth is that it
is difficult to know which types of policy issue or area complexity theory applies to. For example, Klijn (2008: 314)
suggests that complexity theory is best suited to wicked problems, suggesting that it refers primarily to issues of joined-upgovernment and/ or
intractable policy problems (what would this exclude?). Bovaird (2008: 325) suggests that complex systems are less likely to be found in commandandcontrol environments. This is confusing for two related reasons. First, the best example in the UK of a command-and-control approach is the
English NHS. Yet, Kernick (2006) argues that complexity theory is well suited to explain why the NHS is impervious to central control. Second,
perhaps Bovaird is referring not to areas with command-and-control styles, but those conducive to them. If so, there seems to be no way to decide
which areas are most relevant. The irony of governance, highlighted by Rhodes (1997), in which successive governments have contributed to their own
lack of central control, knows no bounds. Perhaps the point is that the identification of emergence and self-organizing behaviour is most likely in areas
where the role of the centre is not strong, but this also raises further issues (below). The sixth is that, although anti-reductionism and

whole-systems approaches sound attractive (almost like a valence issue), reductionist theories have a strong hold in
political science. Indeed, rational choice theory may represent complexity theorys poplar opposite because it
seeks parsimonious results based on a reduction of the social world into as few factors as possible. This is as much a
practical as a philosophical issue. While we may view the world as a complex system, we do not have the ability to study
it as one. The ACF, for example, situates analysis at the level of the subsystem and identifies two main processes: a process of learning within
subsystems as advocacy coalitions compete to define the policy problem and account for new information, and an external process which may produce
shocks to the system that change how the subsystem operates (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Weible et al, 2009). The interesting aspect

of this framework is that, while from a complex systems perspective we may prefer to study the system as a
whole, the ACF may be no worse a way to study the process when we are faced with limited resources and
cognitive abilities. A final problem may be that complexity theory complicates the study of public policy without
offering something new. This point seems strongest when applied to the study of implementation. For example, one
case study in the PMR special issue demonstrates how local governments develop contrasting behaviour on the same national policy impulse due to
self-organizing abilities to combine adaptiveness and self referentiality (Teisman and Klijn, 2008: 296), but Teisman and Klijn do not show how this
differs from similar bottom-up processes of self-selection in implementation structures (Hjern, 1981; Hjern and Porter, 1982) or street-level
bureaucracy (Lipsky, 1980) identified 30 years ago (also compare Buuren and Gerrits 2008: 382 line that decisions are neither the starting nor the
finishing points of a decision-making process with Barret and Fudges focus on policy in action). Similarly, the statement that complexity theory shows
us that managers are not the rational beings presented in many managerial handbooks (Teisman and Klijn, 2008: 297) does not seem startlingly
original. We are in the very familiar territory of uncertain policy effects and unintended consequences. A sympathetic assessment might suggest that
these points are being restated because the lessons from bottom-up studies have been lost or ignored. This seems to be the tone of Butler and Allans
(2008) argument that there is no one-best-way in the delivery of local services and in Kernicks (2006: 388) criticism of the assumption of a single

organizational solution in the NHS (and promotion of a more meaningful dialogue between those who design and those who deliver and use the
service). But is there anything more to complexity theory than this?

RUSSIA STUFF

LEADERSHIP HIGH SMRS

Russian nuclear exports strong now
Reuters 12 (Reuters, Russia doubles nuclear exports despite Fukushima, 3/23/12)
http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL6E8EN4WP20120323?sp=true
MOSCOW, March 23 (Reuters) - Russia doubled foreign orders to build nuclear reactors last year and has a $50 billion order book for the next decade
despite jitters over atomic power following the Fukushima disaster, its nuclear power chief said on Friday. S tate-owned Rosatom says it

builds more nuclear plants worldwide than anyone else and feared that reactor meltdowns at Japan's Fukushima plant,
triggered by a tsunami last March, could have prompted customers to switch out of nuclear . "We knew that we might be facing a
year of losses and we would miss out, not only on boosting our contracts, but on keeping our existing contracts," Sergei Kiriyenko, a former prime
minister who heads the nuclear monopoly, told reporters. In reality, he said, the volume of contracts to build nuclear plants

abroad almost doubled last year thanks to demand from Asia. Rosatom is building plants in China, Vietnam, India,
Iran and Turkey. In January it had 21 deals to build reactors compared to 12 at the same time a year earlier, Kiriyenko told journalists in Moscow,
ahead of a nuclear security summit in Seoul next week. "Rosatom's overall volume of signed contracts today - we only count on a 10-year horizon - is over
$50 billion," said Kiriyenko, referring to foreign and domestic demand. It wants foreign sales alone to hit $50 billion a year by 2030
- tripling their current value. The International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA) said the global use of nuclear

energy could double in the

next two decades, even though the number of new reactor construction starts fell to only three last year from 16 in 2010. Fukushima raised a
question mark over whether atomic energy is safe and Germany, Switzerland and Belgium all decided to move away from nuclear to grow their reliance
on renewable energy. Kiriyenko, though, has said that the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl nearly 26 years ago helped hone its technology and put it at the
forefront of safety innovations. Russia possesses about 40 percent of the world's uranium enrichment capacity, and exports some $3 billion worth of fuel
a year, offering discounts to clients who buy its reactors. The company's profits reached almost 500 billion rouble s ($17 billion)

last year, while uranium production increased by 35 percent, he said. (Reporting By Alissa de Carbonnel; Editing by Ben Harding)
Russia is looking to compete in small reactors
Kramer 10 (Andrew E. Kramer, New York Times, Russias Nuclear Industry Seeks to Profit From Alternative
Fuels, 3/18/10) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/19/business/global/19minireactor.html?pagewanted=all
MOSCOW Russias nuclear industry has profited handsomely from the worlds interest in alternatives to fossil fuels. But at least one environmental
group is saying the latest Russian effort to capitalize on the green reputation of nuclear power marketing designs for old Soviet nuclear submarine
engines is potentially dangerous. The Russian industry is not alone in pushing the idea that the next generation of nuclear reactors should be
shrunken, having more in common with the small power plants on submarines than the sprawling, panoramic installations of today. The kind of marine
reactors the Russians are promoting, though, also happened to create a byproduct that no one knows how to handle: spent fuel that is being stored at
naval yards in the Russian Arctic, angering neighboring Norway. Spent nuclear fuel is usually removed from a reactor and stored apart, in a pool of
water. But the Soviet submarine model a Moscow company is trying to commercialize often ended with the fuel and the reactor frozen in one piece, and
stored as such awaiting a time when an engineering solution will be devised to process the novel type of waste. Moreover, the technology caused a
number of mechanical accidents when it was used inside Soviet submarines, from the 1970s until the early 1990s. But the same quality packing a good
punch in a small package that appealed to the Soviet admirals is now being marketed as the latest in green technology. As countries like China are
racing ahead in wind energy and solar-cell manufacturing, Russias focus has been nuclear . Kirill Danilenko, the director of the

Russian company Akme Engineering, said during an interview that nuclear power could be safely miniaturized for civilian use, with no more of
a meltdown risk at a small plant than at a larger one. He said it was his vision that small reactors would become so common
that utilities could use them to build power plants like Lego sets. The promise of miniature reactors powering homes, offices
and schools is still years from being realized. The first Russian design, a pontoon-mounted reactor designed to be floated into harbors in
energy-hungry developing countries, is already being built. But most promoters expect small reactors to begin operating only at the end of the
decade.

LINK SMRS
SMR technology is a race if the US wins Russia loses
Angwin 11 (Meredith Angwin, Former project manager at Electric Power Research Institute, Chemist,
Sanders The Sole Vote Against Small Modular Reactor Research, 8/19/11)
http://theenergycollective.com/meredith-angwin/63331/sanders-sole-vote-against-small-modular-reactorresearch
One of these measures was the Nuclear Power Act S512. This act would authorize the Secretary of Energy to start a cost-shared program for development
of small modular reactors (SMRs). This act had strong bi-partisan support, being sponsored by 3 Republican and 4 Democratic Senators. The act
requires research and development funds for SMRs. The Act is still in process, and does not have a firm dollar amount attached, but the dollar amount is
likely to be small (in government terms, at least.). Current estimates are $100 million per fiscal year for four years, starting next year. The act also
requires that industry cost-share the expense. If industry doesn't think it is worth spending money on the research, the research will not receive
government funding either. As a background to the probable cost of this Act, we should note that President Obama requested $4.8 billion dollars for
Department of Energy research, of which $3.2 billion is allocated for renewable energy and energy efficiency research. (This number has changed with
the debt deal, but new numbers are not available at this time.) Small Modular Reactors for The Future Sander's opposition to this Nuclear

Power Act will hurt America's chances to develop an important new exportable technology. Outside of Europe,
the nuclear renaissance remains in full swing, with reactors being ordered and built in Arabia, China, India and
Southeast Asia. Developing a strong set of SMR designs would be America's best chance to re-entering the
world market for nuclear power. SMRs are modular (assembled in a factory and delivered to the site), small (50 to 225 MW) and have
many safety features, such as passive cooling. SMRs are expected to have a huge international market. They suitable for many places that do not have the
population density or money for the current crop of huge reactors (1200 MW, built on site at great expense). SMRs would make nuclear power affordable
and salable many places. Westinghouse and Babcock & Wilcox have invested significant amounts of their own money in developing these products. The
NRC is also active in assessing preliminary designs. At another Senate committee meeting on SMRs, Commissioner Magwood of the NRC said that he
does not expect decisions made by the NRC to be the critical factor in the success or failure of SMRs. Magwood noted that SMRs have passive safety
features and large water inventories; these would be considered during license review. America Fallen Behind America has fallen far behind

the rest of the world in most nuclear technologies. Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) and Boiling Water
Reactors (BWRs) were developed in this country. They are being sold all over the world, but not by United
States companies. We're out of the running. Other countries licensed and improved our original technologies.
Companies from France, Korea, Russia and China compete to build large reactors in China, Arabia, and
Southeast Asia. Three American companies have put millions of dollars into the development of SMRs: Westinghouse, Babcock & Wilcox, and
NuScale (a small start-up). Many people in the nuclear industry feel that the race to develop the first successful SMR is
a truly high-stakes race, being fought at the level of nationwide efforts . Luckily, SMR development has bi-partisan support, and
Mr. Sanders was alone in his opposition to supporting American industry efforts to develop these plants.

US SMRs trade off one for one with manufacturing and export benefits overseas
Mowry 11 (Christopher Mowry, President, Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Energy, Inc, serves on the Board of
Directors of the Nuclear Energy Institute, MS in Mechanical Engineering from Drexel, Testimony before the
Energy & Water Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, July 2011,
http://www.generationmpower.com/pdf/mowry_testimony.pdf)
This timeline is also critical to maintain the U.S.'s competitive edge in the international nuclear power market. Our international competitors are largely
state-owned or subsidized companies making large investments in nuclear technology, including SMRs. There are currently several SMRs

being developed internationally, in China, Russia, India, Argentina, South Korea, and elsewhere. Failing to
move forward with this program will not stall the deployment of SMRs in the United States or world-wide, but
will simply stymie the U.S. industrys current early mover advantage in SMR technology and manufacturing leadership.
Failure to fund an SMR cost-share program will ensure that foreign SMRs (like the South Korean SMART reactor) receive
the manufacturing jobs and exporting benefits by selling to U.S. utility customers . At a time when we need to ensure that
public policy promotes U.S. competitiveness in technology innovation and leadership, the SMR cost-share program is the conduit to
maintain U.S. leadership and create the manufacturing base here instead of overseas . Conversely, the sharing of risks and
costs through public-private partnership will ultimately result in a return on investment to government by supporting nuclear technology which can
compete in the market without government support or subsidy, while creating U.S. design, supply chain, construction, and operations jobs.

SMRs revitalize the industry can be produced entirely domestically creates new
manufacturing, engineering, etc. jobs
ITA 11 (US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, February 2011, The commercial
outlook for US small modular nuclear reactors,
http://trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/@nuclear/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003185.p
df)

A serious obstacle to the resurgence of traditional nuclear power in the United States is the eroded domestic
manufacturing capacity for the major nuclear components. A robust program of building SMRs, however, could
make use of existing domestic capacity that is already capable of completely constructing most proposed SMR
designs. SMRs would not require the ultra-heavy forgings that currently can only be made overseas. U.S.
suppliers say that firms could retool using existing capabilities and resources and could source most of the
components of SMRs here in the United States. This ability could mean tremendous new commercial
opportunities for U.S. firms and workers.
A substantial SMR deployment program in the United States could result in the creation of many new jobs in
manufacturing, engineering, transportation, construction (for site preparation and installation) and craft labor,
professional services, and ongoing plant operations. As SMR manufacturers prove their designs in the domestic
market, they will likely consider export opportunities. The modular nature of SMRs and their relative
portability means that locating export-oriented SMR manufacturing and assembly could make sense for U.S.
companies, as opposed to the localization that is typically necessary for building larger reactors.